Rule 7 Formoso vs PNB (June 1, 2011) Facts:
The petition for certiorari filed with the CA stated the following names as petitioners: Nellie Panelo Vda. De Formoso, Ma. Theresa Formoso-Pescador, Roger Formoso, Mary Jane Formoso, Bernard Formoso, Benjamin Formoso, and Primitivo Malcaba. Admittedly, among the seven (7) petitioners mentioned, only Malcaba signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in the subject petition. There was n o proof that Malcaba was authorized by his co-petitioners to sign for them. There T here was no special power of attorney attorne y shown by the Formosos authorizing Malcaba as their attorney-in-fact in filing a petition for review review on certiorari. Neither could the petitioners give at least a reasonable ex planation as to why onl only y he signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping. In Athena Computers, Inc. and Joselito R. Jimenez v. Wesnu A. Reyes, the Court explained that: The verification of the petition and certification on non-forum shopping before the Court of Appeals were signed only by Jimenez. There is no showing that he was authorized to sign the same by Athena, his co-petitioner. Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules states that a pleading is verified by b y an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that tha t the allegations therein are true and correct of his h is knowledge and belief. Consequently, the verification should have been signed not only by Jimenez but also by Athena’s duly authorized representative. In Docena v. Lapesura, we ruled that the certificate of non-forum shopping should be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that the signing by only one of them is insufficient. The attestation on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party executing the same, and the lone signing petitioner cannot be presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by b y his co-petitioners of any action or claim the same as similar to the current petition. The certification against forum shopping in CA-G.R. SP No. 72284 is fatally defective, not having been duly signed by both petitioners and thus warrants the dismissal of the petition for certiorari. We have consistently held that the certification against forum shopping must be signed by the principal parties. With respect to a corporation, the certification against forum shopping may be signed for and on its behalf, by a specifically authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed in such document. While the Rules of Court may be relaxed for persuasive and weighty reasons to relieve a litigant from an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedures, nevertheless they must be faithfully followed. In the instant case, p etitioners have not shown any
reason which justifies relaxation of the Rules. We have held that procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have prejudiced a party’s substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed. Not one of these persuasive reasons is present here. In fine, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari in view of the procedural lapses committed by petitioners.[11] [Emphases supplied] Furthermore, the petitioners argue that the CA should not have dismissed the whole petition but should have given it due course insofar as Malcaba is concerned because he signed the certification.
Issue: WON the CA should have been liberal in the application of the Rules with respect to the petitioners because they have a meritorious case against PNB? Ruling : The Court, however, is not persuaded.
The petitioners were given a chance by the CA to comply with the Rules when they filed their motion for reconsideration, but they refused to do so. Despite the opportunity given to them to make all of them sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, they still failed to comply. Thus, the CA was constrained to deny their motion and affirm the earlier resolution.[12] Indeed, liberality and leniency were accorded in some cases.[13] In these cases, however, those who did not sign were relatives of the lone signatory, so unlike in this case, where Malcaba is not a relative who is similarly situated with the other petitioners and who cannot speak for them. In the case of Heirs of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. v. Plaridel Mingoa, Sr.,[14] it was written: In the instant case, petitioners share a common interest and defense inasmuch as they collectively claim a right not to be dispossessed of the subject lot by virtue of their and their deceased parents’ construction of a family home and occupation thereof for more than 10 years. The commonality of their stance to defend their alleged right over the controverted lot thus gave petitioners xxx authority to inform the Court of Appeals in behalf of the other petitioners that they have not commenced any action or claim involving the same issues in another court or tribunal, and that there is no other pending action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same issues. Here, all the petitioners are immediate relativeswho share a common interest in the land sought to be reconveyed and a common cause of action raising the same arguments in support thereof. There was sufficient basis, therefore, for Domingo Hernandez, Jr. to speak for and in behalf of his co-petitioners when he certified that they had not filed any action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same issues. Thus, the Verification/Certification that Hernandez, Jr. executed constitutes substantial compliance under the Rules. [Emphasis supplied]
The same leniency was accorded to the petitioner in the case of Oldarico S. Traveno v. Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative,[15] where it was stated: The same leniency was applied by the Court in Cavile v. Heirs of Cavile, because the lone petitioner who executed the certification of non-forum shopping was a relative and co-owner of the other petitioners with whom he shares a common interest. x x x[16] Considering the above circumstances, the Court does not see any similarity at all in the case at bench to compel itself to relax the requirement of strict compliance with the rule regarding the certification against forum shopping. x x x."
Metrobank v Abad Santos
Facts: Respondent, De Koning, obtained a loan from Metrobank (MB) worth P 2,019,000.00 evidenced by a Promissory Note. It was secured by a Real Estate Mortage over a condominium unit in Makati. Respondent failed to pay the loan so MB extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. MB was the highest bidder at the public auction of the condominium. The redemption period lapsed so MB demanded that respondent turn over the possession of the land. When respondent refused, When De Koning refused, MB filed with the RTC Makati, Branch 65, an ex parte petition for a writ of possession over the foreclosed property, pursuant to Act No. 3135, as amended. During the scheduled ex parte hearing, De Koning’s counsel appeared and manifested that he filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Metrobank’s petition violated Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court which requires the attachment of a certification against forum shopping to a complaint or other initiatory pleading. The RTC dismissed MB’s petition and subsequently denied its motion for reconsideration.
The CA affirmed the dismissal. It ruled that Sec. 5 of Rule 7 covers any initiatory pleading that asserts a claim for relief. Since the writ of possession is an initiatory pleading, the same must be covered by the rule.
Issue:
WON the writ of possession is an initiatory pleading and covered by the rule Held: In order to obtain a writ of possession, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale must file a petition, in the form of an ex par te motion, in the registration or cadastral proceedings of the registered property.
The reason why this pleading, although denominated as a petition, is actually considered a motion: 1) The certification against forum shopping is required only in a complaint or other in iti atory pleading . The ex par te petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by the respondent is not an initiatory pleading. 2) A motion is not an independent right or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the progress of a cause. It relates to some question that is collateral to the main object of the action and is connected with and dependent upon the principal remedy. An application for a writ of possession is a mere incident in the registration proceeding .
The petition for writ of possession under Act No. 3135, as amended, is neither a complaint nor an initiatory pleading. Therefore, a certification against forum shopping is not required. The proceedings are ex parte in nature. The CA decision was set aside. The right to possess a property merely follows the right of ownership. Thus, after the consolidation of title in the buyer’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right and its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial function.
COSCO PHILIPPINES SHIPPING, INC., vs. KEMPER INSURANCE COMPANY
Facts: Respondent Kemper Insurance Company is a foreign insurance company based in Illinois, USA with no license to engage in business in the Philippines, as it is not doing business in the Philippines, except in isolated transactions; while petitioner is a domestic shipping company organized in accordance with Philippine laws.
Respondent insured the shipment of imported frozen boneless beef (owned by Genosi, Inc.), loaded at a port in Brisbane, Australia, for shipment to Genosi, Inc. (the importer-consignee) in the Philippines. Upon arrival at the Manila, a portion of the shipment was rejected by Genosi, Inc. Because of spoilage from alleged temperature fluctuations of petitioner's reefer containers.
Genosi, Inc. filed a claim against both petitioner and respondent. The claim was referred to McLarens Chartered for investigation, evaluation, and adjustment of the claim. After processing the claim documents, the latter recommended a settlement of the claim in the amount of $64,492.58, which Genosi, Inc. (the consignee-insured) accepted.
Respondent paid the claim of Genosi, Inc. (the insured) in the amount of $64,492.58. Respondent then made demands upon petitioner, but the latter failed and refused to pay the said amount.
Respondent then filed a Complaint for Insurance Loss and Damages against petitioner before the trial court.
In its Answer, petitioner insisted that respondent had no capacity to sue since it was doing business in the Philippines without the required license; that the complaint has prescribed and/or is barred by laches ; that no timely claim was filed; that the loss or damage sustained by the shipments, if any, was due to causes beyond the carrier's control.
During the pre-trial proceedings, respondent's counsel proffered and marked its exhibits, while petitioner's counsel manifested that he would mark his client's exhibits on the next scheduled pre-trial. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that Atty. Lat's act of signing the certification against forum shopping was a clear violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
RTC DECISION
The RTC granted petitioner's Motion to Dismiss and dismissed the case without prejudice, ruling that it is mandatory that the certification must be executed by the petitioner himself, and not by counsel. Respondent's counsel did not have a SPA to act on its behalf, hence, the certification against forum shopping executed by said counsel was fatally defective.
Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court.
CA DECISION
The CA reversed and set aside the trial court's order. It ruled that the required certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory and that the same must be signed by the plaintiff or principal party concerned and not by counsel; and in case of corporations, the physical act of signing may be performed in behalf of the corporate entity by specifically authorized individuals. However, the factual circumstances of the case warranted the liberal application of the rules and, as such, ordered the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was later denied by the CA.
Hence, petitioner elevated the case to this Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES
Whether Atty. Lat was properly authorized by respondent to sign the certification against forum shopping on its behalf
SC DECISION
The certification against forum shopping must be signed by the principal parties. If, for any reason, the principal party cannot sign the petition, the one signing on his behalf must have been duly authorized.
With respect to a corporation, the certification against forum shopping may be signed for and on its behalf, by a specifically authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed in such document.
In turn, a corporation exercises said powers through its board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents. In turn, the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a specific act of the board of directors.
In the present case, since respondent is a corporation, the certification must be executed by an officer or member of the board of directors or by one who is duly authorized by a resolution of the board of directors; otherwise, the complaint will h ave to be dismissed. The lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by mere amendment of the complaint, but shall be a cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice. The same rule applies to certifications against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to file the complaint on behalf of the corporation.
There is no proof that respondent, a private corporation, authorized Atty. Lat, through a board resolution, to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping on its behalf. Accordingly, the certification against forum shopping appended to the complaint is fatally defective, and warrants the dismissal of respondent's complaint for Insurance Loss and Damages against petitioner.
Contrary to the CA's finding, the Court finds that the circumstances of this case do not necessitate the relaxation of the rules. There was no proof of authority submitted, even belatedly, to show subsequent compliance with the requirement of the law.
Neither was
there a copy of the board resolution or secretary's certificate subsequently submitted to the trial court that would attest to the fact that Atty. Lat was indeed authorized to file said complaint and sign the verification and certification against forum shopping, nor did respondent satisfactorily explain why it failed to comply with the rules.
Moreover, the SPA submitted by respondent allegedly authorizing Atty. Lat to appear on behalf of the corporation, in the pre-trial and all stages of the proceedings, signed by Brent Healy, was fatally defective and had no evidentiary value. It failed to establish Healy's authority to act in behalf of respondent, in view of the absence of a resolution from respondent's board of directors or secretary's certificate proving the same. Like any other corporate act, the power of Healy to name, constitute, and appoint Atty. Lat as respondent's attorney-in-fact, with full powers to represent respondent in the proceedings, should have been evidenced by a board resolution or secretary's certificate.
As to laches, respondent's allegation that petitioner is estopped by laches from raising the defect in respondent's certificate of non-forum shopping does not hold water. Since Atty. Lat was not duly authorized by respondent to file the complaint and sign the verification and certification against forum shopping, the complaint is considered not filed and ineffectual, and, as a necessary consequence, is dismissable due to lack of jurisdiction.
Clearly, since no valid complaint was ever filed with the RTC, Branch 8, Manila, the same did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent.
Since the court has no jurisdiction over the complaint and respondent, petitioner is not estopped from challenging the trial court's jurisdiction, even at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. This is so because the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel .
Here, the trial court's jurisdiction was questioned by the petitioner during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, and it cannot be said that considerable length of time had elapsed for laches to attach.
Heirs of Faustino Mesina v. Heirs of Domingo Fian, Jr., G.R. No. 201816 April 8, 2013 FACTS: The late spouses Faustino and Genoveva Mesina (spouses Mesina), during their lifetime, bought from the spouses Domingo Fian Sr. and Maria Fian (spouses Fian) two parcels of land on installment. Upon the death of the spouses Fian, their heirs –– whose names do not appear on the records, claiming ownership of the parcels of land and taking possession of them –– refused to acknowledge the payments for the lots and denied that their late parents sold the property to the spouses Mesina. Meanwhile, the spouses Mesina passed away. Notwithstanding repeated demands, the Heirs of Fian refused to vacate the lots and to turn possession over to the heirs of the spouses Mesina, Thus, Norman, as attorney-in-fact of his siblings Victor, Maria and Lorna, filed an action for quieting of title and damages before the RTC, against the Heirs of Fian, naming only Theresa Fian Yray (Theresa) as the representative of the Heirs of Fian. The case is entitled Heirs of Sps. Faustino S. Mesina & Genoveva S. Mesina, represented by Norman Mesina v. Heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr., represented by Theresa Fian Yray, Thereafter, respondent Theresa filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint, arguing that the complaint states no cause of action and the petitioners are not real-party-in-interest. The RTC and CA affirmed the motion. The CA also held that the RTC correctly dismissed the complaint for being improperly verified. ISSUE: WON the complaint should be dismissed because of improper verification HELD:
Anent the issue on defective verification, Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides as follows: Sec. 4. Verification. – Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit. A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records. Both the RTC and the CA found said verification defective, since the phrase "or based on authentic records," as indicated under the second paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 7 as afore-quoted, was omitted. We do not agree. That the verification of the complaint does not include the phrase "or based on authentic records" does not make the verification defective. Notably, the provision used the disjunctive word "or." The word "or" is a disjunctive article indicating an alternative. As such, "personal knowledge" and "authentic records" need not concur in a verification as they are to be taken separately. Also, verification, like in most cases required by the rules of p rocedure, is a formal requirement, not jurisdictional. It is mainly intended to secure an assurance tha t matters which are alleged are done in good faith or are true and correct and not of mere speculation. Thus, when circumstances so warrant, as in the case at hand, "the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served."
Rule 8 Ledda v BPI
Facts: This case arose from a collection suit filed by respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) against Ledda for the latter’s unpaid credit card obligation.
Ledda defaulted in the payment of her credit card obligation, which BPI claimed in their complaint amounted to P548,143.73. Despite BPI’s repeated demands, Ledda failed to pay her credit card obligation constraining BPI to file an action for collection of sum of money with the Regional Trial Court, Makati City.
The trial court declared Ledda in default for failing to file Answer within the prescribed period, despite receipt of the complaint and summons. Upon Ledda’s motion for reconsideration, the trial court lifted the default order and admitted Ledda’s Answer Ad Cautelam.
While she filed a Pre-Trial Brief, Ledda and her counsel failed to appear during the continuation of the Pre-Trial. Hence, the trial court allowed BPI to present its evidence ex-parte. The RTC, in turn, ruled in favor of BPI.
CA Decision:
The Court of Appeals rejected Ledda’s argument that the document containing the Terms and Conditions governing the use of the BPI credit card is an actionable document contemplated in Section 7, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals held that BPI’s cause of action is based on "Ledda’s availment of the bank’s credit facilities through the use of her credit/plastic cards, coupled with her refusal to pay BPI’s outstanding credit for the cost of the goods, services and cash advances despite lawful demands."
However, the CA modified the amount that Ledda is liable to pay to BPI.
Issue: Whether the document containing the Terms and Conditions is an actionable document
SC Decision:
Section 7, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: SEC. 7. Action or defense based on document. — Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written instrument or document, the substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in the pleading.
Clearly, the above provision applies when the action is based on a written instrument or document.
In this case, the complaint is an action for collection of sum of money arising from Ledda’s default in her credit card obligation with BPI. BPI’s cause of action is primarily based on Ledda’s (1) acceptance of the BPI credit card, (2) usage of the BPI credit card to purchase goods, avail services and secure cash advances, and (3) non-payment of the amount due for such credit card transactions, despite demands.
BPI’s cause of action is not based only on the document containing the Ter ms and Conditions accompanying the issuance of the BPI credit card in favor of Ledda. Therefore, the document containing the Terms and Conditions governing the use of the BPI credit card is not an actionable document contemplated in Section 7, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As such, it is not required by the Rules to be set forth in and attached to the complaint.
At any rate, BPI has sufficiently established a cause of action against Ledda, who admits having received the BPI credit card, subsequently used the credit card, and failed to pay her obligation arising from the use of such credit card.
Hibberd vs. Rohde G.R. No. L-8418, December 09, 1915 Trent, J. Facts:
D.J. McMillian was in the retail liquor business and secured a stock of merchandise valued at P1,200 from Brand & Hibberd. Later Brand & Hibberd filed a complaint of estafa against McMillian. The defendant Rohde was a practicing attorney and undertook McMillian's defense in the estafa case. Rohde testified that he was well acquainted with the nature of the transaction between the firm of Brand & Hibberd and McMillian.
Later on Rohde agreed to sign the following note if Brand & Hibberd would withdraw the estafa complaint:
Baguio, Benget, April 27th, 1911
For value received, we the undersigned parties, jointly and severally agree to pay to the firm of Brand & Hibberd, of the city of Baguio, P.J., tewelve hundred pesos Philipine currenct in monthly installments of one hundred pesos per month, beginning with the first day of June 1911.
W.M.J. Rohde D.J. McMillian
Rohde did this because he did not want his client to remain in confinement pedning his trial in the Courts of First Instance. However the CFI found as a fact that the consideration of the note was the compromise of a public offense. Now because Rohdes have not entered a verified specific denial of the genuiness and due execution of the note, the plaintiff cliams that his special defense of illegality of consideration is cut off.
Issue:
Whether Rohde was barred from questioning the legality of the note due to not having verified specific denial of the genuiness and due execution of the note.
Held:
By the admission of the genuiness and due execution of an instrument is meant that the party whose signature it bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by another for him with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleadings of the party relying upon it; that the documents was deliverd; and that any formal requisites required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waved by him. Hence such defense as that the signature is a forgery or that it was unauthorized as in the case of an agent signing for his principal, or one signing in behalf of a partnership or of a corporation; or that, in that in the case of the latter, that the corporation was not authorized under its charted to sign the instrument; or that the party charged signed the instrument in some other capacity that that alleged in the pleading setting it out; or that it was never delviered are cut off by the admission of its genuiness and due execution.
Undoubtedly when a plaintiff produces in court an instrument corresponding to the one set forth he is exempted from proving its execution.
To so interpret section 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure, according to the plaintiff ―as to prohibit such a defense as illegality of consideration,‖ which is clearly a defense of new mattter, would pro tanto repeal the second paragraph of Sec.94 which permits a defendant to answer by ―A statement of any new matter constituting a de fense or counterclaim.‖
FILIPINAS TEXTILE MILLS, INC. and BERNARDINO VILLANUEVA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC Facts:
Petitioners: Filipinas Textile Mills, Inc. ("Filtex") and Bernardino Villanueva ("Villanueva") jointly Respondent: State Investment House, Inc. ("SIHI") SIHI instituted a Complaint 4 for the collection of the sum of P3,118,949.75, with interest, penalties, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit against herein petitioners Filtex and Villanueva. In its Complaint, SIHI alleged that sometime in 1983, Filtex applied for domestic letters of credit to finance the purchase of various raw materials for its textile business . Finding the application to be in order, SIHI issued on various dates domestic letters of credit authorizing Indo-Philippine Textile Mills, Inc. ("Indo-Phil"), Texfiber Corporation ("Texfiber"), and Philippine Polyamide Industrial Corporation ("Polyamide") "to value" on SIHI such drafts as may be drawn by said corporations against Filtex for an aggregate amount not exceedingP3,737,988.05. Filtex used these domestic letters of credit to cover its purchase of various textile materials from Indo-Phil, Texfiber and Polyamide. Upon the sale and delivery of the merchandise, Indo-Phil, Texfiber and Polyamide issued several sight drafts on various dates with an aggregate value of P3,736,276.71 payable to the order of SIHI, which were duly accepted by Filtex. Subsequently, the sight drafts were negotiated to and acquired in due course by SIHI which paid the value thereof to Indo-Phil, Texfiber and Polyamide for the account of Filtex. Villanueva executed a comprehensive surety agreement whereby he guaranteed, jointly and severally with Filtex, the full and punctual payment at maturity to SIHI of all the indebtedness of Filtex. In order to ensure the payment of the sight drafts aforementioned, Filtex executed and issued to SIHI several trust receipts of various dates , which were later extended with the issuance of replacement trust receipts all dated June 22, 1984, covering the merchandise sold. Under the trust receipts, Filtex agreed to hold the merchandise in trust for SIHI, with liberty to sell the same for SIHI's account but without authority to make any other disposition of the said goods. Because of Filtex's failure to pay its outstanding obligation despite demand, SIHI filed a Complaint praying that the petitioners be ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the principal amount of P3,118,949.75, plus interest and penalties, attorney's fees, exemplary damages, costs of suit and other litigation expenses.
In its Answer with Counterclaim, Filtex interposed special and affirmative defenses, i.e., the provisions of the trust receipts, as well as the comprehensive surety agreement, do not reflect the true will and intention of the parties, full payment of the obligation, and lack of cause of action. For his part, Villanueva interposed the same special and affirmative defenses and added that the comprehensive surety agreement is null and void and damages and attorney's fees are not legally demandable. The petitioners, however, failed to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the actionable documents upon which the Complaint was based. The RTC of Manila rendered judgment11 holding Filtex and Villanueva jointly and severally liable to SIHI. CA Decision: The CA debunked the petitioners' contention that the letters of credit, sight drafts, trust receipts and comprehensive surety agreement are inadmissible in evidence ruling that the petitioners had "in effect, admitted the genuineness and due execution of said documents because of their failure to have their answers placed under oath, the complaint being based on actionable documents in line with Section 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court." Issue: Whether or not the letters of credit, sight drafts, trust receipts and comprehensive suret y agreement are admissible in evidence despite the absence of documentary stamps thereon as required by the Internal Revenue Code SC Decision: We rule in the affirmative. As correctly noted by the respondent, the Answer with Counterclaim and Answer, of Filtex and Villanueva, respectively, did not contain any specific denial under oath of the letters of credit, sight drafts, trust receipts and comprehensive surety agreement upon which SIHI's Complaint was based, thus giving rise to the implied admission of the genuineness and due execution of these documents. Under Sec. 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, when an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts. Moreover, under Section 173 of the Internal Revenue Code the liability for payment of the stamp taxes is imposed on "the person making, signing, issuing, accepting, or transferring" the document. As correctly pointed out by SIHI, Filtex was the issuer and acceptor of the trust receipts and sight drafts, respectively, while the letters of credit were issued upon its application.
On the other hand, Villanueva signed the comprehensive surety agreement. Thus, being among the parties obliged to pay the documentary stamp taxes, the petitioners are estopped from claiming that the documents are inadmissible in evidence for non-payment thereof.
The petitioners also questioned the admissibility of these documents rather belatedly, at the appeal stage even. Their respective answers to SIHI's Complaint were silent on this point. The rule is well-settled that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the trial court need not, and ordinarily will not, be considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal because this would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.
