SUNVILLE vs. JUDGE ABAD The application of the expertise of the adinistrative a!enc" in the resol#tion of the iss#e raised is a condition precedent for the event#al exaination$ if still necessar"$ of the sae %#estion &" a co#rt of '#stice. (A)TS* S#nville +as !ranted a Ti&er License A!reeent A!reeent ,TLA- a#thoriin! it to exploit ti&er in Lison Valle"$ Valle"$ /a&oan!a del S#r. 0espondents filed a petition +ith the DEN0 to ann#l the said TLA d#e to soe serio#s violations of its conditions and provisions of forestr" la+s$ carried o#t &" petitioner. The" li1e+ise filed a coplaint for in'#nction in the 0T)$ 0T)$ &ased on the sae ca#ses of action. S#nville filed a otion to disiss for lac1 of '#risdiction of the co#rt and non2 exha#stion of adinistrative reedies. The otion +as denied &" J#d!e A&ad of the 0T). The )A affired affired and held that the doctrine of exha#stion of adinistrative reedies +as not +itho#t exception and pointed to the several instances approved &" this )o#rt +here it co#ld &e dispensed +ith. The respondent co#rt fo#nd that in the case &efore it$ the applica&le exception +as the #r!ent need for '#dicial intervention !iven the petitioner3s operations have ca#sed heav" siltation in vario#s rivers. ISSUE* 4hether the respondents sho#ld first exha#st adinistrative reedies5 6ELD* 7ES. The doctrine of exha#stion of adinistrative reedies calls for resort first to the appropriate adinistrative a#thorities in the resol#tion of a controvers" fallin! #nder their '#risdiction &efore the sae a" &e elevated to the co#rts of '#stice for revie+. revie+. 8ne of the reasons for the doctrine of exha#stion is the separation o f po+ers$ +hich en'oins #pon the J#diciar" a &ecoin! polic" of non2interference +ith atters coin! priaril" ,al&eit not excl#sivel"- +ithin the copetence of the other departents. As correctl" s#!!ested &" the respondent co#rt$ ho+ever$ there are a n#&er of instances +hen the doctrine a" &e dispensed +ith and '#dicial action validl" resorted to iediatel". Aon! Aon! these exceptional cases are* ,9+hen the %#estion raised is p#rel" le!al: ,;- +hen the adinistrative &od" is in estoppel: ,<+hen the act coplained of is patentl" ille!al: ,=- +hen there is #r!ent need for '#dicial intervention: ,>- +hen the clai involved is sall: ,?- +hen irrepara&le daa!e +ill &e s#ffered: ,@- +hen there is no other plain$ speed" and ade%#ate reed": ,- +hen stron! p#&lic interest is involved: ,- +hen the s#&'ect of the controvers" is private land: and 9C- in %#o +arranto proceedin!s. In this case$ the (orest ana!eent B#rea# of the DEN0 sho#ld &e allo+ed to r#le in the first instance on this controvers" coin! #nder its express po+ers &efore the co#rts of
'#stice a" intervene. The respondents have failed to satisfactoril" esta&lish that the extraordinar" circ#stances to '#stif" deviation fro the doctrine &" exha#stion of adinistrative reedies and iediate resort to the co#rts. In fact$ S#nville has stopped its operations in copliance +ith the order of the DEN0.
0ep#&lic of the hilippines SUPREME COURT
anila (I0ST DIVISI8N
G.R. No. 85502 February 24, 1992 SUNVILLE TIMBER PR!U"TS, IN"., petitioner, vs. #N. $LFNS G. $B$!, a% &u'(e RT", Br. 22 o) Pa(a'*a+ "*y, "URT F $PPE$LS, ISI!R GILBLING $N! RBUSTI$N BUGT$I, respondents. Manuel V. Trinida for petitioner. Adolf Leo P. Boncavil for private respondents.
"RU-,
J.:
The Court will focus its attention only on one of the issues raised in this petition — the correct application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA, authori!ing it to cut, remove and utili!e timber within the concession area covering "#,$%% hectares of forest land in &amboanga del 'ur, for a period of ten years expiring on 'eptember ), )##". *n +uly ), )#-, the herein private respondents filed a petition with the epartment of /nvironment and 0atural 1esources for the cancellation of the TLA on the ground of serious violations of its conditions and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations. The same charges were subse2uently made, also by the herein private respondents, in a complaint for in3unction with damages against the petitioner, which was doc4eted as Civil Case 0o. "-" in the 1egional Trial Court of 5agadian City. The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit6 ) the court had no 3urisdiction over the complaint7 " the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted administrative remedies7 and the in3unction sought was expressly prohibited by section ) of 5 8%$.
+udge Alfonso 9. Abad denied the motion to dismiss on ecember )), )#-, 1 and the motion for reconsideration on :ebruary )$, )#. 2 The petitioner then elevated the matter to the respondent Court of Appeals, which sustained the trial court in a decision dated +uly ;, )#, and in its resolution of 'eptember "-, )#, denying the motion for reconsideration. 4 The Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without exception and pointed to the several instances approved by this Court where it could be dispensed with. The respondent court found that in the case before it, the applicable exception was the urgent need for 3udicial intervention, which it explained thus6 The lower court found out that sometime on +uly )#), the City Council of 5agadian in its 1esolution 0o. ))) re2uested the
nstead in )#", a TLA covering "#,$%% hectares, including the area re2uested, was given to petitioner. Then the fear expressed by the City Council of 5agadian in its resolution became reality. ?As averred in the complaint, the erosion caused by the logging operations of the defendant has caused heavy siltation not only in the Labangan 1iver (as predicted by the City Council of 5agadian City in )#) but also in the Tu4uran 1iver, 'alug 1iver, 'indangan 1iver, and 'ibuguey 1iver. >n other words, the adverse effects of the logging operations of the defendant have already covered a wider area than that feared to be adversely affected by the City Council of 5agadian City. :loods are un4nown phenomena in heavily forested areas years bac4, particularly in the >sland of @indanao. hen the grant of logging concessions started, so was the denudation of forests. . . . >t is common 4nowledge that heavy floods have occurred in areasBplaces ad3oining logging concessions. (1esolution dated ecember )), )#-, p. $. Thus, it is urgent that indiscriminate logging be stopped. >rreparable damage would ensue unless the court intervenes. 1eliance on the /01 may not be enough, 3udging from its inaction on the councils re2uest seven years bac4.
The respondent court cited in support of this conclusion the case of De Lara v . Cloribel , 5 where ?irreparable damage and in3ury? was allowed as an exceptional ground, and Arrow Transportation Corporation v . Board of Transportation, / where the doctrine was waived because of ?the strong public interest in having the matter settled? as soon as possible. The decision also declared invalid 'ection ) of 5 8%$, which provides6
'ec. ). 0o court of the 5hilippines shall have 3urisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary in3unction or preliminary mandatory in3unction in any case involving or growing out of the issuance, approval or disapproval, revocation or suspension of, or any action whatsoever by the proper a dministrative official or body on concessions, licenses, permits, patents, or public grants of any 4ind in connection with the disposition, exploitation, utili!ation, exploration andBor development of the natural resources of the 5hilippines.
This was held to be an encroachment on the 3udicial power vested in the 'upreme Court and the lower courts by Article =>>>, 'ection ), of the Constitution. The respondent court cited Export Processing one Aut!orit" v . Dula" , where several presidential decrees were declared unconstitutional for divesting the courts of the 3udicial power to determine 3ust compensation in expropriation cases. The petitioner is now before the Court, contending that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not correctly applied and that the declaration of the unconstitutionality of 'ection ) of 5 8%$ was improper. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their 3urisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of 3ustice for review. 0onDobservance of the doctrine results in lac4 of a cause of action, 8 which is one of the grounds allowed in the 1ules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint. The deficiency is not 3urisdictional. :ailure to invo4e it operates as a waiver of the ob3ection as a ground for a motion to dismiss and the court may then proceed with the case as if the doctrine had been observed. *ne of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which en3oins upon the +udiciary a becoming policy of nonDinterference with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively within the competence of the other departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in a better position to resolve 2uestions addressed to their particular expertise and that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so. A no less important consideration is that administrative decisions are usually 2uestioned in the special civil actions of certiorari , prohibition and #anda#us, which are allowed only when there is no other plain, speedy and ade2uate remedy available to the petitioner. >t may be added that strict enforcement of the rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number of avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their heavily loaded doc4ets. 9 As correctly suggested by he respondent court, however, there are a number of instances when the doctrine may be dispensed with and 3udicial action validly resorted
to immediately. Among these exceptional cases are6 ) when the 2uestion raised is purely legal7 10 " when the administrative body is in estoppel7 11 when the act complained of is patently illegal7 12 ; when there is urgent need for 3udicial intervention7 1 $ when the claim involved is small7 14 8 when irreparable damage will be suffered7 15 - when there is no other plain, speedy and ade2uate remedy7 1/ when strong public interest is involved7 1 # when the sub3ect of the controversy is private land7 18 and )% in $uo warranto proceedings. 19 The private respondents now submit that their complaint comes under the exceptions because forestry laws do not re2uire observance of the doctrine as a condition precedent to 3udicial action7 the 2uestion they are raising is purely legal7 application of the doctrine will cause great and irreparable damage7 and public interest is involved. e rule for the petitioner. /ven if it be assumed that the forestry laws do not expressly re2uire prior resort to administrative remedies, the reasons for the doctrine above given, if nothing else, would suffice to still re2uire its observance. /ven if such reasons were disregarded, there would still be the explicit language of pertinent laws vesting in the /01 the power and function ?to regulate the development, disposition, extraction, exploration and use of the countrys forests? and ?to exercise exclusive 3urisdiction? in the ?management and disposition of all lands of the public domain,? 20 and in the :orest @anagement
doctrine by exhaustion of administrative remedies and immediate resort to the courts of 3ustice. >n fact, this particular submission must fall flat against the petitioners uncontested contention that it has since )# stopped its operations under the TLA in compliance with the order of the /01. >n the 5etition for prohibition filed with the respondent court, the petitioner alleged that its logging operations had been suspended pursuant to a telegram 22 received on :ebruary ", )#, by the istrict :orester from the 1egional /xecutive irector of the /01, &amboanga City7 reading as follows6 >'T1>CT :*1/'T/1 5A9A>A0 C>TE FG*T/ H/1/G0/1 >' 1A>* @/''A9/ AT/ :/<1GA1E "", )# :1*@ '/C1/TA1E :GL9/0C>* '. :ACT*1A0, +1. FG*T/ /::/CT>=/ >@@/>AT/LE C@A 'G'5/0 ALL L*99>09 *5/1AT>*0' *: 'G0=>LL/ >0 =>/ *: '/1>*G' =>*LAT>*0' *: :*1/'T 51*T/CT>*0 A0 1/:*1/'TAT>*0 G0FG*T/ 'G<@>T 1/5*1T A'A5. 1/
The petition now before us contains the allegations that the ?petition for cancellation of petitioners TLA is still pending up to this date and that petitioners logging operations (were ordered suspended by the 'ecretary of the /01 pending further investigation.? 2
>n the memorandum filed by the petitioner with this Court, it is informed that ?the 'ecretary of the /01 suspended petitioners logging operations until further investigation. The suspension is still in force up to this date after the lapse of almost years.? 24 These statements have not been disputed by the private respondents in their pleadings before the respondent court and this Court and are therefore deemed admitted. There in no 2uestion that Civil Case 0o. "-" comes within the 3urisdiction of the respondent court. 0evertheless, as the wrong alleged in the complaint was supposedly committed as a result of the unlawful logging activities of the petitioner, it will be necessary first to determine whether or not the TLA and the forestry laws and regulations had indeed been violated. To repeat for emphasis, determination of this 2uestion is the primary responsibility of the :orest @anagement
issue raised is a condition precedent for the eventual examination, if still necessary, of the same 2uestion by a court of 3ustice. >n view of the above observations, we find that there was no need for the respondent court to declare the unconstitutionality of 'ection ) of 5 8%$. The rule is that a 2uestion of constitutionality must be avoided where the case can be decided on some other available ground, 25 as we have done in the case before us. The resolution of this same 2uestion must await another case, where all the indispensable re2uisites of a 3udicial in2uiry into a constitutional 2uestion are satisfactorily established. >n such an event, it will be time for the Court ?to ma4e the hammer fall, and heavily,? in the words of +ustice Laurel, if such action is warranted. H/1/:*1/, the petition is 91A0T/. The decision of the respondent court dated +uly ;, )#, and its resolution dated 'eptember "-, )#, as well as the resolutions of the trial court dated ecember )), )#- and :ebruary )$, )#, are all 1/=/1'/ and '/T A'>/. Civil Case 0o. "-" in the 1egional Trial Court of 5agadian City is hereby >'@>''/. '* *1/1/. %arvasa& C.'.& (ri)o*A$uino and Medialdea& ''.& concur.
