VALLANGCA v ARIOLA G.R. No. L-29226 September 28, 1873 Fernando, J. Facts: On July 21,1964, a hearing was set for the criminal case for illegal possession of firearms (People v Honorato Lania). A subpoena was issued on July 7 to notify the bondsmen to produce the person of the accused at the scheduled trial. The bondsmen, however, did not accept service of such subpoena and did not produce the accused in court on the said hearing. Neither were they present. With this, an order of such court was issued, requiring such bondsmen to explain within fifteen days why bail should not be forfeited. Although the submitted memorandum of explanation or motion for reconsideration was considered unsatisfactory, the Municipal Court of Buguey, Cagayan still granted an additional period of fifteen days to produce the person of the accused. But the bondsmen were unable to do so. Consequently, petitioner Vallangca filed a motion asking a period of thirty days within which to comply with the obligation to have the accused appear before the court. It was granted but with the same negative result. Therefore, the Municipal Court decree the forfeiture. When it became final and executory, Provincial Fiscal of Cagayan, respondent Narciso Aquino, filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution against the real properties of the bondsmen. Respondent Municipal Court Judge Crispin G. Ariola granted said motion. Meanwhile, third respondent Deputy Sheriff Nemesio Onate, after posting the notice of sale and after proper publication, sold such property at public auction to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, as the highest bidder. With this, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari in the court a quo assailing the judgment of the municipal court in forfeiting their bonds in favor of the government. They further prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and consequently filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against deputy sheriff Nemesio Onate to restrain him from selling at public auction their properties under the bail bond. But the order of said court was returned unserved on that date for lack of material time because the properties had already been sold to the government of the Republic of the Philippines at public auction. Petitioners contended that the validity of the motion for execution filed by provincial fiscal Narciso A. Aquino, the writ of execution issued by judge Crispin G. Ariola and the sale of the properties at public auction by deputy sheriff Nemesio T. Onate are questionable.. Moreso, they claimed that former Judge Ernesto Furugganan of the municipal court had already dismissed Criminal Case No. 1060 against Honorato Lania on June 27, 1962. However, there is no order of dismissal found in the records of said case. After respondents filed their answers, the petition was set for hearing on October 27, 1967, but was only heard on December 11, 1967. The lower court ruled for the denial of said petition. Hence this present appeal. Issue: Whether or not the decision of the lower court, denying a petition for certiorari with preliminary writ of injunction to annul a municipal court
judgment ordering the confiscation of a bail bond, is in accordance with the appropriate rules of court. Held: Yes. The specific provision of the Rules of Court explicitly reads that, "When the appearance of the defendant is required by the court, his sureties shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given date. If the defendant fails to appear as required, the bond is declared forfeited and the bondsmen are given thirty (30) days within which to produce their principal and to show cause why a judgment should not be rendered against them for the amount of their bond. Within the said period of thirty (30) days, the bondsmen (a) must produce the body of their principal or give the reason for its non-production; and (b) must explain satisfactorily why the defendant did not appear before the court when first required so to do. Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen." In the instant case, that is what the lower court did. Hence, the forfeiture of bail bond is correct or justified. The Court further held that to grant this petition for certiorari, therefore, would set at naught the final verdict rendered by the Municipal Court of Buguey which to all appearances is in accordance with law." 18 Reference was then made to the leading case of Lee Kim Tho v. Go Siu Kao, 19 where it was stressed: "Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them. WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of February 20, 1968 is affirmed.
COMMUNICATIONS INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. v VILLALUZ G.R. No. Nos. L-36721-27 August 29, 1980 De Castro, J. Facts: Petitioner is charged with seven cases of estafa through falsification of commercial document, thereby filed a motion for the reduction of its liability under the seven bail bonds posted for the temporary release of Nestor Evangelista (Evangelista). Respondent Judge Villaluz issued an order denying said motion which was declared forfeited when petitioner failed to produce the body of Evangelista to appear during the scheduled trial and to show cause why judgments should not be rendered against on its bonds. As a result, an order of respondent judge a “writ of execution” was issued for the seven bonds amounting to Php 134,000. Petitioner then filed a motion for the reduction of its liability under the bonds it posted. However, respondent judge denied the motion. Through a Court’s resolution, petitioner was required to pay the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court the amount of P90,000.00, equivalent to three times the highest amount of bail bond (P30,000) offered by petitioner on behalf of accused Nestor Evangelista , as a condition precedent to the giving of due course to the petition as regards the balance of P44,000.00 of the total bail bond of P134,000.00. Petitioner invoked to reduce its liability under its bonds based on the socalled "three-fold" rule under Art. 70 of the Revised Penal Code whereby the convict would be made to serve not more than three-fold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed on him, which in no case shall exceed forty (40) and sought to apply, by analogy, Circular No. 29, May 7,1972 which reads: “When the accused is charged of three or more offenses arising from the same incident, the crime not being complex the bail bonds shall
not exceed three-fold that which is required under this Circular for the most severe offense.” Issue: Whether or not the “three-fold rule” under Art. 70 of the Revised Penal Code and Circular No. 29 can be applied in the reduction of liability under its bail bonds. Held: No. The three-fold rule, on the other hand, has absolutely no bearing on the confiscation of the bond and the amount to be forfeited. It has reference only to the maximum duration of the sentence to be served where three or more offense been committed. It has, therefore, no relevance at all when the accused absconds to become a fugitive from justice and makes a mockery of the judicial process, designed to protect society in general and particular members thereof directly offended. Considerations of liberality as have inspired the rulings relied upon by petitioner cannot be said to equally exist in the case at bar where there is not a mere delay in the presentation of the accused, but a total failure to produce him to be tried and sentenced accordingly if found guilty. By its own terms and phraseology, the circular of the Secretary of Justice also invoked by petitioner, is clearly not applicable. It explicitly excludes complex crimes from its benign effects, the kind of crime with which Nestor Evangelista is charged in all the seven counts of estafa with falsification of commercial documents. They likewise do not arise from the same incident, which is one of the conditions required in the circular for its application in a given situation. Furthermore, the circular sets a rule for the determination of the amount of bail in the situation contemplated, certainly a different matter from the amount to be forfeited to the State of bail bonds confiscated for violation of the terms and conditions thereof. WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the order complained of, much less grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. No costs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v PRIETO G.R. No. L-46542 July 21, 1978 Fernando, J. Facts: Respondent Judge Hermenegildo A. Prieto, Sr., of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, issued an order to forfeit the accused Dario Gamayaon’s bail bond due to his continuous failure to appear in Court or in trial, in compliance with the Rules of Court. Assistant Solicitor General Vicente V. Mendoza, meanwhile, correctly pointed out that in the bond posted by the accused, there was the usual undertaking that the accused would appear and answer the charge, hold himself amenable to the orders of the court, and, if convicted, would appear for judgment. After the issuance of such order by respondent Judge, there was a motion for reconsideration. The respondent judge ruled to set aside his previous
order in consideration of the constitutional provision on the right to bail. Apparently, the former failed to take into account that the constitutional right to bail 6 would be rendered nugatory if, by the mere fact that the trial could proceed in the absence of the accused, the undertaking in a bail bond and the Rules of Court provision could be ignored. Hence, this petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether or not the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he set aside his previous order of forfeiture of bail bonds in view of the trial in absentia. Held: No. Certainly, there was grave abuse of discretion when respondent Judge set aside the order in question which was issued by him on February 7, 1977. It bears repeating that after declaring the bond forfeited for the continuous failure of the accused to appear in Court everytime the case is called for trial, it gave the bondsmen thirty (30) days from notice to produce the body of the accused Gamayon and show cause why judgment should not be rendered against them for the amount of their undertaking. Thus, he followed to the letter the applicable Rules of Court. The grave abuse of discretion, to repeat, is quite apparent. There was a deliberate failure of respondent Judge to respect what is so clearly provided in the Rules of Court. It is quite categorical. As set forth above: "If the defendant fails to appear as required, the bond is declared forfeited ... . 12 The very caption of such section reads: "Forfeiture of bail." Respondent Judge did precisely that, with the bondsmen, again in accordance with the Rules of Court, being given thirty days from notice "to produce the body of the accused Dario Gamayon and show cause why judgment should not be rendered against them for the amount of their undertaking. 13 That order was in accordance with law. Respondent Judge should have stood firm. He ought not to have acceded to the plea of the accused to set it aside As concurred and mentioned by Justice Aquino in his separate opinion, “the constitutional provision allowing trial in absentia did not abrogate section 15, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court regarding forfeiture of the bail bond in case the accused fails to appear at the trial. A means should be availed of to compel the accused to appear at the trial so that he may be Identified and fingered by the prosecution witnesses and So that the decision may be properly promulgated. The forfeiture of the bail bond is one means of enforcing the attendance of the accused at the trial. If the accused went abroad, passport may be cancelled (Suntay vs. People, 101 Phil. 833).”
BELFAST SURETY AND INSURANCE COMPANY, INC v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-47309. January 30, 1982 Concepcion, Jr., J. Facts: The accused Allan Pangilinan, Angelito Pangilinan, Reynaldo Tiotuico, and Lauriano Tiamzon are charge with the crime of murder.All the accused posted their bail bonds for their provisional liberty. Petitioner Belfast Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. executed bailbond of Allan Pangilinan in the sum of P20,000. When arraigned, the accused entered a plea of not guilty and the trial proceeded. But the accused Allan Pangilinan failed to appear twice for trial, prompting respondent Judge to order the arrest of the accused, to declare forfeiture of the bond, and to direct the petitioner to produce the person of the accused and show cause within 30 days why no judgment should be rendered against it. Five days before the expiration of the 30-day period, respondent Judge issued an order acquitting all the accused and ordering the cancellation of their bonds except that of the accused Allan Pangilinan. On June 29, 1976 or 29 days after the promulgation of the order of acquittal, respondent Judge rendered judgment on the bond condemning petitioner to pay the government the sum of P20,000 which represented the bond posted for Pangilinan. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied and a writ of execution was subsequently issued. Failing in its motion to recall and/or set aside the judgment for lack of jurisdiction, petitioner filed this petition. Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge’s order of acquittal prior to the expiration of the 30-day period requirement for the forfeiture of bail, relieve the surety by such obligation. Held: Yes. The surety is relieved by such obligation. It would have been different if the order of acquittal was promulgated after the 30-day period, because by then, the liability of the petitioner-surety would have become fixed and the order of forfeiture is final. In the case at bar, a judgment of acquittal is final immediately after promulgation (People v. Yelo, 83 Phil. 618; Cea, Et. Al. v. Cinco, Et Al., 96 Phil. 131). The respondent Judge’s order of acquittal, therefore, became final immediately after its promulgation on May 31, 1976. After the said date, the respondent Judge had no more jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused Allan Pangilinan. Since the respondent Judge’s Judgment on the bond was rendered on June 29, 1976, 29 days after the order of acquittal became final, the same is null and void for lack of jurisdiction. The Court further held that: "In criminal cases the judgment is required to be promulgated by reading the judgment or sentence in the presence of the defendant and the judge of the court who rendered it (Rule 116, Section 6) and although it may be read by the clerk of court when the judge is absent or outside the province, it is implied that it may be read, provided he is the judge therein. As the judgment was promulgated after the judge who penned it had ceased to be a judge, it was not legally binding.
In the case of Cea, Et. Al. v. Cinco, Et Al., (96 Phil. 131) this Court held that where the judgment is one of acquittal. "reading in the presence of the defendant" may be substituted by giving a copy of the decision to him, and such act—delivery of copy—amounted to promulgation. There is nothing however in the decision which invalidates the promulgation of a judgment of acquittal where the defendant is not furnished a copy of the decision. On the contrary, Section 6 Rule 120 of the Rules of Court does not require that a copy of the judgment be served on the parties (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., p.340). Lastly, the Court held that the rule that certiorari does not lie when there is an appeal is relaxed where, as in the present case, the trial court had already ordered the issuance of a writ of execution (Omico Mining & Industrial Corporation v. Vallejos, 63 SCRA 285; Vda de Saludes v. Pajarillo and Bautista, 78 Phil. 754).
COMMENDADOR v DE VILLA G.R. No. 93177. August 2, 1991 Feliciano., J. Facts: These are four consolidated cases. The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed coup d’etat. They are charged with Mutiny (Article of War 67), Conduct of Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman (Article of War 96) and Various Crimes (Article of War 94) in relation to Murder (Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code). In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, petitioners are questioning the conduct of the Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel constituted to investigate the charges against them and the creation of the General Court Martial (GCM) convened to try them. In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging the legality of GCM No. 14, seek certiorari against its ruling denying them the right to peremptory challenge as granted by Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408. In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are assailed on certiorari on the ground that he has no jurisdiction over GCM No. 14 and no authority either to set aside its ruling denying bail to the private respondents. In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in a petition for habeas corpus directing the release of the private respondents. Jurisdictional objections are likewise raised as in G.R. No. 95020. Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel had been constituted pursuant to Office Order No. 16 dated January 14, 1990, to investigate the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948. The PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena. On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn statements of witnesses, and death and medical certificates of victims of the rebellion. At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various grounds, prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days within which to file their objections in writing. This was done through a Motion for Summary Dismissal. In a resolution dated February
27, 1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5 days from notice to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses. Then, the petitioners verbally moved for reconsideration of the foregoing denial and the PTI Panel gave them 7 days within which to reduce their motion to writing. The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-tial investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of War 71. Petitioners further contended that: initial hearing of the charges consisted merely of a roll call and that no prosecution witnesses were presented to reaffirm their affidavits; they have been denied due process because the investigation was resolved against them owing to their own failure to submit their counter-affidavits; GCM No. 14 has not been constitute in accordance with Article 8 of the Articles of War because General Order No. M-6, which supposedly convened the body, was not signed by Gen. Renato de Villa as Chief of Staff.; in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their relea.se and otherwise interfere with the court-martial proceeding Issues: 1. Whether or not the petitioners as Armed Forces officers may invoke their right to bail. 2. Whether or not the petitioners’ denial to pretrial investigation is tantamount to non-compliance with Article of War 71. 3. Whether or not the petitioners are denied of their right to due process. 4. Whether or not the petitioners’ right to preemptory challenge remained withdrawn under P.D. No. 39. Held: 1. No. The Court find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where we observed that "the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist." The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as follows: “The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail. Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within the framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from the people. All other insurgent elements carry out their activities outside of and against the existing political system. The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection clause is not acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others. The accused officers can complain if they
are denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians.” 2. No. The Court ruled that there was a substantial compliance with Article of War 71 by the PTI Panel. Moreover, it is now settled that "even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-martial of jurisdiction." A trial before a general court-martial convened without any pretrial investigation under article of war 71 would of course be altogether irregular; but the court-martial might nevertheless have jurisdiction. Significantly, this rule is similar to the one obtaining in criminal procedure in the civil courts to the effect that absence of preliminary investigation does not go into the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. As declared in Kapunan v De Villa, “The Court finds that, contrary to the contention of petitioners, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of law as provided in the Articles of War and P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911. The amended charge sheets, charging petitioners and their co-respondents with mutiny and conduct unbecoming an officer, were signed by Maj. Antonio Ruiz, a person subject to military law, after he had investigated the matter through an evaluation of the pertinent records, including the reports of respondent AFP Board of Officers, and was convinced of the truth of the testimonies on record.” 3. No. On the contention of the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 that they had not been charged after more than one year from their arrest, our finding is that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial. The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise of judgment and discretion (AW 71). A petition for certiorari, in order to prosper, must be based on jurisdictional grounds because, as long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. Even an abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari. 4. We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that the right to peremptory challenge remains withdrawn under P.D. No. 39. To repeat for emphasis, this decree was itself withdrawn when martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981. Indeed, even if not so withdrawn, it could still be considered no longer operative, having been cast out under the new dispensation as, in the words of the Freedom Constitution, one of the "iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime." It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This
principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of the law is its soul. Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No. 2045. As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again allows the right to preemptory challenge. As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177 have not acted with grave abuse of discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify the intervention of the Court and the reversal of the acts complained of by the petitioners. Such action is indicated, however, in G.R. No. 96948, where we find that the right to peremptory challenge should not have been denied, and in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the private respondents should not have been ordered released. ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is GRANTED, and the respondents are DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under Article 18 of the Articles of War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also GRANTED, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No Costs.
ASWAT v. GALIDO
G.R. No. 88555. November 21, 1991 Feliciano, J. Facts: Petitioner Eduardo N. Aswat and victim Felix B. Nebres were both enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines ("AFP") with the ranks of Private First Class and Corporal, respectively. Both were assigned to the SOLCOM but petitioner Aswat was detailed as caretaker of Brigadier General Galido’s Baguio resthouse while victim Nebres was assigned to act as a personal driver of Brigadier General Galido’s wife. On 29 December 1988, petitioner was involved in a shooting incident at Dominican Hills, Baguio City, which resulted in the death of Niebres Records also disclosed that petitioner voluntarily surrendered to the Baguio City police authorities and was briefly incarcerated at the Baguio City Jail until he was transferred to a SOLCOM detention cell on 31 December 1988. Petitioner has been detained at the SOLCOM Headquarters in Camp Guillermo Nakar, Lucena City since then. On 20 April 1989, petitioner was charged with homicide before a SOLCOM General Court Martial ("SOLCOM-GCM") with violation of Article 94 of the Articles of War (AW). While the court-martial proceeding were going on, petitioner filed the instant petition. Petitioner contended (1) that the specification of homicide with which he was charged was committed outside a military installation and hence the offense was cognizable by a regular, civilian court; (2) that he is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right pursuant to Section 13, Article III of the Constitution; and (3) that he should be given his due base pay and other pay, aside from the allowances he has been receiving, computed from the time of commencement of his detention. Furthermore, petitioner sought to make a distinction between offenses committed outside and those committed inside a military installation or reservation. Issues: 1. Whether or not the petitioner’s charge of homicide is under the jurisdiction of the military tribunal. 2. Whether or not the petitioner is entitled of the right to bail pursuant to Sec. 13, Article III of the Constitution. 3. Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to be paid with his base and other pay from the start of his detention. Held: 1. Yes. Article 94, A.W., in its original form, did refer only to offenses committed inside a Philippine military reservation as falling within the jurisdiction of a court-martial. In 1948, however, R.A. No. 242 amended Article 94, A.W. by providing that offenses committed outside a military reservation shall also be punished as a court-martial may direct, but only "when the offended party (and each one of the offended parties if there be more than one)" is similarly subject to military law. Further, there is no question that both petitioner and the deceased Nebres were subject to military law at the time the latter was shot and killed. And from the moment that petitioner asked for the affirmative relief of bail from the SOLCOM-
GCM, he in effect recognized the jurisdiction of the General Court-Martial. Hence, petitioner is properly deemed estopped to deny such jurisdiction. Article 94 of AW provides that “any person subject to military law who commits any felony, crime, breach of law or violation of municipal ordinances which is recognized as an offense of a penal nature and is punishable under the penal laws of the Philippines or under municipal ordinances, (A) inside a reservation of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or (B) outside any such reservation when the offended party (and each one of the offended parties if there be more than one) is a person subject to military law, shall be punished as a court-martial may direct: In imposing the penalties for offenses falling within this article, the penalties for such offenses provided in the penal laws of the Philippines or in such municipal ordinances shall be taken into consideration.” 2. No. Although the right to bail applies to "all," the Court has very recently ruled that the guarantee is not without any exception. In Comendador v. De Villa, Et Al., the Court en banc, speaking through Mr. Justice Cruz, held: "We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where We observed that the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist. The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as follows: ‘The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail. Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within the framework of the democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from the people. All other insurgent elements carry out their activities outside of and against the existing political system.’ . . .’The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection clause is not acceptable. This guarantee requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others. The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians.’" 3. No. Petitioner, during detention, ceased to perform his ordinary military duties. His continued detention necessarily restrains his freedom of work, and he cannot carry out his normal military functions. There is no showing by petitioner that he was placed on "full duty status" and performing "regular duties" pending trial. On the premise of "no work no pay", petitioner cannot insist on his right to receive base pay or any other pay while under detention. However, while petitioner is not entitled to receive any base pay or any other pay during his detention, the Law expressly
permits him to receive his regular and other allowances, if otherwise entitled thereto, while under detention. The Court put emphasis on Section 18, Article 6 of R.A. No. 138, as amended, which states, "SECTION 18. An enlisted man awaiting trial by Court-martial or the result thereof is not entitled to receive pay as distinguished from allowances until the result of the trial as known; Provided, that any enlisted man who is placed on a full duty status and performs regular duties while awaiting trial by court-martial, or the result thereof, shall be entitled to receive all his pay and allowances for the period of such duty unless the same shall have been lawfully forfeited by the approved sentence of a court-martial prior to actual payment thereof to the enlisted man. For the purposes of this section, the restoration to full duty status of enlisted men awaiting trial by court-martial, or the result thereof, shall be as directed by the Chief of Staff, with the approval of the Secretary of National Defense’ (as amended by R.A. 1067)." ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition for Habeas Corpus for lack of merit. No prouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
YUSOP v SANDIGANDYAN G.R. No. 138859-60 - February 22, 2001 Panganiban. J. Doctrine: The right of a person to preliminary investigation is recognized by the law and is governed by the Rules of Court. However, the failure to accord this right does not ipso facto result in the dismissal of the information; the case is merely suspended, and the prosecutor directed to conduct the proper investigation Facts: In a Resolution issued by the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, the prosecution of Benjamin Arao, Fredireck Winters, Pelaez Pantaran, Eduardo Dablo, Efren Sissay and the city jail warden of Pagadian City as respondents was recommended for violating Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code (unlawful arrest) and Section 3-a in relation to Section 3-e of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended. Petitioner Alvarez Yusop was included as one of the persons to be prosecuted, although he was not one of the original respondents mentioned in the Order of September 19, 1995. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the
recommendation. Subsequently, an Order of Arrest was issued by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24524 but the petitioner posted a bail bond before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolos City on May 20 of the same year. On the same day, a "Motion To Remand Case To The Ombudsman - Mindanao For Preliminary Investigation was filed but the Sandiganbayan denied the same for failure to submit the petitioner himself to the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court. With this, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss. The respondent Sandiganbayan, however resolved not to take action on the motion. Hence, this recourse. Petitioner contended that he had not been accorded preliminary investigation, thereby, requested for the dismissal of those charges. Meanwhile, respondent Sandiganbayan argued that “the claim of accused Yusop that he was not notified with respect to one of the cases on an identical set of facts herein is not [of] particular significance since this would be indulging in a superfluity.” Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan, despite being informed of the lack of preliminary investigation with respect to petitioner, committed grave abuse of discretion in proceeding with his arraignment. Held: Yes. The Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of disretion. The Court held that there is no basis for the Sandiganbayan's ruling that petitioner "had not given timely notice nor any statement of the alleged inadequacy of the proceeding regarding the filing of the Information.” First, there was no showing that petitioner was notified of the charges filed by Erlinda Fadri. Second, petitioner immediately informed the Sandiganbayan that no preliminary investigation had been conducted in regard to him. In fact, moments before his arraignment, he reiterated his prayer that the preliminary investigation be conducted. Third, petitioner cannot be expected to know of the investigator's subsequent act of charging him. Lastly, neither did the filing of a bail bond constitute a waiver of petitioner's right to preliminary investigation. Under Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, "[a]n application for or admission to bai; shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. xxx.” The right to preliminary investigation is substantive, not merely formal or technical. To deny it to petitioner would deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process. 17Hence, preliminary investigation with regard to him must be conducted. The Court, on the other hand, ruled that petitioner’s claim for the dismissal of cases due to lack of preliminary investigation is untenable. Nowhere in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, or even the old Rules, is there any mention that this lack is a ground for a motion to quash. 21 Furthermore, it has been held that responsibility for the "absence of preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings." 22 We reiterate the following ruling of the Court in People v. Gomez: "If there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention of the court of their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information, should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or
remand the case to the inferior court so the preliminary investigation may be conducted." WHEREFORE, the Petition is partially GRANTED. The assailed Orders are REVERSED, and the Office of the Ombudsman is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a preliminary investigation of the charge of violation of Section 3-a of RA 3019 against Petitioner Alvarez Aro Yusop. The trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 24524 shall be SUSPENDED in regard to petitioner until the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
