Demosthenes Piety

DEMOSTHENES ON PHILANTHRŌPIA AS A DEMOCRATIC VIRTUE

matthew r. christ

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of the development of the Greek idea of “gentleness,” Jacqueline de Romilly observes that a triad of associated words and their cognates—φιλανθρωπία, πραότης, and ἐπιείκεια—emerges in the Greek vocabulary in the late �fth century and rises to prominence in fourth-century literary sources, and that these terms appear conspicuously in Athenian characterizations of their city and its citizens. 1 Building on de Romilly’s general observations, this article proposes that Demosthenes played a pivotal role in formulating and promulgating a democratic ideal of philanthr ō pia that draws together numerous preexisting strands of Athenian civic ideology and promotes them under a single appealing and �exible term. 2 A close examination of Demosthenes’ treatment of philanthr ō pia illuminates his transformation of this concept into a democratic virtue, and suggests that he is an innovative political thinker who not only transmits received democratic ideology to his mass audiences in the Assembly and lawcourts, but revises and reshapes it. 3 Whereas recent scholarship has sought to trace the in�uence of Plato’s political thought on late fourth-century orators,4 this article argues that in Demosthenes’ case we can see a democratic orator actively engaged in developing his own political ideas before mass audiences while at the same time exploiting these to advance himself and his agenda. This paper considers �rst how Demosthenes’ predecessors invoked the idea of philanthr ō pia to advance their conservative political perspectives and the signi�cance of his application of it instead to democratic Athens and its citizens. Next, it examines in detail Demosthenes’ presentation of philanthr ō pia as a distinctly Athenian virtue that is associated closely with democratic institutions and a free and tolerant democratic way of life. Finally, it turns to the question of what this may tell us about Demosthenes as a political thinker N HER INTELLECTUAL HISTORY

1. De Romilly 1979, 37–52, 97–112. 2. De Romilly (1979, 37) notes notes Demosthenes’ frequent use of philanthr ō pia (see below, n. 18) and the emphasis he places on Athens’ “douceur” in general (101–3, 107–9; cf. 118–19, 124–25), but does not consider in her broad survey his role in promoting philanthr ō pia as a democratic virtue. When I speak of philanthr ō pia in this article, I am using this as shorthand for both the abstract noun and its cognates. All translations are my own unless otherwise noted. 3. On elite orators and their invocation of democratic ideology before mass audiences, see Ober 1989. 4. Allen (2010, 89–107) argues that Plato’s political thought in �uenced Aeschines, Lycurgus, and Hyperides (among others), and that all three may have been students of the philosopher (192–93 n. 14); she does not �nd evidence of Platonic in �uence on Demosthenes and is rightly skeptical of the tradition that Demosthenes studied with Plato (cf. Cooper 2000).

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DEMOSTHENES ON P HILANTHRŌPIA

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and about the potential for orators not only to invoke but to shape democratic ideology before mass audiences. Democratizing P �� To understand the signi�cance of Demosthenes’ application of philanthr ō pia to the Athenian democracy and its people, it is important �rst to set this in its fourth-century context.5 Before Demosthenes, philanthr ō pia appears most conspicuously in the works of two politically conservative fourth-century authors, Xenophon and Isocrates, whose use of this term re�ects their own preoccupations and biases. For both of these writers, philanthr ō pia is an ideal aristocratic attribute that is manifested primarily in the generosity and humanity of kings, potentates, and generals toward those less powerful than themselves. Consistent with this is their occasional application of philanthr ō pia to the ultimate elites in the Greek world, heroes and gods, in their relations with their mortal inferiors. 6 philanthr thr ō pia most frequently in connection with Xenophon speaks of philan Cyrus the Great in his Cyropaedia, characterizing him at the start of the work as “most generous in spirit” (ψυχὴν δὲ φιλανθρωπότατος, 1.2.1) and emphasizing throughout it Cyrus’ ability to win and keep friends and allies through his unstinting personal generosity.7 Similarly, Xenophon praises the Lacedaemonian king Agesilaus for his well-known philanthr ō pia toward conquered peoples, which makes his enemies more willing to surrender to Ages. 1.22). Elsewhere, Xenophon attributes philanthr ō pia to the gods him ( Ages Mem. 4.3.5, in connection with their provision of food and �re to humans ( Mem. 8 4.3.7; cf. Oec. 15.4, 19.17). Only sparingly does this longtime Athenian exile and Laconophile speak of philanthr ō pia in connection with his native city. His Euryptolemus defends the generals at Arginusae on the grounds that they acted with philanthr ō pia in giving orders that the shipwrecked survivors Hell. 1.7.18). And Xenophon praises Socrates as of the battle be rescued ( Hell. manifestly “a friend of the people and generous” (δημοτικὸς καὶ φιλάνθρωπος ) since he spent his entire life helping others to become better men through his Mem. 1.2.60–61). 9 company and conversation and charged no fee for this ( Mem Far from identifying philanthr ō pia as a typical Athenian trait, Xenophon, like Plato, distinguishes Socrates from his fellow Athenians on the basis of his manifestation of this. 10 5. Philanthr ō pia is securely attested only twice in �fth-century sources, [Aesch.] PV 28 28 (of Prometheus) and Ar. Pax 392–94 392–94 (in an appeal to Hermes): see de Romilly 1979, 45, 47–48. 6. On philanthr ō pia and related virtues as ideal attributes of the powerful in Isocrates and Xenophon, see de Romilly 1979, 127–44; on the philanthr ō pia of the gods in these two writers and elsewhere, see ibid. 44–47. As de Romilly observes, philanthr ō pia can be viewed as a “disposition” (43) or a “virtue” (48; cf. 99, 107); cf. Konstan 2001, 88. 7. See Cyr. 1.4.1, 4.2.10, 8.2.1, 8.4.7–8, 8.7.25; cf. 7.5.73. 8. Xenophon also speaks of philanthr ō pia in connection with animals that are well-disposed toward hu Eq. 2.3; Cyn. 3.9, 6.25) and legislation that he proposes concerning merchants ( Vect. 3). mans ( Eq. 9. Cf. [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 16.8, which applies both of these adjectives to Pisistratus. 10. Plato’s Socrates speaks of his philanthr ō pia in conversing with all men for no charge ( Euthphr. 3d5– 9), and sets himself apart from other men on the basis of his helping of fellow citizens as if they were his kin Ap. 31a7–b5). On the characterization of Socrates in these terms in Xenophon and Plato, see de Romilly 1979, ( Ap. 46–47 and Christ 2012, 64–65.

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Isocrates, like Xenophon, most frequently speaks of philanthr ō pia as an ideal trait of a king or potentate. Thus, for example, he praises Evagoras, king of Cyprian Salamis, for administering his city piously and with philanthr ō pia (θεοφιλῶς καὶ φιλανθρώπως, 9.43) and exhorts Evagoras’ son, Nicocles, to act in the same manner (2.15); and he calls on Philip to imitate his ancestor Heracles’ philanthr ō pia and goodwill (eunoia) toward the Greeks (5.114; cf. 116). 11 At one point, Isocrates suggests that he himself is a promoter of philanthr ō pia in teaching his students an ethical and honorable rhetoric that induces them to embrace noble causes “that bene�t mankind and concern the common good” (φιλανθρώπους καὶ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν πραγμάτων, 15.276). Isocrates speaks just once of philanthr ō pia in connection with Athens’ behavior. In the portion of his Panegyricus (c. 380 B.C.E.) that draws on and imitates the tradition of the Attic funeral orations to praise Athens, he asserts that the city acted generously (φιλανθρώπως ) in sharing Demeter’s Mysteries and gift of grain with all other peoples (29). Although this is noteworthy as an early attribution of philanthr ō pia to Athens, Isocrates is not drawn, as we shall see Demosthenes is, to develop the idea that philanthr ō pia is a characteristic Athenian virtue and one linked with the city’s democratic constitution.12 Indeed, Isocrates’ only other application of philanthr ō pia in an Athenian context is critical of “the many” in Athens on the grounds that they are attracted more to those active in public life “who deceive them with a show of cheerfulness and philanthr ō pia than those who bene�t them with dignity and gravity” (τοὺς μετὰ φαιδρότητος καὶ φιλανθρωπίας φενακίζοντας ἢ τοὺς μετ’ ὄγκου καὶ σεμνότητος ὠφελοῦντας, 15.132–33). Against this backdrop, what we shall see to be Demosthenes’ repeated os and the average citizens attribution of philanthr ō pia to the Athenian d ēm who constitute it appears to be a largely new development. Indeed, it is quite possible in light of this earlier usage that Demosthenes is consciously appropriating as a democratic virtue a positive attribute that conservatives associated with elite individuals. His democratization of philanthr ō pia, in fact, has two facets: he not only applies this to the collective actions of the Athenian d ēm os in its governance of the city and administration of its a ffa irs, but also extends it to the behavior of average citizens in their daily lives.13 There is ample precedent for this sort of democratic appropriation, for example, in the way that the city’s encomiasts attribute ἀρετή (“excellence”), which aristocrats claimed as their exclusive possession, to the city’s democratic

11. For similar exhortations to the powerful to embrace philanthr ō pia, see Isoc. Epistulae 7.6, 7.12 (to Timotheus, ruler of Heracleia); 5.2 (to Alexander); and 4.9 (to Antipater). For the collocation of philanthr ō pia and eunoia, as in Isoc. 5.114, see Dem. 18.5 (cf. 19.99). On the importance of eunoia to Isocrates, see de Romilly 1958; cf. Mitchell 1997. 12. Isocrates does, however, speak repeatedly of the characteristic “mildness” ( πραότης ) of Athenians at home and abroad (10.37; 12.56; 14.17) and laments the occasions when Athenians have strayed from this (7.20; 14.39–40; 15.20, 15.299–300). Although Isocrates does not usually associate this mildness closely with the city’s democratic constitution, at one point (7.67) he contrasts the mild behavior of the restored d ēm os in 403 B.C.E. with the savage behavior of the Thirty. 13. Isocrates (4.29) anticipates Demosthenes in speaking of Athenians’ collective philanthr ō pia, but he does not attribute this to the d ēm os or to the city’s democratic constitution.



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hoplites. 14 If a desire to democratize an aristocratic virtue was one impetus behind Demosthenes’ use of philanthr ō pia , however, I will argue that other considerations came into play as well. Namely, Demosthenes found in philanthr ō pia an attractive and �exible term that could subsume a range of preexisting democratic ideals concerning especially the nature of political and social life within the city, and give new expression to them. Before Demosthenes, the city’s encomiasts extol the characteristic generosity and humanity of the democratic city and its citizens in a variety of ways. In their relations with other states, Athenians nobly run to assist (βοηθέω) those suff ering wrong and exercise their own power with mildness (πραότης). Within their city, Athenians respect their fellow citizens’ freedom to live as they wish and refrain from harsh judgment of, or interference with, this (Thuc. 2.37.2–3), and thus are able—unlike many peoples—to live in concord (ὁμόνοια) without the horrors of civil strife. In their lawcourts, Athenians are naturally inclined to show pity and mildness (πραότης) in judging defendants.15 Demosthenes, as we shall see, is intimately familiar with these democratic ideals and the vocabulary traditionally used to articulate them,16 but also links them to one another in �nding Athenian philanthr ō pia operating across these diverse spheres. Essential to this Demosthenic project is the �exibility of philanthr ō pia, which Demosthenes uses to connote not only “humanity,” “generosity,” and “kindness,” but also the “civility,” “sociability,” and “tolerance” that hold the city together. 17 P ��

as a D emocratic P olitical and S ocial V irtue

As we turn to philanthr ō pia in Demosthenes, the �rst thing that is striking is the relative frequency with which he uses this word and its cognates. 18 His seventy-one attested uses of these represent more than double the total instances of them in Xenophon and Isocrates, and indeed exceed all occurrences 14. On the salience of ἀρετή in the state funeral orations for the war dead, see Ziolkowski 1981, 110–32 and Loraux 1986. I agree with Ober (1989, 289–92, 339; contra Loraux 1986, 217, 334) that the democracy appropriates aristocratic virtues and ideals for its own purposes: “the aristocratic ethos and terminology did not serve to suppress or undermine egalitarian ideals, but rather ar istocratic ideals were made to conform to the needs of the democratic state” (291). Cf. Balot’s excellent discussion (2010) of the Athenian democratization of courage. 15. On the Athenian claim of helping wronged peoples, see Loraux 1986, 67–75; M ills 1997, 63–66; Tzanetou 2005; Forsdyke 2005, 256–59; Low 2007, 177–86; Hunt 2010, 178, 194; Christ 2012, 118–76 (with further bibliography). On assertions of Athenian πραότης at home and abroad, see Dover 1974, 202; de Romilly 1979, 97–112; Hansen 1991, 310; Whitehead 2000, 437–38; Forsdyke 2005, 231–32, 265–66. On ὁμόνοια as an Athenian ideal from the late �fth century on, see de Romilly 1972; Funke 1980; Wohl 2010, 213–14; Christ 2012, 50–67 (with further bibliography). On the complex role of pity in the Athenian lawcourts, see Johnstone 1999, 109–25; Konstan 2001, 27–48; cf. Sternberg 2005a. 16. De Romilly (1979, 49) observes that Demosthenes often uses philanthr ō pia in conjunction with related terms. On Demosthenes’ fondness of “doublets,” see Cook 2009, 43–44. 17. LSJ8 only captures some of these nuances in its de �nition of philanthr ō pia: “humanity, benevolence, kind-heartedness, humane feeling, or, in a weaker sense, kindliness, courtesy ” (emphasis in original). On philanthr ō pia and sociability, see de Romilly 1979, 50. Dover (1974, 201–2) notes the wide range of philanthr ō pia and its close connection with other value-terms. 18. Dem. 6.1; 8.33, 8.71; 13.17; 16.9, 16.17; 18.5, 18.112, 18.186, 18.209, 18.231, 18.268, 18.298, 18.316; 19.39, 19.96, 19.99, 19.102, 19.139, 19.140 (2x), 19.220, 19.225, 19.315; 20.55, 20.109, 20.165; 21.12, 21.44, 21.48, 21.49, 21.57, 21.75, 21.128, 21.148, 21.185; 23.13, 23.131, 23.156, 23.165; 24.24, 24.51, 24.156, 24.191, 24.193, 24.196; 25.51, 25.76, 25.81, 25.86, 25.87 (2x), 25.89; 36.47, 36.55, 36.59; 40.32; 41.2; 44.8; 45.4; 60.32; 61.13, 61.18, 61.21, 61.46; Prooemia 16 (2x), 23.1; Epistulae 1.10, 3.22, 3.41.


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of the word in these two authors, Plato, and Aristotle combined.19 More signi�cant than the number of times Demosthenes uses philanthr ō pia, however, is how often he invokes it in connection with Athenians and their democratic polity. Both in his own speeches before the Assembly and the popular lawcourts and in the forensic speeches that he writes for clients, Demosthenes os and a democratic way of links philanthr ō pia closely to the Athenian d ēm 20 life. Consistent with what we shall see to be Demosthenes’ appropriation of philanthr ō pia as a democratic virtue is his denial of this virtue to the foreign autocrats with whom the city has dealings. While Xenophon and Isocrates are drawn especially to characterize the behavior of kings and other powerful individuals in terms of philanthr ō pia, Demosthenes warns his Athenian audiences repeatedly of the false philanthr ō pia of foreign potentates, in particular Philip of Macedon. 21 In advance of Philip’s defeat of Athens and its allies at Chaeronea in 338 B.C.E., he warns his audiences that Philip is a wolf in sheep’s clothing and that he is merely feigning philanthr ō pia toward the Greeks he intends to conquer. 22 After Chaeronea, Demosthenes asserts in On the Crown that Philip’s ostensible philanthr ō pia in granting moderate terms should not veil his true nature from Athenians (18.231): καὶ οὐκέτι προστίθημι ὅτι τῆς μὲν ὠμότητος , ἣν ἐν οἷς καθάπαξ τινῶν κύριος κατέστη Φίλιππος ἔστιν ἰδεῖν , ἑτέροις πειραθῆναι συνέβη, τῆς δὲ φιλανθρωπίας, ἣν τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐκεῖνος περιβαλλόμενος ἐπλάττετο , ὑμεῖς καλῶς ποιοῦντες τοὺς καρποὺς κεκόμισθε. I need not add that other peoples have had experience of the savagery that is always observable once Philip has gained power over men, whereas you through your good fortune enjoy the fruits of the philanthr ō pia that he feigns while pursuing the rest of his goals. (Trans. C. A. Vince and J. H. Vince, modi�ed)

In the same speech, Demosthenes also reminds his audience that unlike Aeschines and other rhē tores, he has consistently seen through Philip’s 19. De Romilly (1979, 37) tabulates the following �gures for the use of philanthr ō pia and cognates in fourth-century authors: Xenophon (18), Isocrates (12), Plato (5), Aristotle (11), Demosthenes (72). A search of the TLG yields slightly di ff erent results for Xenophon (19); Plato (3, excluding Def. 412e11 as spurious); and Demosthenes (71, excluding [Dem.] 7.31). The only Attic Orators besides Demosthenes and Isocrates who use philanthr ō pia are Aeschines (9, excluding instances in the spurious Epistles), Lycurgus (1), and Hyperides (1). Philanthr ō pia only crops up once in fourth-century Athenian honorary decrees, in a mid-fourth-century inscription ( IG II 2 1186 = Syll.3 1094) praising Damasius, a Theban metic at Eleusis, for acting generously (φιλανθρώπως ) toward those dwelling in the deme (see Veligianni-Terzi 1997, 131, 216; cf. de Romilly 1979, 51; Whitehead 1986, 151–52); on the virtues most commonly praised in these decrees, see Whitehead 1993 and Veligianni-Terzi 1997. 20. In his extant speeches, Demosthenes uses philanthr ō pia six times before the Assembly, �fty-four times before the popular lawcourts (thirty-seven times in his own voice, seventeen times in speeches written for his clients, that is, in Dem. 23, 24, 36, 40, 41, 44, 45), and once in his epitaphios (see the list of citations in n. 18). The larger number of uses in Demosthenes’ forensic speeches likely re �ects the fact that not only more of these survive than of his deliberative speeches, but also Demosthenes envisions philanthr ō pia operating more in a domestic context, on which forensic orations tend to focus, than in an interstate one, on which deliberative orations usually center. Although the speeches in the Demosthenic corpus may sometimes have been revised for publication, they likely do not deviate substantially from the actual speeches presented by Demosthenes and his clients before Athenian audiences: see Hunt 2010, 270–74. 21. Besides exposing Philip in this way, Demosthenes warns of the false philanthr ō pia of Cersobleptes (23.13–14) and Charidemus (23.13–14; cf. 23.165), and of Cotys’ complete lack of philanthr ō pia toward Athens (23.131). 22. See Dem. 19.39, 102, 139, 140, 315; cf. 19.220; 6.1.



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pretense of philanthr ō pia—his φιλανθρωπία λόγων—and has off ered Athenians honest and sound advice (18.297).23 If Demosthenes adamantly rejects the pretended philanthr ō pia of Philip and other potentates, he regularly portrays this as a virtue that Athenians collectively embrace. This crops up, for example, in the orator’s representation of Athens’ relations with other states. In one of his prooimia , Demosthenes plays off the idea that Athenians routinely act with philanthr ō pia toward other peoples as he urges the Athenians in Assembly to look to their own interests under the current circumstances (16):24 Ἐβουλόμην ἂν ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ᾗ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας εἰώθατε προσφέρεσθαι φιλανθρωπίᾳ, ταύτῃ καὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς χρῆσθαι· νυνὶ δ’ ἀμείνους ἐστὲ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων δείν’ ἐπανορθοῦν ἢ τῶν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς συμβαινόντων φροντίζειν . ἴσως μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ τοῦτό τις ἂν φήσειε μέγιστον ἔπαινον φέρειν τῇ πόλει, τὸ μηδενὸς ἕνεκα κέρδους ἰδίου πολλοὺς κινδύνους ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ δικαίου προῃρῆσθαι. ἐγὼ δὲ ταύτην τ’ ἀληθῆ τὴν δόξαν εἶναι νομίζω κατὰ τῆς πόλεως καὶ βούλομαι, κἀκεῖνο δ’ ὑπολαμβάνω σωφρόνων ἀνθρώπων ἔργον εἶναι, ἴσην πρόνοιαν τῶν αὑτοῖς οἰκείων ὅσηνπερ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ποιεῖσθαι, ἵνα μὴ φιλάνθρωποι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοῦν ἔχοντες φαίνησθε. I would have wished, men of Athens, that you treat yourselves with the philanthr ō pia that you are accustomed to practice toward all other peoples. As it now is, you are better at rectifying the problems of others than you are at giving thought to the troubles that befall you. Someone may perhaps say that this is exactly what brings the greatest glory to the city—to have chosen to assume many risks for the sake of justice alone with no thought of any private gain. I myself believe this reputation that prevails concerning the city to be true and wish it to be, but I assume it also to be an obligation of prudent men to exercise as much foresight in their own a ff airs as in those of strangers, so that you may show yourselves to be not only generous [φιλάνθρωποι] but sensible. 25 (Trans. N. W. DeWitt and N. J. DeWitt, modi�ed)

While Demosthenes regularly invokes Athens’ tradition of generously assisting other Hellenes (see esp. 18.95–101), only occasionally does he attribute this, as here, to the city’s philanthr ō pia. 26 Interestingly, Demosthenes for the most part reserves philanthr ō pia for talking about ideal political and social relations within the city. Philanthr ō pia, according to Demosthenes, permeates the democratic city’s institutions, laws, and citizen relations.27 As we shall see, Demosthenes varies in how explicitly he links philanthr ō pia to the Athenian democracy. Sometimes Demosthenes makes this connection overtly and emphatically when he identi�es philanthr ō pia with the city’s democratic constitution and distinguishes 23. Aeschines, by contrast, speaks of the genuine philanthr ō pia and moderation of Philip toward the defeated Athenians (3.57). 24. On the authenticity of Demosthenes’ “preambles,” see Yunis 1996, 287–89 and Worthington 2006, 57. 25. For a similar appeal, see Dem. 2.24: “I am amazed . . . that you have so often saved other states, both all of them together and each separately in turn, but now sit down under the loss of what is your own” (trans. J. H. Vince, modi �ed) (ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο θαυμάζω . . . τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους σεσώκατε πολλάκις πάντας καὶ καθ’ ἕνα αὐτῶν ἐν μέρει, τὰ δ’ ὑμέτερ’ αὐτῶν ἀπολωλεκότες κάθησθε); cf. also 18.101. 26. On Athenian philanthr ō pia toward other Greeks, see esp. Dem. 23.156; cf. 8.33; 16.9; [Dem.] 7.30–31. By contrast, Demosthenes speaks of the false philanthr ō pia of the Spartans toward fellow Greeks (16.16). 27. On the wide range of application of philanthr ō pia in connection with Athens, see de Romilly 1979, 49–50; cf. 99–100.


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between Athens and its oligarchic rivals on this basis (Dem. 20.109, 24.24; cf. 40.32, 22.51). More commonly, however, Demosthenes focuses on how philanthr ō pia operates within democratic institutions, like the Assembly and lawcourts, and through democratic laws as the d ē mos collectively exercises its authority to protect and advance its interests; or on how philanthr ō pia makes possible the easygoing and tolerant daily relations of members of the d ē mos with one another. Whether he makes the link with democracy more or less explicitly in a particular instance, however, Demosthenes suggests that philanthr ō pia is central to collective and individual behavior in the democratic city. Striking testimony to the philanthr ō pia of the Athenian d ē mos, Demosthenes has a client point out, is found in its decision, upon the restoration of democracy in 403 B.C.E., not to force the sons of the Thirty into exile (Dem. 40.32). 28 According to Demosthenes, in fact, the democracy’s central os exercises its authority, the Assembly institutions through which the d ēm and the popular lawcourts, regularly embrace philanthr ō pia—at least when they behave as they should. Thus, he posits as a general principle that men active in political life should accustom Athenians in the Assembly to be “mild and humane” (πράους καὶ φιλανθρώπους ) in matters involving themselves and their allies, and to reserve their harshness for the city’s enemies (8.33).29 Similarly, Demosthenes asserts that Athenians in their lawcourts ought to act with humanity (φιλανθρώπους εἶναι), and reserve intimidation and threats for military campaigns (13.17). 30 One important way that the Assembly shows its philanthr ō pia, according to Demosthenes, is by reciprocrating the good deeds of its benefactors with honors and privileges. Thus, in his Against Leptines Demosthenes argues os in Assembly on its against the revocation of honors bestowed by the d ēm various benefactors because this would be at odds with the philanthr ō pia os to reward its benefactors and would violate the vital that prompted the d ēm principle of charis (20.55; cf. 20.165). 31 Demosthenes asserts, moreover, that os to encourage men freedom in a democracy hinges on the ability of the d ēm to compete to serve it through the rewards it off ers (20.108; cf. 20.111), and distinguishes oligarchic regimes like those found in Sparta and Thebes from the Athenian democracy on the basis of their very diff erent practices in the dispensation of honors (20.105–8). He holds up the Thebans in particular as dark foils to the Athenians in this regard (20.109):

28. Cf. Isocrates 7.67, which cites this episode as evidence of the πραότης of the Athenian d ēm os. On the likely authenticity of Demosthenes 40, see MacDowell 2009, 79. 29. Cf. Dem. 19.99: The Athenian people, “acting the part of good and generous men” ( πρᾶγμα ποιοῦντες ἀνθρώπων χρηστῶν καὶ φιλανθρώπων), receive with goodwill those who put themselves forward in public life. 30. As we shall see later, however, Demosthenes quali �es this view of the lawcourts when seeking stern verdicts against his opponents. On Dem. 13 as an authentic Demosthenic speech, see MacDowell 2009, 226– 27. 31. For the city’s philanthr ō pia in honoring its benefactors, see also Dem. 36.47, in which Demosthenes speaks of this in connection with its bestowal of citizenship on Pasio and Phormio; in the same speech, he also emphasizes Phormio’s philanthr ō pia toward the city and its citizens (36.55, 58–59).



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καὶ μὴν περὶ τοῦ γε μηδὲ Θηβαίους μηδένα τιμᾶν, ἐκεῖν’ ἂν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἀληθὲς οἴομαι . μεῖζον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, Θηβαῖοι φρονοῦσιν ἐπ’ ὠμότητι καὶ πονηρίᾳ ἢ ὑμεῖς ἐπὶ φιλανθρωπίᾳ καὶ τῷ τὰ δίκαια βούλεσθαι. Again, concerning the absence of honors at Thebes, I think I can express the truth thus: the Thebans, men of Athens, pride themselves more on savagery and iniquity than you on philanthr ō pia and desire for justice. (Trans. J. H. Vince, modi�ed)

Here and elsewhere, Demosthenes portrays philanthr ō pia as a mark of, and preserver of, a civilized society in which relations are based on reciprocity and fairness; such a society, he emphasizes, lies in stark contrast to one that culti os embraces vates savagery (ὠμότης) instead. 32 Thus, when the Athenian d ēm philanthr ō pia and rewards its benefactors, it not only serves its own best interests by encouraging a competition among its benefactors that sustains democratic freedom, but also establishes itself as superior to its oligarchic rivals in its embrace of a civilized standard for social life. os bestows If Demosthenes is committed to defend the honors that the d ēm on others as a proper and admirable show of philanthr ō pia, he is also ready to defend the honors that Ctesiphon proposed for him on the same basis. In his On the Crown, Demosthenes speaks in support of Ctesiphon, whom Aeschines had indicted on the grounds that his proposal in the Assembly that Demosthenes should be honored with a crown was illegal. At the outset, Demosthenes declares that he has a signi�cant stake in the outcome of this prosecution, as he stands to lose the people’s “goodwill and philanthr ō pia” (τῆς . . . εὐνοίας καὶ φιλανθρωπίας , 18.5). He blames Aeschines squarely for advocating misanthr ō pia—that is, the polar opposite of philanthr ō pia—toward a generous benefactor of the city (18.112): τίς γάρ ἐστι νόμος τοσαύτης ἀδικίας καὶ μισανθρωπίας μεστὸς ὥστε τὸν δόντα τι τῶν ἰδίων καὶ ποιήσαντα πρᾶγμα φιλάνθρωπον καὶ φιλόδωρον τῆς χάριτος μὲν ἀποστερεῖν, εἰς τοὺς συκοφάντας δ’ ἄγειν, καὶ τούτους ἐπὶ τὰς εὐθύνας ὧν ἔδωκεν ἐφιστάναι ; What law is so full of injustice and misanthropy that, when a man has given something from his private resources and done something benevolent [φιλάνθρωπον ] and generous, it would deprive him of the gratitude [charis] owed to him and drag him before malicious prosecutors and put them in charge of holding an audit of what he has donated?

Demosthenes is especially irked by Aeschines’ denigration of his good ser vices to the city on the grounds that they fall short of the great deeds of past patriots (cf. Aeschin. 3.177–89), expressing indignation that a wretch like Aeschines should thereby seek to deprive him of “the honor and philanthr ō pia ” (τῆς . . . τιμῆς καὶ φιλανθρωπίας , 18.209) of the people. 33 He later asks (18.316): πότερον κάλλιον καὶ ἄμεινον τῇ πόλει διὰ τὰς τῶν πρότερον εὐεργεσίας, οὔσας ὑπερμεγέθεις , οὐ μὲν οὖν εἴποι τις ἂν ἡλίκας, τὰς ἐπὶ τὸν παρόντα βίον γιγνομένας εἰς ἀχαριστίαν καὶ προπηλακισμὸν ἄγειν, ἢ πᾶσιν, ὅσοι τι μετ’ εὐνοίας πράττουσι, τῆς παρὰ τούτων τιμῆς καὶ φιλανθρωπίας μετεῖναι; 32. See also Dem. 18.231; 25.81, with 25.83–84. On the antithesis of philanthr ō pia and ὠμότης, see Dover 1974, 202–3; cf. Kremmydas 2012, 377–78. 33. Elsewhere, Demosthenes attacks Aeschines for his pretense of philanthr ō pia (19.95).


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Is it more decent and better for the city that for the sake of the benefactions of men of old times, enormous as they were and indeed great beyond expression, the services that are now being rendered to the present age should be treated with ingratitude and vituperation, or that every man who does something with goodwill should receive some share of the honor and philanthr ō pia of his fellow citizens? 34 (Trans. C. A. Vince and J. H. Vince, modi�ed)

Thus, in Demosthenes’ view he, like his patriotic predecessors, merits the philanthr ō pia of the people as a show of charis in return for his services to it; as a benefactor of his fellow citizens, Demosthenes has himself shown philanthr ō pia (18.112, quoted above), and he deserves the same in return os. 35 It is not only right that the d ēm os act in this way, but also from the d ēm “better for the city” (ἄμεινον τῇ πόλει, 18.316), which relies on the goodwill of its benefactors (cf. 20.108). The same spirit of philanthr ō pia should prevail, Demosthenes proposes, in the democracy’s laws, at least insofar as this serves the best interests of os and the average citizens who constitute it. In the speech that he the d ēm wrote for Diodorus in his prosecution of Timocrates for proposing an illegal law, Demosthenes insists that the city’s laws under the democracy should be framed in such a way as to show philanthr ō pia to average citizens in their daily lives and relations, not to public men in their conduct of the city’s a ff airs (24.192–93): ἀλλὰ μὴν πρός γε τὸ τοῖς πολλοῖς συμφέρειν τοὺς νόμους πράους καὶ μετρίους εἶναι τάδε χρὴ σκοπεῖν. ἔστιν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δύο εἴδη περὶ ὧν εἰσιν οἱ νόμοι καθ᾽ ἁπάσας τὰς πόλεις· ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστιν, δι ’ ὧν χρώμεθ’ ἀλλήλοις καὶ συναλλάττομεν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἃ χρὴ ποιεῖν διωρίσμεθα καὶ ζῶμεν ὅλως τὰ πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς , τὸ δέ, ὃν τρόπον δεῖ τῷ κοινῷ τῆς πόλεως ἕν ’ ἕκαστον ἡμῶν χρῆσθαι, ἂν πολιτεύεσθαι βούληται καὶ φῇ κήδεσθαι τῆς πόλεως. ἐκείνους μὲν τοίνυν τοὺς νόμους τοὺς περὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἠπίως κεῖσθαι καὶ φιλανθρώπως ὑπὲρ τῶν πολλῶν ἐστιν · τούσδε δὲ τοὺς περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ δημόσιον τοὐναντίον ἰσχυρῶς καὶ χαλεπῶς ἔχειν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἐστιν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἥκισθ’ οἱ πολιτευόμενοι τοὺς πολλοὺς ὑμᾶς ἀδικοῖεν. ὅταν δὴ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ χρῆται, ἐπὶ ταῦτ’ ἀπαντᾶτε, ὅτι τοὺς νόμους οὐκ ἐκείνους τοὺς ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν πράους ποιεῖ , ἀλλὰ τούσδε οἳ τοῖς πολιτευομένοις φόβον παρέχουσιν. Again, with regard to the plea that mild and moderate laws are good for the many, you must consider this. There are two sorts of things, men of Athens, with which the laws of all cities are concerned. First, what are the principles under which we associate with one another, have dealings with one another, de�ne the obligations of private life, and in general, live among ourselves? Second, in what manner is every man among us to act in regard to our common city, if he wishes to take part in public life and says that he cares for the city? Now it is to the advantage of the many that laws of the former category, laws concerning private a ff airs, be distinguished by mildness and humanity 34. On Demosthenes’ emphasis on his goodwill ( εὔνοια) in this speech, see Cook 2009, 40–52. 35. On Demosthenes’ philanthr ō pia, see also 18.268, in which the orator, after listing his liturgies (18.267), speaks of his philanthr ō pia in his private life toward those in need, including his ransoming of captives and provision of dowries. Cf. Dem. 8.70–71, in which Demosthenes speaks of his trierarchies, chor ēg iai, payment of eisphorai, ransoming of captives, and “other such acts of philanthr ō pia” ( τοιαύτας ἄλλας φιλανθρωπίας ). Lycurgus (1.3) goes so far as to speak of his service as volunteer prosecutor as an act of philanthr ō pia (on this claim, see Christ 2012, 86–87).



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[φιλανθρώπως]. In contrast, it is to your common advantage that laws of the second type, the laws that govern our relations to the state, be strong and strict, because, if they are so, those who are politically active will do the least harm to you, the many. Therefore, when my opponent makes use of this plea, refute it by telling him that he is introducing mildness not into the laws that bene�t you, but into the laws that intimidate politicians. 36 (Trans. J. H. Vince, modi�ed)

Viewed in this light, the philanthr ō pia of the laws is intimately connected with the interests of “the many,” which entail treating private persons with philanthr ō pia but politicians with strictness and sternness.37 If Demosthenes tailors his theory of law here, as elsewhere, to do the most harm to a particular defendant, he is consistent in arguing that the d ē mos and the laws it makes must protect the interests of average citizens by showing philanthr ō pia selectively rather than indiscriminately.38 In other forensic contexts, Demosthenes posits that philanthr ō pia is central not only to the law’s regulation of private a ff airs under the democracy, but to social relations themselves. In this context, philanthr ō pia encapsulates for Demosthenes the sociability, civility, and tolerance that are essential for amicable citizen relations under the democracy. Although Demosthenes’ predecessors, as noted earlier, had sought in diverse ways to articulate what was distinctive about the relations among free and equal citizens under the democracy, speaking, for example, of widespread tolerance among citizens toward each other’s pursuits and the harmony (homonoia) among them arising from mutual restraint and respect, the manner in which the orator elaborates this ideal vision of social relations and the emphasis he places on this is quite striking, and, I believe, largely unprecedented in extant Athenian public discourse. Especially noteworthy is the way that Demosthenes invites jurors os who are alert to their interests to enforce collectively as members of the d ēm the practice of philanthr ō pia in social relations through their own selective exercise of philanthr ō pia in the lawcourts. Demosthenes invokes philanthr ō pia as central to Athenian social relations in a variety of legal contexts, for example, when he has one of his clients tell an Athenian lawcourt that he has only brought suit against his brother-in-law as a last resort (41.1–2): καὶ εἰ μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, μὴ πᾶσαν σπουδὴν καὶ προθυμίαν ἐποιησάμην βουλόμενος διαλύεσθαι καὶ τοῖς φίλοις ἐπιτρέπειν, ἐμαυτὸν ἂν ᾐτιώμην, εἰ μᾶλλον ᾑρούμην δίκας καὶ πράγματ’ ἔχειν ἢ μίκρ’ ἐλαττωθεὶς ἀνέχεσθαι· νῦν δ’ ὅσῳ πραότερον ἐγὼ καὶ φιλανθρωπότερον τούτῳ διελεγόμην, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλόν μου κατεφρόνει.

36. Demosthenes also has Diodorus point out that Timocrates is seeking to exploit and manipulate Athenian philanthr ō pia through his proposed law (24.51–52), and that he misrepresents his law as motivated by philanthr ō pia (24.190–91, 195–97; cf. 156). 37. By contrast, Hyperides ( Dem. 24–25) asserts that the Athenian people embrace philanthr ō pia in letting public men pro �t, within limits, from their positions. 38. As we shall see later in the text, Demosthenes o ff ers a di ff erent distinction regarding the scope of the law’s philanthr ō pia in his Against Meidias, positing that it di ff erentiates between intentional and unintentional off enses. Ober (2005, 410) well observes, on the basis of such passages, that Demosthenes “served as a ‘public political theorist of law.’” On Athenians’ diverse characterizations of “the law,” see Wohl 2010.


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And if, men of the jury, I had not shown all zeal and eagerness in my desire to �nd a settlement and to submit the matters at issue to our friends, I would have blamed myself for choosing to engage in a troublesome lawsuit rather than suff er a tri�ing loss. But, as it is, the more mildly and civilly [φιλανθρωπότερον ] I conversed with the defendant, the more contempt he showed toward me. (Trans. Murray, modi�ed)

Although Demosthenes’ client suggests that philanthr ō pia should especially prevail over contentiousness among kin (cf. Dem. 25.87–89, discussed later), he frames his appeal to jurors broadly in terms of the social ideals of cooperation and harmony that his opponent has violated.39 In his own public prosecutions, Demosthenes likewise invokes philanthr ō pia precisely because his sociopathic opponents have acted contrary to it. In his prosecutions of Meidias and Aristogeiton, in fact, Demosthenes develops in detail a picture of the centrality of philanthr ō pia to social life under the democracy in the course of showing how his opponents’ behavior constitutes an attack on this. 40 As so often in Athenian public discourse, the articulation and advancement of citizen ideals goes hand in hand with the repudiation of their opposites. 41 Let us consider �rst how Demosthenes casts Meidias’ hubris against him as a violation of philanthr ō pia, and then how he portrays Aristogeiton’s vicious and lawless behavior as a threat to this democratic virtue. When Demosthenes prosecutes Meidias for slapping him in the face while os at the City Dionysia, he presents this as an act he was serving as chor ēg of hubris that poses a threat to the community at large. 42 An important, but not fully appreciated, aspect of his legal counterassault on Meidias is Demosthenes’ development of the position that Meidias has acted contrary to philanthr ō pia, which is central to democratic life, and therefore does not himself deserve philanthr ō pia from a jury that represents, and acts in the os at large. Near the beginning of his speech, Demosinterests of, the d ēm os thenes ampli�es the egregious nature of Meidias’ off ense against a chor ēg participating in the festival by pointing out that the city’s laws provide for the prosecution even of those who simply disturb the festival by seeking to exact payments from their debtors during it; this, he asserts, attests to the high level of “ philanthr ō pia and piety” (φιλανθρωπίας καὶ εὐσεβείας) that Athenians observe during the festival (21.12). If the city’s laws hold citizens to an especially high standard of philanthr ō pia through the course of the festival, however, they also seek to ensure that philanthr ō pia will prevail over threats to it in daily life. Thus, as Demosthenes expands on the heinous nature of hubris, he declares that while the city’s laws treat unintentional off enses, even in the case of homicide, “with much consideration and philanthr ō pia” 39. On ideals of cooperation among family members and fellow citizens in the Athenian courts, see Christ 1998, 160–92. 40. Demosthenes uses philanthr ō pia and its cognates sixteen times in these two speeches: nine times in Dem. 21 and seven times in Dem. 25 (see n. 18, above, for the citations). 41. On this feature of Athenian discourse, see Hunter 1994, 110 and Christ 2006, 4. 42. On this speech, see Ober 1989, 208–12; 1994; MacDowell 1990, 1–37; 2009, 245–53; Wilson 1991; 2000, 156–68; Fisher 1992, 44–51; Cohen 1995, 90–101; Roisman 2003, 136–41; Wohl 2010, 181–88; Christ 2012, 109–13.



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(αἰδέσεως καὶ φιλανθρωπίας πολλῆς), they are strict (χαλεπούς ) toward men who are willfully hubristic (21.42–44). 43 This strictness toward hubristic off enders is, in fact, a consequence of the law’s philanthr ō pia (τοῦ νόμου τῆς φιλανθρωπίας ) toward the weak, which protects even slaves from hubris (21.48). Indeed, if someone were to relay to the barbarian lands from which these slaves come that “there are some people in Hellas who are so mild and humane” (εἰσὶν Ἕλληνές τινες ἄνθρωποι οὕτως ἥμεροι καὶ φιλάνθρωποι , 21.49) as to treat even their enemies with this regard, they would want to make the Athenians their proxenoi (21.50). This humane character of the law is useless, however, if jurors fail to enforce it against malefactors (21.57): ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδέν ἐστ’ ὄφελος καλῶς καὶ φιλανθρώπως τοὺς νόμους ὑπὲρ τῶν πολλῶν κεῖσθαι, εἰ τοῖς ἀπειθοῦσι καὶ βιαζομένοις αὐτοὺς ἡ παρ’ ὑμῶν ὀργὴ τῶν ἀεὶ κυρίων μὴ γενήσεται. After all, there is no bene�t in having laws that admirably and with philanthr ō pia protect the many, if those who disobey and violate them escape the anger of you who have authority to enforce them on each occasion. (Trans. MacDowell, modi�ed)

Thus, the protection of the many that the city’s laws provide out of philanthr ō pia requires that jurors actively defend their common interests and come down hard on those who arrogantly and intentionally violate these laws. Demosthenes goes on to argue that although jurors rightly take pity on decent men and show them philanthr ō pia when judging them, this would be completely out of place in the case of a villain like his hubristic opponent. Meidias, Demosthenes insists, cannot claim that his life has generally been “moderate and humane” (μέτριον . . . καὶ φιλάνθρωπον ) and thereby escape the current charge against him (21.128); he is, in fact, a wicked, violent, and hubristic man whom the jury should not deem worthy of “any pardon, philanthr ō pia , or favor [charis]” (συγγνώμης ἢ φιλανθρωπίας ἢ χάριτός τινος, 21.148). 44 Demosthenes thus suggests that forensic charis, as an act of collective philanthr ō pia, should be withheld from individuals who forego philanthr ō pia in their social relations and therefore do not deserve this favorable treatment. Demosthenes elaborates on this principle of reciprocity more explicitly in a passage that draws metaphorically on the eranos—a friendly, interest-free loan to which men contribute with the expectation that the recipient will reciprocate in like form if a lender should ever be in �nancial distress (21.184–85):45 ἔστιν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μεγάλη τοῖς ἀδικοῦσιν ἅπασι μερὶς καὶ πλεονεξία ἡ τῶν ὑμετέρων τρόπων πραότης. ὅτι δὴ ταύτης οὐδ’ ὁτιοῦν ὑμῖν μεταδοῦναι τούτῳ προσήκει, ταῦτ ’ ἀκούσατέ μου. ἐγὼ νομίζω πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἐράνους φέρειν παρὰ τὸν βίον αὑτοῖς , οὐχὶ τούσδε μόνους οὓς συλλέγουσί τινες καὶ ὧν πληρωταὶ γίγνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλους. οἷον 43. By contrast, Demosthenes asserts in 24.192–93, discussed earlier in the text, that the laws reserve their strictness for men in public life. 44. On charis in forensic oratory, see Davies 1971, xvii–xviii; 1981, 92–97; Millett 1998; Johnstone 1999, 100–106; Rubinstein 2000, 212–31; Christ 2006, 180–84; 2012, 72–76, 106–9. On charis as a binding force within the city, see Fisher 2010. 45. On the eranos, see Millett 1991, 153–59; cf. MacDowell 1990, 322–24.


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ἔστι μέτριος καὶ φιλάνθρωπός τις ἡμῶν καὶ πολλοὺς ἐλεῶν· τούτῳ ταὐτὸ δίκαιον ὑπάρχειν παρὰ πάντων, ἄν ποτε εἰς χρείαν καὶ ἀγῶν’ ἀφίκηται. ἄλλος οὑτοσί τις ἀναιδὴς καὶ πολλοὺς ὑβρίζων, καὶ τοὺς μὲν πτωχούς, τοὺς δὲ καθάρματα, τοὺς δ’ οὐδὲν ὑπολαμβάνων εἶναι· τούτῳ τὰς αὐτὰς δίκαιον ὑπάρχειν φοράς, ἅσπερ αὐτὸς εἰσενήνοχεν τοῖς ἄλλοις. ἂν τοίνυν ὑμῖν ἐπίῃ σκοπεῖν, τούτου πληρωτὴν εὑρήσετε Μειδίαν ὄντα τοῦ ἐράνου, καὶ οὐκ ἐκείνου. One thing that contributes greatly to the advantage of all off enders, men of Athens, is your characteristic mildness. Let me explain why it is not appropriate for you to extend any of it whatsoever to this man. I believe that all men contribute to loans [eranoi] throughout their life for their own bene�t—not just these loans that people collect and that have contributors, but others too. For example, one of us is moderate, kind [φιλάνθρωπος ], and sympathetic to many; it is right for him to get the same treatment from everyone, if ever he gets into a difficulty or a legal contest. Suppose someone else is shameless and treats many with hubris, regarding some men as paupers, some as rubbish, and some as negligible: it is right for him to get the same payments as he has given to the others. So, if you will look into the matter, you will �nd that Meidias is a contributor to the latter kind of loan [eranos], not the former. 46 (Trans. MacDowell, modi�ed)

Viewed in this light, those who reject philanthr ō pia in their own social relations do not merit philanthr ō pia from the jurors collectively judging their suits, and jurors thus are in the important position of enforcing this principle of social relations as they determine who deserves their charis. 47 In his prosecution of Aristogeiton for addressing the Assembly and bringing suits before the lawcourts when he was disfranchised because of his debts to the city, Demosthenes paints a similar picture of the centrality of philanthr ō pia to social relations under the democracy while at the same time elaborating on some of the details of this. 48 Although some scholars have challenged the authenticity of this speech, it is quite plausibly Demosthenic. 49 Indeed, its presentation of philanthr ō pia, as we shall see, has much in common with that found in Demosthenes’ Against Meidias and this may be counted as a further indication of its authenticity.50 Throughout his prosecution, Demosthenes casts Aristogeiton as an enemy of the democracy and of a peaceful and harmonious democratic way of life, who must be driven from the city.51 Aristogeiton openly �outs the city’s laws, os, and generally perverts the challenges the governing authority of the d ēm meaning of democratic freedom by interpreting it as license to do whatever base thing he desires (25.20–32). Aristogeiton not only threatens the democracy itself, but social relations within the city, as he acts as a sykophant in 46. Dem. 21.101, which invokes eranos in a similar vein, may be an earlier version of this passage: see MacDowell 1990, 322. 47. On philanthr ō pia and reciprocity, see de Romilly 1979, 51–52; cf. 109. 48. On the charge against Aristogeiton and the state debts attributed to him, see MacDowell 2009, 298–301. 49. On the speech’s likely authenticity, see MacDowell 2009, 310–13, with earlier bibliography. 50. Although some might argue that this would be consistent with Dem. 25 being the work of a Demosthenic imitator, it is simpler to view the resemblance as evidence of common authorship. It is interesting in this regard that the numerous speeches of Apollodorus that are included in the Demosthenic corpus do not use philanthr ō pia at all (it appears in Dem. 45.4, but this speech could well be Demosthenic: see Trevett 1992, 73, but note the reservations of MacDowell 2009, 120). 51. On Demosthenes’ characterization of Aristogeiton, see Christ 1998, 56–59; Rosenbloom 2003; Worman 2008, 230–32; MacDowell 2009, 298–310; Lape 2010, 71–78; Wohl 2010, 50–64.



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abusing law and the legal process to harass, and extort money from, innocent Athenians. 52 In complete contrast to other citizens who frequent the agora on personal or public business, Aristogeiton (25.51–52): οὐ φιλανθρωπίας, οὐχ ὁμιλίας οὐδεμιᾶς οὐδενὶ κοινωνεῖ · ἀλλὰ πορεύεται διὰ τῆς ἀγορᾶς, ὥσπερ ἔχις ἢ σκορπίος ἠρκὼς τὸ κέντρον, ᾄττων δεῦρο κἀκεῖσε, σκοπῶν τίνι συμφορὰν ἢ βλασφημίαν ἢ κακόν τι προστριψάμενος καὶ καταστήσας εἰς φόβον ἀργύριον εἰσπράξεται . takes no part in any aspect of philanthr ō pia or social intercourse, but rather moves through the agora like a snake or a scorpion with stinger held up, darting here and there, on the lookout for someone on whom he can in�ict disaster or calumny or mischief of some sort, and whom he can terrify till he extorts money from him. (Trans. J. H. Vince, modi�ed)

The philanthr ō pia that is essential to social relations among citizens, Demosthenes suggests, is utterly alien to the bestial and savage Aristogeiton. Demosthenes insists that Aristogeiton, as an aggressive rogue who shakes up and confounds society (25.19, 25, 75, 90), cannot seek, as other defendants do, pity and philanthr ō pia from jurors on the basis of moderation or prudence in his life or on any other grounds (25.76).53 To merit collective philanthr ō pia from a jury, a defendant must himself embrace this virtue (25.81–82): τί οὖν λοιπόν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι ; ἃ κοινὰ νὴ Δία πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις παρὰ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων ὑμῶν φύσεως , καὶ οὐδεὶς αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ταῦτα φέρει τῶν κρινομένων , ἀλλ’ ὑμῶν ἕκαστος ἔχων οἴκοθεν ἔρχεται, ἔλεον, συγγνώμην, φιλανθρωπίαν. ἀλλὰ τούτων γ’ οὐδ’ ὅσιον οὐδὲ θέμις τῷ μιαρῷ τούτῳ μεταδοῦναι. διὰ τί; ὅτι ὃν ἂν αὐτὸς ἕκαστος νόμον τῇ φύσει κατὰ πάντων ἔχῃ, τούτου τυγχάνειν παρ’ ἑκάστου δίκαιός ἐστι καὶ αὐτός. τίνα οὖν νόμον ὑμῖν ἢ τίνα βούλησιν ἔχειν Ἀριστογείτων κατὰ πάντων δοκεῖ ; πότερον εὐτυχοῦντας ὁρᾶν καὶ ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ καὶ χρηστῇ δόξῃ διάγοντας; καὶ τί ποιῶν ζήσεται; τὰ γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων κακὰ τοῦτον τρέφει. οὐκοῦν ἐν κρίσεσι καὶ ἀγῶσι καὶ πονηραῖς αἰτίαις ἅπαντας εἶναι βούλεται. What help, then, remains for him, Athenians? The help, by Zeus, that comes to all defendants alike from the natural temper of the jury, the help that no man on his trial provides for himself, but that each of you brings with him from home to the court—I mean pity, pardon, and philanthr ō pia. But of such help it is neither pious nor lawful that this polluted creature partake. Why? Because whatever law each man’s nature prompts him to apply to others, that law it is only fair that they should apply to him. What law do you think Aristogeiton applies to all other men, and what are his wishes concerning them? Does he wish to see them enjoying prosperity, happiness, and good reputation? If so, what becomes of his livelihood? For he thrives on the misfortunes of others. Therefore, he wants to see everyone involved in trials, lawsuits, and vile charges. (Trans. J. H. Vince, modi�ed)

As in his extended deployment of the eranos-metaphor in his prosecution of Meidias to emphasize that those who reject philanthr ō pia in their private relations cannot seek philanthr ō pia from the community in court, Demosthenes insists here that Aristogeiton’s complete inversion of philanthr ō pia in his 52. On Athenian views of sykophancy, see Harvey 1990; Osborne 1990; Christ 1998. 53. Cf. how Demosthenes asserts that Timocrates can lay no claim to philanthr ō pia when he has joined tax-collectors in the aggressive invasion of other citizens’ homes (24.196–97).


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social relations and utter “savagery” (ὠμότης, 25.84) bar him from receiving pity and philanthr ō pia from jurors. Aristogeiton shows his disdain for philanthr ō pia, Demosthenes asserts, not only in his direct and aggressive harassment of citizens, but in his attempt in court to assimilate his situation to that of other state-debtors and thus to bring unwarranted collective hostility down upon them by association with him. Other state-debtors have found themselves unable to pay their obligations because of their standing surety for friends, acts of philanthr ō pia, and private debts that involve no wrong to the city; by contrast, Aristogeiton’s debt arose from a judicial �ne imposed on him for his illegal attempt to have citizens executed without trial (86–87; cf. 83). The former deserve philanthr ō pia from their fellow citizens, whereas Aristogeiton does not. The indulgence due to innocuous state-debtors, which Aristogeiton’s line of defense threatens, prompts Demosthenes to discourse on the proper nature of social relations in the city and the role of philanthr ō pia within this. His striking re�ections, which set forth an ideal vision of the democratic city’s ethos, merit quoting in full (25.87–90): ἔπειθ’ ὅτι τὴν κοινὴν φιλανθρωπίαν ἣν ὑμεῖς ἔχετ’ ἐκ φύσεως πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὗτος ἀναιρεῖ καὶ διαφθείρει. ὑμεῖς γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ τῆς φύσεως, ὅπερ εἶπον, χρώμενοι φιλανθρωπίᾳ, ὥσπερ αἱ συγγένειαι τὰς ἰδίας οἰκοῦσιν οἰκίας, οὕτω τὴν πόλιν οἰκεῖτε δημοσίᾳ . πῶς οὖν ἐκεῖναι; ὅπου πατήρ ἐστι καὶ υἱεῖς ἄνδρες, τυχὸν δὲ καὶ τούτων παῖδες, ἐνταῦθ’ ἀνάγκη πολλὰς καὶ μηδὲν ὁμοίας εἶναι βουλήσεις · οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν οὔτε λόγων οὔτ’ ἔργων ἐστὶν ἡ νεότης τῷ γήρᾳ. ἀλλ’ ὅμως οἵ τε νέοι πάνθ’ ὅσ’ ἂν πράττωσιν , ἄνπερ ὦσιν μέτριοι , οὕτω ποιοῦσιν ὥστε μάλιστα μὲν πειρᾶσθαι λανθάνειν , εἰ δὲ μή, φανεροί γ’ εἶναι τοῦτο βουλόμενοι ποιεῖν· οἵ τε πρεσβύτεροι πάλιν, ἂν ἄρ’ ἴδωσιν ἢ δαπάνην ἢ πότον ἢ παιδιὰν πλείω τῆς μετρίας, οὕτω ταῦθ’ ὁρῶσιν ὥστε μὴ δοκεῖν ἑωρακέναι . ἐκ δὲ τούτων γίγνεταί τε πάντα ἃ φέρουσιν αἱ φύσεις καὶ καλῶς γίγνεται. τὸν αὐτὸν τοίνυν τρόπον ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι , τὴν πόλιν οἰκεῖτε συγγενικῶς καὶ φιλανθρώπως, οἱ μὲν οὕτως ὁρῶντες τὰ τῶν ἠτυχηκότων ἔργα ὥστε, τὸ τῆς παροιμίας, ὁρῶντας μὴ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούοντας μὴ ἀκούειν, οἱ δ’ οὕτω ποιοῦντες ἃ πράττουσιν ὥστ’ εἶναι φανεροὶ καὶ φυλαττόμενοι καὶ αἰσχυνόμενοι. ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἡ κοινὴ καὶ πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰτία τῇ πόλει μένει καὶ συνέστηκεν ὁμόνοια. ταῦτα τοίνυν Ἀριστογείτων τὰ καλῶς οὕτω πεπηγότα τῇ φύσει καὶ τοῖς ἤθεσι τοῖς ὑμετέροις κινεῖ καὶ ἀναιρεῖ καὶ μεταρρίπτει. [Further reason for hating Aristogeiton] is that he upturns and destroys the mutual philanthr ō pia that you yourselves naturally preserve toward one another. For you, Athenians, observing what I have called a natural philanthr ō pia, live in this city in public just as families live in their private homes. How then do families live? Where there is a father and grown-up sons and possibly also grandchildren, there are bound to be many divergent wishes; for youth and old age do not talk or act in the same way. Nevertheless, whatever the young men do, if they are modest, they do in such a way as to most avoid notice; or if not, at any rate they make it clear that such was their intention. The elders in their turn, if they see any immoderation in spending or drinking or amusement, manage to see it without showing that they have seen it. The result is that everything that their various natures suggest is done, and done well. And that is just how you, men of Athens, live in this city like relatives and with philanthr ō pia [φιλανθρώπως], some watching the proceedings of the unfortunate in such a way that, as the saying runs, “seeing, they see not; hearing, do not hear”; while the others by their behavior show that they are both on their guard and alive to a sense of shame. The result is that that general concord [homonoia], which is the source of all good things, abides and stands �rmly established in our city. Those feelings,



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that have been so admirably implanted in your nature and your character, Aristogeiton would change and remove and overturn. (Trans. J. H. Vince, modi�ed)

When Demosthenes emphasizes here the importance of philanthr ō pia to Athenian society, he is clearly advocating not philanthropy in the common modern sense of active assistance to those in need, but rather a benign tolerance of others’ minor off enses in the interest of civic harmony. 54 Because Aristogeiton poses a threat to this fundamental social principle in and out of court, the orator insists, he is manifestly an enemy of the Athenian people and they should take decisive action to expel him from the city (25.95). Several features of this excursus are noteworthy. First, while Demosthenes was not the �rst to praise the democracy for the way its free and equal citize ns tolerate each others’ pursuits and pleasures, he innovates in rooting this tolerance in the speci�c virtue of philanthr ō pia, which encapsulates the general humanity and benevolence of Athenians toward one another.55 Second, he vividly envisions the philanthr ō pia that Athenians practice as similar to that of family members, whose philanthr ō pia enables them to live in harmony with each other, despite their diverse ages and desires.56 Third, Demosthenes proposes that the philanthr ō pia that governs relations among Athenians is, in fact, responsible for the general concord (homonoia) that prevails within the city, which he and other orators �ag as a signal achievement of the Athenian democracy (Dem. 20.110; Lys. 2.18–19; Andoc. 1.106–9; cf. Dem. 18.246).57 Thus, Demosthenes directly links the tolerance of democratic Athenians for one another and the resulting general harmony of their democratic city, which mirrors that of a family, with their embrace of philanthr ō pia as an essential virtue. It is against this backdrop of Demosthenes’ exposition of the centrality of philanthr ō pia to peaceful coexistence in the democratic city that we should understand his designation of it as something “natural” to Athenians. He does not mean to suggest by this that philanthr ō pia comes into being independently of the democratic regime in which it is practiced, but rather that its practice and cultivation by members of the d ē mos, whom he is addressing in a court, has led it to become ingrained in the nature and character of Athenians. Notably, Demosthenes speaks of “nature” here, not as if it is something immutable, but rather as something, along with “character,” that can be shaped and modi�ed; the perfect participle, πεπηγότα conveys that the Athenian nature and character have come into being through a process over time, and that virtues like philanthr ō pia can thus become implanted in these. Although Demosthenes does not pause here to explain precisely how philanthr ō pia came to be a part of the nature and character of Athenians, he is likely thinking of this as a product of the democratic city’s laws and institutions. Earlier in his 54. See Christ 2012, 55–56. 55. De Romilly (1979, 102; cf. 97–99) rightly notes how Demosthenes elaborates here on the idea of tolerance in daily life found in Thucydides’ Periclean funeral oration (2.37.2–3). 56. Demosthenes also associates philanthr ō pia with ideal familial relations in 41.1–2 (quoted in the text); 45.4; 60.32. For the city as an extended family, see Dem. 10.39–40. 57. On homonoia in Dem. 25.87–90, see Christ 2012, 54–56.


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speech, in fact, Demosthenes speaks of the salutary eff ect of laws in imposing order on men’s diverse natures (25.15–16);58 and in his funeral oration for the city’s war dead after the Battle of Chaeronea, he echoes the city’s encomiasts in crediting the democratic city for cultivating virtue (ἀρετή) through its ideals and institutions (60.16–17; cf. Thuc. 2.36; Lys. 2.69). Thus, if philanthr ō pia is “natural” to Athenians, this is because their democratic environment has made it so. Demosthenes as P opular P olitical T heorist Demosthenes’ development of the idea that philanthr ō pia is a quintessential democratic virtue is simultaneously bold, opportunistic, and insightful. His audacity shows forth in the fact that, having to a large extent invented philanthr ō pia as a democratic virtue, he instructs and exhorts his popular audiences to embrace this collectively in administering the city and individually in their daily lives. 59 There is at the same time an unmistakeable opportunism in Demosthenes’ deployment of this concept to promote himself and his agenda in the Assembly and the lawcourts, as he insists that he himself embraces philanthr ō pia and that his rivals and enemies at home and abroad reject it. Likewise, when Demosthenes speaks of philanthr ō pia in the speeches he composed for his legal clients, he does so to advance their interests at the expense of those of their opponents. If Demosthenes is bold and opportunistic in his deployment of philanthr ō pia in his speeches, however, it would be a mistake to view his treatment of this simply as further evidence of his oratorical skills and shrewdness. There is something intellectually ambitious and even compelling in Demosthenes’ presentation of philanthr ō pia as a de�ning attribute of the democratic city and its citizens. In linking together the disparate characterizations of the Athenian democratic ethos that he inherited from his predecessors under the single rubric of philanthr ō pia, Demosthenes off ers his popular audience a new and uni�ed way to conceptualize what is distinctive about themselves and their democratic polity. Philanthr ō pia, Demosthenes suggests, subsumes many positive aspects of the Athenian character, including gentleness, generosity, kindness, tolerance, civility, and sociability. Demosthenes indicates, moreover, that this virtue is central to the Athenian experience, as it shapes how citizens relate to one another in their daily lives, how democratic laws regulate life within os administers the Assembly and the lawcourts. If the city, and how the d ēm philanthr ō pia is ubiquitous in Athens, however, Demosthenes insists that the os does not apply this indiscriminately in governing the city; Athenian d ēm instead, it employs its philanthr ō pia in a manner that is consistent with its strong interest in honoring those who bene�t the city and punishing those os. In brief, who threaten average citizens and the ruling authority of the d ēm one might say that Demosthenes identi�es for his audience a distinctively 58. For an insightful analysis of Demosthenes’ portrayal of the interplay of nomos and phusis in this speech, see Wohl 2010, 50–64. 59. On Demosthenes’ didactic stance toward his audiences, see Ober 1989, 186 –87, 321–22 (cf. 2008, 272) and Yunis 1996, 247–77.



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democratic ethos, delineates where and how this manifests itself across the spectrum of Athenian social and political experience, and proposes parameters for its application that protect the interests of the Athenian d ē mos. Demosthenes’ re�ection on philanthr ō pia as a democratic ideal in these terms quali�es him as a serious and innovative political thinker.60 To be sure, Demosthenes does not convey his political ideas in the systematic and expository form that we may �nd in Plato and Aristotle, but rather elaborates them in relatively short excurses in orations presented before mass audiences across time and always as part of his broader project of defeating rivals in the competitive arena of the Assembly or lawcourts. The manner in which Demosthenes presents his political ideas, however, re�ects his medium and the exigencies of persuading mass audiences rather than any de�ciency in the depth and sophistication of his thinking. Indeed, despite the constraints of his medium, Demosthenes often re�ects thoughtfully and expansively on philanthr ō pia and its place in the city’s laws and in social and political life. There is, moreover, a broad consistency to Demosthenes’ presentation of philanthr ō pia as a fundamental democratic virtue and some subtlety to his application of this across diverse spheres of Athenian experience and to his eff orts to establish parameters for its application by the Athenian d ē mos. Although Demosthenes’ expression of political thought necessarily diverges in form from that found in the works of contemporary philosophers, this should not prevent us from appreciating its importance and signi�cance as an articulation of the democratic ethos that pervades daily life and the city’s institutions. While it was uncontroversial in the popular mind that freedom and equality were fundamental to democracy, 61 the precise implications of these for political and social relations were less clear and open to diverse interpretations. Viewed against this backdrop, Demosthenes’ elaboration of the centrality of philanthr ō pia to democratic life takes on special signi�cance as a thoughtful expression of how free and equal citizens should behave in their relations with one another and in their administration of the democratic city. To judge from Demosthenes’ frequent invocations of philanthr ō pia before large popular audiences, these may well have resonated with them as an appealing articulation of the democratic ethos that—though it was difficult to encapsulate—helped bind them together. If Demosthenes’ exposition of philanthr ō pia as a democratic virtue illuminates his status as a political thinker, it may also provide insights more generally into the relationship between elite orators and mass audiences. Demosthenes’ promotion of democratic philanthr ō pia illustrates how an orator might not only invoke the received commonplaces of democratic ideology that mass audiences expected him to employ and on which his predecessors had drawn, but elaborate on, and give new expression to, them. Indeed, while 60. As Yunis (1996, 238–41) observes in a di ff erent context, Demosthenes’ opportunism does not mean we should not take him seriously as a political thinker. As noted earlier (see n. 38, above), Ober (2005, 410) suggests that Demosthenes’ re �ections on law make him a sort of public political theorist of law; cf. Ober 1998, 370 (on “dialectical” passages in forensic oratory). 61. On the centrality of freedom and equality in Athenian democracy, see Hansen 1991, 74–85.


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we can identify recurring elements of democratic ideology in public discourse through the Classical period, this continuity should not lead us to believe that democratic ideology was entirely �xed and ossi�ed. Demosthenes’ example suggests, on the contrary, that public speakers were free to interpret and clarify for their audiences what received democratic ideals meant for them as citizens. Although Demosthenes was surely not the �rst to engage in this process of innovation and elaboration, his advancement of philanthr ō pia as a central democratic virtue in diverse ways across his large corpus allows us to see vividly how a talented individual might shape how Athenians understood themselves and their polity. This is testament not only to Demosthenes’ abili os in ties as orator and political thinker, but to the wisdom of the Athenian d ēm allowing speakers freedom to innovate in interpreting for it what is essential to democracy and a democratic way of life. 62 Indiana University 62. I am grateful to this journal’s editors and its two anonymous referees for their very helpful suggestions and criticisms.

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Demosthenes Piety

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