TABLE OF CONTENTS Page
Introduction......................................................................................................................................................
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Acronyms and Abbreviations.........................................................................................................................
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Chapter 1.
Definitions ..................................................................................................................................
1-1
Chapter 2.
General Principles......................................................................................................................
2-1
Operational aspects........................................................................................................................
2-1
Chapter 3.
Collection and Transmission of Information ...........................................................................
3-1
Chapter 4.
Air Traffic Control ......................................................................................................................
4-1
Chapter 5.
Contingency Plans.....................................................................................................................
5-1
Principles........................................................................................................................................ Threat assessment and risk management...................................................................................... Contingency plan exercises............................................................................................................ Crisis management team................................................................................................................ Incident access and control ............................................................................................................ Isolated parking position................................................................................................................. Suspect explosive devices ............................................................................................................. Emergency operations centre......................................................................................................... Communications............................................................................................................................. Press and media ............................................................................................................................ Telephone enquiries and relatives.................................................................................................. Response to threats .......................................................................................................................
5-1 5-3 5-4 5-4 5-6 5-7 5-7 5-8 5-8 5-9 5-10 5-10
Review, Analysis and Reports ..................................................................................................
6-1
Introduction..................................................................................................................................... Reports...........................................................................................................................................
6-1 6-1
Appendix 1. Compilation and dissemination of information concerning an aircraft which is being subjected to an act of unlawful interference.............................................................................................
A1-1
Appendix 2.
Threat Assessment Methodology..........................................................................................
A2-1
Appendix 3.
Risk Management Model ........................................................................................................
A3-1
Appendix 4.
Action by the Recipient of a Bomb Threat Telephone Call..................................................
A4-1
Appendix 5.
Bomb Threat Assessment ......................................................................................................
A5-1
2.1
5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10 5.11 5.12 Chapter 6. 6.1 6.2
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Page Appendix 6.
Response to Bomb Threats Against Aircraft ........................................................................
A6-1
Appendix 7.
Aircraft Security Search Checklist.........................................................................................
A7-1
Appendix 8.
Suspect Explosive Devices ....................................................................................................
A8-1
Appendix 9.
Search and Evacuation Guidelines........................................................................................
A9-1
Appendix 10.
Official Report on Act of Unlawful Interference..................................................................
A10-1
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INTRODUCTION
This manual has been developed to assist States in promoting safety and security within the field of civil aviation. The objective of this document is to advise States on the prevention of and, where necessary, response to acts of unlawful interference, through the application of an aviation security system comprised of four main elements: •
legal framework and security oversight;
•
airport design, infrastructure and equipment;
•
human resources recruitment, selection, training and certification; and
•
procedures and the implementation of security measures.
In order to achieve a high degree of sustainable performance, it is necessary to apply a multi-layered security system combining principles, procedures, programmes, technologies and countermeasures, based on each of the above elements, to form an overall “system of systems” approach to aviation security. The security manual, comprised of five volumes addressing the above-mentioned elements, contains guidance on how States may comply with the Standards and Recommended Practices of Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed at Chicago on 7 December 1944. While the methods of compliance provided are based on generally recognized practices and procedures common within the international civil aviation industry, they are not the only means of compliance. Other methods of meeting the Standards and Recommended Practices contained in Annex 17 — Security may be equally appropriate. Modification to the practices and procedures proposed in the manual may be necessary in order to meet the varied legal and administrative structures within individual States. The material in this volume, entitled Crisis Management and Response to Acts of Unlawful Interference is intended for the appropriate authority, airport and aircraft operators and any other entity responsible for crisis management and emergency response. This volume provides guidance with regard to threat and risk assessment, contingency plans, collection and transmission of information during an act of unlawful interference, and the subsequent review, analysis and reporting of any act of unlawful interference. The remaining four volumes of the security manual address the following aspects of an aviation security system: •
Volume I — National Organization and Administration is intended for the appropriate authority and provides guidance with regard to the development and implementation of a national legal framework, oversight responsibilities of a State, as they pertain to aviation security. This volume contains guidance related to legal aspects, international cooperation, and additional security measures such as in-flight security officers, armed personnel, a national civil aviation security programme, quality control, and procedures for handling sensitive information;
•
Volume II — Recruitment, Selection and Training is intended for any entity responsible for the recruitment and training of personnel involved in the implementation of aviation security. It provides guidance material with regard to the national training policy and the national civil aviation security training programme, including recruitment, selection, training and certification of security staff, selection and training of non-security staff and training development;
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Volume III — Airport Security, Organization, Programme and Design Requirements is intended for the airport operator and any entity responsible for design of the airport infrastructure. It provides guidance material with regard to the requirements of organization, airport security programme and airport design; and
•
Volume IV — Preventive Security Measures is intended for all entities responsible for the implementation of an aviation security system and consists of preventive procedures with regard to access control, aircraft operator security, general aviation and aerial work, passengers and cabin baggage, hold baggage, special categories of passengers, cargo, mail and security procedures for other entities.
In order to keep this manual relevant and accurate, suggestions for improving it in terms of format, content or presentation are welcome. Any such recommendation or suggestion will be examined and, if found suitable, will be included in the next edition of this manual. Regular revision will ensure that this manual remains both pertinent and accurate. Comments concerning this manual should be address to: The Secretary General International Civil Aviation Organization 999 University Street Montréal, Quebec H3C 5H7 Canada
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AFS ASTPs ATS AVSEC BD CMT EDDS EDS EMT EOC EOD FCP ICAO IED IFSO LAGs NCASP NCASQCP NCCC PANS-ATM PoC PTI RDC SAR STEB TIC TIP UPU
Aeronautical fixed service Aviation Security Training Packages Air traffic services Aviation Security Bomb disposal Crisis management team Explosive device detection system Explosive detection system Emergency management team Emergency operations centre Explosive ordnance disposal Forward control point International Civil Aviation Organization Improvised explosive device In-flight security officer Liquids, gels and aerosols National Civil Aviation Security Programme National Civil Aviation Security Quality Control Programme National coordination and control centre Procedures for Air Navigation Services – Air Traffic Management Point of contact Positive target identification Rest and debriefing centre Search and rescue Security tamper-evident bag Telephone and information centre Threat image projection Universal Postal Union
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Chapter 1 DEFINITIONS
Terms that are defined in the International Civil Aviation Vocabulary (Doc 9713) and the Annexes are used in accordance with the meanings and usages given therein. A wide variety of terms are in use throughout the world to describe facilities, procedures and concepts for airport operations and planning. As far as possible the terms used in this document are those which have the widest international use. Acts of Unlawful Interference (Definition given for guidance purposes) These are acts or attempted acts such as to jeopardize the safety of civil aviation and air transport, i.e. •
unlawful seizure of aircraft in flight,
•
unlawful seizure of aircraft on the ground,
•
hostage-taking on board aircraft or on aerodromes,
•
forcible intrusion on board an aircraft, at an airport or on the premises of an aeronautical facility,
•
introduction on board an aircraft or at an airport of a weapon or hazardous device or material intended for criminal purposes,
•
communication of false information such as to jeopardize the safety of an aircraft in flight or on the ground, of passengers, crew, ground personnel or the general public, at an airport or on the premises of a civil aviation facility.
Accompanied hold baggage. Baggage accepted for carriage in the hold of an aircraft which the passenger who checked it in is on board. Aerial work. An aircraft operation in which an aircraft is used for specialized services such as agriculture, construction, photography, surveying, observation and patrol, search and rescue, and aerial advertisement. Aircraft. Any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air other than the reactions of the air against the earth’s surface. Aircraft in flight. An aircraft from the moment when all its external doors are closed following embarkation until the moment when such doors are opened for disembarkation. Aircraft in service. A parked aircraft which is under surveillance sufficient to detect unauthorized access. Aircraft maintenance area. All the ground space and facilities provided for aircraft maintenance. This includes aprons, hangars, buildings and workshops, vehicle parks and roads associated therewith. Such an area is normally designated as a security restricted area.
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Aircraft not in service. An aircraft that is either parked for a period of more than 12 hours or is not under surveillance sufficient to detect unauthorized access. Aircraft operators’ documents. Air waybills/consignment notes, passenger tickets and boarding passes, bank and agent settlement plan documents, excess baggage tickets, miscellaneous charges orders (M.C.O.), damage and irregularity reports, baggage and cargo labels, timetables, and weight and balance documents, for use by aircraft operators. Aircraft security check. An inspection of the interior of an aircraft to which passengers may have had access and an inspection of the hold for the purposes of discovering suspicious objects, weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices, articles and substances. Aircraft security search. A thorough inspection of the interior and exterior of the aircraft for the purpose of discovering suspicious objects, weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices, articles or substances. Aircraft stand. A designated area on an apron intended to be used for parking an aircraft. Airport. Any area in a Contracting State which is open for commercial aircraft operations. Airside. The movement area of an airport, adjacent terrain and buildings or portions thereof, access to which is controlled. Appropriate authority for aviation security. The authority designated by a State within its administration to be responsible for the development, implementation and maintenance of the national civil aviation security programme. Apron. A defined area, on a land aerodrome, intended to accommodate aircraft for purposes of loading or unloading passengers, mail or cargo, fuelling, parking or maintenance. Apron passenger vehicle. Any vehicle used to convey passengers between aircraft and passenger buildings. Background check. A check of a person’s identity and previous experience, including where legally permissible, any criminal history, as part of the assessment of an individual’s suitability to implement a security control and/or for unescorted access to a security restricted area. Baggage. Personal property of passengers or crew carried on an aircraft by agreement with the operator. Baggage container. A receptacle in which baggage is loaded for conveyance in aircraft. Baggage sorting area. Space in which departure baggage is sorted into flight loads. Baggage storage area. Space in which checked/hold baggage is stored pending transport to aircraft and space in which mishandled baggage may be held until forwarded, claimed or otherwise disposed of. Bomb alert. A status of alert put in place by competent authorities to activate an intervention plan intended to counter the possible consequences arising from a communicated threat, anonymous or otherwise, or arising from the discovery of a suspect device or other suspect item on an aircraft, at an airport or in any civil aviation facilities. Bomb threat. A communicated threat, anonymous or otherwise, which suggests, or infers, whether true or false that the safety of an aircraft in flight or on the ground, or any airport or civil aviation facility or any person may be in danger from an explosive or other item or device.
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Definitions
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Cabin baggage. Baggage intended for carriage in the cabin of an aircraft. Cargo. Any property carried on an aircraft other than mail, stores and accompanied or mishandled baggage. Cargo area. All the ground space and facilities provided for cargo handlings. It includes aprons, cargo buildings and warehouses, vehicle parks and roads associated therewith. Cargo building. A building through which cargo passes between air and ground transport and in which processing facilities are located, or in which cargo is stored pending transfer to air or ground transport. Catering stores. All items, other than catering supplies, associated with passenger in-flight services, for example newspapers, magazines, headphones, audio and video tapes, pillows and blankets, and amenity kits. Catering supplies. Food, beverages, other dry stores and associated equipment used on board an aircraft. Certification. A formal evaluation and confirmation by or on behalf of the appropriate authority for aviation security that a person possesses the necessary competencies to perform assigned functions to an acceptable level as defined by the appropriate authority. Check-in. The process of reporting to an aircraft operator for acceptance on a particular flight. Check-in position. The location of facilities at which check-in is carried out. Co-mail. Abbreviation of aircraft operator company mail, shipped within the company’s network of stations. Co-mat. Abbreviation of aircraft operator company materials, shipped within the company’s network of stations. Commercial air transport operation. An aircraft operation involving the transport of passengers, cargo or mail for remuneration or hire. Note.— For the purpose of this manual the term “aircraft operator” will be used instead of a “commercial air transport operator”. Contingency plan. A “proactive” plan to include measures and procedures addressing various threat levels, risk assessments and the associated security measures to be implemented, designed to anticipate and mitigate events as well as prepare all concerned parties having roles and responsibilities in the event of an actual act of unlawful interference. A contingency plan sets forth incremental security measures that may be elevated as the threat increases. It may be a stand-alone plan or included as part of the Crisis Management Plan. Corporate aviation. The non-commercial operation or use of aircraft by a company for the carriage of passengers or goods as an aid to the conduct of company business, flown by a professional pilot employed to fly the aircraft. (Note that corporate aviation is a subset of general aviation.) Courier service. An operation whereby shipments tendered by one or more shippers are transported as the baggage of a courier passenger on board a scheduled aircraft operator service under normal passenger hold baggage documentation. Crew member. A person assigned by an operator to duty on an aircraft during a flight duty period. Crisis management. Contingency measures implemented in response to increased threat levels as well as implementation of measures and procedures in response to the emergencies to include acts of unlawful interference.
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Dangerous goods. Articles or substances which are capable of posing a risk to health, safety, property or the environment and which are shown in the list of dangerous goods in the Technical Instructions or which are classified according to those Instructions. Deportee. A person who had legally been admitted to a State by its authorities or who had entered a State illegally, and who at some later time is formally ordered by the competent authorities to leave that State. Note.— The competent authorities may provide an escort for such persons. Diplomatic pouch (bag). A shipping container having diplomatic immunity from search or seizure. Direct transit area. A special area established in an international airport, approved by the public authorities concerned and under their direct supervision or control, where passengers can stay during transit or transfer without applying for entry to the State. Disruptive passenger. A passenger who fails to respect the rules of conduct at an airport or on board an aircraft or to follow the instructions of the airport staff or crew members and thereby disturbs the good order and discipline at an airport or on board the aircraft. Emergency plan. The plan setting forth the procedures for coordinating the response of different aerodrome agencies (or services) and of those agencies in the surrounding community that could be of assistance in responding to the emergency. Explosive Detection System (EDS). A system or combination of different technologies which has the ability to detect, and so to indicate by means of an alarm, explosive material contained in baggage, irrespective of the material from which the bag is made. Explosive Device Detection System (EDDS). A system or combination of different technologies which has the ability to detect, and so to indicate by means of an alarm, an explosive device by detecting one or more components of such a device contained in baggage, irrespective of the material from which the bag is made. Explosive substance. Solid or liquid substance (or mixture of substances) which is in itself capable by chemical reaction of emitting gases at such a temperature, pressure and speed as to cause damage in the surrounding area. This definition includes pyrotechnic substances, even if they do not emit gases. Those substances that are in themselves not explosive but may produce an explosive atmosphere of gas, vapour or dust are not included. Facilitation. The efficient management of a necessary control process, with the objective to expedite clearance of persons or goods and prevent unnecessary operational delays. Freight. See Cargo. General aviation operation. An aircraft operation other than a commercial air transport operation or an aerial work operation. Human Factors principles. Principles which apply to aeronautical design, certification, training, operations and maintenance and which seek safe interface between the human and other system components by proper consideration to human performance. Human performance. Human capabilities and limitations which have an impact on the safety, security and efficiency of aeronautical operations. Identification cards. See Permits.
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Definitions
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Inadmissible person. A person who is or will be refused admission to a State by its authorities. Such persons normally have to be transported back to their State of departure, or to any other State where the persons are admissible, by the aircraft operator on which they arrived. (See appropriate Standards in Annex 9 — Facilitation, Chapter 5.) In-flight security officer. A person who is employed and trained by the government of the State of the Operator or by the government of the State of registration to be deployed on an aircraft with the purpose of protecting that aircraft and its occupants against acts of unlawful interference. This excludes persons employed to provide exclusive personal protection for one or more specific people travelling on the aircraft, such as personal bodyguards. Integrated/consolidated cargo. A consignment of multi-packages which has been originated by more than one person, each of whom has made an agreement for carriage by air with another person other than a scheduled aircraft operator. Interline baggage. Baggage of passengers subject to transfer from the aircraft of one operator to the aircraft of another operator in the course of the passenger’s journey. International airport. Any airport designated by the Contracting State in whose territory it is situated as an airport of entry and departure for international air traffic, where the formalities incident to customs, immigration, public health, animal and plant quarantine and similar procedures are carried out. Known consignor. 1
For cargo: The originator of property for transportation by air for his own account and who has established business with a regulated agent or aircraft operator. For mail: The originator of mail for transportation by air for his own account and who has established business with a regulated postal authority/administration. Known supplier of LAGs and/or Known supplier of STEBs. Entity that ensures implementation of the security controls on and protection from unauthorized interference with supplies of liquids, gels and aerosols (LAGs) or supplies of secure tamper-evident bags (STEBs), respectively, from their first point of entry on airside until their delivery to passengers. The known supplier of LAGs and/or the known supplier of STEBs fully accepts responsibility, by written declaration, for the introduction and quality control of LAGs and STEBs within the supply chain on the airside. Landside. That area of an airport and buildings to which both travelling passengers and the non-travelling public have unrestricted access. (See also Non-restricted area.) Mail. Dispatches of correspondence and other items tendered by and intended for delivery to postal services in accordance with the rules of the Universal Postal Union (UPU). Mishandled baggage. Baggage involuntarily, or inadvertently, separated from passengers or crew. Movement area. That part of an aerodrome to be used for the take-off, landing and taxiing of aircraft, consisting of the manoeuvring area and the apron(s). Narcotics control. Measures to control the illicit movement of narcotics and psychotropic substances by air. Non-restricted area. Areas of an airport to which the public have access or to which access is otherwise unrestricted.
1. Throughout this manual, the use of the male gender should be understood to include male and female persons.
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Off-airport processing facilities. A passenger or cargo transport link terminal at an urban population centre at which processing facilities are provided. Passenger area. All the ground space and facilities provided for passenger processing. This includes aprons, passenger buildings, vehicle parks and roads. Permits. A permit system consists of cards or other documentation issued to individual persons employed on airports or who otherwise have need for authorized access to the airport, airside or security restricted area. Its purpose is to identify the individual and facilitate access. Vehicle permits are issued and used for similar purposes to allow vehicular access. Permits are sometimes referred to as airport identity cards or passes. Person with disabilities (with reduced mobility). Any person whose mobility is reduced due to a physical incapacity (sensory or locomotor), an intellectual deficiency, age, illness or any other cause of disability when using transport and whose situation needs special attention and the adaptation to the person’s needs of the services made available to all passengers. Pilot-in-command. The pilot responsible for the operation and safety of the aircraft during flight time. Regulated agent. An agent, freight forwarder or any other entity who conducts business with an operator and provides security controls that are accepted or required by the appropriate authority in respect of cargo or mail. Restricted articles. Articles which are, in the specific context of aviation security, defined as those articles, devices or substances which may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference against civil aviation or which may endanger the safety of the aircraft and its occupants, or installations and the public. Sabotage. An act or omission, intended to cause malicious or wanton destruction of property, endangering or resulting in unlawful interference with international civil aviation and its facilities. Screening. The application of technical or other means which are intended to identify and/or detect weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices, articles or substances which may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference. Note.— Certain dangerous articles or substances are classified as dangerous goods by Annex 18 and the associated Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air (Doc 9284) and must be transported in accordance with those instructions. Security. Safeguarding civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference. This objective is achieved by a combination of measures and human and material resources. Security audit. An in-depth compliance examination of all aspects of the implementation of the national civil aviation security programme. Security checks for LAGs and STEBs. Visual checks or security controls, performed by security staff, for signs of interference, in particular tampering with seals, theft and the introduction of potentially dangerous devices, articles or substances. The checks should be made at the first point of entry on the airside. The checks should be made on all supplies of LAGs and STEBs to establish that they have been protected, that there is no evidence or suspicion of tampering, and that the necessary documentation is in order. Security control. A means by which the introduction of weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices, articles or substances which may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference can be prevented.
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Definitions
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Security equipment. Devices of a specialized nature for use, individually or as part of a system, in the prevention or detection of acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation and its facilities. Security exercise. A full-scale security exercise is a simulated act of unlawful interference with the objective of ensuring the adequacy of the contingency plan to cope with different types of emergencies. A partial security exercise is a simulated act of unlawful interference with the objective of ensuring the adequacy of the response to individual participating agencies and components of the contingency plan, such as the communications system. Security inspection. An examination of the implementation of relevant national civil aviation security programme requirements by an airline, airport or other entity involved in security. Security investigation. An inquiry into any act or attempted act of unlawful interference against civil aviation and/or any alleged or suspected instance of non-compliance with the State’s National Civil Aviation Security Programme or other legal and/or regulatory requirements pertaining to civil aviation security. Security programme. Written measures adopted to safeguard international civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference. Security restricted area. Those areas of the airside of an airport which are identified as priority risk areas where in addition to access control, other security controls are applied. Such areas shall normally include, inter alia, all commercial aviation passenger departure areas between the screening checkpoint and the aircraft, the ramp, baggage make-up areas, including those where aircraft are being brought into service and screened baggage and cargo are present, cargo sheds, mail centres, airside catering and aircraft cleaning premises. Security survey. An evaluation of security needs including the identification of vulnerabilities which could be exploited to carry out an act of unlawful interference, and the recommendation of corrective actions. Security test. A covert or overt trial of an aviation security measure which simulates an attempt to commit an unlawful act. Service panel. Aircraft external access point used for providing aircraft services; such include water, lavatory, ground electrical outlets and other service compartments that have external clip-down panels. Small arms. A general description applied to all hand-held firearms. State of Registry. The State on whose register the aircraft is entered. Sterile area. That area between any passenger inspection or screening control point and aircraft into which access is strictly controlled. (Also known as Security restricted area.) Stores (Supplies). •
Stores (Supplies) for consumption. Goods, whether or not sold, intended for consumption by the passengers and the crew on board aircraft, and goods necessary for the operation and maintenance of aircraft, including fuel and lubricants.
•
Stores (Supplies) to be taken away. Goods for sale to the passengers and the crew of aircraft with a view to being landed.
Supplies of LAGs. Liquids, gels and aerosols, in any volume, for sale at airport outlets (excluding food and beverages for consumption in the airport premises and not intended for carriage into the aircraft passenger cabin) or on board aircraft during the day(s) of the journey, either in the airside area, or in a security restricted area.
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Supplies of STEBs. Security tamper-evident bags that should only be used for the sale of LAGs by airport outlets or on board aircraft. Terminal. The main building or group of buildings where the processing of commercial passengers and freight and the boarding of aircraft occurs. Threat Image Projection (TIP). A software programme approved by the appropriate authority which can be installed on certain X-ray machines. The programme projects virtual images of threat articles (e.g. guns, knives, improvised explosive devices) within the X-ray image of a real bag under examination or complete virtual images of bags containing threat articles, and provides immediate feedback to the X-ray machine operators of their ability to detect such images. Trace detection equipment. Technology system or combination of different technologies which has the ability to detect very small amounts of explosive materials, and so to indicate, by means of an alarm, those materials contained in baggage or other articles subjected for analysis. Transfer passengers/baggage. Passengers/baggage making direct connections between two different flights. Transit passengers. Passengers departing from an airport on the same flight as that on which they arrived. Travel document. A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State or organization which may be used by the rightful holder for international travel . Unaccompanied baggage. Baggage that is transported as cargo and may or may not be carried on the same aircraft with the person to whom it belongs. Unclaimed baggage. Baggage that arrives at an airport and is not picked up or claimed by a passenger. Unidentified baggage. Baggage at an airport, with or without a baggage tag, which is not picked up by or identified with a passenger. Unruly passengers. Persons who commit on board a civil aircraft, from the moment when the aircraft door is closed prior to take-off to the moment when it is reopened after landing, an act of: •
assault, intimidation, menace or wilful recklessness which endangers good order or the safety of property or persons;
•
assault, intimidation, menace or interference with a crew member in the performance of duties or which lessens the ability to perform duties;
•
wilful recklessness or damage to an aircraft, its equipment, or attendant structures and equipment such as to endanger good order and safety of the aircraft or its occupants;
•
communication of information which is known to be false, thereby endangering the safety of an aircraft in flight;
•
disobedience of lawful commands or instructions for safe, orderly or efficient operations.
Vulnerable point. Any facility on or connected with an airport, which, if damaged or destroyed, would seriously impair the functioning of the airport.
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Chapter 2 GENERAL PRINCIPLES
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OPERATIONAL ASPECTS
2.1.1 Despite the best efforts of States, airport administrations and aircraft operators, acts of unlawful interference, attempts to commit such acts or threats thereof are likely to occur from time to time. Therefore States should develop crisis management measures and procedures which should involve identifying a crisis, planning the appropriate response to the crisis and confronting and resolving the crisis. As a consequence, flexible contingency and emergency plans for each type of occurrence as a part of a crisis management plan should be prepared for each airport in accordance with requirements of the National Civil Aviation Security Programme (NCASP). 2.1.2 Emergency plans are by nature “reactive” dealing with incidents occurring in the air or on the ground (which are primarily safety-related emergencies even if they start as security-related incidents) and are designed to limit the consequences or the impact of such incidents. Contingency plans are more “proactive” and include measures and procedures to deal with various threat levels, risk assessments and the associated security measures to be implemented. They are designed to anticipate events and prepare all parties concerned involved in case of emergencies. In either case, resources, facilities and personnel must be made available to support these plans. 2.1.3 States should ensure that airports remain open and available for use by an aircraft subjected to an act of unlawful interference. The denial of essential navigation aids or air traffic services (ATS) and communications services, the turning off of essential lighting, particularly on runways and taxiways, and the deliberate obstruction of runways can only increase the probability that such an aircraft will have an accident. A combination or any one of these deliberate decisions will seriously endanger the lives of passengers. Lack of provision of assistance to such an aircraft could result in: a)
injury to persons on board an aircraft;
b)
damage resulting from an in-flight explosion;
c)
fuel shortage;
d)
mechanical failure; and/or
e)
other unforeseen emergencies.
In addition, the perpetrators may vent their frustrations on the hostages under their control. 2.1.4 Each State is obliged, under the aviation security Conventions, to take adequate measures for the safety of passengers and crew of an aircraft which is subjected to an act of unlawful interference until their journey can be continued. This obligation may arise as a consequence of a wide variety of acts, ranging from the sabotage of an aircraft in transit through the airspace of a State to the termination of an act of unlawful seizure at an airport. The length of time which may be required to restore an aircraft to a serviceable state after its emergency exit equipment has been deployed to allow the evacuation of passengers must also be taken into account.
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2.1.5 A single government agency should be assigned primary responsibility and authority to determine the course of action to be taken when an aircraft subjected to unlawful interference is in the airspace or at an airport. This agency should coordinate all actions with the civil aviation authority, the airport administration, the affected operator, the State of Registry/Operator of the affected aircraft, and such other organizations on or off the airport as may be deemed appropriate. 2.1.6 When different government agencies are assigned responsibility for managing acts of unlawful interference taking place in flight or on the ground, it will be essential for a clear and precise procedure to have been established prior to an occurrence, so that there will be no confusion as to when responsibility passes from one agency to another during an act of unlawful interference. 2.1.7 When an aircraft which has been unlawfully seized is parked at an airport, the competent authorities of the State in which the airport is situated should not take any action to terminate the unlawful seizure of the aircraft without taking into account, in particular, any wishes that the pilot-in-command may have been able to express and, if feasible, those of appropriate officials of the State whose aircraft operator is operating the aircraft. As the safety of the passengers and crew should be the overriding consideration of those involved in reaching any decision, full weight must be given to all relevant circumstances and to the views of the operator. 2.1.8 Contingency plans for dealing with an act of unlawful interference involving an aircraft should take into consideration the following factors:
1.
a)
the safest place for an aircraft under an act of unlawful interference is on the ground (the national contingency plan should therefore be closely coordinated with airport contingency plans);
b)
the paramount objective is the safe release of passengers and crew, which overrides other considerations such as capture and punishment of the perpetrators and the protection of property;
c)
there is a need to ensure that the perpetrators of acts of unlawful interference will be confronted with a well-organized and effective response so that damage or injury may be prevented or minimized;
d)
negotiations should always prevail over the use of force until it becomes evident to decision makers that all other possibilities have been exhausted and the consultative process has reached a deadlock;
e)
negotiations with the offenders should be conducted by persons properly trained and skilled in such matters since this is far more likely to result in the successful termination of the occurrence with the least loss of life, injury to persons and damage to or loss of property;
f)
in general, persons in a position to make decisions on the demands made by offenders without referral to a higher authority should not enter into direct negotiations with the offenders and should preferably not be immediately available at the airport Emergency Operating Centre (EOC) or other command post;
g)
procedures and equipment to ensure secure communications channels between the aircraft and the negotiators must be in place; and
h)
the aircraft should, where possible, be parked in an isolated parking position to minimize the disruption to normal airport operations.
1
ICAO has developed Aviation Security Training Packages (ASTPs) for negotiators (Levels 1 and 2). Check the ICAO website www.icao.int under aviation security.
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General principles
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2.1.9 States should develop a standard procedure to relay confidential information to appropriate parties concerning an act of unlawful interference. Measures should ensure that persons, including aircraft operators acting in an official capacity, do not divulge information likely to jeopardize the safety of international civil aviation to the press or to others. 2.1.10 In addition to the requirements included in Annex 17, Annex 6 — Operation of Aircraft, Part 1, Chapter 13 prescribes that: a)
operators shall establish and maintain an approved security training programme which ensures crew members act in the most appropriate manner to minimize the consequences of acts of unlawful interference;
b)
pilots-in-command shall submit reports on acts of unlawful interference promptly to the designated local authority;
c)
a checklist detailing bomb search procedures shall be available on board the aircraft; and
d)
the flight crew compartment door on passenger-carrying aircraft shall be capable of being locked from within the flight deck compartment.
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Chapter 3 COLLECTION AND TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION
3.1.1 In the event of an occurrence, each Contracting State responsible for providing air traffic services for an aircraft which is the subject of an act of unlawful interference shall collect and compile all pertinent information on the 1 flight of that aircraft and transmit the information to all other States responsible for the air traffic services (ATS) units concerned. The units at the airport of the known or presumed destination should also be included, so that timely and appropriate action may be taken en route and at the aircraft’s known, likely or possible destination. 3.1.2 This information must be distributed locally to the appropriate authority for security, ATS units concerned, appropriate airport administrations, the aircraft operator and others concerned, as soon as practicable. 3.1.3 The rapid, systematic collection and dissemination of information regarding such an aircraft requires close cooperation between security services and related ATS units in each State through whose airspace the aircraft will, or may, proceed. In particular, close cooperation is required between the designated security officer and the relevant ATS unit in whose area the unlawful seizure first becomes known. The object is to ensure that information is collected and transmitted, in a step-by-step manner as the flight progresses, to the appropriate security services and ATS units in each State which may become involved, so that timely and appropriate safeguarding action may be taken en route and at the aircraft’s known, likely or possible destination. Further guidance is shown in Appendix 1 — Compilation and dissemination of information concerning an aircraft which is being subjected to an act of unlawful interference. 3.1.4 The initial notification should be sent to all security services and ATS units within an area of probability to be determined in each case but avoiding unnecessary alerting on too wide a scale. Circumstances such as direction of flight, range of aircraft, proximity to the borders of other States or to other flight information regions, and the need to provide any advance warning should all be considered. This should be done, if possible, within at least one or two hours. As a minimum, all adjacent States along, or in the proximity of, the projected flight path should be forewarned. It is desirable that all security services and ATS units follow the same pattern as the flight progresses. 3.1.5 The State in which an aircraft subjected to an act of unlawful interference has landed shall pass information regarding the landing to the State of Registry and the State of the Operator of the aircraft, by the quickest possible means, and not later than one hour after the aircraft has landed. 3.1.6 In every case, the recipient of a message should acknowledge receipt so that the originator knows the message has been delivered. 3.1.7 As soon as circumstances indicate that special security precautions may be dispensed with, such information should immediately be transmitted by the appropriate authority for security to the affected States, airports and operators. 3.1.8 include:
1.
The essential information that should be collected and transmitted progressively to those concerned should
Refer to ICAO’s Procedures for Air Navigation Services — Air Traffic Management (Doc 4444) for more information on air traffic services.
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a)
the known or anticipated route of flight;
b)
the known or suspected destination and the estimated time of arrival;
c)
supplementary flight plan data such as fuel endurance (expressed in hours and minutes, if possible) and number of crew and passengers on board;
d)
the composition of the flight crew and its knowledge and experience of the anticipated route;
e)
the presence of In-Flight Security Officers (IFSOs) on board the aircraft;
f)
the availability on board the aircraft of navigation charts and associated documentation; and
g)
flight time limitations of the flight crew taking into account the number of hours already flown.
In addition, the following information should be forwarded, to the extent that it can be obtained: a)
the number, names and nationalities of passengers and, if possible, of the offenders;
b)
the number and condition of injured persons on board;
c)
the number, type and any other information on weapons, explosives and incendiary material, devices or other substances known or believed to be in the possession of the offenders; and
d)
the physical condition of the flight crew and IFSOs, if present, on board.
The most efficient means of disseminating the information are as follows: a)
ATS units along the flight route collect and transmit to other ATS units concerned, all information required for ATS and search and rescue (SAR) purposes; and
b)
security services in each State along the flight route collect and transmit information to other security services concerned using the designator YZY to identify and thereby expedite delivery of messages.
3.1.11 Each State in which an aircraft subjected to an act of unlawful interference has landed is required to notify by the most expeditious means the State of Registry and the State of the Operator of the aircraft of the landing and similarly transmit by the most expeditious means all other relevant information to: a)
the State of Registry and the State of the Operator of the aircraft;
b)
each State whose citizens suffered fatalities or injuries;
c)
each State whose citizens are/were detained as hostages;
d)
each State whose citizens are/were known to be on board the aircraft; and
e)
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and any other relevant international/regional organizations.
3.1.12 In order that threat information may be disseminated immediately, taking into account confidentiality and local requirements, one of the following means of communication may be used:
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a)
telephone, electronic mail, telegram or the aeronautical fixed service (AFS) circuits to report an incident likely to occur within the next 12 hours;
b)
telegram, electronic mail or AFS to report an incident likely to occur sometime after the next 12 hours and within the next 12 days;
c)
registered airmail or telegram to report an incident likely to occur more than 12 days hence; and
d)
the ICAO Aviation Security Point of Contact (AVSEC PoC) network .
2
3.1.13 Designators should be used to identify communications intended for the airport security services as published in ICAO’s Designators for Aircraft Operating Agencies, Aeronautical Authorities and Services (Doc 8585). 3.1.14 When a State has intelligence or other information which indicates that specific aircraft may be subject to an act of unlawful interference, the aircraft operator concerned and any airports at which the aircraft might land are to be notified to enable them to respond and implement any additional security measures considered necessary to counter the threat and any increased risk assessment by the appropriate authorities. 3.1.15 Notification should follow well-established communication procedures and be sufficiently secure and fast to ensure its timely receipt by the aircraft operator and other agencies required to respond and implement the additional security measures. The appropriate authority for security must be included in the notifications if it is not the initiating agency of such requirements.
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2.
For further information on the ICAO AVSEC PoC network, please contact the SGM Section at
[email protected].
Chapter 4 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
4.1.1 All unlawfully seized aircraft or those subject to a bomb threat must be deemed to be in a state of emergency and treated accordingly. When such aircraft are not fitted with a transponder able to transmit a code setting of 7500 which will alert all radar stations equipped with secondary radar, the flight crew should if possible use plain language to inform ground control authorities (i.e. this is not always possible during acts of unlawful seizure when there is a cockpit intrusion). 4.1.2 Flight information service should be provided in accordance with Annex 11 — Air Traffic Services and the PANS-ATM. Alerting service (Annex 11 and PANS-ATM), search and rescue (Annex 12 — Search and Rescue), and those procedures relating to emergencies and radio communications failure (PANS-ATM), should be called for and provided as dictated by the circumstances surrounding each occurrence. 4.1.3 States should plan for the possibility of an unlawful act of interference occurring to an aircraft while it is within the jurisdiction of their air traffic control facilities. A notification system should be developed which would utilize radar transponder coded transmission, voice communication, visual signals and other suitable methods. Specific air traffic control instructions should be published. Where transponder coded transmission is not available, the use of the term “channel 7500” immediately after the aircraft call sign in transmissions to air traffic control can be a useful contingency. Other alternatives, involving other words not common to air traffic service normal terminology, are similarly useful. 4.1.4
Air traffic controllers should: a)
be prepared to recognize plain language or covert messages that indicate the occurrence or impending occurrence of an unlawful seizure, bomb threat or act of sabotage;
b)
immediately notify their supervisor upon receiving information that indicates the unlawful seizure of an aircraft. The supervisor should immediately notify the following:
c)
•
the appropriate authority for security and the civil aviation authority (if the two are not one and the same);
•
the appropriate airport administration;
•
the appropriate search and rescue agency, as required;
•
the owner/operator of the aircraft;
•
other government organizations;
•
adjacent ATS units; and
comply with the following when controlling an aircraft that has been unlawfully seized: •
be discreet in communications with the pilot and be responsive to the pilot’s requests; 4-1
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monitor the aircraft and use normal hands-off procedures without requiring transmissions or responses by the pilot unless the pilot has established communication; and
•
if military aircraft are dispatched to intercept and escort the unlawfully seized aircraft, provide all possible assistance to the intercepting aircraft to aid in placing them in a position behind and below the seized aircraft.
4.1.5 In cases of emergency it may be necessary, in the interests of safety, for an aircraft to enter an airport traffic circuit and effect a landing without proper authorization. Controllers should render all assistance possible. 4.1.6 Upon receiving notification of the threat of an act of unlawful interference to an aircraft at the airport, the controller should immediately notify the appropriate authority, the aircraft operator and the airport operator, and: a)
if the aircraft is on the ground, deny clearance for its take-off until appropriate measures have been taken to establish that the threat is false and continuance of the flight may be authorized, or until the aircraft and contents have been searched and declared by a competent authority to be no longer under threat. After denying clearance the control tower should clear affected taxiways and runways and direct the aircraft to taxi or be towed to the isolated parking position. At the same time, the rescue, firefighting and security services should be alerted in accordance with the airport emergency plan; and
b)
if the aircraft is airborne, clear the aircraft to land in accordance with established emergency procedures at the request of the pilot-in-command. In these circumstances, the decision on the action to be taken should be that of the pilot-in-command. If the decision made is to continue the flight, then, for the duration of that flight, the aircraft should be treated as suspect and appropriate separation arranged with contiguous ATS units to ensure that other aircraft are not endangered.
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Chapter 5 CONTINGENCY PLANS
5.1
PRINCIPLES
5.1.1 As part of a crisis management plan security instructions, emergency instructions and contingency plans should be developed at the national level and for each airport. The national contingency plan should focus mainly on incidents involving aircraft in the air, while airport contingency plans should focus more on incidents occurring on the ground. These instructions should, at the very least, deal with: a)
measures for re-screening of passengers, baggage, cargo, mail and stores following a threat;
b)
action to be taken in respect of unlawful seizure or sabotage of aircraft;
c)
action to be taken in respect of unlawful attacks at an airport (aircraft or installations);
d)
threat of such acts;
e)
investigation of suspected explosive devices or other potential hazards at airports or inside the aircraft; and
f)
contingency plans, which should contain procedures for the disposal of such items.
5.1.2 Airport contingency plans for aviation security incidents should be compiled in much the same manner as airport emergency plans are prepared to deal with emergencies of a non security nature occurring at airports. The national contingency plan should also follow the same format but focus more on incidents or emergencies in the air. More information on the preparation of airport emergency plans is contained in the Airport Services Manual (Doc 9137), Part 7 — Airport Emergency Planning. 5.1.3 To achieve their purpose, the airport and national contingency plans should be set out in an easily understood manual (inclusion, if possible, in aerodrome emergency manuals should be considered for airport contingency plans, and inclusion in the national security programme for the national contingency plan) and should contain the following elements: a)
policies in force;
b)
options possible;
c)
measures to be implemented;
d)
resources available;
e)
responsibilities; and
f)
decision process, links with authorities and delegation of authorities.
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5.1.4 The national contingency plan should be developed in cooperation with all national agencies/authorities which take part in the resolution of major incidents/emergencies in the State and its airspace, considering the abilities, resources and potential of each individual national airport and region. At the airport level, each contingency plan should be a coordinated programme between national authorities/agencies, individual airports and the surrounding community. This is desirable as the planning and procedures needed to handle major security emergency situations on the airport are similar to other types of emergencies that can strike a community, particularly in the response of the authority responsible for police functions and medical aid agencies. The airport contingency plan should spell out the coordinated response or participation of all existing agencies, both on and off airport, which could be of assistance in responding to such emergencies, and should designate specific duties to be undertaken by each responding agency. Examples of such agencies are: a)
government authorities;
b)
authority responsible for police functions;
c)
airport administration;
d)
air traffic services;
e)
aircraft operator;
f)
military;
g)
medical services;
h)
rescue and firefighting services; and
i)
hospitals.
5.1.5 Each airport/community has individual needs and distinct peculiarities because of political, jurisdictional and agency differences. However, the basic needs and concepts of security emergency planning remain the same and common major problem areas which need to be addressed are command, control and communication. 5.1.6 principles:
The elaboration of a contingency plan at one airport is a major project and should respect the following
a)
development of the project, planification, definition of the objectives and the team;
b)
identification of the potential risks taking into consideration the strengths and weaknesses of the airport, the State’s policies as well as the local, national and regional environment;
c)
development of possible actions and responses; and
d)
implementation of the necessary material and human resources for an effective response.
5.1.7 Prior to the preparation of a contingency plan, it is essential that a thorough assessment be conducted to obtain information about the layout and installations at the airport. Any such survey should include the vulnerable points, the extent of available supporting services within and outside the airport, facilities for evacuating personnel and diverting aircraft from normal terminals and the availability of accommodation for the use of police, as well as floodlighting, communications and access points throughout the airport. The reconnaissance should identify and make a special study of the most advantageous points at which unlawfully seized aircraft might be positioned.
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5.1.8 Up-to-date maps of the airport, plans and photographs of the airport and its environs and the main types of aircraft in use by the major aircraft operators as well as a scale model of the airport are invaluable aids to planning and training. If possible, advanced preparation and training of the forces which might be engaged in the response should be organized for thorough familiarization of the local facilities.
5.2
THREAT ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT
5.2.1 In order to ensure the effective application of preventive security measures, the level of threat must be continually reviewed taking into account the domestic, regional and international situations. 5.2.2 Contingency planning to promote coordinated and timely counteraction to the level of threat is important. To ensure such a counteraction in the event of a serious incident of unlawful interference involving a national-level government response, national contingency plans should include details on policy, responsibilities and lines of command and communication from the highest level to the on-site command and control authority. 5.2.3 Security measures and procedures should be flexible and commensurate with the threat assessment which may fluctuate given various changing factors. As a consequence, the national civil aviation security programme must detail the mechanisms for a valid threat assessment process, as well as a risk management scheme, which must be followed by timely and effective implementation. 5.2.4 Valid threat assessment and analysis can be best achieved by instituting a systematic and continual process of intelligence collection and evaluation. This will require coordination at the national level among all responsible entities as well as close cooperation with the regional/international intelligence community. Guidance material is shown in Appendix 2 — Threat assessment methodology. 5.2.5 Whenever a specific threat exists, selected and predetermined preventive security measures should be applied depending upon the nature of the threat. The appropriate authority for aviation security, usually through the civil aviation security policy and regulatory section, needs to analyse the vulnerabilities of the aviation system in relation to the threat assessment and initiate appropriate adjustments to the National Civil Aviation Security Programme as well as the set of additional security measures to be implemented for each elevated threat level. Guidance material is shown in Appendix 3 — Risk management model. 5.2.6 Because terrorism is a trans-national problem, an act of unlawful interference can originate in one State but impact more than one State. Each Contracting State must be prepared for such an eventuality and have procedures in place to share pertinent threat information with other Contracting States, at least to the extent practicable taking into account the protection of sources and methods of collection. Procedures should be designed to disseminate threat 1 information in a timely manner and with the proper controls. Use of the ICAO AVSEC PoC network is highly recommended.
Airport threat and risk assessment 5.2.7 When applying security considerations in airport design, it will be necessary to conduct an airport threat and risk assessment. It is strongly recommended that these threat and risk assessments be undertaken together with national appropriate authorities so that the design of the airport will be flexible enough to adapt to future security requirements. The sooner proper resources are allocated to threat and risk assessment of the airport, the better
1.
For further information on the ICAO AVSEC PoC network, please contact the SGM Section at
[email protected].
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additional requirements will be smoothly implemented without major, and costly, restructuring. Knowing, even at the design stage, the strengths and weaknesses of an airport as regards potential terrorist attacks is essential decisionmaking information.
5.3
CONTINGENCY PLAN EXERCISES
5.3.1 Contingency plans should be practised and exercised on a regular basis to identify weaknesses and modifications necessary for the safe conclusion of an actual emergency situation. Particular emphasis should be placed upon ensuring the operational reliability and compatibility of all communication equipment which is designated for use during an incident. 5.3.2 In addition to major full-scale exercises on the overall contingency plans to be conducted at least every two years, smaller scale exercises in addition to tests, inspections, evaluations and audits of the different portions of the contingency plans, should be organized regularly and at least yearly, as mentioned in the National Civil Aviation Security Quality Control Programme. 5.3.3 In each case, the result of the exercises, tests, audits and other investigations should be communicated to the security and airport authorities who should, after due consultations with the agencies concerned including the appropriate authorities, aircraft operators, and any other concerned and/or affected stakeholders, re-evaluate security measures and procedures and take such action as is necessary to remedy weaknesses. If any changes are contemplated in procedures for screening of passengers, baggage, cargo, mail and stores, the matter should be discussed by the airport security committee and the appropriate authorities. Sufficient notice should be given to the agencies concerned to enable them to incorporate the changes in their procedures.
5.4
CRISIS MANAGEMENT TEAM
5.4.1 The National Civil Aviation Security Programme must set out, in clear and concise language, the offices and organizations responsible for the management of each type of occurrence. At the same time, the contingency plans required by the National Civil Aviation Security Programme must provide for flexibility so that there will be an effective response to unforeseen eventualities which may arise during an occurrence. 5.4.2 Depending on the importance of the crisis, two crisis teams should be activated: 1) the Crisis Management Team (CMT) at the airport level Emergency Operation Centre (EOC), and 2) the National Coordination and Control Centre (NCCC) at the national level EOC. The NCCC is composed of high-level government officials and represents the executive command. The CMT is located at the airport and represents the operational command of the incident. The CMT receives support from administrative, logistical and operational groups. The members of the CMT should be 2 selected based upon their competencies, experience and knowledge of different types of crises . 5.4.3 Where the incident involves the taking of hostages, the contingency plan will need to take into account the need for hostage negotiation and possibly armed intervention to terminate the incident. Hostage negotiation is a full-time 3 job for trained personnel, and comprehensive specialized training should be offered to negotiators . The contingency
2. 3.
ICAO has developed an ASTP on the Management of aviation security crisis (ASTP/CRISMAN) which details the role, structure and organization of CMT. ICAO offers ASTPs for negotiators (Levels 1 and 2) as a base, in addition to more specialized training offered by full-time specialists on negotiation.
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plan will need to specify who will provide negotiation personnel and lines of command. The provision of other resources such as interpreters, accommodation, communication facilities and the specific requirements of any armed intervention unit deployed for an incident need to be included in the plan. 5.4.4 It is essential that the Chief of the CMT has been nominated by the highest authorities of the State. There should be a clear understanding of who is in charge when a crisis is signalled. The Chief of the CMT should be experienced and properly trained in crisis management. The Chief’s title, name and responsibilities should be clearly indicated in the contingency plan. 5.4.5 As a general rule, the appropriate authority for security will be assigned overall responsibility for the management of crises. Other government organizations, especially the civil aviation authority, the authority responsible for police functions and military authorities, the foreign ministry and airport administrations will be assigned responsibilities in support of the appropriate authority for security. Provisions should also be made for the involvement and participation of the affected aircraft operator and a senior flight crew member familiar with the type of aircraft involved, when deemed appropriate. 5.4.6 Because of its unique coordinating duties and responsibilities, the civil aviation Security Policy and Regulatory Section may be the most suitable organization to which responsibility for the establishment, maintenance and operational readiness of the national EOC should be assigned. This may not be applicable in all cases particularly where responsibility for major incident response lies with a national authority responsible for police functions. 5.4.7 The airport security officer will likewise be the most suitable official to whom responsibility for the establishment, maintenance and operational readiness of the airport EOC should be assigned. 5.4.8 In addition to those listed in Part 7 of the Airport Services Manual, resources and expertise required to deal effectively with an act of unlawful interference involving an aircraft will include some or all of the following areas: a)
in-flight explosive device search procedures;
b)
in-flight handling and securing of suspect explosive articles;
c)
policing authority responsible for reacting to a crisis situation;
d)
hostage negotiation;
e)
psychiatry/psychology;
f)
communications;
g)
air traffic services;
h)
airport operations and layout;
i)
special parking location for aircraft subjected to acts of unlawful interference;
j)
experts and documents available from adjacent locations;
k)
flight operations; and
l)
other support services (e.g. linguist or religious specialist).
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5.5
INCIDENT ACCESS AND CONTROL
5.5.1 A controlled area should be established covering the main incident area. Within the controlled area, an outer and an inner cordon should be established surrounding the actual incident with a forward control point (FCP) to control all access to the inner cordon. The cordons are normally protected by armed personnel. The purpose of the outer cordon is to protect the incident site and prevent access to the site by the public, press or non-essential airport/aircraft operator staff. The purpose of the inner cordon is to isolate the incident and prevent access by anyone not directly involved in the resolution of the crisis. Access to the inner cordon is permitted only with the agreement of the FCP commander. In the case of an act of unlawful seizure it is important that the FCP be mobile. An example incident site is 4 illustrated in Figure V-1 . 5.5.2 Plans must include traffic control around the airport and within the landside areas of the airport to allow rapid access and exit of emergency vehicles and of any other persons or agencies needed at the airport to assist in resolving the incident. A rendezvous point and staging area should be nominated outside the inner cordon for all agencies arriving at the incident site. Emergency services such as fire and ambulance crews should be on stand-by at the rendezvous point outside the outer cordon to be in a position to quickly intervene should there be an explosion or fire.
National command control centre
INCIDENT
Inner cordon FCP
Outer cordon
Incident control centre Staging area
Figure V-1.
4.
RV point
EOC
Example incident site
ICAO has developed an ASTP on the Management of aviation security crisis (ASTP/CRISMAN) which details the functions and coordination at the incident site.
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ISOLATED PARKING POSITION
5.6.1 It is important that an aircraft which is suspected of having an explosive device or dangerous substance on board be isolated from normal aircraft operations. To achieve this, each airport should designate an isolated parking position to which such aircraft may be moved. The site selected should be, if possible, a minimum of 400 m from any other aircraft parking position, taxiway, runway, building, public area, fuel tank farm or storage area for explosive or incendiary material. The isolated parking position may also be used to handle unlawfully seized aircraft which require servicing or special attention; therefore, consideration should be given to its location so it cannot be easily observed from public areas off airport property. 5.6.2 Care should be taken to ensure that there are no services such as gas pipelines, refuelling hydrant pipes, other fuel lines or electric power cables beneath the aircraft parking area surface. If possible, a second isolated parking spot may be designated in case the primary isolated parking position is unavailable or in case of multiple crises. 5.6.3 Airport emergency procedures should designate one or more points to which affected aircraft might be directed. However, plans must be flexible enough not to rely on such an aircraft being able to park at a designated point and must allow for the aircraft to change its position. The following should be taken into account in selecting designated points: a)
the availability of covered approaches to facilitate action by the security forces; for example, adjacent buildings, natural features such as undulations in the terrain and the presence of trees;
b)
the need for police and other units to have quick and easy access to the scene to deal with the situation;
c)
the possible danger to other aircraft or people in the vicinity, and hazards such as fuel tanks;
d)
the need for isolation from the press and public; and
e)
the continuance, as far as possible, of normal air traffic in and out of the airport during the incident.
5.7
SUSPECT EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
5.7.1 If a suspect explosive device or substance is found on board an aircraft or in equipment, buildings or installations, it is essential that it be dealt with immediately. Transporting such a device or substance off the airport through public areas creates undesirable risks. It is therefore recommended that airports set aside an isolated disposal area where experts may disable such material. Ideally, the location should be situated in close proximity to, but not less than 100 m from, the isolated parking position. 5.7.2 The airport security officer should survey the airport and predetermine the routes to the disposal area from all likely locations at which suspect explosive devices or substances may be discovered on the airport in order to determine the safest routes over which they should be transported. In conducting this survey, consideration should be given to the best routes which avoid other parked aircraft, buildings, public areas, fuel and electric power installations, natural gas pipelines, communication and navigation aids. There should always be more than one route from any location on the airport to the isolated disposal area. 5.7.3 When the explosive disposal technician is moving such a device or substance, care should be taken to eliminate the possibility of electronic signals from airport installations triggering the activating mechanism. The use of mobile and hand-held transmitting equipment within 30 m (or 10 m for low-powered transmitters) of the suspect device should be avoided.
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5.7.4 In order to minimize the effect of an explosion, the provision of a blast containment area should be considered. Explosive disposal experts should be consulted, and any facilities that they require should be provided. Along with the provision of a shelter to permit explosive disposal experts to work efficiently, the construction of the blast containment area should allow for a vehicle carrying the device to drive inside for unloading. 5.7.5 Some explosive devices are actuated by simple pressure-sensitive mechanisms that operate when a preset altitude is reached. To check suspect baggage, cargo or mail that may contain such a device, a chamber which simulates changing atmospheric conditions is useful. At the same time, all other flight conditions likely to be encountered, including sonic and electronic signals generated by aircraft engines and equipment, should be simulated.
5.8
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTRE
5.8.1 The contingency plan for dealing with an incident of unlawful interference at the national and the airport level, when implemented, will need to be controlled from a central location. This will best be done from a command or emergency operations centre (EOC). Information on the planning, establishment and operation of airport emergency operations centres can be found here below and is also published in the Airport Services Manual (Doc 9137), Part 7 — Airport Emergency Planning. That material covers all types of major emergencies likely to occur on or near an airport and will be useful should the need for an EOC at the national level be decided upon. The operational readiness of each EOC must be tested periodically. 5.8.2 It is necessary that the airport EOC be provided with a flexible and effective communications capability which will permit direct communications with the affected aircraft as well as with ATS and all security services units whose assistance is likely to be required at the airport. 5.8.3 Annex 14 — Aerodromes stipulates, in the form of a Standard, that aerodrome emergency plans shall be developed which provide for the coordination of actions taken in an emergency occurring at aerodromes. A fixed EOC providing a forum for that coordination is a Recommended Practice in that Annex. 5.8.4 Experience has shown that a well-operated and equipped EOC is indispensable in the management of a response to an act of unlawful interference. The EOC acts as a focal point for the control and coordination of all responding agencies and, as such, the procedures for its use and staffing should be clearly designated in the contingency plans. 5.8.5 The EOC should be located in an area off airport property that is easily accessible. The EOC has to be permanently accessible, and it must be possible to reach the EOC in the shortest time possible. The EOC environment should be spacious and open to make it possible for the group to operate in a stressful environment without interfering with each other’s work. 5.8.6
The EOC should have at least the following equipment and characteristics: a)
enough desk space, chairs and office supplies to accommodate all members of the emergency management team (EMT);
b)
computers and/or portable computer hook-ups;
c)
all modes of telecommunication: radio, television, enough phone lines, cellular phones;
d)
up-to-date maps of the airport, plans and photographs of the airport and its environs and the main types of aircraft in use by the major aircraft operators as well as a scale model of the airport;
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e)
auxiliary power supply;
f)
operational display boards, airport maps, site plans, floor plans, infrastructure plans (water, sewer, electric, gas);
g)
washroom and eating facilities; and
h)
nearby area reserved for media, families and next of kin.
In addition, the EOC should be:
5.8.7
a)
restricted to authorized personnel; and
b)
easily accessible.
The operational readiness of each EOC should be tested periodically.
5.9
COMMUNICATIONS
5.9.1 Communications, unless already in position, are likely to be a major problem. Contingency arrangements for advising telephone authorities must be made in advance. Links will be required between the forward control point and personnel deployed within the inner cordon. Links are also required with the EOC. Radio is probably the only system that gives the required degree of flexibility, but it must be remembered that radio transmissions may be overheard by the perpetrators, the press and others unless encryption or secure transmission methods are used. 5.9.2 The early establishment of secure landlines from the forward control point to the EOC, to the negotiators and to the control tower is highly desirable. At the EOC, good internal communications are required and there should be secure communication links to the government control centre, police headquarters, emergency services, airport authorities, the control tower and the aircraft operator concerned. 5.9.3 Maximum use should be made of hard-wired telephones but, where cellular or mobile telephones are required to be used during an emergency as an alternative to radio or landline communications, they will require special configuration. The cellular or mobile phone service provider should be requested to arrange for immobilization of all nonessential cellular or mobile telephones within the area of the incident.
5.10
PRESS AND MEDIA
5.10.1 The pressure of media interest at a major security incident will be considerable. It is important that the media are dealt with fairly but firmly to ensure that they do not publish information which might pre-empt action planned or being taken by the security forces. Control of information about the situation is paramount as, in the past, police and aircraft radio communications have been intercepted and rebroadcast as news items over the public networks. Camera teams have also been known to infiltrate the incident area and film operations. This can dangerously heighten the tension among the perpetrators while premature disclosure of information regarding operations can frustrate tactical plans. 5.10.2 It is also advisable, however, to ensure that the media are treated with consideration and are given information and assistance as is possible without compromising the safety of the passengers involved and the police and security personnel dealing with the situation. If the media are denied all information they will become frustrated and
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be unlikely to cooperate with police requests. They will instead pursue information by all means and, intentionally or not, reduce the possibility of a peaceful solution. An initial agreement with the media should be made to have regular press briefings in a dedicated press room (for example, every hour or second hour) so that only official and safe information will be communicated by the media officer selected by the police and the CMT. In addition, press releases should be approved by the Chief of CMT before being disseminated. 5.10.3 The appropriate authority for security and other entities involved in the management of acts of unlawful interference should exercise restraint in providing information that may be disseminated to and by news media in respect of acts of unlawful interference, during or after the occurrence. In particular publicity should be minimized about the actual methods and planning used by the offenders and the security measures applied by States to prevent acts of unlawful interference.
5.11
TELEPHONE ENQUIRIES AND RELATIVES
5.11.1 There should be separate facilities, other than at the EOC, to deal with the public who will be making 5 enquiries concerning persons involved in the incident. A Telephone and Information Centre (TIC) will need to be set up, which need not be necessarily at the incident site, with a dedicated telephone number, and trained staff, to cope with the high volume of calls from public, relatives and friends of persons involved. Incoming overseas calls in different languages should be expected. As relatives and friends might provide useful information for the resolution of the crisis (name, age, nationality, physionomy, health condition, etc.), it is essential to develop a predetermined and systematic collection system (special detailed forms collecting details on passengers and on the persons calling) so that proper intelligence analysis could be made by the CMT (and not by the TIC which should concentrate on the collection of information and first-level analysis such as maintaining an accurate list of persons involved). All information provided by the TIC to the public, relatives and friends should be closely coordinated with the CMT and the media officer. 5.11.2 In addition to the high volume of calls arriving at the airport of the incident, some relatives and friends might be present at the airports of departure, of destination, or of the incident in case the incident is taking place at another location. The relatives and friends present at the airport of the incident should be isolated from the rest of the 6 public in a Rest and Debriefing Centre (RDC). The RDC should be separated from the TIC and the EOC, and ideally isolated from the public area of the airport. The main functions of the RDC are to assist relatives and friends during a very difficult period, remove the pressure of dealing with stressful persons from the entities directly involved in the resolution of the incident and also collect additional information on the persons involved or victims of the crisis. The forms used by RDC should follow the same format as the TIC forms, but clearly indicate that the source of information is physically present at the RDC. All RDC forms should be forwarded to TIC before being sent to CMT. CMT might decide to conduct further interviews of relatives and friends for confirmation and intelligence purposes. 5.11.3 It is recommended to exercise TIC and RDC functioning on a strict regular basis, at least once a year, to maintain the high level of expertise of its staff, as well as the speed and adequacy of processing. In the case of injuries or casualties, the information collected by TIC and RDC on relatives and friends is of paramount importance for police.
5.12
RESPONSE TO THREATS
5.12.1 It is very important that the airport contingency plan clearly reflect, in accordance with the National Civil Aviation Security Programme, responsibility for the evaluation of all potential bomb or other violent threats, whether they
5. More information on TIC is available in Doc 8973, Volume III — Airport Security, Organization, Programme and Design Requirements. 6. More information on RDC is available in Doc 8973, Volume III — Airport Security, Organization, Programme and Design Requirements.
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affect aircraft on the ground or in flight, or buildings on the airport. Bomb assessors must be appointed and appropriately trained in order that they can assess the threat and give guidance as to what security measures are considered appropriate to counter the threat received. 5.12.2 Each bomb threat received by telephone, written message or other means of communication alleging that an unlawful act will occur at an airport or in the air must be considered serious. Each threat should be thoroughly investigated and reported immediately to safeguard the public. Appropriate individuals should be familiar with a specific reporting format, an example of which is shown in Appendix 4 — Action by the recipient of a bomb threat telephone call. 5.12.3 While some States, due to the existing local situation, may call for a more stringent evaluation of threats, experience has shown that the following technique in assessing threats is reliable in most circumstances.
Positive Target Identification 5.12.4 A systematic procedure to assess bomb threats is necessary to ensure, as far as possible, that whenever there exists an actual bomb or other device the assessment leads to positive action and, where the warning is a hoax, the assessment results in the minimum disruption to operations. 5.12.5 Such a procedure has been devised by several States using a technique called “Positive Target Identification” (PTI). The methodology was designed to lead a bomb assessor to a logical conclusion. PTI will assist in classifying the threat as: a)
specific;
b)
non-specific; or
c)
hoax.
5.12.6 The process of PTI is to use the specificity of the information contained in the threat to determine the credence to be applied to it. The more information given by the caller (most threats are made anonymously over the telephone), the more likely the threat should be taken seriously. Further guidance on PTI and its use can be found in Appendix 5 — Bomb threat assessment.
Action by flight crew 5.12.7 Annex 6 — Operation of Aircraft requires that operators establish and maintain training programmes which enable crew members to act in the most appropriate manner to minimize the consequences of acts of unlawful interference. 5.12.8 After assessing the situation, the pilot-in-command should communicate the circumstances concerning the threat to an ATS unit. However, serious consideration should be given to the consequences which may occur as a result of any action being taken by ATS or other authorities of a State that is contrary to the requests of the pilot-in-command. 5.12.9 The Tokyo Convention specifies the powers of the pilot-in-command while in flight and authorizes specific action to be taken by that officer in the event of an unlawful act. In addition, the pilot-in-command shall have command over all crew members including any security guards. If the pilot-in-command is unable to do so, another qualified member of the crew should assume command, in accordance with the sequence provided for in the operator’s manual. All crew members under direction of the commander shall assist that officer in every way.
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5.12.10 Full account should be taken of the possibility that a person committing an unlawful act on board an aircraft in flight may be in an unstable state of mind or extremely volatile or nervous. Crew members should therefore: a)
refrain from unnecessary conversation or actions which may irritate the individual;
b)
exercise due care to ensure that the passengers do not become excited or, in an attempt to overcome the individual, resort to action which may jeopardize safety. One practicable measure to restrain passengers would be to instruct them to fasten their seat belts; and
c)
terminate the serving of alcoholic beverages.
5.12.11 Of prime importance to the safe conduct of the flight is the security of the flight crew compartment. Once the unlawful seizure has commenced, an attempt should be made to dissuade the offenders from entering the flight crew compartment. 5.12.12 In many cases, the destination of an aircraft subject to an act of unlawful interference will be in a region for which the flight crew does not possess the necessary flight documentation and manuals. It is therefore desirable that the flight crew be supplied with a condensed set of valid emergency navigation material for possible diversionary landing locations that are not on the scheduled route. This technical/navigational emergency kit will assist the crew to land an aircraft safely at an airport with which they are not familiar but which lies within the range of the aircraft. Additional guidelines on crew actions in the case of an act of unlawful interference can be found in the Manual on the Implementation of the Security Provisions of Annex 6 (Doc 9811 — Restricted).
Bomb threats on the ground 5.12.13 When a bomb threat is associated with an aircraft that is still on the ground, and once the warning has been assessed, aircraft operators in consultation with airport authorities and other responsible law enforcement entities should: a)
disembark all passengers and crew with all cabin baggage by steps or jetties. Escape slides should only be used in extreme emergencies;
b)
move the aircraft to a remote location such as the isolated parking position;
c)
isolate and re-screen all passengers and their cabin baggage and hold them in a separate area until the crew members, hold baggage, cargo and catering supplies have been inspected/screened, searched and declared safe;
d)
unload all hold baggage and require passengers to identify their baggage, which should then be screened or searched before it is reloaded;
e)
unload all cargo which should then be screened or searched before it is reloaded;
f)
unload and check the integrity of catering supplies; and
g)
search the aircraft.
5.12.14 In case of bomb threat the aircraft should be searched only by designated and appropriately trained staff from law enforcement authorities.
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5.12.15 In the event of a bomb threat in flight, responsibility for the decisions taken rests with the pilot-in-command. In dealing with a bomb threat directed against an aircraft in flight, it may be necessary for some or all of the following actions to be taken: a)
evaluation of the threat;
b)
response/decision, including whether reaction will be overt or covert;
c)
conducting search procedures in flight;
d)
evaluation of possible effects of pressurization or pressure equalization;
e)
establishment of the order of search (e.g. public areas first);
f)
arranging of search assignments for flight crew;
g)
announcement of the threat by the pilot-in-command to the passengers;
h)
arranging for possible passenger participation in search;
i)
establishment of emergency procedures once a suspect explosive device is located; and
j)
determination of flight routing, and landing and deplaning procedures.
5.12.16 Further guidance on actions to be taken in the event of a bomb threat in flight can be found in Appendix 6 — Response to bomb threats against aircraft.
Searching procedures 5.12.17 Specific supplementary procedures and measures should be provided by airport authorities or the aircraft operator, depending on whether the bomb alert or the discovery of a suspect explosive device concerns an aircraft in flight or on the ground or a building or area of the air terminal or airport. A search plan and checklist should be available on each aircraft. The checklist should be developed by the aircraft operator’s engineering department. Different checklists should exist for each different type of aircraft and cabin configuration. 5.12.18 The searching of a building or aircraft for a suspect explosive device identified by a bomb threat should follow these basic guidelines: a)
searches will be most effective if carried out by staff familiar with the building or aircraft concerned;
b)
searches must be carried out in a systematic manner and areas cleared should be marked distinctly;
c)
strict access control to the building or aircraft being searched must be imposed and maintained during the period of the search;
d)
search teams should be briefed not to touch or interfere with any unusual object which they might discover but to immediately alert the person responsible for the search party; and
e)
suspect explosive devices found by the search should be marked distinctly and the immediate area cordoned off.
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Further guidance is detailed in Appendix 9 — Search and evacuation guidelines.
In-flight aircraft search procedures 5.12.20 The large number of aircraft in service throughout the world makes it impossible to provide in this manual recommended aircraft inspection procedures that will be adequate in all cases. Aircraft operators should develop an aircraft search procedure checklist for each type of aircraft in service and include this checklist as part of the flight crew security kit. (Refer to Appendix 7 — Aircraft security search checklist for assistance in this process.) A training programme should be established and maintained for all flight and cabin crew members. 5.12.21 To avoid duplication of effort, the search of an aircraft should be conducted systematically by staff familiar with the particular aircraft who are provided with a checklist and assigned to specific areas of the aircraft. Attention should be given to those areas to which passengers have had access, such as main cabins, galley areas and toilets but searches should also include the flight deck or any lower cabin compartment accessible in flight. 5.12.22 In general, a search should be conducted with extreme caution, using flashlights and mirrors when searching in confined or dark areas. Areas to be searched should include all quick-latch or easy access doors. Equipment areas should be searched carefully as there is the possibility that a bomb may be hidden in, behind or under equipment. It may not be necessary to search some areas if a door, compartment or piece of equipment is properly sealed or secured and there is no evidence of tampering. 5.12.23 It is difficult to give guidance to search teams about the appearance of suspect explosive devices as they can be disguised in many ways. Search teams should be briefed to look for unidentified objects or anything: a)
that should not be there;
b)
that cannot be accounted for; and
c)
that is out of place.
5.12.24 In view of the possibility that explosive devices and weapons may be concealed within aircraft equipment or components, searches of aircraft considered at higher risk should be conducted by trained and competent security personnel assisted where necessary by aircraft crew or aircraft engineering support personnel. 5.12.25 Further action should be taken in accordance with Appendix 8 — Suspect explosive devices and Appendix 9 — Search and evacuation guidelines.
Evacuation procedures 5.12.26 If the airport or building management, in consultation with the airport security officer, decides on evacuation, the airport security officer should direct which floor(s) or area(s) are to be cleared. In single or two-storey buildings, evacuation can be executed with relative ease; however, in a building with more than three floors, evacuation should usually be limited to the immediate area where the suspicious article or substance is found, or the area that is specifically identified in the threat and the equivalent space on the floors immediately above and below. 5.12.27 The decision to evacuate buildings to which the public is normally permitted access should be made by the building management, preferably after consultation with the airport security officer and/or the policing authority. Operators should establish similar procedures for their own buildings. The following factors should be taken into account:
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a)
the number and frequency of false threats and the effect evacuation of buildings has on the frequency of such threats;
b)
the possible hazards arising as a result of evacuation, e.g. numerous people concentrated in halls or stairways where a bomb would likely be located; and
c)
the problems and hazards created by evacuation of public areas (where the general public is permitted access).
Further information on evacuation procedures is shown in Appendix 9 — Search and evacuation guidelines.
Evacuation of air traffic services 5.12.29 Air traffic services administrations should develop specific procedures to cover the possible need for evacuation of ATS units in the event of a bomb threat. Such procedures would basically be the same as those to be applied in cases of inactivation of ATS units due to fire, natural disasters or complete breakdown of essential communication facilities. The procedures should take account of the location and staffing of the ATS units, the amount and type of traffic handled, any alternative means available for ensuring continued provision of air traffic services and the available communication facilities. 5.12.30
The following matters should be covered by the procedures: a)
the authority for and the means and methods of issuing orders for evacuation;
b)
the unit or units to which the responsibility for temporary provision of air traffic services should be transferred;
c)
the means and methods of notifying the unit(s) mentioned in b) and of transferring essential flight data to such units;
d)
the means and methods of notifying aircraft in flight of the situation and of the procedures to be applied by them;
e)
the means and methods of notifying aircraft on the ground and operators of the situation; and
f)
resumption of normal activities following elimination or cancellation of the bomb threat, including the means and methods of issuing orders for such resumption.
5.12.31 It is recognized that in many cases, e.g. where large area control centres or approach control offices are affected, considerations of the safety of passengers, crew members and aircraft will militate against the complete closing down of the ATS unit. In such cases, it is important that the procedures provide for a reduction of the ATS staff. 5.12.32 Search procedures for buildings described in Appendix 9 — Search and evacuation guidelines should be adapted and applied to buildings in which ATS units are located, as required.
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Chapter 6 REVIEW, ANALYSIS AND REPORTS
6.1
INTRODUCTION
6.1.1 As soon as possible after each occurrence or threat, a review and analysis of all that transpired should be conducted by the appropriate authority for security. Depending on the nature and severity of the occurrence, written reports from participants may be desirable. In any event, all persons involved should report on their roles, the problems and successes encountered, relationships with others involved, effectiveness of communications and observations on the need for amendment or revision of the specific contingency plan or the security programme. 6.1.2 The results of this review and analysis should be made available to all participants, along with the recommendations of the national civil aviation security policy and regulatory section for general improvement and for the correction of any deficiencies identified. Any action a State deems necessary to correct a deficiency is to be notified to ICAO at the earliest opportunity. 6.1.3 Following review and analysis, the appropriate authority for security should conduct or arrange for an overall critique of the occurrence which should be attended by all airport and operators’ security officers, members of security committees and others who may have an official interest. The purpose of this critique is to share the experience with those who were not directly involved so that they will benefit from it and be better prepared to respond to future occurrences in which they may be involved.
6.2
REPORTS
6.2.1 The reporting of acts of unlawful interference is important, and States concerned with an act of unlawful interference must provide ICAO with all pertinent information concerning the security aspects of the occurrence as soon as practicable after the act is resolved. States should, whenever appropriate, furnish copies of reports prepared for ICAO to other States which may have an interest. 6.2.2 Information provided by States will be analysed by ICAO with a view to facilitating the Council’s consideration of proposals for new or revised Standards, Recommended Practices or procedures intended to safeguard civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference. It is also used to develop additional guidance material for inclusion in this manual and other appropriate ICAO documents. 6.2.3 Experience has shown the development of new patterns and trends involving acts of sabotage, bombings, bomb threats and extortion. It is therefore logical to expect the continued development of new patterns covering a wider range of unlawful acts. 6.2.4 An effective international and national civil aviation security programme must provide for the revision of security measures and procedures from time to time in order to compensate for the development of new patterns as well as new methods and techniques used in committing acts of unlawful interference. 6.2.5 It is therefore essential that States call for, and provide ICAO with, reports on the non-political aspects of all types of occurrences. These reports should be fully analysed by the State, appropriate conclusions drawn and
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meaningful information and recommendations disseminated so that effective safeguarding action may be taken. Reports should be submitted promptly and should include details of deficiencies in States’ programmes revealed by a review/analysis and critique of the occurrence and/or plans for improvement of the methods and procedures that failed. 6.2.6 The details of important developments such as new or unusual methods of operation and techniques used by perpetrators must be promptly disseminated to the appropriate authorities for security of airports at which similar techniques may be used. While public knowledge of such matters is undesirable, it is essential that all airports which are liable to experience similar occurrences, particularly those in adjacent States, be informed as soon as is possible. Such action will facilitate the early development and implementation of effective countermeasures and procedures. 6.2.7 Each State shall promptly provide ICAO with reports on each incident of unlawful seizure, both successful and unsuccessful, as preventive measures are the keystone to the aviation security programme. A complete final report often involves considerable investigation, and its completion may not be possible before the lapse of several weeks after the incident occurs. Therefore, in order that ICAO may keep abreast of changing patterns, the following reports are requested:
6.2.8
a)
a preliminary report on an act of unlawful interference, to be prepared and forwarded as soon as possible by the State of Registry (Appendix 10); and
b)
a final report on an act of unlawful interference, to be prepared and forwarded upon completion of investigations (not the judicial procedures) by States (Appendix 10).
The reports have been designed to accommodate any act of unlawful interference as follows: a)
act of unlawful seizure of an aircraft;
b)
attempted act of unlawful seizure of an aircraft;
c)
unlawful act against the safety of civil aviation (including acts of sabotage, malicious damage, bombs and other explosive devices and substances found on airports, aircraft or in airmail, air cargo, baggage);
d)
attempted unlawful act against the safety of civil aviation;
e)
any other act of unlawful interference (including armed attacks at airports and other unlawful acts directed toward off-airport personnel, facilities, vehicles and other acts which have the potential to develop into a threat to international civil aviation and its facilities); and
f)
other acts not specified above.
Timescales for reports 6.2.9 Preliminary reports, in one of the working languages of the Organization, should be prepared by the appropriate authority and forwarded to appropriate States and to ICAO by airmail within thirty (30) days of the occurrence. Should immediate remedial action be required, appropriate States and ICAO should be provided with the pertinent details as soon as the information is known and by the most suitable and quickest means available. 6.2.10 If possible, final reports should be sent within sixty (60) days by the appropriate authority of each State (at least the State in which the occurrence originated and the State in which the occurrence was terminated) to:
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a)
the State which instituted the investigation, if it delegated responsibility for the investigation to another State;
b)
the State of Registry;
c)
the State of the Operator;
d)
any States whose citizens were killed, injured or detained as a consequence of the occurrence;
e)
any State which provided relevant information, significant facilities, experts or other assistance; and
f)
ICAO.
6.2.11 In the interests of safeguarding civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference, the investigating States should publish their final reports, and further updates if needed, on an occurrence as soon as possible and provide a copy to ICAO. 6.2.12 The investigating authority should, at any stage of an inquiry into an occurrence, immediately provide the appropriate authorities for security, including those in other States, with recommendations on the remedial action which needs to be taken promptly to prevent similar occurrences. Such action should not be deferred until completion of the final report.
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Appendix 1 COMPILATION AND DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING AN AIRCRAFT WHICH IS BEING SUBJECTED TO AN ACT OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE
OBJECTIVE 1. The purpose is to ensure that all pertinent information concerning an aircraft which is being subjected to an act of unlawful interference is available to those States likely to be affected by the flight so that timely and appropriate decisions and action may be taken to safeguard the passengers and crew members, the aircraft, all other civil aircraft in its vicinity, and others likely to be affected by that aircraft’s operations.
WHAT INFORMATION IS REQUIRED 2.
The pertinent information to be compiled, collated and disseminated consists of the: a)
intended or assumed route;
b)
flight plan details;
c)
airworthiness of the aircraft;
d)
number and condition of injured persons on board;
e)
numbers of crew, passengers and offenders on board;
f)
number, type, and other details, of weapons, explosive and incendiary devices known or believed to be in the possession of the offenders or explosive/incendiary devices found on board the aircraft;
g)
physical condition of flight crew members;
h)
composition and competence of the flight crew for the intended flight;
i)
number of hours previously flown by the flight crew and flight time limitations; and
j)
navigation charts and associated documentation available on board for the intended route and destination.
3. The sources from which the information may be obtained and the offices or officials who might require it are tabulated in Attachment A to this appendix.
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4. A number of variable factors will determine whether or not the required information is available from the operator, ATS units or the security services. They include: a)
when, where and under what circumstances the unlawful act first became known;
b)
what, if any, communication with the flight crew and/or offenders has been possible or permitted;
c)
the route and destination changes which ATS units observe or of which they are advised;
d)
the feasibility of determining: injuries to persons on board; the fuel reserves, stores, including essential food and water, and airworthiness of the aircraft; status, composition and competence of crew members; the number of hostages taken on board the aircraft and the circumstances prevailing at that time;
e)
the feasibility of determining the number, type, etc., of weapons, explosive and incendiary material and devices in the possession of the offenders, or explosive/incendiary devices found on board the aircraft; and
f)
the role of the operator, particularly in those cases where the operator: •
is not represented at the aerodrome of most recent landing; or
•
has not participated in servicing the aircraft.
5. It is not desirable to assign responsibility for compilation and dissemination of all the information required for security purposes to a non-governmental entity such as the operator who may not always have a representative available at the airports where the aircraft has landed or is likely to land. Further, assignment to ATS units of this responsibility for compiling non-ATS information, at a time when ATS units may be carrying a maximum workload, will be undesirable. It is therefore recommended that primary responsibility for the compilation and dissemination of the information required for security purposes be assigned to a designated security service. 6. However, ATS units and the operator should be required to assist, to the extent feasible, in compilation of the required information. Assignment of responsibility at this level and in the following manner would be appropriate: a)
the operator: to provide all available pertinent details that are not contained in the flight plan;
b)
ATS units: to provide all ATS information available, assisting, when possible, in obtaining from the pilot such other information as is required; and
c)
the designated security service: to collect, compile and collate all of the required information, including specialist advice requested by the pilot-in-command, and to immediately transmit such information by the fastest available means to other security services likely to be affected and to the pilot-in-command when deemed necessary or desirable, at the same time informing the appropriate authority for security of the action taken.
Note.— In some cases, it will be desirable to use the operator’s communications capability as it may be the fastest means available.
Appendix 1. Compilation and dissemination of information concerning an aircraft which is being subjected to an act of unlawful interference
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DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION 7. The urgent nature of each act of unlawful interference makes it necessary for pertinent information to be transmitted immediately as it becomes known and by the quickest means available to permit the timely implementation of plans for safeguarding the affected aircraft and all other aircraft likely to be affected by its operation. Therefore, the ATS unit which first becomes aware of an aircraft which is being subjected to an act of unlawful interference should transmit an initial alerting message containing all available pertinent information to those ATS units which might be affected having regard to the fuel endurance of the aircraft, the possibility of sudden changes in destination and other relevant factors. 8. As the flight progresses, ATS units should transmit updated information required for ATS and SAR purposes in accordance with Annex 11 and the PANS-ATM. 9. As a parallel action, the security services in the States concerned should transmit all the available pertinent information to the security services at the aircraft’s known or suspected destination and to the security services in the States expected to be overflown. 10. The requirements for ATS units to forward information relating to an aircraft which is being subjected to an act of unlawful interference are currently covered by provisions contained in Annex 11 and the PANS-ATM.
SUMMARY OF TYPICAL ACTIONS 11.
To summarize the series of actions that are envisaged as a requirement to meet the objective: a)
ATS informs the designated security services and the operator immediately when it is known, observed or suspected that an aircraft has been subjected to an act of unlawful interference;
b)
if the aircraft is diverted from its original route and its destination is unknown, ATS units, using the available flight plan details and all other reliable information, attempt to determine the actual or suspected route(s) and/or destination and notify the designated security services and the operator accordingly;
c)
ATS transmits an alerting message to all ATS units which might be concerned with the flight giving such details as are available;
d)
ATS requests supplementary flight plan data from the ATS unit at the airport of departure;
e)
the operator assists in providing the required information to the designated security services;
f)
the security services collect all the data required and transmit it as specified in paragraph 9;
g)
these procedures are repeated as required during the flight;
h)
the security services at the airport of intended or assumed landing initiate the airport emergency plan for safeguarding injured or ill persons, the passengers and crew members and the aircraft. If necessary, plans for dealing with a major disaster resulting from an accident on landing or a subsequent explosion and/or fire on board the aircraft will also be implemented by the airport security services; and
i)
an arrival message, and any subsequent changes thereto, is sent by ATS to the airport of departure and to all addressees on the alerting message when the aircraft arrives at its final destination and the act of unlawful interference has been concluded, parallel action being taken by the security services.
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Attachment A to Appendix 1 TABULATION OF THE INFORMATION REQUIRED, BY WHOM AND THE POSSIBLE SOURCE (for an act of unlawful interference affecting more than one State or airport) Information required
Required by
Possible source
FLIGHT PLAN DETAILS intended or assumed route
ATS units
operator
flight levels
rescue coordination centre
pilot
deviations from the intended or assumed route
designated security services
if the pilot is not communicating with the ground, radar-equipped ATS units may be able to provide useful information in respect of deviation from the route
operator
observations of other aircraft DESTINATION intended or assumed destination and estimated time of arrival
airport administrations
ATS units
security services
flight plan message
ATS units
operator
operator
pilot
hours of fuel on board emergency and survival equipment
rescue coordination centre if refuelled, airport administration and/or operator, and the airport security services AIRWORTHINESS OF THE AIRCRAFT impairment of the aircraft’s operating efficiency as a result of an act of violence, explosion or otherwise
airport administrations
pilot
security services
operator
ATS units
airport security services
operator
other persons who obtained the information by observation
rescue coordination centre
Appendix 1. Compilation and dissemination of information concerning an aircraft which is being subjected to an act of unlawful interference
Information required
A1-5
Required by
Possible source
NUMBER OF CREW MEMBERS, PASSENGERS, HOSTAGES AND OFFENDERS AND THEIR PHYSICAL CONDITION total number on board
airport administrations
number seriously injured
security services
whether any minimum essential crew members have been incapacitated. If so, the extent of the incapacitation
ATS units
the number of crew and passengers may be obtained from: •
the pilot
•
ATS units at the airport of departure
•
the operator
operator rescue coordination centre
details of those in need of prescription drugs or special medical attention immediately upon landing
information on the physical condition of persons and food, water on board the aircraft may be obtained from:
number, type, etc., of weapons, explosive and incendiary devices, known or believed to be in the possession of the offenders or found on board the aircraft risk of an accident on landing or a subsequent explosion and/or fire
•
the pilot
•
airport security services
•
the operator
•
other persons who obtained the information by observation
adequacy of essential food, potable and other water on board CREW COMPOSITION, EXPERIENCE AND COMPETENCE IN THE ROUTES LIKELY TO BE FLOWN, AND AT THE KNOWN OR PRESUMED DESTINATION self-explanatory
airport administrations
operator
security services
pilot
ATS units
the airport security services when crew changes have been made without consulting the operator
ADEQUACY OF THE NAVIGATIONAL CHARTS AND ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTATION ON BOARD FOR THE INTENDED OR ASSUMED ROUTE AND DESTINATION self-explanatory
ATS units, if the flight is being diverted into an area for which adequate charts and associated documentation are not on board
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operator pilot
Appendix 2 THREAT ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
INTRODUCTION 1. Annex 17 — Security requires that each Contracting State constantly review the level of threat to civil aviation operations within its territory and adjust relevant elements of its national civil aviation security programme accordingly. This requirement addresses two concepts — threat assessment and risk management — which together form the basis of a viable and cost-effective security response to those threats that target civil aviation. 2. One of the most difficult tasks for aviation security professionals is devising an effective security plan that correlates to the threat against civil aviation. Accurately identifying the threat or threats must be the first step in the process. 3. A methodology on threat assessment has therefore been developed and is described in this appendix. There are multiple benefits to using this methodology. It is versatile enough to assess threats to an aircraft operator, an airport or a State. Secondly, as most organizations have limited human and technological resources, a valid threat assessment can still be made without receiving significant intelligence information or employing a lot of specialized personnel because it uses a quantitative analytical approach. Furthermore, one of the primary benefits to using this methodology is that it offers a reliable procedure to identify the threat which, in turn, assists security professionals and other decision-makers in optimally allocating funds, acquiring critical security equipment and deploying manpower. This last aspect is part of the risk management concept and is addressed in Appendix 3. 4. It is readily acknowledged that the responsibility for assessing the nature and level of threats to civil aviation within a State may be delegated to another entity, such as an intelligence service or a military component, and not to the Civil Aviation Authority. This guidance material is therefore provided primarily to assist a Contracting State in meeting its requirement under Annex 17 if it has no other usable threat assessment process for civil aviation. The intention is that the appropriate authority responsible for the threat assessment considers adapting this model as necessary to fit the State’s particular circumstances.
ANALYTICAL PROCESS 5. In devising a threat assessment methodology, it is preferable to use a systematic and quantifiable approach to evaluate what the specific threat or threats may be to an airport, an aircraft operator, or a nation. The structure of this methodological approach therefore employs three core principles of security: identify, implement and sustain. When making a threat assessment, the analyst mainly uses the first principle, identify, while the other two principles play a significant role in the risk management process. 6. In undertaking the task of assessing the threat to civil aviation, there are several sources of empirical evidence and statistical data available in the fields of intelligence and aviation security from which to form an analysis of past trends of acts of unlawful interference involving international civil aviation. In order to provide decision-makers with a current and credible threat assessment, however, multiple sources of information should be explored. Because it is often difficult to come across dependable information regarding threats to aviation, the analyst must optimize the sporadic and vague information that is available. Analysts of this type of information, whether they be trained intelligence A2-1
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specialists, law enforcement officers or aviation security professionals, should therefore routinely assess both current intelligence and historical data in determining the threat and its impact on air operations and the safety of the air travelling public. 7. It is important to note that when making the threat analysis, the analyst must also avoid being influenced by institutionalized standards such as those attitudes and habits an organization may perpetuate as established norms which inhibit the thought process. The analyst should try not to be constrained by traditional methods or processes but should blend traditional thinking with innovative evaluation techniques.
DETERMINING THREAT AND VULNERABILITY CRITERIA 8. The analyst must first determine the threat and vulnerability criteria before conducting the assessment by deciding on focal points or “centres of gravity”. Centres of gravity can be defined as those factors or criteria that are estimated to have the most weight or value in a given process. Centres of gravity change according to the “system” being studied. Examples of systems are a country, an airport, an aircraft operator, or a group of people. 9. This methodological approach can be adapted to any system mentioned above, as long as the process is constructed of quantifiable values ascribed to the chosen centres of gravity. In recognizing that most organizations have limited human and technological resources, a quantitative analytical approach requires less information to form a conclusion. It also directs the analyst to consider relevant data with objectivity rather than with subjective speculation. 10. This process utilizes two facets of analysis that together form a credible means of assessing the threat and determining a security response through application of risk management measures. First, it must be understood that a deliberate act of unlawful interference against civil aviation must, by definition, be premeditated and carried out with purpose by the perpetrators. This means that someone has a reason to conduct an unlawful act and thus proceeds to plan and execute the act. Therefore, before assessing how an act of unlawful interference may be carried out against a target, the analyst should first consider the reasons why an unlawful act would be committed against civil aviation and the probability of its being committed. (This premise eliminates the possibility of using this methodology to analyse a threat for any incident where air operations are disrupted by an unruly passenger or mentally unstable individual whose actions cannot be predicted and are spontaneous.) 11. The next step would be to create working tools to assist in the assessment process. The working tool for this methodology has been named a “vulnerability matrix”. The two vulnerability matrices described in this appendix can be combined to form the final analysis for a follow-on risk management process, or they can be used independent of each other depending on the needs of the analyst. It should be noted that in order to assess the vulnerabilities of an airport the matrix on aviation security threat categories must be used, at a minimum. 12. For purposes of this guidance material, Vulnerability Matrix No. 1 profiles a group that has the potential to perpetrate acts of unlawful interference (see Table A2-1). The second matrix covers aviation security threat categories which can be adapted to assess the threat directed at a potential target such as an airport or to evaluate the aviation security posture of an aircraft operator or of a State (see Tables A2-2 and A2-3).
GROUP PROFILE 13. For the vulnerability matrix on profiling a group, one should subscribe to the assumption that most humanbased “systems” can be organized according to five basic attributes. Therefore, any group can be defined as having the following components: leadership, system essential, infrastructure, population and a fighting mechanism. These five
Appendix 2.
Threat assessment methodology
A2-3
attributes will now become the centres of gravity for our evaluation of a group which has the potential to commit unlawful acts, whether it be called a terrorist group, insurgent faction or organized crime. 14. The leadership function includes the group’s hierarchy, presence of legitimate political representation and use of charismatic personalities, to name a few examples. 15. The system essential can be described as the will and means of a group to convert theoretical goals, such as political agendas or religious causes, into practical application through surveillance operations, acquisition of weapons, developing sources of funding and training of operatives. 16. Infrastructure combines several elements such as the size and number of group “cells” or sub-units, an established communications network and effective use of transportation and supply lines. 17. The population attribute refers to the existence of an extended support network made up of local sympathizers or others who may provide safe haven, food and money to the group whether in accord with the group’s goals, or possibly out of fear and coercion. 18. The fighting mechanism is the attribute assigned with carrying out the group’s actions in pursuit of achieving their goals. These group members can be referred to as “warriors”, for example hijackers, or “technicians”, such as bomb-makers. 19. Under the five attributes mentioned, functional subcategories can be added according to the depth of analysis desired by the analyst. Those subcategories could include factors such as the group’s capability to conduct violent action, location and history of known previous activities and level of commitment to its ideological purpose (i.e. attacks by suicide bombers). Once the point values assigned to each centre of gravity have been totalled, the bottom line will provide the analyst with a profile of a group and a reliable estimate on the probability capability of the group to conduct an act of unlawful interference against civil aviation.
AVIATION SECURITY THREAT CATEGORIES 20. The second vulnerability matrix is based on six threat categories. The matrix can be expanded to include other factors judged to be important to the analyst, but for the purpose of this sample matrix the number of categories has been limited to those most often affecting the aviation security mission. 21. The categories include the presence of a group which could commit an unlawful act, a history of attacks against civil aviation, existence of internal strife, conditions of economic crisis, the volume of flights and the transit of high-risk flights. These six areas of focus represent different centres of gravity from those of the group profile. It can be seen that these centres of gravity are better suited to the threat assessment of States, aircraft operators or airports. 22. Once the point values are totalled, the analyst has a quantifiable method of predicting the level of threat for the target being evaluated. If the sum totals are combined with the totals of a group profile, the result can be directly linked to the application of security countermeasures commensurate to the assessed threat. 23. It must be emphasized at this point that, as with any analytical method, the benefits of such a process are only valid if the process is undertaken routinely. Prescribed periodic review of current data is essential when evaluating any change to the assessed threat. Thus, with proper control and management, this methodological approach to a threat assessment will continue to provide aviation security professionals and other decision-makers the means for effective risk management and security response.
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FINAL ANALYSIS 24.
In completing the matrices explained in Tables A2-1 through A2-3, the analyst should: a)
first specify the criteria to be assessed;
b)
fill in the columns according to the point values given for both matrices;
c)
add up the total points in each row or column as appropriate; and
d)
assign priorities for countermeasures in order of point value with the greater number of points equalling a higher level of threat and vulnerability.
25. It may be generally assumed that a thorough explanation incorporating the rationale behind the specified conclusions should accompany any threat assessment. A well-based explanation justifies the resulting risk management programme that will be devised to counteract the assessed threat or threats to civil aviation.
Appendix 2.
Threat assessment methodology Table A2-1.
A2-5 Vulnerability Matrix No. 1
Sample criteria and point values of system attributes for a group profile (More questions may be added as necessary.) [NAME OF GROUP TO BE EVALUATED] ATTRIBUTES
CRITERIA
POINT VALUES
LEADERSHIP
Does the group have a senior leadership? Is the leadership centralized? Is the leadership unified in its objectives?
Each YES answer equals 1 point. Each NO or UNKNOWN answer equals 0 points.
SYSTEM ESSENTIAL
Does the group have a cause or motive? Does the group make its cause public? Is the group capable enough to take action?
Each YES answer equals 1 point. Each NO or UNKNOWN answer equals 0 points.
INFRASTRUCTURE
Does the group have a known structure? Is the structure extensive? Is it effective?
Each YES answer equals 1 point. Each NO or UNKNOWN answer equals 0 points.
POPULATION
Does the group receive support from local or foreign government sources? Does the group have local supporters? Are the group members dedicated?
Each YES answer equals 1 point. Each NO or UNKNOWN answer equals 0 points.
FIGHTING MECHANISM
Does the group actively recruit members? Do the members receive operations training? Has the group conducted successful attacks?
Each YES answer equals 1 point. Each NO or UNKNOWN answer equals 0 points.
TOTAL POINTS Legend: 11 – 15 TOTAL POINTS = High probability that this group will commit an unlawful act. 6 – 10 TOTAL POINTS = Medium probability that this group will commit an unlawful act. 0 – 5 TOTAL POINTS = Low probability that this group will commit an unlawful act.
POINTS
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Vulnerability Matrix No. 2
AVIATION SECURITY THREAT CATEGORIES [AIRCRAFT OPERATOR] or [AIRPORT] or [STATE]
PRESENCE OF A GROUP
HISTORY OF ATTACKS
INTERNAL STRIFE
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
NUMBER OF FLIGHTS
HIGH-RISK FLIGHTS
TOTAL POINTS
Appendix 2.
Threat assessment methodology Table A2-3.
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Definitions and point values of aviation security threat categories for Vulnerability Matrix No. 2
Presence of a group
Known presence of a group which has the potential to conduct unlawful acts.
Point values
Present = Point value of 1
History of attacks
Earlier attacks are recorded. This may include any form of violent action, but special attention should be paid to any attacks directed against civil aviation, such as a hijacking, bombing at an airport or aircraft operator ticket office, and other armed attacks in the vicinity of the airport.
Point values
Frequent = Point value of 2
Internal strife
Conditions of turmoil such as ongoing or impending civil war or other political unrest exist.
Point values
Serious = Point value of 2
Economic problems
A state of economic crisis exists that is likely to result in severe funding cutbacks which may impact on the ability to sustain aviation security measures.
Point values
Serious = Point value of 2
Number of flights
Volume of air traffic. (The higher the number of flights, especially those with passengers, the greater the risk that an unlawful act will occur.)
Point values
50 + flights per week = Point value of 3
High-risk flights
Any aircraft operator or flight that could be considered especially vulnerable to an act of unlawful interference. Examples of high-risk aircraft operators or flights include: having been a target of previous attacks; carrying passengers on one-time or seasonal recurring flights such as international sports events or religious pilgrimages where an attack would maximize media reporting; and frequent labour disputes.
Point values
Present = Point value of 1
Not applicable = Point value of 0
Occasional = Point value of 1
Minor = Point value of 1
Minor = Point value of 1
20 – 49 flights per week = Point value of 2
Not applicable = Point value of 0
_____________________
Not applicable = Point value of 0
Not applicable = Point value of 0
Not applicable = Point value of 0
1 – 19 flights per week = Point value of 1
Appendix 3 RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL
INTRODUCTION 1. Annex 17 requires that each Contracting State keep under constant review the level of threat to civil aviation within its territory, and establish and implement policies and procedures to adjust relevant elements of its National Civil Aviation Security Programme (NCASP) accordingly, based upon a security risk assessment carried out by the relevant national authorities. This requirement addresses two concepts — threat assessment and risk management — which together form the basis of a viable and cost-effective security response to acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation. This appendix focuses on the risk management model. Guidance material describing a methodology for conducting a threat assessment may be found in Appendix 2. BACKGROUND 2. Security professionals have long recognized that implementing increased preventive measures commensurate with a higher level of threat has an associated expense that may become a heavy financial burden on the resources of a State or aviation authority. It is therefore considered more effective to deploy defences where and when they are most needed rather than applying them universally. This concept is called risk management. 3. Standards in Annex 17 consist of a baseline set of preventive security measures that are expected to be applied equally at airports serving civil aviation in all Contracting States regardless of the threat environment impacting on civil aviation operations. While these arrangements were established to ensure minimum uniform standards at airports serving civil aviation, no specific standards exist to address variable threat conditions. Whenever a State introduces additional security measures to meet a higher threat level, it may find that implementation is difficult to sustain, especially when the extra measures have not been tailored to the specific threat. Therefore, once a State has properly assessed the nature and level of threat within its own territory, it can then apply appropriate enhanced measures at its airport(s) and for aircraft operators operating to/from its territory. In order to encourage a consistent approach among all Contracting States, this risk management model, which may be used and adapted as necessary, was developed to aid Contracting States in their response to increased threat conditions. 4. States can profit from using a risk management approach whereby enhanced measures are implemented either to prevent an unlawful act from being committed against airports or aircraft operators or, at a minimum, to mitigate any consequences resulting from an unlawful act. Some of the more obvious benefits include the optimum allocation of fiscal and personnel assets and the encouragement of public confidence in the safety of air travel to and from that State. CONCEPT OF RISK MANAGEMENT 5. Overall, the methodologies of threat assessment and risk management use three core security principles: identify, implement and sustain. When making a threat assessment, the first principle is primarily employed, while the second and third principles play a significant role in the risk management process. 6. The main purpose of any security countermeasure is prevention. Therefore, after the first step to identify the threat or threats to civil aviation is completed, the next task is to devise an appropriate security response commensurate with that threat. This task employs the implement principle. A3-1
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7. If the assumption is made that potential perpetrators with the intention to interfere with civil aviation can defeat a security system if given enough information, time and opportunity, then the logical objective is how best to deter the perpetrators from carrying out a successful act of unlawful interference. It is therefore essential that the implementation of suitable preventive security measures be considered. 8. This operational intervention leads to the third principle, sustain, which can be described as a State having the political will and accompanying capability to maintain appropriate reliable security practices. Without the commitment to sustain effective aviation security measures, the efficacy of the other principles is diminished. When taking steps to prevent acts of unlawful interference and other criminal activity directed against airports and aircraft operators, it is necessary to evaluate the sustainability of security measures through inspections, audits and surveys, such as provided by a National Civil Aviation Security Quality Control Programme (NCASQCP).
RISK MANAGEMENT MATRIX 9. This section provides criteria for three levels of threat conditions which correlate to the three sets of suggested countermeasures laid out in the risk management matrix described in Table A3-1:
10.
a)
Level One — Baseline: Indicates low threat conditions where, in the absence of verifiable intelligence information to indicate that any aircraft operator or airport has been targeted for attack, there may be the possibility of unlawful interference by individuals or groups due to causes such as civil unrest, labour disputes and the active presence of anti-government factions;
b)
Level Two — Intermediate: Intelligence information indicates there is a probability that one or more aircraft operators and/or airports are targeted for attack; and
c)
Level Three — High: Intelligence information indicates that one or more aircraft operators and/or airports are specifically targeted for attack.
Before assigning countermeasures the following actions should be considered: a)
evaluate the nature and level of threat to an operator or airport in accordance with a valid threat assessment;
b)
determine the duration for heightened threat conditions;
c)
become familiar with the layout and operations of affected facilities;
d)
conduct inventory of available security staff and equipment;
e)
review the current security measures in place; and
f)
appraise the number of flights and passengers and the volume of baggage and cargo that would be subject to enhanced security procedures.
Appendix 3.
Risk management model
Table A3-1.
1.
A3-3
Suggested security measures for baseline, intermediate and high threat conditions
NO.
FOCUS AREA
BASELINE
INTERMEDIATE
HIGH
1
Landside and airside boundaries
Establish boundaries between landside and airside areas. Protect and inspect all passages through such boundaries at irregular intervals.
Apply baseline measures plus increased vigilance and patrols.
Apply intermediate measures.
2
Security restricted areas
Control access into security restricted areas at all times. Employ a pass system or other means for vehicles, staff and crew.1 Check all IDs and passes at access points. Inspect vehicles and supplies on a random basis.
Apply baseline measures plus search at least 20% of staff, items carried and vehicles before access is allowed.
Apply baseline measures plus search 100% of staff, items carried and vehicles before access is allowed.
3a
Passenger screening (where centralized)
Search all departing passengers by hand or screen them with metal detection equipment before access is allowed into the security restricted area.
Apply baseline measures plus search 10% of passengers by hand at the departure gate.
Search all departing passengers again at the departure gate by hand or screen them with metal detection equipment before boarding the aircraft. Search 20% of passengers by hand who have been screened by metal detection equipment.
3b
Passenger screening (at departure gate)
Same as for 3a.
Same as for 3a.
Same as for 3a.
4a
Cabin baggage screening (where centralized)
Search all cabin baggage of departing passengers either by hand or by X-ray equipment. 10% of cabin baggage screened by X-ray equipment to be searched by hand.
Apply baseline measures plus search 10% of cabin baggage by hand (or by approved advanced technology) at the departure gate.
Search the cabin baggage of all departing passengers again at the departure gate either by hand or by X-ray equipment before being taken on board an aircraft. Search 20% of cabin baggage by hand (or by approved advanced technology) which has been screened by X-ray equipment.
4b
Cabin baggage screening (at departure gate)
Same as for 4a.
Same as for 4a.
Same as for 4a.
Background checks to be carried out before pass is issued.
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NO.
FOCUS AREA
BASELINE
INTERMEDIATE
HIGH
5
Separation of screened and unscreened passengers
Separate screened departing passengers from inbound passengers. Where physical separation cannot be achieved, application of compensatory measures in accordance with threat assessment by national authority.
Apply baseline measures.
Apply baseline measures and enhance monitoring of compensatory measures.
6
Aircraft security checks and searches
Check/search (in case of aircraft entering in service) originating aircraft prior to departure and aircraft in transit to ensure no weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices have been placed or left on board.
Apply baseline measures.
Conduct thorough search of aircraft supported by appropriate detection techniques at the discretion of the appropriate authority.
7
Access control to aircraft
Access to aircraft restricted to authorized staff having duties on board, and passengers. Aircraft doors should be closed and steps removed when unattended or air bridges withdrawn.
Apply baseline measures.
Access to aircraft to be strictly controlled with guards at each door in use. All staff seeking access to be searched by hand together with items carried.
8
Passenger risk assessment
No requirement.
No requirement.
All passengers subjected to a system of passenger risk assessment with selected passengers subject to enhanced screening.
9
Reconciliation of hold baggage
Conduct positive hold baggage match with crew and passengers before loading by either manual or automated means. All unaccompanied baggage to be identified.
Apply baseline measures.
Apply baseline measures or positive passenger/bag identification.
Appendix 3.
Risk management model
A3-5
NO.
FOCUS AREA
BASELINE
INTERMEDIATE
HIGH
10
Hold baggage screening
Screen 100% of originating and transfer hold baggage either by hand, conventional X-ray equipment or explosive detection system (EDS) equipment. With respect to transfer hold baggage, an exception can be made where a validation process and continuous implementation of procedures have been established for screening at the point of origin, and baggage is subsequently protected from unauthorized interference from the originating airport to the departing aircraft at the transfer airport.
Apply baseline measures, plus where conventional X-ray is used, 10% of bags also to be searched by hand or subjected to advanced X-ray technology.
Apply intermediate measures but use best available technology and procedures.
11
Unaccompanied hold baggage
Screen all unaccompanied hold baggage except when its origins and ownership can be verified.2
Screen all unaccompanied baggage either by hand or EDS equipment, or subject to flight simulation using compression chamber, or do not carry.
Apply intermediate measures.
12
Protection of hold baggage
Protect hold baggage from unauthorized interference from the point of its screening or acceptance, whichever is earlier, until departure of the aircraft. If the integrity of hold baggage is jeopardized, it shall be re-screened before being placed on board an aircraft.
Apply baseline measures.
Apply baseline measures plus keep hold baggage under constant supervision by designated security guards or transported in sealed, tamperevident containers and verified.
13
Air cargo
All items to be subjected to security controls by aircraft operators and/or designated regulated agents and/or any appropriate entity before being placed on the aircraft.
Apply baseline measures with added random screening and increased checks. (Exception for regulated agents.)
All air cargo to be subjected to security controls or subject to full flight simulation and then protected until loaded. Aircraft carrying only cargo apply intermediate measures only.
14
Protection of air cargo
Protect air cargo from unauthorized interference from the point security controls are applied until departure of the aircraft.
Apply baseline measures.
Apply baseline measures plus keep air cargo under constant supervision by designated security guards or transported in sealed, tamper-evident containers and verified.
2.
In this context, unaccompanied hold baggage means hold baggage which has become unintentionally separated from its passenger.
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NO.
FOCUS AREA
15
Mail
16
Protection of mail
17
18
BASELINE
INTERMEDIATE
HIGH
All items to be subjected to security controls by aircraft operator and/or designated regulated agents and/or any appropriate entity before being placed on the aircraft.
Apply baseline measures with added random screening and increased checks. (Exception for regulated agents.)
All mail to be screened or subject to flight simulation in compression chamber, then protected until loaded. Aircraft carrying only cargo apply intermediate measures only.
Protect mail from unauthorized interference from the point security controls are applied until departure of the aircraft.
Apply baseline measures.
Apply baseline measures plus keep mail under constant supervision by designated security guards or transported in sealed, tamper-evident containers and verified.
Aircraft catering supplies and stores
All items to be subjected to appropriate security controls, i.e. to prevent introduction of dangerous items into catering supplies or stores taken on board an aircraft, and thereafter protected until loaded onto the aircraft.
Search a reasonable proportion of catering supplies and stores and either escort to the aircraft or transport in sealed, tamper-evident containers.
All catering supplies and stores to be prepared under direct aircraft operator security supervision or searched before loading and either escorted to the aircraft or sent under seal.
Designate security coordinator
No requirement.
No requirement.
Designate a dedicated security coordinator to ensure all measures are properly implemented.
_____________________
Appendix 4 ACTION BY THE RECIPIENT OF A BOMB THREAT TELEPHONE CALL
CHARACTERISTICS OF BOMB THREATS 1.
Experience has shown that bomb threats may be directed against: a)
aircraft on the ground or in the air;
b)
airport installations, facilities and buildings; or navigation aids on or in the immediate vicinity of the airport; and
c)
air cargo designated for shipment by air; or cargo installations, facilities and buildings.
RECEIPT OF BOMB THREATS 2. Telephoned bomb threats may be received by airports, aircraft operators and cargo agents either directly from the people issuing the threats or from intermediaries, for example, the media or press agencies. In either case, recipients should try to obtain as much information as possible about the threat in order to facilitate assessment of it and identification of the person issuing it. 3. To facilitate the collection of information, aircraft operators and airports should install tape recording facilities on appropriate exchanges and/or telephones. Continuous loop equipment, which should be kept running continuously, is preferable to conventional recording equipment which must be switched on when a recording is to be made. When a bomb threat has been recorded, the tape should be retained as evidence.
STAFF INSTRUCTIONS AND TRAINING 4. Staff such as telephone switchboard operators and aircraft operator ticket sales people who are likely to receive bomb threat calls should be briefed on the action they should take before taking up their duties, and the responses required from them should be incorporated into appropriate staff instructions. 5. They should be provided with checklists to facilitate their reactions. Supervisors should be similarly aware of the response required and of the need to relay information about bomb threats to trained bomb threat assessors.
ACTION BY RECIPIENT OF A BOMB THREAT 6.
Any person receiving a bomb threat directly by telephone should:
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a)
listen carefully and make a note of the actual words used by the caller;
b)
either take action to trace the call or alert a colleague in order that they may do so;
c)
take such action as may be necessary to tape-record the call, where this is not done automatically;
d)
prolong the call to obtain as much information as possible;
e)
ask the caller the following questions:
WHERE is the bomb?
Asked first so that an evacuation can be planned
WHEN will it go off?
So that a time factor is known for the evacuation
WHAT does it look like?
To help in recognition of the device during a search
WHO are you?
To see if the caller is from a credible group
WHY are you doing this?
To build up a better picture of the incident and keep the caller on the line to assist in tracing the call
Note 1.— The questions should be posed as open questions rather than as leading ones. For example, ask, “Where exactly is the bomb?” rather than, “Is the bomb in the hold of the aircraft?” Note 2.— The order in which the questions are asked is important as the caller may hang up before all the questions can be asked.
7.
f)
if possible, test the credibility of the caller by making up a non-existent flight number, flight time or location and asking the caller whether that is the one to which he is referring; and
g)
inform a supervisor who should inform the nominated bomb threat assessor, the police or security services.
People receiving calls from intermediaries should: a)
ask for, and make written note of, the precise time at which the threat was issued and the exact words used by the caller; and
b)
ask whether the intermediary obtained answers to any of the questions detailed above and about the origin of the call and the caller’s identity.
8. The recipient of a written bomb threat should preserve the message and deliver it to the supervisor with precise information about its discovery. Messages discovered in flight should be referred to the pilot-in-command immediately. 9. Supervisors should interview the recipient of any call or message in order to complete the Bomb Threat Report Form shown below and relay it without delay to the nominated bomb threat assessor.
Appendix 4.
Action by the recipient of a bomb threat telephone call
A4-3
SAMPLE BOMB THREAT REPORT FORM Name of person receiving threat message :
Time :
Date :
Message : (Caller’s exact words)
WHERE IS THE BOMB? Terminal
Fuel storage facility
Cargo area
Aircraft operator offices or maintenance area
Aircraft
Flight number
Departing
Going to
Other
Did the caller appear to be familiar with the aircraft or building when describing the location? YES / NO WHEN WILL IT EXPLODE? Time : In flight? :
Day : YES / NO
If moved? :
Date : YES / NO
Other :
WHAT DOES IT LOOK LIKE? Briefcase
Shopping/carrier bag
Box/parcel
Other (describe)
Suitcase
WHO ARE YOU? Name :
Organization :
Where are you now? WHY ARE YOU DOING THIS?
BACKGROUND DETAILS (Circle appropriate answer) Origin of call Local
Long distance
Attempt made to trace call?
Internal (from within building) YES / NO
Public telephone/cellular/mobile
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A4-4 Caller’s identity Sex :
Approximate age :
Language spoken :
Voice characteristics Loud
Soft
High-pitched
Deep
Raspy
Pleasant
Other
Fast
Distinct
Stuttering
Slurred
Slow
Distorted
Nasal
Other
Noisy
Quiet
Trains
Aircraft
Street traffic
Voices
Office machines
Factory machines
Kitchen
Party atmosphere
Animals
Music
Speech
Background noise
Mixed (describe) Accent Local
Not local
Colloquial
Regional
Foreign
Manner Angry
Calm
Irrational
Rational
Coherent
Incoherent
Deliberate
Emotional
Intoxicated
Laughing
Righteous
Obscene
Other (describe) Command of language Excellent
Good
Fair
Poor
COMPLETE FORM AND PASS TO NOMINATED BOMB THREAT ASSESSOR. DISCUSS THREAT CALL ONLY WITH BOMB THREAT ASSESSOR OR POLICING AUTHORITIES. _____________________
Appendix 5 BOMB THREAT ASSESSMENT
1. A systematic procedure to assess bomb threats is necessary to ensure, as far as humanly possible, that whenever there exists an actual bomb or other device the assessment leads to positive action, and where the threat is a hoax the assessment results in the minimum disruption to operations. 2. Along with the technique called “Positive Target Identification” (PTI) described in Chapter 5 of this manual, States should ensure that contingency plans provide for:
3.
a)
a controlled response by persons receiving bomb threats;
b)
an assessment of the threat and the risk involved by designated and accredited personnel (bomb threat assessors) employing PTI;
c)
coordination of any action taken which should be appropriate to the risk as assessed;
d)
detection of persons responsible for bomb threats; and
e)
follow-up action.
Contingency plans should be exercised frequently.
CHARACTERISTICS OF BOMB THREATS 4.
Experience has shown that bomb threats may be directed against: a)
aircraft on the ground or in the air;
b)
airport installations, facilities and buildings; or navigation aids on or in the immediate vicinity of the airport; and
c)
air cargo designated for shipment by air; or cargo installations, facilities and buildings.
RECEIPT OF BOMB THREATS 5. Telephoned bomb threats may be received by airports, aircraft operators and cargo agents either directly from the people issuing the threats or from intermediaries, for example, the media or press agencies. Action to be taken by the recipient of a bomb threat telephone call is outlined in Appendix 4.
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A5-2 BOMB THREAT ASSESSMENT ON THE GROUND
6. Bomb threat assessment carries substantial responsibility. Bomb threat assessors should be appropriately trained and available 24 hours a day. Each aircraft operator and airport should have at least one assessor on duty or on call within the company at all times. Where a threat is received against an aircraft on the ground, the targeted aircraft operator and the appropriate airport security services agency should agree on assessment. 7. Aircraft operators may require pilots-in-command to refer bomb threats received on board aircraft in flight to operations staff on the ground for assessment, or they may authorize the pilots-in-command to assess threats themselves. Where pilots-in-command are authorized to assess bomb threats, they should be provided with guidance from the police or State security services. 8. It is important that the bomb threat assessor obtain full details of the threat message — ideally in the form of a completed Bomb Threat Report Form (see Appendix 4) from the person who received it and by the fastest possible means. 9. The bomb threat assessor should assess the threat by working methodically through the form which is designed to lead the assessor to a logical assessment of the threat as GREEN, AMBER or RED described below with the actions required.
GREEN
A warning, which may not identify a target or a specific group of targets, or which otherwise lacks credibility.
Present countermeasures negate threat. No extra precautions necessary.
AMBER
A warning that can be related to one or more targets but where there is doubt about its credibility or about the effectiveness of existing countermeasures.
This may involve danger and may require augmentation of countermeasures.
RED
A specific warning where the threat is of a nature which permits identification of a specific target, or where the caller has positively identified himself or the organization involved and is judged credible.
Likely to involve a danger to people, property or commercial activities and therefore merits countermeasures. Take all necessary countermeasures.
Note.— Category RED warnings against aircraft in flight should be notified immediately to the pilot-incommand of the aircraft and the destination or nominated diversion airport. 10. Although the procedure is largely dependent upon the provision of “Yes” or “No” answers to a series of questions, the assessor must also take account of other factors that may bear upon the credibility of the threat including, but not limited to, the following: a)
the recent history of warnings and incidents for the airport and the main aircraft operators;
b)
the possible influence of current events such as: •
industrial disputes concerning the aircraft operator of the flight concerned or airport;
Appendix 5.
Bomb threat assessment
A5-3
•
disputes with neighbouring communities or environmental protest groups concerned with, for example, airport expansion or development;
•
similar incidents having been recently reported in the media which may have prompted a hoax call; and
•
high-profile persons who may attract a threat at the airport or are passengers on the flight;
c)
any reported incidents such as overbooked passengers, a passenger refused boarding, or disputes at check-in or the gate involving friends or relatives;
d)
anything particular or unique about the cargo being carried on the flight; and
e)
additional security measures that have been taken and the local police or security authority’s opinion of the warning.
BOMB THREAT ASSESSMENT IN THE AIR 11. Written bomb threats discovered on board aircraft in flight are likely to be spurious, but each one should be considered on its merits in order to assess the risks involved. Where pilots-in-command are authorized to assess threats, aircraft operators should provide them with guidance to enable them to assess the risks and decide upon a course of action. They should consider the following: a)
the circumstances surrounding the threat to determine if it originated before the aircraft’s departure or during the flight. The pilot-in-command should consider whether the threat could have been discovered during the pre-flight search of the aircraft, or at an earlier stage in the flight;
b)
the precise wording of the threat, to determine whether it suggests there is a credible reason for the threat having been given. A threat is most likely to be genuine if there is a reason for it, such as a desire to avoid the casualties that would result from an explosion. It is likely that a person issuing such a threat will seek to ensure that it gets through and that there is time to react to it. Where no clear reason for the threat can be deduced, the threat is less likely to be genuine;
c)
whether there is any person on board (e.g. a political figure or other well-known person) who might attract a threat;
d)
whether there are passengers on board who might be responsible for a threat (e.g. a potentially disruptive passenger, deportee or inadmissible, young people or rowdy passengers);
e)
whether the aircraft operator’s operations centre can be contacted by radio to establish whether this is an isolated incident or one of a series of similar events affecting the aircraft operator; and
f)
if the pilot-in-command is not satisfied that the incident is a hoax, he should seek information through the aircraft operator’s operations centre about the current threat to the aircraft operator’s interests at the airport of departure, with a view to establishing whether there are credible motives for attacking the aircraft or disrupting the flight and the quality of security measures at the airport of departure. Aircraft operators should therefore develop procedures for making such information available to the pilot-incommand with the least possible delay.
Security Manual Volume V
A5-4 DETERRING AND DETECTING PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR BOMB THREATS
12. Details of bomb threat incidents should be recorded by aircraft operators and airports and detailed in a report which should be sent to the State’s civil aviation and security policy and regulatory section so that trends may be considered, and to the appropriate police authority in order that the circumstances may be investigated. 13. When a person initiating a bomb threat is identified, that person should be prosecuted under the relevant laws of the State; evidence of the cost and concern caused by the incident should be submitted for consideration by the court, and convictions should be publicized to deter potential offenders.
ACTION AFTER POSITIVE THREAT ASSESSMENT 14. In consultation with the police and other appropriate agencies, each aircraft operator and airport should develop contingency plans to be implemented when bomb threats issued against it are assessed as RED or AMBER to reduce the risks arising from such bomb threats. Actions which should be included in contingency plans relating to aircraft are outlined in Appendix 6.
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Appendix 6 RESPONSE TO BOMB THREATS AGAINST AIRCRAFT
AIRCRAFT ON THE GROUND 1. When a bomb threat is associated with an aircraft that is still on the ground, and once the warning has been assessed, aircraft operators in consultation with airport authorities should: a)
disembark all passengers and crew with all cabin baggage by steps or jetties. Escape slides should only be used in extreme emergencies;
b)
move the aircraft to a remote location such as the isolated parking position;
c)
isolate and re-screen all passengers and their cabin baggage and hold them in a separate area until the crew members, hold baggage, cargo and catering supplies have been inspected/screened, searched and declared safe;
d)
unload all hold baggage and require passengers to identify their baggage, which should then be screened or searched before it is reloaded;
e)
unload all cargo which should then be screened or searched before it is reloaded;
f)
unload and check the integrity of catering supplies; and
g)
search the aircraft.
AIRCRAFT IN FLIGHT 2. When a bomb threat is associated with an aircraft in flight, and once the threat has been assessed as positive, the aircraft operator should contact the pilot-in-command, directly or through the ATS unit, to provide information about the threat and device and about how to respond. 3. On receipt of the information, the pilot-in-command should require a discreet search of the aircraft by crew members insofar as this is possible in flight and conducted in such a manner as to not cause passengers to panic. 4. In those cases where the bomb threat assessment indicates that it is unlikely that there is a bomb on board the aircraft, but where an aircraft operator or a pilot-in-command wishes to be prudent — before committing, for example, to an extended flight across water — the aircraft should be diverted to an airfield at which it can land safely. Once it has landed, consideration should be given to taking the actions described above for threats against an aircraft on the ground. 5. When the pilot-in-command has reasonable grounds for believing that there is a bomb on board the aircraft, consideration should be given to the potential effects of an explosion on board the aircraft to people on the ground, particularly within densely populated areas. Action as described in the following guidelines should be taken: a)
an aircraft emergency should be declared to the ATS unit stating the nature of the emergency, and the aircraft should be diverted to the nearest civil or military airfield at which it can land safely. The route to the nominated nearest suitable airfield should avoid densely populated areas; A6-1
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A6-2 b)
if the aircraft is required to make an approach to land over a densely populated area, it should be permitted to land at that airfield in accordance with current emergency procedures. Its time in the air should not be prolonged in order to divert to another airfield;
c)
if an immediate landing cannot be made, consideration should be given to seeking expert advice by communicating on radio with the ATS unit or other ground station which should, in turn, provide a landline link with the State’s explosive disposal experts. The possibility of radio communications between aircraft and ATS units being monitored, with the attendant risk of compromise, should be taken into account during transmissions. Consideration should be given to the use of on-board aircraft telephone communications or digital cellular telephones; and
d)
the pilot-in-command may also consider making discreet inquiries to establish whether any passenger has bomb disposal (BD) or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) expertise. Only the initials for these skills should be used in order to reduce the likelihood of alarming other passengers. Caution should be exercised about the skills any passengers may say they have and where possible a check on their background should be initiated through the ATS unit or ground station with which the aircraft is in communication.
6. In addition to the above guidelines, if a suspect explosive device is discovered on board an aircraft, the pilot-in-command should direct that: a)
the suspect object not be moved, touched or opened;
b)
passengers should be moved as far away as possible, instructed to fasten their seat belts and keep their heads below the tops of the seat backs; and
c)
portable oxygen, bottles of alcohol and first-aid kits should be removed from the vicinity. Fire extinguishers should be readily available.
7. If an immediate landing can be made, the item should be left in place, covered with polythene and then packed around with pillows, blankets, coats and other blast-absorbent materials. The item itself must be kept dry (hence the polythene) but surrounding materials should be wet in order to reduce the risk of fire. 8. If an immediate landing cannot be made, the pilot-in-command should take expert advice from explosives disposal experts as described above and consider moving the item, especially if its position poses a real threat to the aircraft. Reference to the aircraft flying manuals should identify the type specific least risk bomb location. If this is a door, a stable platform of hard, blast-attenuating materials, such as cabin baggage, upon which the suspect item can be placed, should be built to the centre of the door. 9. It is unlikely that an explosive device placed on an aircraft will be fitted with an anti-handling triggering mechanism. Nevertheless, if the device is to be moved, the following actions should be taken: a)
the suspect object should not be opened;
b)
a check should be made to ensure that it is free to move — i.e. that there is, for example, no thread joining it to the aircraft structure which may indicate an anti-handling triggering mechanism;
c)
it should be moved gently and kept in the same attitude in which it was found; and
d)
it should be placed, in the same attitude, in the prepared least risk bomb location and packed around as described above and suitably restrained against movement during flight or during deceleration or landing.
Appendix 6.
Response to bomb threats against aircraft
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Note 1.— No procedures which involve disconnecting or cutting electrical circuits in the suspect items should be attempted. Note 2.— As a general rule, a suspect package or article should not be jettisoned from an aircraft in flight, particularly through a dorso-lateral door, emergency exit or hatch. Tests have shown that such a course of action will subject the object to severe buffeting by the airflow. This could cause an explosion in close proximity to the fuselage, or engine(s) of the aircraft, resulting in a loss of control and possible consequential destruction of the aircraft. 10. If no suspicious item is found and an immediate landing cannot be made, the pilot-in-command should consider the following: a)
although a bomb threat may have been received and assessed as RED, the aircraft should be flown as normally as possible, striking a balance between the need for a rapid landing and the risk arising from undue haste;
b)
an emergency should be declared and the aircraft should divert to the nearest suitable airfield. The choice of airfield should take into account landing performance requirements, approach aids, emergency facilities and the proximity of approach paths to densely populated areas;
c)
the ATS unit should be fully briefed on flight intentions so that the appropriate ground measures can be initiated at the airfield of intended landing;
d)
the cabin crew should be briefed to be prepared for a possible emergency landing and prepare for the possible use of crew oxygen/smoke masks;
e)
if operationally possible, the cabin differential pressure should be reduced to zero by descending the aircraft to the cabin altitude. Do not raise the cabin altitude. Maintain this cabin altitude until the top of descent. When the minimum safe altitude and range considerations permit, descend aircraft to below 3 000 m (10 000 ft);
f)
all efforts should be taken to minimize aircraft manoeuvres and to try to avoid turbulence;
g)
careful consideration should be given to the choice between flying fast to minimize airborne time and flying slowly to minimize air loads and damage in the event of fuselage rupture. In most cases, the turbulent air penetration speed will be a reasonable compromise;
h)
consideration should be given to establishing the aircraft-landing configuration as soon as possible; and
i)
details of remote parking requirements and the immediate availability of passenger steps should be requested from the airfield of landing. The airfield should be advised of the need to remove passengers from the vicinity of the aircraft to at least 200 m in an upwind direction as quickly as possible after landing.
11. When an aircraft lands following receipt of a bomb threat that has been assessed RED or AMBER, provision should be made to disembark passengers and crew with a minimum of delay (with their cabin baggage when circumstances permit). The necessary emergency services should be provided to preserve life and prevent injury, and the aircraft should be parked where it will not hazard people or premises in the event of an explosion. The actions for a bomb threat against an aircraft on the ground should then be implemented.
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Appendix 7 AIRCRAFT SECURITY SEARCH CHECKLIST
1. The regular search of aircraft for suspect explosive devices and weapons may be conducted prior to commencing each flight based on a risk assessment conducted by the appropriate authority. A similar search will be required when an aircraft is suspected of being the target of an act of unlawful interference. The difference between the two types is only in the degree and thoroughness of search undertaken, and these will be dictated by the total circumstances applicable to each situation. 2. The large number of aircraft in service throughout the world makes it impossible to provide guidance here for recommended aircraft inspection procedures that will be adequate in all cases. Aircraft operators should develop an aircraft search procedure checklist for each type of aircraft in service and include this checklist as part of the flight crew security kit. Use of such a checklist by ground crews will be particularly helpful at locations where the only persons familiar with the particular type of aircraft or configuration of aircraft are flight deck and cabin crew members. 3. The designated isolated parking position will likely prove to be the best location on the airport at which an aircraft subjected to a specific threat can be searched, but contingency plans should recognize that it may not always be possible to access this position. 4. Aircraft searches should be carried out in good lighting conditions; this may require the use of auxiliary power units or the attachment of ground power lines to the aircraft. It will be necessary to impose and maintain control of access to the aircraft before starting the search, which should be carried out with the minimum number of persons on board. 5. To avoid duplication of effort, the search of an aircraft should be conducted systematically by staff familiar with the particular aircraft, provided with a checklist and assigned to specific areas of the aircraft. Attention should be given to those areas to which passengers have had access, such as main cabins, galley areas and toilets, but the search should also include the flight deck exterior of the aircraft and cargo holds. 6. Before starting the search, strict control of access must be implemented to the aircraft being searched. This is necessary to ensure devices are not introduced into the aircraft once it has been cleared. Control of access must then be maintained until the aircraft doors are closed prior to push back. 7. Searchers should be briefed not to touch suspicious objects but to notify the search coordinator, mark the location with a prominent object (but not touching the device), and withdraw from the immediate area to await further instructions. When a suspect device is discovered, the possibility of secondary devices should not be discounted. 8. Hand-held communications are useful for coordination of the search and are often the only way of ensuring appropriate and speedy lifesaving procedures for search and evacuation. However, once a suspect device has been located, those using hand-held communications should immediately move away and ensure that they and anyone else in the area move outside the cordon as quickly as possible. Radios should not be used to transmit within 25 m of a suspect device. 9. All entrance doors, hatches, inlet and exhaust ducts, service and access doors, etc., must be opened to allow the necessary access to all areas to be inspected. However, a check must be made to ensure that all doors and covers which were opened for inspection purposes are closed on conclusion of the search. A7-1
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10. It is difficult to give guidance to search teams about the appearance of suspect explosive devices as they can be disguised in many ways. Search teams should be briefed to look for unidentified objects or anything: a)
that should not be there;
b)
that cannot be accounted for; and
c)
that is out of place.
AIRCRAFT INTERIOR • • • • • • • • • •
Seats, including pouches, cushions and underside of seats Log book and flight manual stowage Crew oxygen mask stowage Entire floor, including area forward of rudder pedals and beneath all flight deck seats Ceiling, side and rear walls Life jacket stowage Crew coatroom and luggage stowage area Table and drawer of third crew member’s position Area around rudder/brake pedals Inside first-aid kit Forward entrance
• • • • • • • •
Stairway including underside Connection of stair to fuselage, as well as shelf at this point Escape chute stowage Cabin attendant seat, life raft stowage and seat back Forward windscreen and storage unit, including compartments Oxygen mask compartment Ceiling and wall Fire extinguisher stowage Companionway — flight deck
• • • • • •
Walls, ceiling and floor Coatroom Overhead baggage storage — entire area with baggage removed Compartments above baggage rack and coatroom Drinking fountain, cup dispenser, cup disposal compartment and drain valve access Area above and along sidewall of stowage compartment, forward side of forward toilet Forward compartment
• • •
Coatrooms and enclosed mask and vest stowages Flight attendants’ and passengers’ seats (including underside of seats) Passenger berth
Appendix 7.
Aircraft security search checklist • • • • • • •
A7-3
Ceiling, floor and walls Crew and passenger life vest stowages Portable oxygen stowage cupboard Seats (pouches and oxygen mask compartment) Table between rear lounge chairs and its compartment Escape chute stowage Literature containers Forward galley
• • • • • • •
Remove all containers, food boxes and ovens, if not already done Open and inspect all galley compartments, bar and refrigerator Inspect containers removed from galley and bar Oxygen mask stowage (bar) Galley service door (tape stowage; hinge recess) Escape chute stowage Compartments above service doors Forward toilets
• • • • • • • • • • •
Remove soiled and waste material not already removed Remove containers under sinks, inspect contents and areas around sink Inspect towel compartment Tissue dispenser Toilet Mirror and compartments Walls, ceiling and floor Door Oxygen mask stowage Access to drinking fountain Waste water receptacle Main cabin
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Seats (pouches, oxygen mask stowage, cushions and underside of seats) Pillow racks, blankets and handrail Floor — do not remove carpet unless presence of foreign object is suspected Side walls, including windows and curtains Bulkheads and foot recesses and oxygen mask stowage Ceiling Light recesses Compartments at aft end of each handrail Compartments behind rear cabin seats Stretcher equipment stowage above hat rack Demonstration life vest stowage Emergency escape rope compartments Escape chute stowages Main door and recess with door closed Magazine racks Life raft stowages
Security Manual Volume V
A7-4 • • • • • • • • • • • •
Life vest pouches Passenger berths Oxygen cabinet Cargo tie-down stowage Literature containers First-aid kit, only if unsealed Passenger oxygen service units — drop them down and inspect Oxygen and CO2 cylinder stowage drawers, forward sides of Nos. 1 and 3 galleys and aft toilets Overwing emergency exit release covers Aft entry door cabin attendant’s seat Drinking fountain, cup dispenser, cup disposal compartment and drain valve access at floor Portable emergency exit lights — remove light and inspect Centre galley and bar
• • • • • • • • • • • •
Remove all containers, food boxes and ovens, if not already done Open and inspect all galley compartments, bar and refrigerator Inspect all containers removed from the aircraft Walls, ceiling and floor Glass stowage in bulkhead forward of bar First-aid kit in compartment aft side of aft unit — only if unsealed Compartment above service door Service door and recess Escape chute stowages Cabin attendants’ seats in aisle No. 2 galley Oxygen mask compartment in ceiling Portable emergency exit light — remove light and inspect Rear galley area and bar
• • • • • • • • • • • •
Flight attendants’ seat Galley — remove all containers Open and inspect all compartments Walls, ceiling and floor Compartments in front bulkhead Inspect containers removed from aircraft Diplomatic mail locker Galley service door hinge recess Escape slide stowages (each door) Aft entrance door hinge recess Life raft stowages Oxygen bottle ceiling stowage Aft toilets
• • • • •
Remove soiled and waste material Remove and inspect container under sink Inspect sink and area around sink Towel container Tissue dispenser
Appendix 7.
Aircraft security search checklist • • • • • • • •
A7-5
Toilet seat and lid Mirror and compartments Flight attendants’ seat Door Walls, ceiling and floor Oxygen mask stowage Access to drinking fountain Waste water receptacle Aft wardrobes and coatrooms
• • • • • •
Remove coats and hand baggage Inspect entire area Sky cots and flight cradles Oxygen mask stowage First-aid kit, only if unsealed Life vest stowage
AIRCRAFT EXTERIOR Fuselage (the areas behind/in the following doors and openings should be checked): • Radom • Ground pneumatic connector panel • Cabin compressor air-inlets • Cabin compressor access panels • Doppler navigation antenna door • Cabin compressor air-outlets • Heat exchanger control access panels • Heat exchanger outlet guide vanes • Radio rack air-outlet • Beacon-holder (beacon removed) • Security locker and contents • Flashlights (check batteries) • Seals of first-aid kits for proper condition • Seals of life raft panels for proper condition • Accessory compartment door • Auxiliary tank fuel sump doors • Cabin pressure safety valves • Aft waste water service panel • Cabin pressure regulator valve • Aft waste system service panels • Access door to stabilizer-mechanism • Tail cone access door • Aft potable water service panel • Aft cargo doors • Forward cargo doors • Forward potable water service panel • Ground air conditioning connector door • External power fuser door • External power receptacle
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A7-6 Cabin compressor compartment •
Entire compartment, especially area of hollow spaces and cavities Accessory compartment
•
Entire compartment as well as all installations Cargo compartments
• • • • •
Forward cargo compartment, especially area underneath hinge snap-panel of cargo door floor covering Waste water tank compartment Flight-kit boxes Aft cargo compartment (especially area of cargo door hinge joints) Zone immediately behind aft cargo compartment Landing gear wheel wells and gears
• • •
Nose wheel well — area behind access and zip-fastener panels Entire main wheel wells and zone of wing roots LH + RH Gears, wheels — tires, rims, brakes and parts such as struts, drag-braces, beams, arms, actuators, frames and trucks Wings
• • • • • •
Trailing edge flap sections Snap-covers to fuel X-feed tube Snap-covers to fire-extinguisher bottles Pressure refuelling adapters Inspection snap-covers Fuel vent openings Engines and pylons
• • • • • •
Engine air-intake, exhaust and fan-duct Engine oil and pneumatic heat exchanger air-inlet scoop Engine oil refill cover Engine heat exchanger air-outlet door Constant speed drive oil refill cover Open engine cowl doors and fan cascade vanes. Entire engine installation and all openings on the cowl doors and pylons to be checked.
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Appendix 8 SUSPECT EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN WHEN FINDING SUSPECT EXPLOSIVE DEVICES 1. There are four generic steps that should be taken by anyone finding a suspicious item during a search to ensure the safety of personnel and the minimum disruption to operations. By training staff to follow these four steps in conjunction with local contingency plans a safe conclusion to the incident with the minimum loss of life can be achieved in most circumstances. The four steps and the order in which they should be executed are as follows: a)
CONFIRM
b)
CLEAR
c)
CORDON
d)
CONTROL
CONFIRM 2. Confirm that the item found should actually be reported as a suspect explosive device. Check for labels or tags giving possible information of the owner. Do not attempt to move the item in order to gain better access to it since the device may be equipped with an anti-handling device which may cause it to detonate. 3. Eliminate the possibility that the suspect item is private property left unattended by anyone in the immediate area, e.g. crew baggage. Do not take too long in carrying out this action since the device may be on a timer or able to be detonated by remote control. 4. Note its exact location; make brief notes of its appearance and mark its position (if necessary) with a distinct item to assist police or explosive disposal staff in identifying the item on their arrival. 5. questions:
Assess the validity and likelihood of the suspect item being in that particular location. Ask the following
a)
is the suspect item placed in a position to kill personnel or destroy resources?; and
b)
is the target valuable, vital, attractive or under threat from possible attack?
6. Once satisfied that the suspect item could be an explosive device, carry out the next three steps and take the necessary actions as defined in local contingency plans. IF IN ANY DOUBT, TREAT AS A SUSPECT EXPLOSIVE DEVICE.
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A8-2 CLEAR
7. Evacuate all persons, including any search teams, from the immediate area of the suspect device. A minimum initial distance of 100 m should be achieved but the actual circumstances, i.e. the presence of large areas of glass, the presence of flammable or explosive substances in the vicinity of the suspect explosive device, the possibility of building collapse or local contingency plans, may dictate a larger distance. 8. At the same time ensure that the relevant duty personnel such as the airport security officer or duty airport officer are notified about the suspect device according to local contingency plans.
CORDON 9. Establish a cordon to prevent anyone gaining access to the area. Size will depend on the site of the incident, the size of the suspect explosive device and the protection of cordon personnel. A good baseline is to ensure that cordon personnel are out of line of sight of the device. 10. Establish one cordon entry point and ensure that nobody approaches the device unless authorized by the incident commander. It is not unusual for senior management and other persons to insist that they view the device to give a second opinion; they should be politely denied access until explosive disposal experts have arrived and agree it is safe to do so. 11. The police may deploy a further outer cordon on access routes to ensure safe evacuation and the speedy arrival of emergency services.
CONTROL 12. Inform the relevant personnel according to local contingency plans about the suspect device if not already carried out. The persons who discovered the device should remain to assist police and explosive disposal agencies. Establish an incident control point to act as the central control for the incident until police or specialized staff arrive on the scene and take command. The police should assume control on their arrival and dictate further actions as necessary. 13. Nominate a rendezvous point outside the cordon for all other agencies that will be arriving at the incident. Follow further local procedures or instructions for suspicious explosive device incidents. 14. Emergency services such as fire and ambulance crews should stand by at the rendezvous point outside the cordon to deal with the results of an explosion or fire. 15. In the event of an explosion, first aid to injured personnel should be rendered immediately, followed by established damage control procedures. 16. After the effects of the explosion are under control, the search should be continued in case there are secondary explosive devices.
DEFINITIONS 17. When dealing with suspect explosive device incidents, it is important to use common terminology so as to minimize misunderstandings. The following definitions are used by many explosive disposal experts and agencies, and it
Appendix 8.
Suspect explosive devices
A8-3
is recommended they should be adopted by Contracting States when dealing with incidents and reporting incidents to ICAO. 18. Improvised Explosive Device (IED). An explosive device placed or fabricated by terrorists or criminals. These devices may incorporate military explosives stores (shells, grenades, etc.) but are normally devised from nonmilitary components. 19. Bomb threat. The manner in which an IED incident starts; this is usually by telephone, but also covers an alarm raised by the discovery of a device. 20. Bomb alert. The bomb threat has been investigated or assessed, and discredited. No device was found, any precautionary measures have been relaxed and normal activity resumed. 21. False alarm. A suspect IED was discovered and explosive disposal resources tasked. Investigation of the item by explosive disposal experts reveals the item to be innocent, i.e. left without evil intent and containing no explosive device or substance. 22. Hoax. A suspect IED was discovered and explosive disposal resources tasked. Investigation of the item by explosive disposal experts reveals it to be constructed to resemble a viable IED but containing no explosive or dangerous substance.
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Appendix 9 SEARCH AND EVACUATION GUIDELINES
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 1. For searches to be effective they should be conducted systematically by staff familiar with the area concerned. The main reason for this is that outside personnel will be unlikely to know the layout of the aircraft or terminal building and the various places in which a device could be concealed and therefore will not so easily be able to spot anything that is out of place or unfamiliar. Search plans should be prepared in advance and staff trained to use them. A search coordinator must be assigned to provide control of the search process and, if necessary, take the decision to evacuate. 2. Searchers should be briefed not to touch suspicious objects but to notify the search coordinator, mark the location with a prominent object (without touching the device), and withdraw from the immediate area to await further instructions. When a suspect device is discovered, the possibility of secondary devices should not be discounted. 3. Hand-held communications are useful for coordination of the search and are often the only way of ensuring appropriate and speedy lifesaving procedures for search and evacuation. However, once a suspect device has been located, those using hand-held communications should immediately move away and ensure that they and anyone else in the area move outside the cordon as quickly as possible. Radios should not be used to transmit within 25 m of a suspect device. 4. Before starting the search, strict control of access must be implemented in the area being searched. This is necessary to ensure devices are not introduced into the area once it has been cleared. 5. Effective and systematic searching takes time. If the warning received indicates a possible detonation time for the device which will prevent a thorough search being conducted, the best and safest option is to evacuate all personnel to a safe area and wait for the arrival of specialist explosive disposal personnel.
INITIATION OF A SEARCH 6.
The coordinator can initiate a search by: a)
sending a message to the search teams over a public address system. It should be coded to avoid unnecessary disruption and alarm to the public;
b)
using personal radios, pagers or mobile/cellular phones; or
c)
using a telephone “cascade” system: the coordinator rings, for example, three members, who in turn each ring a further three members and so on until all the teams have been alerted.
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A9-2 What searchers should be looking for
7. It is difficult to give guidance to search teams about the appearance of suspect explosive devices as they can be disguised in many ways. 8.
Search teams should be briefed to look for unidentified objects or anything: a)
that should not be there;
b)
that cannot be accounted for; or
c)
that is out of place.
GUIDANCE FOR SEARCHING AIRCRAFT 9. The large number of aircraft in service throughout the world makes it impossible to provide in this manual recommended aircraft inspection procedures that will be adequate in all cases. 10. Aircraft operators should develop an aircraft search procedure checklist for each type of aircraft in service and include this checklist as part of the flight crew security kit. (Refer to Appendix 7 for assistance in this process.) Use of such a checklist will be particularly helpful at locations where the only persons familiar with the aircraft are flight deck and cabin crew members. 11. The designated isolated parking position will likely prove to be the best location on the airport at which an aircraft subjected to a specific threat can be searched, but contingency plans should recognize that it may not always be possible to reach this position. 12. Aircraft searches should be carried out in good lighting conditions; this may require the use of auxiliary power units or the attachment of ground power lines to the aircraft. It will be necessary to impose and maintain control of access to the aircraft before starting the search, which should be carried out with the minimum number of persons on board. 13. To avoid duplication of effort, the search of an aircraft should be conducted systematically by staff familiar with the particular aircraft, provided with a checklist and assigned to specific areas of the aircraft. Attention should be given to those areas to which passengers have had access, such as main cabins, galley areas and toilets, but the search should also include the flight deck exterior of the aircraft and cargo holds. 14. If a suspect explosive device is found either within or in the immediate vicinity of an aircraft, the initial action should be to withdraw all personnel to a safe distance and await the arrival of explosive disposal experts. Any further decision to move the aircraft away from the device or the device away from the aircraft should take into account the main priority which is the preservation of life. Moving the aircraft will involve putting at risk additional personnel, such as the ground engineers, marshalling staff and aircraft tug drivers, whereas leaving the aircraft in situ and evacuating all personnel to a safe location may result only in damage to the aircraft and terminals or facilities, should the suspect device explode.
Appendix 9.
Search and evacuation guidelines
A9-3
GUIDANCE FOR SEARCHING TERMINAL BUILDINGS
Search plans 15. It is vital to have search plans prepared in advance and staff trained in them. The objective is to make sure that the whole terminal building is checked as quickly and effectively as possible. 16. Search plans must be readily available at all times. Architects’ drawings, checked for accuracy and appropriately adapted, are suitable for this purpose. Sufficient spare copies should be available for use during search operations. Searchers and the coordinator can then eliminate sections from the plan as they are declared clear.
Search sectors 17. The first step in preparing a search plan is to divide the terminal building into sectors. The building may already be segregated into various zones and therefore it may be convenient to make these the sectors. Each sector must be of manageable size for the number of searchers nominated to it. Remember that effective and systematic searching takes time. 18. The sector may be one large room, such as a check-in area, concourse or baggage reclaim area, or perhaps a number of small aircraft operator operations offices in an office suite. It is most important that cloakrooms, stairs, corridors and elevators be included in the search plans as well as car parks and other areas outside the building.
Search teams 19. Search teams should be formed from staff nominated to search those areas with which they are most familiar. The numbers required will depend upon the size of the search task. Reserves should be appointed in case of absence. Staff should be trained and rehearsed.
Search priorities 20. Those areas that will be used as evacuation assembly areas, together with those areas where the greatest number of the public or staff are likely to be vulnerable, should be searched first. Consider also, as a priority, those public areas to which the perpetrator may have had easy access such as restrooms, elevators, stairways and hallways. Those areas to which access is normally controlled may be searched last. Do not overlook car parks, the outside area of the terminal building and the perimeter.
How to search 21. The conduct of searches will depend on local circumstances and local knowledge. The overriding principle is that they should be conducted in a systematic and thorough manner so that no part is left unchecked. The searchers need to practise in order to get a feel for the logical progression through their area (whether it be in a terminal building, baggage reclaim area or administrative or operations office suite) and the length of time it will take. 22. With this in mind the method outlined in this example is of a room search in a sector. It should be adapted to reflect the peculiarities of the actual area being searched.
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23. A search should begin at the entrance to the room. Each searcher or team should first stand still and look around the room. They should note the contents of the room and make a quick assessment of those areas that will need special attention. They should look for any unusual lights (including small light sources known as light emitting diodes which are often used in the arming circuits of improvised explosive devices). They should also listen carefully for any unusual noises, particularly ticking or whirring sounds. If nothing unusual is seen, the search should begin. 24. If anything unusual is seen, the searcher or team should alert the coordinator who will decide whether to evacuate the building. 25. The search should be conducted methodically, moving in one direction around the area to be searched. It should be carried out in three sweeps. 26. The first sweep is to work around the edges of the room, taking in the walls from top to bottom and the floor area immediately beneath the wall. Look inside fireplaces, behind curtains and window blinds, behind and beside furniture around the edges of the room. The sweep should finish at the doorway where it began. 27. The second sweep should take in the furniture and the floor. Furniture should not be removed but drawers should be opened and searched and gaps in and under furniture should be explored. If the floor covering shows signs of recent disturbance, it should be lifted. 28. The third sweep should cover the ceiling if it is of a kind in which objects might be concealed. Start at one corner and systematically search the whole surface. 29. After the search has been completed, and if nothing has been found, the coordinator should be informed immediately so that the sector can be marked “clear” on the search plans. 30. Searching should continue until the whole area has been cleared. Do not forget that secondary devices are not unknown. 31.
If a suspicious object is found, follow the golden rules: a)
do not touch or move the device;
b)
if possible leave a distinctive marker near (not touching) the device;
c)
move away from the device to a designated control point, leaving lights on;
d)
inform search team leader or coordinator;
e)
the coordinator should implement the evacuation plan;
f)
stay at the control point and draw an accurate plan of the location of the suspicious package or device for the assistance of the police and explosive disposal experts; and
g)
the person finding the object should be immediately available for interview by the police or security services.
EVACUATION 32. The purpose of evacuation is to move people from an area where they might be at risk to a place of safety. This may be achieved by:
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Search and evacuation guidelines
A9-5
a)
internal movement to a safe area;
b)
partial evacuation (where large buildings are involved and only a suspect letter bomb or small device has been found); and
c)
full evacuation.
33. In all cases where a bomb threat is received, the coordinator should immediately inform the airport security officer and police and advise them of what action is being taken.
MAKING THE DECISION TO EVACUATE 34. The decision to evacuate must normally be taken by the coordinator but the police or airport security officer may be ready to advise on request. 35. In exceptional circumstances, where for example the police or security services have received specific information, they may themselves order an evacuation, if necessary overruling the decision of the coordinator. 36. On the other hand, it may be necessary for the police or security services in some circumstances to insist that the terminal building not be evacuated. They might, for example, have reason to believe that there may be an explosive device outside the terminal building and evacuation would place people at greater risk. 37. There are four actions open to the coordinator. Which one is chosen depends upon the assessment of the threat which the situation presents. The choices are: a)
to do nothing; or
b)
to search, and then to evacuate if a suspicious object is found; or
c)
to evacuate all persons except search teams and essential staff, and then carry out a search and evacuate fully if a suspicious object is discovered; or
d)
to evacuate all staff immediately then re-occupy using trained searchers.
Option 1: Do nothing 38. This option may appear attractive if the threat appears to come from an intoxicated person or a child, but it should not be adopted unless the coordinator is absolutely sure that it is a malicious call or prank. If there is the slightest doubt, the coordinator must turn to one of the other options.
Option 2: Search and then evaluate if necessary 39. This choice means, of course, that people will be in the terminal building for a longer period should there be a bomb present. However, if a bomb is found, they can then be evacuated away from danger. If nothing is found and there are no other significant factors, the coordinator may consider this option appropriate if assessing the threat level as low.
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A9-6 Option 3: Search and partial evacuation
40. When the threat level is considered to be moderate but there is no reason to believe an explosion may be imminent, or if the suspect device is small (e.g. a letter bomb) and parts of the terminal building may be some considerable distance from the device, the coordinator might consider evacuating part of the terminal building alone or retaining only essential staff and search teams within the terminal building.
Option 4: Evacuate immediately 41. If a call is received which the coordinator considers to indicate the existence of a high risk, there will be a case for evacuating as quickly as possible without conducting a search, especially where there is a possibility of an imminent explosion. 42. When the time of explosion has been disclosed in a threat call, the coordinator must ensure that any searches are finished and staff cleared at least 20 minutes before the deadline, irrespective of whether any device has been found or not.
EVACUATION PLANS 43. As in the case of search plans, the coordinator should have up-to-date drawings of evacuation routes. This is especially necessary when there are a number of exits from the terminal building. The purpose is twofold: a)
to evacuate as quickly and efficiently as possible using all available exits. A public address system can help in directing staff to particular exits. When no other form of communication is available, the fire alarm can be used providing that it can be sounded in a way which distinguishes it from a fire warning, that staff have been trained to recognize the signal, and that the fire alarm is not part of an automatic system connected to the local fire service. Use of the fire alarm is a poor alternative to a public address system and should only be employed temporarily pending the installation of something better; and
b)
to provide alternative routes for evacuation so that people can leave the terminal building without being placed in danger by passing close to the suspect explosive device. For example, if there are four evacuation routes but one of the routes runs closer to a suspect explosive device than the others, the coordinator can decide at once to evacuate using the other routes only.
44. To ensure the safe evacuation of the public, the coordinator should consider using members of the staff as “evacuation marshals” to ensure that the public can leave quickly and without panic by the pre-selected routes. Evacuation marshals need to be selected in advance and trained in their role. 45. The evacuation plan should also show two designated assembly areas in opposite directions where people should congregate after evacuation. Sometimes fire assembly points can be utilized for this purpose, as long as they are located at a minimum 400 m from the terminal building. In some circumstances, assembly areas may need to be up to 1 000 m away from the building. Explosive disposal experts’ advice should be sought as to whether this is necessary. 46. Ideally, all employees and members of the public should be asked to take personal belongings and baggage which is still in their possession with them, since this will help to avoid unnecessary suspicion over articles of property left behind after evacuation. However, this will be difficult to implement unless a public address system or other suitable means of communication is readily available and used properly.
Appendix 9.
Search and evacuation guidelines
A9-7
47. Personnel and passengers who have been evacuated may have to remain outside for a long time before the terminal building is declared safe, so it is best if shelter can be provided under cover. It may be possible to seek accommodation by arrangement in alternative buildings. This provides the opportunity to shelter from weather, maintain good communication and cater to individual needs. 48. If possible, car parks should not be designated as assembly areas, especially if they are adjacent to the evacuated terminal building since they may contain secondary explosive devices hidden within vehicles. 49. Evacuation assembly areas should be included in the search plans and checked whenever search procedures are initiated or an immediate evacuation is ordered. 50. When an evacuation is initiated, doors and windows should, whenever possible, be left unlocked, especially in the vicinity of a suspect explosive device. Lights should be left on, but plant and machinery shut down where practicable. Procedures should be established to ensure concessionaire kitchen facilities are left in a safe condition. It is recommended that utilities such as gas and water (unless this affects the building firefighting sprinkler system) not required to facilitate the search of an area in a building be turned off in order to minimize damage in the event of an explosion. 51. A method must be devised to check that everyone has left the terminal building after the evacuation and that all personnel, staff and visitors are accounted for. Nobody should be allowed to re-enter until the terminal building is declared safe.
THE DECISION TO RE-OCCUPY 52. Once an evacuation has been completed, the coordinator will have to decide when the building can be reoccupied. Of course, where a suspect explosive device has been found, the decision to re-occupy will require close coordination with the police and security services until the device is declared safe. 53. It should be remembered that there may be another suspicious object somewhere in the terminal building — undiscovered because the search was terminated and the terminal building evacuated due to the discovery of the first suspect object. The coordinator should, therefore, have the rest of the terminal building searched before considering reoccupation. Where the evacuation was carried out before any search, the coordinator will have to initiate a search before considering the question of re-occupation. 54. Where the time has been given for an explosion, but no explosion occurs, the coordinator must ensure that at least one hour is allowed to lapse after that time before search procedures are initiated or recommenced.
STAFF TRAINING 55. Good training is essential so that in the event of a need to search and evacuate, not only the search teams but also every airport employee will know what to do. Regular search and evacuation drills will help maintain staff awareness and vigilance. All staff should be made aware of the evacuation assembly points. Telephonists, information desk staff and any other persons likely to answer a telephone number available to the public should be instructed how to handle a bomb threat call (refer to the checklist for telephonists at Appendix 4). 56. Other key staff such as evacuation marshals need to know their role and be regularly trained. It is important that all staff recognize those who have been specially nominated and obey their instructions. Procedures must ensure that nominated staff are replaced when they leave or are temporarily absent, so that there are no lapses of cover. _____________________
Appendix 10 OFFICIAL REPORT ON ACT OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE
INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THIS REPORT IS RESTRICTED AND WILL ONLY BE DISCLOSED TO AUTHORIZED PERSONS
PRELIMINARY
FINAL
(CHECK
)
REPORT ON ACT OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE File number: ............................................. Date of report: .......................................... [Day/month/year]
THE PRELIMINARY REPORT SHOULD BE COMPLETED AND FORWARDED TO ICAO WITHIN THIRTY DAYS OF THE OCCURRENCE Reporting requirements under Annex 17, Article 11 of The Hague Convention or Article 13 of the Montreal Convention
Successful Act a) b) c) d) e) f)
Attempted Act
Act of unlawful seizure of aircraft Attack against airport and air navigation facilities Attack against persons within airport terminal facilities Act of sabotage of aircraft Attack against aircraft while in flight Other acts not specified above PART I:
INFORMATION CONCERNING THE OCCURRENCE A.
GENERAL INFORMATION
1.
State providing the report: .......................................................................................................................
2.
Date of the occurrence: ..............................................
3.
Time of the occurrence: .............................................
4.
Duration of the occurrence: .....................................................................................................................
[Day/month/year]
[Local time – 24-hour clock]
A10-1
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A10-2
B. 1.
PARTICULARS OF AN ACT OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE
Flight information Flight departure date: ........................................... [Day/month/year]
Flight departure time: ........................................... [Local time – 24-hour clock]
Flight identification: ............................................... Type of aircraft: Operator: Number of passengers: ........................................ Number of crew: In-flight security guards (if any): ............................ Number of perpetrator(s): ..................................... Type of operation (scheduled, chartered, etc.): .............................................................................................................. Airport of departure: Intended destination:
2.
.......................................................................
..................................................................
Name
State
.......................................................................
..................................................................
Name
State
Aircraft State of Registry: .......................................................................................................................................................... Registration number: ..................................................................................................................................................... Aircraft type: .................................................................................................................................................................. Airport where the sabotage device/substance was (believed) loaded on the aircraft: ...................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................
3.
Airport buildings or facilities affected: ............................................................................................................................ ...................................................................................................................................................................................... ...................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................
Appendix 10.
Official report on act of unlawful interference
C. 1.
3.
A10-3
THE OCCURRENCE
Location of the aircraft:
2.
Ground facility:
On the ground
On airport
During flight
Off airport
Weapons/devices
Describe
Real
Fake
Weapon No. 1: ................................................................................................................................................ Weapon No. 2: ................................................................................................................................................ Weapon No. 3: ................................................................................................................................................ Weapon No. 4: ................................................................................................................................................ Weapon No. 5: ................................................................................................................................................ Explosives: ...................................................................................................................................................... Incendiary: ...................................................................................................................................................... Other (describe): ............................................................................................................................................. ........................................................................................................................................................................ ........................................................................................................................................................................ 4.
Communications
4.1 Source of threat: Written message Telephone call Other (describe): ................................................................................................................................................................ ........................................................................................................................................................................................... ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 4.2 Who received the threat: Flight crew Cabin crew Aircraft operator ground staff Passenger Other (describe): ................................................................................................................................................................ ........................................................................................................................................................................................... ...........................................................................................................................................................................................
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Yes
No
4.3 Were there specific demands made? (if yes, please explain) ............................................................................................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 4.4 Who transmitted the demands to authorities on the ground?
Yes
No
The pilot The perpetrator Other (describe): .................................................................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 5.
Countermeasures
Yes
No
Yes
No
5.1 Was there any attempt to stop the action of the perpetrator(s)? 5.2 If so, by what means? Negotiations
Force
Other
5.3 Results: Successful
Unsuccessful
5.4 Did the perpetrator(s) enter the cockpit? If yes, describe: ...................................................................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................................................................... Yes
No
5.5 Were crew members in possession of a bomb threat search list? 5.6 Were crew members familiar with least risk bomb location? 5.7 Did the perpetrator(s) have: Technical knowledge of the aircraft’s operation? Familiarity with the design of the aircraft? Knowledge of the airport or essential navigation facilities? If yes, please explain: ............................................................................................................................................................. ............................................................................................................................................................................................... ...............................................................................................................................................................................................
Appendix 10.
6.
Official report on act of unlawful interference
A10-5
Diversion of the aircraft (please answer only if aircraft was diverted)
6.1 List airports in chronological order: Airport
State
Arrival date and time
Departure date and time
a)
...................................
........................................
................................
................................
b)
...................................
........................................
................................
................................
c)
...................................
........................................
................................
................................
d)
...................................
........................................
................................
................................
e)
...................................
........................................
................................
................................
6.2 Was there sufficient fuel to reach all of the destinations ordered? List below. a)
...................................................................................................................................................................
b)
...................................................................................................................................................................
c)
...................................................................................................................................................................
d)
...................................................................................................................................................................
e)
...................................................................................................................................................................
Landing permitted Yes
No
Yes
No
If yes, describe: ............................................................................................................................................................................. ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 6.3 Did the crew have the necessary charts available for the destinations? List below. a)
...................................................................................................................................................................
b)
...................................................................................................................................................................
c)
...................................................................................................................................................................
d)
...................................................................................................................................................................
e)
...................................................................................................................................................................
Yes
No
If yes, describe: ............................................................................................................................................................................. ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................................
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A10-6
6.4 Were any of the passengers allowed to leave the aircraft at any of the airports? List airports in chronological order: Airport a)
...................................................................................................................................................................
b)
...................................................................................................................................................................
c)
...................................................................................................................................................................
d)
...................................................................................................................................................................
e)
...................................................................................................................................................................
Yes
No
If yes, describe: ............................................................................................................................................................................. ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 6.5 Was action taken at any of the airports to resolve the occurrence? List below. Airport a)
...................................................................................................................................................................
b)
...................................................................................................................................................................
c)
...................................................................................................................................................................
d)
...................................................................................................................................................................
e)
...................................................................................................................................................................
Yes
No
If yes, describe: ............................................................................................................................................................................. ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 6.6 Was maintenance undertaken at any of the airports? List below. Airport a)
...................................................................................................................................................................
b)
...................................................................................................................................................................
c)
...................................................................................................................................................................
d)
...................................................................................................................................................................
e)
...................................................................................................................................................................
Yes
No
If yes, describe: ............................................................................................................................................................................. ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................................................................................................
Appendix 10.
Official report on act of unlawful interference
D.
A10-7
THE PERPETRATOR (use additional sheets if more than 3)
Total number of perpetrators: ....................... 1.
Name:............................................................................................................................................................. (male/female) Alias: .................................................................................................................................................................................. Date of birth:
....................................... [Day/month/year]
Airport of embarkation:
Place of birth: ................................
...............................................................
Name
Nationality: .................................
.................................................................. State
How did the perpetrator(s) gain access to the aircraft/building facility? ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 2.
Name:............................................................................................................................................................. (male/female) Alias: .................................................................................................................................................................................. Date of birth: .......................................... [Day/month/year]
Airport of embarkation:
Place of birth: ................................
...............................................................
Name
Nationality: .................................
.................................................................. State
How did the perpetrator(s) gain access to the aircraft/building facility? ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 3.
Name:............................................................................................................................................................. (male/female) Alias: .................................................................................................................................................................................. Date of birth: .......................................... [Day/month/year]
Airport of embarkation:
Place of birth: ................................
...............................................................
Name
Nationality: .................................
.................................................................. State
How did the perpetrator(s) gain access to the aircraft/building facility? ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................
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E.
AIRPORT SECURITY
1.
Is there an airport security programme where the perpetrator(s) boarded the aircraft?
2.
Does the security programme provide for protection of the airside (fences, guards, locked gates, patrols, identification system, etc.)?
3.
Are the identification cards issued to ground personnel and auxiliary services reviewed regularly?
4.
Inspection/screening of passengers, crew and cabin baggage:
5.
a)
Are all passengers and cabin baggage subjected to inspection/screening for all international flights?
b)
Are all passengers and cabin baggage subjected to inspection/screening for all domestic flights?
c)
Are all crew members subjected to security control?
d)
Are all passengers and their cabin baggage which have been subjected to inspection/screening re-screened before boarding the aircraft if they mix or have contact with persons who have not been subjected to inspection/screening?
Inspection/screening system used: Gate plan (direct access to aircraft) Sterile hold area plan (pre-boarding lounge) Sterile concourse plan
6.
System of security control in use: Metal detection device: Walk-through Hand-held X-ray unit Physical inspection Other
Yes
No
Appendix 10.
Official report on act of unlawful interference
A10-9
Yes 7.
Was the operation of the metal detection devices and X-ray units recently examined using test objects?
8.
Has training been provided regularly to security personnel who operate metal detectors and X-ray units?
9.
Matching baggage: a)
Is a reconciliation made of the number of checked-in passengers with the pieces of baggage loaded on the aircraft?
b)
Does the procedure in a) above include transfer passengers and their inter-line checked baggage?
No
10. Did the perpetrator(s) circumvent the security measures in place by use of: Force Other Describe briefly: .................................................................................................................................................................. ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 11. What new measures and procedures have been taken or are being contemplated to prevent recurrence of a similar event? ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................
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A10-10
F. 1.
TERMINATION OF THE OCCURRENCE
Position of the negotiator (explain if the negotiator had decision-making authority or acted only as an intermediary): ............................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................................................................
2.
Airport/aircraft Number of persons affected:
3.
Killed
Injured
Crew
............................
..........................
Passengers
............................
..........................
Perpetrator(s)
............................
..........................
Others
............................
..........................
Circumstances surrounding death or injuries: ...................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................
4.
Damage to the aircraft/airport facilities (short description to include cost of damage, time loss and flights affected): ................................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................
5.
Furnish any additional information relevant to circumvention of security procedures during this occurrence: ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................
Appendix 10.
Official report on act of unlawful interference
PART II:
1.
A10-11
INFORMATION CONCERNING THE ACTION TAKEN FOR THE RELEASE OF PASSENGERS AND CREW AND THE RETURN OF THE AIRCRAFT, IF APPLICABLE
Action taken for the release of passengers and crew: ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................
2.
Action taken to facilitate the continuation of the journey of the passengers and crew as soon as practicable: ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................
3.
Action taken to return the aircraft and its cargo, without delay, to the persons lawfully entitled to possession: ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................
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PART III: 1.
INFORMATION CONCERNING THE MEASURES TAKEN IN RELATION TO THE PERPETRATOR(S)
Action by the competent authorities to take the perpetrator(s) into custody or other measures taken to ensure his/her/their presence: ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................
2.
Action taken to institute extradition proceedings or to submit the case to the competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution; advise of the results of such proceedings, if available (otherwise provide such information separately as soon as practicable): ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ PART IV: INFORMATION CONCERNING THE ACTION TAKEN TO REMEDY WEAKNESSES SO AS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE OF ACTS OF UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE AS SPECIFIED IN ANNEX 17, STANDARD 3.4.8 ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................
Appendix 10.
Official report on act of unlawful interference
PART V:
A10-13
ANY ADDITIONAL RELEVANT INFORMATION
............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................
Name
..................................................................................
Title
..................................................................................
Department
— END —
