Consti 2 cases

CONSITUTIONAL LAW CASES

ARTICLE III BILL OF RIGHTS Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, inviolab le, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

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Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Section 9. Private property shall not be taken tak en for public use without just compensation. compen sation. Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person p erson by reason of poverty. povert y. Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families. Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by Page | 2


sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided , that he has been duly notified not ified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion, when the public pu blic safety requires it. Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations. (2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted. Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

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(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law. Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax. Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.

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ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL vs. HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA G.R. No. L-24693, July 31, 1967 FACTS: The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed by the petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of the second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances.". It was then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor of the City of Manila.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 4760 is a valid exercise of police power. po wer.

HELD: YES. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues argu es eloquently for it.

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TAXICAB OPERATORS vs. BUREAU OF TRANSPORTATION 119 SCRA 597 FACTS: This Petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order" filed by the Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace Transportation, seeks to declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular No. 77-42, dated October 10, 1977, of the Board of Transportation, and Memorandum Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, of the Bureau of Land Transportation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Circular violated the equal equ al protection clause of the petitioners.

RULING: Petitioners alleged that the Circular in question violates their right to equal protection of the law because the same is being enforced in Metro Manila only and is directed solely towards the taxi industry. At the outset it should be pointed out that implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under Identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria. Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. To declare a law unconstitutional, the infringement of constitutional right must be clear, categorical and undeniab le.

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REPUBLIC vs. MERALCO GR No. 141314, November 15, 2002 FACTS: On December 23, 1993, MERALCO filed with the ERB an application for the revision of its rate schedules. The application reflected an average increase of 21 centavos per kilowatthour (kwh) in its distribution charge. The ERB granted the said application subject to conditions. However, the COA submitted its Audit Report and contained, among others, the recommendation not to include income taxes paid by MERALCO as part of its operating expenses for purposes of rate determination. Subsequently, the ERB adopted the said recommendation.

ISSUE: Whether or not public interest prevail over private profits.

RULING: The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the police powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the control and regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property is used for a public purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to promote the common good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the property is continued, the same is subject to public regulation.

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LIM vs. PACQUING GR No. 115044, January 27, 1995 FACTS: Respondent Honorable Judge issued an orders, which are subject of this case, which are the following: (a) order dated March 28, 1994 directing Mayor Lim to issue the permit/license to operate the jai-alai in favor of Associated Development Corporation (ADC); (b) order dated April 11, 1994 directing Mayor Lim to explain why he should not be cited for contempt for non-compliance with the order dated March 28, 1994; (c) order dated April 20, 1994 reiterating the previous order directing Mayor Lim to immediately issue the permit/license to ADC.

ISSUE: Whether or not franchising is subject to Police Power.

RULING: Yes, a gambling franchise is always subject to the exercise of police power for the public welfare. On the alleged violation of the non-impairment and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, it should be remembered that a franchise is not in the strict sense a simple contract but rather it is, more importantly, a mere privilege specially in matters which are within the government’s power to regulate and even prohibit through the exercise of the police power.

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LUTZ vs. ARANETA GR No. L-7859, December 22, 1955/ 98 Phil. 148 FACTS: This case was initiated in the CFI of o f Negros Occidental to test the legality of taxes imposed by Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as the Sugar Adjustment Act. Plaintiff Waltz, seeks to recover from the Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of P14, 666.40 paid by the estate as taxes.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA No. 567 is primarily an exercise of the police power. po wer.

RULING: Sugar production is one of the great industries of our nation, sugar occupying a leading position among its export products; that it gives employment to thousands of laborers in fields and factories; that it is a great source of the state’s wealth, is one of the important sources of foreign exchange needed by our government. Its promotion, protection and advancement, therefore redounds red ounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence H ence it was competent for the legislature to find that the general welfare demanded that the sugar industry should be stabilized in turn; and it the wide field of its police power, the lawmaking body could provide provide that the distribution of benefits therefrom be readjusted among its components in taxes that it had sustain.

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MAGTAJAS vs, PRYCE PROPERTIES CORP. GR No. 111097, July 20, 1994/ 234 SCRA 255 FACTS: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Lot of people, organizations and religious sectors opposed the said project. However, the PAGCOR was able to expand its operations; it leased a portion of a building belonging to PRYCE. The Sangunniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro enacted Ordinance No. 3353 which prohibits the issuance of business permit p ermit and cancelling existing business permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion po rtion thereof for the operation of casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 which prohibits the operation of casino and providing penalty for violation therefor.

ISSUE: Whether or not gambling is a justiciable issue.

RULING: The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons consider sufficient. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government.

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TIO vs. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD GR No. L-75697, June 18, 1987/ 151 SCRA 208 FACTS: Petitioner questioned PD No. 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry, because on his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of other videogram operators adversely affected. A month after the promulgation of the said decree, Presidential Decree No. 1994 amended the NIRC providing that, there shall be collected on each processed video-tape video -tape cassette, ready for playback, pla yback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.

ISSUE: Whether or not PD 1987 is constitutional.

RULING: Sec. 10 of 1987 provides that, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the provision shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program. The express purpose of the Decree to include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5.

The Constitutional requirement that “every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof” is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which statutes seeks to achieve. The provision of Sec. 10 of 1987 is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the DECREE, which is the regulation of the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. Page | 11


YNOT vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, et al GR No. 74457, March 20, 1987/148 SCRA 659

FACTS: On Jan.13,1984 Ynot had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo but was confiscated by the the police station commander of Banotac Nueva, Ilioilo for violation E.O. 626-A. This E.O. 626-A was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the inter province transportation of Carabaos and carabeef .The supreme court reverse the decision of court of appeals.The supersedes bond is cancelled and the amount there is is restored

to

the

petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not E.O.626-A is constitutional.

RULING: This E.O. 626-A is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos violated due process because of his right to be heard was denied. To justify the State interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not duly oppressive upon individuals. E.O. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional.

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DE KNECHT vs. BAUTISTA GR No. L-51078, October 30, 1980/ 100 SCRA 660 FACTS: Petitioner alleges that the government through the DPWH prepared a plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to Roxas Boulevard. However, the plan was changed, the expansion will be in Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project; upon learning of the changed plan, the owners of the residential houses that would be affected, the herein petitioner being one of them, filed a formal petition to Pres. Marcos asking him to order the Ministry of Public Highways to adopt the original plan instead of the new plan. The government filed in the CFI presided by the respondent judge, a complaint for expropriation against the owners of the houses.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court the respondent judge should be held liable for grave abuse of discretion.

RULING: It is doubtful whether the extension of EDSA along Cuneta Avenue can be objected to on the ground so social impact. The improvements and buildings along Cuneta Avenue to be affected by the extension are mostly motels. Even, arguendo, that more people will be affected, the Human Settlements Commission has suggested coordinative efforts of said Commission with the National Housing Authority in the relocation and resettlement of those adversely affected. From all the facts and records it is clear that the new extension plan is arbitrary and should not be granted. The respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in allowing the government to take immediate possession of the properties sought to be expropriated.

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PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC., vs. COMELEC G.R. No. L-119694 May 22, 1995/ 244 SCRA 272 FACTS: The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers assailed the validity of Resolution No. 2772 of the COMELEC and its corresponding COMELEC directive dated March 22, 1995, on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government and any of its agencies, against taking the private property for public use without just compensation. Finally, PPI argued that Sec.8 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of expression. Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2772 directs the print media to provide the COMELEC a free print space of not less than ½ page.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2772 is a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.

RULING: NO. The Court set aside and nullified Sec.2 of COMELEC Res. No. 2772. 2772 . It does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain and of the police power of the state. Section 2, in its present form, and as interpreted by COMELEC in its March 22, 1995 letter letter directives, purports to require print media enterprises to “donate” free print space to COMELEC. To compel print media enterprises to donate “COMELEC space” amounts to “taking” of private property for public use or purpose. Section 2 failed to specify the the intended frequency of such compulsory “donation.” The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property which are, the necessity for the taking and the legal authority to effect the taking, has not been shown by COMELEC. It has not been suggested that COMELEC has been granted the power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and administration of election laws by COMELEC must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed. The taking of private property is authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of “just compensation” (Art.III, (Art.III, Sec.9). Page | 14


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SALEM INVESTMENT GR No. 137569 FACTS: The main petition in this case is for determination of just compensation for the expropriation of lands under BP Blg. 340, authorizing the expropriation of parcels of lands in the names of the defendants in this case, including a portion of the land belonging to Milagros and Inocentes De la Rama. Alfredo Guerrero intervened in this proceeding arguing that, instead of the De la Ramas, he should receive the just compensation for the subject land. The trial court and the Court of Appeals declared him the rightful recipient of the amount. This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Who, between the De la Ramas and Guerrero, is/are entitled to receive payment of just compensation for the taking of 290 square squ are meters of the subject land?

RULING: The power of eminent domain is an inherent power of the State. No constitutional conferment is necessary to vest it in the State. The SC ruled that there is no point in distinguishing between judicial and legislative expropriation as far as the two stages mentioned above are concerned. Both involve these stages and in both the process is not completed until payment of just compensation is made. The CA was correct in saying that BP Blg. 340 did not effectively expropriate the land of De la Ramas. As a matter of fact, it merely commenced the expropriation of the subject property. Thus, the De la Ramas still had authority to transfer ownership of their land and convey all rights, including the right to receive just compensation, to Guerrero.

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REPUBLIC vs. CA GR No. 146587, July 2, 2002 FACTS: Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings before the RTC of Bulacan, covering a total of 544, 980 Square Meters of contiguous land to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities the “Voice of the Philippines” Philippines” project, which name was derived from the “Voice of America” when it ceased its operation. In the meantime, Pres. Estrada issued Proclamation No. 22, transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated property to Bulacan State University for expansion of its facilities and another 5 hectares to be used exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine carabao. The remaining portion retained b y the PIA Despite the circumstances and court order the Santos heirs remained unpaid and no action was taken. The Heirs of Santos only opposed when the Petitioner tried to deposit in court an amount for the payment of the expropriation ex propriation of the property of Luis Santos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to just compensation which was granted by the trial court to the Heirs of Santos has already prescribed.

RULING: The right to eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. Respondents, Respond ents, in arguing laches against petitioner did not take into account that the same argument could likewise apply against them. Respondents first instituted proceedings for payment p ayment against petitioner on May 9, 1984, or five years after the 1979 judgment had become final. The unusually long delay in bringing the action to compel payment against herein petitioner would militate against them. Consistently with the rule that one should take good care of his own concern, respondents should have commenced the proper action upon the finality of the judgment which, indeed, resulted in a permanent deprivation of their ownership and possession of the property.

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CITY OF MANILA vs. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET AL., G.R. No. L-14355, October 31, 1919 FACTS: The city of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of said city, praying that certain lands, therein particularly described, be b e expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement. The defendant, the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [Chinese Community of Manila], answering the petition of the plaintiff, alleged among others that a great number of Chinese were buried in said cemetery; that if said expropriation be carried into effect, it would disturb the resting places of the dead, would require the expenditure of a large sum of money in the transfer or removal of the bodies to some other place or site and in the purchase of such new sites, would involve the destruction of existing monuments and the erection of new monuments in their stead, and would create irreparable loss and injury to the defendant and to all those persons owning and interested in the graves and monuments which would have to be destroyed; that the plaintiff was without right or authority to expropriate said cemetery or any part or portion thereof for street purposes; and that the expropriation, in fact, was not necessary as a public improvement.

ISSUE: Whether or not the city of Manila has authority or right under the law to expropriate public property such as cemeteries.

RULING: It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public property. If that is true, then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that the city of Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public property. But, whether or not the cemetery is public or private property, its appropriation for the uses of a public street, especially during the lifetime of those specially interested i nterested in its maintenance as a cemetery, should be a question of great concern, and its appropriation should not be made for such purposes until it is fully established that the greatest necessity exists therefor. In the present case, even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which will answer an swer every purpose of the plaintiff.

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LLADOC vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE G.R. No. L-19201, June 16, 1965

FACTS: Sometime in 1957, the M.B. Estate, Inc., donated P10,000.00 in cash to Rev. Fr. Crispin Ruiz, then parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental.On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate, Inc., filed the donor's gift tax return. Under date of April 29, 1960, the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for donee's gift tax against the Catholic Parish of Victorias, Negros Occidental, of which petitioner was the priest. In the petition for review, the Rev. Fr. Casimiro Lladoc claimed, among others, that at the time of the donation, he was not the parish priest in Victorias; that there is no legal entity or juridical person known as the "Catholic Parish Priest of Victorias," and, therefore, he should not be liable for the donee's gift tax. It was also asserted that the assessment of the gift tax, even against the Roman Catholic Church, would not be valid, for such would be a clear violation of the provisions of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the assessment of gift tax against the RC church is unconstitutional.

RULING: NO. Section S ection 22 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, exempts from taxation cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents, appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious purposes. In the present case, what the Collector assessed was a donee's gift tax; the assessment was not on the properties themselves. Manifestly, gift tax is not within the exempting provisions of the section just mentioned. A gift tax is not a property tax, but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos, the imposition of which on property used exclusively for religious purposes, does not constitute an impairment of the Constitution. As well observed by the learned respondent Court, the phrase "exempt from taxation," as employed in the Constitution (supra) should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. And there being no clear, positive or express grant of such privilege by law, in favor of petitioner, p etitioner, the exemption herein must be denied. d enied. Page | 18


PHILEX MINING COR. vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE GR No. 125704, August 28, 1998 FACTS: The BIR sent a letter to Petitioner asking it to settle its tax liabilities for the 2 nd, 3rd, and 4th quarter of 1991 as well as the 1st and 2nd quarter of 1992 in the total amount of P123, 821, 982.52. Petitioner protested the demand for payment of the tax liabilities stating that it has pending claims for VAT input credit/refund for the taxes it paid for the years 1989 to 1991 in the amount of P119, 977, 037.02 plus interest. Therefore, these claims for tax credit/refund should be applied against the tax liabilities. BIR denied the offsetting of Philex’s claim for VAT input credit/refund against its excise exci se tax obligation. Petitioner raised the issue to the Court of Tax Appeals. The Court of Tax Appeals ruled that taxes cannot be subject to set-off on compensation since claim for taxes is not debt or contract.

ISSUE: Whether or not taxes can be subject to set-off on compensation since claim for taxes is not a debt or contract.

RULING: Taxes cannot be subject to compensation for the simple reason that the government and the taxpayer are not creditors and debtors of each other. A person cannot refuse to pay to pay a tax on the ground that the government owes him an amount equal to or greater than the tax being collected. The imposition of surcharge and interest for the non-payment of the excise taxes within the time prescribed was unjustified. Philex posits the theory that it had no obligation to pay the excise tax liabilities within the prescribed period since, after all, it still has pending claims for VAT input credit/refund with BIR. The SC fail to see the logic of Philex’s claim for this is an outright outrig ht disregard of the basic principle in tax law that taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without unnecessary hindrance. Evidently, to countenance Philex’s whimsical reason would render ineffective our tax collection system.

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CHAVEZ vs. PCGG GR No.130716, December 9, 1998 FACTS: Petitioner, as taxpayer, citizen and former government official who initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies, alleges that he was impelled to bring the present action because of several news reports bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos and the reported execution of a compromise, between the government, through PCGG, and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that respondents make publicly any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG’s task of recovering the Marcoses ill-gotten ill-gotten wealth.

ISSUE: Whether or not the PCGG can be compel to disclose publicly the details of any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses.

RULING: The arguments cited by petitioner constitute the controlling decisional rule as regards his legal standing to institute the instant petition. Access to public documents and records is a public right, and the real parties in interest are the people themselves. Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, it is incumbent upon PCGG to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. There is no doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses’ alleged ill-gotten ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest. Furthermore, ill-gotten wealth, by its nature, assumes a public character.

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SECRETARY OF JUSTICE vs. JUDGE LANTION GR 139465 Jan 18 2000 FACTS: On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs of the United States requesting for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for various crimes in violation of US laws. In compliance with the related municipal law, specifically Presidential Decree No. 1069 “Prescribing the Procedure for Extradition of Persons Who Have committed Crimes in a Foreign Country” and the established “Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government Government of the United States of America”, the department proceeded with proceeded with the designation of a panel of attorneys to conduct a technical evaluation and assessment as provided

for

in

the

presidential

decree

and

the

treaty.

The respondent requested for a copy of the official extradition request as well as the documents and papers submitted therein. The petitioner denied the request as it alleges that such information is confidential in nature and that it is premature to provide such document as the process is not a preliminary investigation but a mere evaluation. Therefore,

the

constitutional

rights

of

the

accused

are

not

yet

available.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent, Mark B. Jimenez, be granted access to the official extradition request and documents with an opportunity to file a comment on or opposition

thereto

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the private respondent be furnished a copy of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to give him a reasonable period of time within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. In this case, there exists a clear conflict between the obligation of the Philippine Government to comply with the provisions of o f the treaty and its equally significant role of protection of its citizens of its right

of

due

process.

The processes outlined in the treaty and in the presidential decree already pose an impending threat to a prospective extraditee’s liberty as early as the evaluation stage. Page | 21


SECRETARY OF JUSTICE vs. LANTION GR No. 139465, October 17, 2000 FACTS: On January 18, 2000, by a vote of 9-6, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and ordered the petitioner to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. On February 3, 2000, the petitioner timely filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and questioned the decision of the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

RULING: Respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. There is no provision in the RP-US Extradition Treaty and in PD No. 1069 which gives an extradite the right to demand from the petitioner Secretary of Justice copies of the extradition request from the US government and its supporting documents and to comment thereon while the request is still undergoing evaluation. It is well-settled that a court cannot alter, amend, or add to a treaty by the insertion of any clause, small or great, or dispense with any of its conditions and requirements or take away any qualification, or integral part of any stipulation, upon any motion of equity, or general convenience, or substantial justice.

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GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. v s. PURGANAN GR No. 148571, September 24, 2002 FACTS: Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC. The TRO prohibited the DOJ from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued and whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending.

RULING: The prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez. The SC agrees with the petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word “conviction”, the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence innocenc e is not at issue.

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ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN GR No. 148560, November 19, 2001 FACTS: Petitioner, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080, An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended. He therefore makes a stringent call for the Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the reasonable doubt standard in criminal prosecutions; and (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under the RPC, all of which purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied of his right to due process.

RULING: When a statute lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects-it violates due processes for failure to accord persons, especially the parties p arties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid, and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes and arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. The first may be “saved” by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such activities. With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this c ase.

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DUMLAO vs. COMELEC 96 SCRA 392 FACTS: A petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order was filed to enjoin respondent form implementing certain provisions of BP 51, 52 and 53 for being unconstitutional. Petitioner Dumlao questions Sec. 4 of BP 51 as discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Meanwhile, Petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr questions the accreditation of some political parties by respondent as contrary to the constitution that provides that a bona fide candidate shall be free from any an y form of harassment and discrimination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filed petition is an actual case or controversy subject to judicial review.

RULING: The Supreme Court held that the petitioners fell short of the necessity that the case be an actual controversy. Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of BP 52 nor is any party seeking for his disqualification. The question he poses is in the abstract and a hypothetical issue. Whether or not petitioners are the proper party to submit the petition, the Supreme Court held in the case of Igot and Salapatan, neither of them has been called to have been adversely affected by the operation of the statutory provisions they assail as unconstitutional. What they have is only generated gene rated grievance as contrasted to a direct injury creating a substantial interest in the case. Without a litigate interest, they cannot claim any locus standi. However, due to the impelling public interest involved and the proximity of the elections, the strict procedure for judicial relaxed. The Supreme Court held that Sec. 4 of BP 51 was not discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. The equal protection clause of the constitution does not forbid all legal classification. It only proscribes arbitrary and unreasonable classification. Furthermore, it should be emphasized the purpose of such classification was to allow emergence of younger blood in local governments. Page | 25


ANG TIBAY vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS GR No. 46496, February 27, 19450/ 69 Phil. 635 FACTS: The Solicitor General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations has filed a motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, mo tion, the Supreme Court consider the conclusions of the majority opinion of the Court. The respondent on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgment rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial.

ISSUE: Whether or not due process is violated and should be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relation.

RULING: The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard d isregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due d ue process in trials and investigations of an an administrative character. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations.

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PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION vs. PRADO GR No. 105371, November 11, 1993/ 227 SCRA 703 FACTS: The main target of this case is the constitutionality of Section 35 of RA No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No. 92-28, said act withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court including the lower courts and other certain government agencies. Petitioners questioned the act on the grounds, among others; that it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.

ISSUE: The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary.

RULING: The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some unjustly discriminate against others. The Supreme Court ruled that the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the perceived need of the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of communication between the government and the people. Assumingly, it is difficult to understand why, of all the departments of the government, it is the Judiciary that has been denied the franking privilege. There is no question that if there is any major branch of the government that needs the privilege, it is the Judicial Department.

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DE GUZMAN vs. COMELEC GR No. 129118, July 19, 2000 FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, assailing the validity of Section 44 of Republic Act No. 8189 otherwise known as the “The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996”. Said Section 44 provides for the reassignment of Election Officers. Petitioners alleged that said provision of RA 8189 is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 44 of RA 8189 is valid and constitutional.

RULING: The singling out of election officers in order to ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Moreover, to require the COMELEC to reassign all employees who have served at least four years in a given city or municipality would entail a lot of administrative burden on the part of the COMELEC.

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ORMOC SUGAR CENTRAL vs. ORMOC CITY GR No. L-23794, February 7, 1968 FACTS: In 1964, Ormoc City passed a bill which read: “There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Incorporated, in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries.” For production of sugar su gar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when the sugar produced is exported. Ormoc Sugar S ugar paid the tax (P7,087.50) in protest averring that the same is violative of Sec 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides. And that the ordinance is violative to equal protection as it singled out Ormoc Sugar As being liable for such tax impost for no other sugar mill is found foun d in the city.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection.

HELD: The SC held in favor of Ormoc Sugar. The SC noted that even if Sec 2287 of the RAC had already been repealed by a latter statute (Sec 2 RA 2264) which effectively authorized LGUs to tax goods and merchandise carried in and out of their turf, the act of Ormoc City is still violative of equal protection. The ordinance is discriminatory for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance’s enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CAYAT GR No. 45978, May 5, 1939 FACTS: Prosecuted for violation of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3) the accused, Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, was sentenced by the justice of the peace court of Baguio to pay a fine of five pesos (P5) or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Cayat was caught in possession one bottle A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so called native wines prior to the passage of Act No. 1639. Sections 2 and 3 of Act 1639 prohibits the non-Christian tribe members to have in his possession or drink liquors.

ISSUE: Whether or not Act No. 1639 is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws.

RULING: The purpose of Act No. 1639 is to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and, eventually, to hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater Philippines. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JALOSJOS GR No. 132875-76, February 3, 2000/ 324 SCRA 689 FACTS: Jaloslos is a full-fledged member of the Congress who was convicted for the crime of statutory rape. He filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.

ISSUE: Whether or not membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general.

RULING: Allowing accused appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only onl y elevates accused-appellant’s accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction co rrection system. Accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Accused-appellant admits that while under detention, he has filed several bills and resolutions. It also appears that he has been receiving his salaries and other monetary benefits. He has been discharging his mandate as a member of the House of Representatives.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MIJANO GR No. 129112, July 23, 1999 FACTS: Accused-appellant was charged of the crime of rape and later he was convicted. In his defense, he alleged that he was arrested for unknown reason, but the trial court did not accord to his testimony, pointing out in its decision that the defense of denial and alibi deserve no serious preoccupation of the mind.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant should be sentenced to death.

RULING: The equality the Constitution guarantees is legal equality or, as it is usually put, the equality of all persons before the law. Under this guarantee, each individual is dealt with as an equal person in the law, which does not treat the person differently because of who he is or what he is or what he possesses. It applies to all persons and to all classes of persons. The evidence pointing to accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime is overwhelming. The law punishes with death a person who shall commit rape against a child below seven years of age. The perpetration of rape against a 5-year old girl does not absolve or exempt accused-appellant from the imposition of the death penalty by the fact that he is poor, uneducated, jobless, job less, and lacks of catechetical instruction.

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SOLIVEN vs. MAKASIAR 167 SCRA 394 FACTS: Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He together with others was charged for libel by the president. Cory herself filed a complaint- affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then the president would allow herself to be placed under the court’s jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause.

RULING: Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 19 73 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance o f warrants of arrest.

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ALLADO vs. DIOKNO GR No. 113630, May 5, 1994 FACTS: Petitioners are partners of the Law Firm of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado. In the practice of their profession, and on the basis of an alleged extrajudicial confession of a security guard, they have been accused of the heinous crime of kidnapping with murder by the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) and ordered arrested without bail b y respondent judge.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge committed grave abuse in issuing the warrant of arrest.

RULING: Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant for the arrest of petitioners it appearing that he did not personally examine the evidence nor did he call for the complainant and his witnesses in the face of their incredible accounts. Instead, he merely relied on the certification of the prosecutors that probable cause existed. A warrant of arrest shall issue only upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses. Before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must satisfy himself that there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof.

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BURGOS vs. CHIEF OF STAFF GR No. L-64261, December 26, 1984 FACTS: Petitioners questioned the validity of the two (2) search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by the respondent Judge. The said search warrants contain the following, to wit: "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of o f the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, pap ers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr.”.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issued search warrants are valid.

RULING: When the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish.

Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the n ature of general warrants.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DORIA GR No. 125299, January 22, 1999 FACTS: PNP Narcom was informed that one “Jun was engaged in illegal drug activities and the Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest “Jun” in a buy-bust buy-bust operation. On the day of entrapment, PO3 Manlangit handed “Jun” the marked bills and “Jun” instructed PO3 Manlangit to wait for him while he got the marijuana from his associate. When they met up, “Jun” gave PO3 something wrapped in plastic upon which PO3 arrested “Jun”. They frisked Jun but did not find the marked bills on him. “Jun” revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate named “neneth”. They went to Neneth’s house and noticed a carton box under the dining table and noticed something wrapped in plastic inside the box, suspicious, police officers entered the house and took hold of the box and found that it has 10 bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. Simultaneously, the marked bills were recovered from Neneth and she was also arrested. They were both convicted feloniously selling, administering and giving away to another 11 plastic bags of suspected marijuana fruiting tops, in violation of R.A 6425, as amended by RA 7659

ISSUE: Whether or not Violeta Gaddao is liable.

RULING: Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense that can be raised by an accused & partakes the nature of a confession & avoidance. Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest under Sec. 5a of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding that there was no occasion at all for Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in “hot pursuit”. pursuit” . Neither could her arrest be be justified under second instance of “personal knowledge” in Rule 113 113 as this must be based upon probable cause which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds for suspicion. Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her co-accused. Furthermore, the fact that the box containing about 6 kilos of marijuana was found in Gaddao’s house does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged. The prosecution thus had failed to prove that Gaddao conspired with Doria in the sale of the said drug.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MENGOTE G.R. No. 87059 June 22, 1992

FACTS: Accused-Appellant Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of firearms on the strength mainly of the stolen pistol found on his person at the moment of his warrantless arrest. In the appeal, he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and was therefore the fruit of the poisonous tree. The incident occurred shortly before noon of August 8, 1987, after the Western police District (WPD) received a telephone call from an informer that there were suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo Manila. Responding policemen searched the suspect. One of them who turned-out to be the Accused-Appellant, was found with .38 caliber smith and Wesson revolver with six bullets in the chamber. His companion, later identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants pocket. Accordingly, they were accused of possession of firearms without first having secured the necessary license or permit from the proper authorities. For the part of Mengote, he made no effort to prove that he was licensed to possess it and claimed instead that the weapon had been planted on him at the time of his arrest.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the arrest is valid having no warrant served.

RULING: No, the arrest is invalid. The appealed decision is reversed and set aside. The Acussed-Appellant is acquitted and ordered released immediately unless he is validly detained for other offenses. In arrests without a warrant, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed as essential pre- condition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MALMSTEDT G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991

FACTS: Accused Mikael Malmstedt a Swedish National who went to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days. At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, Captain Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Acop, Tublay, for purposes of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The checkpoint was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana. Moreover, information was received, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Two NARCOM Officers boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. They started their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof. During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag ba g and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana. Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus, accused stopped to get two (2) traveling bags from the luggage carrier. Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizures are valid.

HELD: YES. Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances. Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. ?? A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.

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MALACAT vs. COURT OF APPEALS GR no. 123595, December 12, 1997 FACTS: Petitioner was charged with a crime for violating Section 3 of PD No. 1866 for keeping and possessing a hand grenade without firs securing the necessary license and/or permit therefore from the proper authorities. The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to a “stop and frisk”, where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest and whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest was valid.

RULE: The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court confused the concepts of a “stop-and“stop-andfrisk” and of a search incidental incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope. There could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack or personal knowledge on the part of the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of the petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. Thus, invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search conducted on petitioner could have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BOLASA G.R. No. 125754. December 22, 1999 FACTS: An anonymous caller tipped off PO3 Dante Salonga and PO3 Albert Carizon in the early evening of 11 September 1995 that a man and a woman were repacking prohibited drugs at a certain house in Sta. Brigida St., Karuhatan, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. PO3 Salonga and PO3 Carizon together with SPO1 Fernando Arenas immediately proceeded to the house of the suspects and parked their car some three hundred (300) meters away. They walked towards their quarry's lair accompanied this time by their unnamed informer. When they reached the house they "peeped (inside) through a small window and saw one man and a woman repacking suspected marijuana. They entered the house and introduced themselves as police officers to the

occupants and thereupon confiscated the tea bags and some drug paraphernalia. They arrested the two (2) who turned out to be the accused Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto delos Reyes. Subsequent examination of the tea bags by NBI Forensic Chemist Rubie Calalo confirmed the suspicion that the tea bags contained marijuana. Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto delos Reyes were thus charged with violation of Sec. 8, Art. II, of RA 6425.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search and arrest was illegal.

RULING: We sustain the appeal. This case clearly illustrates how constitutional guarantees against illegal arrests and seizures can be violated by overzealous police officers in the arrest of suspected drug offenders. Thus, after a meticulous evaluation of the evidence at hand, this Court finds itself with no other recourse but to strike down the process adopted by the prosecution and acquit accused-appellants for insufficiency of evidence and reasonable doubt. The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended is illegal. Perforce, their arrest is illegal. First, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants had just committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime. Second, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that a crime was not committed nor did they have any reasonable ground to believe that accused-appellants committed it. Page | 41


COLUMBIA PICTURES, Inc. vs. FLORES GR No. 78631, June 29, 1993 FACTS: Petitioners are all foreign corporation represented by their attorney-in-fact, Cruz of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. (MPAA). MPAA lodged a complaint before the NBI against certain video v ideo establishment for violation of PD P D No. 49 (Protection of Intellectual Property). NBI conducted surveillance. After said surveillance, NBI applied and was granted a search warrant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering the immediate release and return of some of the items seized by virtue of the search search warrant.

RULING: In issuing a search warrant, the Judge must strictly comply with the constitutional and statutory requirements. Measured by the constitutional and legal provisions as well as the existing jurisprudence on the matter, the Supreme Court ruled that Search Warrant No. 45 fails to satisfy the test of legality. More so because the Court has previously decide a case dealing with virtually the same search warrant. Respondent court was merely correcting its own erroneous conclusions in issuing Search Warrant No. 45 when it ordered the return of the seized television sets and other paraphernalia specified in the motion filed by FGT. Far from being despotic or arbitrary, respondent judge must be commended for rectifying his error when he found that his initial conclusions were inaccurate and erroneous, colliding as they did with the constitutional rights or private respondent.

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VALMONTE vs. DE VILLA G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989

FACTS: On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and checkups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up without a court order or search warrant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the checkpoints are unlawful and there is violation of petitioners’ right against unlawful searches and seizure.

RULING: NO, not n ot all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable reasona ble are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

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PAPA vs.MAGO GR No. L-27360, February 28, 1968 FACTS: Petitioner, head of the counter-intelligence of the MPD, acting upon a reliable information to the effect that

a certain certain shipment of personal personal effects, allegedly

misdeclared and undervalued, would be released from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of Petitioner, they conducted surveillance and elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Customs Bureau has jurisdiction to seize the goods and institute forfeiture proceedings.

RULING: The purpose of the seizure by the Customs Bureau was to verify whether or not Custom duties and taxes were paid for their importation. Having declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department of the goods in question was in accordance with law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purpose of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance.

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PEOPLE vs. MARTI GR No. 81561, January 18, 1991 FACTS: Marti and his common-law wife, went to the booth of the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, carrying with them 4gift- wrapped packages to be send to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes did not inspect the packages as Marti refused, who assured the former that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. However, following standard operating procedure opened the boxes for final inspection, where a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. A cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves, and took several grams of the contents thereof. Reyes reported to the NBI and requested a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. At the Narcotics Section of the NBI, the box was opened, yielding dried marijuana leaves, or cake-like (bricks) dried marijuana leaves. Thereafter, an Information was filed against Marti for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. After trial, Marti was convicted.

ISSUE: Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of the accused’s constitutional rights, be invoked against the State.

RULING: In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The contraband herein, having come into possession possession of the Government without the latter transgressing the accused’s rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert con vert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search. Where the contraband

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articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

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QUA CHEE GAN v. DEPORTATION BOARD GR No. 10280, 1963 FACTS: The Court of First Instance denied the petition for writs of habeas corpus, mandamus and certiorari by the petitioners. On May 12, 1952, Special ProsecutorEmilio L. Galang charged petitioner before the Deportation Board. The crimes, Purchasing $130,000 with license from Central Bank and remitted it to Hong Kong and attempted bribery of Phil and US officials In effect, Deportation Board issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner (E.O. No 398, series of 1951). Upon fixing of bonds, petitioner was temporarily set free.

ISSUES: Whether or not the President has authority to deport aliens. Whether or not the Deportation Board also has authorityto file warrants of arrest.

RULING: 1. Yes. Section 69 of Act No. 2711 of RAC: No alien can be deported by prexy EXCEPT upon prior investigation, conducted by said executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such action is contemplated

2. Yes, but only after investigation has resulted to the actual order of deportation. Arrest would have been necessary for deportation to take effect. However, in the case at bar, investigations were still ongoing and no order for deportation was yet made. Decision: E.O. No 398, series of 1951:declared illegal.

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STONEHILL vs. DIOKNO 20 SCRA 388, GR No. L-19550June 19, 1967

FACTS: Stonehill and company, were accused of the following offenses:"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code (as stated in the application for search warrants)."Government officers applied and were able to get 42 search warrants against petitioners p etitioners and the corporations in which they were officers. The warrant directed any peace officer to search the “ premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit: Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, c orrespondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarettewrappers).” Items were seized from the residences and offices but the court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoin the prosecution from using the seized items as evidence.

ISSUES: Whether or not the items found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations obtained legally. Whether or not the items found and seized in the residences of the petitioners obtained legally.

RULING: For those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, Stonehill et. al. have No cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof th ereof because said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection o bjection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.

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For those found and seized in the residences of the Stonehill, et. al., the court ruled that the warrants issued for them are warrants that are in the nature of general warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void because the Constitution provides that “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

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ZULUETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 107383, 1996 Feb 20

FACTS: Petitioner Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

ISSUE: Whether or not the documents and papers are admissible in evidence.

RULING: NO. The Supreme Court held that indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

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GAMBOA vs. CRUZ GR No. L-56291, June 27, 1988 FACTS: Petitioner alleged that he was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant of arrest. He was detained, and later on he was identified by the complainant during the police lineup. Petitioner was charged of robbery. Instead of presenting his defense, petitioner by counsel manifested in open court that he was filing a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer to Evidence, on the ground that the conduct of police line-up, without notice to and in the absence of, his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied of the right to counsel.

RULING: The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, when the investigating officer starts to ask question to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. In the present case, the police line-up was not part of the custodial investigation, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled to counsel. Given the clear constitutional intent in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, to extend to those under police investigation the right to counsel, this occasion may be better than any to remind police investigators that, while the Court finds no real need to afford a suspect the services of counsel during a police line-up, the moment there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel.

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LUMIQUED vs. EXEVEA GR No. 117565, November 18, 1997 FACTS: Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian ReformDAR-CAR, until he was dismissed from that position pursuant to AO No. 52. The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by DAR-CAR Re gional Cashier, for falsification, violation of Commission on Audit rules and regulation and oppression and harassment.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied of the th e constitutional right to counsel.

RULING: The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during the custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and , with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the present case, Petitioner invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Petitioner, however, was not accused of any crime in the proceedings. Administrative investigation stating that a respondent in administrative complaint must be informed of his right to the assistance of a counsel of his choice, is inappropriate. In administrative administrative proceedings, the essence essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even much more creditably as it is more practicable than oral arguments, through pleadings. An actual hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of due process. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course; he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very v ery essence of due process.

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MAGTOTO vs. MANGUERA GR No. L-37201-02, March 3, 1975 FACTS: The present cases involve an interpretation of Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution which provides that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. The confessions of the accused in the present cases were taken before the effectivity of the New Constitution in accordance with the rules then in force, no right had been violated as to render them inadmissible in evidence although they were not informed of their right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right, because, no such right existed at that time.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution can be retroactively effected.

RULING: The new right granted in Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution which provides a right to a detained person to counsel and to be informed of such right under pain of his confession being declared inadmissible in admissible in evidence, has and should be given a prospective and not a retroactive effect. It did not exist before its incorporation in our New Constitution. However, the fundamental rights of the accused to prove that their confession were involuntary still stands.

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PEOLE vs. GAMBOA GR No. 91374, February 25, 1991 FACTS: Accused-appellant Gamboa was charged with the crime of murder together with Cedran. After arraignment but during the trial, the case against Cedran was dismissed. Thereafter, a decision was rendered finding Gamboa guilty of the crime of murder and imposing him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in not rejecting the paraffin test result as inadmissible evidence.

RULING: The ballistics examination shows that it was fired from the very shotgun of the appellant. This evidence corroborates the theory of the prosecution, very strongly, that the appellant was the assailant of the victim. As to the paraffin test to which the appellant was subjected to he raises the question, that it was not conducted in the presence of his lawyer. This right afforded to any person under investigation for the commission of an offense whose confession or admission may not be taken unless he is informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. His right against self-incrimination is not violated by the taking of the paraffin test of his hands. This constitutional right extends only to testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AGUSTIN GR No. 110290, January 25, 1995 FACTS: The accused were charged with murder, frustrated murder and with attempted murder. The crimes were allegedly committed in Baguio City and resulted in the deaths of Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa Francisco and the wounding of the other persons. The information in the murder cases charged that the accused acted in conspiracy and alleged presence of the qualifying circumstances of treachery and the ordinary aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and price.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court committed error in considering accused-appellant’s accused-appellant’s extrajudicial confession as admissible evidence against him.

RULING: Appellant insist that his extrajudicial confession was taken in violation violation of his rights under Section 11, Article III of the constitution. He argues that the lawyer who assisted him was not of his own choice but was foisted upon him by the City Fiscal. The Supreme Court ruled that the extrajudicial admission, not the extrajudicial confession, of the appellant, which is the only evidence of the prosecution linking him to the commission of the crime charged, is wholly inadmissible because it was taken in violation of Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. There is also blatant disregard of the appellant’s right under Section 2 of Article III when he was unlawfully arrested. The assailed extrajudicial statement of the appellant is not an extrajudicial confession but it is only an extrajudicial admission. There is nothing in the extrajudicial statement that the appellant expressly acknowledged his guilt; he merely admitted some facts or circumstances which in themselves are insufficient to authorize a conviction and which can only tend to establish the ultimate fact of guilt.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BASE G.R. No. 109773 March 30, 2000 FACTS In the early morning of February 8,1990, accused and company, introduced themselves as policemen allegedly looking for a certain Hernandez suddenly shot Julianito in the head and immediately after, they sped away in an owner-type jeep. Accused-appellant Base was among those identified on board the jeep and were indicted for Murder with Direct Assault upon a Person in Authority.

Accused-appellant

denied having anything to do with the fatal shooting of the victim and alleges, in sum, that he was tortured to admit the crime.

ISSUE: Whether or not a counsel should never prevent an accused from fully and voluntarily telling the truth.

RULING: Verily, to be an effective counsel a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The counsel, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ENDINO G.R. No. 133026

February 20, 2001

FACTS: On a busy street in Puerto Princesa City in the evening of 16 October 1991, an emboldened Gerry Galgarin, uncle of accused Edward Endino, suddenly and without warning lunged at Dennis and stabbed him repeatedly on the chest. Dennis' girlfriend Clara Agagas who was with him, stunned by the unexpected attack, pleaded to Galgarin to stop. Dennis struggled and succeeded momentarily to free himself from his attacker. Dennis dashed towards the nearby Midtown Sales but his escape was foiled when from out of nowhere Edward Endino appeared and fired at Dennis. As Dennis staggered for safety, the two (2) assailants fled in the direction of the airport.

ISSUE: Whether or not confessions made by the accussed-appellant to the newsmen are admissible in evidence.

RULING: The court a quo's admission of accused-appellant's videotaped confession, we find such admission proper. The interview was recorded on video and it showed accusedappellant unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had indeed been forced into confessing, he could have easily sought succor from the newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have been sympathetic with him. A word of counsel then to lower courts: we should never presume that all media confessions described as voluntary have been freely given. This type of confession always remains suspect and therefore should be thoroughly examined and scrutinized. Detection of coerced confessions is admittedly a difficult and arduous task for the courts to make. It requires persistence and determination in separating polluted confessions from untainted ones. Page | 57


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LOVERIA GR No. 79138, July 2, 1990 FACTS: Accused-appellant was charged before the RTC with the crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide. Upon being arraigned he entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, the trial court found the appellant guilty as charged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the prosecution witness is credible.

RULING: Inconsistencies between the testimonies given during the investigation stage and during the court proceedings may be disregarded without impairing the credibility of the witnesses, considering such factors as illiteracy. The lapse of time between the commission of the crime and the filing of the complaint was due to the fact the victim was still recuperating from the wounds inflicted on him. The rule is well-established that the failure to reveal or disclose at once the identity of the accused does not necessarily affect much less impair, the credibility of the witness.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MAHINAY GR No. 122485, February 1, 1999 FACTS: Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of rape against Maria, 12 years of age. With the assistance of Atty. Vierness, appellant executed an extrajudicial confession wherein he narrated in detail how he raped and killed the victim. He even admitted that he was not alone in raping and killing the victim. After trial, accused-appellant was convicted of the crime charged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession executed by accused-appellant is admissible as evidence against him.

RULING: Accused-appellant during the custodial investigation and after having been informed of his constitutional rights with the assistance of Atty. Viernes, voluntarily gave his statement admitting the commission of the crime. Said confession of accusedappellant is believed to have been freely and voluntarily given. That accused did not complain to the proper authorities of any maltreatment on his person. He did not even informed the Inquest Prosecutor when he was sworn to the truth of his statement, that he was forced, coersed or was promised of reward of leniency. That his confession abound with details know only to him. As testified by Atty. Vierness, he informed and explained to the accused his constitutional rights and was present all throughout the giving of the testimony.

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PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES vs. MALIMIT GR No. 190775, November 14, 1996 FACTS: Appellant Jose Encarnacion Malimit, charged with and convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, was meted by the trial court the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of Onofre Malaki the sum

of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant’s right to self incrimination was violated.

RULING: Appellant asseverates that the admission as evidence of Malaki's wallet together with its contents, viz ., ., (1) Malaki's residence certificate; (2) his identification card; and (3) bunch of keys, violates his right against self-incrimination. Likewise, appellant sought for their exclusion because during the custodial investigation, wherein he pointed to the investigating policemen the place where he hid Malaki's wallet, he was not informed of his constitutional rights. We are not persuaded. The right against self-incrimination guaranteed under our fundamental law finds no application in this case. This right, as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States, ". . . is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him . . ." It is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the [accused]'s own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt . It does not apply to the instant case where the evidence sought to be excluded is

not an incriminating statement but an object evidence.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MOJELLO GR No. 145566, March 9, 2004 FACTS: Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide. Accusedappellant committed the crime against Lenlen Rayco under 12 years of age. During the arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty. After trial he was convicted of the crime charged and was sentenced sentenc ed to suffer the death penalty.

ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession executed by the appellant is admissible in evidence against him.

RULING: The extrajudicial confession executed by the appellant, complies with the strict constitutional requirements on the right to counsel or in other words it is valid and therefore admissible in evidence. Appellant was fully apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and his right to counsel, as contained in such confession. Appellant was properly assiste4d by Atty. Giduquio. The extrajudicial confession was subscribed and sworn to before Judge Jaca. Judge Jaca declared that he explained to the appellant the contents of the extrajudicial confession and asked if he understood it. The extrajudicial confession executed by the appellant followed the rigid requirements of the Miranda doctrine; consequently, it is admissible evidence. On cross-examination, appellant did not claim his life was threatened, thereby inducing him to execute an extrajudicial confession, yet he filed any case against the person who threatened him, nor he reports this to his counsel. He further claimed that he did not understand the contents of the confession which was read in the Visayan dialect, yet he admits that he uses the Visayan dialect in his daily discourse.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. OLVIS GR No. 71092, September 30, 1987 FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the RTC for the crime of murder. The case was certified by the Supreme Court following the death sentences imposed on each of the three accused-appellants, over which, under the Constitution then in force, the said SC exercised exclusive appellate jurisdiction. The three accused-appellants filed a statement informing the Supreme Court that they desire to continue with the case as appealed case. While in custody, the three accused-appellants executed five separate written confessions each. Based on these subsequent statements, the trail court rendered separate verdicts on the three accused and were all sentenced to die for the crime of murder.

ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession executed by the accused-appellants are admissible as evidence against them.

RULING: Based on the evidence, the three accused-appellants’ accused-appellants’ extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible in in evidence. The accused-appellants were were not assisted by counsel when they waived their rights to counsel. The lacks of counsel makes those statements, in contemplation of law, involuntary, even if it were otherwise voluntary. The accused-appellants were denied of their right to counsel not once, but twice, with regards to the forced re-enactment of the crime the three accused were made to perform shortly after their apprehension. Forced re-enactment, like uncounselled and coerced confessions come within the ban against self-incrimination. Accordingly, all evidence based on such a re-enactment to be in violation of the Constitution and hence, incompetent evidence.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PINLAC GR No. 74123, 1988 FACTS: The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXLV (145) Makati, Metro Manila dated March 18, 1986 rendered jointly in its Criminal Case No. 10476 and Criminal Case No. 10477, is before us on automatic review. Therein, accused Ronilo Pinlac was charged in two (2) separate information of robbery and murder. After said accused entered a plea of not guilty, the cases proceeded to trial. On March 18, 1986, the trial court rendered its now assailed decision finding the accused guilty as charged.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant was denied of the right to counsel.

RULING: When the Constitution requires a person under investigation "to be informed" of his right to remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of a meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a rule, therefore, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical terms. Going to the instant case, We find that the evidence for the prosecution failed to prove compliance with these constitutional rights. Furthermore, the accused was not assisted by counsel and his alleged waiver was made without the assistance of counsel. The record of the case is also replete with evidence which was not satisfactorily rebutted by the prosecution, that the accused was maltreated and tortured for seven (7) solid hours before he signed the prepared extra-judicial confession.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROJAS 147 SCRA 169 FACTS: A massacre of two girls lead to the arresting of Rojas and company. After investigation, all the suspects were charged with murder in three separate informations to which they all pleaded not guilty. Every one of the remaining defendants was provided with counsel de oficio. An extended trial followed and decision was finally rendered on January 27, 1975, convicting all of them and sentencing them to death.

ISSUE: Whether or not the taken confession of the accused-appellants constitute violation of their constitutional right under the Bill of Rights.

RULING: The extrajudicial confession is being test test it against the requirements requirements of Article IV, Section 20, of the 1973 Constitution. This statement was obtained from him on May 28, 1973. It is therefore covered by Magtoto v. Manguera and other subsequent cases holding that this section should be given only prospective operation from January 17, 1973, when the Constitution was ratified. The Th e said provision categorically states that "any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such right." This surely does not suggest compliance with the constitutional mandate. The rights which Totoy was entitled to know were not specifically communicated to him. Being informed of his "rights under the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines" did not mean he was informed particularly of his right to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel during his custodial investigation. He was not told he did not have to answer if he did not feel like answering. He was not told he had a right to be assisted by counsel. He was not given a chance to retain counsel de parte if he wanted to, and neither was he offered the services of counsel de oficio. Not knowing about his right to counsel, he could not have waived it.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. OBRERO GR No. 122142, May 17, 2000 FACTS: Accused-appellant was charged of the crime of robbery with homicide. During the investigation, accused-appellant gave a confession in writing with the assistance of counsel, Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes, in which he admitted participation in the killing of Nena Berjuega and Remedios Hitta. Pat. Ines himself executed an affidavit stating the circumstances of accused-appellant's arrest. He said accused-appellant refused to sign the booking and information sheet.

ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of the accused-appellant which forms the basis of his conviction for the crime of robbery robber y with homicide is valid.

RULING: YES, we discern no sign that the confession was involuntarily executed from the fact that it was signed by accused-appellant five times. Nor can it be inferred that the confession was involuntarily executed from the fact that accused-appellant refused to sign the booking and information sheet. For if he were simply forced to execute the extrajudicial confession and sign it for five times, there is no reason the police was not able to make him sign the said sheet as well. The inference rather was that no force was used to make accused-appellant execute the confession; otherwise, he could also have been forced to sign the booking and information sheet. Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary, and, in the absence of conclusive evidence showing the declarant's consent in executing the same has been vitiated, such confession will be sustained.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DUERO GR No. L-52016, May 13, 1981 FACTS: This is an automatic review of the decision of the CFI of Iloilo, convicting Severino Duero of robbery with homicide, sentencing him to death and ordering him to pay the heirs of Fausta Duero. The principal evidence of the prosecution if the testimony of the Lieutenant Tomas Lujan and declared that Severino Duero confessed to him that accussed committed the robbery with homicide but Severino refused to sign a confession.

ISSUE: Whether or not the oral confession of Severino Duero is admissible in evidence against him.

RULING: Severino Duero’s oral confession

is inadmissible in evidence against him,

without that confession, the prosecution’s other evidence is not sufficient to establish Duero’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution failed to established that before Duero made his alleged oral confession he was informed of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel and because there is no proof that he knowingly and intelligently waived those rights, his confession is inadmissible in evidence.

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ESMEÑA vs. POGOY GR No. L-54110, February 20, 1981 FACTS: Petitioners were charged with grave coercion in the City Court of Cebu City for having allegedly forced Father Tomas Tibudan to withdraw the sum of five thousand pesos from the bank and to give that amount to the accused because the priest lost it in a game of cards. When the case was set to hearing, the priest was not around and the counsel of the defense invoked the right of the accused to have a speedy trial. The case was provisionally dismissed. Twenty-seven days later, the prosecutor filed a motion for the revival of the case and attached a medical certificate of the priest, and cited a ruling that a provisional dismissal with the conformity of the accused lacks the impress of finality and, therefore, the case could be revived without filing of a new information. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the the case on the ground of double jeopardy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners can invoke the right of double jeopardy.

RULING: The acquittal or conviction of the accused or the dismissal or termination of the case without his express consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is included therein. In the present case, the petitioners were placed in jeopardy by the provisional dismissal of the grave coercion case. That provisional dismissal would not have placed the petitioners in jeopardy if respondent judge had taken the precaution of making sure that the dismissal was with their consent. It is not clear that the petitioners consented to the dismissal of the case.

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IVLER vs. MODESTO-SAN PEDRO GR No. 172716, November 17, 2010 FACTS: Petitioner, following a vehicular collision, was charged before the MeTC of Pasig City, with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (crim. Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline Ponce; and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Crim. Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent husband and damaged to the Spouses vehicle. Petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. But the trial court denied the motion to quash finding no identity of offenses in the two case.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366.

RULING: The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code (Article 365), as amended, defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. quasi-offenses. The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. It is not disputed that petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Petitioner’s submission that the lowers courts erred in refusing to extend in his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy clause, has merit.

Page | 68


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BALISACAN GR No. L-26376, August 31, 1966 FACTS: Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the CFI of Ilocos Norte for killing Leoncio Bulaoat. Upon arraignment, he entered a plea of guilty. At his de oficio counsel’s petition, however, he was allowed to present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances. Thereupon the accused testified to the effect that he stabbed the victim in self-defense because the said victim was strangling him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy.

RULING: It is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy. In the present case, it is true, the accused had first entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in the course of being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances, that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony, therefore, as the court recognized in its decision, had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead a new on the charge, or atleast direct that a new plea of guilty be entered for him. However, this was not done. It follows that in effect there having been no standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered its judgment or acquittal, there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein.

Page | 69


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ECHEGARAY GR No. 117472, June 25, 1996 FACTS: Leo Echegaray was charged and convicted of the crime of statutory rape and was meted the sentenced of death penalty. He committed the crime against his own daughter, Rodessa Echegaray a ten year-old girl. Leo Echegaray in his answers, among others, alleged alibi as his defense.

ISSUE: The issue boils down to the credibility of the testimony of the victim.

RULING: Echagaray’s contention that the grandmother has fabr icated icated the charge against him has no merit, because no grandmother would be so callous as to instigate her 10-year old grandmother to file a rape case against her own father simply on account of her alleged interest over the disputed lot. It is well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that the testimony of a rape victim is credible where she has no motive to testify against the accused. The fact that the ten-year old victim referred to the accused-appellant accused-appellant as “Papa” is reason enough to conclude that accused-appellant is either the father or stepfather of Rodessa. Thus, the act of sexual assault perpetrated by the accused on his young victim has become all the more repulsive and perverse.

Page | 70


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RELOVA GR No. L-45129, March 6, 1987 FACTS: Police searched the ice plant owned by Opulencia; they discovered electric wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed without necessary authority from city government. Asstant City Fiscal charged Opulencia for violation of a city ordinance which prohibits unauthorized wiring installations. Opulencia pleaded not guilty and filed motion to dismiss on the ground that the crime had already prescribed (offense charged was a light felony w/c prescribes 2 mos from discovery thereof). Lower court dismissed the case. Acting City Fiscal filed another info for theft of electric power. Opulencia filed Motion to Quash upon the ground of double jeopardy.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was double jeopardy.

RULING: A person who was charged for violating a city ordinance for having installed a metering device to lower his electric bills which was dismissed for prescription of the offense may not be charged again for theft of electric power under the RPC. The second sentence of Art. IV Sec. 22 embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the RPC, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. Where an offense is punished by different sections of a statute or different statutes, the inquiry, for purposes of double jeopardy is on the identity of offenses charged BUT where an offense is penalized by an ordinance and a statute, the inquiry is on the identity of acts. Since the dismissal of the case against Opulencia for violation of an ordinance already amounted to an acquittal, he can no longer charged with an offense punishable under a statute which arises from the same act.

Page | 71


TACAS vs. CARIASO GR No. L-37406, August 31, 1976 FACTS: Petitioner was charged of two offenses filed by the Chief of Police Felipe Agdeppa. The first offense was a criminal complaint for less physical injuries and the other criminal complaint was assault upon a person in authority.

ISSUE: Whether or not constitutional provision on double jeopardy bars a prosecution for the crime of assault upon a person of authority.

RULING: There was no circumventing event or circumstance that could affect or change the nature if the act originally committed. This is a case therefore of there being a single act resulting in the complex crime of less serious physical injuries and assault upon a person in authority. The indictment, was, however, solely for less serious physical injuries. It is therefore now too late to hold him liable as well for the offense of assault against a person in authority.

Page | 72


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CITY COURT OF MANILA GR No. L-36528, September 24, 1987 FACTS: On Oct. 17, 1972, Diolito dela Cruz figured in an accident. The next day information for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence (SPIRI) was filed against private respondent driver of the truck. On Oct. 18, the victim died. On Oct. 20, private respondent was arraigned on the charge of o f SPIRI; he pleaded guilty. On Oct. 24, information for homicide thru reckless imprudence (HRI) was filed against private respondent. On Nov. 17 – 17 – city court of Manila dismissed above info on the ground of double

jeopardy.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was double jeopardy.

RULING: Where the victim of an accident died 2 days prior to the arraignment of the accused who pleaded guilty to information for SPIRI, he can no longer be charged with HRI

as

no

new

fact

supervened

after

the

arraignment.

In the case of Melo v. People, it was held that where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy. Above case not applicable in the instant case because there was no supervening event.

Page | 73


ISABELA SUGAR vs. MACADAEG 98 Phil. 995 FACTS: The Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co., Inc., BISCOM for short, is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of centrifugal sugar at Binalbagan, Negros Occidental. Among its employees were Enrique C. Entila and Victoriano Tenazas. On March 6, 1952, Entila and Tenazas joined the Fraternal Labor Organization (FLO), which is a labor union composed of employees and laborers of the BISCOM. On May 3, 1957, the BISCOM entered into a two-year collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop clause with said union wherein it was stipulated that the agreement may be extended for a period of one year unless either party notifies the other in writing not less than 60 days prior to its expiry date of its intention to terminate the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not the corporation was denied the right to due process.

RULING: The court a quo likewise found that Tenazas, being a member of the Board of Directors of the FLO, did not undergo an impeachment proceeding as provided in its by-laws relative to the action to be taken against an officer of the union, while Entila was not given proper hearing even if he was called before a lawyer of the union for investigation. The court found that during the alleged hearing not a single witness was presented as Entila was merely questioned regarding the contents of certain affidavits. In fact, the son of Entila who was a law student asked for postponement of the hearing so that he could prepare the defense of his father, but the request was denied. This is also a question of fact which we cannot now look into being supported by substantial evidence.

Page | 74


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GALLARDE GR No. 13302, February 17, 2000 FACTS: On 24 June 1997, GALLARDE was charged with the special complex crime of rape with homicide of a minor.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant was denied the right to due process.

RULING: A reading of the accusatory portion of the information shows that there was no allegation of any qualifying circumstance. Although it is true that the term “homicide” as used in special complex crime of rape with homicide is to be understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on the occasion of rape it is settled in this jurisdiction that where a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the component offense, the accused can be convicted of the other. In rape with homicide, in order to be convicted of murder in case the evidence fails to support the charge of rape, the qualifying circumstance must be sufficiently alleged and proved. Otherwise, it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged. It is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in an information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The prosecution is not always tasked to present direct evidence to sustain a judgment of conviction; the absence of direct evidence does not necessarily absolve an accused from any criminal liability.

Page | 75


UNITED STATES vs. VALENTINE KARELSEN G.R. No. 1376, January 21, 1904 FACTS: The defendant was accused of the crime of embezzlement. That the said J. Valentine Karelsen, on the 2nd day of April, 1903, whilst acting as postmaster at Calamba, of the Province of Laguna, P. I., and having in his charge public funds belonging to the post-office, withdrew, for his own use and benefit, the sum of $1,000, gold currency of the United States, the property of the Post-Office Department of the Government of the Philippine Islands, contrary to the statutes made and provided in such cases.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was denied de nied of the right to due process.

RULING: In this case it is alleged that the complaint was insufficient in that it did not describe the “one thousand dollars” by piece or denomination or value. Our attention is called to several cases in the United States upon this question. In the present case the books of the accused showed that he had the sum of $1,046.64, gold, United States currency, belonging to the Post-Officce Department on the 1st day of April, 1903. He is charged with embezzling “$1,000, gold, legal money of the United States.” This allegation is in substance in the terms of his own accounts, and we fail to see how he can in any way misunderstand the allegation or be confused in making his defense under it. Under all the evidence given in the trial of this cause we find that an ocular inspection of the mail sack, in which it is alleged the said money was sent to Manila as claimed by the accused, would not aid the court in reaching its conclusion.

Page | 76


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEGAZPI GR Nos. 92167-68, July 14, 1995 FACTS: This is an appeal from the consolidated Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 124, Kalookan City, in Criminal Case No. C-28760(87) for double murder and Criminal Case No. C-28761(87) for violation of Republic Act No. 6539 (AntiCarnapping Act), finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with double homicide. Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to the charges. The cases were jointly tried and after trial, the court rendered a consolidated decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellants were denied of o f their right to due process.

RULING: Appellants' conviction is based on the positive testimonies of the witnesses, the investigation conducted and the evidences .The circumstantial evidence found by the trial court is sufficient to convict appellants. We may likewise add that appellants failed to provide any explanation to the following circumstances: (1) the recovery of the dagger (Exh. "G") stained with blood from the jeepney at the time of the arrest; and (2) Torres' possession of the driver's license of the deceased Ronaldo Abales (Exh. "H"). The requisites provided for in Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence regarding the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence have been complied with. Appellants' defense of denial and alibi are inherently weal especially when only appellants testified as to said defenses. Appellant Legaspi also claimed that he was denied his right to counsel during the custodial investigation. However, the trial court did not consider any evidence taken during the custodial investigation of appellants.

Page | 77


PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICRE EXPORTERS, INC. vs. DRILON GR No. 81958, June 30, 1988 FACTS: Petitioner is engaged in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement. Petitioner challenges the constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series S eries of 1988, of the DOLE. It alleges that it is violative of the right to travel and it is invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.

ISSUE: Whether or not Department Order No. 1 is constitutional.

RULING: The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to female contract workers, but it does not thereby make undue discrimination between sexes. It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribed a total ban on overseas deployment. Department Order No.1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to afford protection to labor.

Page | 78


MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989

FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition before the court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to the Marcos family and to enjoin the implementation of the the President’s decision to bar the their return return to the Phili ppines.( ppines.( Ferdinand Marcos was then on his deathbed. It was noted that on February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent non-violent “People’s Power” revolution forcing him into exile in Hawaii.In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared President under a revolutionary government.) The petitioners commented that the president is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so “within the limits prescribed by the law” nor may the the president impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. That before the right to travel maybe impaired, by any authority, there must be legislation to that effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcos’s from returning to the Philippines.

RULING: With or without the restricting legislation, the right to travel may be impaired or restricted in the interest of national security, public safety, and public health. The power of the state in particular cases to restrict travel of its citizen’s finds abundant support in the police power of the state which may be exercised to preserve and maintain the government as well as to promote the general welfare of the greatest number of people. And yet, the power of the state, acting through a government in authority at any given time, to restrict, even if founded on police power, cannot be absolute and unlimited under all circumstances, much less can be arbitrary irrational.

Page | 79


YAP vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 141529

June 6, 2001

FACTS: The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and travel, are being invoked to set aside two resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions on change of residence and travel abroad. For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted of estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City1 and was sentenced to four years and two months of prision correctional, as minimum to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, "in addition to one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20) years."2 He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings. The motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated February 17,1999.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of his right against excessive bail.

RULING: YES, Under the circumstances of this case, we find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any change of residence and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, we find that the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of petitioner's right to bail. The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the Court. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which petitioner is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00).is to permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of; this we cannot allow because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court. Page | 80


MANOTOC vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-62100 May 30, 1986

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as well as the communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him

for

departure.

The

Court

of

Appeals

denied

the

petition.

Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty could prevent him h im from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

ISSUE: Whether or not his constitutional right to travel has been violated.

RULING: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.

The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts. Petitioner has not shown the necessity for his travel abroad. There is no indication that the business transactions cannot be undertaken by any other person in his behalf.

Page | 81


AUSTRIA vs. NLRC GR No. 124382, August 16, 1999 FACTS: Subject of the instant petition for certiorari is the resolution of the public respondent NLRC in an NLRC case entitled “Austria vs. Central Philippine Union Mission Corporation of Seventh Day Adventists, which dismissed the case for illegal dismissal filed by the petitioner against private respondents for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the termination of the services of petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair and as such involves the separation of church churc h and state.

RULING: The rationale of the principle of separation of church and state is delineate the boundaries between the two institutions and thus avoiding encroachments by one against the other because of a misunderstanding of the limits of their respective exclusive jurisdictions. The case does not concern an ecclesiastical or purely religious affair as to bar the state from taking cognizance of the same. While the matter at hand han d relates to the church and its religious minister it does not ipso facto give the case a religious significance. What is involved here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the the church.

Page | 82


GARCES vs. ESTENZO GR No. L-53487, May 25, 1981 FACTS: This case is about the constitutionality of four resolutions of the barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City, regarding the acquisition of the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in the celebration of his annual feast day.

ISSUE: Whether or not the parish priest or a layman should have the custody of the image.

RULING: The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated. This case is a petty quarrel quarrel over the custody of a saint’s image. There can be no question that the image in question belongs to the barangay council. The priest claim that it belongs to his church is wrong. The barangay council, as owner of the image, has the right to determine who should have custody thereof.

Page | 83


GONZALES vs. CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE TARLAC LABOR UNION GR No. L-38178, October 3, 1985 FACTS: The plaintiffs are members of the Iglesia ni Kristo, a religious sect that prohibits its members from joining a labor organization. The plaintiffs, through members of the Iglesia ni Kristo, being ignorant of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3350, and believing that it was the only way by which they could continue working for the respondent, by reason of Section 4 of the Exclusive Collective Bargaining Agreement, joined the defendant labor union.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3350, prohibiting the affiliation of members of religious sect in any labor organization, is constitutional.

RULING: The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual or religious or holy and eternal. It was intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons refused work, or be dismissed from work, or de dispossessed of their right to work and being impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by reason of union security agreements. The act classifies employees and workers, as to the effect and coverage of union shop security agreements, into those who by reason of their religious beliefs and convictions cannot sign up with a labor unions.

Page | 84


IGLESIA NI CRISTO (INC) vs. COURT OF APPEALS GR No. 119673, July 26, 1996 FACTS: Petitioner, a duly organized religious organization, has a television program entitled “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo”, airing religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparatives studies with other religions. Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television tapes of its program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as “X” or not for public viewing on the ground that they offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law. Petitioner filed two (2) courses of action against the respondent Board.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Board has the power to review petitioner’s TV Program and whether it gravely abused its discretion when it prohibited the airing of the said program.

RULING: Under the provision of PD 1986, it provides the Board the power to screen, review and examine all television programs. By the clear terms of the law, the Board has the power to approve, delete and/or prohibit the exhibition and/or television broadcast of television programs. Thus, petitioner’s postulate that its religious program is per se beyond review by the respondent Board is rejected. The respondent cannot rely on the ground that the program of petitioner attacks against another religion in x-rating the religious program of said petitioner. Section 3 of PD No. 1986, will reveal that it is not among the grounds to justify an order prohibiting the broadcast of petitioner’s television program. The ground attack against another religion was merely added by the respondent Board in its Rules. This rule is void for its runs smack against the doctrine that administrative and regulations cannot expand the letter and spirit of the law they seek to enforce. Furthermore, in x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule.

Page | 85


PRIMICAS vs. FUGOSO GR No. L-1800, January 27, 1948 FACTS: This is an action of mandamus instituted by the petitioner, Cipriano Primicias, a campaign manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties against Valeraino Fugoso, as Mayor of the City of Manila, to compel the latter to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at Plaza Miranda on Sunday afternoon, November 16, 1947, for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress to grievances on the ground that the respondent refused to grant such permit. Due to urgency of the case, this Court, after mature deliberation, issued a writ of mandamus, as prayed for in the petition of November 15, 1947, without prejudice to writing later an extended and reasoned decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner were denied of their right of freedom of expression.

RULING: Section 2434 of the Administrative Code, a part of the Charter of the City of Manila, which provides that the Mayor shall have the power to grant and refuse municipal licenses or permits of all classes, cannot be cited as an authority for the Mayor to deny the application of the petitioner, for the simple reason that said general power is predicated upon the ordinances enacted by the Municipal Board requiring licenses or permits to be issued by the Mayor, such as those found in Chapters 40 to 87 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. It is not a specific or substantive power independent from the corresponding municipal ordinances which the Mayor, as Chief Executive of the City, is required to enforce under the same section 2434. As the request of the petition was for a permit "to hold a peaceful public meeting," and there is no denial of that fact or any doubt that it was to be a lawful assemblage, the reason given for the refusal of the permit cannot be given any an y consideration.

Page | 86


MUTUC vs. COMELEC GR No. L-32717, November 26, 1970 FACTS: Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention (1970). His candidacy was given due course by the COMELEC but he was prohibited from playing his campaign jingle on his mobile units because this is an apparent violation of COMELEC’s band “to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.” It was COMELEC’s contention that the

jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material (falling under and the like’s category), under the above COMELEC statute subject to confiscation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case falls with the constitutional right of Freedom of Expression.

RULING: By virtue of Ejusdem Ejusdem Generis , general words following any enumeration must be of the same class as those specifically referred to. It did contend, however, that one of its provisions referred to above makes unlawful the distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words “and the like.” For respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify such an order. We view the matter differently. What was done cannot merit our approval under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. This is a curtailment of Freedom of Expression. The Constitution prohibits the abridgment of the freedom of speech.

Page | 87


NPC vs. COMELEC GR No. 102653, March 5, 1992 FACTS: In the three (3) consolidated Petitions before us, the common question raised by petitioners is the constitutionality of Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646. Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election issues and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6646 is constitutional.

RULING: No one seriously disputes the legitimacy or the importance of the objective sought to be secured by Section 11 (b) (of Republic Act No. 6646) in relation to Sections 90 and 92 (of the Omnibus Election Code). That objective is of special importance and urgency in a country which, like ours, is characterized by extreme disparity in income distribution between the economic elite and the rest of o f society, and by the prevalence of poverty, with the bulk of our population falling below that "poverty line." In the constitutional assaying of legislative provisions like Section 11 (b), the character and extent of the limitations resulting from the particular measure being assayed upon freedom of speech and freedom of the press are essential considerations. It is important to note that the restrictive impact upon freedom of speech and freedom of o f the press of Section 11 (b) is circumscribed circumscribed by certain important limitations.

Page | 88


ADIONG vs. COMELEC GR No. 103156, March 31, 1992 FACTS: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos.6646 and 7166 and other election laws. Section 15(a) of the resolution provides: Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on"mobile" places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.

RULING: The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the COMELEC providing that "decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph ( f) of Section S ection 21 hereof" is DECLARED NULL and VOID. The Th e COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in designated d esignated areas provided for by the th e COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646) and as couched in the resolution is void for over breadth. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle (The provisions allowing regulation are so loosely worded that they include the posting of decals or stickers in the privacy of one's living room or bedroom.) Page | 89


REYES vs. BAGATSING GR No. L-65366, November 9, 1983 FACTS: Petitioners sought a permit to hold a peaceful march and rally, requesting for the removal of the foreign military bases in Manila, starting from Luneta park to the gates of the US Embassy. Respondent Mayor denied the request as recommended by the police authorities and suggested another area where the safety of the participants and the general public may be ensured. Petitioner contends that said s aid denial was a violation of free speech and assembly.

ISSUE: Whether or not denial of a public p ublic rally on a public park and the US Embassy is a violation of constitutional guarantee to free speech and assembly.

RULING: Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. It is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use u se dependent depen dent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group. There can be no legal objection, absent of clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta and US Embassy as the place for the peaceful rally. Time immemorial Luneta has been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Moreover, denial of permit for a rally in front of the US Embassy is justified only in the presence of a clear and present danger to life or property of the embassy.

Page | 90


AYER PRODUCTION vs. CAPULONG GR No. 82380, April 29, 1988 FACTS: Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer Productions, envisioned, sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and other government agencies consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production. Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising

or

commercial

exploitation

ISSUE: Whether

or

not

freedom

of

expression

was

violated.

RULING: Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television. Furthermore the circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for

availing

of

freedom

of

speech

and

of

expression.

The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" d anger" of any violation of any right to privacy. Subject matter is one of public interest and concern. The subject thus relates to a highly critical stage in the history of the country. At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place, Enrile was a "public figure:"

Page | 91


SUBIDO vs. OZAETA GR No. L-1631, February 27, 1948 FACTS: This is a petition for mandamus. The petitioner, editor of the Manila Post, a morning daily, prays that an order issue "commanding the respondents to furnish (petitioner) the list of real estates sold to aliens and registered with the Register of Deeds of Manila since the promulgation of the Department of Justice Circular No. 128 or to allow the petitioner or his duly accredited representatives (to) examine all records in the respondents' custody relative to the (said) transactions."

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner maybe allowed to examine the records of the respondent.

RULING: The petition in part is grounded on the liberty of the press. We do not believe that this constitutional right is in any way involved. The refusal by the respondents does not constitute a restriction upon or censorship or publication. It only affects facilities of publication, and the respondents are correct in saying that freedom of information or freedom to obtain information for publication is not guaranteed by the constitution.The case is governed by statute and to a certain degree be general principles of democratic institutions. It has been expressly stated that the right to examine or inspect public records is purely a question of statutory construction. (80 A. L. R., 761 citing cases.) The right of inspection of title records is a subject of express statutory regulation in the Philippines. Section 56 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 3300, provides that "All records relating to registered lands in the office of the Register of Deeds shall be open to the public subject to such reasonable regulations as may be prescribed by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office with the approval of the Secretary of Justice." The Chief of the General Land Registration Office does not seem to have adopted any regulations in pursuance of this provision. Page | 92


VALMONTE vs. BELMONTE GR No. 74930, February 13, 1989 FACTS: Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray that respondent responden t be directed: (a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information. (Petition, pp. 4-5; paragraphing supplied.

ISSUE: Whether or not they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information.

RULING: Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have both the right to gather and the obligation to check the accuracy of information the disseminate. For them, the freedom of the press and of speech is not only critical, but vital to the exercise of their professions. The right of access to information ensures that these freedoms are not rendered nugatory by the government's monopolizing pertinent information. For an essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. Page | 93


LAGUNZAD vs. CA GR No. L32066, August 6, 1979 FACTS: This is a Petition for Review by certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34703, promulgated on January 13, 1970, affirming the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, dated June 30, 1964, in Civil Case No. 6414 entitled "Maria Soto Vda. de Gonzales vs. Manuel Lagunzad," for a Sum of Money and Attachment. The present controversy stems from a "Licensing Agreement" entered into by and between petitioner Manuel M. Lagunzad and private respondent Maria Soto Vda. de Gonzales on October 5, 1961, which contract petitioner claims to be null and void for having been entered into by him under duress, intimidation and undue influence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional right of the Petitioner to free speech and free press was denied. RULING:

The right of freedom of expression, indeed, occupies a preferred position in the "hierarchy of civil liberties." The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the "balancing-of-interests test." The principle requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation." In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by respondent and the right of -freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. Taking into int o account the interplay of those interests, we hold that under the particular circumstances presented, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern. Page | 94


CHAVEZ vs. PCGG GR No. 13076, December 9, 1998 FACTS: Petitioner, as taxpayer, citizen and former government official who initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies, alleges that he was impelled to bring the present action because of several news reports bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos and the reported execution of a compromise, between the government, through PCGG, and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets. Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that respondents make publicly any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG’s task of recovering the Marcoses ill-gotten wealth.

ISSUE: Whether or not the PCGG can be compel to disclose publicly the details of any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses.

RULING: The arguments cited by petitioner constitute the controlling decisional rule as regards his legal standing to institute the instant petition. Access to public documents and records is a public right, and the real parties in interest are the people themselves. Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, it is incumbent upon PCGG to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. There is no doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses’ alleged ill-gotten ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest. Furthermore, ill-gotten wealth, by its nature, assumes a public character.

Page | 95


ORTIGAS vs. FEATI GR No. L-24670, December 14, 1979 FACTS: Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to the public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along EDSA, Mandaluyong, Rizal. On March 4, 1952, plaintiff pl aintiff entered into separate agreements of sale with Augusto A ugusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles over 2 parcels of land. On July 19, 1962 the vendees transferred their rights and interests over the said lots to Emma Chavez. The plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez upon payment of the purchase price. Both the agreements and the deeds of sale thereafter executed ex ecuted contained the stipulation that the parcels of land subject of the deeds of sale “shall be used by the Buyer exclusively for residential purposes”. residential purposes”.

ISSUE: Whether Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power.

RULING: Yes. The validity of Resolution No.27 was never questioned. In fact, it was impliedly admitted in the stipulation of facts, when plaintiff-appellant did not dispute the same. Having admitted the validity of the subject resolution, plaintiff-appellant cannot now change its position on appeal. While non-impairment of contacts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power. Invariably described as the “most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers” and the “greatest and most powerful attribute of government”, the exercise of police power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee. Thus, the state, in order to promote the general welfare, ma y interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.

Page | 96


BAYOT vs. SANDIGANBAYAN GR Nos. L-61776-L-61861, March 23, 1984 FACTS: Petitioner Reynaldo R. Bayot is one of the several persons accused in more than one hundred (100) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents before the Sandiganbayan. The said charges stemmed from his alleged involvement, as a government auditor of the Commission on Audit On May 30, 1980, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting c onvicting herein petitioner and some of his co-accused in all but one of the thirty-two (32) cases filed against them. On March 16, 1982, Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 was passed amending, among others, Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3019 is an ex post facto law.

RULING: Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, is a penal statute in which case the provision of said Act must be strictly construed in favor of the accused and against the State. We find no merit in petitioner's contention that Section 13 of Republic Act 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which includes the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document as among the crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension from office pending action in court, is a penal provision which violates the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto law. Paragraph 3 of Article 24 of the Revised Penal Code clearly states that suspension from the employment or public office during the trial or in order to institute proceedings shall not be considered as penalty. The amendatory provision clearly states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under Republic Act 3019 or for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.

Page | 97


LOZANO vs. MARTINEZ GR No. L-63419, September 18, 1986 FACTS: Among the constitutional objections raised against BP 22, the most serious is the alleged conflict between the statute and the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt. It is contended that the statute runs counter to the inhibition in the Bill of Rights which states, "No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax." Petitioners insist that, since the offense under BP 22 is consummated only upon the dishonor or non-payment of the check when it is presented to the drawee bank, the statute is really a "bad debt law" rather than a "bad check law." What it punishes is the non-payment of the check, not the act of issuing it.

ISSUE : Whether or not BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.

RULING: BP 22 does not conflict with the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. Checks have become widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and commerce. Although not legal tender, checks have come to be perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and financial transactions. The basis or foundation of such perception is confidence. If such confidence is shakes the usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished.

Page | 98


PRESLEY vs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC. G.R. No. 86774 August 21, 1991 FACTS: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on November 28, 1988 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court in toto. A complaint for specific performance and damages with preliminary injunction was filed by plaintiff-appellee, Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA for short) against Teofilo Almendras and Rollo Almendras (now both deceased and substituted by defendantappellant Enedina Presley) for violation of the Deed Restrictions of Bel-Air Subdivision that the subject house and lot shall be used only for residential and not for commercial purposes and for non-payment of association dues to plaintiff BAVA amounting to P3,803.55. After due hearing on the merits, the trial court rendered the decision in favor of BAVA which was affirmed by the respondent Court Cou rt of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Restriction is valid.

RULING: The respondent court in the case at bar was not at all entirely wrong in upholding the Deed of Restrictions annotated in the title of the petitioners. It held that the provisions of the Deed of Restrictions are in the nature of contractual obligations freely entered into by the parties. Undoubtedly, they are valid and can be enforced against the petitioner. However, these contractual stipulations on the use of the land even if said conditions are annotated on the torrens. With respect to the demand for payment of association dues in the sum of P3,803.55, the records reveal that this issue is now moot and academic after petitioner Presley purchased the property subject of lease from the Almendrases and settled all association dues.

Page | 99


TERRY LYN MAGNO vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 101148, August 05, 1992 FACTS: Appealed to this Court by way of petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for issuance of a restraining or status quo order is the denial by the Court of Appeal of a petition for for habeas corpus (CA-G.R. SP. No. 25442) wherein petitioner challenged as illegal and violative of constitutional due process her arrest without a warrant by agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) and her resultant detention at the CID Detention Center.

ISSUE: Whether or not Wirt for Habeas Corpus should be granted.

RULING: Petitioner's release from detention has rendered this petition moot and academic insofar as it questions the legality of her arrest and detention. A habeas corpus proceeding "x x x shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty x x x." (Rule 102, Sec. 1, Revised Rules of Court)Validity of the arrest has ceased to be an issue especially because a decision in the deportation proceeding will not result in petitioner's permanent or prolonged detention but exclusion ex clusion or departure from this country. Her subsequent commitment to the custody of the CID, if, after the proceedings before the proper forum, she is found to be an undesirable alien, will have no more connection with the questioned warrantless arrest and subsequent detention on the night of 17 July 1991.Petitioner's claim to Filipino citizenship cannot be settled before this Court at this instance. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General's rejoinder to petitioner's reply, there are factual issues that make petitioner's citizenship controversial. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; the factual controversies must first be resolved before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation.

Page | 100


MONCUPA vs. ENRILE 141 SCRA 233 FACTS: Petitioners were arrested and detained on the allegation that they were members of a subversive organization. Petitioners filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.Respondents filed a motion to dismiss after the petitioner was temporarily released from detention on the ground that the petition for habeas corpus may be deemed moot and academic since the petitioner is free and no longer under the respondent’s custody. Petitioner argues that his temporary release did not render the instant petition moot and academic because of the restrictions imposed by the respondents which constitute an involuntary and illegal restraint on his freedom.

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus becomes moot and academic in view of the detained person’s release with restrictions.

RULING: No. Restraints attached to temporary release of a detained person warrant the Supreme Court’s inquiry into the nature of the involuntary restraint and relieving him of such restraints as may be illegal. Reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the detainee’s temporary release constitutes restraints on the liberty of the detainee. It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus. Temporary release of detainee from detention with involuntary restraints does not render the petition for writ of habeas corpus moot and academic. It is available where a person continue to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are necessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary.

Page | 101


SARMIENTO vs. TUICO 162 SC RA 678 FACTS: The case arose when on May 7, 1986, petitioner Asian Transmission Corporation terminated the services of Catalino Sarmiento, vice-president of the Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATU), for allegedly carrying a deadly weapon in the company premises.

2

As a result, the BATU filed a notice of strike on May 26, 1986,

claiming that the ATC had committed an unfair labor practice.

The conciliatory

conference held on June 5, 1986, failed to settle the dispute

ISSUES: Whether or not, pending such determination, the criminal prosecution of certain persons involved in the said strike may be validly restrained.

RULING: It is contended by the ATC that the NLRC had no jurisdiction in issuing the return-to-work order and that in any case the same should be annulled for being oppressive and violative of due process. While as a general rule the prosecution of criminal offenses is not subject to injunction, the exception must apply in the case at bar. The suspension of proceedings in the criminal complaints filed before the municipal court of Calamba, Laguna, is justified on the ground of prematurity as there is no question that the acts complained of are connected with the compulsory arbitration proceedings still pending in the NLRC. The T he first two complaints, as expressly ex pressly captioned, are for "violation of Art. 265, par. 2, in relation to Art. 273, of the Labor Code of the Philippines," and the third complaint relates to the alleged acts of coercion committed by the defendants in blocking access acc ess to the premises of the ATC. The Court makes no findings on the merits me rits of the labor dispute and the criminal cases against the workers as these are not in issue in the petitions before it.

Page | 102


LT. GENERAL LISANDRO ABADIA vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS GR No. 105597, September 23, 1994 FACTS: Private respondent Lt. Col. Marcelino Malajacan was arrested on April 27, 1990 in connection with the December 1989 coup attempt. He was detained for nine months without charges. On January 30, 1991, a charge sheet was filed against private respondent by the office of the Judge Advocate General alleging violations of the 67th, 94th and 97th Articles of War for Mutiny, Murder and Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman, respectively.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied the right to speedy trial.

RULING: In the context of the constitutional protection guaranteeing fair trial rights to accused individuals particularly the Right to a Speedy Trial, we cannot accept petitioners' submission that the absence of any specific provision limiting the time within which records of general courts martial should be forwarded to the appropriate reviewing authority and for the reviewing authority to decide on the case would deny private respondent - or any military personnel facing charges before the General Courts Martial, for that matter - a judicial recourse to protect his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The records of the case may indefinitely remain with the General Court Martial, and our courts, because of a procedural gap in the rules, cannot be called upon to ascertain whether certain substantive rights have been or are being denied in the meantime. That is not the spirit ordained by inclusion of the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which mandates the "duty of the Courts of Justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch b ranch or instrumentality of the government."

Page | 103


CABALLES vs. TELLO 153 SCRA 153 FACTS: Petitioner was a Telegraph Operator and Telegraphic Transfer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Prosperidad, Agusan Agusan del Sur. On 5 December 1986, Lordino Tomampos Saligumba (Saligumba), Commission on Audit Auditor II assigned at the office of the Provincial Auditor of Agusan del Sur, received an order directing him and Dionisio Virtudazo (Virtudazo) to conduct an audit examination of petitioner’s accounts. Saligumba and Virtudazo Virtudazo (the auditors) conducted an audit from 8 to 10 December 1986 where it was initially determined that petitioner had a shortage in the total amount of P6,152.90.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied the right to speedy disposition.

RULING: Section 16, Article III of the Constitution provides: provides: “All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi- judicial or administrative bodies.” The Court ruled that petitioner failed to seasonably assert his right and he merely sat and waited from the time his case was submitted for resolution. In this case, petitioner similarly failed failed to assert his right to a speedy disposition of his his case. He did not take any step to accelerate the the disposition of his his case. He only invoked his right right to a speedy disposition of cases after the Sandiganbayan promulgated its decision convicting him for malversation of public funds. Petitioner’s silence silence may be considered as a waiver of his right.

Page | 104

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