Husserl Stud (2009) 25:159–168 DOI 10.1007/s10743-009-9057-7
Thompson, Evan. Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007, 568 pp., $49.95 (hardcover), ISBN 9780674025110 Dan Zahavi
Received: Received: 18 January January 2009 / Accepted: Accepted: 23 January January 2009 / Published Published online: online: 13 February 2009 Ó Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009
In 1991 1991 Fran Franci cisc sco o Vare Varela la,, Evan Evan Thom Thomps pson on,, and and Elea Eleano norr Rosc Rosch h publ publis ishe hed d The Embodie Embodied d Mind: Mind: Cognit Cognitive ive Scienc Science e and Human Human Experi Experience ence. The book was an import important ant milest milestone one.. It critic criticize ized d mainst mainstream ream comput computati ationa onalis listt and cognit cognitivis ivistt tendencies in cognitive science by arguing persuasively that the scientific study of the mind could not continue to ignore the experiential and embodied dimensions of human cognition. In outlining an alternative it drew on various sources, including Varela and Maturana’s work on autopoiesis, Buddhism, and phenomenology. The latter tradition was by and large defined through the work of Merleau-Ponty, who was heralded as somebody who in his first major work, The Structure of Behavior, ‘‘argu ‘argued ed for for the the mutu mutual al illu illumin minat atio ion n am among ong a phen phenom omen enol ology ogy of dire direct ct live lived d experience, psychology and neurophysiology’’ (Varela et al. 1991 1991,, p. 15). Husserl, by cont contra rast st,, was was quic quickl kly y dism dismis isse sed d as a Ca Cart rtes esia ian, n, a repre represe sent ntat atio iona nalis listt and and meth me thod odolo ologi gica call soli solips psis istt who who igno ignored red the the em embo bodi died ed and and cons consen ensu sual al aspe aspect ct of experience (Varela et al. 1991 1991,, pp. 16–17, 68). was quit quitee influ influent entia ial, l, and and what what back back then then migh mightt have have The The Embodi Embodied ed Mind Mind was appe appear ared ed visi vision onar ary y has has thes thesee days days beco become me far far more more ma main inst stre ream am.. It is toda today y commonplace to speak of embodied cognition, and it has recently even become fash fashio ionab nable le to char charac acter teriz izee cogn cognit itio ion n in term termss of 4Es: 4Es: em embo bodi died, ed, em embe bedd dded, ed, The Embo Embodi died ed Mind Mind is almo enac enacti tive ve and and exte extende nded. d. In such such disc discus ussi sion ons, s, The almost st invariably listed as one of the core references. There is much of merit in Evan Thompson’s new book, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind , a book that can be seen as a follow-up on his earlier book. But one very noticeable feature—a feature that should be of particular interest to readers of this journal—is the remarkable change of appraisal when when it come comess to Huss Husserl erlia ian n phen phenome omenol nology ogy.. Wher Wherea eass The Embo Embodie died d Mind Mind D. Zahavi (&) Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen, Njalsgade 140-142, 2300 Copenhagen, Denmark e-mail:
[email protected]
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basically basically gave voice to, and repeated, a widespread widespread caricature, caricature, Mind in Life presents a far more nuanced and well-informed interpretation, one that relies not only on the author’s increased familiarity with Husserl’s own writings but also on his careful read readin ing g of much much rece recent nt Huss Husser erll scho schola lars rshi hip. p. Inde Indeed ed,, alth althou ough gh Merl Merlea eau-P u-Pont onty y continues to play an important role, Husserl has gained a central position. This is readily readily visible visible in Thompson’s extensive extensive discussion discussion of, and reliance on, such notions as stat static ic,, gene geneti ticc and and gene genera rativ tivee phen phenome omeno nolo logy gy,, epoc epoche he´ , phenom phenomenol enologi ogical cal reduction, constitution, intentionality and life-world. The change in question is so noticeable that Thompson finds reason to offer an explanation himself. As he points out in a brief appendix entitled ‘‘Husserl and Cognitive Science,’’ he simply doesn’t subscribe to the earlier Husserl-interpretation any longer. He has come to realize that Husserlian phenomenology contains far more resources for a productive crossfertilization with cognitive science and Buddhist thought than he initially thought. As he explains, when he co-authored The Embodied Mind not only did he have limi limite ted d know knowle ledg dgee of Huss Husser erl’ l’ss own own writ writin ings gs and and of the the rele releva vant nt seco second ndar ary y lite litera ratur ture; e; his his inte interpr rpret etat atio ion n was was also also influ influen ence ced d by Heid Heidegg egger er’s ’s unch unchar arit itab able le reading of Husserl, as well as by the quite influential and dismissive criticism that Dreyfus gave voice to in the volume Husserl, Husserl, Intentionali Intentionality ty and Cognitive Cognitive Science. Science. And And as Thom Thomps pson on conc conclu lude des, s, alth althou ough gh Drey Dreyfus fus shou should ld be cred credit ited ed for for havi having ng brought Husserl into the purview of cognitive science, it is urgent ‘‘to go beyond his interpretation and to reevaluate Husserl’s relationship to cognitive science on the basis of a thorough assessment of his life’s work’’ (p. 416).
1 Embodied Embodied Dynamicism Dynamicism and Naturalized Naturalized Phenomenolo Phenomenology gy In his introduction, Thompson starts out by outlining and discussing some of the prevailing options in cognitive science, including cognitivism, connectionism and embodied dynamicism dynamicism. Whereas classical cognitivism viewed the what he labels embodied mind as a digital computer and located it inside the skull, and connectionism saw it as a neural network, embodied dynamicism, the most recent proposal, sees the mind as an embodied dynamic system in the world (p. 4) and explicitly criticizes the disembodied approach to cognition favored by the two other options. Whereas the more more orth orthod odox ox appr approa oach ches es in cogn cognit itiv ivee scie scienc ncee have have pers persis iste tent ntly ly igno ignore red d the subjective and experiential dimension of consciousness, Thompson’s ambition is to show that a special trend within embodied dynamicism labeled the enactive approach can can ma make ke real real prog progres resss when when it come comess to brid bridgi ging ng the the appa appare rent nt gap gap betw between een the the neur neurop ophys hysiol iolog ogic ical al proc proces esses ses that that we can can desc descri ribe be and and anal analyz yzee scientifically from a third-person perspective and the experiences that we are all familiar with from a first-person perspective. To assess Thompson’s proposal fully, however, it has to be seen in light of the recent debate concerning the possibility of naturalizing phenomenology (cf. Varela 1996,, 1997 1996 1997;; Gallagher 1997 1997,, 2003 2003;; Gallagher and Zahavi 2008 2008;; Petitot et al. 1999 1999;; Lutz and Thompson 2003 2003;; Zahavi 2004 2004). ). On one interpretation, a naturalization of phenomenology entails the attempt to integrate phenomenology into an explanatory framework where every acceptable
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property is made continuous with the properties admitted by natural science (cf. Roy et al. 1999 1999,, pp. 1–2). On such a reading, a naturalization of phenomenology is one that will eventually eventually make phenomenology phenomenology part of, or at least an extension of, natural science. This proposal de facto denies the legitimacy of methods and questions that are unique to philosophy. It wants to replace the transcendental clarification that phenomenology offers with an explanatory account. On another (more cautious) interpretation, phenomenology studies phenomena (including (including body-awarenes body-awareness, s, attention, attention, intentionali intentionality, ty, social social cognition, cognition, perception perception and recollection) that are also open to empirical investigation, and, as it is claimed, insofar as phenomenology concerns itself with such phenomena it should also be informed by the best available scientific knowledge. On this reading, a naturalized phenomenology is simply a phenomenology that is informed by, and engages in a fruitful exchange and collaboration with, empirical science. The phenomenological cred credo o ‘‘To ‘To the the thin things gs them themse selv lves es’’’ call callss for for us to let let our expe experie rienc ncee guide guide our our theo theorie ries. s. We shou should ld pay pay atte attent ntio ion n to the the way way in whic which h we expe experie rienc ncee real realit ity. y. Empi Empiric rical al scie scient ntis ists ts migh mightt not not pay pay much much atte attenti ntion on to the the form formal al struc structu ture re of pheno phenomen menal alit ity, y, but but as em empir piric ical al rese resear arch cher erss they they do in fact fact pay pay quit quitee a lot lot of attention to concrete phenomena and might consequently be less apt to underestimate the richness, complexity, and variety of phenomena than the standard armchair philosopher. philosopher. One way to appraise Thompson’s proposal is to see it as being situated somewhere in betwee between n these these two optio options. ns. On On his view, view, it is not not only only possible possible but but also also necess necessary ary to pursue pursue phenome phenomenol nology ogy and experi experimen mental tal scienc sciencee as mutuall mutually y constr constrain aining ing and enligh enlighten tening ing projec projects. ts. For Thompson Thompson,, phenom phenomenol enology ogy should shouldn’t n’t just just provid providee a careful description and analysis of experience; it should also understand and interpret its own investigations in the light of the empirical exploration of the life of the mind. But according to Thompson, phenomenology is certainly also in a position to teach some someth thin ing g to the the scie scienc nces es of mind mind.. If our our aim aim is to have have a compr ompreehens hensiv ivee understanding of the mind, then focusing narrowly on the nature of the sub-personal events that underlie experience without considering the qualities of the experience itself will just not take us very far (p. 273). In that sense, a careful description of the explan explanandu andum m is an obvious obvious requis requisite ite.. More More radica radically, lly, howeve however, r, Thompso Thompson n also also claims claims that a naturalization of phenomenology will lead to a renewed understanding of the nature of both life and mind (p. 14). Indeed, on his view, phenomenology provides a way of observing and describing natural phenomena that bring out features which would otherwise remain invisible to science; features such as selfhood, normativity, subjectivity, intentionality, and temporality. Thus, one of the decisive ambitions of precisely to show how phenomenology phenomenology might enable enable us to appreciate appreciate Mind in Life is precisely the inner life of biological systems (p. 358). For an initial idea of what Thompson has in mind, a useful and obvious point of Structure ure of Behavi Behavior or . In that comparison comparison is Merleau-Pont Merleau-Ponty’s y’s discussion discussion in The Struct early ear ly work, work, Merlea Merleau-P u-Ponty onty direct directly ly engage engaged d with with variou variouss scient scientist istss of his time, time, including Pavlov, Freud, Koffka, Piaget, Watson, and Wallon. The last sub-chapter of the book carries the heading ‘‘Is There Not a Truth in Naturalism?’’ It contains a criticism of Kantian transcendental philosophy, and on the very final page of the book Merleau-Ponty Merleau-Ponty calls for a redefinition of transcendent transcendental al philosophy that makes
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it pay heed to the real world (Merleau-Pon (Merleau-Ponty ty 1963 1963,, p. 224). Thus, rather than making us choo choose se betw betwee een n eith either er an exte extern rnal al scie scient ntifi ificc expl explan anat atio ion n or an inte intern rnal al phenomenological reflection—a choice that would rip asunder the living relation between consciousness and nature—Merleau-Ponty asks us to reconsider the very oppos opposit itio ion n and and to sear search ch for a dime dimens nsio ion n that that is beyon beyond d both both obje object ctiv ivis ism m and and subjectivism. What is interesting and important is that Merleau-Ponty did not conceive of the relation between transcendental phenomenology and empirical science as a question of how to apply already established phenomenological insights to empirical issues. It wasn wasn’t ’t simp simply ly a ques questi tion on of how how phen phenom omen enol ology ogy migh mightt cons constra train in posit positiv ivee science. On the contrary, Merleau-Ponty’s idea was that phenomenology itself can be changed and modified through its dialogue with the empirical sciences. In fact, it needs this confrontation if it is to develop in the right way. This is a view that Thompson shares, though Thompson’s account—and that is obviously one of the fascinating characteristics of Mind in Life—is informed by the most recent advances in science. But how would Thompson respond to Husserl’s well known anti-naturalism? In the the long long essa essay y from from 1910 1910–1 –1911 911,, ‘‘Phil ‘Philos osop ophy hy as Rigo Rigorou rouss Scie Scienc nce, e,’’’ Huss Husser erll described naturalism as a fundamentally flawed philosophy (Hua XXV, p. 41), and he explicitly contrasted his own phenomenology of consciousness with a natural scientific scientific account of consciousne consciousness ss (Hua XXV, p. 17). Both disciplines disciplines investigated investigated consciousness, but according to Husserl they did so in utterly different manners. Why did Husserl oppose the attempt to implement a thorough naturalistic account of consciousness? One reason was that naturalism on his view was incapable of doing full full just justic icee to cons consci ciou ousn snes ess. s. Not Not only only had had it—i it—in n the the shap shapee of expe experi rime menta ntall psychology—lost sight of (subjective) consciousness (Hua XXV, p. 104), but even more importantly, naturalism treated consciousness as a real occurrent entity in the worl world. d. But But for Huss Husserl erl this this was was unacc unaccep epta tabl blee sinc sincee cons consci ciou ousne sness ss,, rath rather er than than mere me rely ly bein being g an obje object ct in the the worl world, d, was was also also a subj subjec ectt for for the the worl world, d, i.e. i.e.,, a necessary condition of possibility for any entity to appear as an object in the way it did and with the meaning it had. Thompson is, of course, not unaware of this criticism. He attempts to tackle it in different ways. First of all, he points out that one of Husserl’s reasons for opposing naturalism was that he considered its reductionism incompatible with the essential difference between the mental and physical. In response, Thompson emphasizes that the naturalism he favors is of a non-reductive kind, indeed one of his points is precisely that phenomenology and biology are on equal footing. He also argues that our best contemporary scientific understanding of (physical and biological) nature differs rather markedly from the view that Husserl was criticizing—nature is no longer seen simply as an assemblage of externally juxtaposed objects—and that part of Husserl’s motive for embracing an anti-naturalism has for this reason simply been been supe supers rsed edeed by more more rece recent nt deve develo lopm pmen ents ts in scie scienc ncee (p. (p. 357) 357).. Most ost significantly, however, Thompson shares Husserl’s opposition to objectivism and sees sees his his own own proj projec ectt as one one that that full fully y resp respec ects ts the the tran transc scen ende dent ntal al stat status us of consciousness and conceives of it as a condition of possibility for the disclosure of any any objec objectt (p. (p. 86). 86). For For Huss Husserl erl,, obje object ctiv ivity ity is not not some someth thin ing g prepre-ex exis isti ting, ng, but but
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something constituted, and Thompson explicitly argues that this fundamental insight is one that the enactive approach shares. According to the latter theory, cognition is not a fait faithfu hfull repr repres esent entat atio ion n occu occurr rrin ing g betw betwee een n two two sepa separa rate te and and inde indepe pend nden entt entities, mind and world. On the contrary, rather than being something inside the brain or inside the body, cognition is viewed as something that cuts across the divide betw betwee een n body body,, brai brain, n, and and envi enviro ronm nmen ent. t. Ra Rath ther er than than seei seeing ng the the worl world d of the the cognitive being as an external realm that is represented (mirrored) internally in the brain, the enactive approach views it as a cognitive domain that is enacted, i.e., brou brough ghtt abou aboutt or cons consti titu tute ted d by the the coup coupli ling ng of the the livi living ng orga organi nism sm with with its its environment (p. 154).
2 Contin Continuit uity y Between Between Life and Mind Mind A core concept concept at work in Thompson’s Thompson’s account is the concept concept of self-organiz self-organization ation or autopoi autopoiesi esis. s. Thomps Thompson on argues argues that that living living organi organisms sms have have a differ different ent,, emerge emergent, nt, form of individuality and unity than physical being. Already at the metabolic level, living organisms preserve their identity through material changes, and in that sense one migh mightt spea speak k of thei theirr self self-i -ide denti ntity ty in term termss of an inva invari rian antt dyna dynami micc patt patter ern n (p. (p. 75). 75). As Thom Thomps pson on puts puts it, it, to exis existt as an indi indivi vidu dual al me mean anss to be not not only only numerically numerically distinct distinct from other things but to be a self-pole self-pole in a dynamic relationship relationship with with that that whic which h is othe otherr (p. (p. 153) 153).. Even Even at the the mini minima mall cell cellul ular ar leve level, l, livi living ng organis organisms ms mainta maintain in their their own identi identitie tiess by differ different entiat iating ing themse themselves lves from from their their surroundings (p. 149). Thompson emphasizes that this differentiation between self and world, this boundary between inside and outside, should not be conflated with independence or separation. The identity and individuality of the organism is one that is established in constant exchange with, assimilation of, and accommodation to the world (p. 150). In chapter 6, the central thesis concerning the deep continuity between life and mind is articulated in five propositions (p. 158): 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Life autopoiesis and cognition Autopo Autopoies iesis is entail entailss the emerge emergence nce of a bodil bodily y self Emer Emerge gence nce of a self enta entail ilss emerg emergenc encee of a worl world d Emer Emerge gence nce of sel selff and and worl world d sense-making Sens Sense-m e-mak akin ing g enaction. =
=
=
Althoug Although h Thomps Thompson on concede concedess that that there there are distinc distinctiv tivee differ differenc ences es betwee between n human and animal cognition, he nevertheless defines cognition broadly in terms of the meaning that stimuli have for the organism, a meaning that emerges from its dynamically self-organizing sensorimotor activity. As he also writes, ‘‘Cognition is beha behavi vior or or cond conduct uct in rela relati tion on to me mean anin ing g and and norm normss that that the the syst system em itse itself lf enac enacts ts or brin brings gs fort forth h on the the basi basiss of its its auto autono nomy my’’’ (p. (p. 159) 159).. Ulti Ultima mate tely ly,, Thompson is prepared to speak of cognition, self-organization, sense-making and inte intent ntio ional nalit ity y alre alread ady y at the the bact bacter eria iall level level (p. 159) 159).. In that that sens sense, e, he cert certai ainly nly thinks that intentionality has its natural roots. By contrast—and this would be one point point of disa disagr gree eeme ment nt betw betwee een n the the pres presen entt prop proposa osall and and the the one one espou espouse sed d by
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Shee Sheets ts-Jo -John hnst stone one in her her book, book, The — Thomps mpson on is not not The Prim Primac acy y of Move Moveme ment nt —Tho prepared to speak of microbial consciousness or sentience. Sentience entails a felt pres presen ence ce of one’ one’ss own body body and and worl world d (She (Sheet etss-Jo John hnst stone one 1999 1999,, p. 161, 161, 221) 221).. Although bacteria possess autopoietic selfhood, they lack phenomenal selfhood or subjec subjectivi tivity. ty. Nevert Neverthel heless ess,, insofa insofarr as an organis organism m is self-o self-orga rganiz nizing ing,, things things will will for it , and this have have signi signific fican ance ce or vale valenc ncee for this me mean anss that that,, it qua qua livi living ng bei being embodies a kind of interiority. Consequently, even at the bacterial level one can distinguish an internal identity and an outside world. This interiority of life is a prec precur urso sorr to the the inte interi rior orit ity y of cons consci ciou ousn snes esss (whi (which ch shou should ld be view viewed ed as a structure of engagement with the world). On Thompson’s account, life and mind thus thus share share a set of basic basic organiz organizati ationa onall proper propertie ties. s. The propert properties ies distin distincti ctive ve of mind are an enriched version of those fundamental to life. Mind is life-like and life is mind-like (p. 128). Thus, Thompson’s general idea is that by articulating a biol biolog ogic ical ally ly base based d conc concep epti tion on of cogn cognit itio ion n that that give givess a natu natura rall plac placee to the the significance things have for an organism, one might join biology to subjectivity and phenomenology, where other theories are left with an explanatory gap. Given what has been said so far, it should come as no surprise that Thompson questions the standard formulation of the explanatory gap and the hard problem of consciousness (as formulated by Chalmers). In his view, the problem presupposes a radical discontinuity between life and consciousness and is consequently ill posed and ultimately unsolvable (pp. 223–225). We will have no chance of uniting mind and and natu nature re unle unless ss we work work to rede redefin finee both both side sidess and and view view cons consci ciou ousn snes esss as fund fundam amen enta tall lly y em embo bodi died ed.. Ra Rath ther er than than seei seeing ng the the chal challe leng ngee as cons consis isti ting ng in explaining how consciousness can arise from inanimate objects, a more meaningful and useful approach is to examine the relation between a living body and a lived (minded) body (p. 237). Thus rather than framing the problem of consciousness in terms of the mind-body problem, Thompson suggests that we conceive of it as a body–body problem instead.
3 Mutual Mutual Constraints Constraints and Mutual Mutual Enlightenment Enlightenment Thomps Thompson on insist insistss that that phenome phenomenol nology ogy and cognit cognitive ive (neuro (neuro)sc )scien ience ce stand stand in a relation relation of mutual constraint constraint and mutual enlightenment. enlightenment. Phenomenological Phenomenological analysis can can help help clar clarif ify y the the conc concep eptu tual al rela relati tion on betw between een acco account untss of expe experie rienc ncee at the the personal level and accounts of cognitive and neural processes at the sub-personal level (p. 269). This is exemplified in the third part of the book through a number of concrete concrete cases, cases, including including analyses analyses of perceptual perceptual intentional intentionality ity and pre-reflectiv pre-reflectivee body-awareness, mental imagery, time-consciousness, emotions, and empathy. My own favorite is Thompson’s analysis of mental imagery and his discussion of the debate between pictorialists and descriptionalists. Pictorialists and descriptionalists share the view that mental imagery seems subjectively to be a question of inspecting a mental picture using the mind’s eye. But they disagree about whether the sub-personal mental representations used in visual problem solving are depictive or prop propos osit itiional onal in form form (p. (p. 269) 269).. By draw drawin ing g on Huss usserl’ erl’ss and and Sart Sartre re’s ’s invest investiga igatio tions ns of imagina imaginatio tion n and pictori pictorial al intent intentiona ionalit lity, y, Thomps Thompson on basica basically lly
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argues that both sides in the contemporary contemporary debate misdescribe misdescribe the explanandum explanandum and more generally misunderstand the nature of pictorial consciousness. In another chapter Thompson presents and defends the project of neurophenomenology nology that that was was init initia iall lly y deve develop loped ed by Vare Varela la.. The basi basicc aim aim of neuro neurophe phenom nomeno enolo logy gy is to gene genera rate te new new data data by incor incorpo pora rati ting ng pheno phenome meno nolo logi gica call form formss of inves investi tiga gati tion on into into the the experimental protocols of neuroscientific research on consciousness (p. 339). More specifically specifically the idea is to train experimental experimental subjects to gain greater intimacy with their own experie experience nces. s. Through Through practic practicee and sustai sustained ned attent attentiven iveness ess the experime experimental ntal subjects subjects can learn to bring into focus dimensions dimensions and aspects aspects of consciousnes consciousnesss that are normally not attended to, thereby making them describable in more accurate ways. These These first first-p -per erso son n data data can can then then cons constra train in and and faci facili lita tate te the anal analys ysis is and and inter interpre preta tati tion on of the correlated neuro-physiological processes. Finally, to just mention one further example, in one of the last chapters of the book Thompson convincingly argues that a satisfactory account of social cognition must distinguish different levels of empathy. He then cashes out such distinctions by appealing both to classical phenomenological accounts as well as to more recent empirical findings in the fields of social neuroscience, developmental psychology, and cognit cognitive ive lingui linguisti stics. cs. Accordi According ng to Thomps Thompson, on, we first first have have to distin distingui guish sh spontaneous and involuntary forms of sensorimotor and affective coupling. These form formss of em empa pathy thy not not only only allo allow w one one to expe experi rien ence ce anot anothe herr as a livi living ng bodil bodily y subject like oneself, they also allow for affective resonance where two or more indi individ vidua uals ls affe affect ct each each other other’s ’s em emot otion ional al stat states es.. Seco Second ndly ly,, we have have a kind kind of empath empathy y that that takes takes place place through through imagin imaginary ary transp transposi ositio tion n or perspe perspecti ctiveve-tak taking, ing, where one mentally transposes oneself into the place of the other. A third form of empathy is a form of reiterative empathy, where I understand you as an other who sees me as an other, and where I consequently have the possibility of seeing myself from your perspective (pp. 393–398). A fourth and final form of empathy is one that allows us to see the other as a being who deserves concern and respect, i.e., as a person in the moral sense (p. 401).
4 Conclu Conclusion sion I am, as might already be apparent, sympathetic towards large parts of Thompson’s enterprise. However, given the ambitious scope of the book and the many topics it covers, there are obviously many questions one could raise and many issues that call for further exploration and analysis. Let me end by briefly raising two questions. 1. As we have seen, Thompson puts much emphasis on the idea that the relation between phenomenology and empirical science is one of mutual constraints and mutual enlightenment. Presumably, most phenomenologists would heartily embrace the view that phenomenology can be of value to cognitive science, neuroscience, and and biol biolog ogy y and, and, more more gene genera rall lly, y, to any any em empi piri rica call inve invest stig igat atio ion n of the the mind. mind. However, Thompson evidently wants the influence to go both ways, i.e., it is also a question of letting phenomenology profit from—and be challenged by—empirical findings findings.. Indeed, Indeed, Thomps Thompson on explic explicitl itly y argues argues that that neuros neuroscie cienti ntific fic analys analyses es can provoke revisions and refinements of the phenomenological accounts (p. 340). That
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is, the idea is not merely that they can complement, complement, but rather that they can also help us improve and refine, the classical phenomenological analyses. Were this not to happen, happen, the often often repeat repeated ed claim claim regardi regarding ng mutual mutual enligh enlighten tenmen mentt would would start start to sound somewhat vacuous. But how can analyses pertaining to various sub-personal proc proces esse sess and and me mech chan anis isms ms possi possibly bly influ influen ence ce and and enri enrich ch phen phenom omen enol ologi ogica call acco account untss that that atte attemp mptt to do just justic icee to the the first first-pe -pers rson on pers perspe pect ctiv ivee and and seek seek to understand the experience in terms of the meaning it has for the subject? Here is one simple suggestion: Let us assume that our initial phenomenological description presents us with what appears to be a simple and unified phenomenon. When studying the neural correlates correlates of this phenomenon, phenomenon, we discover discover that two quite distinct mechanisms are involved; mechanisms that are normally correlated with distinctive distinctive experiential experiential phenomena, phenomena, say, perception perception and memory. memory. This discovery might motivate us to return to our initial phenomenological description in order to see whether the phenomenon in question is indeed as simple as we thought. Perhaps a more more care carefu full anal analys ysis is will will reve reveal al that that it harb harbor orss a conc concea eale led d comp comple lexi xity ty.. (Obviously, one might also consider the reverse case, where the phenomenological analysis presents us with what appears to be two distinct phenomena and where subs subsequ equen entt neuro neurosc scie ient ntifi ificc findi findings ngs sugg sugges estt a stri striki king ng overl overlap ap,, unit unity, y, or even even iden identi tity ty). ). Howe However ver,, it is very very impor importa tant nt to em emph phas asiz izee that that the the disc discov overy ery of a significant complexity on the sub-personal level—to stick to this simple example— cannot by itself force us to refine or revise our phenomenological description. It can onl only serv servee as moti motiva vati tion on for for furt furthe herr inqui nquiry ry.. Ther Theree is no stra traight ightfo forw rwaard isomorphism between the sub-personal and personal level, and ultimately the only way to justify a claim concerning a complexity on the phenomenological level is by cashing it out in experiential terms. In any any cas case, give given n that that the the slog slogaan rega regard rdin ing g reci recipr proc ocaal cons constr trai aint ntss and and enligh enlighten tenmen mentt is of centra centrall concer concern n to Thomps Thompson, on, one natura naturally lly expect expectss him to provi provide de a care carefu full demo demons nstr trat atio ion n of how neur neuros osci cien enti tific fic findi findings ngs can can lead lead to a refinement and revision of standard phenomenological analyses. But insofar as the book explicitly explicitly deals with the relation relation between between phenomenolog phenomenology y and (neuro)scien (neuro)science, ce, the focus is by and large on how phenomenological distinctions and considerations can be of use to variou variouss empiri empirical cal discip discipline lines. s. Very Very little little detail detail concer concernin ning g the reverse influence is provided. Indeed, on the occasion where Thompson undertakes to spell out what is meant by reciprocal constraints and specifically mentions the requirement that neuroscientific findings can ‘‘provoke revisions and refinements of the the phen phenome omeno nolo logi gica call acco accoun unts ts’’’ (p. (p. 340) 340),, he me mere rely ly adds adds a note note stat statin ing g that that preliminary examples of this can be found in neurophenomenological studies of epilepsy and pain (p. 474). These results are not discussed in any further details in the book, and I find it somewhat surprising and also slightly disappointing that Thompson doesn’t provide any examples of his own and fails to engage in a more extensive discussion of this important issue. 2. As already mentioned, Thompson wishes to preserve the transcendental status of consciousness. Consciousness is, as he writes, a condition of possibility for there being any appearance at all (p. 240). He obviously finds this stance compatible with the kind of naturalism that he endorses. What remains unclear to me, however, is how deep deeply ly comm commit itte ted d to tran transc scen ende denta ntall thou thought ght Thom Thomps pson on is. is. How How far far is he
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prepared to go? Does he for instance endorse some kind of compatibility between empirical empirical realism and transcendenta transcendentall idealism? idealism? It is clear that he rejects rejects objectivism objectivism and regards objectivity objectivity as something something constituted. constituted. But when, for instance, he stresses stresses the the co-e co-eme merg rgen ence ce of self self and and worl world, d, how how radi radica call lly y is this this to be unde unders rsto tood od?? Thompson evidently wishes to take natural history seriously. But on his view what status should we ascribe to our theories regarding, say, geochronology and the early history of our planet prior to the emergence of biological life? There is, of course, a long debate in phenomenology phenomenology—parti —particularly cularly in the secondary literature literature – regarding regarding how to apprais appraisee Husser Husserl’s l’s,, Heideg Heidegger ger’s, ’s, and Merlea Merleau-Po u-Ponty nty’s ’s positi positions ons on the realism-idealism question. To better understand Thompson’s view on the compatibility of naturalism and transcendental phenomenology it would have been helpful had he addressed some of these issues more explicitly. What remains clear, however, is that Thompson is committed to the idea that a naturalization of phenomenology entails a re-examination of the usual concept of naturalization and a revision of the classical dichotomy between the empirical and the transcendental. Thus, on his view, a naturalization of phenomenology not only entails a modification (rather than an abandonment) of transcendental philosophy, but also a rethinking of the concept of nature—a rethinking that might ultimately lead to a transformation of natural science itself. Regardless of how theoretically fasc fascin inati ating ng such such a propo proposa sall might might seem seem,, it shoul should d be obvi obvious ous that that the the task task is daun daunti ting ng and and that that ther theree is stil stilll a long long way way to go. go. But But Thom Thomps pson on’s ’s book book is an important step in the right direction. It should be mandatory reading for anybody inte intere rest sted ed in the the topi topicc of natu natura rali lize zed d phen phenom omen enolo ology gy or in atta attaini ining ng a bett better er understanding of how recent developments in cognitive science and philosophy of mind converge with views found in phenomenology.
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