A REJOINDER TO THE MONSOON WAR WAR Lt Col Saleem Akhtar Malik (Retired), Frotier For!e Re"imet, #aki$ta Arm%
#rolo"&e
The The firs firstt Kash Kashmi mirr war war did did not not end end in a deci decisi sive ve solu soluti tion on for for eith either er of the the contestants. Pakistanis felt frustrated and bitter while their leadership tried to hide behind the United Nations resolutions and similar excuses. On the other hand, Nehru, the person who had promoted himself as a person symboliin! "ndia, was !enerally content with what "ndia had !rabbed. #or now, he appeared sated like a cat after it had polished polished off the mouse. #or him, Pakistan held Kashmir could wait for another day. day. The The "ndian leadership, however, however, occasionally occasionally made noises about about recoverin! the chunks of Kashmir "ndia had lost to Pakistan, $a%%ad $a%%ad &yder, a senior senior Pakistani Pakistani diplomat, diplomat, told told of a meetin! with with Nehru durin! which the former tried to discuss Kashmir. Kashmir. Nehru Nehru started lookin! out the window. window. 'fter a few moments of silence Nehru !ot up and said ()et me show you the roses in prime minister*s house+. Then takin! &yder by the arm Nehru led him toward the main !ate where he showed the hi!h commissioner freshly cultivated roses . &avin! &avin! done that, that, &yder &yder was seen seen off. off. $imila $imilarly rly,, preside president nt Kennedy Kennedy once remarked that whenever he tried to talk to Nehru about Kashmir Kashmir he would lower lower his !lance and start lookin! at his shoes -hutto,/0/1. Nehru*s arro!ance toward the Pakistani mandarins was %ustified 2 they deserved it. "t is stupid to talk to the other side about re!ainin! the territory you have lost in war. &owever, short of howlin!, Pakistan*s leaders and bureaucrats did nothin! to seriously untan!le the problem. Nevertheless, 3ammu 4 Kashmir dispute (issue+ to the "ndians1 refused to die. "t lin!ered on as a dysfunctional conflict, breedin! frustrations and creatin! an over overal alll host hostil ilee envi enviro ronm nmen entt in the the $ubc $ubcon onti tine nent nt.. The The prob proble lem m with with a dysfunctional conflict is that it creates inertia which sometimes needs to be broken throu!h ne!ative and violent means. -reakin! the inertia was the main motivation for Pakistan to move forward, hence the 05 6ar. There are many theories about the causes of this war. The boiler plate explanation by the Pakistani leadership is the refusal by "ndia to !rant the ri!ht of self7determination to the Kashmiris. 'ccordin! to the proponents of this theory the 8alley was simmerin! simmerin! with unrest unrest due to the inept Kashmiri Kashmiri leadership leadership , hi!h hand handed edne ness ss of the the occu occupa pati tion on admi admini nist stra rati tion on,, and and perha perhaps ps beca becaus usee "ndi "ndian an leadership was contemplatin! on withdrawin! the special status accorded to the state under under the "ndian constitut constitution. ion. 'ccord 'ccordin! in! to the "ndian version, version, Pakistan Pakistan 'rmy, havin! received military aid from the United $tates durin! the 9old 6ar 6ar ,
and encoura!ed by "ndia*s defeat in the /0: $ino7"ndia border war, was lon!in! for a show down with "ndia. $ome Pakistani theorists point out to the !rowin! frustration and resentment when the people ran out of their romance with 'yub Khan, particularly after his controversial success in the /0; !eneral elections. 'yub Khan was losin! his !rip on power as new power centres were emer!in! -hutto, the army itself, and -en!ali autonomists1.
/=, we are offered a !limpse of the concept of limited war? “ A bridge thrown over the breach afforded a communication between the besiegers and the besieged: tables were spread in every quarter, and the officers entertained one another by turns: within and without, under tents and arbours, there was nothing but balls, entertainments and concerts. All the people people of the envir environ onss flocke flocked d there there on foot, foot, on horseb horseback ack,, and in carriages: provisions arrived from every quarter, abundance was seen in a moment, and there was no want of stage doctors and tumblers. It was a charming fair, a delightful rendezvous. @emoirs of Aoldoni ,trans. 3ohn -lack,=;1, vol ",p.:B>.
E$!alatio
Cann of Kutch , comprisin! an area area of DB,BBB sEuare sEuare kilometers, is a seasonal salt marshland situated in the $outh76est of the $ub79ontinent, in the re!ion of :; th Parall Par allel. el.
kilometersD,5B kilometers D,5BB B sEuare miles1, miles1, approximat approximately ely a mar!inal mar!inal area of /B sEuare sEuare kilometers D5B sEuare miles1 to the south and east of Cahimki -aar includin! 9hadd -ed. "ndian claim on the whole of the Cann was re%ected. The "nternational "nternational boundary in this area was thus rou!hly delineated alon! the line that existed in /5D. #or 'y 'yub Khan the out come come of Cann of Kutch encount encounter er was a victory for the Pakistan 'rmy. This perceived victory made him draw wron! conclusions that "ndian n 'rmy would be unable to defend itself a!ainst a Euick military move in the "ndia 3ammu 4 Kashmir even even as it had failed to counter the 9hinese onslau!ht in /0:. &e was mistaken mistaken that the situation situation in the "ndian held Kashmir was ripe for a popular uprisi upr isin!. n!. 'yub Kha Khan n als also o mis mistak takenl enly y con conclu cluded ded tha thatt 'm 'meri erica ca wou would ld com comee to Pakist Pak istan* an*ss assist assistanc ancee even when when the the latter latter provo provoked ked a war with with "ndia. "ndia. "t is surprisin! how he failed to re!ister U.$. ambassador 6alter @c 9onau!hy*s stern warnin! to Pakistan a!ainst usin! U.$. arms in a conflict with "ndia Aill,:BB;1.
#re're&i$ite$ o a Militar% O*tio
&ow serious was 'yub Khan in optin! for a military solution to break the inertiaJ $uch an option option implied meetin! the followin! pre7reEuisites?7 #ormula #ormulatin tin! ! a nation national al polic policy y by identif identifyin yin! ! and mer! mer!in! in! the the politic political al and and military ob%ectives. : Neutralii Neutraliin! n! the pro7"ndia pro7"ndia 34K National National 9onference 9onference in "&K and cultivati cultivatin! n! a parallel pro7plebiscite leadership. D Nurturin! Nurturin! political political awareness awareness in "&K "&K conduc conducive ive for for an an uprisin uprisin! ! in the state. state. ; Ixpl Ixploi oiti tin! n! the UN reso resolu luti tion onss and and "nte "ntern rnat atio iona nall opin opinio ion n to the the hilt hilt,, wherever they suited Pakistan ,without makin! them the sole instrument of conflict resolution. 5 "denti "dentifyi fyin! n! the the type type of war reEu reEuire ired d to achie achieve ve the the milita military ry ob%ec ob%ectiv tives es and and trainin! for it. 0 9raftin 9raftin! ! a compre comprehen hensiv sivee plan aimed aimed at achievi achievin! n! the militar military y ob%ect ob%ective ivess across the 9ease #ire )ine while holdin! the enemy alon! the "nternational border. This reEuired abandonin! abandonin! the limited war war mind set. )et us see to what what extent the the decision makers addressed the prereEuisites prereEuisites for a military option to defreee the Kashmir dispute.
#aki$ta+$ Natioal #oli!% o Jamm& ad a$hmir-
Pakistan*s national policy re!ardin! 3ammu 4 Kashmir is based on two broad precepts ?1 Kashmir is Pakistan*s %u!ular vein. :1 Kashmiris should be !iven the ri!ht to self7determination to decide if they want to %oin Pakistan or "ndia. Over the period of time these precepts have been reduced to clichs. 6hat was, and has remained remained all alon!, the train of thou!hts thou!hts of the Pakistani Pakistani and "ndian leadership leadershipJJ 'ccordin! to Nyla 'li Khan :B:1? “!ir "wen #i$on, the %nited &ations representative for India and 'akistan, noted in ()*+ that the ashmir issue was so tumultuous because ashmir was not a holistic geographic, economic, or demographic entity but, on the contrary, was an aggregate of diverse territories brought under the rule of one -aharaah. !ir "wen #i$on propounded the trifurcation of the state along communal or regional regional lines or facilitating the secession of parts of the /helum 0alley 0alley to 'akistan. #espite the bombastic statements and blustering of the governments of India and 'akistan, the Indian government has all alon along g perc percei eive ved d the the incl inclus usio ion n of 'aki 'akist stan anii admi admini nist ster ereed /amm /ammu u and and ashmir and the &orthern Areas in India as unfeasible. 1ikewise, the government of 'akistan has all along either implicitly or e$plicitly acknow acknowled ledged ged the imprac impractic ticali ality ty of includ including ing pred predom omina inantl ntlyy 2uddis 2uddisht ht 1adakh and predominantly predominantly 3indu /ammu as part of 'akistan. 4he coveted area that continues to generate irreconcilable differences between the two governments is the valley of ashmir. ashmir. #espite such obstructions, !ir "wen #i$on remained remained determined to formulate a viable solution to the ashmir issue and suggested that a plebiscite be held only in the ashmir valley subsequent to its demilitarization, demilitarization, which would be conducted by an admi admini nist stra rati tive ve body body of %nit %nited ed &ati &ation onss offi offici cial als. s. Alth Althou ough gh,, sepa separa rati tist st movements movements have been surfacing surfacing and resurfa resurfacing cing in Indian Indian administe administere red d /ammu and ashmir and parts of 'akistani administered administered ashmir since the accession of the state to India in ()56, the attempt to create a unitary cultur cultural al identi identity ty bolste bolstere red d by nation nationali alist st politi politics cs has been been subver subverted ted by regio regional nal politi political cal force forces. s. 4he cultur culturall ally, y, lingui linguisti stical cally ly,, and relig religiou iously sly dive divers rsee popu popula lati tion on of Indi Indian an and and 'aki 'akist stan anii admi admini nist ster ereed /amm /ammu u and and ashmir has been unable to reach a consensus on the future of the land and the heterogeneous peoples of the state. 4he revolutionary act of demanding the right right of self7d self7dete etermi rminat nation ion and autono autonomy my for Indian Indian admini administe stere red d /ammu 8 ashmir has not been been able to nurture a unity amongst all regional regional groups and socioeconomic classes. #ue to the regional regional sentiments that are so well entrenched entrenched in the psyche of the people, the attempt to create a
unitary identity is still in a volatile stage. 4he symbols of nationhood in the former princely state, flag, anthem, and constitution, have thus far been unable to forge the process of nationalist self7imagining9. 6hereas 6hereas Pakistani Pakistani leadership leadership hoped a!ainst a!ainst hope hope that someday someday , somehow the Kashmiris will be allowed by "ndia to exercise their ri!ht to self7determination as a result of which "&K will become part of Pakistan, short of Luixotic adventurism like the one unleashed in /;> throu!h the tribal invasion, they had never seriously thou!ht of a military solution. True, the @ilitary Operations
6ar plans are based on the threat assessment. )et us have a look at the relative #aki$ta Idia forc forcee rati ratios os befo before re Pa Pakistan #ront 9hina #ront the war?
"nfantry
'rmoured
"nfantry < >
'rmoured #ormations 'rmd
: @tn D @tn
: "1 'rmd -de D"1 'rmd -de =
0 'rmd
/
Total?=x "nf
:x'rmd
B
; @tnM
/
5@tn 0 @tnM =@tn > @tn :B@tn :D @tnM :> @tn D/ @tn 5> @tn x 'rmd
:x @tn
Table ;.
Cikhye,:B;G Cia,/=;1 MPulled out from 9hina 9hina border to reinforce reinforce " and " 9orps in Iast Pakistan 9ombat Power 8alues? "nfF @tn
9omb 9ombat at Powe Powerr ratio atio wes weste tern rn front front11 at the the start of the war was :.D? in "ndia*s favour
Another Lavon Affa Affair ir -
The ori!inal plan for the operation, code named Aibraltar, may have been prepared by the Pakistan 'rmy as early as the /5Bs but, accordin! to the folklore, was resurrected by @a%or Aeneral 'khtar 'khtar &ussain @alik, AO9 :
referred to in "srael as the Unfortunate 'ffair or The -ad -usiness . 'fter "srael publicly denied any involvement in the incident for 5 years, the survivin! a!ents were officially honored in :BB5 by bein! awarded certificates of appreciation by the "sraeli President @oshe Katav. Parallels Parall els can be dra drawn wn bet betwee ween n how )av )avon on 'f 'ffai fairr and Ope Operat ration ion Aib Aibral raltar tar unfolded, except that in the latter case Pakistan*s Pakistan*s president and his army chief also had their fi!ures in the pie. "t is !enerally believed that the plan was endorsed by QulfiEar 'li -hutto, the forei!n minister . -hutto had also assured 'yub Khan that fi!hti fi! htin! n! would would be con confin fined ed to 3am 3ammu mu 4 Kas Kashmi hmirr and "ndia "ndia would would not att attack ack across acr oss the "nt "ntern ernati ationa onall bor border der.. 'cco ccordi rdin! n! to Aen Aenera erall @uh @uhamm ammad ad @us @usa, a, the 9ommander7in79hief ? “..the concept of sending infiltrators in the Indian held ashmir, code named ;oreign Affairs, is the simple truth and nothing but the truth.. ... After the
#orce+ #orc e+ wa wass no nott mo more re th than an 5, 5,BB BBB B to >, >,BB BBB B me men n su subd bdiv ivid ided ed in into to ni nine ne fo force rcess $alahu $al ahuddi ddin@ n@and andi, i, Aul Aulmar mar!, !, and $ri $rina! na!ar1, ar1, Aha Ahana navi vi
Holding the Enemy Enemy
Iarlie Iarl ierr, we had iden identi tifi fied ed as an esse essent ntia iall of mili milita tary ry opti option on ( crafti craftin! n! a comprehensive plan aimed at achievin! the military ob%ectives across the 9ease #ire )ine while holdin! the enemy alon! the "nternational border+. This reEuired abandonin! the limited war mind set. 6ere the "ndians !oin! to sit idleJ No. They would would defini definitel tely y retali retaliate ate by exploi exploitin tin! ! the weakne weaknesse ssess and !aps !aps in Pakist Pakistani ani defences. Nothin! was done to reinforce the holdin! troops and plu! the !aps in own defences. 'lerted by the infiltration attempts and skirmishes with the @u%ahideen, from 0th 'u!ust 'u!ust onwards "ndians increased their patrollin! patrollin! alon! the 9#). "n the Kar!il sector, $rina!ar7)eh road, "ndian 'rmy*s life line to )adakh , was domina dominated ted by the hei!ht hei!htss held held by Pakist Pakistan. an. "ndian "ndian 'rmy convoy convoyss traver traversin sin! ! $rina!ar $rina!ar 2 )eh road would would freEuently freEuently come under heavy heavy machine !un fire from the Pakistani posts overlookin! the road. road. "ndians had the the compulsion to keep keep the 9#) as far away from this road as possible. possible. $ince /;=, "ndians had been been nibblin! at the hei!hts dominatin! this vital road.
-etween :5 th 'u!ust and th $eptember $eptember "ndians attacked attacked and and captured captured important Paki Pakist stan anii post postss in Neel Neelam am and and 3hel 3helum um vall valley eys. s. "t is not not easy easy to capt captur uree a dominatin! feature held by a well trained defender. 6hy were Pakistani defences
in the area fallin! fallin! like like nine pinsJ pinsJ )et us try to find out out by readin! readin! between between the lines of the official history. No. 1 Sector . The sector bri!ades in 'ad Kashmir were called sectors till the > 6ar1 was responsible for Neelam and 3helum valleys, a front of approximately =B kilometers 5B miles1. "t was defended by?
5 Pun%ab / 'K D 'K 0 'K :D 'K Official history of Pakistan 'rmy Cia,/=51 tells us that 5 Pun%ab, the battalion holdin! Nausehri ;: Km northeast of @uaffarabad1 had moved from )ahore to @uaffarabad in mid7'u!ust. Nausehri was attacked by the "ndians on :/ th 'u!ust. The battalion held out. On the same day :/ th 'u!ust1, Aeneral 'khtar had decided to reor!anie No. sector. &e ordered the bri!ade commander -ri!adier Khil%i1 to infiltrate across the 9#) and operat operatee behind behind enemy enemy positi positions ons in Tan!dhar n!dhar7T 7Tit ithwa hwall area. area. #or this this purpose , :D 'K was detached detached to command Khil%i #orce . Khil%i #orce comprised? :'K moved from -himber on :0 th 'u!ust1 :D 'K detached from No. $ector1 $$A elements Ilements ex Nusrat #orce No. $ector was thus reconstituted reconstituted with? Pun%ab 5 Pun%ab = 'K 'K / 'K 'K D 'K 0 'K
$tatus of the other incomin! units Pun%ab, and = 'K1 is not clear , but we know that :D 'K 'K was detached to command Khil%i Khil%i #orce, leavin! its prepared defences to operate operate behind the enemy lines. lines. This was done despite despite the fact that , between th th :0 and :/ 'u!ust important posts in the Neelam and 3helum valleys, and the entire &a%i Pir Pass were lost to the "ndians. On the day :D 'K 'K was detached detached from No. No. $ector :/ th 'u!ust 1, the situation became so precarious as one after another post was captured by the "ndians, that the Khil%i #orce :'K and :D 'K inclusive1 was called back and ordered to counter attack some of the lost features. No. 2 Sector: The area of responsibility extended from Pir Kanthi northern shoulder of &a%i Pir -ul!e1 to -attal south7east of -andi 'bbaspur1. "n short it was responsible for defendin! the whole of &a%i Pir -ul!e. The sector comprised ; 'K 'K 0 'K 'K > 'K 'K B 'K
The official history does not include B 'K in No.: $ector*s initial order of battle. &owever, it was very much part of this sector and located at &illan $humalia villa!e close to the 9#) near -andi 'bbas Pur1. 6e 6e know this this from the account of )ieutenant )ehrasab Khan later lieutenant lieutenant !eneral1 who was plucked plucked from Iast -en!al Ce!iment, Ce!iment, his parent unit at the time located located at Kasur1 and posted to B 'K. &e was to take part as a @u%ahid in B 'K operations in "&K. On reachin! -andi 'bbas Pur B B 'K rear, as part of the battalion had already left for for its its assi assi!n !ned ed area area behi behind nd the the enem enemy y line lines1 s1 he was was issu issued ed,, like like the the othe other r infiltrators, a rucksack, a sten !un, :BB x rounds, a blanket, Cs 5,BBBF7 "ndian currency and Cs. 5,BBBF7 Pakistani currency by the officer commandin! rear party. 'ccordin! to )ehrasab (The mission of the -attalion was (!o to
@u%a @u%ahi hids ds who who were were !ive !iven n = week weekss (ri! (ri!oro orous us++ trai traini nin! n! and and wore wore dark dark !ree !reen n shalwar shalwar kamee and PT shoes to facilitate facilitate easy reco!nitio reco!nition n by the enemy1. This was how the infiltrators were thrown into held Kashmir. Three7four days later most of them had run out of rations and ammunition. 'ccord 'ccordin! in! to )ahras )ahrasab ab the the taskin taskin! ! of B B 'K 'K was was sudde suddenly nly chan!e chan!ed d on :0 th 'u!ust because the "ndians had made swift pro!ress towards &a%i Pir Pass and the battalion was asked to abandon the ori!inal mission and fall back to help defend own positions. )ahrasab*s account is corroborated by the official history which makes a passin! reference that probably1 after the loss of &i% Pir Pass 9ommander No.: $ector reEuested reinforcement reinforcement and was !iven B 'K pa!e B=1. &a%i Pir -ul!e was attacked by 0= "ndian -ri!ade in a pincer move on :0 th 'u!ust. 's the "ndians continued their advance ,No.: $ector was reinforced by :B Pun%ab. On :Bth ' 'u!ust u!ust the battalion was en!a!ed in watermanship trainin! trainin! in -arakao, / kilometers north east of Cawalpindi. 't BBB hours the same day the battalion receiv rec eived ed ord orders ers to mov movee to Caw Cawala alakot kot &e &eadE adEuar uarter terss No. No.: : $ec $ector tor1, 1, whe where re it reac re ache hed d at :B :BBB BB ho hour urss :B th 'u 'u!us !ust. t. Two of its com compan panies ies wer weree det detach ached ed to command 0'K and ;'K . -attalion less two companies, after hoppin! up from one place to another, finally reached $ankh feature a spur about = Km west of &a%i Pir1 on :/ th ' 'u!ust. u!ust. $ankh was attacked attacked and captured by the "ndians on DB th 'u!ust.
$o durin! Operation Aibraltar, whole infantry battalions were pulled out from their defe de fens nsiv ivee po posi siti tion onss by bl blee eedi din! n! th thee ho hold ldin in! ! su sub7 b7fo forma rmati tion onss to be beef ef up th thee infiltration forces. $ome of the units were hastily moved into the area from their peace time locations. 6hen the "ndians retaliated by attackin! Pakistani posts all alon! the 9#), the infiltratin! units were recalled and asked to counter attack. There was little time for preparation. "n the confusion of battle, companies lost contact with each other and with battalion headEuarters. This was the state of plannin! to liberate liberate Kashmir.
Oeration !rand Slam
"n order to ease the pressure on : and @;= Patton tanks. '!ainst a militarily stron!er and lar!er Pakistani thrust, the "ndian forces retreated from their defensive positions. On the the second second day of of the attac attack, k, @a%o @a%orr Aeneral Aeneral 'k 'khtar htar @alik was replac replaced ed by AO9 >
To relieve pressure from 9hamb and 'khnoor and force the Pakis Pakistan tan 'rm 'rmy y to defen defend d further south, "ndia attacked Pakistan alon! the "nternational "nternational border on ni!ht 5 th F 0th $eptember. Lahore Sector
't the )ahore front "ndian " 9orps be!an its operations by advancin! on three axes 2 5 BB hours, 0 th $ep $eptem tember ber.. Cesultan Cesultantly tly,, inf infant antry ry battalio battalions ns , und under er command armour elements , and line line parties of artillery observers bumped into the attack att ackers ers wh while ile occ occupy upyin! in! the ass assi!n i!ned ed for forwar ward d def defend ended ed loc locali alitie tiesF sF art artill illery ery observation posts . None of the twenty odd brid!es were prepared for demolition. These were haphaardly blown up belatedly in face of the stiff enemy pressure. 6hile the advance positions were overrun by the enemy , some elements continued operatin! on the east bank of -C- till the cease fire. 'll the enemy attacks on forwar for ward d def defend ended ed lo local caliti ities es we were re bea beaten ten bac back, k, mai mainly nly by own art artill illery ery.. The invadin! divisions did not attempt to establish a brid!e head anywhere across the canal. -y :: nd $ep $eptem tember ber,, "ndians "ndians , whi while le leanin! leanin! on the water water obs obstac tacle, le, had captured two ma%or villa!es, -urki and
"n this sector -C- canal flows alon! a north7south ali!nment. "nternational border runs runs to the the east east of -C-, -C-, almo almost st para parall llel el to the the cana canall up to a plac placee call called ed -allan -allanwal wala. a. #rom there onward onward it takes a U7 turn that forms forms the "ndian "ndian Khem Khem Karan enclave. Next to the enclave, an inverted U7turn forms the Pakistani $eh%ra $eh%ra
salient. Khem Karan7'mritsar railway line divides the area almost at the centre. "mmediately to the east of "nternational border the area of operations was like a horse shoe, its apex pointin! toward Pakistan. To the north of the railway line, line, the area is bounded by Kasur
9hakravorty :B;1
To the south south of the railway railway line, line, -allanwala -allanwala onward, onward, Cohi Cohi Nullah, Nullah, flowin! flowin! in in a south7 south7 easterly direction, direction, finally finally drains into the $utle% river. 'n all weather weather road connects Khem Karan Karan with 'mritsar throu!h -hikkiwind . "n /05 /05 , 'sal Uttar, 8altoha, and
&ere Pakistan*s and 0: @ounta @ountain in -ri!a -ri!ade1 de1 with with under under comm command and
"ndians attacked all alon! the front on ni!ht 5 th F0th $eptember. 6hereas Pakistan*s 5: -ri!ade and B0 -ri!ade were to defend the Kasur $ector alon! the -C- canal, : -ri!ade was located located at )uliani )uliani and was was @ountain -ri!ade; Arenadiers, > Arenadiers, and F/ Aorkha Cifles1, also supported by sEuadron ex Arenadiers > @ountain -ri!ade 1 and D , and our troops troops were able to di! defences and lay mines. The three field companies laid the mines and the areas to the south and west of the defences were flooded. Pakistan allowed the division to prepare its defences methodically by not disturbin! it on $eptember B>+. Pakistan*s Pakistan*s
Emloyment of Armo&r
"he Armo&r Array Table ;.D %as&r Sector #aki$ta 1Armd (iv ; 9avalry 5 &orse 0 )ancers :; 9avalry / )ancers : 9avalry Cecce Ce!t1
Sial'ot Sector #aki$ta Armd (iv B 9avalry 9avalryM :: 9avalry 1/ (iv DD T
Idia 2)*+Armd ,de D 9avalry = 9avalry Cecce Ce!t1
- $tn (iv
Idia 1 Armd (iv > &orse 0 9avalry : )ancers 0: 9avalry ; &orse 1-(iv 'rmd Ce!t J 2 (iv = 9avalry 0 )*+ Armd ,de :x 'rmd Ce!t
M
"he ,attles of Asal ttar
't that time Pakistan*s 'rmoured , @7;=, and 9hafee 9hafee recce re!iment1 re!iment1 tanks. tanks. #acin! #acin! 'rmoured 'rmoured ## and B ## were mechanied whereas ## was lorried. "t must be kept in mind that mechanied infantry provides intimate infantry support to tanks . "t assaults and clears the enemy defences over run by tanks. "f we assi!n an infantry division a value of , an armoured division a value of D, and the armoured bri!ade a value of : , we can calculate the relative combat power as follows? Table ;.; Idia Formatio :"1'rmd-de ; @tn
C/t #0r : .5M : .5
#aki$ta Format matio 'rmd
C/t #0r
D 7 D
M : hours
of battlin! the
Usin! )anchaster*s eEuation, we sEuare each side*s combat power and !et 0.:5 for "ndia and / for Pakistan, or a .;; to Pakistani superiority in Kasur sector.
Pakistan Pakistan launch launched ed the counter7s counter7stroke troke with its its 'rmoured 'rmoured $eptember by :## under under command 5: -ri!ade1. This This was a holdin! bri!ade responsible for defendin! the area from inclusive road Kasur7Khem Karan to inclusive road Kasur7#eroepur. 5'rmoured -ri!ade could not be inducted into the brid!ehead on the same ni!ht ni!ht because of en!ineers delay in construction of the brid!e on the nullah. 6hen the brid!e finally became operational, the leadin! tank 0 )ancers1 hit the brid!e railin! and plun!ed into the nullah, blockin! all the traffic across the brid!e and delayin! the induction of armour into the brid!ehead. 't about =BB hours on > th $eptember, sEuadron 0 )ancers , followed by company ## lorried1 , still stru!!lin! on the far bank ,broke out in an attempt to expand the brid!e head. 'dva 'dvanc ncin in! ! appro approxi xima mate tely ly two two mile miless ahea ahead d of the the null nullah ah,, this this forc forcee had had to withdraw for the ni!ht lea!uer. 'n armoured formation, breakin! out of the brid!ehead, is always followed in one by an infantry infantry formation. formation. 't 't dusk the armour armour hands over the area up to the line of control forward ed!e of the area cleared by the armour1 to the follow in one infantry formation which then establishes its defences alon! the line a!ainst enemy counter attacks.Normlly, the formation establishin! the brid!e head also acts as follow in one infantry after the armour has broken out. 6ith the tasks
!ive !iven n to 'rmou rmoured red : hours of battlin! the Arenadiers and D
9hakravorty :B;1
's mentioned earlier, in Phase of the Pakistani offensive , division had already established a shallow shallow brid!ehead of sorts across Cohi Nullah with with : ## ex 5: -ri!ade. )ater on on the entire bri!ade bri!ade was tasked to expand expand the brid!ehead. brid!ehead. The th th < day was delayed from > to = $eptember $eptember due due to the the dama!e dama!e caused caused to the the brid!e on Cohi Nullah. "n Phase :, 'rmoured BB hours on = th $eptember. Under cover of artillery fire the advancin! tanks moved within /BB meters of the enemy*s defended area. 't this point point they were en!a!ed by tanks tanks of tanks includin! D: tanks bo!!ed down and captured in runnin! condition1 as a!ainst "ndian losses of 5 tanks. 'ccordin! to Cia /=;1, :; "ndian tanks were destroyed between 0 and B $eptember, which appears to be a more realistic estimate. "ndian tank losses are recorded below? Table ;.5 $erial
> $ep
Time B0BB hrs 0BB hrs
Tanks
Cemarks &it while the "ndian tanks started shootin! > Pun%ab position at Nathuwala $iphon 5: -ri!ade area1 $hot up by 0 )ancers while attackin! Khem Karan
D.
= $ep
;.
/FB7 $ep B $ep B $ep
5. 0. Total
BDB hrs Ni!ht
:DB hrs
5
D
/ :
:;
Notwithstandin! Notwithstandin! the alle!ed superiority of Patton tanks, Pakistani and "ndian armour armour , as discusse discussed d earlie earlier, r, posses possessed sed almost almost eEual eEual combat combat power power in Kasur Kasur sect sector or.. 9omb 9ombat at powe powerr of Paki Pakist stan anii armo armour ur was was furt furthe herr de!r de!rad aded ed by the the channelied terrain where "ndian armour had transitioned to a defensive posture. (Bhy was the armoured division launched in an area unsuitable for armourF “#oes an armoured division breakout through a bridgehead made by one infantry battalion+J battalion+J Ceply by the commandin! officers when Aeneral &amid, 9orps 9ommander of sorts , asked them on mornin! th $eptember (what went wron!+J1 wron!+J1
Sial'ot Sector @ap ;.D
This sector is essentially the Cavi79henab corridor. "ts western boundary is defined by river 9henab which enters Pakistan in the vicinity of @arala, north of $ialkot and, meanderin! northeast to south west, cuts Arand Trunk road south of Au%rat.
The The east easter ern n boun bounda dary ry of the the corr corrid idor or is mark marked ed by rive riverr Cavi Cavi . &ere &ere,, the the "nternational border, runnin! rou!hly parallel to the river, at places decides to cut ri!ht throu!h it, creatin! a number of Pakistani and "ndian enclaves on both the sides, notably the Pakistani enclave at 3assar and the ad%acent "ndian enclave at division for the 9hamb operation1, two artillery re!iments, two mechanied infantry battalions, and had no bri!ade headEuarters. &owever, in the $ialkot sector , Pakistan 'rmy also had four armour re!iments under command 5 &orse, 0 9avalry and sEuadron ex 0: 9avalry1, : )orried -ri!ade : )ancers, 0: 9avalry less sEadron, and :x lorried infantry battalions1, and
"ndependent 'rmoured -ri!ade :x armour re!iments1 located in 3ammu, and an armour re!iment each under ; . Usin! )anchaster*s eEuation, we sEuare each side*s combat power and !et ;/ for "ndia and 0 for Pakistan, or a D to "ndian superiority in $ialkot sector. Table ;.0 Idia Formatio 'rmd
C/t #0r D
D"1 'rmd -de 0 @tn
: =M
#aki$ta Format matio 0 'rmd
D
5
C/t #0r
;
M@ake allowance to "ndia for (superiority+ of Patton tanks and lower its combat power to >
5
between )ahore and $ialkot. #or 'rmoured
6hile the "ndian 'rmoured "nfantry th $eptember. The "ndian "ndian bri!ad bri!adee comman commander der sent sent exa!!e exa!!erat rated ed report reportss about about Pakist Pakistani ani local local counter attack to 9orps &eadEuarters and reEuested permission to withdraw. &owever, 9orps &eadEuarters prevailed upon the bri!ade commander, orderin! him to launch another attack on ni!ht 0 th F>th $eptember. This attack was successful and the "ndians recaptured the southern end of the brid!e by B=BB hours, > th $eptember. "n response to this development, development, 5 5 -ri!ade immediately blew up a span of the 3assar brid!e. The situation had stabilied , with river Cavi between both the opposin! opposin! bri!ades positioned north and south of the river. river.
't DB hours, > th $eptember, 5 -ri!ade commander, without confirmin!, sent a report to 5
The Fi1i" For!e Atta!k
"ndian :0 th F=th $eptember. -oth the bri!ades captured their insi!nificant ob%ectives. "n any case, the troops opposite $ialkot were too weak to interfere with the advance of the "ndian attack. The "ndi "ndian anss howe howeve verr rema remain ined ed obse obsess ssed ed with with defe defenc ncee of 3amm 3ammu u and and , on th $eptember brou!ht a fourth bri!ade bri!ade 5: @ountain -ri!ade1. -ri!ade1. The Mai Idia Atta!k
't B0BB hours ,= th $eptember, "ndian 'rmoured
opposite 'rmoured 'rmoured -ri!ade leadin! the advance advance of "ndian 'rmoured 'rmoured kilometers accordin! to &arbaksh $in!h, sic1of their advance inside Pakistan. 'ccordin! to the "ndian accounts , P'# attacked the leadin! "ndian armour re!iments at about B=;B hours hours at 9hobara but was unable unable to hit any tank. :5 9avalry 9avalry tanks came in contact with "ndian 0 )i!ht 9avalry tanks, without a clue that they were up a!ainst "ndian 'rmoured Poona &orse, which was advancin! on the left towards Tharoah , commenced its advance two sEuadrons up but soon chan!ed to one sEuadron up because of the limited fields of fire and observation which made command and control extremely difficult. "t came in contact with :5 9avalry at B/;5 hours in Tharoah area and was also checked like 0 )i!ht 9avalry. 'ccordin! to Aurcharan $in!h, some firin! took place in between tanks of 0 )i!ht 9avalry and > Poona &orse. This happened because the inter re!iment !ap between both the re!iments was too less. 9 $Euadron, 0: 9avalry ,which was tasked to provide flank protection to 'rmoured
-y DBB hours, commander 'rmoured -ri!ade reached the conclusion that he was held up by at least two Patton re!iments and that there was no possibility of advancin! direct toward Phillora without sufferin! unacceptable losses. &e was further unnerved by reports of a Sraid* by enemy tanks on artillery !uns and soft vehicles which, in reality, was the firin! between 0: 9avalry tanks re7crossin!
a much deeper penetration could have been achieved. 4he fleeting chance that could have been e$ploited to gain a striking success, was lost forever. and while we were fumbling about ineffectively in a chaotic situation of our own creation, the enemy had that vital breathing space so essential for a quick rally round from the stunning impact of surprise. Be courted a serious setback through faulty decision and immature handling handling of armour which the enemy was not slow to e$ploit. >rom now onwards,the thrust intended to keep the enemy off balance and reeling until the final blow by sheer speed of advanc adv ance, e, tur turned ned int into o a slo slow w slo sloggi gging ng mat matchH chHa a ser series ies of bat batter tering ing7ra 7ram m actions=. 'fter /th $eptember $eptember when the the Pakistani Pakistani 0 'rmoure 'rmoured d
Air ad Na2al 3attle$
$hukla:B;1 wrote? 4o set the stage, the 'A> in ()C* was a well7trained, American supplied air force of (6 squadrons D(@7(C aircraft per squadronE, which included a squadron of >7 (+5 !tarfighters, then the most formidable fighter in Asia eight squadrons squadrons of >7GC !abre !abres s two squadr squadron onss of highly highly regar regarde ded d 27*6 27*6 bomber bombers s and a high7a high7alti ltitud tudee recon reconnai naissa ssance nce squadr squadron on of J27*6, J27*6, includ including ing the secre secrett J27*6> J27*6> photo7 photo7re recce cce aircraft that flew at 6+,+++ feet, beyond the reach of Indian fighters and anti7 aircraft weapons. 4he 'A> imaginatively used its two squadrons of light trainers for reconnaissance reconnaissance and ground ground attack. attack. 4he IA>, in contrast, had 5G squadrons, almost thrice the 'A>=s strength, although si$ 0ampire 0ampire and three 4oofani 4oofani fighter squadrons squadrons were clearly obsolescent.
>urthermore, >urthermore, India retained retained a number of squadrons squadrons in the east to guard against ?hina. Bith Indian quantity offset by 'A> quality, the decks were evenly stacked . 's both the air forces were busy tryin! to !ain air superiority over the enemy, which none of them was able to fully achieve till the end of war, neither of them them could provide meanin!ful close air support to their !round forces , except for P'# supp support ort duri durin! n! Oper Operat atio ion n Aran Arand d $lam $lam,, and and its its acti action on late laterr a!ai a!ains nstt "ndi "ndian an 'rmoured wars. To sum up, Pakistan fou!ht the /05 6ar 6ar a!ainst "ndia in a cavalier manner, based on a simpli simplisti sticc assump assumptio tion n that that the war would would remain remain confined confined to 3ammu 3ammu 4 Kashmir. 's a total war with "ndia had not been factored in Pakistani war plannin!, panic ensued when "ndia attacked across the "nternational border, and the strate!ic reserves were prematurely committed . 6ith 6ith 'rmoured
Aal%$i$ "he $indset The limited war scenario, as fancied by the #orei!n Office, some !enerals • ,'yub ,'yubKhan, Khan, and his army chief in that order1, proved wishful thinkin!. "n case case they they were were intent intent upon upon a milita military ry soluti solution, on, the operat operation ional al strate strate!y !y should have been , as pointed out earlier, hin!ed upon fosterin! , incubatin! and abettin! an insur!ency in the 8alley for at least one year. 6e should have fully expected a backlash by "ndia and, to counter it, maintained a defe defens nsiv ivee post postur uree all all alon alon! ! the the 9#) 9#) , the the 6orkin rkin! ! -oun -ounda dary ry,, and and the the "nternational border, while holdin! the strate!ic defensive balance with 'rmoured
&owever, we started the war in the 8alley and then reacted to the enemy*s moves. "ndia responded responded to Operation Operation Aibraltar by occupyin! the hei!hts in the Kar!il sector, Neelam 8alley , and the &a%i Pir -ul!e. Pakistan reacted with Operation Arand $lam in 9hamb sector. "ndia responded by attackin! alon! the "nternational border ,and we lost our nerves. @any ifs and buts would be raised on the practicability of the su!!ested operational strate!y . -ut !iven Pakistan*s resources, war stamina, and its capability to !arner "nte "ntern rnat atio iona nall supp suppor ortt , this this was was a bett better er opti option on as comp compare ared d with with the the headstron! approach which was followed and which recoiled to the utter embarrassment of those concerned.
Aims 4 O53ectives •
and durin! the war only Pakistan had heavy artillery. artillery. Res, "ndia had more infantry formations and we know that infantry is essentially employed, not to destroy the enemy, but to capture and hold !round.
•
The "ndians always come up with the excuse that, had the /05 war been allowed to prolon! for, say, another two weeks, Pakistan 'rmy would have been defeated. They !ive the same excuse in case of the first Kashmir war. That both these wars ended in stalemate was not due to "ndia*s ma!nanimity or improper appreciation by their civil and military leadership. Nor were they pressuried by the external powers. "t was because , like Pakistan, their military machine had also lost its steam. Pakistanis and "ndians, bein! from the same racial stock, have a certain level of endurance beyond which they mentally collapse. Unlike the 8ietnamese, they lack the resolve to brin! an armed conflict to its lo!ical end. This is a !enetic defect which cannot be rectified by raisin! more army divisions or inductin! state of the art weapons platforms. $hastri had asked Aeneral 9howdhry if he could continue the war for some more time. ti me. "t was 9howdhry who buckled down.
•
The three three week weekss of fi!htin fi!htin! ! had resul resulted ted in in a stalema stalemate te in both both Cavi Cavi 2 9henab and Cavi7$utle% corridors. Pakistan had made a shallow penetration in Kasur sector whereas the "ndians had made !ains in the $ialkot sector. "n both these sectors, the new defensive defensive lines were not based on any any formidable obstacle, obstacle, which which means that the fi!htin! fi!htin! stopped stopped only when both the sides sides were exhausted. "f we !o by the lo!ic lo!ic that the "ndian "ndian %u!!ernaut, due to to its sheer wei!ht, would have rolled down the numerically inferior Pakistani forces in due course of time, this was not evident durin! those three weeks of fi!htin!. fi!htin!. 'dvanc 'dvancin! in! between between the Cavi79henab Cavi79henab corridor corridor , the "ndians could not even contact the the Arand Trunk Trunk road. 'nd this happened happened when the Pakistan 'rmy had stumbled into war without any serious preparation. The Pakistani leaders approached the military option to recover 34K in a lukewarm manner. $o, were they serious about a peaceful resolution of the problemJ They were not because this entails !ive and take to which both Pakistan and "ndia are averse. B years different approaches and !overnance models have been presented at various forums to address 34K imbro!lio. Pakistan has forwarded the 9henab formula which has been countered by "ndia with the Neelam formula . Then there was the Trieste
model. model. 'll 'll these formulas formulas and models have failed failed because both the sides sides have used them as a ploy for foot dra!!in!. 6lanning 4 6rearation 6rearation Iarlier, we had identified (craftin! a comprehensive plan aimed at achievin! • the military ob%ectives ob%ectives across the 9ease 9ease #ire )ine while while holdin! holdin! the enemy enemy alon! the "nternational border+ as one of the prereEuisites for effectively de7 freein! the Kashmir dispute. "t seems Pakistan*s military planners were in undue hurry to wa!e a war in Kashmir. They were confusin! commando opera operati tion onss with with !uerri !uerrill llaa warfa warfare. re. &ad they they !ive !iven n at leas leastt a year year for for incubatin! and maturin! the insur!ency in in 34K throu!h creation of sleeper sleeper cells, tied up the loose ends by not succumbin! to bleedin! :
The above mentioned strate!y would not be effective without the creation of a nimble but effective command infrastructure and lo!istics support network in the 8alley. 9ombined teams comprisin! the locals , irre!ulars, and the 'rmy , divided into small !roups should have been created. Iach team would be self sufficient and armed with small arms, rocket launchers , heavy mortars, mortars, with further further supplies supplies hidden in the forests, forests, tunnels tunnels and mountain mountain crevices. $uch teams would have unrestrained freedom of action, facilitatin! Euick relative to mountainous terrain1 re!roupin! and response rate.
-y the end of the three weeks fi!htin!, both sides were runnin! low on ammunition. Pakistan was in worse shape because it started with only two week weekss !ene !enera rall serv servic icee rese reserv rves es.. &owe &oweve verr, 9hin 9hines esee smal smalll arms arms and and ammu ammuni niti tion on had had star starte ted d comi comin! n! in by air air. &eav &eavy y arms arms and and arti artill ller ery y ammun ammunit itio ion n were were bein bein! ! ship shippe ped. d.9o 9omi min! n! back back to thei theirr depe depend nden ence ce on borrowed power, once they bun!led up on the battle field due to their own naivet and ineptitude, the Pakistani leaders started blamin! the U$ for clampin! an arms embar!o on the $ubcontinent. They should have known better and should not have wa!ed the war if they were not confident of concludin! concludin! it within within the resources resources available. available. 'n 'n then, the ritual ritual of ravin! ravin! and rantin! before the wailin! wall of the United Nations.
Force Ratios The United $tates $tates made sure that the military assistance it was providin! to Pakistan did not tilt the balance a!ainst "ndia. "n /05, on the western border Pakistan had seven infantry divisions ;
•
defeated. defeated. On the other other hand, "ndia had D? superiori superiority ty in combat power power in the $ilakot sector. &owever, "ndian offensive in this sector failed to achieve its ob%ectives. 'rmy leadership of both the countries did not know how to exploit their respective superiority in armour and infantry. The offensive at 9hamb did not fritter away so much due to chan!e in command than the fact that >
Emloyment of Armo&r "t is difficult to calculate the force ratio between armour , mainly because of • the disparity disparity in Euality Euality of tanks. tanks. ' compari comparison son between between "ndia*s 9enturi 9enturion on and Pakistan*s @;> and @;= Pattons is !iven below? Table;.0 9haracteristi cs @ain 'rmament $econdary 'rmament 'rmour 6ei!ht PowerFwei!ht r Power &e & ei!ht $peed
•
9enturion
@;>
@;=
B5 mm
/B mm :x .5B cal @A x .DB cal @A B mm ;;. ton >.0 hpFton =Bhp D.D5 m 0B kmpFh
/B mm :x .5B cal @A x .DB cal @A :B mm ;5 ton 5. hpFton 05B hp D.m ;= kmpFh
5: mm 50 tons 05B hp D.B m D; kmpFh
The The 9ent 9enturi urion on*s *s adva advant nta! a!ee lay lay in its its supe superi rior or fire fire powe powerr and and armou armour r protection as compared with the @;> and @;= Patton tanks. The PattonHs armor could in fact be penetrated be penetrated by the >5 mm !un of the '@7D."n fire power, the Patton was inferior to the 9enturion, thou!h superior to the $herma $herman. n. &oweve &owever, r, the the Patton Patton had had !reate !reaterr mobili mobility ty and was was easier easier to maintain. The @;= version had better hull armour than early models models of the the 9enturion. 9enturion*s turret stow bins provided added protection a!ainst infantry hand held anti7tank weapons Qalo!a,///1. "n discussions, "ndian defe defenc ncee anal analys ysts ts poin pointt out out to the the Patt Patton on*s *s adva advant nta! a!ee in ni!h ni!htt fi!h fi!hti tin! n! capability due to infra red devices. "n fact, fact, these devises had been removed by the 'mericans before the tanks were shipped to Pakistan. The 9enturian was not to be shru!!ed off. "sraelis had fou!ht the /0> and />D wars with this tank , and prevailed. 6hile developin! the @erkava, "srael*s main battle tank, many features of the 9enturian, particularly its suspension system were retained. The Patton was held in reasonably hi!h esteem by both sides and
poor tactics were to blame for the debacle at 'sal Uttar. "n the cate!ory of li!h li!htt tank tankss eEui eEuipp ppin in! ! the the recc reccee re!im re!imen ents ts,, "ndia "ndia*s *s '@7 @7D D was was more more modern than Pakistan*s P akistan*s 9hafee. "he Aftermath
communications, disrupt his supplies and !enerally inflict dama!e. " am talkin! about a people*s militia bein! based in every villa!e and town. $ince Pakistan lacks an industrial base to replenish supplies, this kind of defence is obviously suited to its needs.+ 'ccordin! to $ultan @. Khan, Pakistan*s ambassador to 9hina, ( there was a stunned silence amon! the !enerals. The concept of puttin! arms into the hands of the common man was was totally alien to themG in fact, fact, it was deemed a threat to law and order in Pakistan. The notion of a prolon!ed conflict involvin! the citienry of Paki Pakist stan an was was not not part part of the the defe defenc ncee strat strate! e!y y plan planne ned d by thes thesee prof profes essi sion onal al soldiers.+ Khan,:BB01. Noted in the memoirs of war veteran, Aeneral Tar later four7s four7star tar ariE iE @a% @a%id id later !eneral1, 9hou In7)ai had lon! advised the !overnment in the classic style of $un Tu? to !o slow, not to push "ndia hardG and avoid a fi!ht over Kashmir, Hfor at least, :B7DB years, until you have developed your economy and consolidated your nation national al power power.A .Aene eneral ral @a%id @a%id mainta maintaine ined d in Kating
.'li,).'. :BB/1. The Cann of Kutch and its aftermath. !outh Asian !tudies 8ol. :;, No.: :. -hutto,Q.'. /0/1. 4he -yth of Independence.Oxford Independence.Oxford University Press. D.Aates,$. 4 Coy, Coy,K K . Unconventional warfare in $outh 'sia. Cetrieved from ;.Aauhar,' //D1. Ay //D1. Ayub ub han: 'akistanLs >irst -ilitary Jule. $an!emeel Publications. 5.Aill,3.&.:BB;1. .Khan, >.Khan, N.'. :B:1. Islam, :B:1. Islam, Bomen, Bomen, and violence in ashmir: 2etween India and 'akistan ?omparative >eminist !tudies1. !tudies1. Pal!rave7@acmillan. =.Khan, $.'. :B51. /05. The old time time !reat memories of battle of 9hawinda. Cetrieved
from www.pakmade.info www.pakmade.info.. /.Khan, /. Khan, $.@. :BB01. @emories and Ceflections of a Pakistani
