CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
Introduction •
The The true true role role of Cons Consti titu tuti tion onal al Law Law is to effe effect ct an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights.
The Fundamental Powers of the State •
The fundamental powers of the state are inherent and do not need to expressly conferred by constitutional pro(ision on the State.
Similarities of the three inherent powers of the State: The fundamental powers of the State: 1. 1.
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oli olice ce power power ! the the powe powerr of the the Stat State e to regul regulat ate e liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare owe owerr of #min #minen entt $oma $omain in ! enab enable les s the the Stat State e to forc forcib ibly ly acqu acquir ire e prop proper erty ty%% upon upon paym paymen entt of &ust &ust compensation% for some intended public use Taxati xation on ! enab enable les s the State State to deman demand d from the the members of the society their proportionate share or contribution in the maintenance of the go(ernment
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They They are inhe inheren rentt in the the State State and and may be exer exercis cised ed by it without need of express constitutional grant. They They are not not only nece necess ssary ary but but indisp indispens ensabl able. e. The The State cannot continue or be effecti(e unless it is able to exercise them. They They are metho methods ds by whic which h the State State inter interfer feres es with with pri(ate rights. They They all presu presuppo ppose se an equi(a equi(alen lentt compen compensat sation ion for for the pri(ate rights interfered with. They are exercise exercised d primari primarily ly by the legislatur legislature. e.
$ifferences between the three inherent powers of the State: 1.
Nature of the Constitution Constitution ! the written instrument enacted by direct action of the the peop people le by whic which h the the fund fundam amen enta tall powe powers rs of the the go(ernment are established% limited and defined% and by which those powers are distributed among the se(eral departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic
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#ssential parts of the written constitution: 1.
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Con Constit stitut utio ion n of lib liberty erty ! cons onsists ists of a serie eries s of prescriptions setting forth the fundamental ci(il and political rights of the citi)ens and imposing limitations on the powers of go(ernment as a means of securing the en&oyment of those rights Consti Constitut tution ion of go(er go(ernme nment nt ! consis consists ts of a series series of pro( pro(is isio ions ns outl outlin inin ing g the the orga organi ni)a )ati tion on of the the go(ernment go(ernment%% enumeratin enumerating g its powers% powers% laying laying down certain rules relati(e to its administration% and defining the electorate Con Constit stitut utio ion n of so(e so(ere reig ignt nty y ! cons onsist ists of the pro(is pro(ision ions s pointi pointing ng out the mode mode or proced procedure ure in acco accord rdan ance ce with with whic which h form formal al chan change ges s in the the fundamental law may be brought about
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The Police Power •
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The Constitution should be interpreted in such a way as to gi(e effect to the intendment of the framers. The Constitution must change with the changing times lest it impede the progress of the people with antiquated rules grown ineffecti(e in a modern age.
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*n case of doubt% the constitution should be considered self+executing rather than non+self+executing, mandatory rather than directory, and prospecti(e rather retrospecti(e.
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Self+executing pro(ision ! a rule that by itself is directly or indirectly applicable without need of statutory implementation -on+self+executing ! one that remains dormant unless it is acti(ated by legislati(e implementations
The polic police e power power regulate regulates s both liber liberty ty and proper property ty.. The The powe powerr of emin eminen entt doma domain in and and the the powe powerr of taxation affect only property rights. The The polic police e power power and the the power power of taxat taxatio ion n may be exerci exercised sed only only by the go(ern go(ernmen ment. t. The The power power of eminent domain may be exercised by some pri(ate entities. The prope property rty take taken n in the exerc exercise ise of of the police police powe power r is destroyed because it is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose. The property taken under the po wer of emin eminen entt doma domain in and and the the power power of taxa taxati tion on is intended for a public use or purpose and is therefore wholesome. The The comp compen ensa sati tion on of the person person sub&e sub&ect cted ed to the the police power is the intangible altruistic feeling that he has has cont contri ribu bute ted d to the the gene genera rall welf welfar are. e. The The compensation in(ol(ed in the other powers is more concre concrete% te% to wit% wit% a full full and fair equi(a equi(alen lentt of the prop proper erty ty expr exprop opri riat ated ed or prot protec ecti tion on and and publ public ic impro(ements for the taxes paid.
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The police power may not be bargained away through the medium of a contract or e(en a treaty. The impairment claus clause e must must yield yield to the police police power power whene( whene(er er the contract deals with a sub&ect affecting the public welfare. The police power may sometimes use the taxing power as an implem implement ent for the attain attainmen mentt of a legiti legitimat mate e police police ob&ecti(e. Like taxation% the power of eminent domain could be used as an implement of the police power. 0 Association of Small Landowners v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 343 The police police power power is lodged lodged primar primarily ily in the nation national al legi legisl slat atur ure. e. *ts *ts exer exerci cise se lies lies in the the disc discre reti tion on of the the legislati(e department. The ascertainment of facts upon whic which h the the poli police ce powe powerr is to be base based d is like likewi wise se a legislati(e prerogati(e.
Tests of the police power !"
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The interests of the pu#lic $enerall%& as distin$ui distin$uished shed from those those of a particula particularr class& class& re'uire the e(ercise of the police power) and
The first requisite simply means that the sub&ect of the measure is within the scope of the police power% that is% that the acti(ity or property sought to be regulated affects the public welfare. Since Since a franchise franchise is a mere pri(ilege% pri(ilege% the exercise exercise of the pri( pri(il ileg ege e may may be reas reason onab ably ly be burd burden ened ed with with the the perf perfor orma manc nce e by the the gran grante tee e of some some form form of publ public ic ser(ice. 2"
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select the exact location of the impro(ement. *n such a case% case% it is well well settle settled d that that the utility utility of the proposed proposed impro(eme impro(ement% nt% the extent extent of the public public necessity necessity for its constr construct uction ion%% the expedi expedienc ency y of constr construct ucting ing it% the suitableness of the location selected and the consequent necessity of taking the land selected for its site% are all questions exclusi(ely for the legislature to determine% and the courts ha(e no power to interfere% or to substitute their own (iews for those of the representati(e of the people. 0City of Manila v. Cinese Comm!nity, 4" #il. 34$ •
The The mean means s empl emplo% o%ed ed are reas reason ona# a#l% l% neces necessa sar% r% for the accomplishment of the purpose and not undul% oppressi*e upon indi*iduals"
The means employed for the accomplishment of the police ob&ect ob&ecti(e i(e must must pass pass the test test of reason reasonabl ablene eness ss and% and% specifically% specifically% conform to the safeguards embodied in the 2ill of 3ights for the protection of pri(ate rights.
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+minent ,omain Pri*ate propert% shall not #e ta-en for pu#lic use without .ust compensation" /Section 9, Article III, 1987 Constitution0 Constitution0 •
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The exerci exercise se of the right right of eminen eminentt domain domain%% whethe whether r direct directly ly by the State% State% or by its authori) authori)ed ed agents agents%% is necessarily in derogation of pri(ate rights% and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. The power of eminent domain is lodged primarily in the nati nation onal al legi legisl slat atur ure% e% but but its its exer exerci cise se may may be (ali (alidl dly y delegated to other go(ernmental entities and% in fact% e(en to pri(ate pri(ate corporatio corporations% ns% like the so+called so+called quasi+public quasi+public corporations ser(ing essential public needs or operating public utilities.
4nder existing laws% the following may exercise the power of expropriation: 1. ". '. . /.
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The Co Congress, The resi residen dentt of of the the hil hilipp ippine ines, s, The (ariou (arious s local local legisl legislati ati(e (e bodi bodies, es, Cert Certai ain n publ public ic corp corpor orat atio ions ns%% like like the the Land Land 5utho 5uthori rity ty and the -65, 7uasi+ 7uasi+pub public lic corpor corporati ations ons like like the hilip hilippin pine e -ation -ational al 3ailways% the L$T Co. and the 8eralco.
$estruction from necessity cannot require the con(ersion of the property taken to public use% nor is there any need for the payment of &ust compensation. 7uestions of necessity or wisdom are essentially political when decided by the national legislature legislature and are usually not sub&ect to &udicial re(iew. The legislature% in pro(iding for the exercise of the power of eminent domain% may directly determine the necessity for for appr approp opri riat ating ing pri( pri(at ate e prop proper erty ty for for a part partic icul ular ar impro(ement of public use% and it may select the exact location of the impro(ement for public use% and it may
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The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporatio corporation n 0by the legislatur legislature e to exercise the right of eminen eminentt domain domain is admitt admittedl edly y withi within n the power power of the legislature. 2ut whether or not the municipal corporation or entity 0the delegate is exercising the right in a particular case case unde underr the the cond condit itio ions ns impo impose sed d by the the gene genera rall authority is a question which the courts ha(e the power to inquire into. 0City 0City of Manila v. Cinese Comm!nity, s!%ra roperty already de(oted to public use is still sub&ect to expropriation% pro(ided this is done directly by the national legislatur legislature e or under a specific specific grant of authority authority to the delegate. 5 mere general authority may not suffice. Compensat Compensation ion is required required if the property property is a patrimonia patrimoniall property% that is% property acquired by the municipality with its pri(at pri(ate e funds funds in its corpor corporate ate or pri(at pri(ate e capaci capacity ty.. 6owe(er% if it is any other property such a public buildings or legua comunal held by the municipality for the State in trust for the inhabitants% the State is free to dispose of it at will. 0&rom 0&rom law%ilreviewer The Sanggu Sanggunia niang ng anlal anlalawi awigan gan may only only declar declare e a municipal resolution in(alid if it is ultra (ires. 0 Moday v. CA, '() SCRA 5)( This rule is especially important in expropriations made by L94s because they expropriate through a municipal ordinance. 5 municipal ordinance for expropriation is ultra (ires if it not for public use and no &ust compensation. compensation. Ser(ic Ser(ices es are consi consider dered ed embrac embraced ed in the concep concepts ts of proper property ty sub&ec sub&ectt to taking taking under under the power power of eminen eminentt domain. 0Re%!*lic 0Re%!*lic of te #ili%%ines v. #L+, '( SCRA ('"
#ssential requisites of eminent domain: 1. ". '. .
Taking king by compet competent ent author authority ity,, bser( bser(anc ance e of of due due proces process s of of law, law, Taking king for for pub publi lic c use use,, aymen aymentt of of &ust &ust compe compensa nsatio tion. n.
Taking ! imports a physical dispossession of the owner% as when he is ousted from his land or relie(ed of his watch or his car and is thus depri(ed of all beneficial use and en&oyment of his property, in law% the term has a broader connotation as to include trespass without actual e(iction of the owner% material impairment of the (alue of the property or pre(ention of the ordinary uses for which the property was intended #xamples: 1.
;here ;here farmla farmland nd is perman permanent ently ly inunda inundated ted becau because se of the construction of a dam nearby% the owner who is pre(en pre(ented ted from planti planting ng on the land is entitl entitled ed to compensation although he remains in possession of the property.
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*f go(ernment planes fly o(er pri(ate property at such low altitude as to practically touch the tops of the trees thereon% there would be such an intrusion into the super&acent rights of the owner as to entitle him to payment of &ust compensation although again there is no di(estiture of title. 0 -.S. v. Ca!s*y, 3') -.S. '5( The imposition of an easement o(er a '+meter strip of the plaintiff
-ot e(ery taking is compensable% as it may be &ustified under the exercise of police power aimed at impro(ing the general welfare. 0This rule is (alid as long as the pre&udice suffered by the indi(idual property owner is shared in common with the rest of the community. *f he suffers more than his aliquot part of the damages% that is% a special in&ury o(er and abo(e that sustained by the rest of the community% he will be entitled to payment of the corresponding compensation.
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Consequential damages ! consist of in&uries directly caused on the residue of the pri(ate property taken by reason of the expropriation •
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The expropriator must enter a pri(ate property, The entry must be for more than a momentary period, The entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority, The property must be de(oted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or in&uriously affected, The utili)ation of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and depri(e him of beneficial en&oyment of the property.
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The expropriator may enter into a pri(ate property e(en if the case for expropriation is still pending% pro(ided that the expropriator has gi(en prior notice and has deposited an amount equi(alent to the assessed (alue of the property for tax purposes. 8ere notice of the intention to expropriate a particular property does not bind its owner and inhibit him from disposing of it or otherwise dealing with it. Such notice will not &ustify immediate taking. 0#eo%le v. &a/ardo, s!%ra
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The owner does not need to file the usual claim for reco(ery of &ust compensation with the C5 if the go(ernment takes o(er his property and de(otes it to public use without benefit of expropriation.
ublic use ! any use directly a(ailable to the general public as a matter of right and not merely of forbearance or accommodation, or while not directly a(ailable to the public% redound to their indirect ad(antage or benefit =ust compensation ! a full and fair equi(alent of the property taken from the pri(ate owner by the expropriator wner ! as applied in eminent domain cases% refers to all those who ha(e lawful interest in the property to be condemned% including a mortgagee% a lessee and a (endee in possession under an executory contract
Consequential benefits% like consequential damages% must be direct and particular and not merely shared with the rest of the properties in the area% as when there is a general appreciation of land (alues because of the public use to which the condemned properties are de(oted. The property taken should be assessed at the time of the taking% which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. 0Re%!*lic v. Castellvi, 5) SRCA 33( 24T if the (alue increased independently of what the expropriator did% then the (alue is that of the latter filing of the case.
3equisites of taking in eminent domain: 1. ". '.
;here the entire property is not expropriated% there should be added to the basic (alue of the owner
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;here the entry precedes the filing of the complaint for expropriation% the assessment should be made as of the time of entry. The owner is entitled to payment of interest from the time of the taking until &ust compensation is actually paid to him. 0-rt!la v. Re%!*lic, '' SCRA 477 *nterest must be claimed% howe(er% or are deemed wai(ed. Taxes paid by the owner from the time of the taking until the transfer of title% during which he did not en&oy any beneficial use of the property% are reimbursable by the expropriator. 0City of Manila v. Roas, (" #il. '15 ;hile the non+payment of compensation does not entitle the pri(ate landowner to reco(er possession of the expropriated lots% howe(er% in cases where the go(ernment failed to pay the compensation within fi(e years from the finality of the &udgement in the expropriation proceedings% the owner concerned shall ha(e the right to reco(er possession of their property. 0Re%!*lic v. Lim, 4(' SCRA '(5 Title to the property shall not be transferred until after actual payment of &ust compensation is made to the owner. 00isayan Refining Co. v. Cam!s, 4" #il. 55" 5irtime is not a property of radio and tele(ision broadcasting companies. 0elecom v. CM2L2C, ')$ SCRA 337 Thus% compulsory allocation of airtime in fa(or of the go(ernment for free is not taking of pri(ate property without &ust compensation. *f the land is expropriated for a particular purpose with the condition that when the purpose is ended% it shall return to the former owner% then the former owner reacquires the property. *f the decree of expropriation gi(es to the entity a fee simple title% then the land becomes the absolute property of the State. The public use may be abandoned without impairment of the right of title or re(ersion to the former owner. 0eirs v. Moreno, 413 SCRA 5"'
1udicial re*iew of the e(ercise of the power of eminent domain 1. To determine the adequacy of the compensation
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To determine the necessity of the taking To determine the >public use? character of the taking. 6owe(er% if the expropriation is pursuant to a specific law passed by Congress% the courts cannot question the public use character of the taking.
insofar as their property are concerned. 0 Smit, 6ell Co. v. 8atividad, 4" #il. 13( $epri(e ! to take away forcibly% to pre(ent from possessing% en&oying or using something •
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-otice and hearing is always afforded to owner of the property to be taken so that the owner can •
Ta(ation Taxes ! the enforced proportional contributions from persons and property% le(ied by the State by (irtue of its so(ereignty% for the support of go(ernment and for all public needs
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Taxation ! the method by which tax contributions are exacted •
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The power to tax does not include the power to destroy as long as the Court sits. 0!stice olmes The power to tax may include the power to destroy if it is used (alidly as an implement of the police power in discouraging and in effect ultimately prohibiting certain things or enterprises inimical to the public welfare #ach local go(ernment unit shall ha(e the power to create its own sources of re(enue and to le(y taxes% fees and charges% sub&ect to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may pro(ide consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. 0 Article , Section 5
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$epri(ation per se is not necessarily unconstitutional. ;hat is prohibited is depri(ation of life% liberty or property without due process of law. ne cannot ha(e a (ested right to a public office% as this is not regarded as property. *f created by statute% it may be abolished by the legislature at any time% e(en if the term of the incumbent therein has not yet expired. ;here the salary has already been earned% it cannot be reduce or withdrawn by a retroacti(e law as the salary has already accrued as a property right. 0Mississi%%i v. Miller,'7( -.S. 174 8ere pri(ileges% such as a license to operate a cockpit or a liquor store are not property rights and are therefore re(ocable at will. ne does not ha(e a (ested property right in the continued operation of a law% which may be repealed or amended at will by the legislature% or in the maintenance of a &udicial doctrine% which may be modified or re(ersed in the discretion of the Supreme Court.
Substanti(e due process ! requires the intrinsic (alidity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life% liberty or property 0see test of police power
#quality in taxation ! the tax shall be strictly proportional to the relati(e (alue of the property
The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process 0procedural and neither of these elements can be eliminated without running afoul of the constitutional guaranty. 00inta Maritime Co. v. 8LRC, ')4 SCRA (5(
#quitable taxation ! taxes should be apportioned among people according to their capacity to pay
3e'uirements of procedural due process in .udicial proceedin$s
4niformity in taxation ! persons or things belonging to the same class shall be taxed at the same rate
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There is double taxation when additional taxes are laid on the same sub&ect by the same taxing &urisdiction during the same taxing period and for the same purpose.
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The ill of 3i$hts •
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The pro(isions in the 2ill of 3ights are generally self+ executing.
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,ue Process of Law
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5rtificial persons like corporations and partnerships are also co(ered by the protection of due process but only
The &udge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be &ust. 0avier v. CM2L2C, 144 SCRA 1$4
Competent court ! one (ested with &urisdiction o(er a case as conferred upon it by law
The pro(isions of the 2ill of 3ights can only be in(oked against the State and not against pri(ate indi(iduals.
Section !& Article III" No person shall #e depri*ed of life& li#ert% or propert% without due process of law"""
There must #e an impartial court or tri#unal clothed with .udicial power to hear and determine the matter #efore it)
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1urisdiction must #e lawfull% ac'uired o*er the person of the defendant and o*er the propert% which is the su#.ect matter of the proceedin$)
*n action in personam% such as a complaint for reco(ery of a loan% &urisdiction o(er the defendant is acquired by the court by his (oluntary appearance or through ser(ice of summons upon him. *n actions in rem or quasi in rem% such as land registration proceedings or the foreclosure of a real estate mortage% the &urisdiction of the court is deri(ed from the power it may exercise o(er the property.
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The defendant must #e $i*en an opportunit% to #e heard, •
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5 decision rendered without a hearing is null and (oid ab initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally. 0+avid v. A9!ili:an, $4 SCRA 7"7
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5batement of nuisance per se re(enti(e suspension ro(isional increase Contempt
$ue process is not (iolated where a person is not heard because he has chose% for whate(er reason% not to be heard. *f he opts to be silent where he has a right to speak% he cannot later be heard to complain that he was unduly silenced. 0Strongold ;ns!rance Co. v. CA, '"5 SCRA ("5
Section !& Article III" ( ( (& nor shall an% person #e denied the e'ual protection of the laws"
$ue process as a constitutional precept does not% always and in all situations% requires trial+type proceedings. 0
#qual protection ! all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike% both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed
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Cancellation of the passport of a person sought for the commission of a crime, The pre(enti(e suspension of a ci(il ser(ant facing administrati(e charges, The distraint of properties for tax delinquency, The padlocking of restaurants found to be insanitary or of theatres showing obscene mo(ies, The abatement of nuisances per se. 1ud$ement hearin$"
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3equisites of procedural due process in administrati(e proceedings: 1.
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The right to a hearing% which includes the right to present one
$isciplinary cases in(ol(ing students need not necessarily include the right to cross+examine. 5n administrati(e proceeding conducted to in(estigate student
Substanti(e equality is not enough. *t is also required that the law be enforce and applied equally. 0#xample: #(en if the law be fair on its face% it will still (iolate equal protection if it is administered with an e(il eye and an une(en hand so as to un&ustly benefit some and pre&udice others. 5 law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance% yet% if it permits of un&ust and illegal discrimination% it is within the constitutional prohibition. 0#eo%le v. 0era, (5 #il. 5( The equal protection clause is a(ailable to all persons% natural as well as &uridical. 5rtificial persons% howe(er% are entitled to the protection only insofar as their property is concerned. 0Smit, 6ell v. 8atividad, 4" #il. 13(
Classification ! the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars •
;hile it is true that the hilippines as a state is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory% once an alien is admitted% he cannot be depri(ed of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of li(elihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is gi(en to all persons% both aliens and citi)ens. 00illegas v. i! Ciong, )( SCRA '7"
3e'uisites of classification !" •
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$ue process is required in summary dismissal. There must be notice and hearing.
$ue process need not be obser(ed in the following cases:
The law does not require another notice and hearing for a re(iew of the decision of the board of special inquiry on the basis of e(idence pre(iously presented. 0Caoile v. 0ivo, 1'5 SCRA )7
Some exceptions to the requirements of notice and hearing:
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$ue process is required in deportation and extradition cases.
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It must #e #ased upon su#stantial distinctions)
The classification of cities into highly urbani)ed cities and component cities on the basis of their regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction. 0 Ceni:a v. CM2L2C, $( SCRA 7(3 ersons who work with substantially equal qualifications% skills% effort and responsibility% under similar conditions% should be paid similar salaries. 0;nternational Scool Alliance of 2d!cators v. =!isim*ing, 333 SCRA 13 2"
It must #e $ermane to the purposes of the law)
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The classification% e(en if based on substantial distinctions% will still be in(alid if it is not germane to the purpose of the law. #xample: The law cannot pro(ide for a lower o passing a(erage for women in the bar examinations on the basis of classification of physical strength. hysical strength% although a substantial distinction between men and women% is not the test for admission to the legal profession.
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It must not #e limited to e(istin$ conditions onl%)
The classification must be enforced not only for the present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected continues exist. 5"
It must appl% e'uall% to all mem#ers of the class"
The pro#a#le cause personall% #% the .ud$e)
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This power is deri(ed by the &udge directly from the self+ executing pro(isions of 5rticle ***% Section "% of the Constitution and therefore may not be limited% much less withdrawn% by the legislature. The issuance of a warrant is not a ministerial function of the &udge who had the right to determine for himself the existence of probable cause. ;hile he could rely on the findings of the prosecutor% he is ne(ertheless not bound thereby. 0#lacer v. 0illan!eve, 1'( SCRA 4(3
The &udge may either do the following to personally determine probable cause:
*t is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry% in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice, and as long as this is achie(ed% all those co(ered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an indi(idual belonging to a class differs from the other members% as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others% does not &ustify the non+application of the law to him.
The warrant must refer to only one specific offense. 0 R!le 1'(, Section 3, R!les of Co!rt
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ersonally e(aluate the report and the supporting documentsB submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and on the basis thereof% issue a warrant, or *f on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause% he may disregard the fiscal
7The &udge should not rely on the recommendations alone of the prosecutor but must independently arri(e at his own conclusions based not only on the bare report of the prosecutor but also on other rele(ant documents.
Searches and Sei6ures •
Section 2& Article III" The ri$ht of the people to #e secure in their persons& houses& papers& and effects a$ainst unreasona#le searches and sei6ures of whate*er nature and for an% purpose shall #e in*iola#le& and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue e(cept upon pro#a#le cause to #e determined personall% #% the .ud$e after e(amination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he ma% produce& and particularl% descri#in$ the place to #e searched& and the persons or thin$s to #e sei6ed" Constitutional re'uirements of a *alid search warrant or warrant of arrest !"
$ifference between the determination of the existence of probable cause by the prosecutor and by the &udge: The prosecutor determines whether there is probable cause to belie(e that the accused is guilty and should be held for trial. n the other hand% the &udge determines whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant.
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It must #e #ased upon pro#a#le cause)
robable cause ! referring to such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that in themsel(es are sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof, consists of a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themsel(es to warrant a cautious man in belie(ing accused to be committing the offense or to be guilty of the offense, the knowledge of facts% actual or apparent% strong enough to &ustify a reasonable man in the belief that he has lawful grounds for prosecuting defendant in the manner complained of% the concurrence of facts and circumstances reasonable warranting the belief, such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to belie(e that an offense has been committed and that the ob&ects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched
;hat the Constitution underscores is the exclusi(e and personal responsibility of the issuing &udge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause.
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;arrants of arrest may be issued by administrati(e authorities only for the purpose of carrying out a final finding of a (iolation of law% like an order of deportation or an order of contempt% and not for the sole purpose of in(estigation or prosecution. 06oard of Commissioners v. +e la Rosa, 1$7 SCRA )53 >aron, ang iss!ance of warrant is strictly /!dicial. The requirement of probable cause is% strictly speaking% not applicable in deportation proceedings% which are not criminal in nature. 4"
The determination must #e made after e(amination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he ma% produce) 05pplies to search warrants, also to warrants of arrest if the &udge is not satisfied with the report of the prosecutor and the supporting documents.
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arrest without a warrant when an officer sees the offense although at a distance% or hears the disturbance or disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene of the crime. 0 #eo%le v. 2varisto, '(1 SCRA 431
*n issuing warrants of arrest% there is no need to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses if the &udge% after e(aluating the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor% is satisfied of the existence of probable cause. Section . Re9!isites for iss!ing search warrant . 5 search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the &udge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce% and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be sei)ed which may be anywhere in the hilippines. 0 R!le 1'(, R!les of Co!rt The &udge% before issuing the search warrant% must personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers% in writing and under oath the complainant and any witness he may produce on facts personally known to them% and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affida(its submitted. 0 Section 5, R!le 1'(, R!les of Co!rt The e(idence offered by the complainant and his witnesses should be based on their own personal knowledge and not on mere information or belief. 6earsay is not allowed. 5"
It must particularl% descri#e the place to #e searched and the persons or thin$s to #e sei6ed"
;hile a =ohn $oe warrant is generally held in(alid% it will satisfy the constitutional requirement if there is some descriptio personae that will enable the officer to identify the accused. 0#eo%le v. 0eloso, 4) #il. 1($ 5 description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can% with reasonable effort% ascertain and identify the place intended.
/#0 When an offense has .ust #een committed& and he has pro#a#le cause to #elie*e #ased on personal -nowled$e of facts or circumstances that the person to #e arrested has committed it) and 0ot %!rs!it D;hat is important here is to determine whether the arresting officer has personal knowledge.E See #eo%le v. 6riones, '"' SCRA 7") . *n this case% the eyewitness went to the police to report a crime committed by the accused. The peace officers arrested the accused without a warrant based on the eyewitness< information. The SC held that the warrantless arrest was not (alid because the arresting officers had no personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the accused has committed the crime. *t was the eyewitness who had such personal knowledge. *n the case of eople (. Tonog% =r.% "F/ SC35 AA"% it was held by the SC that the there was a (alid warrantless arrest. 4pon the in(estigation of the police officer% it was found out that the accused was the perpetrator of the crime based on the information gi(en by a witness. The police officer arrested the accused without a warrant of arrest. This case differs from the 2riones case in that in this case% there was an in(estigation conducted by the arr esting officer. The information gathered b y the arresting officer at his in(estigation becomes within his personal knowledge. •
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;here by the nature of the articles to be sei)ed their description must be rather general% it is not required that a technical description be gi(en. roperties sub&ect to search and sei)ure: •
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roperty sub&ect of the offense, roperty stolen or embe))led and other proceeds or fruits of the offense, and roperty used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
The information deri(ed from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the crime upon which the police acted does not constitute personal knowledge of the arresting police. 0?o v. CA, '"( SCRA 13) The filing of charges and the issuance of the warrant of arrest against a person in(alidly detained will cure the defect of that detention or at least deny him the right to be released because of such defect. 0 Sance: v. +emetrio!, ''7 SCRA ('7 The accused% in(alidly arrested without a warrant% is deemed to ha(e submitted to the &urisdiction of the court if he raises ob&ections on grounds other than the ground that the court had not acquired &urisdiction because of the in(alid warrantless arrest. 0Sance: v. +emetrio!, s!%ra /c0 When the person to #e arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal esta#lishment or place where he is ser*in$ final .ud$ment or is temporaril% confined while his case is pendin$& or has escaped while #ein$ transferred from one confinement to another"
The return of stolen goods% e(en if illegally sei)ed% may not be ordered by the court. 0#eo%le v. Marcos, 117 SCRA $$$
A peace officer or a pri*ate person ma%& without a warrant& arrest a person
5dditional instances of (alid warrantless arrest: /a0 When& in his presence& the person to #e arrested has committed& is actuall% committin$& or is attemptin$ to commit an offense) 0in flagrante delicto •
5n offense is committed in the presence or in the (iew of an officer within the meaning of the rule authori)ing an
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*f a person lawfully arrested escapes or is rescued% any person may immediately pursue or retake him without a warrant at any time and in any place within the hilippines. 0Section 13, R!le 113 Gor the purpose of surrendering the accused% the bondsmen may arrest him or upon written authority
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endorsed on a certified copy of the undertaking% cause him to be arrested by a police officer or any other person of suitable age and discretion. 0Section '3, R!le 114 5n accused released on bail may be re+arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the hilippines without permission of the court where the case is pending. 0Section '3, R!le 114
that the warrantless search made by the policemen was (alid because when osadas attempted to flee when the police officers were merely introducing themsel(es% it ga(e probable cause for the policemen to belie(e that osadas was hiding something illegal. *n eople (. 8engote% "1F SC35 1A% the facts were similar with the case of osadas except that it happened at noon and the accused 8engote did not attempt to flee when policemen introduced themsel(es and searched him. The SC held that the warrantless search was in(alid because the policemen has no probable cause to search 8engote.
5n application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the (alidity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor% or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary in(estigation of the charge against him% pro(ided that he raises them before entering his plea. 0Sec. '(, R!le 114, R!les of Co!rt
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9#-#35L 34L#: *nspection in checkpoints of mo(ing (ehicles is limited to a (isual or ocular inspection. 00almonte v. +e 0illa
5n accused is stopped from question the legality of his arrest where he ne(er raised it before entering his plea. 0#eo%le v. Salvatierra, '7( SCRA 55
#IC#T*-: #xtensi(e search may be (alid if the officers conducting the search ha(e reasonable or probable cause to belie(e before the search that they will find the instrumentality or e(idence pertaining to a crime in the (ehicle to be searched. #xample: ;hen the police officers ha(e information that a passenger riding as certain (ehicle was carrying something illegal. 0#eo%le v. Malmstedt, 1$) SCRA 4"1 and #eo%le v. 6agista, '14 SCRA 53 The ruling in Malmstedt and 6agista was not howe(er applied in the case of #eo%le v. Amin!di, 1(3 SCRA 4"' % where the police recei(ed information that 5minudin carrying mari&uana was on a certain (essel from 8indanao. The SC said that the warrantless search was not (alid because the police officer still ha(e time to secure the necessary search warrant.
Instances of *alid warrantless search and sei6ure !" •
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Search of mo*in$ *ehicle
Search incident to a lawful arrest
;hen an arrest is effected by (irtue of a (alid warrant% or under any of the circumstances of a (alid warrantless arrest% a search may be made as an incident to such (alid arrest. The indi(idual may be frisked for concealed weapons that may be used against the arresting officer and all unlawful articles found in his person or within his immediate control may be sei)ed. 0 Adams v. @illiams, 47 -.S. 143 5 warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest may be made only within the permissible area of search% or the place within the immediate control of the person being arrested.
#IC#T*-: ;hen there is consent to search the (ehicle. 5"
+*idence in plain *iew
*t is beyond ca(il that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. ;here a search first undertaken% then an arrest effected based on e(idence produced by the search% both such search and arrest would be unlawful% for being contrary to law. 3equisites: 2"
Stop and fris- ! ;here a police officer obser(es unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in the light of his experience that criminal acti(ity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous% where in the course of in(estigating this beha(iour% he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries% and where nothing in the initial stages of encounter ser(es to dispel his reasonable fear for his own and other
*n the case of osadas (. C5% 1HF SC35 "H'% the accused osadas% carrying a buri bag and acting suspiciously% was approached by two policemen who identified themsel(es as such. osadas suddenly attempted to lea(e. Thus% the policemen caught him. 5nd when searched% osadas was found out carrying firearms and ammunitions. The SC held
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The plain (iew doctrine will not &ustify the sei)ure of the ob&ect where the incriminating nature of the ob&ect is not apparent from the plain (iew. 8"
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The law enforcement officer in search of the e(idence has a prior &ustification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can (iew a particular area, The disco(ery of the e(idence in plain (iew is inad(ertent, and *t is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he obser(es may be e(idence of a crime% contraband or otherwise sub&ect to sei)ure.
Customs searches
Searches% sei)ures and arrests may be made e(en without warrants for purposes of enforcing customs and tariff laws. 3#5S-: The (essel can be quickly mo(ed out o of the locality or &urisdiction in which the search
must be sought before the warrant could be secured. 9"
3estrictions on freedom of e(pression !"
Consented search
re(ious restraint or censorship on freedom of expression bears a hea(y presumption of constitutional in(alidity. 0smeBa v. CM2L2C, ')) SCRA 447 *t is incumbent for the 9o(ernment to show that the restraint or censorship has passed the clear+and+present danger test 0or the dangerous tendency test or the balancing of interest test. D5pplies only to content>#ased restrictionsE
3equisites: 1. ". '. . •
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The right exist, That the person in(ol(ed had knowledge% either actual or constructi(e% of the existence of such right, and The said person had actual intention to relinquish the right, The consent must be (oluntary.
Two ways of restrictions 0concerns lawsJregulations:
Silence is not equi(alent to consent. 0 #eo%le v. 6!rgos, 144 SCRA 1 ;here the permission to enter a residence was gi(en to search for rebels% it is illegal to search the rooms therein for firearms without a search warrant. 0 0eroy v. Layag!e, '1" SCRA $7
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+(i$ent searches or searches durin$ emer$enc% circumstances ;" Searches pursuant to airport securit% procedures <" Searches pursuant to .ail safet% procedures !=" Search #% pri*ate persons
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Section 4& Article III" /!0 The pri*ac% of communication and correspondence shall #e in*iola#le e(cept upon lawful order of the court& or when pu#lic safet% or order re'uires otherwise as prescri#ed #% law"
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The court order herein must be issued upon compliance with the constitutional requirements for the issuance of a warrant% and shall only be effecti(e for only sixty 0@F days.
/20 An% e*idence o#tained in *iolation of this or the precedin$ section shall #e inadmissi#le for an% purpose in an% proceedin$" 02cl!sionary r!le &r!it of te %oisono!s tree •
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;here the accused did not raise the issue of admissibility of the e(idence against him on the ground that it had been illegally sei)ed% such omission constituted a wai(er of the protection granted by this section% and the illegally sei)ed e(idence could then be admitted against him. 0#eo%le v. 2ala The accused should raise the ob&ection before the prosecution rests during trial.
Freedom of +(pression Section 5& Article III" No law shall #e passed a#rid$in$ the freedom of speech& of e(pression& or of the press& or the ri$ht of the people peacea#l% to assem#le and petition the $o*ernment for redress of $rie*ances" Greedom of expression is a(ailable only insofar as it is exercised for the discussion of matters affecting the public interest.
Clear and present danger is not needed to &ustify content+ neutral regulations. Substantial go(ernmental interest is sufficient to support them. 0smeBa v. CM2L2C, s!%ra The restriction on freedom of expression in content+neutral regulations is only incidental. 0smeBa, s!%ra Content>#ased restrictions
Content+based restrictions on freedom of expression restrict such freedom based on the content of the speech. Censorship conditions the exercise of freedom of expression upon the prior appro(al of the go(ernment. nly those ideas acceptable to it are allowed to be disseminated, all others are restricted or suppressed.
$istinctions between content+neutral and content+based:
C-T#-T+-#4T35L
C-T#-T+25S#$
Content+neutral regulations only restricts freedom of expression incidentally% thus% they are presumed a (alid exercise of police power.
Content+based restrictions are abridgements on freedom expression% thus% there is a presumption of constitutional in(alidity against them.
Since they are presumed (alid% the burden of showing that they are not is upon those who challenge the regulationJlaw.
Since they are presumed constitutionally in(alid% the burden of showing that they are (alid is upon the 9o(ernment.
They are concerned with the They are concerned with the time% place% and manner of content and substance of the exercising the freedom. speech. Substantial go(ernmental interest is sufficient to &ustify content+neutral regulations. 2"
Greedom of expression is a preferred right.
Content>neutral re$ulations
Content+neutral regulations on freedom of expression are concerned with the time% place and manner of the exercise of such freedom% and not with the content of the speech.
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Pre*ious restraint or censorship)
Clear and present danger must be shown to &ustify content+based restrictions.
Su#se'uent punishment"
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about the substanti(e e(il which the legislati(e body seeks to pre(ent. 0Ca*ansag v. &ernande:, 1"' #il. 15'
Greedom of speech includes freedom after the speech. *t has been held that freedom of expression does not co(er ideas offensi(e to public order or decency or the reputation of person which are all entitled to protection by the State.
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Three ma.or criteria for determinin$ the lia#ilit% of the indi*idual for ideas e(pressed #% him !" •
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The clear and present dan$er rule
The question in e(ery case is whether the words used are used in circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substanti(e e(ils that the State has the right to pre(ent. 0Scenc v. -nited State, '4$ -.S. $7
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The rule is that the danger created must not only be clear and present but also traceable to the ideas expressed.
Clear ! a causal connection with the danger of the substanti(e e(il arising from the utterance questioned
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resent ! refers to the time element •
The substanti(e e(il must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished.
*n #rimicias v. &!goso, )" #il. 71% the Supreme Court held that the respondent 8ayor
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The #alancin$ of interest test
;hen particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order% and the regulation results in an indirect% conditional% partial abridgement of speech% the duty of the courts is to determine which of the two conflicting interests demands the greater protection under the particular circumstances presented. 0 American Comm!nications Assoc. v. +o!ds, 33$ -.S. ')' ++ The official acts% and now e(en the pri(ate life of% a public ser(ant 0includes public figures and persons in(ol(ed in a public issue are legitimate sub&ects of public comment. The people ha(e a right to scrutini)e and commend or condemn the conduct of their chosen representati(es in the go(ernment. 5nd as long as their comments are made in good faith and with &ustifiable ends% they are insulated from prosecution or damage suits for defamation e(en if such (iews are found to be inaccurate or erroneous. *n prosecution for libellous comments against a public official% it is upon the public official concerned to pro(e that the false defamatory statement was made with actual malice% that is% with knowledge that it was false or with disregard of whether it was false or not. 00as9!e: v. CA, 314 SCRA 4(" The right to in(ade a person
Tests of obscenity: *n Reyes v. 6agatsing, 1'5 SCRA 553% the Supreme Court held that the denial by the respondent 8ayor to issue a permit to rally was in(alid because there was no showing of the probability of a clear and present danger that might arise as a result of the rally. 2" •
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The dan$erous tendenc% doctrine
*f the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the State has a right to pre(ent% then such words are punishable. *t is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force% (iolence% or unlawfulness be ad(ocated. *t is sufficient that such acts be ad(ocated in general terms. -or is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force% (iolence or unlawfulness. *t is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring
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;hether the a(erage% applying contemporary community standards% would find that the work% taken as a whole% appeals to the prurient interest, ;hether the work depicts or describes% in a patently offensi(e way% sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable law, ;hether the work% taken as a whole% lacks serious literary% artistic% political or scientific (alue.
3ules re$ardin$ the ri$ht peacea#l% to assem#le and petition the ?o*ernment •
The permit for an assembly to be held in a public place is required for the use of such place% and not for the assembly itself.
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The power of the local officials with regards to lawful assemblies is only one of regulation and not prohibition. 0#rimicias v. &!goso, s!%ra 8eaning mag designate lang sila ug other place or time. 5nother place may be designated by the licensing authorities upon clear and con(incing e(idence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger that will bring about the substanti(e e(ils that such authorities has a right to pre(ent. *f the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit% the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law. 0Sec. (DeE, 6.#. 6lg. ))"
5 permit for the holding of a public assembly shall not be necessary where the meeting is to be held: 1. ". '.
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*n a pri(ate place, *n the campus of a go(ernment+owned and operated educational institution, *n a freedom park. 0#!*lic Assemnly Act, 6.#. 6lg. ))"
;here a permit is required% the written application therefor shall be filed with the mayor
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The establishment clause is not (iolated if: 1. ". '.
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3ights to peaceably assemble and petition the go(ernment for redress of grie(ances% like any other liberty% must be exercised within reasonable limits so as not to pre&udice the public welfare. 0+e la Cr!: v. CA, 3"5 SCRA 3"3 *f they exercise their right beyond the reasonable limits% they may be penali)ed% not because they exercised such right but because of the manner they exercised such right. 06angalisan v. CA, '7( SCRA (1$ roperty rights are inferior to the rights of free expression and of assembly. 0#6M 2m%loyees v. #il. 6looming Mills Co., 51 SCRA 1)$
Freedom of 3eli$ion 3eligion ! any specific system of belief% worship% conduct% etc.% often in(ol(ing a code of ethics and philosophy •
3eligion embraces matters of faith and dogma% as well as doubt% agnosticism and atheism.
Section 8& Article III" No law shall #e made respectin$ an esta#lishment of reli$ion& or prohi#itin$ the free e(ercise thereof"""
The statute has a secular legislati(e purpose, *ts principal or primary effect is one that neither ad(ances nor inhibits religion, and *t does not foster an excessi(e go(ernment entanglement with religion.
Greedom of religion includes freedom from religion, the right to worship includes the right not to worship.
*n 2ngel v. 0itale, 37" -.S. 4'1% the 4.S. Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional the recitation by the student in public schools in -ew Mork of a prayer. *t held that the State aligned itself with the worshiper as against the atheist and (iolated its obligation to maintain an attitude of strict neutrality in religious matters. Section 2< /20& Article @I" -o public money or property shall be appropriated% applied% paid or employed directly or indirectly% for the use% benefit% or support of any sect% church% denomination% sectarian institution% or system of religion% or of any priest% preacher% minister% or other religious teacher% or dignitary as such% except when such priest% preacher% minister% or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces% or to any penal institution or go(ernment orphanage or leprosarium. •
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The doctrine of the separation of Church and State cuts both ways. *t is not only the State that is prohibited from interfering in purely ecclesiastical affairs, the Church is likewise barred from meddling in purely secular matters.
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5ny benefit indirectly en&oyed by a religious institution% as long as such benefit was only incidental to a legitimate secular ob&ecti(e% would not (iolate the prohibition. 0 Agli%ay v. R!i:, (4 #il. '"1 *n ?arces v. 2sten:o F1"5 SCRA 51"G, the Supreme Court ruled that the purchase of a religious image by a barangay council with pri(ate funds raised from (oluntary contributions did not (iolate the Constitution. Section "K 0" does not inhibit the use of public property for religious purposes when the religious character of such use is merely incidental to a temporary use which is a(ailable indiscriminately to the public in general. ayment of public funds is prohibited to ecclesiastics only >as such%? which means that they may be paid from public funds if they ser(e the go(ernment in a non+ecclesiastical capacity.
Section 4 /40& Article I@" 5t the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians% religion shall be allowed to be taught to their children or wards in public elementary and high schools within the regular class hours by instructors designated or appro(ed by the religious authorities of the religion to which the children or wards belong% without additional cost to the 9o(ernment. Section 2; /40& Article @I" Charitable institutions% churches and personage and con(ents appurtenant thereto% mosques% non+profit cemeteries% and all lands% buildings% and impro(ements% actually% directly and exclusi(ely used for religious% charitable or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
0The taxes co(ered by the constitutional exemption are real estate taxes or ad (alorem taxes imposed on the property itself. D5s distinguished from excise taxesE 0 Lladoc v. C;R, 14 SCRA '$' +o+ •
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*ntramural disputes regarding religious dogma and other matters of faith are outside the &urisdiction of the secular authorities. ;here the dispute in(ol(es the property rights of the religious group% or the relations of the members where property rights are in(ol(ed% the ci(il courts may assume &urisdiction. #xample is in the case of &onacier v. CA, $( #il. 417 % where the SC applied the pertinent laws and the internal rules of the hilippine *ndependent Church to determine who between the two persons is the head of the church and thus has the right to control its properties. ;here a ci(il right depends upon some matter pertaining to ecclesiastical affairs% the ci(il tribunal tries the ci(il right and nothing more% taking the ecclesiastical decision out of which the ci(il right has arisen as it finds them% and accepting those decisions as matters ad&udicated by another &urisdiction. 0?on:ales v. Arc*iso% of Manila, 51 #il. 4'"
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Freedom to #elie*e
This freedom is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. 2" Freedom to act on oneBs #elief
*n olentino v. Sec. of &inance, '35 SCRA (3" % the registration fee of 1%FFF was upheld by the Supreme Court because such fee was not imposed on the exercise of a pri(ilege but only for the purpose of defraying part of the cost of registration.
Li#ert% of A#ode and Tra*el Section 9& Article III" The li#ert% of a#ode and of chan$in$ the same within the limits prescri#ed #% law shall not #e impaired e(cept upon lawful order of the court" Neither shall the ri$ht to tra*el #e impaired e(cept in the interest of national securit%& pu#lic safet% or pu#lic health& as ma% #e pro*ided #% law" •
;here the indi(idual externali)es his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public% his freedom to do so becomes sub&ect to the authority of the State. The constitutional pro(ision on religious freedom terminated disabilities% it did not create new pri(ileges. *t ga(e religious liberty% not ci(il immunity. *ts essence is freedom from conformity to religion% not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma. 0@. 0a. 6oard of ed!cation v. 6arnette, '1$ -.S. ('4
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#xamples: 1.
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ne has full freedom to belie(e in Satan% but he may not offer the ob&ect of his piety a human sacrifice% as this would be murder. ne has freedom to belie(e in the 2iblical command to >go forth and multiply%? but he is not allowed to contract plural marriages in (iolation of the laws against bigamy.
5s long as it can be shown that the exercise of the right does not impair the public welfare% the attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit such right would be an unconstitutional encroachment.
The freedom to act in one
*n American 6i*le Society, s!%ra% the Supreme Court held that the ordinance requiring petitioner to obtain a license and pay the corresponding fee for being engaged in the sale of merchandise unconstitutional. The SC said that petitioner was not engaged in the sale of merchandise but was in the exercise of his freedom to religion. Such pri(ilege is not sub&ect to license and fees.
( ( ( The free e(ercise and en.o%ment of reli$ious profession and worship& without discrimination or preference& shall fore*er #e allowed" No reli$ious test shall #e re'uired for the e(ercise of ci*il or political ri$hts" Aspects of the ri$ht to reli$ious profession and worship
5ny restraint in the freedom to act in one
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5n employment agency% regardless of the amount it may ad(ance to a prospecti(e employee% has absolutely no power to curtail the freedom of said employee. The fact that power to control said freedom may be an effecti(e means of a(oiding monetary loss to the agency is no reason for &eopardi)ing a fundamental human right. 0Ca!nca v. Sala:ar, )' #il. )51 *t is desirable that respondent Tra(el rocessing Center should exercise the utmost care to a(oid the impression that certain citi)ens desirous of exercising their constitutional right to tra(el could be sub&ected to incon(enience or annoyance. 0Salonga v. ermoso, $7 SCRA 1'1 5n order of a court to a person released on bail to remain to be a resident in a certain area constitutes a lawful order as contemplated by the pro(ision in the Constitution. 0 Ha% v. CA, 35) SCRA 5(4 ro(isions of law limiting en&oyment of liberty should be strictly construed against the go(ernment and in fa(or of the indi(idual. The power of the court to restrict the right to tra(el of an accused released on bail is inherent on their power to administer &ustice.
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The right to tra(el refers to the right to mo(e from one place to another. 0Mirasol v. +#@, 4$" SCRA 31)
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Access to Information
rders and decisions of the courts are matters of public concern and the public has a right to be informed. 6owe(er% when it comes to pleadings and other documents filed by the parties to a case% the purpose for which they are sought is to be considered. 0ilado v. Reyes, '$( SCRA ')'
3emedies: Section :& Article III" The ri$ht of the people to information on matters of pu#lic concern shall #e reco$ni6ed" Access to official records& and to documents and papers pertainin$ to official acts& transactions& or decisions& as well as to $o*ernment research data used as #asis for polic% de*elopment& shall #e afforded the citi6en su#.ect to such limitations as ma% #e pro*ided #% law"
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3i$ht of Association •
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#xcept perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is unlawful or sheer% idle curiosity% we do not belie(e it is the duty under the law of registration officers to concern themsel(es with the moti(es% reasons% and ob&ects of the persons seeking access to the records. 06aldo:a v. +imaano, 71 SCRA 14 The authority to regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry with it the power to prohibit.
Section ;& Article III" The ri$ht of the people& includin$ those emplo%ed in the pu#lic and pri*ate sectors& to form unions& associations or societies for purposes not contrar% to law shall not #e a#rid$ed" Section 2 /80& Article I>" The right to self+organi)ation shall not be denied to go(ernment employees. •
$istinctions between the discretion to refuse outri$ht the disclosure of or access to a particular information and the authorit% to re$ulate the manner in which the access is to #e afforded: •
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The refusal may only be made by the Legislature by law, while regulation pertains to the go(ernment agency charged with the custody of public records. ;hile the manner of examining public records may be sub&ect to reasonable regulation by the go(ernment agency in custody thereof% the duty to disclose the information of public concern% and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies.
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#xecuti(e pri(ilege% whether asserted against Congress% the courts% or the public% is recogni)ed only in relation to certain types of information of a sensiti(e character. The extraordinary character of the exemption indicates that the presumption inclines hea(ily against executi(e secrecy and in fa(or of disclosure. 0Senate v. 2ec. Sec., 4)) SCRA 1
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8atters co(ered by the executi(e pri(ilege: 1. ". '.
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Some of the recogni)ed restrictions on freedom of information: 1. ". '. . •
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8embers of the ci(il ser(ice may not declare a strike to enforce their economic demands. 0 Alliance of ?overnment @orers v. Ministry of La*or and 2m%loyment, 1'4 SCRA 1 Laborers who are inhibited from &oining labor unions because of their religious beliefs ha(e the right not to associate in spite of any closed+shop agreement with the management. The right to associate includes the right not to associate. 00ictoriano v. 2li:alde Ro%e @orerIs -nion, 5$ SCRA 54 9#-#35L 34L#: The right to associate includes the right not to associate. #IC#T*-: Closed+shop agreement 5 closed+shop agreement is a (alid form of union security and a pro(ision therefor in a collecti(e bargaining agreement is not considered a restriction of the right of association. 00illar v. ;nciong, 1'1 SCRA 444 3#5S- for the (alidity of a closed+shop agreement: The purpose of the self+organi)ation of the workers could be thwarted if e(ery worker were to choose to go his own separate way instead of &oining his co+employees in planning collecti(e action and presenting a united front when they sit down to bargain with their employees. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the *ntegrated 2ar is not (iolati(e of his constitutional freedom to associate 0and not to associate. 0;n re 2dillon, )4 SCRA 554 Section H only guarantees the right to associate. *t does not guarantee registration as a group.
-ational security matters and intelligence information, Trade secrets and banking transactions, Criminal matters, and ther confidential information.
Cases on 3.5. -o. K"@" and child abuse are prohibited from public knowledge.
The Impairment Clause Section !=& Article III" No law impairin$ the o#li$ation of contracts shall #e passed"
Contract ! refers to any lawful agreement on property or property rights% whether real or personal% tangible or intangible
Section !!& Article III" Free access to the courts and 'uasi> .udicial #odies and ade'uate le$al assistance shall not #e denied to an% person #% reason of po*ert%"
;hat >contracts? include: 1. ". '. .
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#xecuted or executor contracts, Contract between pri(ate persons only% natural or artificial, Contracts between pri(ate persons and the go(ernment or its agencies, Granchises or charters granted to pri(ate persons or entities.
The >contracts? herein do not include licenses% as these in(ol(e grants of pri(ileges only that are essentially re(ocable.
The Writ of a#eas Corpus ;rit of habeas corpus ! a writ directed to the person detaining another% commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place% with the day and cause of his caption and detention% to do% to submit to% and recei(e whate(er the court or &udge awarding the writ shall consider in his behalf •
License ! merely a permit or pri(ilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful and not a contract with the go(ernment •
5 public office is not a property right and therefore cannot be the sub&ect of a contract between the incumbent and the go(ernment. The office itself% if created by statute% may be modified or e(en abolished or any of its incidents may be changed% as b y reduction of the term or the salary. The exception already noted is where the salary has already been earned% in which case it will be deemed a (ested property right that cannot be withdrawn or reduced by retroacti(e legislation. 0Mississi%%i v. Miller, '7( -.S. 174
Law ! includes statutes enacted by the national legislature% executi(e orders and administrati(e regulations promulgated under a (alid delegation of power% and municipal ordinances passed by the local legislati(e bodies
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The function of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one
;hen the writ of habeas corpus is a(ailable: 1. ".
bligation ! the law or duty which binds the parties to perform their undertaking or agreement according to the terms of the contract and the intent of the parties
'. *mpairment ! anything that diminishes the efficacy of the contract, the obligation is reduced or increased% the period of payment is shortened or lengthened% conditions are added or remo(ed% remedies to enforce right are completely withdrawn •
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*n the case of remedies for the enforcement of rights of the parties% there will be impairment only if all of them are withdrawn% with the result that either of the parties will be unable to enforce his rights under the original agreement. There will be no impairment% in other words% as long as a substantial and efficacious remedy remains. 5nd this rule holds true e(en if the remedy retained is the most difficult to employ and it is the easier ones that are withdrawn. 0Manila rading Co. v. Reyes, (' #il. 4(1 5n obligation may be impaired by law if the law is in the proper exercise of police power. The obligation% howe(er% is not considered impaired within the meaning of the impairment clause. The legislature cannot bargain away the police power through the medium of a contract.
Free Access to Courts
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5rbitrary detention, 8oral restraint% as where a housemaid is pre(ented from lea(ing her employ because of the influence of the person detaining her, ;hen con(iction was made by a court without &urisdiction, ;here the sentence has become in(alid, ;hen a person is sentenced to a longer penalty than that subsequently meted out to another person con(icted of the same offense, *n case of unlawful denial of bail, ;hen there is denial of the right to a speedy trial.
Section !8& Article III" The pri*ile$e of the writ of ha#eas corpus shall not #e suspended e(cept in cases of in*asion or re#ellion when pu#lic safet% re'uires it" •
Suspension of the pri(ilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not suspend the writ itself% but only its pri(ilege. This means that when the court recei(es an application for the writ% and it finds the petition in proper form% it will issue the writ as a matter of course% i.e.% the court will issue an order commanding the production before the court of the person allegedly detained% at a time and place stated in the order% and requiring the true cause of his detention to be shown to the court. *f the return to the writ shows that the person in custody was apprehended and detained in areas where the pri(ilege of the writ has been suspended or for crimes mentioned in the executi(e proclamation% the court will suspend further proceedings in the action. 02 #arte Milligan, 4 @all. 131
Section !;& Article @II" ( ( ( *n case of in(asion or rebellion% when the public safety requires it% he may for a period not exceeding sixty days% suspend the pri(ilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the hilippines or any part thereof under martial law"""
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((( The Supreme Court may re(iew% in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citi)en% the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the pri(ilege of the writ or the extension thereof% and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. 5 state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution% nor supplant the functioning of the ci(il courts or legislati(e assemblies% nor authori)e the conferment of &urisdiction on military courts and agencies o(er ci(ilians where ci(il courts are able to function% nor automatically suspend the pri(ilege of the writ. The suspension of the writ shall apply only to persons &udicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with in(asion.
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5ll citi)ens may be required% under conditions pro(ided by law% to render personal military or ci(il ser(ice. 0Sec. 4, Article ;; 5 person who enlists in the ser(ice of a merchant (essel may be compelled to remain in such ser(ice until the end of the (oyage for which he contracted. *n pursuit of persons who ha(e (iolated the law% such as brigands% the authorities might command all the male inhabitants of a certain age to assist them. 0 -.S. v. #om%eya, 31 #il. '45 Striking workers in industries affected with public interest may be required to return to work pending settlement of the labor dispute. 0>aisaan ng Manggagawa sa >aoy v. ?otamco Sawmills, 45 .?. 147 4nemancipated minors come under the patria potestas and so are obliged to obey their parents so long as they are under parental power% and to obser(e respect and re(erence toward them always.
*n Ca!nca v. Sala:ar, s!%ra% the Supreme Court released on habeas corpus a housemaid who was being detained and required to render domestic ser(ices in payment for the money ad(anced for her transportation from the pro(ince.
$uring the suspension of the pri(ilege of the writ% any person thus arrested or detained shall be &udicially charged within three days% otherwise he shall be released.
Speed% ,isposition of Cases Non>Imprisonment for ,e#t Section !9& Article III" All persons shall ha*e the ri$ht to a speed% disposition of their cases #efore all .udicial& 'uasi> .udicial& or administrati*e #odies"
Section 2=& Article III" No person shall #e imprisoned for de#t or non>pa%ment of a poll ta(" $ebt ! refers to any ci(il obligation arising from contract% expressed or implied
In*oluntar% Ser*itude •
Section !;& Article III" /!0 No person shall #e detained solel% #% reason of his political #eliefs and aspirations" /20 No in*oluntar% ser*itude in an% form shall e(ist e(cept as a punishment for a crime whereof the part% shall ha*e #een dul% con*icted"
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*n(oluntary ser(itude ! the condition of one who is compelled by force% coercion% or imprisonment and against his will% to labor for another% whether he is paid or not Sla(ery ! that ci(il relation in which one man has absolute power o(er the life% fortune and liberty of another eonage ! a condition of enforced ser(itude by which the ser(itor is restrained of his liberty and compelled to labor in liquidation of some debt or obligation% real or pretended% against his will #xceptions to the prohibition on in(oluntary ser(itude:
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2ut although the debtor cannot be imprisoned for his failure to pay his debt% he can be (alidly punished in a criminal action if he contracted his debt through fraud. *n such a case% the act for which he is penali)ed is the deception he employed in securing the debt% not his default in paying it. The gra(amen of the offense punished by 2.. 2lg. "" is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. *t is not the non+payment of an obligation which the law punishes. Since tax is not a debt but arises from the obligation of the person to contribute his share in the maintenance of the go(ernment% failure to pay the same can be (alidly punished with imprisonment. #xception: oll tax
oll tax ! a specific fixed sum le(ied upon e(ery person belonging to a certain class without regard to his property or occupation
+( Post Facto Laws
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Section 22& Article III" No e( post facto law or #ill of attainder shall #e enacted" #x post facto law is one which: 1.
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8akes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done% and punishes such an act, 5ggra(ates a crime% or makes it greater than it was% when committed, Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed, 5lters the legal rules of e(idence% and authori)es con(iction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, 5ssumes to regulate ci(il rights and remedies only% in effect imposes penalty or depri(ation of a right for something which when done was lawful, and $epri(es a person accused of a crime some lawful protection to which he has become entitled% such as the protection of a former con(iction or acquittal% or a proclamation of amnesty.
*n #eo%le v. Com%il, '44 SCRA 135 % the accused upon his arrest in 7ue)on City was interrogated by the police while being transported back to 8anila% where his formal in(estigation was conducted at the police station. The Supreme Court held that his custodial in(estigation started in 7ue)on City. 6is right to counsel has began from the time when he was interrogated in 7ue)on City. •
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Characteristics of an ex post facto law: •
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1. 3efers to criminal matters, ". 3etroacti(e in its application, '. re&udices the accused. 5 law pro(iding for the suspension pende lite of any public officer or employee accused of offenses in(ol(ing fraudulent use of public funds or property% including those charged earlier% is not ex post facto e(en if applied retroacti(ely because the suspension was not puniti(e but merely pre(enti(e. 06ayot v. Sandigan*ayan, 1') SCRA 3)3
5ny person arrested% detained or under custodial in(estigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel. 0Sec. ', R.A. 8o. 743) The right to counsel may be wai(ed but to insure that the wai(er is (oluntary and intelligent% the wai(er must be in writing and in the presence of the counsel of the accused. 0#eo%le v. +el Castillo, 43$ SCRA ("1 *n custodial in(estigation only% not in trial.
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3i$hts of the Accused •
Custodial in(estigation ! the stage where the police in(estigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsol(ed crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out the process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statement, this includes the practice of issuing an in(itation to a person who is in(estigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to ha(e committed% without pre&udice to the liability of the in(iting officer for any (iolation of law
5 barangay chairman is not deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying the right to counsel. Thus% a suspect
3equisites for the (alidity of an extra&udicial confession in custodial in(estigation:
2ill of attainder ! a legislati(e act which inflicts punishment without trial% its essence being the substitution of legislati(e fiat for a &udicial determination of guilt
Section !2& Article III" /!0 An% person under in*esti$ation for the commission of an offense shall ha*e the ri$ht to #e informed of his ri$ht to remain silent and to ha*e competent and independent counsel prefera#l% of his own choice" If the person cannot afford the ser*ices of counsel& he must #e pro*ided with one" These ri$hts cannot #e wai*ed e(cept in writin$ and in the presence of counsel"
8ere inquiry on the commission of a crime by law enforcement authorities does not automatically trigger the application of the right to counsel. *t is only after the in(estigation ceased to be a general inquiry and begins to focus on a particular suspect% the suspect is taken into custody% and the police carries out a process of interrogations that lend itself to eliciting incriminating statements.
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*t must be (oluntary, *t shall be in writing and signed by the person arrested% detained or under custodial in(estigation, *t must be signed in the presence of his counsel or in the latter
;hen things were sei)ed from an accused during arrest% the signing of the receipt for the things sei)ed by the accused must be with the presence of a counsel. Tactical interrogation is included in Section 1". Section 1" does not apply in cases where the accused signed the marked money used during a buy+bust operation without counsel. The signed marked money is admissible in court e(en if it was signed without counsel. Confession made to a TN reporter is admissible in court. 0#eo%le v. a*oga, 37( SCRA 5"5 Counsel is not necessary in administrati(e in(estigations. Statements in a counter+affida(it are admissible e(en if executed without counsel.
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but not yet pro(en guilty and to relie(e the accused of imprisonment and the State of the burden of keeping him% pending trial.
3es gestae statements are admissible e(en without counsel. The rights under Section 1" apply only to custodial in(estigation or questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise depri(ed of his freedom of action in any significant way. 0Se*astian v. ?acitorena, 343 SCRA 4(3
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There is a presumption that the rights in Section 1" are not afforded to the accused. The prosecution has the burden of proof. •
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There is a presumption that the wai(er is in(alid. rosecution has the burden to pro(e otherwise.
/20 No torture& force& *iolence threat or intimidation& or an% other means which *itiate the free will shall #e used a$ainst him" Secret detention places& solitar%& incommunicado & or other similar forms of detention are prohi#ited"
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0There is a presumption that these acts are not done by law enforcers. /40 An% confession or admission o#tained in *iolation of this or Section !: shall #e inadmissi#le in e*idence a$ainst him" •
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Section !4& Article III" All persons& e(cept those char$ed with offenses punisha#le #% reclusion perpetua when the e*idence of $uilt is stron$ shall& #efore con*iction& #e #aila#le #% sufficient sureties& or #e released on reco$ni6ance as ma% #e pro*ided #% law""" Section !" Bail defined " D ail is the security gi(en for the release of a person in custody of the law% furnished by him or a bondsman% to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified. 2ail may be gi(en in the form of corporate surety% property bond% cash deposit% or recogni)ance. 0R!le 114, R!les of Co!rt •
The purpose of bail is to combine the administration of criminal &ustice with the con(enience of a person accused
The right to bail has traditionally not been recogni)ed and it is not a(ailable in the military. 0Commendador v. +e 0illa, '"" SCRA )" 2y its definition% bail requires that a person must first be in the custody of the law or depri(ed of his liberty before it can be a(ailed of. 0Manig*as v. L!na, $) #il. 4(( 2ail cannot be denied simply because the person detained has not yet been formally charged in court but is still under in(estigation for the commission of an offense. if one who has already been indicted is entitled to bail% there is no reason why another who has not yet been charged ! against whom prima facie case has not yet been established ! should be denied a similar right. 0 eeanee v. Rovira, 4' .?. 717
*f bail can be granted in deportation cases% there is no reason why it should not be granted in extradition cases if petitioner is not a flight risk. 0 ?overnment of ong >ong v. lalia, A%ril 1$, '""7
5 re+enactment of the crime in the absence of counsel is inadmissible e(idence against the accused. 0 #eo%le v. S!are:, '(7 SCRA 11$
/50 The law shall pro*ide for penal and ci*il sanctions for *iolations of this section as well as compensation to and reha#ilitation of *ictims of torture or similar practices& and their families"
The right to bail is not suspended by the suspension of the pri(ilege of the writ of habeas corpus. 0Section 13, Article ;;;, 1$) Constit!tion
>*n custody of the law? may mean 01 physical or actual custody% or 0" constructi(e custody. 0 #ederanga v. CA, '47 SCRA 41
The right to counsel is not a(ailable during a police line+up as this is not considered part of the custodial in(estigation. 0+e la orre v. CA, '$4 SCRA 1$(
;hile the right to be represented by counsel is absolute% the accused
The right to bail is a constitutional right. *t is personal in nature and is therefore% wai(able. 0#aderanga c. CA, '47 SCRA 741
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2efore the complaint or information is filed% the person arrested may ask for a preliminary in(estigation in accordance with this 3ule% but he must sign a wai(er of the pro(isions of 5rticle 1"/ of the 3e(ised enal Code% as amended% in the presence of his counsel. -otwithstanding the wai(er% he may apply for #ail and the in(estigation must be terminated within fifteen 01/ days from its inception. 0Sec. (, R!le 11', R!les of Co!rt
( ( ( The ri$ht to #ail shall not #e impaired e*en when the pri*ile$e of the writ of ha#eas corpus is suspended" +(cessi*e #ail shall not #e re'uired" Section 2" Conditions of the bail ) requirements" D All -inds of #ail are su#.ect to the followin$ conditions /a0 The underta-in$ shall #e effecti*e upon appro*al& and unless cancelled& shall remain in force at all sta$es of the case until promul$ation of the .ud$ment of the 3e$ional Trial Court& irrespecti*e of whether the case was ori$inall% filed in or appealed to it) 0The accused ha(e to apply for another bail after promulgation of the &udgement of the 3TC. *f granted% the accused may continue his pro(isional liberty under the same bail pro(ided the bondsman consents. D %ar. ', Sec. 5 E
/#0 The accused shall appear #efore the proper court whene*er re'uired #% the court of these 3ules) /c0 The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without .ustification and despite due notice shall #e deemed a wai*er of his ri$ht to #e present thereat" In such case& the trial ma% proceed in absentia) and /d0 The #ondsman shall surrender the accused to the court for e(ecution of the final .ud$ment" The ori$inal papers shall state the full name and address of the accused& the amount of the underta-in$ and the conditions herein re'uired" Photo$raphs /passport si6e0 ta-en within the last si( /90 months showin$ the face& left and ri$ht profiles of the accused must #e attached to the #ail" /2a0 Section 4" No release or transfer excet on court order or bail " D No person under detention #% le$al process shall #e released or transferred e(cept upon order of the court or when he is admitted to #ail" /4a0
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The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal% pro(ided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. 6owe(er% if the decision of the trial court con(icting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non+bailable to bailable% the application for bail can only be filed with and resol(ed by the appellate court. Should the court $rant the application& the accused ma% #e allowed to continue on pro*isional li#ert% durin$ the pendenc% of the appeal under the same #ail su#.ect to the consent of the #ondsman" If the penalt% imposed #% the trial court is imprisonment e(ceedin$ si( /90 %ears& the accused shall #e denied #ail& or his #ail shall #e cancelled upon a showin$ #% the prosecution& with notice to the accused& of the followin$ or other similar circumstances /a0 That he is a recidi*ist& 'uasi>recidi*ist& or ha#itual delin'uent& or has committed the crime a$$ra*ated #% the circumstance of reiteration)
Section 5" Bail, a matter of ri!ht ) excetion" D All persons in custod% shall #e admitted to #ail as a matter of ri$ht& with sufficient sureties& or released on reco$ni6e as prescri#ed #% law or this 3ule
/#0 That he has pre*iousl% escaped from le$al confinement& e*aded sentence& or *iolated the conditions of his #ail without *alid .ustification)
/a0 #efore or after con*iction #% the Eetropolitan Trial Court& Eunicipal Trial Court& Eunicipal Trial Court in Cities& or Eunicipal Circuit Trial Court& and /#0 #efore con*iction #% the 3e$ional Trial Court of an offense not punisha#le #% death& reclusion eretua& or life imprisonment" /5a0 /c0 2efore con(iction by the 3egional Trial Court of an offense punishable by death% reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the e(idence of guilt is not strong. •
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;here bail is a matter of right% the existence of a high probability that the defendant will abscond confers upon the court no greater discretion than to increase the bond that would assure his presence when wanted. 0San Mig!el v. !dge Maceda, A%ril 4, '""7 The remedy of the petitioner from the order of the trial court denying a petition for bail is to file a petition for certiorari if the trial court committed a gra(e abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of &urisdiction in issuing the said order. 0#eo%le v. ?ome:, 3'5 SCRA (1
Section 8" Bail & when discretionar"" D Upon con*iction #% the 3e$ional Trial Court of an offense not punisha#le #% death& reclusion eretua& or life imprisonment& admission to #ail is discretionar%" Where to file #ail after con*iction #% the 3TC !" 2"
Appellate Court) or 3TC despite the filin$ of a notice of appeal& pro*ided the followin$ conditions concur a" The ori$inal record of the case has not #een transmitted to the appellate court) and
The decision of the 3TC con*ictin$ the accused has not chan$ed the nature of the offense from non>#aila#le to #aila#le"
/c0 That he committed the offense while under pro#ation& parole& or conditional pardon) /d0 That the circumstances of his case indicate the pro#a#ilit% of fli$ht if released on #ail) or /e0 That there is undue ris- that he ma% commit another crime durin$ the pendenc% of the appeal" The appellate court ma%& motu rorio or on motion of an% part%& re*iew the resolution of the 3e$ional Trial Court after notice to the ad*erse part% in either case" /8a0 •
5 finding that none of the circumstances enumerated in paragraph '% Section / of 3ule 11 is present does not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authori)e the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach. 0Leviste v. CA, Marc 17, '"1"
Section 9" Caital offense defined " D A capital offense is an offense which& under the law e(istin$ at the time of its commission and of the application for admission to #ail& ma% #e punished with death" /9a0 Section :" Caital offense or an offense unishable b" reclusion eretua or life imrisonment, not bailable " D No person char$ed with a capital offense& or an offense punisha#le #% reclusion eretua or life imprisonment& shall #e admitted to #ail when e*idence of $uilt is stron$& re$ardless of the sta$e of the criminal prosecution" /:a0
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/.0 Pendenc% of other cases where the accused is on #ail"
The general rule is that a hearing upon notice is mandatory before the grant of bail% whether bail is a matter of right or discretion.
+(cessi*e #ail shall not #e re'uired" /
Section !5& Article III" /!0 No person shall #e held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law" 0See comments in Section 1% 5rticle *** •
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-otify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation, Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present e(idence to show that guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the courts to exercise its sound discretion, $ecide whether the e(idence of guilt is strong based on the summary of e(idence of the prosecution, *f the e(idence guilt of the accused is not strong% discharge the accused upon the appro(al of the bail bond.
*n the hearing for a petition for bail by an accused charged with an offense punishable by death% reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment% the presentation of mitigating circumstance will be considered unless the prosecution ob&ects. 5nd if such presentation of mitigating circumstance makes the maximum penalty for the offense less than reclusion perpetua% bail becomes a matter of right. 06ravo v. 6or/a, 134 SCRA 4((
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/a0 Financial a#ilit% of the accused t o $i*e #ail) /#0 Nature and circumstances of the offense)
The rule is that the right to preliminary in(estigation is wai(ed when the accused fails to in(oke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. 0?o v. CA, '"( SCRA 13) WAI@+3 OF T+ 3I?T TO P3+LIENA3 IN@+STI?ATION 6ow to in(oke the rightO 2y filing a 8otion to Conduct a reliminary *n(estigation.
Article 2" Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the fficial 9a)ette 0or in a newspaper of general circulation in the hilippines% unless it is otherwise pro(ided. 0Civil Code of te #ili%%ines •
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Section <" Amount of bail ) !uidelines" D The .ud$e who issued the warrant or $ranted the application shall fi( a reasona#le amount of #ail considerin$ primaril%& #ut not limited to& the followin$ factors
The holding of a preliminary in(estigation is not required by the Constitution. *t is not a fundamental right and is not among those rights guaranteed in the 2ill of 3ights. The right thereto is of a statutory character and may be in(oked only when specifically created by statute. 0Marinas v. Sioci, 1"4 SCRA 4'3 6owe(er% since it has been established by statute% it becomes a component of due process in criminal &ustice. $enial of this right% in the absence of a (alid wai(er% will (iolate due process. 06!nye v. Sandigan*ayan, '"5
$ue process is denied where a person is impleaded for (iolation of a law% administrati(e regulation or municipal ordinance not pre(iously published as he would not know what acts he must do or a(oid to pre(ent prosecution. ;here appeal is permitted by the Constitution or by statute% denial thereof will also militate against due process. 0Reyes v. CA, )" SCRA 143
Section !5& Article III" /20 In all criminal prosecutions& the accused shall #e presumed innocent until the contrar% is pro*ed& " " " Section ! /a0" To be presumed innocent until the contrary is pro(ed beyond reasonable doubt. 0R!le 115, R!les of Co!rt
/c0 Penalt% for the offense char$ed) •
/d0 Character and reputation of the accused) /e0 A$e and health of the accused)
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/f0 Wei$ht of the e*idence a$ainst the accused) /$0 Pro#a#ilit% of the accused appearin$ at the trial) •
/h0 Forfeiture of other #ail) /i0 The fact that accused was a fu$iti*e from .ustice when arrested) and
5ccusation is not synonymous with guilt. 0 #eo%le v. +ramayo, 4' SCRA 5$ ;hile the law enforcers en&oy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties% this presumption cannot pre(ail o(er the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot by itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 0#eo%le v. Cantale/o, ?.R. 8o. 1)'7$" The onus probandi on the prosecution is not discharged by casting doubts upon the innocence of an accused% but by eliminating all reasonable doubts as to his guilt. 0#eo%le v. Mirantes, '"$ SCRA 17$
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*t is generally conceded that the legislature has the power to pro(ide that proof of certain facts can constitute prima facie e(idence of the guilt of the accused and then shift the burden of proof to the accused pro(ided there is a rational connection between the facts pro(ed and the ultimate fact presumed. 0i:on v. CA, '(5 SCRA 517 roof beyond reasonable doubt does not require that the guilt of the accused must be shown with absolute certainty. The rule merely requires moral certainty. 0#eo%le v. Malilay, (3 SCRA 4'", citing -.S. v. Lasada
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The requisites of trial in absentia: 1. ". '. •
*n establishing the guilt of the accused% &urisprudence requires that the prosecution must rest on its own merits and must not rely on the weakness of the defenses.
#quipoise rule ! where the e(idence of the parties in a criminal case is e(enly balanced% the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in fa(our of the accused ( ( ( and shall en.o% the ri$ht to #e heard #% himself and counsel " " " Section ! /c0" To be present and defend in person and by counsel at e(ery stage of the proceedings% from arraignment to promulgation of the &udgment. The accused may% howe(er% wai(e his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail% unless his presence is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The a#sence of the accused without .ustifia#le cause at the trial of which he had notice shall #e considered a wai*er of his ri$ht to #e present thereat" ;hen an accused under custody escapes% he shall be deemed to ha(e wai(ed his right to be present on all subsequent trial dates until custody o(er him is regained. 4pon motion% the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his right without the assistance of counsel. 0R!le 115, R!les of Co!rt
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To be present at e(ery stage of the proceedings% from arraignment to promulgation of the &udgement, To defend in person and by counsel at e(ery stage of the proceedings% from arraignment to promulgation of the &udgement.
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4pon the termination of a trial in absentia% the court has the duty to rule upon the e(idence presented in court. The court need not wait for the time until the accused who escape from custody finally decides to appear in court to present his e(idence and cross+examine the witnesses against him. 0?imene: v. 8a:areno, 1(" SCRA 1
;hen an accused is silent when he should speak% in circumstances where an innocent person so situated would ha(e spoken% on being accused of a crime% his silence and omission are admissible e(idence against him. 0#eo%le v. +elmendo, '$( SCRA 371
( ( ( to #e informed of the nature and cause of accusation a$ainst him " " " •
The defendant is denied the right to be informed of the charge against him% and to due process as well% where the statute itself is couched in such indefinite language that is not possible for men of ordinary intelligence to determine therefrom what acts or omissions are punished and% hence% should be a(oided. 0e voidJforJvag!eness r!le
Section ! /#0" To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 0R!le 115, R!les of Co!rt
*nstances when the accused may not be allowed to wai(e his presence in court: $uring arraignment because he is required to personally enter his plea, 5t the promulgation of &udgement, $uring trial for purposes of identification, 5ny other instances when the court so requires with due notice.
Trial in absentia does not abrogate the pro(isions of the 3ules of Court regarding forfeiture of the bail bond if the accused fails to appear at his trial. 0 #eo%le v. #rieto, )4 SCRA 1$)
B5merican rule is used, only matters co(ered by the direct examination as distinguished from Section @% 3ule 1'" on the 3ules on #(idence where the #nglish rule is used wherein cross+examination not only on matters co(ered by the direct examination but also those connected therewith are allowed.
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The accused has already been arraigned, 6e has been duly notified of the trial, 6is failure to appear is un&ustified.
Section ! /d0" To testify as a witness in his own behalf but sub&ect to cross+examination on matters co(ered by direct examinationB. 6is silence shall not in any manner pre&udice him. 0R!le 115, R!les of Co!rt
Two rights here: 1.
The right of the accused to counsel in criminal proceedings has ne(er been considered sub&ect to wai(er. 0&lores v. R!i:, $" SCRA 4'$
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The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation is not wai(able because public interest is in(ol(ed% the public ha(ing an interest in seeing to it that no person is unlawfully depri(ed of his life or liberty. 0 -.S. v. #alisoc, 4 #il. '"7 The (ariance in the identities of the check described in the information and the check allegedly issued and admitted in e(idence (iolates the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 0+ico v. CA, 45' SCRA 441
Section ;" #esi!nation of the offense" D The complaint or information shall: !"
state the designation of the offense gi(en by the statute% D8ot an essential element of a com%laint or information *eca!se, at most, tat is a mere concl!sion of te fiscal. 8oteK @en te facts
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a%%earing in te com%laint or information are so stated tat tey are ca%a*le of two or more inter%retations, ten te designation of te offense in te ca%tion controls. 0-.S. v. ic:on, '5 #il. (7 E a(er the acts or omissions constituting the offense% and specify its qualifying and aggra(ating circumstances.
*f there is no designation of the offense% reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. 0R!le 11", R!les of Co!rt •
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*t is axiomatic that the nature and character of the crime charged are determined not by the designation of the specific crime% but by the facts alleged in the information. Controlling in an information should not be the title of the complaint or the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly (iolated% these being% by and large% mere conclusions of law by the prosecutor% but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. 0#eo%le v. =!emeggen, ?.R. 8o. 17)'"5
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5 qualifying aggra(ating circumstance to be such must be alleged in the information. *f it is not alleged but pro(en at the trial% it is a generic aggra(ating circumstance only. ;hile% under the new rules% an aggra(ating circumstance that is not alleged in the information cannot be appreciated in determining the criminal liability of the accused% the rules do not pre(ent its appreciation for the purpose of determining ci(il liability. 0#eo%le v. S!ela, 373 SCRA 1(3 7ualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descripti(e words such as >qualifying? or >qualified by? to properly qualify an offense. 0#eo%le v. A9!ino, '""' Dmu+ apply pud sa aggra(atingE
The right to speedy disposition of cases is considered (iolated only when the proceedings are attended by (exatious% capricious% and oppressi(e delays. The concept of speedy disposition of cases is relati(e or flexible. 0Rodrig!e: v. Sandigan*ayan, 4'4 SCRA '3( $ue regard must be gi(en to the facts and circumstances surrounding each case.
Gactors to be considered in the determination of whether or not the right to a speedy trial has been (iolated: 1. ". '. .
The length of delay, The reasons for such delay, The assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and The pre&udice caused by the delay.
3emedies of an accused whose right to a speedy trial is being (iolated:
The failure to designate the offense by the statute or to mention the specific pro(ision penali)ing the act or erroneous specification of the law (iolated does not (itiate the information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged. 0Malto v. #eo%le, ?.R. 8o. 1(4733
5 generic aggra(ating circumstance% if not alleged in the information or complaint e(en pro(en at the trial% cannot be appreciated against the accused. 0Som*ilon v. #eo%le, '""$
*t is not the use of the words >qualifying? or >qualified by? that raises a crime to a higher category% but the specific allegation of an attendant circumstance which adds the essential element raising the crime to a higher category. 0#eo%le v. Rosas, ?.R. 8o. 177)'5
( ( ( to ha*e a speed%& impartial and pu#lic trial " " " 0same as Section 1 DhE% 3ule 11/% 3ules of Court
The real question is not >did he commit a crime gi(en in the law some technical and specific nameO?% but >did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner thereinO? 0Matrido v. #eo%le, ?.R. 8o. 17$"(1
Section <" Cause of the accusation" D The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggra(ating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggra(ating circumstances and for the court to pronounce &udgment. /
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ppose the postponement and insist on trial, 8andamus% if the court grants the postponement e(ery time the prosecution asks for it o(er the ob&ection of the accused, *f the accused is restrained of his liberty% his remedy is habeas corpus.
*f the court denies the postponement asked by the prosecution and directs the prosecution to proceed and cannot do so because he does not ha(e the e(idence% accused should mo(e for the dismissal of the case on the ground of failure to prosecute or insufficiency of e(idence. *f the motion for dismissal is granted% such dismissal is equi(alent to an acquittal and there is no way for that case to be brought back because it will amount to dou#le .eopard%. The purpose of the right to a public trial is for the public to see that the accused is fairly dealt with and not un&ustly condemned and for keeping his triers keenly ali(e to a sense of responsibility and to the importance of their function.
( ( ( to meet the witness face to face " " " Section !/f0" To confront and cross+examine the witnesses against him at the trialB. #ither party may utili)e as part of its e(idence the testimony of a witness who is deceased% out of or can not with due diligence be found in the hilippines% una(ailable or otherwise unable to testify% gi(en in another case or proceeding% &udicial or administrati(e% in(ol(ing the same parties and sub&ect matter% the ad(erse party ha(ing the opportunity to cross+examine him. 3equisites:
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The testimony is gi(en by a witness who is deceased% out of or cannot with due diligence be found in the hilippines% una(ailable or otherwise unable to testify, The testimony is gi(en in another case or proceeding% &udicial or administrati(e, The other case in(ol(es the same parties and sub&ect matter, The ad(erse party had the opportunity to cross+ examine the witness.
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B*n trial only. -ot in ad(ance because it might endanger the witnesses if the accused were to know the prosecution witnesses in ad(ance. #xceptions to this right: •
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Second paragraph of DfE, ;hen there is a separate ci(il action filed against the accused by the offended party and he made a reser(ation, The exceptions to the 6earsay 3ule.
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( ( ( and to ha*e compulsor% process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and production of other e*idence in his #ehalf" 0Same as Section 1 0g% 3ule 11/% 3ules of Court •
The right to compulsory process must be in(oked during the trial. Gailure to do so constitutes a wai(er that cannot be rectified or undone on appeal. 0-.S. v. ?arcia, 1" #il. 3)4
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Section !:& Article III" No person shall #e compelled to #e a witness a$ainst himself" •
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The right is a(ailable not only in criminal prosecutions but also in all other go(ernment proceedings% including ci(il actions and administrati(e or legislati(e in(estigations.
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The right may not be in(oked where the question asked relates to a past criminal liability for which the witness can no longer be prosecuted. •
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The witness may not refuse to answer where he has been pre(iously granted immunity under a (alidly enacted statute.
Section ! /e0" To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself. 0R!le 115, R!les of Co!rt •
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The right against self incrimination prescribes an option of refusal to answer incriminating questions% and not a prohibition of inquiry. 0#eo%le v. Ayson, ?.R. 8o. )5'15 The right against self+incrimination does not gi(e a witness the right to disregard a subpoena% to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed% or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness recei(ing a subpoena must obey it% appear as required% take the stand% be sworn and answer questions. *t is only when a particular question is addressed to him% the answer to which may incriminate him for some offense% that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty. 0 #eo%le v. Ayson, s!%ra
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The preceding rule applies only to a witness who is not the accused. The accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions. n this instance% it is assumed that the purpose of his interrogation is to incriminate him. ;hereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the pri(ilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him% an accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions. Gor% in reality% the purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the eople would be to incriminate him. 0Cave: v. CA, '4 SCRA ((3 This pri(ilege applies only to natural person. 0-.S. v. @ite, 3'' -.S. ($4 The pri(ilege against self+incrimination applies only to e(idence that is >communicati(e? in essence. 0 errera v. Al*a, 4(" SCRA 1$7 The kernel of the right against self+incrimination is against not all compulsion but testimonial compulsion only. 0 4 @igmore, Sec. ''(3 Gorce re+enactments come within the ban against self+ incrimination. 0#eo%le v. lvis, ?.R. 8o. 71"$' The constitutional inhibition is directed not merely to gi(ing of oral testimony% but embraces as well the furnishing of e(idence by other means than by word of mouth% the di(ulging% in short% of any fact which the accused has a right to hold secret. 06eltran v. Samson and ose, 53 #il. 57" +oes not cover mecanical acts. Mecanical act does not re9!ire concentration and intelligence The prohibition applies to the compulsion for the production of documents% papers and chattels that may be used as e(idence against the witness% except where the State has a right to inspect the same% such as the books of accounts of corporations% under the police power. 0@igmore The right against self+incrimination is wai(able by the accused taking the stand and testifying as a witness or by freely answering the incriminating question put to him. 0-.S. v. ?rant, 1) #il. 1'' The pri(ilege also protects the accused against any attempt to compel him to furnish a specimen of his handwriting in connection with his prosecution for falsification. 06eltran v. Samson, 53 #il. 57"
S*T45T*-: rosecution presented as e(idence a letter allegedly written by the accused. The accused denied that it was his handwriting. 2ecause of such denial% the accused cannot anymore refuse to gi(e a specimen of his handwriting on the ground of (iolation of the right against self+incrimination because he is deemed to ha(e wai(ed such right when he testified that the handwriting in the letter presented was not his. D+a%at wala /!y masi denial !ng incriminating.E Section !<& Article III" /!0 +(cessi*e fines shall not #e imposed& nor cruel& de$radin$ or inhuman punishment inflicted" Neither shall the death penalt% #e imposed
unless& for compellin$ reasons in*ol*in$ heinous crimes& the Con$ress hereafter pro*ides for it" An% death penalt% alread% imposed shall #e reduce to reclusion perpetua" /20 The emplo%ment of ph%sical& ps%cholo$ical& or de$radin$ punishment a$ainst an% prisoner or detainee or the use of su#standard or inade'uate penal facilities under su#human conditions shall #e dealt with #% law"
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6owe(er% the con(iction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances:
Section 2!& Article III" No person shall #e twice put in .eopard% of punishment for the same offense" Section :" $ormer con%iction or &eoard" " D ;hen an accused has been: 1. ". '.
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0b the facts constituting the gra(er charge became known or were disco(ered only after a plea was entered in the former complaint or information, or
con(icted or acquitted% or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent
for the offense charged% or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof% or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
3e'uisites that must #e present in order to properl% raise the defense of dou#le .eopard% !"
0a the gra(er offense de(eloped due to super(ening facts arising from the same act or omission constituting the former charge,
acquittal ) double
by a court of competent &urisdiction% upon a (alid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a con(iction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge% the con(iction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution: 1. ".
5ny offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
The first .eopard% must ha*e #een attached prior to the second) a. The former complaint or information is (alid% sufficient in form and substance to sustain a con(iction, i. *t charges an offense, and ii. *t is filed by a person or officer legally authori)ed to do so b. *t was filed in a court of competent &urisdiction, c. The accused had been arraigned under said complaint or information and had pleaded to the same. The first .eopard% must #e *alidl% terminated) and a. ;hen the accused had been pre(iously con(icted, b. ;hen the accused had been pre(iously acquitted, or c. ;hen the case against him had been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. The second .eopard% must #e for the same offense as that of the first" The accused cannot anymore be charged of: a. The same offense charged in the former complaint or information, b. The attempted or frustrated stage of the offense charged in the former complaint or information, or
0c the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor and of the offended party except as pro(ided in section 1 0f of 3ule 11@. *n any of the foregoing cases% where the accused satisfies or ser(es in whole or in part the &udgment% he shall be credited with the same in the e(ent of con(iction for the gra(er offense. 0R!le 117, R!les of Co!rt
When does jeopardy NOT attach: 1)
If information does not charge any offense
2) If, upon pleading guilty, the accused presents evidence of complete self-defense, and the court thereafter acquits him without entering a new plea of not guilty for accused. 3) If the information for an offense cognizale y the !"# is filed with the $"#. %) If a complaint filed for preliminary investigation is dismissed. Section ;" 'ro%isional dismissal " D 5 case shall not be pro(isionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party. The pro(isional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six 0@ years or a fine of any amount% or both% shall become permanent one 01 year after issuance of the order without the case ha(ing been re(i(ed. ;ith respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six 0@ years% their pro(isional dismissal shall become permanent two 0" years after issuance of the order without the case ha(ing been re(i(ed. 0R!le 117, R!les of Co!rt •
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The grant of the demurrer to e(idence amounts to an acquittal. Thus% double &eopardy can arise. ;here the accused is acquitted without gi(ing the prosecution its day in court% this denial of due process may be (alidly appealed.
( ( ( If an act is punished #% a law and an ordinace& con*iction or ac'uittal under either shall constitute a #ar to another prosecution for the same act"
$istinctions between the first sentence and the second sentence in Section "1% 5rticle ***: 1.
;hat the first sentence prohibits is double &eopardy for the same offense, what the second sentence prohibits is double &eopardy for the same act punished by an ordinance and a law.
2. There is no double &eopardy in the first sentence so
long as the second offense charged is different e(en if it arises from the same act, there is double &eopardy in the second sentence e(en if the offenses are distinct pro(ided they arise from the same act punished by a law and an ordinance.
