In Francisco vs. Permskul, the Court laid down the conditions to make a memorandum decision valid: 1) it should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision; and 2) it is resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties and easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will require an extended discussion of the laws involved. The Constitutional mandate need not apply to decisions rendered in administrative proceedings, as in this case; it applies only to decisions rendered in judicial proceedings. The rights of parties in administrative proceedings are not violated as long as the constitutional requirement of due process has been satisfied as laid down in Ang Tibay. There is no requirement that the decision must express clearly 85 and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. For as long as the administrative decision is grounded on evidence, and expressed in a manner that sufficiently informs the parties of the factual and legal bases of the decision, the due process requirement is satisfied.
In many cases,[89] this Court has time and time again reminded “magistrates to heed the demand of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.” The Court, through Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. in Yao v. Court of Appeals, [90] discussed at length the implications of this provision and strongly exhorted thus: “Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. It is likewise demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution. The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit.Vouchsafed
neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in the justness of his decision.”
ALFREDO CHING vs. CA FACTS: In the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, Ching executed a trust receipt agreement in favor of Allied Banking Corporation which became due. Under the terms of which the petitioner agreed to sell the same for cash with the express obligation to remit to the bank the proceeds of the sale and/or to turn over the goods, if not sold, on demand. But Ching, once in possession of said goods, far from complying with his obligation and with grave abuse of confidence, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the said goods and/or the proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, failed and refused and still fails and refuses, to account for and/or remit the proceeds of sale thereof to the Allied Banking Corporation to the damage and prejudice of the said complainant bank. Petitioner was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Makati with four counts of estafa punishable under Article 315 par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Presidential Decree 115, otherwise known as the "Trust Receipts Law.” An "Omnibus Motion to Strike Out Information, or in the Alternative to Require Public Prosecutor to Conduct Preliminary Investigation, and to Suspend in the Meantime Further Proceedings in these Cases," was filed by the petitioner. Later, petitioner Ching, together with Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc., filed a case before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC-Manila), Branch 53, for declaration of nullity of documents and for damages. The RTC-Makati issued an order which denied the petition for suspension and scheduled the arraignment and pre-trial of the criminal cases. As a result, petitioner moved to reconsider the order but the same was denied. Subsequent appeal was made to the CA but was again denied. Notwithstanding the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals, the RTCManila (civil case), in an order dated 19 November 1993 in Civil Case No. 9260600, admitted petitioner's amended complaint. ISSUE: When will allegations in a complaint cease to be judicial admission? RULING:
Under the Rules, pleadings superseded or amended disappear from the record, lose their status as pleadings and cease to be judicial admissions. While they may nonetheless be utilized against the pleader as extrajudicial admissions, they must, in order to have such effect, be formally offered in evidence. If not offered in evidence, the admission contained therein will not be considered. Consequently, the original complaint, having been amended, lost its character as a judicial admission, which would have required no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial admission, the admissibility of which, as evidence, required its formal offer. In virtue thereof, the amended complaint takes the place of the original. The latter is regarded as abandoned and ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The original complaint no longer forms part of the record. ST MARTIN FUNERAL HOME VS NLRC G.R. No. 130866 /REGALADO; Sept 16, 1998 NATURE-Petition for certiorari which stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by herein private respondent before the NLRC FACTS- . Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martin's Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private respondent, who was formerly working as an overseas contract worker, asked for financial assistance from the mother of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private respondent voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business. - In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter then took over the management of the business. She then discovered that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other government fees, although the records purported to show that the same were already paid. Amelita then made some changes in the business operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment. - Private respondent appealed to the NLRC. On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and remanding the
case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in its resolution dated August 18, 1997 for lack of merit, hence the present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion. ISSUE-WON the SC should entertain the present petition HELD-NO (should be remanded to CA) Ratio. All references in the amended Sec 9 of BP No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the SC are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the CA in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired. Reasoning. It will be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over all final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically referred to therein except, among others, "those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with . . . the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, . . . ." This would necessarily contradict what has been ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie from decisions of the NLRC. Yet, under such excepting clause literally construed, the appeal from the NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court by necessary implication. The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of B.P. No. 129, and those specified cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. These cases can, of course, be properly excluded from the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However, because of the aforementioned amendment by transposition, also supposedly excluded are cases falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Labor Code. This is illogical and impracticable, and Congress could not have intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor Code the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court for that matter. -Incidentally, it was noted by the sponsor therein that some quarters were of the opinion that recourse from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals as an initial step in the process of judicial review would be circuitous and would prolong the proceedings. On the contrary, as he commendably and realistically emphasized, that procedure would be advantageous to the aggrieved party on this reasoning:
i.e., , to allow these cases to be appealed to the Court of Appeals would give litigants the advantage to have all the evidence on record be reexamined and reweighed after which the findings of facts and conclusions of said bodies are correspondingly affirmed, modified or reversed. -Under such guarantee, the Supreme Court can then apply strictly the axiom that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court. A perusal of the records will reveal appeals which are factual in nature and may, therefore, be dismissed outright by minute resolutions. -While the SC does not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom of a law, on this score it adds the further observations that there is a growing number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of fact, has at times been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the increased number of its component divisions; and that there is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor. -This case therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that the Supreme Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.
undivided until petitioners discovered a public document denominated "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF A PREVIOUS ORAL AGREEMENT OF PARTITION" - By virtue of this deed, respondents divided the property among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners. - The complaint prayed that the document be declared null and void and an order be issued to partition the land among all the heirs. - Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the case as the action is one for re-partition and since the assessed value of the property as stated in the complaint is P5,000.00, then, the case falls within the jurisdiction of the MCTC of Liloan, Compostela, Cebu - Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss saying that the complaint is for the annulment of a document denominated as "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION," which is clearly one incapable of pecuniary estimation, thus, cognizable by the RTC - The respondent judge issued an Order granting the Motion to Dismiss. - A Motion for Reconsideration of said order was filed by petitioners - Respondents did not oppose the motion for reconsideration. - Respondent judge issued another Order denying the motion for reconsideration. - Hence, this petition
Disposition.The instant petition for certiorari is hereby REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof ordered to be FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition consistent with the views and ruling herein set forth, without pronouncement as to costs.
ISSUE -WON the RTC has jurisdiction to entertain the civil case.
RUSSELL V VESTIL 304 SCRA 738/KAPUNAN; March 17, 1999 NATURE-Petition for Certiorari FACTS - Petitioners filed a complaint against respondents, denominated "DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND PARTITION," with the RTC of Mandaue City - The complaint alleged that petitioners are co-owners of that parcel of land in Liloan, Cebu. The land was previously owned by the spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho. - Upon the death of said spouses, the property was inherited by their legal heirs, herein petitioners and private respondents. Since then, the lot had remained
HELD -YES. Ratio Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill: In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific performance, support, or foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of judgment; also actions questioning the validity of a mortgage, annulling a deed of sale or conveyance and to recover the price paid and for rescission, which is a counterpart of specific performance.
While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary estimation, the law specifically mandates that they are cognizable by the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed value of the real property involved does exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or P50,000.00, if located elsewhere. If the value exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 as the case may be, it is the Regional Trial Courts which have jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2). Reasoning The subject matter of the complaint in this case is annulment of a document denominated as "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION." The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and void the document in which private respondents declared themselves as the only heirs of the late spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho and divided his property among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs and entitled to the property. While the complaint also prays for the partition of the property, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the declaration of nullity of the document above-described. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. Disposition The petition was GRANTED. De Ungria et al. vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 165777 | July 25, 2011 FACTS This is a petition for review on certiorari for ownership, possession and damages, and alternative causes of action either to declare two documents as patent nullities, and/or for recovery of Rosario's conjugal share with damages or redemption of the subject land against petitioner Ceferina de Ungria et al. Respondent Rosario is the surviving wife of the late Fernando Castor, while the rest of the respondents are their legitimate children. The documents they (respondents) sought to annul are (1) the Deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest including Improvements thereon allegedly executed by Fernando in favor of Eugenio de Ungria, petitioner's father; and (2) the Affidavit of Relinquishment executed by Eugenio in favor of petitioner. Petitioner also filed an Addendum to the Motion to Dismiss raising, among others that the court has non jurisdiction over the case for failure of plaintiffs to pay the filing fee in full. Pending resolution of the motion, respondents filed a Motion to Allow them to continue prosecuting this case as indigent litigants.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and clarification on whether plaintiffs should be allowed to continue prosecuting the case as igentlitigants. Said motion was denied. The same was filed to the RTC and to the CA; both were denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner raises the following assignment of error: that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that respondent RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss despite respondent’s non-payment of the correct docket fees. ISSUE-Was jurisdiction vested to the RTC in this civil case despite the failure of the plaintiff to file the necessary docket fees? RULING. YES. It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that when an action is filed in court, the complaint must be accompanied by the payment of the requisite docket and filing fees. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Section 7(b)(1) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. - (a) For filing an action or a permissive counter-claim or money claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing with leave of court a third-party, fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a complaint-in-intervention, and for all clerical services in the same, if the total-sum claimed, exclusive of interest, or the stated value of the property in litigation, is: x x x x (b) For filing: 1. Actions where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated ........ P 400.00 2. x x x In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees. Since we find that the case involved the annulment of contract which is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation, thus, falling within the jurisdiction of the RTC, the docket fees should not be based on the assessed value of the subject land as claimed by petitioner in their memorandum, but should be based on Section 7(b)(1) of Rule 141. A perusal of the entries in the Legal Fees Form attached to the records would reflect that the amount of P400.00 was paid to the Clerk of Court, together with the other fees, as assessed by the Clerk of Court. Thus, upon respondents' proof of payment of the assessed fees, the RTC has properly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint. Jurisdiction once acquired is never lost, it continues until the case is terminated.
DARMA MASLAG VS ELIZABETH MONZON, WILLIAM GESTON, AND REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF BENGUET FACTS This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari on the resolution of CA which dismissed petitioner Darma Maslag's ordinary appeal to it for being an improper remedy. The Petition also assails the CAâs September 22, 2006 Resolution denying petitionerâs Motion for Reconsideration. The petitioner filed a Complaint for reconveyance of real property with declaration of nullity of original certificate of title against the respondents. The Complaint was filed before the Municipal Trial Court. After trial, the MTC found respondent Monzon guilty of fraud in obtaining an OCT over petitioners property. Respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declaring the MTC without jurisdiction over petitioners cause of action. The presiding judge declared that it will take cognizance of the case pursuant to Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court which provides for appeal from orders dismissing the case without trial; lack of jurisdiction. RTC thereafter reversed the decision of the MTC, prompting the petitioner to file a Notice of Appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed the said appeal and affirmed the respondents contention that the proper remedy is a Petition for Review under Rule 42, and not an ordinary appeal. Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari. ISSUE: 1. Who has jurisdiction over the case? 2. Whether petionerâ s appeal is the proper remedy? HELD: 1. Under the present state of the law, in cases involving title to real property, original and exclusive jurisdiction belongs to either the RTC or the MTC, depending on the assessed value of the subject property. Pertinent provisions of BP 129,29Â as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7691,30Â provides: Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. â Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: (1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where x x x the assessed value of the property exceeds Fifty thousand pesos ([P]50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; x x x x SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. a Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: x x x x (3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00). 2. Yes. The CA is correct in holding that the proper mode of appeal should have been a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, and not an ordinary appeal under Rule 41. In fact and in law, the RTC Resolution was a continuation of the proceedings that originated from the MTC. It was a judgment issued by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. It cannot be overemphasized that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by law and it is ânot within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside. Neither would the active participation of the parties nor estoppel operate to confer original and exclusive jurisdiction where the court or tribunal only wields appellate jurisdiction over the case. The present court looks at what type of jurisdiction was actually exercised by the RTC, and not into what type of jurisdiction the RTC should have exercised. Inquiring into what the RTC should have done in disposing of the case is a question that already involves the merits of the appeal, but the court obviously cannot go into that where the mode of appeal was improper to begin with. Wherefore, Petition for Review is denied for lack of merit. The Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Pascual vs. Court of Appeals (339 SCRA 117) July 27, 2010
Jurisdiction of the SEC Facts: Private respondents filed an action for reconveyance of a piece of land and for accounting and damages against petitioners. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. They claim that the case involves an intra-corporate dispute and thus, the SEC has jurisdiction and not the regular courts. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that the case does not involve an intra-corporate dispute. The CA affirmed. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not this case involves an intra-corporate dispute and whether or not the SEC has jurisdiction over it?
also payment of unpaid and outstanding rentals. MTC's dismissing the complaint was properly decreed, Petition for review is granted. Held: Pursuant to R.A. 8799, §5.2, which took effect on August 8, 2000, the jurisdiction of the Sec to decide cases involving intra-corporate dispute was transferred to courts of general jurisdiction. Thus, the question as to whether this case involves an intra-corporate dispute is now only of academic interest. Even if the case involves an intra-corporate dispute, it would be remanded to the RTC just the same.
Transfarm & Co., Inc. vs. Daewoo Corporation (343 SCRA 410) July 27, 2010
Jurisdiction of SEC Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. vs. Cyborg Leasing Corp. Facts: Cyborg Leasing Corp filed before the MTC of Manila a case captioned "Damages with prayer for a writ Replevin" against Conpac and Movers. It was alleged that pursuant to a lease agreement, Cyborg had delivered one forklift to Conpac. The lease agreement stipulated a monthly rental of P11,000.00 for the use of the equipment. Conpac failed and refused to pay the stipulated rentals. Petitioner took control of the operations of Conpac and seized all the cargoes and equipment in ludi g the subject porklift. Petitioner ignored Cyborg's demand for the return to it of the equipment and the formal disclaimer of ownership made by Conpac. A Writ of Replevin was issued. Petitioner was served with a copy of the summons and the latter filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the of MTC since the complaint had asked for the actual market value of the equipment, actual damage,, exemplary damages and atty's fees. MTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Cyborg filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injuction against MTC Judge, COnpac and Movers before the RTC f Manila. RTC granted Cyborg's application for preliminary injunction. Petitioner assails the decision of RTC. Hence this petition.
Facts: Daewoo Corp (Daewoo) entered into a joint venture agreement with Transfarm & Co. (Transfarm) for the delivery, assembly, production & distribution of Daewoo cars in the country. Transdaewoo Automotive Manufacturing Company was to be incorporated with Transfarm owning 70% & Daewoo 30%. Transfarm & TAMC were then to enter into a separate agreement that would name Transfarm as the exclusive distributor in the country of Daewoo cars. Parties stipulated that controversies or claims arising out of the joint venture itself should be settled by arbitration conducted in Hong Kong but the joint venture agreement itself was to be governed & construed in accordance with Philippine laws. When the agreement went awry, Transfarm & TAMC filed a complaint with the RTC against Daewoo & Daewoo Motor Co., Ltd. (DMCL), a corp organized under Korean laws & not doing business in the Phils, praying that Daewoo & DMCL be ordered to refrain from doing business here. An MTD was filed on the ground that what was field was an intracorp controversy hence cognizable by the SEC. RTC denied such MTD. CA dismisses the case & says that jurisdiction is with the SEC. With a subsequent MR rebuffed, Transfarm now files a petition with the SC. During the pendency of the petition with the SC, RA8799 was enacted.
Issue: WON, MTC has jurisdiction over the complaint? Held: NOMTC's jurisdiction over the action filed by Cyborg is the concern of the case. The jurisdiction of the court and the nature of the action must be determined by t heaverments in the complaints and the character of the relief sought. The complaint filed by Cyborg with the MTC prayed for the return of the Nissan Forklift to it as the owner or in the alternative for the payment of 150T plus damages, amount of unpaid lease and atty's fees.It would be incorrect to argue that the actual damages in the form of unpaid rental swere just in incident of the action for the return of the forklift considering that private respondent specifically sought in the complaint not only seizure of the forklift from petitioner Movers but
Issue: WON SEC has jurisdiction over the dispute. Held: CA decision set aside & case remanded back to RTC. - The Securities Regulation Code (RA 8799) transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction the SEC’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Sec.5 of PD 902-A. The SEC shall retain jurisdiction over pending cases involving intra-corp disputes submitted for final resolution which shall be resolved within 1 year from the enactment of RA 8799. The SEC shall retain jurisdiction over pending suspension of payments/ rehabilitation cases filed as of 30 June 2000 until finally disposed.
- The instant case, neither filed nor pending with the SEC, let alone ready for final resolution by it, is clearly cognizable by the RTC. EXTRA: • Statutes regulating court jurisdiction & procedure are generally construed to be applicable to actions pending & undetermined at the time of the passage of said enactments.
MANOLO P. SAMSON, petitioner, vs. HON. REYNALDO B. DAWAY as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CATERPILLAR, INC., respondents. (G.R. Nos. 16005455, July 21, 2004) Facts: The petitioner, owner/proprietor of ITTI Shoes/Mano Shoes Manufactuirng Corporation, allegedly sold or offers the sale of garment product using the trademark “Caterpillar” to the prejudice of Caterpillar, Inc., private respondent in this case. The respondent filed the case with the RTC. The petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense charged contending that the case should be filed with the MTC because violation of unfair competition is penalized with imprisonment not exceeding 6 years under RA 7691. Issue: Which court has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases for violation of intellectual property rights? Ruling of the Court: The SC held that under Section 163 of the IPC, actions for unfair competition shall be brought before the proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws. The law contemplated in Section 163 of IPC is RA 166 otherwise known as the Trademark Law. Section 27 of the Trademark Law provides that jurisdiction over cases for infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin and false description or representation, is lodged with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). Since RA 7691 is a general law and IPC in relation to Trademark Law is a special law, the latter shall prevail. Actions for unfair competition therefore should be filed with the RTC Madrinan vs. Madrinan, 527 SCRA 487, GR No. 159374, July 12, 2007 (Special Proceedings – Court of Appeals and Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the family courts of Habeas Corpus involving custody of minors)
Facts: Petitioner and respondent were married, and after a bitter quarrel, petitioner left the conjugal abode bringing with him their three sons (2 of which are minors) to Albay and to Laguna subsequently. Respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals for their their 2 minor sons on the ground that petitioner’s act disrupted their education and deprived them of their mother’s care. Petitioner filed a memorandum alleging that respondent was unfit to take custody of their children and questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under Section 5(b) of RA 8369, family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its authority to take cognizance and ruling, that under the Family Code, respondent was entitled to custody of the minors. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition for habeas corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts under RA 8369. Issue: WON the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving custody of minors. Held: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in a previous jurisprudence that The Court of Appeals should has cognizance of this case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors. The concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court with family courts in said cases was further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors which provides that: Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. – A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs. xxx xxx xxx The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
Nova vs. Judge Sancho Dames II (2001) Facts: Complainant Greogorio S. Nova filed with the NLRC complaint for illegal dismissal against R.A. BroadcastingCorporation represented by its Vice P resident forOperations Vilma J. Barcelona and Station Manager DeoTrinidad. The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of Nova and ordered R.A. Broadcasting to pay his separation pay and full back wages. NLRC affirmed such decision and denied the MFR filed by R.A. Construction on the ground that it was filed out of time. The NLRC issued an alias writ of execution and the property of Sps. Barcelona was scheduled in an auction sale. The said spouses filed with the RTC Camarines Norte action for damages with prayer of TRO to restrain the NLRC from conducting thescheduled public auction. The RTC granted the TRO. Novaargued that under the Labor Code, issuance of the TRO orpreliminary injunction in a case arising from labor disputeis prohibited. Issue: Whether the RTC cannot issue injunction against NLRC? Held: YES, Regular courts have no jurisdiction to hear and decidequestions which arise and are incidental to theenforcement of decisio ns, orders or awards rendered in labor cases by appropriate officers and tribunals of the DOLE. Corollarily, any controversy in the execution of the judgment shall be referred to the tribunal which issued the writ of execution since it has the inherent power to control its own processes in order to enforce its judgments and orders. True, an action for damages lies within the jurisdiction of are gional trial court. However, the RTC has no jurisdiction to issue a TRO in labor cases. The SC finds respondent Judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Labor Arbiter bars the subsequent claim for moral damages in a regular court.
Manliguez v. CA, 232 SCRA 427 (1994) Facts: Employer was ordered in a final judgment to pay its employees. Writ of execution was issued and enforced by levying on property. Manliguez filed a complaint which sought the lifting of the levy over, and annulment of the sale of, the property on the ground that Manliguez was the owner of such property and that the employer was just leasing it from him.
Held: Where the civil case is to lift levy over and annulment of the sale of the property on the ground that it was not owned by the respondent in the labor case, the civil court has jurisdiction. Where the action attacked the regularity of the issuance of the writ of execution in the labor case, the labor officials have jurisdiction. If the action does not attack the issuance, but the manner of execution, the civil courts have jurisdiction.
EVIOTA vs CA Case Digest FACTS Sometime on January 26, 1998, the respondent Standard Chartered Bank and petitioner Eduardo G. Eviota executed aontrat o! emp"oyment under #hih the petitioner #as emp"oyed $y the respondent $ank as Compensation and Bene!its %ana&er, '( )%21*. (etitioner ame up #ith many proposa"s #hih the $ank approved and made preparations o!. +e #as a"so&iven privi"e&es "ike ar, renovation o! the o!!ie, and even a trip to Sin&apore at the ompany s expense. +o#ever, thepetitioner a$rupt"y resi&ned !rom the respondent $ank $are"y a month a!ter his emp"oyment and re-oined his !ormeremp"oyer. n June 19, 1998, the respondent $ank !i"ed a omp"aint a&ainst the petitioner #ith the /0C o! %akati City !ordama&es $rou&ht a$out his a$rupt resi&nation. 0hou&h petitioner reim$ursed part o! the amount demanded $y Standard, he #as not a$"e to pay it !u"".Standard a""e&ed that assumin& ar&uendo that Eviota had the ri&ht to terminate his emp"oyment #ith the Bank ! or no reason,the manner in and irumstanes under #hih he exerised the same are "ear"y a$usive and ontrary to the ru"es &overnin&human re"ations, &overned $y the Civi" Code.urther, Standard a""e&ed that petitioner a"so vio"ated the a$or Code #hen he terminated his emp"oyment #ithout one ) 1*notie in advane. 0his stipu"ation #as a"so provided in the emp"oyment ontrat o! Eviota #ith Standard, #hih #ou"d a"soonstitute $reah o! ontrat. 0he petitioner ! i"ed a motion to dismiss the omp"aint on the &round that the ation !or dama&es o! the respondent $ank #as#ithin the ex"usive -urisdition o! the a$or 3r$iter under para&raph 4, 3rti"e 215 o! the a$or Code o! the (hi"ippines, asamended. 0he petitioner averred that the respondent $ank s "aim !or dama&es arose out o! or #ere in onnetion #ith hisemp"oyeremp"oyee re"ationship #ith the respondent $ank or some aspet or inident o! suh re"ationship. 0he respondent$ank opposed the motion, "aimin& that its ation !or dama&es #as #ithin the ex"usive -urisdition o! the tria" ourt. 3"thou&hits "aims ! or dama&es inidenta""y invo"ved an emp"oyeremp"oyee re"ationship, the said "aims are atua""y prediated onthe petitioners ats and omissions #hih are separate"y, spei!ia""y and distint"y &overned $y the 7e# Civi" Code. ISSUE- hether or not the /0C had -urisdibtion over the ase.
HELD- 0he SC he"d that the /0C has -urisdition. Case "a# has it that the nature o! an ation and the su$-et matter thereo!, as #e""as #hih ourt has -urisdition over the same, are determined $y the materia" a""e&ations o! the omp"aint and the re"ie!sprayed !or in re"ation to the "a# invo"ved. 7ot every ontroversy or money "aim $y an emp"oyee a&ainst the emp"oyer orvieversa is #ithin the ex"usive -urisdition o! the "a$or ar$iter. 3 money "aim $y a #orker a&ainst the emp"oyer or vieversa is #ithin the ex"usive -urisdition o! the "a$or ar$iter on"y i! there is a reasona$"e ausa" onnetion: $et#een the"aim asserted and emp"oyeeemp"oyer re"ation. 3$sent suh a "ink, the omp"aint #i"" $e o∋a$"e $y the re&u"ar ourts o! -ustie.3tions $et#een emp"oyees and emp"oyer #here the emp"oyeremp"oyee re"ationship is mere"y inidenta" and the ause o!ation preedes !rom a di!!erent soure o! o$"i&ation is #ithin the ex"usive -urisdition o! the re&u"ar ourt. 0he -urisditiono! the a$or 3r$iter under 3rti"e 215 o! the a$or Code, as amended, is "imited to disputes arisin& !rom an emp"oyeremp"oyee re"ationship #hih an on"y $e reso"ved $y re!erene to the a$or Code o! the (hi"ippines, other "a$or "a#s or theiro""etive $ar&ainin& a&reements. Jurisprudene has evo"ved the ru"e that "aims !or dama&es under para&raph 4 o! 3rti"e 215, to $e o∋a$"e $y the a$or3r$iter, must have a reasona$"e ausa" onnetion #ith any o! the "aims provided !or in that arti"e. n"y i! there is suh aonnetion #ith the other "aims an the "aim !or dama&es $e onsidered as arisin& !rom emp"oyeremp"oyee re"ations. thus, !orin&the private respondent to hire a rep"aement. 0he private respondent #as "e!t in a "urh, and its orporate p"ans andpro&ram in -eopardy and disarray. %oreover, the petitioner took o!! #ith the private respondent s omputer diskette, papersand douments ontainin& on!identia" in!ormation on emp"oyee ompensation and other $ank matters. n its seond auseo! ation, the petitioner simp"y #a"ked a#ay !rom his emp"oyment #ith the private respondent sans any #ritten notie, to thepre-udie o! the private respondent, its $ankin& operations and the ondut o! its $usiness. 3nent its third ause o! ation,the petitioner made !a"se and dero&atory statements that the private respondent rene&ed on its o$"i&ations under theirontrat o! emp"oyment> thus, depitin& the private respondent as un#orthy o! trust. 0he primary re"ie! sou&ht is !or "i=uidated dama&es !or $reah o! a ontratua" o$"i&ation. 0he other items demanded are not"a$or $ene!its demanded $y #orkers &enera""y taken o∋ane o! in "a$or disputes, suh as payment o! #a&es, overtimeompensation or separation pay. 0he items "aimed are the natura" onse=uenes !"o#in& !rom $reah o! an o$"i&ation,intrinsia""y a ivi" dispute.
ation o! the private respondent a&ainst the petitioner do not invo"ve the provisions o! thea$or Code o! the (hi"ippines and other "a$or "a#s $ut the 7e# Civi" Code. 0hus, the said auses o! ation are intrinsia""yivi". 0here is no ausa" re"ationship $et#een the auses o! ation o! the private respondent s auses o! ation a&ainst the o so Mangaliag v. Pastoral Facts: Respondent Serquina filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against petitioners Mangaliag and Solano. This complaint alleges that the Serquina and his co-passengers sustained serious injuries and permanent deformities from the collision of their tricycle with the petitioners’ dump truck and the gross negligence, carelessness and imprudence of the petitioners in driving the dump truck. Respondents seek damages in the form of medical expenses amounting to P71,392.00. Respondents also claim P500,000.00 by way of moral damages, as a further result of his hospitalization, lost income of P25,000.00 or the nominal damages, and attorney’s fees. Petitioners filed their answer with counterclaim. After pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued. After the respondent rested his case, petitioners testified in their defense. Subsequently, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. They alleged that since the principal amount prayed for, in the amount of P71,392.00, falls within the jurisdiction of MTC. Petitioners maintain that the court’s jurisdiction should be based exclusively on the amount of actual damages, excluding therefrom the amounts claimed as moral, exemplary, nominal damages and attorney’s fee, etc. The respondent opposed the motion saying that since the claim for damages is the main action, the totality of the damages sought to be recovered should be considered in determining jurisdiction. He relied on Administrative Circular No. 09-94 which provides that “in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action. . . the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court” Also, the petitioners’ defense of lack of jurisdiction has already been barred by estoppel and laches. He contends that after actively taking part in the trial proceedings and presenting a witness to seek exoneration, it would be unfair and legally improper for petitioners to seek the dismissal of the case. RTC ruled in favor of respondent. Petitioners filed an MR which was denied. Subsequently, they filed a petition for certiorari with the SC. Issues: (1) Whether petitioners are barred from raising the defense of the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction? NO
(2) Whether it is the amount of P71,392.00 as medical expenses, excluding moral, nominal damages and attorney’s fees, which determines jurisdiction, hence it is MTC which has jurisdiction? NO Ruling: On the matter of estoppel and laches: In the present case, no judgment has yet been rendered by the RTC. As a matter of fact, as soon as the petitioners discovered the alleged jurisdictional defect, they did not fail or neglect to file the appropriate motion to dismiss. Hence, finding the pivotal element of laches to be absent, the Sibonghanoy doctrine does not control the present controversy. What happened in the Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings had already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence of laches. But in this case, there is no laches. Thus, the general rule that the question of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings must apply. Petitioners are not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC. (1) On the issue which of the amounts is determinative of jurisdiction: The well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. In the present case, the allegations in the complaint plainly show that private respondent seeks to recover not only his medical expenses, lost income but also damages for physical suffering and mental anguish due to permanent facial deformity from injuries sustained in the vehicular accident. Viewed as an action for quasi-delict, the present case falls squarely within the purview of Article 2219 (2), which provides for the payment of moral damages in cases of quasi-delict causing physical injuries. Private respondent’s claim for moral damages of P500,000.00 cannot be considered as merely incidental to or a consequence of the claim for actual damages. It is a separate and distinct cause of action or an independent actionable tort. It springs from the right of a person to the physical integrity of his or her body, and if that integrity is violated, damages are due and assessable. Hence, the demand for moral damages must be considered as a separate cause of action, independent of the claim for actual damages and must be included in determining the jurisdictional amount. If the rule were otherwise, i.e., the court’s jurisdiction in a case of quasi-delict causing physical injuries would only be based on the claim for actual damages and the complaint is filed in the MTC, it can only award moral damages in an amount within its jurisdictional limitations, a situation not intended by the framers of the law.
(2) (Not really an issue raised by the respondent himself, but was nonetheless discussed by the SC) On the issue whether a direct recourse by petition for certiorari to the SC from the order of RTC: Generally a direct recourse to this Court is highly improper, for it violates the established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts. Although this Court, the RTCs and the CA have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition. Thus, this Court, as a rule, will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. Be that as it may, the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. It generally applies to cases involving warring factual allegations. For this reason, litigants are required to repair to the trial courts at the first instance to determine the truth or falsity of these contending allegations on the basis of the evidence of the parties. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot be brought immediately before appellate courts as they are not triers of facts. Therefore, a strict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary when the cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions. In the present case, petitioners submit a pure question of law involving the interpretation and application of paragraph 2 of Administrative Circular No. 0994. This legal question and in order to avoid further delay are compelling enough reasons to allow petitioners’ invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction in the first instance.
(Maybe it is important to note that the petition for certiorari was filed from the denial of the RTC of the petitioners’ motion to dismiss. There is no final adjudication yet as to the complaint for damages.)
