Digests Nego (2004)

Digests Negotiable Instruments Law Michael Vernon Guerrero Mendiola 2004 Shared under Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Philippines license.

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Table of Contents Abubakar vs. Auditor General, GR L-1405, 31 July 1948 …......... 1 Ang Tiong vs. Ting, GR L-26767, 22 February 1968 …......... 1 Arrieta vs. National Rice & Corn Corporation (NARIC), GR L-15645, 31 January 1964 …......... 1 Associated Bank vs. CA, GR 89802, 7 May 1992 …......... 2 Associated Bank vs. CA, GR 107382, 31 January 1996 …......... 2 Bataan Cigar and Cigarette Factory vs. CA, GR 93048, 3 March 1994 …......... 3 Caltex (Philippines) Inc. vs. CA, GR 97753, 10 August 1992 …......... 3 Caram Resources vs. Contreras, AM MTJ0830849, 26 October 1994 …......... 4 City Trust Banking vs. CA, GR 92591, 30 April 1991 …......... 5 Clark vs. Sellner, GR 16477, 22 November 1921 …......... 5 Co vs. PNB, GR L-51767, 29 June 1982 …......... 6 Cruz vs. CA, GR 108738, 17 June 1994 …......... 6 Crystal vs. CA, GR L-35767, 18 June 1976 …......... 6 Dela Victoria vs. Burgos, GR 111190, 27 June 1995 ….........7 Firestone Tire and Rubber vs. Ines Chaves & Co., GR L-17106, 19 October 1966 …......... 7 Gempesaw vs. CA, GR 92244, 9 February 1993 …......... 8 Hongkong & Shanghai Bank vs. People’s Bank and Trust, GR L-28226, 30 September 1970 …......... 8 Ibasco vs. CA, GR 117488, 5 September 1996 …......... 9 Jimenez vs. Bucoy, GR L-10221, 28 February 1958 …......... 9 Kalalo vs. Luz, GR L-27782, 31 July 1970 …......... 10 Lao vs. CA, GR 119178, 20 June 1997 …......... 10 Lazaro vs. CA, GR 105461, 11 November 1993 …......... 11 Lim vs. CA, GR 107898, 19 December 1995 …......... 11 Lim vs. People, GR 130038, 18 September 2000 …......... 12 Lim vs. Rodrigo, GR 76974, 18 November 1988 …......... 12 Llamado vs. CA, GR 99032, 26 March 1997 …......... 13 Lozano vs. Martinez, GR L-63419, 18 December 1986 …......... 13 Magno vs. CA, GR 96132, 26 June 1992 …......... 14 Manila Lighter Transportation vs. CA, GR L-50373, 15 February 1990 …......... 14 Moran vs. CA, GR 105836, 7 March 1994 …......... 15 MWSS vs. CA, GR L-62943, 14 July 1986 …......... 15 Navarro vs. CA, GR 112389, 1 August 1994 …......... 16 People vs. Grospe, GR L-74053-54, 20 January 1988 …......... 16 People vs. Maniego, GR L-30910, 27 February 1987 …......... 17 People vs. Reyes, GR 101127-31, 18 November 1993 …......... 17 People vs. Tuanda, AC 3360, 30 January 1990 …......... 18 Philippine Bank of Commerce vs. Aruego, GR L-25836-37, 31 January 1981 …......... 18 Philippine Commercial Industrial Bank vs. CA, GR 121413, 29 January 2001 …......... 19 Philippine Education Co. vs. Soriano, GR L-22405, 30 June 1971 …......... 20 Pineda vs. dela Rama, GR L-31831, 28 April 1983 …......... 20 PNB vs. CA, GR L-26001, 29 October 1968 …......... 21 PNB vs. National City Bank, GR 43596, 31 October 1936 …......... 21 PNB vs. Quimpo, GR L-53194, 14 March 1988 …......... 22 Ponce vs. CA, GR L-49444, 31 May 1979 …......... 23 Prudencio vs. CA, GR L-34539, 14 July 1986 …......... 23 Que vs. People, GR 75217-18, 21 September 1987 …......... 24 Republic Bank vs. CA, GR 42725, 22 April 1991 …......... 24 Republic Bank vs. Ebrada, GR L-40796, 31 July 1975…......... 25 Republic Planters Bank vs. CA, GR 93073, 21 December 1992 …......... 25 San Carlos Milling vs. BPI, GR 37467, 11 December 1933 …......... 26

Sesbreno vs. CA, GR 89252, 24 May 1993 …......... 26 State Investment House vs. CA, GR 101163, 11 January 1993 …......... 27 State Investment House vs. IAC, GR 72764, 13 July 1989 …......... 28 Stelco Marketing vs. CA, GR 96160, 17 June 1992 …......... 28 Tan vs. CA, GR 108555, 20 December 1994 …......... 29 Tibajia vs. CA, GR 100290, 4 June 1993 …......... 29 Travel On vs. CA, GR 56169, 26 June 1992 …......... 30 Uy vs. CA, GR 119000, 28 June 1997 …......... 30 Vaca vs. CA, GR 43596, 31 October 1936 …......... 30 Vda. de Eduque vs. Ocampo, GR L-222, 26 April 1950 …......... 31

This collection contains sixty (60) cases summarized in this format by Michael Vernon M. Guerrero (as a sophomore law student) during the Second Semester, school year 2003-2004 in the Negotiable Instruments Law class under Atty. Minda Gapuz at the Arellano University School of Law (AUSL). Compiled as PDF, July 2011. Berne Guerrero entered AUSL in June 2002 and eventually graduated from AUSL in 2006. He passed the Philippine bar examinations immediately after (April 2007).

www.berneguerrero.com

Digests (Berne Guerrero)

[1] Abubakar vs. Auditor General GR L-1405, 31 July 1948 First Division, Bengzon (J) Facts: Treasury Warrant A-2867376 was issued in favor of Placide S. Urbanes on 10 December 1941 for P1,000, but is now in the hands of Benjamin Abubakar. The Auditor refused to authorize the payment of the treasury warrant. Abubakar contends he is a holder in good faith and for value and thus, entitled to the rights and privileges of a holder in due course. Issue: Whether Abubakar is a holder in due course. Held: A treasury warrant is not a negotiable instrument; it being an order for payment out of a “particular fund”, and is not unconditional and does not fulfill one of the essential requirements of a negotiable instrument. Therefore, a holder of a treasury warrant cannot argue that he is a holder in good faith and for value of a negotiable instrument and thus entitled to the rights and privileges of a holder in due course, free from defenses. [2] Ang Tiong vs. Ting GR L-26767, 22 February 1968 En Banc, Castro (J) Facts: Lorenzo Ting issued a check for P4,000 payable to “cash or bearer.” With Felipe Ang’s signature (indorsement in blank) at the back thereof, the instrument was received by Ang Tiong who thereafter presented it to the bank for payment. The drawee bank dishonored it. Ang Tiong made written demands on both Ting and Ang to make good the amount represented by the check. These demands unheeded. Ang Tiong filed suit for collection. The trial court adjudged for Ang Tiong. Only Ang appealed, maintaining that he is only an accommodation party. Issue: Whether Felipe Ang is an accommodation party. Held: Felipe Ang is a general indorser (Section 63, Negotiable Instruments Law), in the absence of any indication by appropriate words his intention to be bound in some other capacity. Even on the assumption that Ang is a mere accommodation party, he is liable on the instrument to a holder for value notwithstanding that such holder at the time of taking the instrument knew him to be only an accommodation party (Section 29, Negotiable Instruments Law). Assuming further that Ang is an accommodation indorser, the fact that Ang may obtain security from the maker to protect himself against the danger of insolvency of the latter cannot in any manner affect his liability to Ang Tiong, as the said remedy is a matter of concern exclusively between an accommodation indorser and an accommodated party. The liability of Felipe Ang remains primary and unconditional. [3] Arrieta vs. National Rice & Corn Corporation (NARIC) GR L-15645, 31 January 1964 En Banc, Regala (J) Facts: On 19 May 1952, Paz and Vitaliado Arrieta participated in the public bidding called by NARIC for the Negotiable Instruments Law, 2004 ( 1 )


supply of 20,000 metric tons of Burmese rice. Ad her bid of $203 per metric ton was the lowest, she was awarded the contract for the same. As a result of the delay in the opening of the letter of credit by NARIC, the allocation of Arrieta’s supplier in Rangoon was cancelled and the 5% deposit amounting to an equivalent of P200,000 was forfeited. Arrieta endeavored but failed to restore the cancelled Burmese rice allocation, and thus offered Thailand rice instead. Such offer was rejected by NARIC. Subsequently, Arrieta sent a letter to NARIC, demanding compensation for the damages caused her in the sum of US$286,000 representing unrealized profit. The demand having been rejected, she instituted the case. Issue: Whether the rate of exchange to be applied in the conversion is that prevailing at the time of breach, or at the time the obligation was incurred, or on the promulgation of the decision. Held: As pronounced in Eastboard Navigation vs. Ismael, if there is any agreement to pay an obligation in the currency other than Philippine legal tender, the same is null and void as contrary to public policy (RA 529), and the most that could be demanded is to pay said obligation in Philippine currency to be measured in the prevailing rate of exchange at the time the obligation was incurred. Herein, the rate of exchange to be applied is that of 1 July 1952, when the contract was executed. [4] Associated Bank vs. CA GR 89802, 7 May 1992 First Division, Cruz (J) Facts: Melissa’s RTW’s customers issued cross checks payable to Melissa’s RTW, which its proprietor Merle Reyes did not receive. It was learned that the checks had been deposited with the Associated Bank by one Rafael Sayson. Sayson was not authorized by Reyes to deposit and encash said checks. Reyes filed an action for the recovery of the total value of the checks plus damages. Issue: Whether the bank was negligent for the loss. Held: Crossing a check means that the drawee bank should not encash the check but merely accept it for deposit, that the check may be negotiated only once by one who has an account in a bank, and that the check serves as warning that it was issued for a definite purpose so that he must inquire if he has received the check pursuant to that purpose. The effect, thus, relate to the mode of its presentment for payment, in accordance with Section 72 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. The bank paid the checks notwithstanding that title had not passed to the indorser, as the checks had been crossed and issued “for payee’s account only.” It does did so in its own peril and became liable to the payee for the value of the checks. The failure of the bank to make an inquiry as to Sayson’s authority was a breach of its duty. The bank is negligent and is thus liable to Reyes. [5] Associated Bank vs. CA GR 107382, 31 January 1996 Second Division, Romero (J) Facts: The Province of Tarlac maintains a current account with the Philippine National Bank (PNB Tarlac Branch) where the provincial funds are deposited. Portions of the funds were allocated to the Concepcion Emergency Hospital. Checks were issued to it and were received by the hospital’s administrative officer and cashier (Fausto Pangilinan). Pangilinan, through the help of Associated Bank but after forging the signature of the hospital’s chief (Adena Canlas), was able to deposit the checks in his personal account. All the checks bore the stamp “All prior endorsement guaranteed Associated Bank.” Through post-audit, the province Negotiable Instruments Law, 2004 ( 2 )


discovered that the hospital did not receive several allotted checks, and sought the restoration of the debited amounts from PNB. In turn, PNB demanded reimbursement from Associated Bank. Both banks resisted payment. Hence, the present action. Issue: Who shall bear the loss resulting from the forged checks. Held: PNB is not negligent as it is not required to return the check to the collecting bank within 24 hours as the banks involved are covered by Central Bank Circular 580 and not the rules of the Philippine Clearing House. Associated Bank, and not PNB, is the one duty-bound to warrant the instrument as genuine, valid and subsisting at the time of indorsement pursuant to Section 66 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. The stamp guaranteeing prior indorsement is not an empty rubric; the collecting bank is held accountable for checks deposited by its customers. However, due to the fact that the Province of Tarlac is equally negligent in permitting Pangilinan to collect the checks when he was no longer connected with the hospital, it shares the burden of loss from the checks bearing a forged indorsement. Therefore, the Province can only recover 50% of the amount from the drawee bank (PNB), and the collecting bank (Associated Bank) is liable to PNB for 50% of the same amount. [6] Bataan Cigar and Cigarette Factory vs. CA GR 93048, 3 March 1994 Second Division, Nocon (J) Facts: Bataan Cigar and Cigarette Factory Inc. (BCCFI) engaged one of its suppliers, Kim Tim Pua George (George King), to deliver bales of tobacco leaf. In consideration thereof, BCCFI issued postdated cross checks to King. King sold the checks, at a discount, to the State Investment House Inc. (SIHI). As King failed to deliver the bales of tobacco leaf despite demand, BCCFI issued stop payment orders on the checks. Efforts by SIHI to collect from BCCFI failed. SIHI filed suit. Issue: Whether SIHI can recover the value of the checks, premised on the issue whether SIHI is a holder in due course. Held: The facts of the case are on all fours to the case of SIHI vs. Intermediate Appellate Court. The crossing of the checks should put the holder on inquiry and upon him devolves the duty to ascertain the indorser’s title to the check or the nature of his possession. Failing in this respect, the holder is declared guilty of gross negligence amounting to legal absence of good faith, contrary to Section 52 (c) of the Negotiable Instruments Law, and as such the consensus of authority is to the effect that the holder of the check is not a holder in due course. BCCFI cannot be obliged to pay the checks as there is a failure of consideration (King being unable to supply the bales of tobacco leaf, for which the checks were intended for). Still, SIHI -- a holder not in due course -- can collect from the immediate indorser, George King. Such is the disadvantage of a holder not in due course, i.e. the instrument is subject to defenses as if it were non-negotiable. [7] Caltex (Philippines) Inc. vs. CA GR 97753, 10 August 1992 Second Division, Regalado (J) Facts: On various dates, Security Bank and Trust Co. (SEBTC), through its Sucat branch, issued 280 certificates of time deposit (CTD) in favor of one Angel dela Cruz who deposited with the bank the aggregate amount of P1.12 million. Anger de la Cruz delivered the CTDs to Caltex in connection with his purchase of Negotiable Instruments Law, 2004 ( 3 )


fuel products from the latter. Subsequently, dela Cruz informed the bank that he lost all the CTDs, and thus executed an affidavit of loss to facilitate the issuance of the replacement CTDs. De la Cruz was able to obtain a loan of P875,000 from the bank, and in turn, he executed a notarized Deed of Assignment of Time Deposit in favor of the bank. Thereafter, Caltex presented for verification the CTDs (which were declared lost by de la Cruz) with the bank. Caltex formally informed the bank of its possession of the CTDs and its decision to preterminate the same. The bank rejected Caltex’ claim and demand, after Caltex failed to furnish copy of the requested documents evidencing the guarantee agreement, etc. In 1983, de la Cruz’ loan matured and the bank set-off and applied the time deposits as payment for the loan. Caltex filed the complaint, but which was dismissed. Issue [1]: Whether the Certificates of Time Deposit (CTDs) are negotiable instruments. Held [1]: The CTDs in question meet the requirements of the law for negotiability. Contrary to the lower court’s findings, the CTDs are negotiable instruments (Section 1). Negotiability or non-negotiability of an instrument is determined from the writing, i.e. from the face of the instrument itself. The documents provided that the amounts deposited shall be repayable to the depositor. The amounts are to be repayable to the bearer of the documents, i.e. whosoever may be the bearer at the time of presentment. Issue [2]: Whether the CTDs’ negotiation require delivery only. Held [2]: Although the CTDs are bearer instruments, a valid negotiation thereof for the true purpose and agreement between it (Caltex) and de la Cruz requires both delivery and indorsement; as the CTDs were delivered to it as security for dela Cruz’ purchases of its fuel products, and not for payment. Herein, there was no negotiation in the sense of a transfer of title, or legal title, to the CTDs in which situation mere delivery of the bearer CTDs would have sufficed. The delivery thereof as security for the fuel purchases at most constitutes Caltex as a holder for value by reason of his lien. Accordingly, a negotiation for such purpose cannot be effected by mere delivery of the instrument since the terms thereof and the subsequent disposition of such security, in the event of non-payment of the principal obligation, must be contractually provided for. [8] Caram Resources vs. Contreras AM MTJ0830849, 26 October 1994 First Division, Davide Jr. (J) Facts: Teresita Dizon obtained a loan from Caram Resources payable in installments. She issued a promissory note and postdated BPI checks, four of which were dishonored when presented to the bank as the account against which they were drawn had been closed. Caram charged Dizon for violation of BP22, but where Judge Contreras acquitted Dizon on the ground of reasonable doubt. Subsequently, Caram charged Judge Maximo Contreras with gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct committed in Dizon’s criminal case. Issue: Whether malice is an essential element in BP 22. Held: In the 4 criminal cases before Judge Contreras, Dizon as accused admitted that a loan was granted to her and in connection therewith she executed a promissory note wherein she bound herself to pay the loan in 12 installments. She issued the postdated checks to cover the installments as they fall due. The checks were drawn against her BPI current account, which she closed in the same months she obtained the loan, so that when the checks were presented for payment they were dishonored. Malice and intent in issuing a worthless check are immaterial. The offense is committed by the very fact of its performance, i.e. the mere act of issuing a worthless check. The offense is malum prohibitum. An act may not be considered by society as inherently Negotiable Instruments Law, 2004 ( 4 )


wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum, pursuant to the State’s exercise of police power. [9] City Trust Banking vs. CA GR 92591, 30 April 1991 Third Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J) Facts: William Samara purchased from Citytrust Bank Draft 23681 for US$ 40,000 the payee being Thai International Airways and the corresponding drawee bank in the United States is Marine Midland. Samara executed a stop-payment order of the bank draft instructing Citytrust to inform Marine Midland about the order through telex. Marine Midland noted the order, and thus Citytrust credited Samara’s account. Seven months later, Citytrust re-debited Samara’s account upon discovery that Marine Midland had already debited Citytrust’s account. Issue: Who shall be liable for the amount. Held: Citytrust and Marine Midland were not in privity with each other in a transaction involving payment through a bank draft. A bank draft is a bill of exchange drawn by a bank upon its correspondent bank issued at the solicitation of a stranger who purchases and pays therefor. It is an order for payment of money. Citytrust was the drawer of the draft through which it ordered Marine Midland, the drawee bank, to pay Thai Airways. The drawee bank acting as payor bank is solely liable for acts not done in accordance with the instructions of the drawer bank or the purchaser of the draft. The drawee bank has the burden of proof that it did not so violate. Meanwhile, the drawer, if sued by the purchaser of the draft, is liable for the act of debiting the customer’s account despite an instruction to stop payment. The drawer has the duty to prove that he complied with the order to inform the drawee. [10] Clark vs. Sellner GR 16477, 22 November 1921 First Division, Romualdez (J) Facts: George Sellner, with WH Clarke and John Mave, signed a note in favor of RN Clark dated 1 July 1914 in Manila for the amount of P12,000. The note matured, but its amount was not paid. Action was filed in court. Sellner’s counsel allege that Sellner did not receive anything of value for the transaction, that the instrumnet was not presented to sellner for payment, and that Sellner, being an accommodation party is not liable unless the note is negotiated, which was allegedly not done. Issue: Whether Sellner is an accommodation party liable for the note. Held: Sellner, as one of the signers of the note, is one of the joint and several debtors on the note, and as such he is liable under Section 60 of the Negotiable Instruments Law/ Sellner lent his name, not to the creditor, but to those who signed with him placing himself with respect to the creditor in the same position and with the same liability as the said signers; and thus is a joint surety rather than an accommodation party. As to the presentment for payment, such action is not necessary in order to charge the person primarily liable, as is Sellner (Section 70, Negotiable Instruments Law). [11]

Negotiable Instruments Law, 2004 ( 5 )


Co vs. PNB GR L-51767, 29 June 1982 Second Division, Barredo (J) Facts: Standard Parts Manufacturing Corporation mortgaged properties to PNB. When Standard failed to pay its obligation (P4,296,803,56 secured by said properties), PNB extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgages. Standard, meanwhile, transferred its rights in the mortgages to Citadel Insurance and Surety Co., which wrote PNB its interest to redeem the Makati property (one of the property mortgaged) for P1,621,970. PNB rejected the offer. Citadel filed suit against PNB, where the complaint was accompanied by an RCBC manager’s check and which was deposited under a savings bank account with RCBC by order of the trial court. Issue: Whether there was a valid and effective tender of payment. Held: The unequivocal tender of redemption was made, through a manager’s check of RCBC (a well-known, big and reputable banking institution) for the amount it believed it should pay as redemption price. PNB rejected it on the sole and only ground that it considered the amount insufficient. Redemption was made on time, i.e. 1 year from the date appearing as the date of the registration of the certificate of sale. Tender by manager’s check was not inefficacious as the Court has already sanctioned redemption by check (See Javellana vs. Mirasol). [12] Cruz vs. CA GR 108738, 17 June 1994 First Division, Kapunan (J) Facts: Andrea Mayor is engaged in the business of granting interest-bearing loans and in rediscounting checks. Roberto Cruz, on the other hand, is engaged in selling ready to wear clothes at the Pasay Commercial Center. Cruz frequently borrows money from Mayor. In 1989, Cruz borrowed P176,000 from mayor, which Mayor delivered. In turn, Cruz issued a Premiere Bank check for the same amount. When the check matured, Mayor presented it to the bank but was dishonored and marked “account closed.” When notified of the dishonor, Cruz promised to pay in cash. No payment was made, and thus the criminal action for violation of BP 22 was instituted. Issue: Whether Cruz is liable for violating BP 22, even upon the claim that the check was issued to serve a mere evidence of indebtedness, and not for circulation or negotiation. Held: A check issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended to be presented for payment has the same effect of an ordinary check, hence, it falls within the ambit of BP 22. When a check is presented for payment, the drawee bank will generally accept the same regardless of whether it was issued in payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee the said obligation. What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the term and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum. [13] Crystal vs. CA GR L-35767, 18 June 1976 Resolution of the Second Division, Barredo (J) Facts: The Supreme Court, in its decision of 25 February 1975, affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, Negotiable Instruments Law, 2004 ( 6 )


holding that Raymundo Crystal’s redemption of the property acquired by Pelagia Ocang, Pacita, Teodulo, Felicisimo, Pablo, Lydia, Dioscoro and Rodrigo, all surnamed de Garcia, was invalid as the check which Crystal used in paying the redemption price has been either dishonored or had become stale (Ergo, the value of the check was never realized). Crystal filed a motion for reconsideration. Issue: Whether the conflicting circumstances of the check being dishonored and becoming stale affect the validity of the redemption sale. Held: For a check to be dishonored upon presentment and to be stale for not being presented at all in time are incompatible developments that have variant legal consequences. If indeed the questioned check was dishonored, the redemption was null and void. If it had only become state, it becomes imperative that the circumstances that caused its non-presentment be determined, for if it was not due to the fault of the drawer, it would be unfair to deprive him of the rights he had acquired as redemptioner. Herein, it appears that there is a strong showing that the check was not dishonored, although it became stale, and that Pelagia Ocang had actually been paid the full value thereof. The Supreme Court, thus, reconsidered its decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. [14] Dela Victoria vs. Burgos GR 111190, 27 June 1995 First Division, Bellosillo (J) Facts: Raul Sesbreno filed a complaint for damages against Assistant City Fiscal Bienvenido Mabanto before the RTC of Cebu City. After trial, judgment was rendered ordering Mabanto to pay Sesbreno P11,000. The decision having become final and executory, the trial court ordered its execution upon Sesbreno’s motion. The writ of execution was issued despite Mabanto’s objection. A notice of garnishment was served upon Loreto de la Victoria as City Fiscal of Mandaue City where Mabanto was then detailed. De la Victoria moved to quash the notice of garnishment claiming that he was not in possession of any money, funds, etc. belonging to Mabanto until delivered to him, and as such are still public funds which could not be subject of garnishment.. Issue: Whether the checks subject of garnishment belong to Mabanto or whether they still belong to the government. Held: Under Section 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto. As ordinarily understood, delivery means the transfer of the possession of the instrument by the maker or drawer with the intent to transfer title to the payee and recognize him as the holder thereof. Herein, the salary check of a government officer or employee does not belong to him before it is physically delivered to him. Inasmuch as said checks had not yet been delivered to Mabanto, they did not belong to him and still had the character of public funds. As a necessary consequence of being public fund, the checks may not be garnished to satisfy the judgment. [15] Firestone Tire and Rubber vs. Ines Chaves & Co. GR L-17106, 19 October 1966 En Banc, Regala (J) Facts: The check was intended as part of the payment of Ines Chaves’ debt. When presented to the Security Bank and Trust Co. by Firestone, the check was returned for insufficiency of funds. Despite repeated Negotiable Instruments Law, 2004 ( 7 )


demands, Ines Chaves failed to settle its account; hence, the suit. Issue: Whether good faith is required in the issuance of a check. Held: Everyone must in the performance of his duties, observe honesty and good faith. Where a person issues a postdated check without funds to cover it and informs the payee of this fact, he cannot be held guilty of estafa because there is no deceit. Herein, there is nothing in the record to show that Firestone knew that there were no funds when it accepted the check, much less that Firestone agreed to take the check with knowledge of the lack of funds. As Ines Chavez is guilty of fraud (bad faith) in the performance of its obligation, it is liable for damages. Its conduct wanting in good faith, the award of attorney’s fees was warranted. [16] Gempesaw vs. CA GR 92244, 9 February 1993 Second Division, Campos Jr. (J) Facts: Natividad Gempesaw issued checks, prepared by her bookkeeper, a total of 82 checks in favor of several supplies. Most of the checks for amounts in excess of actual obligations as shown in their corresponding invoices. It was only after the lapse of more than 2 years did she discovered the fraudulent manipulations of her bookkeeper. It was also learned that the indorsements of the payee were forged, and the checks were brought to the chief accountant of Philippine Bank of Commerce (the Drawee Bank, Buendia Branch) who deposited them in the accounts of Alfredo Romero and Benito Lam. Gempesaw made demand upon the bank to credit the amount charged due the checks. The bank refused. Hence, the present action. Issue: Who shall bear the loss resulting from the forged indorsements. Held: As a rule, a drawee bank who has paid a check on which an indorsement has been forged cannot charge the drawer’s account for the amount of said check. An exception to the rule is where the drawer is guilty of such negligence which causes the bank to honor such checks. Gempesaw did not exercise prudence in taking steps that a careful and prudent businessman would take in circumstances to discover discrepancies in her account. Her negligence was the proximate cause of her loss, and under Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, is precluded from using forgery as a defense. On the other hand, the banking rule banning acceptance of checks for deposit or cash payment with more than one indorsement unless cleared by some bank officials does not invalidate the instrument; neither does it invalidate the negotiation or transfer of said checks. The only kind of indorsement which stops the further negotiation of an instrument is a restrictive indorsement which prohibits the further negotiation thereof, pursuant to Section 36 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. In light of any case not provided for in the Act that is to be governed by the provisions of existing legislation, pursuant to Section 196 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, the bank may be held liable for damages in accordance with Article 1170 of the Civil Code. The drawee bank, in its failure to discover the fraud committed by its employee and in contravention banking rules in allowing a chief accountant to deposit the checks bearing second indorsements, was adjudged liable to share the loss with Gempesaw on a 50:50 ratio. [17] Hongkong & Shanghai Bank vs. People’s Bank and Trust GR L-28226, 30 September 1970 First Division, Fernando (J) Facts: The Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) drew a check on the Hongkong & Negotiable Instruments Law, 2004 ( 8 )


Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) in the latter’s favor for P14,608.05, and sent it through mail. The check fell into the hands of Florentino Changco, who was able to erase the name of the payee and substituted his own, and deposited the altered check in his current account with the People’s Bank and Trust Co. (PBTC). The check was cleared by HSBC, and PBTC credited Changco the amount. The alteration was known when the cancelled check was returned to PLDT. HSBC requested PBTC to refund the amount, but the latter refused. Issue: Whether HSBC can claim reimbursement from PBTC. Held: A person who presents fro payment checks guarantees the genuineness of the check, and the drawee bank need to concern itself with nothing but the genuineness of the signature, and the state of the account with it of the drawee. If at all, whatever remedy, whatever remedy HSBC has would lie not against PBTC but as against the party responsible for changing the name of the payee (i.e. Changco). Its failure to call the attention of PBTC as to such alteration until after the lapse of 27 days would, in the light of Central Bank Circular 9 (24-hour clearing house rule), negate whatever right it might have had against PBTC. [18] Ibasco vs. CA GR 117488, 5 September 1996 Third Division, Davide Jr. (J) Facts: The Ibasco spouses requested credit accommodation fro the supply of ingredients in the manufacture of animal feeds from the Trivinio spouses. Ibasco issued 3 checks for 3 deliveries of darak. The checks bounced and the Ibasco spouses were notified of the dishonor. Ibasco instead offered a property in Daet. The property, being across the sea, the Trivinio spouses did not inspect the property. For the failure of the Ibasco spouses to settle their account, the Trivinio spouses filed criminal cases against the former for violation of BP22. Issue: Whether the checks were for accommodation or guarantee to acquire the benefits of the interpretation of Ministry Circular 4 of the Department of Justice in relation to BP 22. Held: Ministry Circular 4, issued 1 December 1981 by the Department of Justice, provides that where a check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of the obligation, pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or violation of BP 22. Incidents however indicate that the checks were issued as payment and for value, and not for accommodation (i.e. pertaining to an arrangement made a favor to another, not upon a consideration received). as the checks failed to bear any statement “for accommodation” and “for guarantee” to show Ibasco’s intent. ( It must be noted, however, that BP22 does not distinguish and applies even in cases where dishonored checks were issued as a guarantee or for deposit only. The erroneous interpretation of Ministry Circular 4 was rectified by the repealing Ministry Circular 12, issued on 8 August 1984). [19] Jimenez vs. Bucoy GR L-10221, 28 February 1958 En Banc, Bengzon (J) Facts: In the proceedings in the intestate of Luther Young and Pacita Young who died in 1954 and 1952, respectively, Pacifica Jimenez presented for payment 4 promissory notes signed by Pacita for different amounts totalling P21,000. Acknowledging receipt by Pacita during the Japanese occupation, in the currency Negotiable Instruments Law, 2004 ( 9 )


then prevailing, the Administrator manifested willingness to pay provided adjustment of the sums be made in line with the Ballantyne schedule. The claimant objected to the adjustment insisting on full payment in accordance with the notes. The court held that the notes should be paid in the currency prevailing after the war, and thus entitling Jimemez to recover P21,000 plus P2,000 as attorney’s fees. Hence, the appeal. Issue: Whether the amounts should be paid, peso for peso; or whether a reduction should be made in accordance with the Ballantyne schedule. Held: If the loan was expressly agreed to be payable only after the war, or after liberation, or became payable after those dates, no reduction could be effected, and peso-for-peso payment shall be ordered in Philippine currency. The Ballantyne Conversion Table does not apply where the monetary obligation, under the contract, was not payable during the Japanese occupation. Herein, the debtor undertook to pay “six months after the war,” peso for peso payment is indicated. [20] Kalalo vs. Luz GR L-27782, 31 July 1970 En Banc, Zaldivar (J) Facts: On 17 November 1959, Octavio Kalalo entered into an agreement with Alfredo Luz where he was to render engineering design services for a fee. On 11 December 1961, Kalalo sent Luz a statement of account where the balance due for services rendered was P59,505. On 18 May 1962, Luz sent Kalalo a resume of fees due to the latter, and a check for P10,861.08. Kalalo refused to accept the check as full payment of the balance of the fees due him. On 10 August 1962, Kalalo filed a complaint containing 4 causes of action, i.e. $28,000 (representing 20% of the amount paid to Luz in the International Research Institute project) and the balance of P30,881.25 as fees; P17,0000 as consequential and moral damages; P55,000 as moral damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses; and P25,000 as actual damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses). The trial court ruled in favor of Kalalo. Luz filed an appeal directly with the Supreme Court raising only questions of law. Issue: Whether the rate of exchange of dollar to peso are those at the time of the payment of the judgment or at the time when the research institute project became due and demandable. Held: Luz’ obligation to pay Kalalo the sum of US$28,000 accrued on 25 August 1961, or after the enactment of RA 529 (16 June 1950). Thus, the provision of the statute which requires payment at the prevailing rate of exchange when the obligation was incurred cannot be applied. RA 529 does not provide for the rate of exchange for the payment of obligation incurred after the enactment of the Act, and thus the rate of exchange should be that prevailing at the time of payment. The view finds support in the ruling of the Court in Engel vs. Velasco & Co. The trial court did not err in holding the rate of exchange is that at the time of payment. [21] Lao vs. CA GR 119178, 20 June 1997 Third Division, Panganiban (J) Facts: Lim Lim Lao was a junior officer of Premier Investment House in its Binondo branch. She was authorized to sign checks for and in behalf of the corporation. In the course of business, she met Fr. Artelijo Palijo, provincial treasurer of the Society of the Divine Word. Fr. Palijo was authorized to invest donations of the society and had been investing the society’s money with Premiere. Fr. Palijo was issued checks in Negotiable Instruments Law, 2004 ( 10 )


payment of interest for the society’s investments. The checks were dishonored for “insufficiency of funds.” Fr. Palijo was only able to acquire P5,000 for his efforts in demanding the payment of the checks. Premiere, subsequently, was placed under receivership. Fr. Palijo filed a suit against Lim Lao and his co-signatory, Teodulo Asprec, head of operations for violation of BP 22. Issue: Whether an employee who, as part of her regular duties, signs blank corporate check, be held for violation of BP22. Held: The checks co-signed by Lim Lao were signed in advance and in blank, delivered to the head of operations, who subsequently filled in the name of he payee, the amounts and corresponding dates of maturity; this procedure followed in keeping with her duties as a junior officer. Though BP 22 provides the presumption that a drawer is knowledgeable of the fact of insufficiency of funds, such presumption may be debunked by contrary evidence. Herein, Lim Lao does not have the power, duty or responsibility to monitor and assess the balances against the issuance, nor to make sure that the checks were funded. Such responsibility devolved upon the corporation’s Treasury Department in Cubao, Quezon City. Furthermore, no notice of dishonor was actually sent or received by Lim Lao to support the prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. She was thus acquitted. [22] Lazaro vs. CA GR 105461, 11 November 1993 Second Division, Padilla (J) Facts: Marlyn Lazaro received from Rudy Chua the amount of P90,000 as advanced payment for deliveries of sugar, etc. Lazaro was only able to deliver partial delivery. To refund the undelivered goods, she issued a check for P72,000. When deposited, the check was dishonored and stamped “account closed.” To make up for the dishonor, Lazaro indorsed a check issued by one Lolita Soriano, payable to “Cash.” It was likewise dishonored and marked “account closed.” Chua sent a demand letter asking for the payment of the amount covered by the first check within days from receipt of letter. For failure of the accused to pay the amount, Chua filed cases for estafa and violation of BP 22. Issue: Whether damage or prejudice is an element of BP 22 violation. Held: The clear intention of the framers of BP 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a check that is worthless malum prohibitum. The law does not require that there be damage or prejudice to the individual complainant by reason of the issuance of the check. The fine provided for in BP 22 was intended as an additional penalty for the act of issuing a worthless check. BP 22 provides that a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the dishonored check may be imposed by the court. [23] Lim vs. CA GR 107898, 19 December 1995 First Division, Bellosillo (J) Facts: Spouses Manuel and Rosita Lim are the president and treasurer, respectively, of RIGI Built Industries Inc. RIGI had been transacting business with Linton Commercial Company for years, the latter supplying the former with steel plates, steel bars, flat bars and purlin sticks which the company uses in the fabrication, installation and building of steel structures. The Lims ordered steel plates from Linton Commercial, delivering checks to the latter’s collector as payment. The checks were dishonored for “insufficiency of Negotiable Instruments Law, 2004 ( 11 )


funds” with the additional notation “payment stopped” (The Lims claimed that the supplies delivered by Linton Commercial were not in accordance with the specifications of purchase orders). Despite demands, the Lims refused to make good the checks or to pay value of the deliveries. Issue: Whether the receipt of the checks by the collector of Linton is the issuance and delivery to the payee within the contemplation of the law (as prelude to jurisdiction issue). Held: “Issue” means the first delivery of the instrument complete in form to a person who takes it as a holder. “Holder“ refers to the payee or indorsee of a note or who is in possession of it or the bearer thereof. The issuance as well as the delivery of the check must be to a person who takes it as a holder. Delivery of the checks signifies transfer of possession (actual or constructive) from one person to another with intent to transfer title thereto; the delivery being the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation. The collector was not the person who could take the checks as a holder. Neither could the collector be deemed an agent of Linton Commercial with respect to the checks because he was a mere employee. [24] Lim vs. People GR 130038, 18 September 2000 En Banc, Pardo (J) Facts: Rosa Lim bought various kinds of jewelry worth P300,000 from the store of Maria Antonia Seguan, by issuing a check payable to “cash” drawn against MetroBank. The next day, Lim again purchased jewelry valued at P241,668 by issuing another check payable to cash likewise drawn against MetroBank. Seguan deposited the checks with her bank. The checks were returned with a notice of dishonor as Lim’s accounts in said bank were already closed. Upon demand, Lim promised to pay Seguan the amounts of the two dishonored checks. She never did. Rosa Lim was charge for two counts of violation of BP 22, where she was found guilty, and sentenced to 1 year imprisonment with fine (P200,000). Issue: Whether Lim has knowledge of the insufficiency of funds when issuing the checks. Held: The elements of BP22 are (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value, (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. Lim never denied issuing the check. Section 2 of BP 22 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the first and third elements are present. If not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction. It must be noted that similar to the Vaca case, the Court deleted the prison sentences imposed upon Lim, holding that the two fines imposed for each of the violation (P200,000 each ) are appropriate and sufficient. Subsidiary imprisonment not exceeding 6 months is provided in case of insolvency or non-payment of the fines as decreed. [25] Lim vs. Rodrigo GR 76974, 18 November 1988 Third Division, Fernan (J) Facts: Ko Hu issued 5 post dated checks amounting to P200,000 allegedly in payment of a certain obligation Negotiable Instruments Law, 2004 ( 12 )


to Benito Lim. Said checks were handed to Lim’s brother, Vicente, at Ko Hu’s office in Nueva Street, Manila for delivery to Benito Lim in Baguio City. When presented at Lim’s depository bank in Baguio City, the checks were dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account. Lim filed a suit against Ko Hu for violation of BP 22 in Baguio City. Issue: Whether the delivery of the checks to Benito Lim’s brother is the delivery contemplated by law (prelude to juridictional issue) Held: The venue of the offense lies at the place where the check was executed and delivered to the payee and that the place where a check was written, signed or dated does not fix the place where it was executed, as what is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof which is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation. The “delivery” contemplated by law “must be to a person who takes the check as a holder,” i.e. “the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof.” Vicente Lim, Benito’s brother, cannot be said to have taken the checks in the concept of a holder for he is neither the payee or indorsee thereof. Neither could he be deemed to be Benito’s agent with respect thereto, for he was purposely sent to Ko Hu to get certain stock certificates and not the checks in question (This is similar to the People vs. Yabut case). [26] Llamado vs. CA GR 99032, 26 March 1997 Second Division, Torres Jr. (J) Facts: Ricardo Llamado and Jacinto Pascual were Treasurer and President of Pan Asia Finance Corporation. Leon Gaw delivered P180,000 to Llamado with assurance that the amount would be repaid on 4 November 1983 with 12% interest and a share of the profits of the corporation. On said date, Gaw deposited the check but it was dishonored. Informing Llamado of the dishonor, Llamado offered in writing to pay Gaw a portion of the amount equivalent to 10% thereof on 14 or 15 November and the balance rolled over for a period of 90 days. Llamado failed to do so. Gaw filed a complaint against Llamado and Pascual for violation of BP 22. Pascual remains at large. Llamado contends he signed the check in blank. Issue: Whether Llamado is personally liable for the bounced check. Held: Llamado’s claim that he signed the check in blank is hardly a defense. By signing the check, he made himself prone to being charged with violation of BP 22. It became incumbent upon him to prove his defenses. As treasurer of the corporation who signed the check in his capacity as corporate officer, lack of involvement in the negotiation for the transaction is not a defense. Llamado is personally liable even if the check was in the name of the corporation. Third paragraph of Section 1, BP 22, states that “where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person(s) who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.” It must be noted that the check was issued for a valuable consideration (P180,000). Had the money been intended to be returned when the investment was successful, the check need not be issued. A receipt and their written agreement would have sufficed. [27] Lozano vs. Martinez GR L-63419, 18 December 1986 En Banc, Yap (J) Negotiable Instruments Law, 2004 ( 13 )


Facts: Lozano vs. Martinez (GR L-63419), Lobaton vs. Cruz (GR L-66839-42), Datuin vs. Pano (GR 71654), Violago vs. Pano (GR 74524-25), Abad vs. Gerochi (GR 75122-49), Aguiliz vs. Presiding Judge of Branch 154 (GR 75812-13), Hojas vs. Penaranda (GR 75765-67) and People vs. Nitafan (GR 75789) are cases involving prosecution of offenses under BP 22 which were consolidated herein as the parties (defendants) thereto question the constitutionality of the statute, BP 22. Issue: Whether BP 22 is constitutional. Held: The language of BP22 is broad enough to cover all kinds of checks, whether present dated or post dated, whether issued in payment of pre-existing obligations or given in mutual or simultaneous exchange for something of value. BP 22 is aimed to put a stop or to curb the practice of issuing worthless checks, which is proscribed by the State because of the injury it causes to public interests. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check which is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. it is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law publishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public order. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The statute is not unconstitutional. [28] Magno vs. CA GR 96132, 26 June 1992 Second Division, Paras (J) Facts: Oriel Magno lacked funds to purchase necessary equipment to make his car repair shop business operational. He approached Corazon Teng, who in turn referred LS Finance and Management Corporation, who could accommodate him and provide him credit facilities. LS Finance required a warranty deposit (30% of the total value of the pieces of equipment to be purchased), which Teng advanced, unknown to Magno. When the equipment were delivered to Magno, he issued a postdated check to LS Finance, which delivered it to Teng. When the check matured, Magno requested that the check not to be deposited as he no longer banks with Pacific Bank. To replace the check, Magno issued 6 postdated checks, 2 of which were deposited and cleared, the other 4 were held momentarily by Teng, on the request of Magno for they are not covered with sufficient funds. As Magno cannot pay the monthly rentals fro the equipment, the same were pulled out. Only then did Magno learned that Teng was the one who advanced the deposit. Magno promised to pay her but payment never came. When the checks were deposited, they were dishonored. Magno was found guilty of violation of BP22 when the cases were adjudicated. Issue: Whether there was a violation of BP 22. Held: The crux of the matter rest upon the reason for the drawing of the postdated checks by Magno, i.e. whether they were drawn or issued “to apply on account or for value,” as required under Section 1 of BP 22. When viewed against the definitions of “warranty” and “deposit,” for which the postdated checks were issued or drawn, the alleged crime could not have been committed by Magno. Furthermore, the element of “knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank....:” is inversely applied in the case. From the beginning, Magno never hid the fact that he had no funds. Magno, thus, was acquitted of the crime charged. [29] Manila Lighter Transportation vs. CA Negotiable Instruments Law, 2004 ( 14 )


GR L-50373, 15 February 1990 First Division, Grino-Aquino (J) Facts: 49 checks were issued by Manila Lighter Transportation’s customers in payment of brokerage / lighterage services and were all delivered to its collector, Augusto Perez. Upon forged indorsements of the company’s General Manager, Luis Gaskell, the checks found their way to the accounts of third persons and were later withdrawn. A complaint to recover the value of the checks were filed against China Bank. Bank denied liability. Issue: Whether the bank is negligent as to bear the loss resulting from the checks with forged indorsements. Held: Since Manila Lighter Transportation was not a client of the bank, the latter had no way of ascertaining the authenticity of its indorsements on the checks which were deposited in the accounts of third persons (Ko Lit and Cao Pek) in said bank. The bank was not negligent because, in accordance with banking practice, it caused the checks to pass through the clearing house before it allowed their proceeds to be withdrawn by the depositors. [30] Moran vs. CA GR 105836, 7 March 1994 Second Division, Regalado (J) Facts: George and Librada Moran maintained 3 joint accounts with CityTrust Banking Corporation. The Morans issued checks in favor of Petrophil Corporation, which were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Moran deposited the amount that would cover the checks the day after the check’s clearing. Petrophil did not deliver the Morans’ fuel orders for their Wack-Wack Petron Gasoline station, prompting the latter to temporarily stop business operations. The Morans sued the bank for damages. Issue: Whether a bank is liable for its refusal to pay a check on account of insufficient funds, notwithstanding the fact the fact that a deposit was made later in the day. Held: A check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on demand. Where the bank possesses funds of a depositor, it is bound to honor his checks to the extent of the amount of the deposits. Failure to do so, when deposit is sufficient, entitles the drawer to substantial damages without proof of actual damages. Herein, however, the balance of the account maintained in the bank was not enough to cover either of the two checks when they were dishonored. A check, as distinguished from an ordinary bill of exchange, is supposed to be drawn against a previous deposit of funds. As such, a drawer must remember his responsibilities every time he issues a check. He must personally keep track of his available balance in the bank and not rely on the bank to notify him of the necessity to fund the checks he previously issued. A bank is under no obligation to make part payment on a check, up to only the amount of the drawer’s funds, where the check is drawn for an amount larger than what the drawer has on deposit. A check is intended not only to transfer a right to the amount named in it, but to serve the further purpose of affording evidence for the bank of the payment of such amount when the check is taken up. Clearly, a bank is not liable for its refusal to pay a check on account of insufficient funds, notwithstanding the fact that a deposit may be made later in the day. Before a bank depositor may maintain a suit to recover a specific amount from his bank, he must first show that he had on deposit sufficient funds to meet his demand. [31] MWSS vs. CA Negotiable Instruments Law, 2004 ( 15 )


GR L-62943, 14 July 1986 Second Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J) Facts: By special arrangement with PNB, MWSS used personalized checks in drawing from its account. The checks were printed by its printer, F. Mesina Enterprises. 23 checks were paid and cleared by PNB, and debited against MWSS’ account from March to May 1969. The checks were deposited by payees Raul Dizon, Arturo Sison, and Antonio Mendoza in their account with PCIBank. Said persons were later found to be fictitious. MWSS requested PNB to restore the amount debited due to the 23 checks, allegedly forged, to its account. The bank refused. Hence, the present action. Issue: Who shall bear the loss resulting from the alleged forged checks. Held: There was no express and categorical finding that the 23 checks were forged or signed by persons other than the authorized MWSS signatories. Forgery is not presumed but should be established by clear, positive and convincing evidence. MWSS is barred from setting up defense of forgery under Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law as MWSS committed gross negligence in the printing of its personalized checks, failed to reconcile its bank statements with its own records, and failed to provide appropriate security measures over its own record. PNB, the drawee bank, had taken necessary measures in the detection of forged checks and the prevention of their fraudulent encashment through constant reminders to all its current account bookkeepers informing them of the activities of forgery syndicates. MWSS’ gross negligence was the proximate cause of the loss (P3 million), and should bear the loss. [32] Navarro vs. CA GR 112389, 1 August 1994 First Division, Cruz (J) Facts: Mercedes D. Navarro was convicted of violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) in the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan. She failed to file her brief on appeal. She claimed to have made payment to the original complainant’s saleslady when she filed a motion for new trial on the ground of “newly discovered evidence.” Such motion was denied. Issue: Whether Navarro is indeed guilty of violating the bouncing check law. Held: Payment of the value of the check either by the drawer or by the drawee bank within 5 banking days from notice of dishonor given to the drawer is a complete defense. The prima facie presumption that the drawer had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds or credit at the time of the issuance and on its presented for payment would be rebutted by such payment. This defense lies regardless of the strength of the evidence offered by the prosecution to prove the elements of the offense (i.e. violation of BP 22). Herein, Navarro failed to overcome the presumption by substantiating her allegation of payment. There is no proof that the payment, if it was really made at all, was done within 5 days from the notice of dishonor. [33] People vs. Grospe GR L-74053-54, 20 January 1988 Second Division, Melencio-Herrera (J) Facts: Manuel Parulan issued a check to the San Miguel Corporation, which was received by the latter’s finance officer in Guiguinto, Bulacan, and which was forwarded and deposited in SMC’s BPI account in San Negotiable Instruments Law, 2004 ( 16 )


Fernando, Pampanga. Another check was issued by Parulan as direct payment for the spot sale of beer, which was similarly received, forwarded and deposited as above. Both were dishonored for “insufficiency of funds.” Parulan was charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code. Tried jointly, the court dismissed the cases for lack of jurisdiction. Issue: Whether the checks were issued in Bulacan or Pampanga. Held: While the subject check was issued in Bulacan, it was not completely drawn thereat, but in San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was uttered and delivered. The place where the bills were written, signed or dated does not fix or determine the place where they were executed. What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof, as it is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation. The issuance and the delivery of the check must be to a person who takes it as a holder, i.e. the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it or the bearer thereof. Both estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check a transitory or continuing offense. Thus, as jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the information, i.e. San Fernando, Pampanga, the venue was properly laid. Case is remanded to the trial court for proper disposition. [34] People vs. Maniego GR L-30910, 27 February 1987 First Division, Narvasa (J) Facts: Julia Maniego was an indorser of several checks drawn by her sister, Milagros Pamintuan, which were dishonored after they had been exchange with cash belonging to the Government, then in the official custody of Lt. Rizalino Ubay. Ubay, Pamintuan and Maniego were indicted for the crime of malversation. Ubay and Maniego were arraigned, while Pamintuan fled to the United States. Ubay was found guilty while Maniego was acquitted. Both, however, were ordered to pay in solidum the amount of P57,434.50 to the government. Maniego appealed. Issue: Whether Maniego is liable even if she is a mere indorser. Held: Under the law, the holder or last indorsee of a negotiable instrument has the right to enforce payment of the instrument for the full amount thereof against all parties liable thereon. Among the parties liable thereon is an indorser of the instrument. Such an indorser who indorses without qualification, inter alia, engaged that on due presentment, the instrument shall be accepted or paid, or both, according to its tenor, and that if it be dishonored, and the necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder, or to any subsequent indorser who may be compelled to pay it. Maniego may also be deemed an “accommodation party” in the light of the facts (i.e. without receiving value for the same). As such, she is liable on the instrument to a holder for value, notwithstanding such holder at the time of taking the instrument knew her to be only an accommodation party, although she has the right, after paying the holder, to obtain reimbursement from the party accommodated. [35] People vs. Reyes GR 101127-31, 18 November 1993 First Division, Cruz (J) Facts: Lorie Garcia delivered rice to Cresencia Reyes, as accommodation to her friend Manny Cabrera who had no more stock to sell. Reyes issued 6 checks for 6 orders delivered in different dates. Only 3 of the 6 checks were made good, the other 3 were returned by the bank due to “insufficient funds.” Garcia notified Negotiable Instruments Law, 2004 ( 17 )


Reyes of the dishonor and the latter promised to pay her their total value. Despite demands, Reyes failed to make good the checks or replace them with cash. 3 criminal cases for violation of BP 22 and 2 criminal cases for estafa were filed against Reyes. Issue: Whether a single act of issuing a check may entail criminal liability of both violation of BP 22 and Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (Estafa). Held: A single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is a variance or differences between the elements of an offense in one law and another law. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment; and act deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. BP 22 applies even where the dishonored checks were issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guaranty and not as actual payment, as the law does not make any distinction. On the other hand, the checks were not payment for a preexisting obligation nut as consideration for each shipment of rice. The checks were issued as an inducement for the surrender by the party deceived of her property. Reyes made good 3 of the checks, giving assurance to Garcia that the remaining checks were fully funded. Her failure to make good the checks raised the prima facie inference of deceit. [36] People vs. Tuanda AC 3360, 30 January 1990 Resolution En Banc, Per Curiam Facts: In 1983, Atty. Fe Tuanda received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry with a total value of P36,000 for sale on commission bases. In 1984, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry worth P26,250, she issued 3 checks. These checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, Tuanda made no effort to settle her obligation. Criminal cases were filed, wherein she was acquitted of estafa but was found guilty of violation of BP 22. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court and imposed further suspension against Tuanda in the practice of law, on the ground that the offense involves moral turpitude. Issue: Whether violation of BP 22 involves moral turpitude to allow the suspension of a member of the bar from the practice of law. Held: Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. Herein, BP 22 violation is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interest of parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the community at large. Putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The Court affirmed the suspension of Tuanda from the practice of law. [37] Philippine Bank of Commerce vs. Aruego GR L-25836-37, 31 January 1981 First Division, Fernandez (J) Facts: Jose Aruego publishes a periodical called “World Current Events.” To facilitate payment of the printing, Aruego obtained a credit accommodation from the Philippine Bank of Commerce. For every printing Negotiable Instruments Law, 2004 ( 18 )


of the periodical, the printer (Encal Press and Photo-Engraving) collected the cost of printing by drawing a draft against the bank, said draft being sent later to Aruego for acceptance. As an added security for the payment of the amounts advanced to the printer, the bank also required Aruego to execute a trust receipt in favor of the bank wherein Aruego undertook to hold in trust for the bank the periodicals and to sell the same with the promise to turn over to the bank the proceeds of the sale to answer for the payment of all obligations arising from the draft. The bank instituted an action against Aruego to recover the cost of printing of the latter’s periodical for the period of 28 August 1950 to 14 March 1951. Issue [1]: Whether the drafts were bills of exchange or mere pieces of evidence of indebtedness. Held [1]: Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, a bill of exchange is an unconditional order in writing addressed by one person to another, signed by the person giving it, requiring the person to whom it is addressed to pay on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time a sum certain in money to order or to bearer. As long as a commercial paper conforms with the definition of a bill of exchange, that paper is considered a bill of exchange. The nature of acceptance is important only in the determination of the kind of liabilities of the parties involved, but not in the determination of whether a commercial paper is a bill of exchange or not. Issue [2]: Whether Aruego is an agent of Philippine Education Foundation Company when he signed the supposed bills of exchange. Held [2]: Nowhere in the drafts accepted by Aruego that he disclosed that he was signing as representative of the Philippine Education Foundation Company. For failure to disclose his principal, Aruego is personally liable for the drafts he accepted, pursuant to Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. Issue [3]: Whether Aruego is primarily liable. Held [3]: An accommodation party is one who has signed the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor, indorser, without receiving value therefor and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person. Herein, Aruego signed as a drawee / acceptor. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, a drawee is primarily liable. If Aruego intended to be secondarily liable only, he should not have signed as an acceptor / drawee. In doing so, he became primarily and personally liable for the drafts. [38] Philippine Commercial Industrial Bank vs. CA GR 121413, 29 January 2001 Second Division, Quisumbing (J) Facts: Ford issued Citibank checks in favor of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue as payments of its taxes, through the depository bank Insular Bank of Asia and America (later PCIBank). Proceeds of the checks were never received by the Commissioner, but were encashed and diverted to the accounts of members of a syndicate, to which Ford’s General Ledger Accountant Godofredo Rivera belongs. Upon demand of the Commissioner anew, Ford was forced to make second payment of its taxes. Thus, Ford instituted actions to recover the amounts from the collecting (depository) and drawee banks. Issue: Whether Ford has the right to recover from the collecting bank (PCI Bank) and/or the drawee bank (Citibank) the value of the checks. Held: The mere fact that forgery was committed by a drawer-payor’s confidential employee or agent, who by virtue of his position had unusual facilities to perpetrate the fraud and imposing the forged paper upon the Negotiable Instruments Law, 2004 ( 19 )


bank, does not entitle the bank to shift the loss to the drawer-payor, in the absence of some circumstance raising estoppel against the drawer. The rule applies to checks fraudulently negotiated or diverted by the confidential employees who hold them in their possession. In GRs 121413 and 121479, PCIBank failed to verify the authority of Mr. Rivera to negotiate the checks. Furthermore, PCIBank’s clearing stamp which guarantees prior or lack of indorsements render PCIBank liable as it allowed Citibank without any other option but to pay the checks. PCIBank, being a depository / collecting bank of the BIR, had the responsibility to make sure that the crossed checks were deposited in “Payee’s account only” as found in the instrument. In GR 128604, on the other hand, the switching operation involving the checks, while in transit for clearing, were the clandestine or hidden actuations performed by the members of the syndicate in their own personal, covert and private capacity; without the knowledge nor official or conscious participation of PCIBank in the process of embezzlement. Central Bank Circular 580 (1977), however, provide d that any theft affecting items in transit for clearing are for the account of the sending bank (herein PCIBank). Still, Citibank was likewise negligent in the performance of its duties as it failed to establish its payment of Ford’s checks were made in due course and legally in order. The fact that drawee bank did not discover the irregularity seasonably constitutes negligence in carrying out the bank’s duty to its depositors. [39] Philippine Education Co. vs. Soriano GR L-22405, 30 June 1971 En Banc, Dizon (J) Facts: Enrique Montinola sought to purchase from the Manila Post Office 10 money orders (P200 each), offering to pay for them with a private check. Montinola was able to leave the building with his check and the 10 money orders without the knowledge of the teller. Upon discovery, message was sent to all postmasters and banks involving the unpaid money orders. One of the money orders was received by the Philippine Education Co. as part of its sales receipt. It was deposited by the company with the Bank of America, which cleared it with the Bureau of Post. The Postmaster, through the Chief of the Money Order Division of the Manila Post Office informed the bank of the irregular issuance of the money order. The bank debited the account of the company. The company moved for reconsideration. Issue: Whether postal money orders are negotiable instruments. Held: Philippine postal statutes are patterned from those of the United States, and the weight of authority in said country is that Postal money orders are not negotiable instruments inasmuch as the establishment of a postal money order is an exercise of governmental power for the public’s benefit. Furthermore, some of the restrictions imposed upon money order by postal laws and regulations are inconsistent with the character of negotiable instruments. For instance, postal money orders may be withheld under a variety of circumstances, and which are restricted to not more than one indorsement. [40] Pineda vs. dela Rama GR L-31831, 28 April 1983 First Division, Gutierrez (J) Facts: Jose V. dela Rama is a lawyer whose services were retained by Jesus Pineda for the purpose of making representations with the chairman and general manager of the National Rice and Corn Administration to stop Negotiable Instruments Law, 2004 ( 20 )


and delay the institution of criminal charges against Pineda who allegedly misappropriated 11,000 cavans of palay deposited at his ricemill in Concepcion, Tarlac. Subsequently, Dela Rama filed suit to collect a P9,300 loan, evidenced by the matured promissory note, and P5,000 as attorney’s fees. The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of Pineda, which was reversed by the Court of Appeals. Issue: Whether the promissory note is void for lack of consideration. Held: The presumption that a negotiable instrument is issued for a valuable consideration (Section 24, Negotiable Instruments Law) is only prima facie. It can be rebutted by proof to the contrary. The term of the note sustains the version of Pineda that he signed the promissory note because he believed dela Rama’s story that these amounts had already been advanced by dela Rama and given as gifts for NARIC officials. The promissory note was thus executed for an illegal consideration; and thus is void like any other contract as per Article 1409 of the Civil Code. The consideration for the promissory note -- to influence public officers in the performance of their duties -- is contrary to law and public policy. The promissory note is void ab initio and no cause of action for the collection cases can arise from it. [41] PNB vs. CA GR L-26001, 29 October 1968 En Banc, Concepcion (J) Facts: One Augusto Lim deposited in his current account with PCI Bank (Padre Faura Branch) a GSIS check drawn against PNB. The signatures of the General Manager and Auditor of GSIS were forged. PCIBank stamped at the back of the check “All prior indorsements or lack of indorsements guaranteed, PCI Bank.” PCIBank sent the check to PNB through the Central Bank. PNB did not return the check to PCIBank; and thus PCIBank credited Lim’s account. As GSIS has informed PNB that the check was lost two months before said transaction, its account was recredited by PNB upon its demand (due to the forged check). PNB requested for refund with PCI Bank. The latter refused. Issue: Who shall bear the loss resulting from the forged check. Held: The collecting bank is not liable as the forgery existing are those of the drawers’ and not of the indorsers’. The indorsement of the intermediate bank does not guarantee the signature of the drawer. PNB’s failure to return the check to the collecting bank implied that the check was good. In fact, PNB even honored the check even if GSIS has reported two months earlier that the check was stolen and the bank thus should stop payment. PNB’s negligence was the main and proximate cause for the corresponding loss. PNB thus should bear such loss. Upon payment by PNB, as drawee, the check ceased to be a negotiable instrument, and became a mere voucher or proof of payment. [42] PNB vs. National City Bank GR 43596, 31 October 1936 En Banc, Recto (J) Facts: An unknown person or persons negotiated with Motor Service Co. checks purportedly issued by the Pangasinan Transportation Co. by JL Klar, Manager and Treasurer, against PNB and in favor of International Auto Repair Shop for P144.50 and P215.75. Said checks were indorsed by said unknown persons in the manner indicated at the back thereof. The checks were indorsed fro deposit at the National City Bank of New York (NCBNY) and Motor Service Co. was credited with the amounts thereof. Said checks were cleared at Negotiable Instruments Law, 2004 ( 21 )


the clearing house and PNB credited NCBNY for the amounts thereof, believing that the signatures of the drawer are genuine, etc. PNB found that the signature were forged when so informed by the Pangasinan Transportation Co. It demanded reimbursement from NCBNY and Motor Service Co. Both refused. Pangasinan Transportation objected to its deduction of its deposit. Issue [1]: Whether the payment of the checks made by the drawee bank constitutes an acceptance. Held [1]: A check is a bill of exchange payable on demand and only the rules governing bills of exchange payable on demand are applicable to it (Section 185). The fact that acceptance is a step unnecessary insofar as bills of exchange payable on demand are concerned, it follows that the provisions relative to “acceptance” are without application to checks. There is nothing in law, however, against the presentation of checks for acceptance before they are paid. Certification is equivalent to acceptance (Section 187). When certified, the drawer will perform his promise by any other means than the payment of money (Section 132). When certified, the drawer and all indorsers are discharged from liability thereon (Section 188), and then the check operates as an assignment of a part of the funds to the credit of the drawer with the bank (Section 189). Acceptance has a technical meaning in the Negotiable Instruments Law. With few exceptions, “payment” neither includes or implies “payment.” Payment of the check, cashing it on presentment is not acceptance. Issue [2]: Whether the drawee bank is liable for the amount in a forged check for its failure to detect the forgery. Held [2]: In determining the relative rights of a drawee who, under a mistake of fact, has paid, and a holder who has received such payment, upon a check to which the name of the drawer is forged, it is only fair to consider the question of diligence or negligence contributed to the success of the fraud or to mislead the drawee. To entitle the holder of a forged check to retain the money obtained thereon, there must be a showing that the duty to ascertain the genuineness of the signature rested entirely upon the drawee, and that the constructive negligence of such drawee in failing to detect the forgery was not affected by any disregard of duty on the part of the holder, or by failure of any precaution which, from his implied assertion in presenting the check as a sufficient voucher, the drawee had the right to believe he had taken. Under the circumstance of the case, if the PNB is allowed to recover, there will be no change of position as to the injury or prejudice of the Motor Service Co. [43] PNB vs. Quimpo GR L-53194, 14 March 1988 First Division, Gancayco (J) Facts: Francisco Gozon was a depositor of the Philippine National Bank (PNB Caloocan City branch). Ernesto Santos, Gozon’s friend, took a check from the latter’s checkbook which was left in the car, filled it up for the amount of P5,000, forged Gozon’s signature, and encashed it. Gozon learned about the transaction upon receipt of the bank’s statement of account, and requested the bank to recredit the amount to his account. The bank refused. Hence, the present action. Issue: Who shall bear the loss resulting from the forged check. Held: The prime duty of a bank is to ascertain the genuineness of the signature of the drawer or the depositor on the check being encashed. It is expected to use reasonable business prudence in accepting and cashing a check being encashed or presented to it. Payment in neglect of duty places upon him the result of such negligence. Still, Gozon’s act in leaving his checkbook in the car, where his trusted friend remained in, cannot be considered negligence sufficient to excuse the bank from its own negligence. The bank bears the loss. Negotiable Instruments Law, 2004 ( 22 )


[44] Ponce vs. CA GR L-49444, 31 May 1979 First Division, Melencio-Herrera (J) Facts: On 3 June 1969, Jesus Afable, together with Feliza Mendoza and Ma. Aurora Dino executed a promissory note in favor of Nelia Ponce in the sum of P814,868.42 payable without interest on or before 31 July 1969, subject to an interest of 12% per annum if not paid at maturity, and an additional sum equivalent to 10% of total amount due as attorney’s fees in case it is necessary to bring suit, and the execution of a first mortgage on their properties or the Carmen Planas Memorial Inc. in the event of failure to pay the indebtedness in accordance with the terms. Upon failure of the debtors to pay, a complaint was filed against them for the recovery of the principal sum, plus interest and damages. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Ponce. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. On the second motion for reconsideration, however, the appellate court reversed the judgment and opined that the intent of the parties was that the note was payable in US dollars which is illegal, with neither party entitled to recover under the “in pari delicto” rule. Issue: Whether an agreement to pay in dollars defeat a creditor’s claim for payment. Held: If there is an agreement to pay an obligation in a currency other than Philippine legal tender, the same is illegal / null and void as contrary to public policy, pursuant to RA 529, and the most that can be demanded is to pay the said obligation in Philippine currency. It cannot defeat a creditor’s claim for payment, for such will allow a person to enrich himself inequitably at another’s expense. What RA 529 prohibits is the payment of an obligation in dollars. A creditor cannot oblige the debtor to pay in dollars, even if the loan was given in said currency. In such case, the indemnity is expressed in Philippine currency on the basis of the current rate of exchange at the time of payment. [45] Prudencio vs. CA GR L-34539, 14 July 1986 Second Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J) Facts: Eulalio and Elisa Prudencio are the registered owners of a parcel of land located in Sampaloc, Manila. The property was mortgaged to PNB to guarantee a loan of P1,000 extended to one Domingo Prudencio. Sometime in 1955, Concepcion & Tamayo Construction Co., through Jose Toribio (Prudencio’s relative), persuaded the Prudencios to mortgage their property to secure the loan of P10,000 which the company was negotiating with the PNB. The Prudencios signed the “Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage.” The promissory note covering the P10,000 loan was signed by Toribio. The Prudencios also signed the portion of the note indicating that they are requesting the PNB to issue the check covering the loan to the Company. Jose Toribio executed the “Deed of Assignment” assigning all payments made by the Bureau to the company on account of the Puerto Princesa building project in favor of PNB. The Bureau, however, conditioned that the payment should be for labor and materials. The Prudencios wrote PNB that since PNB authorized payments to the Company where there were changes in the conditions of the contract without their knowledge, they seek to cancel the mortgage contract. Failing to cancel the mortgage, they filed suit to cancel the same. Issue: Whether the Prudencios were solidary co-debtors or sureties as a result of being accommodation makers.



Held: In lending his name to the accommodated party, the accommodation party is in effect a surety. However, unlike in a contract of suretyship, the liability of the accommodation party remains not only primary but also unconditional to a holder for value such that even if the accommodated party receives an extension of the period of payment without the consent of the accommodation party, the latter is still liable for the whole obligation and such extension does not release him because as far as the holder for value is concerned, he is a solidary co-debtor. Consequently, the Prudencios cannot claim to have been released from their obligation simply because the time of payment of such obligation was temporarily deferred by PNB without their knowledge and consent. To be freed of obligation, it is thus necessary to determine if PNB, the payee of the promissory note, is a holder in due course. Herein, PNB was an immediate party or in privy to the note, besides that it dealt directly with the Prudencios knowing fully well that they are accommodation makers. The general rule that a payee may be considered a holder in due course does not apply to PNB. [46] Que vs. People GR 75217-18, 21 September 1987 Resolution of the Second Division, Paras (J) Facts: The Regional Trial Court convicted Victor Que of the crime of violation of BP 22. Said judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. In its motion for consideration, Que alleged that the RTC Quezon City does not have jurisdiction as the element of the place of the issuance of the check was absent. Issue [1]: Whether the place of issuance or the place or the place of deposit determines jurisdiction / venue of BP 22 cases. Held [1]: The findings of the trial court reveal that the checks were issued in Quezon City (as admitted by Que himself in his answer). It is of no moment whether the checks were deposited by the complainant in a bank outside of Quezon City. The determinative factor is the place of issuance. Issue [2]: Whether BP 22 applies to dishonored checks issued as guarantee. Held [2]: BP 22 applies even in cases where dishonored checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or guarantee. The enactment does not make any distinction as to whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee the said obligation. The history of the enactment evinces the definite legislative intent to make the prohibition all-embracing without making any exception from the operation thereof in favor of a guarantee. [47] Republic Bank vs. CA GR 42725, 22 April 1991 First Division, Grino Aquino (J) Facts: San Miguel Corporation issued a dividend check for P240 in favor of J. Roberto Delgado, a stockholder. Delgado altered the amount of the check to P9,240. The check was indorsed and deposited by Delgado with Republic Bank. Republic Bank endorsed the check to First National City Bank (FNCB), the drawee bank, by stamping on the back of the check “all prior and / or lack of indorsements guaranteed. Relying on the endorsement, FNCB paid the amount to Republic Bank. Later on, San Miguel informed FNCB of the material alteration of the amount. FNCB recredited the amount to San Miguel’s account, and demanded refund from Republic Bank. Republic Bank refused. Hence, the present action. Negotiable Instruments Law, 2004 ( 24 )


Issue: Who shall bear the loss resulting from the altered check. Held: When an indorsement is forged, the collecting bank or last indorser, as a general rule, bears the loss. But the unqualified indorsement of the collecting bank on the check should be read together with the 24-hour regulation on clearing house operation. Thus, when the drawee bank fails to return a forged or altered check to the collecting bank within the 24-hour clearing period (as provided by Section 4c of Central Bank Circular 9, as amended), the collecting bank is absolved from liability. The drawee bank, FNCB, should bear the loss for the payment of the altered check for its failure to detect and warn Republic Bank of the fraudulent character of the check within the 24-hour clearing house rule. [48] Republic Bank vs. Ebrada GR L-40796, 31 July 1975 First Division, Martin (J) Facts: Mauricia Ebrada encashed a back pay check for P1246.08 at Republic Bank (Escolta Branch). The Bureau of Treasury, which issued the check advised the bank that the alleged indorsement of the check by one “Martin Lorenzo” was a forgery as the latter has been dead since 14 July 1952; and requested that it be refunded he sum deducted from its account. The bank refunded the amount to the Bureau and demanded upon Ebrada the sum in question, who refused. Hence, the present action. Issue: Whether the bank can recover from the last indorser. Held: According to Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, where the signature on a negotiable instrument is forged, the negotiation of the check is without force or effect. However, following the ruling in Beam vs. Farrel (US case), where a check has several indorsements on it, only the negotiation based on the forged or unauthorized signature which is inoperative. The last indorser, Ebrada, was duty-bound to ascertain whether the check was genuine before presenting it to the bank for payment. Her failure to do so makes her liable for the loss and the Bank may recover from her the money she received for the check. Had she performed her duty, the forgery would have been detected and fraud defeated. Even if she turned over the amount to Dominguez immediately after receiving the cash proceeds of the check, she is liable as an accommodation party under Section 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. [49] Republic Planters Bank vs. CA GR 93073, 21 December 1992 Second Division, Campos Jr. (J) Facts: Republic Planters Bank issued 9 promissory notes signed by Shozo Yamaguchi (President) and Fermin Canlas (Treasurer) of Worldwide Garment Manufacturing Inc. Yamaguchi and Canlas were authorized by the corporation to apply for credit facilities with the bank in form of export advances and letters of credit or trust receipts accommodations. Three years after, the bank filed an action to recover the sums of money covered by the promissory notes. Worldwide Garment Manufacturing changed its name to Pinch Manufacturing Corp. Canlas alleged he was not liable personally for the corporate acts that he performed, and that the notes were still blank when he signed them. Issue: Whether the corporate treasurer is liable for the amounts in the promissory notes.



Held: Canlas is a co-maker of the promissory notes, under the law, and cannot escape liability arising therefrom. Inasmuch as the instrument contained the words “I promise to pay” and is signed by two or more persons, said persons are deemed to be jointly and severally liable thereon. As the promissory notes are stereotype ones issued by the bank in printed form with blank spaces filled up as per agreed terms of the loan, following customary procedures, leaving the debtors to do nothing but read the terms and conditions therein and to sign as makers or co-makers. Section 14 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, therefore, does not apply. Canlas is solidarily liable with the corporation for the amount of the 9 promissory notes. [50] San Carlos Milling vs. BPI GR 37467, 11 December 1933 Second Division, Hull (J) Facts: Joseph Wilson, the principal employee of San Carlos Milling Co. Ltd. in the Manila Office, conspired with one Alfredo Dolores, a messenger-clerk in the same office, in sending a cablegram in code to the company in Honolulu requesting a telegraphic transfer of $100,000 to China Bank of Manila. Upon receipt of the money, China Bank sent an exchange contract to San Carlos Milling offering the sum of P201,000, which was then the current rate of exchange. On this contract was forged the name of Newland Baldwin. A manager’s check on China Bank payable to San Carlos Milling or order was receipt for by Dolores. The check was deposited with BPI indorsed by a spurious signature of Baldwin. After clearing, BPI received a letter, purportedly signed by Baldwin, directing the shipment and delivery of P201,000. Dolores witnessed the packing of the money and returned with the check for P201,000 purportedly signed by Baldwin. Dolores turned the money over to Wilson and received as his share P10,000. When the crime was discovered, BPI refused to credit San Carlos Milling’s account with the amount withdrawn by the forged checks. Issue: Who shall be liable for the value of the forged check. Held: A bank that cashes a check must know to whom it pays. It is an elementary principle both in banking and of the Negotiable Instruments Law that a bank is bound to know the signatures of its customers; and if it pays a forged check, it must be considered as making the payment out of its own funds, and cannot ordinarily charge the amount so paid to the account of the depositor whose name was forged. As the proximate cause of loss was due to the negligence of BPI in honoring and cashing the forged checks, it is liable for the amount of P201,000 with legal interest thereon from 23 December 1928, until payment. [51] Sesbreno vs. CA GR 89252, 24 May 1993 Third Division, Feliciano (J) Facts: On 9 February 1981, Raul Sesbreno made a money market placement in the amount of P300,000 with the Philippine Underwriters Finance Corporation (PhilFinance), with a term of 32 days. PhilFinance issued to Sesbreno the Certificate of Confirmation of Sale of a Delta Motor Corporation Promissory Note (2731), the Certificate of Securities Delivery Receipt indicating the sale of the note with notation that said security was in the custody of Pilipinas Bank, and postdated checks drawn against the Insular Bank of Asia and America for P304,533.33 payable on 13 March 1981. The checks were dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. Pilipinas Bank never released the note, nor any instrument related thereto, to Sesbreno; but Sesbreno learned that the security was issued 10 April 1980, maturing on 6 April 1981, has a face value of P2,300,833.33 with PhilFinance as payee and Delta Motors as maker; and was stamped “non-negotiable” on its face. As Sesbreno was unable to collect his investment and interest thereon, he filed an action for damages Negotiable Instruments Law, 2004 ( 26 )


against Delta Motors and Pilipinas Bank. Issue: Whether non-negotiability of a promissory note prevents its assignment. Held: Only an instrument qualifying as a negotiable instrument under the relevant statute may be negotiated either by indorsement thereof coupled with delivery, or by delivery alone if it is in bearer form. A negotiable instrument, instead of being negotiated, may also be assigned or transferred. The legal consequences of negotiation and assignment of the instrument are different. A negotiable instrument may not be negotiated but may be assigned or transferred, absent an express prohibition against assignment or transfer written in the face of the instrument. herein, there was no prohibition stipulated. [52] State Investment House vs. CA GR 101163, 11 January 1993 First Division, Bellosillo (J) Facts: Nora B. Moulic issued to Corazon Victoriano checks, as security for pieces of jewelry sold on commission. Victoriano negotiated the checks to the State Investment House Inc. (SIHI). Moulic failed to sell the pieces of jewelry, so he returned them to the payee before the maturity of the checks. The checks, however, could not be retrieved as they had already been negotiated. Before the check’s maturity dates, Moulic withdrew her funds from the drawee bank. Upon presentment of the checks for payment, they were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. SIHI sued to recover the value of the checks. Issue: Whether the personal defense of failure or absence of consideration is available, or conversely, whether SIHI is a holder in due course. Held: On their faces, the post-dated checks were complete and regular; SIHI bought the checks from the payee (Victoriano) before their due dates; SIHI took the checks in good faith and for value, albeit at a discounted price; and SIHI was never informed not made aware that the checks were merely issued to payee as security and not for value. Complying with the requisites of Section 52 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, SIHI is a holder in due course. As such, it holds the instruments free from any defect of title of prior parties, and from defenses available to prior parties among themselves. SIHI may enforce full payment of the checks. The defense of failure or absence of consideration is not available as SIHI was not privy to the purpose for which the checks were issued. That the post-dated checks were merely issued as security is not a ground for the discharge of the instrument as against a holder in due course. It is not one of the grounds outlined in Section 119 of the Negotiable Instrument Law, for the instrument to be discharged. It must be noted that the drawing and negotiation of a check have certain effects aside from the transfer of title or the incurring of liability in regard to the instrument by the transferor. The holder who takes the negotiated paper makes a contract with the parties on the face of the instrument. There is an implied representation that funds or credit are available for the payment of the instrument in the bank upon which it is drawn. Consequently, the withdrawal of the money from the drawee bank to avoid liability on the checks cannot prejudice the rights of holders in due course. The drawer, Moulic, is liable to the holder in due course, SIHI. [53]



State Investment House vs. IAC GR 72764, 13 July 1989 Third Division, Fernan (J) Facts: New Sikatuna Wood Industries Inc. (NSWI) requested for a loan from Harris Chua, who issued 3 crossed checks. Subsequently, NSWI entered in an agreement with the State Investment House Inc. (SIHI), under a deed of sale, where the former assigned and discounted 11 postdated checks including the 3 issued by Chua. When the 3 checks were allegedly deposited by SIHI, the checks were dishonored by reason of “insufficient funds,” “stop payment” and “account closed.” SIHI made demands upon Chua to make good said checks, Chua failed to do so. Issue: Whether SIHI is a holder in due course so as to recover the amounts in the checks from Chua, the drawer. Held: The Negotiable Instruments Law does not mention “crossed checks” but the Court has recognized the practice that crossing the check (by two parallel lines in the upper left portion of the check) means that the check may only be deposited in the bank and that the check may be negotiated only once (to one who has an account with a bank). The act of crossing a check serves as a warning to the holder that the check has been issued for a definite purpose so that he must inquire if he has received the check pursuant to that purpose, otherwise he is not a holder in due course. Herein, SIHI rediscounted the check knowing that it was a crossed check. His failure to inquire from the holder (NSWI) the purpose for which the checks were crossed prevents him from being considered in good faith, and thus, as a holder in due course. SIHI, therefor is subject to personal defenses, such as the lack of consideration between the NSWI and Chua, i.e. resulting from the nonconsummation of the loan. [54] Stelco Marketing vs. CA GR 96160, 17 June 1992 Second Division, Narvasa (J) Facts: Stelco Marketing Corporation sold steel bars and GI wires to RYL Construction Inc. worth P126,859.61. RYL gave Stelco’s “sister corporation,” Armstrong Industries, a MetroBank check from Steelweld Corporation (The check was issued apparently by Steelweld’s President Peter Rafael Limson to Romeo Lim, President of RYL and Limson’ friend, by way of accommodation, as a guaranty and not in payment of an obligation). When Armstrong deposited the check at its bank, it was dishonored because it was drawn against insufficient funds. When so deposited, the check bore 2 indorsements, i.e. RYL and Armstrong. A criminal case was instituted against Limson, etc. for violation of BP 22, Subsequently, Stelco filed a civil case against RYL and Steelweld to recover the value of the steel products. Issue: Whether Stelco was a holder in due course of the check issued by Steelweld. Held: The records do not show any intervention or participation by Stelco in any manner or form whatsoever in the transaction involving the check, or any communication of any sort between Steelweld and Stelco, or between either of them and Armstrong Industries, at any time before the dishonor of the check. The record does show that after the check was deposited and dishonored, Stelco came into possession of it in some way. Stelco cannot thus be deemed a holder of the check for value as it does not meet two essential requisites prescribed by the statute, i.e. that it did not become “the holder of it before it was overdue, and without notice that it had been previously dishonored,” and that it did not take the check “in good faith and for value.” [55] Negotiable Instruments Law, 2004 ( 28 )


Tan vs. CA GR 108555, 20 December 1994 First Division, Kapunan (J) Facts: Ramon Tan, a businessman from Puerto Princesa, secured a Cashier’s Check from Philippine Commercial Industrial Bank (PCIBank) to P30,000 payable to his order to avoid carrying cash while enroute to Manila. He deposited the check in his account in Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) in its Binondo Branch. RCBC sent the check for clearing to the Central Bank which was returned for having been “missent” or “misrouted.” RCBC debited Tan’s account without informing him. Relying on common knowledge that a cashier’s check was as good as cash, and a month after depositing the check, he issued two personal checks in the name of Go Lak and MS Development Trading Corporation. Both checks bounced due to “insufficiency of funds.” Tan filed a suit for damages against RCBC. Issue: Whether a cashier’s check is as good as cash, so as to have funded the two checks subsequently drawn. Held: An ordinary check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of money. There is an element of certainty or assurance that it will be paid upon presentation; that is why it is perceived as a convenient substitute for currency in commercial and financial transactions. Herein, what is involved is more than an ordinary check, but a cashier’s check. A cashier’s check is a primary obligation of the issuing bank and accepted in advance by its mere issuance. By its very nature, a cashier’s check is a bank’s order to pay what is drawn upon itself, committing in effect its total resources, integrity and honor beyond the check. Herein, PCIB by issuing the check created an unconditional credit in favor any collecting bank. Reliance on the layman’s perception that a cashier’s check is as good as cash is not entirely misplaced, as it is rooted in practice, tradition and principle. [56] Tibajia vs. CA GR 100290, 4 June 1993 Second Division, Padilla (J) Facts: A suit for collection of sum of money was ruled in favor of Eden Tan and against the spouses Norberto Jr. and Carmen Tibajia. After the decision was made final, Tan filed a motion for execution and levied upon the garnished funds which were deposited by the spouses with the cashier of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. The spouses, however, delivered to the deputy sheriff the total money judgment in the form of Cashier’s Check (P262,750) and Cash (P135,733.70). Tan refused the payment and insisted upon the garnished funds to satisfy the judgment obligation. The spouses filed a motion to lift the writ of execution on the ground that the judgment debt had already been paid. The motion was denied. Issue: Whether the spouses have satisfied the judgment obligation after the delivery of the cashier’s check and cash to the deputy sheriff. Held: A check, whether a manager’s check or ordinary check, is not legal tender, and an offer of a check in payment of a debt is not a valid tender of payment and may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor (Philippine Airlines vs. Court of Appeals; Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos vs. Intermediate Appellate Court). The court is not, by decision, sanctioning the use of a check for the payment of obligations over the objection of the creditor (Fortunado vs. Court of Appeals). [57]



Travel On vs. CA GR 56169, 26 June 1992 Third Division, Feliciano (J) Facts: Travel-On Inc. is a travel agency selling airline tickets on commission basis for and in behalf of different airline companies. Arturo S. Miranda had a revolving credit line with Travel-On. He procured tickets on behalf of airline passengers and derived commissions therefrom. Miranda apparently owed Travel-On the amount of P278,201.57 (the value of airline tickets sold to the former), to which Miranda paid various amounts in cash and in kind. He thereafter issued 6 post-dated checks amounting to P115,000 which were all dishonored by the drawee bank. Travel-On filed suit to recover the value of the checks. Miranda countered that he instead overpaid his obligations, and that he merely issued the checks for purposes of accommodation as he allegedly had in the past accorded Travel-On. Issue: Whether Miranda is indebted to Travel-On, or whether he is an accommodation party. Held: A check which is regular on its face is deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration and every person whose signature appears thereon is deemed to have become a party thereto for value. Thus, the mere introduction of the instrument sued on, in evidence prima facie, entitles the plaintiff to recovery. Such presumption subsists unless otherwise contradicted by other competent evidence. The checks, being presented for payment, were thus intended for encashment. There is nothing in the checks (nor in other documents) that stated otherwise. Travel-On was a payee, not an accommodated party for the checks, as it realized no value on the checks which bounced. Travel-On, thus, is entitled to the benefit of the presumption that it is a holder in due course. [58] Uy vs. CA GR 119000, 28 June 1997 First Division, Bellosillo (J) Facts: Rosa Uy and Consolacion Leong, who are friends, formed a partnership; with Consolacion contributing additional capital for the expansion of Rosa’s lumber business. The friendship between the two soured when the partnership documents were never processed. Consolacion asked for the return of her investments. Rosa issued check which were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Uy was charged for estafa and violation of BP 22. Issue: Whether knowledge of insufficiency of funds is transitory or simultaneous with the issuance of the instrument. Held: Even if it is true that BP 22 is a transitory or continuing offense and as such a person indicted with a transitory offense may be validly tried in any jurisdiction where the offense was in part committed, knowledge by the maker or drawer of the fact that he has no sufficient funds to cover the check or of having sufficient funds is simultaneous to the issuance of the instrument. None of the essential ingredients of BP 22 was committed in the City of Manila; i.e. Consolacion was a resident of Makati while Uy was a resident of Caloocan City; the place of business of the alleged partnership is in Malabon; the drawee bank was located in Malabon; and the checks were all deposited for collection in Makati. [59] Vaca vs. CA GR 43596, 31 October 1936 Negotiable Instruments Law, 2004 ( 30 )


En Banc, Recto (J) Facts: Eduardo Vaca is the president and owner of Ervine International while Fernando Nieto, Vaca’s son-inlaw, is the firm’s purchasing manager. They issued a check for P10,000 to the General Agency for Reconnaissance, Detection and Security (GARDS) and drawn against China Bank. When deposited with PCIBank, the check was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. GARDS sent a demand letter but the drawers failed to pay within the time given (7 days from notice). A few days later, however, Vaca issued a check to GARDS for P19,866.16, drawn against Associated Bank, replacing the dishonored check. GARDS did not return the dishonored check. Later on, GARDS Acting Operations Manager filed a criminal suit against Vaca and Nieto for violation of BP 22. The trial court sentenced each to 1 year imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000 and costs. Issue [1]: Whether the drawers had knowledge of insufficient funds in issuing the check. Held [1]: Section 2 of BP 22 provides a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds if the drawer fails to maintain sufficient funds within 90 days after the date of the check, or to make arrangement for payment in full by the drawee of such check within 5 days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee. Herein, the second check supposedly replacing the dishonored check is actually the payment of two separate bills, and was issued 15 days after notice. Such “replacement” cannot negate the presumption that the drawers knew of the insufficiency of funds. Issue [2]: Whether the absence of damages incurred by the payee absolves the drawers from liability. Held [2]: The claim -- that the case was simply a result of a misunderstanding between GARDS and the drawers and that the security agency did not suffer any damage from the dishonor of the check -- is flimsy. Even if the payee suffered no damage as a result of the issuance of the bouncing check, the damage to the integrity of the banking system cannot be denied. Damage to the payee is not an element of the crime punished in BP 22. Note: In this case, the Court recognized the contribution of Filipino entrepreneurs to the national economy; and that to serve the ends of criminal justice, instead of the 1 year imprisonment, a fine of double the amount of the check involved was imposed as penalty. This was made to redeem valuable human material and prevent unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order. [60] Vda. de Eduque vs. Ocampo GR L-222, 26 April 1950 Second Division, Moran (CJ) Facts: On 16 February 1935, Dr. Jose Eduque secured two loans from Mariano Ocampo de Leon, Dona Escolastica delos Reyes and Don Jose M. Ocampo, with amount s of P40,000 and P15,000, both payable within 20 years with interest of 5% per annum. Payment of the loans was guaranteed by mortgage on real property. On 6 December 1943, Salvacion F. Vda de Eduque, as administratrix of the estate of Dr. Jose Eduque, tendered payment by means of a cashier’s check representing Japanese War notes to Jose M. Ocampo, who refused payment. By reason of such refusal, an action was brought and the cashier’s check was deposited in court. After trial, judgment was rendered against Ocampo compelling him to accept the amount, to pay the expenses of consignation, etc. Ocampo accepted the judgment as to the second loan but appealed as to the first loan.



Issue: Whether there is a tender of payment by means of a cashier’s check representing war notes. Held: Japanese military notes were legal tender during the Japanese occupation; and Ocampo impliedly accepted the consignation of the cashier’s check when he asked the court that he be paid the amount of the second loan (P15,000). It is a rule that a cashier’s check may constitute a sufficient tender where no objection is made on this ground.


Digests Nego (2004)

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