CONSOLIDATED CASES IN PALE.docx

Republic of the Philippines ISABELA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW Cauayan Campus

CASE DIGEST in Practical Areas in Legal Ethics (PALE)

Submitted by: 3rd yr. LLB students S.Y. 2015-2016

LIST OF CASES Cases from January to December 2010

  

Atty. Elmer Solidon Vs. Atty. Ramil Macalalad, A.C. No. 8158, February 24, 2010 Rural Bank Of Calape, Inc. (Rbci) Bohol Vs.Atty. James Benedict Florido A.C. No. 5736, June 18, 2010 Spouses Virgilio And Angelina Aranda Vs. Atty. Emmanuel F. Elayda, A.C. No. 7907, December 15, 2010

Cases from January to December 2011     

Atty. Conrado Gandeza, Jr. Vs Judge Maria Clarita Tabin, A.M. No. Mtj-091736, July 25, 2011 Valentin C. Miranda V. Atty. Macario D. Carpio, A.C. 6281, September 16, 2011 Dalisay Capili Vs Atty. Alfredo Bentulan, A.C. No. 5862, October 12, 2011 Urban Bank, Inc. Vs Atty. Magdaleno Peña, G.R. No. 145817, October 19, 2011 Elpidio Tiong Vs Atty. George Florendo, A.C. No. 4428, December 12, 2011

Cases from January to December 2012              

Corazon Nevada Vs Atty. Rodolfo Casuga, A.C. No. 7591, March 20, 2012 Re: Report On Financial Audit Conducted At MCTC, Santiago-San Esteban, Ilocos Sur. A.M. No. P-11-2950. January 17, 2012 Cresencio C. Milla Vs. People Of The Philippines And Carlo V. Lopez. G.R. No. 188726. January 25, 2012. Hector Trenas Vs. People Of The Philippines. G.R. No. 195002. January 25, 2012. Luis P. Pineda Vs. Neil T. Torres, Sheriff II, Municipal Trial Court In Cities, Branch 2, Angeles City. A.M. No. P-12-3027. January 30, 2012 Concerned Citizen Vs. Domingo Nawen Abad, Etc. A.M. No. P-11-2907. January 31, 2012. Re: Verified Complaint Of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, Chairman Of The Board/CEO Etc. Against Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., Et Al. A.M. No. 11184-CA-J. January 31, 2012. Judge Lucina Alpez Dayaon, Etc. Vs. Jesusa V. De Leon. A.M. No. P-112926, February 1, 2012 Office Of The Court Administrator Vs. Judge Celso L. Mantua, Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Palompon, Leyte. A.M. No. RTJ-11-2291. February 8, 2012. Aida R. Campos, Et Al. Vs. Judge Eliseo M. Campos, MTC, Bayugan, Agusan Del Sur. A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761, February 8, 2012. Sps. Democrito And Olivia Lago Vs. Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. RTC, Br. 43, Gingoog City. A.M. No. RTJ-10-2255, February 8, 2012. Office Of The Adrministrative Services, Office Of The Court Administrator Vs. Leoncio K. Gutierrez III, Clerk III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City. A.M. No. P-11-2951, February 15, 2012. Martin Lahn III And James P. Concepcion Vs. Labor Arbiter Jovencio Li. Mayor, Jr., A.C. No. 7430, February 15, 2012. Nesa Isenhardt Vs. Atty. Leonardo M. Real, A.C. No. 8254, February 15, 2012. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

 

         

   

Atty. Rene Medina, Et Al. Vs. Judge Victor Canoy, Et Al. A.M. RTJ-112298, February 22, 2012. Sheila G. Del Rosario, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Br. 36, Santiago City, Isabela Vs. Mary Anne C. Pascua, Court Stenographer III, Same Court. A.M. No. P-11-2999. February 27, 2012. Office Of The Court Administrator Vs. Judge Go, Et Al. A.M. No. MTJ-071667, April 10, 2012. Maria Vs. Cortez. A.C. No. 7880, April 11, 2012. Office Of The Court Administrator Vs. Araya. A.M. No. P-12-3053, April 11, 2012. Attys. Gonzalez, Et Al. Vs. Calo. A.M. No. P-12-3028, April 11, 2012. Suzette Del Mundo Vs. Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano, April 16, 2012 Suzette Del Mundo Vs. Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano. A.C. No. 6903, April 16, 2012. Judge Salvador R. Santos, Jr. Vs. Editha R. Mangahas. A.M. No. P-092720, April 17, 2012. In Re: Supreme Court Resolution Dated 28 April 2003 In G.R. Nos. 145817 And 145822. A.C. No. 6332, April 17, 2012. Judge Andrew P. Dulnuan Vs. Esteban D. Dacsig, Clerk Of Court II, MCTC, Magddela-Nagtipunan, Quirinio. A.M. No. P-11-3004, April 18, 2012. Ramoncito And Juliana Luarca Vs. Judge Ireneo B. Molato, MTC, Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro/ Jeny Agbay Vs. Judge Ireneo B. Molato, MTC, Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. A.M. No. MTJ-08-1711/A.M. No. MTJ08-1716, April 23, 2012. Evelyn J. Jailorina Vs. Richelle Taneo-Regner, Demo II, RTC, OCC, San Mateo, Rizal. A.M. No. P-11-2948, April 23, 2012. In Re: Rodolfo Pactolin, A.C. No. 7940, April 24, 2012 Dr. Ramie G. Hipe Vs. Judge Rolando T. Literato, Municipal Trial Court, Mainit, Surigao Del Norte. A.M. No. MTJ-11-1781, April 25, 2012. Re: Complaint Filed By Paz De Vera Lazaro Against Edna Magallanes And Bonifacio Magallanes. A.M. No. P-11-3003, April 25, 2012.



Office Of The Court Administrator Vs. Sheriff Gareza. A.M. No. P-123058, April 25, 2012



Re: Letter-Complaint Against Hon. Justices Antonio T. Carpio And Maria Loudes P.A Sereno Dated September 16, 2011 Filed By Atty. Magdaleno M. Pena, A.M. No. 12-6-11-SC. June 13, 2012



Leticia Jacinto Vs. Judge Josephus Joannes H. Asis, Metc, Br. 40, Quezon City A.M. No. MTJ-12-1811, June 13, 2012



Re: Report Of The Judicial Audit Conducted In The Regional Trial Court, Branches 72 And 22, Narvacan Ilocos Sur. A.M. No. 06-9-525-RTC, June 13, 2012



Pilar S. Tanoco Vs. Judge Inocencio B. Saguin, Jr. MTCC Br. 3, Cabanatuan City. A.M. No. MTJ-12-1812. June 20, 2012

Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016



Eladio D.Perfecto Vs. Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esideria, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2258, June 20, 2012



State Prosecutors II Josef Albert T. Comilang And Ms. Victoria SunegaLagman Vs. Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, RTC, Branch 36, Calamba City. A.M. No. RTJ-10-2216, June 26, 2012



Filomena B. Consolacion Vs. Lydia S. Gambito, Court Stenographer, MCTC, Binalonan, Pangasinan/Judge Emma S. Ines-Parajas Vs. Lydia S. Gambito, Court Stenographer, MCTC, Binalonan, Pangasinan A.M. No. P06-2186 & A.M. No. P-12-3026. July 3, 2012



Rhea Airene P. Katague, Et Al. Vs. Jerry A. Ledesma, Sheriff IV, RTC, Br. 48, Bacolod City A.M. No. P-12-3067. July 4, 2012. Judge Pelagia Dalmacio-Joaquin Vs. Nicomedes Dela Cruz, Process Server, Municipal Trial Court In Cities, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. A.M. No. P-06-2241. July 10, 2012 Manuel G. Villatuya Vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012. Lambayong Teachers And Employees Cooperative, Represented In This Act By Its Manager, Gudelio S. Valeroso Vs. Carlos P. Diaz, In His Capacity As Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 20, Tacurong City A.M. No. P-062246, July 11, 2012. Isaac C. Basilio, Perlita Pedrozo And Jun Basilio Vs. Atty. Virgil R. Castro A.C. No. 6910. July 11, 2012 Murphy Chu, Et Al. Vs. Hon. Mario B. Capellan, Assisting Judge, Metc, Br. 40, Quezon City. A.M. No. MTJ-11-1779, July 16, 2012. Criselda C. Gacad Vs. Judge Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr., RTC, Br. 3, Nabunturan, Compostela Valley A.M. No. RJ-10-2257. July 17, 2012 Office Of The Court Administrator Vs. Ma. Irissa G. Musni, Court Legal Researcher II RTC, Judicial Region III, Branch 36, Gapan City, Nueva Ecija A.M. No. P-11-3024, July 17, 2012. Office Of The Court Administrator Vs. Lunalinda M. Peradilla, Clerk Of Court II, MCTC, E1 Nido-Linapacan, Palawan A.M. No. P-09-2647, July 17, 2012. Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. Vs. Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa. A.C. No. 7360, July 24, 2012. Engr. Gilbert Tumbokon Vs. Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco, A.C. No. 6116 August 1, 2012 Engr. Gilbert Tumbokon Vs. Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco. A.C. No. 6116, August 1, 2012 Emilia O. Dhaliwal Vs. Atty. Abelardo B. Dumaguing. A.C. No. 9390, August 1, 2012.. Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc., Represented By Gabriel H. Abad Vs. Atty. Richard V. Funk. A.C. No. 9094, August 15, 2012 Judge Armando S. Adlawan, Presiding Judge, 6th MCTC, Bonifacio-Don Mariano Marcos, Misamis Occidental Vs. Estrella P. Capilitan, 6th MCTC, Bonifacio-Don Mariano Marcos, Misamis Occidental. A.M. No. P-123080. August 29, 2012 Manolito C. Villordon Vs. Marilyn C. Avila, Court Interpreter I, Municipal Trial Court In Cities. Branch 3, Cebu City. A.M. No. P-10-2809, August 10, 2012

  

          




  

  

Grace M. Anacta Vs. Atty. Eduardo D. Resurrecction. A.C. No. 9074, August 14, 2012. Astorga And Repol Law Offices, Represented By Atty. Arnold B. Lugares Vs. Leodel N. Roxas, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati City. A.M. No. P-12-3029, August 15, 2012. Memoranda Of Judge Eliza B. Yu Issued To Legal Researcher Marie Joy P. Lagman And To Court Stenographer Soledad J. Bassig, All Of Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 47, Pasay City. A.M. No. P-12-3033, August 15, 2012. Jasper Junno F. Rodica Vs. Atty. Manuel M. Lazaro, Et Al. A.C. No. 9259, August 23, 2012 Emilia O. Dhaliwal Vs. Atty. Abelardo B. Dumaguing, A.C. No. 9390 August 1, 2012 Gerlie M. Uy Vs. Judge Erwin B. Javellana, A.M. No. Mtj-07-1666, September 5, 2012

Cases from January to December 2013           



Mariano T. Ong Vs. Eva G. Basiya-Saratan, Clerk Of Court, RTC, Br. 32, Iloilo City. A.M. No. P-12-3090. January 7, 2013 Re: Complaint Of Leonardo A. Velasco Against Associate Justices Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr., Et Al. A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 10-25-SB-J. January 15, 2013 Re: Verified Complaint Of AMA Land, Inc. Against Hon. Danton Q. Bueser, Et Al. A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 12-202-CA-J. January 15, 2013 Kareen P. Magtagñob Vs. Judge Genie G. Gapas-Agbada. OCA IPI No. 11-3631-RTJ. January 16, 2013 Re: Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) Of Edmundo L. Macarubbo. A.C. No. 6148. January 22, 2013 Sps. Arcing And Cresing Bautista, Et Al. Vs. Atty. Arturo Cefra A.C. No. 5530. January 28, 2013. Fe A. Ylaya Vs. Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott. A.C. No. 6475. January 30, 2013 Anastacio N. Teodoro III Vs. Atty. Romeo S. Gonzales. A.C. No. 6760. January 30, 2013 Geoffrey Beckett Vs. Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr., RTC, Branch 24, Cebu City. A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326. January 30, 2013 Anastacio N. Teodoro Iii Vs. Atty. Romeo S. Gonzales A.C. No. 6760, January 30, 2013 Re: Request Of (Ret.) Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban For ReComputation Of His Creditable Service For The Purpose Of ReComputing His Retirement Benefits, A.M. No. 10-9-15-SC. February 12, 2013 Erlinda C. Mendoza Vs. Pedro S. Esguerra, Process Server, RTC, Br. 89, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, A.M. No. P-11-2967. February 13, 2013



Atty. Manuel J. Jimenez, Jr. Vs. Presiding Judge Michael M. Amdengan, Municipal Trail Court, Angono Rizal, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. February 13, 2013.



Victoriano G. Manlapaz Vs. Judge Manuel T. Sabillo, MCTC, Lamitan, Basilan, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1771. February 13, 2013 Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016



Patrocinio V. Agbulos Vs. Atty. Roseller A. Viray, A.C. No. 7350. February 18, 2013



Thelwoldo E. Fernandez, Antonio A. Henson & Angel S. Ong Vs. Court Of Appeals Asso. Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr., Isaias P. Dicdican, A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J. February 19, 2013



Ray Antonio C. Sasing Vs. Celestial Venus G. Gelbolingo, Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 20, Cagayan De Oro City, A.M. No. P-12-3032. February 20, 2013



Missing Exhibits And Court Properties In Regional Trial Court, Br. 4, Panabo City, Davao Del Norte, A.M. No. 10-2-41-RTC. February 27, 2013



Anonymous Vs. Judge Rio C. Achas, MTCC Branch 2, Ozamiz City, Misamis Occidental, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801. February 27, 2013 Verleen Trinidad, Florentina Lander, Wally Casubuan, Minerva Mendoza, Celedonio Alojado, Rosendo Villamin And Aurea Tolentino, Vs. Atty. Angelito Villarin, A.C. No. 9310 February 27, 2013 Gloria P. Jinon Vs. Atty. Leonardo E. Jiz, A.C. No. 9615 March 5, 2013 Rodrigo E. Tapay And Anthony J. Rustia Vs. Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo And Atty. Janus T. Jarder, A.C. No. 9604 March 20, 2013 Office Of The Court Administrator Vs. Develyn Gesultura. A.M. No. P-041785. April 2, 2013 Office Of The Court Administrator Vs. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Et Al. A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691. April 2, 2013 Sonia C. Decena And Rey C. Decena Vs. Judge Nilo A. Malanyaon, RTC, Br. 32, Pili, Camarines Sur. A.M. RTJ-10-2217. April 8, 2013 Efigenia M. Tenoso Vs. Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez. A.C. No. 8384. April 11, 2013 Civil Service Commission Vs. Merle Ramoneda-Pita. A.M. No. P-082531. April 11, 2013 Judge Renato A. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 17, Davao City Vs. Atty. Rogelio F. Fabro, Etc., Et Al. A.M. No. P-10-2791. April 17, 2013 Office Of The Court Administrator Vs. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Et Al A.M No. Mtj-07-1691, April 2, 2013 Sonia C. Decena and Rey C. Decena Vs. Judge Nilo A. Malanyaon, A.M No. Rtj-10-2217, April 8, 2013 Rex Polinar Dagohoy Vs. Atty. Artemio V. San Juan, A.C. No. 7944, June 03, 2013 Pena Vs. Atty. Paterno, A.C. No. 4191, June 10, 2013 Julian Penilla, Complainant, V. Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr., A.C. No. 9149, September 04, 2013 Josephine L. Orola, Myrna L. Orola, Manuel L. Orola, Mary Angelyn Orola-Belarga, Marjorie Melba Orola-Calip, And Karen Orola, (Heirs Of Antonio) Vs. Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos, A.C. No. 9860, September 11, 2013 Rex Polinar Dagohoy V. Atty. Artemio V. San Juan. A.C. No. 7944, June 3, 2013.

              





Civil Service Commission V. Ismael A. Hadji Ali, Et Al., A.M. No. SCC-0811-P, June 18, 2013. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

         

Rodolfo C. Sabidong V. Nicolasito S. Solas. A.M. No. P-01-1448, June 25, 2013. Josefina Caranza Vda De Saldivar V. Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes, Jr., A.C. No. 7749, July 8, 2013 Office Of The Court Administrator V. Noel R. Ong, Deputy Sheriff, Br. 49, Et Al., A.M. No. P-09-2690, July 9, 2013. Concerned Citizen V. Nonita V. Catena, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Br. 50, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1321-P, July 16, 2013. Ferdinand A. Samson V. Atty. Edgardo O. Era, A.C. No. 6664, July 16, 2013. Sonic Steel Industries, Inc. V. Atty. Nonnatus P. Chua, A.C. No. 6942, July 17, 2013. Development Bank Of The Philippines, Etc. Vs. Damvin V. Famero, Sheriff IV, RTC, Br. 43, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, A.M. No. P-0-2789, July 31, 2013 Jaime Joven And Reynaldo C. Rasing V. Atty. Pablo R. Cruz And Frankie O. Magsalin III, A.C. No. 7686, July 31, 2013. Re: Cases Submitted For Decision Before Hon. Teofilo D. Baluma, Former Judge, Branch 1, Regional Trial Court, Tagbilaran City, Bohol, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2355, September 2, 2013. Danilo E. Lubaton V. Judge Mary Josephine P. Lazaro, Regional Trial Court, Br. 74, Antipolo, Rizal, A.M. RTJ-12-2320, September 2, 2013.



Julian Penilla V. Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr., A.C. No. 9149, September 4, 2013.



Czarina T. Malvar V. Kraft Foods Phils., Inc., Et Al., G.R. No. 183952, September 9, 2013.



Office Of The Court Administrator V. Donabel M. Savadera, Et Al., A.M. No. P-04-1903, September 10, 2013.



Office Of The Court Administrator V. Hon. Santiago E. Soriano, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1683, September 11, 2013.



Joseph L. Orola, Et Al. V. Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos, A.C. No. 9860, September 11, 2013.



In Re: Petition To Sign In The Roll Of Attorneys, B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013.



Mary Ann T. Mattus V. Albert T. Villaseca, A.C. No. 7922, October 1, 2013. Re: Request For Guidance/Clarification On Section 7, Rule III Of Republic Act No. 10154 Requiring Retiring Government Employees To Secure A Clearance Of Pendency/Non-Pendency Of Case/S From The Civil Service Commission, A.M. No. 13-09-08-SC, October 1, 2013. Jesus D. Carbajosa V. Judge Hannibal R. Patricio, Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, President Roxas, Capiz, A.M. No. MTJ-131834, October 2, 2013.






     



  



Ma. Jennifer Tria-Samonte V. Epifania “Fanny” Obias, A.C. No. 4945, October 8, 2013. Maria Cristina Zabaljauregui Pitcher V. Atty. Rustico B. Gagate, A.C. No. 9532, October 8, 2013. Atty. Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao V. Naeptali Angelo V. Nery, Sheriff III, Branch 30, Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, A.M. No. P13-3153, October 14, 2013. Joefil Baguio V. Maria Fe Arnejo, Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Cebu City, A.M. No. P-13-3155, October 21, 2013. Atty. Oscar L. Embido, Etc. V. Atty. Salvador N. Pe, Jr., Etc., A.M. No. 6732, October 22, 2013. Ma. Regina S. Peralta V. Judge George E. Omelio / Romualdo G. Mendoza V. Judge George E. Omelio / Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra V. Judge George E. Omelio, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2259/A.M. No. RTJ-11-2264/A.M. No. RTJ-11-2273, October 22, 2013. Report On The Financial Audit Conducted In The MTCC, Tagum City, Davao Del Norte / Office Of The Court Administrator V. Judge Ismael L. Salubre, Et Al., A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3138-P/A.M. No. MTJ-05-1618, October 22, 2013. Jocelyn De Leon V. Atty. Tyrone Pedrena, A.C. No. 9401, October 22, 2013. Atty. Jerome Norman L. Tacorda For: Odel L. Gedraga V. Judge Reynaldo B. Clemens, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Br. 31, Calbayog City, Western Samar, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2359, October 23, 2013. Atty. Jessie Tuldague And Atty. Alfredo Baldajo, Jr. V. Judge Moises Pardo And Jaime Calpatura, Etc. / Atty. Jessie Tuldague And Atty. Alfredo Baldajo, Jr. V. Jaime Calpatura, Etc. / Re: Report On The Judicial Audit And Investigation Conducted In The RTC, Cabarroguis, Quirino, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1962/ A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2243-P/ A.M. No. 05-10-661-RTC, October 25, 2013. Re: Unauthorized Travel Abroad Of Judge Cleto R. Villacorta III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio City, A.M. No. 11-9-167-RTC, November 11, 2013.



Mariano Agadan, Et Al. V. Atty. Richard Baltazar Kilaan, A.C. No. 9385, November 11, 2013.



Executive Judge Henedino P. Eduarte, RTC, Br. 20, Cauayan, Isabela V. Elizabeth T. Ibay, Clerk II, MTCC, Cauayan, Isabela, A.C. No. P-12-3100, November 12, 2013. Hon. Maribeth Rodriguez-Manahan, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo, Rizal V. Atty. Rodolfo Flores, A.C. No. 8954, November 13, 2013. Azucena Segovia-Ribaya V. Atty. Bartolome C. Lawsin, A.C. No. 7965, November 13, 2013. Re: Application For Survivorship Pension Benefits Under Republic Act 9946 Of Mrs. Pacita A. Gruba, Surviving Spouse Of The Late Manuel K. Gruba, Former CTA Associate Judge, A.M. No. 14155-Ret. November 19, 2013. Aurora H. Cabauatan V. Atty. Freddie A. Venida, A.C. No. 10043, November 20, 2013. Eleanor P. Olivan V. Arnel A. Rubio, Etc., A.M. No. P-13-3063, November 26, 2013.

  

 


    

Mamasaw Sultan Ali V. Judge Baguinda-Ali Pacalna, Et Al., A.M. No. MTJ03-1505, November 27, 2013 Sps. David Williams And Marissa Williams V. Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez, A.C. No. 7329, November 27, 2013. Judge Manahan V. Atty. Flores, A.C. No. 8954, November 13, 2013 Cabuatan V. Atty. Venida, A.C. No. 10043, November 20, 2013 Conchita Baltazar,Et Al. V. Atty. Juan B. Bañez, Jr., A.C. No. 9091, December 11, 2013

Cases from January to December 2014

   

  

 

Rose Bunagan-Bansig Vs. Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera A.C. No. 5581 Jan. 14, 2014 Rose Bunagan-Bansig V. Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera, A.C. No. 5581, January 14, 2014. Edgardo Areola V. Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza, A.C. No. 10135, January 15, 2014. The Conjugal Partnership Of The Spouses Vicente Cadavedo And Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo (Both Deceased), Substituted By Their Heirs, Namely: Herminia, Pastora, Heirs Of Fructiosa, Heirs Of Raquel, Evangeline, Vicente, Jr., And Armand, All Surnamed Cadavedo, G.R. No. 173188. January 15, 2014. Atty. Virgillo P. Alconera V. Alfredo T. Pallanan, A.M. No. P-12-3069, January 20, 2014. Atty. Rhea R. Alcantara-Aquino V. Mylene H. Dela Cruz, Etc., A.M. No. P13-3141. January 21, 2014. Office Of The Court Administrator V. Atty. Mona Lisa A. Buencamino, Etc., Et Al./Re: Report On The Financial Audit Conducted In The Metropolitan Trial Court Etc., A.M. No. P-05-2051/A.M. No. 05-4-118Metc. January 21, 2014. Atty. Solidum, Jr. Failed To Fulfill This Duty. Natividad P. Navarro And Hilda S. Presbitero V. Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr., A.C. No. 9872, January 28, 2014 Edgardo Areola Vs. Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza A.C. No. 10135. January 15, 2014



Natividad P. Navarro Vs. Atty. Ivan M. Solidum Jr., A.C. 9872, January 28, 2014



Carlito Ang V. Atty. James Joseph Gupana, A.C. No. 4545. February 5, 2014.



Wilberto C. Talisic V. Atty. Primo R. Rinen, A.C. No. 8761, February 12, 2014



Veronica F. Galindez V. Zosima Susbilla-De Vera, A.M. No. P-13-3126, February 4, 2014 Angelito R. Marquez, Et Al. V. Judge Venancio M. Ovejera, Etc., Et Al., A.M. No. P-11-2903, February 5, 2014 Carlito Ang V. Atty. James Joseph Gupana, A.C. No. 4545. February 5, 2014

 


           

   

Executive Judge Ma. Ofelia S. Contreras-Soriano V. Clerk III Liza D. Salamanca, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 55, Malabon City, A.M. No. P-13-3119. February 10, 2014 Anacleto O. Villahermosa, Sr., Et Al. V. Victor Sacia, Executive Assistant IV And Efren R. Rivamonte, Etc., A.M. No. CA-14-28-P, February 11, 2014 Wilberto C. Talisic V. Atty. Primo R. Rinen, A.C. No. 8761, February 12, 2014 Rex M. Tupal V. Judge Remegio V. Rojo, Etc., A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842. February 24, 2014 Patrocinio V. Agbulos Vs. Atty. Roseller A. Viray, A.C. No. 7350 February 18, 2013 Nestor Figueras And Bienvenido Victoria, Jr. V. Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez,A.C. No. 9116, March 12, 2014 Stephan Brunet And Virginia Romanillo Brunet V. Atty. Ronald L. Guaren,A.C. No. 10164, March 10, 2014 Ermelinda Lad Vda. De Dominguez, Represented By Her Attorney-InFact, Vicente A. Pichon V. Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron Sr.,A.C. No. 5359, March 10, 2014 Office Of The Court Administrator V. Judge Edwin C. Larida, Jr., RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City,A.M. No. RTJ-08-2151, March 11, 2014 Nestor Figueras And Bienvenido Victoria, Jr. V. Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez, A.C. No. 9116, March 12, 2014 Licerio Dizon V. Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr.,A.C. No. 10185, March 12, 2014 Julieta B. Narag Vs. Atty. Dominador M. Narag, A.C. No. 3405, March 18, 2014 Re: Melchor Tiongson, Head Watcher, During The 2011 Bar Examinations, B.M. No. 2482, April 1, 2014 Re: Melchor Tiongson, Head Watcher, During The 2011 Bar Examinations, B.M. No. 2482, April 1, 2014 Office Of The Court Administrator V. Judge Borromeo R. Bustamante, Municipal Trial Court In Cities, Alaminos City, Pangasinan, A.M. No. MTJ12-1806, April 7, 2014 Antonio M. Lorenzana V. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2, Batangas City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014



Adelia V. Quiachon Vs. Atty. Joseph Adora. Ramos, A.C. No. 9317, June 4, 2014 (Formerly Cbd Case No. 12-3615



Atty. Alan F. Paguia V. Atty. Manuel T. Molina, A.C. No. 9881, June 4, 2014.



Gershon N. Dulang V. Judge Mary Jocylen G. Regencia, MCTC, AsturiasBalamban, Cebu, A.M. No. MTJ-14-1841, June 2, 2014 Adelia V. Quiachon V. Atty. Joseph Ador A. Ramos, A.C. No. 9317, June 4, 2014 Office Of The Court Administrator V. Sarah P. Ampong, Etc., A.M. No. P13-3132, June 4, 2014.

 




Office Of The Court Administrator V. Sarah P. Ampong, Etc., A.M. No. P13-3132, June 4, 2014.



Erlinda Foster Vs. Jaime Agtang, A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014

ATTY. ELMER SOLIDON VS. ATTY. RAMIL MACALALAD, A.C. NO. 8158, February 24, 2010 FACTS: In 2005, Atty. Elmer Solidon engaged the services of Atty. Ramil Macalalad for the latter to handle the judicial titling of a parcel of land owned by the Solidons in Borongan, Samar. They agreed for a fee of P80k. Solidon gave P50k as downpayment to Macalalad and the remaining P30k shall be paid after Solidon shall receive the title over the said property. But for 6 months after the P50k was given, Atty. Macalalad never gave an update to Solidon. It turns out that Macalalad never filed any petition to register the land. Solidon then filed an administrative case against Macalalad. Solidon alleged that Macalalad neglected his duties and even avoided talking to him despite efforts from Solidon to communicate with Macalalad. In his defense, Macalalad averred that he did not file the petition because Solidon failed to update him and that Solidon never gave the documents he was asking for. Eventually, the Commission on Bar Discipline recommended Macalalad to be suspended for three months.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Macalalad should be suspended. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

HELD: Yes. Macalalad is guilty of negligence when he neglected his client’s cause. This is a violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is negligent if he failed to do anything to protect his client’s interest after receiving his acceptance fee. Further, there is also negligence when he failed to update his client about the status of the case. Even if assuming that Solidon was also negligent, Macalalad cannot shift the blame to his client for failing to follow up on his case because it was the lawyer’s duty to inform his client of the status of the case. Even if the client has been equally at fault for the lack of communication, the main responsibility remains with the lawyer to inquire and know the best means to acquire the required information. The act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling Solidon’s case, and subsequently failing, without valid excuse, to render the services, is a clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Supreme Court also found that not only did Macalalad violated Canon 18, he also violated Canon 16 when he failed to account for Solidon’s money. It appears he failed to return Solidon’s downpayment of P50k. A lawyer, when he fails to render legal services, shall immediately account for and promptly return the money he received from his client. Hence, on top of the recommended 3 months suspension, Macalald was suspended for an additional 3 months or for a total of 6 months.

RURAL BANK OF CALAPE, INC. (RBCI) BOHOL vs.ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT FLORIDO A.C. No. 5736, June 18, 2010 FACTS: According to RBCI, respondent and his clients(Nazareno-Relampagos group), through force and intimidation, with the use of armed men, forcibly took over the management and the premises of RBCI. They also forcibly evicted Cirilo A. Garay (Garay), the bank manager, destroyed the bank’s vault, and installed their own staff to run the bank.


In his comment, respondent denied RBCI’s allegations. Respondent explained that he acted in accordance with the authority granted upon him by the Nazareno-Relampagos group, the lawfully and validly elected Board of Directors of RBCI. Moreover, respondent claimed that RBCI failed to present any evidence to prove their allegations. Respondent added that the affidavits attached to the complaint were never identified, affirmed, or confirmed by the affiants and that none of the documentary exhibits were originals or certified true copies. IBP, through its Commissioner, said that respondent had no legal basis to implement the takeover of RBCI and that it was a “naked power grab without any semblance of legality whatsoever.” Respondent appealed from the IBP’s decision. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Florido violated Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. HELD: Canon 19 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law. For this reason, Rule 15.07 of the Code requires a lawyer to impress upon his client compliance with the law and principles of fairness. A lawyer must employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client. It is his duty to counsel his clients to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking justice and refrain from doing an intentional wrong to their adversaries. A lawyer’s duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice. To that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his client’s cause, is condemnable and unethical. WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. James Benedict Florido GUILTY of violating Canon 19 and Rules 1.02 and15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision.

SPOUSES VIRGILIO and ANGELINA ARANDA vs. ATTY. EMMANUEL F. ELAYDA, A.C. No. 7907, December 15, 2010 FACTS: In the Complaint of the spouses Aranda, they alleged that Atty. Elayda’s handling of their civil case was“sorely inadequate, as shown by his Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

failure to follow elementary norms of civil procedure and evidence. However, they were surprised that an adverse judgment was rendered against them resulting to the loss of their Mitsubishi Pajero. Apparently, Atty. Elayda failed to inform the spouses of the date of hearing as well as the order of judgment. No motion for reconsideration or appeal was interposed by the lawyer as well. In his reply, Atty. Elayda said that the spouses did not bother to keep in touch with him and they were the ones who neglected their case in court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Elayda should be sanctioned by the court. HELD: From the foregoing, it is clear that Atty. Elayda is duty bound to uphold and safeguard the interests of his clients. He should be conscientious, competent and diligent in handling his clients’ cases. Atty. Elayda should give adequate attention, care, and time to all the cases heis handling. As the spouses Aran da’s counsel, Atty. Elayda is expected to monitor the progress of said spouses’ case and is obligated to exert all efforts to present every remedy or defense authorized by law to protect the cause espoused by the spouses Aranda. Regrettably, Atty. Elayda failed in all these. Atty. Elayda even admitted that the spouses Aranda never knew of the scheduled hearings because said spouses never came to him and that he did not know the spouses’ whereabouts. While it is true that communication is a shared responsibility between a counsel and his clients, it is the counsel’s primary duty to inform his clients of the status of their case and the orders which have been issued by the court. He cannot simply wait for his clients to make an inquiry about the developments in their case. Close coordination between counsel and client is necessary for them to adequately prepare for the case, as well as to effectively monitor the progress of the case. Besides, it is elementary procedure for a lawyer and his clients to exchange contact details at the initial stages in order to have constant communication with each other. Again, address is simply unacceptable. Evidently, Atty. Elayda was remiss in his duties and responsibilities as a member of the legal profession. His conduct shows that he not only failed to exercise due diligence in handling his clients’ case but in fact abandoned his clients’ cause. He proved himself unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his helpless clients. Moreover, Atty. Elayda owes fealty, not only to his clients, but also to the Court of which he is an officer. On a final note, it must be stressed that whenever a lawyer accepts a case, it deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether or not it is for a fee or free. The IBP Board of Governors recommended a 6 month suspension. This was adopted by the court.


ATTY. CONRADO GANDEZA, JR. VS JUDGE MARIA CLARITA TABIN, A.M. No. MTJ-09-1736 July 25, 2011 FACTS: November 2007, the cars of Atty. Conrado Gandeza, Jr. and Paul Casuga collided with each other. Later at the scene of the collision, Judge Maria Clarita Tabin arrived. She was the aunt of Casuga. Atty. Gandeza observed that the judge kept on reminding the investigating officer that the driver of Gandeza was drunk. Later at the hospital, blood alcohol test was conducted on the driver of Gandeza. The initial result returned negative. But Judge Tabin insisted that the doctor do a second test. This time, the result was positive. About a week later, a criminal case was filed against the driver of Gandeza. The wife of Atty. Gandeza, also a lawyer, later observed that a court employee was bringing the records of the case outside the premises of the court where the case was filed. The court employee said that the records were requested by Judge Tabin. The case also went to mediation where Gandeza also learned that Judge Tabin went to the mediation center and inquired about the case. All these acts of the judge led to Gandeza’s filing of an administrative case against Judge Tabin for Gross Misconduct and Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge. In her defense, Judge Tabin said that she never publicly made known that she was a judge when she was at the collision scene. But she did admit that the investigating officer as well as the doctor knew her to be such. She also said that she merely borrowed the records of the case because she learned that her nephew still did not have a lawyer. She also said that when she was at the mediation center, she merely went there to assist her sister (Casuga’s mom) as the latter did not know where the mediation center was located.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Tabin is guilty of Gross Misconduct or Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge.

HELD: No. But she is guilty of impropriety in violation of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

Her being concern of her nephew is just but natural but as member of the judiciary, she should know that she should not interfere in the conduct of an investigation. She should always appear impartial – this did not happen when she interfered with the investigation and when she borrowed the records as well as when she was at the mediation center inquiring about the records of the case. She may have the best intention devoid of any malicious motive but sadly her actions, however, spawned the impression that she was using her office to unduly influence or pressure the concerned people to conduct the medical examination as well as the investigation in their favor. Indeed, while Judge Tabin’s concern over the safety of her nephew and the outcome of his criminal case is understandable, she should not have disregarded the rules on proper decorum at the expense of the integrity of the court. Although concern for family members is deeply ingrained in the Filipino culture, she, being a judge, should bear in mind that she is also called upon to serve the higher interest of preserving the integrity of the entire Judiciary.

VALENTIN C. MIRANDA v. ATTY. MACARIO D. CARPIO, A.C. 6281, September 16, 2011 FACTS: Complainant Valentin C. Miranda is one of the owners of a parcel of land located at Barangay Lupang Uno, Las Piñas, Metro Manila. Complainant initiated Land Registration Commission (LRC) Case for the registration of the property. During the course of the proceedings, complainant engaged the services of respondent Atty. Carpio as counsel in the said case when his original counsel, Atty. Samuel Marquez, figured in a vehicular accident. In complainant's Affidavit, complainant and respondent agreed that complainant was to pay P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and P2,000.00 as appearance fee. Complainant paid respondent the amounts due him, as evidenced by receipts duly signed by the latter. During the last hearing of the case, respondent demanded the additional P10,000.00 for the preparation of a memorandum, which he said would further strengthen complainant's position in the case, plus 20% of the total area of the subject property as additional fees for his services. Complainant did not accede to respondent's demand for it was contrary to their agreement. Moreover, complainant co-owned the subject property with his siblings, and he could not have agreed to the amount being demanded by respondent without the knowledge and approval of his coheirs. As a result of complainant's refusal to satisfy respondent's demands, the latter became furious and their relationship became sore. A Decision was rendered, granting the petition for registration, which Decision was declared final and executory. The Land Registration Authority (LRA) sent complainant a copy of the letter addressed to the Register of Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

Deeds (RD) of Las Piñas City, which transmitted the decree of registration and the original and owner's duplicate of the title of the property. Complainant went to the RD to get the owner's duplicate of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT).He was surprised to discover that the same had already been claimed by and released to respondent on. Complainant talked to respondent on the phone and asked him to turn over the owner's duplicate of the OCT, which he had claimed without complainant's knowledge, consent and authority. Respondent insisted that complainant first pay him the PhP10,000.00 and the 20% share in the property in exchange for which, respondent would deliver the owner's duplicate of the OCT. Once again, complainant refused the demand, for not having been agreed upon. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Carpio violated Canon 20 HELD: Yes. Respondent's claim for his unpaid professional fees that would legally give him the right to retain the property of his client until he receives what is allegedly due him has been paid has no basis and, thus, is invalid. In collecting from complainant exorbitant fees, respondent violated Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that ―a lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees. It is highly improper for a lawyer to impose additional professional fees upon his client which were never mentioned nor agreed upon at the time of the engagement of his services. At the outset, respondent should have informed the complainant of all the fees or possible fees that he would charge before handling the case and not towards the near conclusion of the case. This is essential in order for the complainant to determine if he has the financial capacity to pay respondent before engaging his services. Respondent's further submission that he is entitled to the payment of additional professional fees on the basis of the principle of quantum meruit has no merit. "Quantum meruit, meaning `as much as he deserved' is used as a basis for determining the lawyer's professional fees in the absence of a contract but recoverable by him from his client." The principle of quantum meruit applies if a lawyer is employed without a price agreed upon for his services. In such a case, he would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services, as much as he has earned.[13] In the present case, the parties had already entered into an agreement as to the attorney's fees of the respondent, and thus, the principle of quantum meruit does not fully find application because the respondent is already compensated by such agreement. Respondent's inexcusable act of withholding the property belonging to his client and imposing unwarranted fees in exchange for the release of said title deserve the imposition of disciplinary sanction. Atty. Macario D. Carpio is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this Decision. He is ordered to RETURN to the complainant the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

immediately upon receipt of this decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

DALISAY CAPILI VS ATTY. ALFREDO BENTULAN, A.C. NO. 5862, OCTOBER 12, 2011

FACTS:

Capili engaged the legal services of Atty. Alfredo Bentulan as her counsel in a civil case. Capili lost in the trial court. She wanted to appeal but despite her payment for the preparation and filing of an appeal brief, Atty. Bentulan failed to file the said pleading. This resulted to the dismissal of her appeal. Ten years after said dismissal, Capili filed a disbarment case against Bentulan. In his defense, Bentulan said that Capili’s action is already barred by laches; that in the first place, Capili knew that the appeal was unmeritorious; that she never actually paid Bentulan for the preparation and filing of said appeal.


ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Alfredo Bentulan should be disciplined.

HELD: Yes. The lapse of ten years from the alleged misconduct does not bar the filing of this case. Ordinary statutes of limitation had no application to disbarment or suspension proceedings against members of the Bar. These proceedings are sui generis. They are not akin to the trials of actions or suits in which interests and rights are enforced by the plaintiffs against the defendants, but are rather investigations into the conduct of the members of the Bar made by the Supreme Court within the context of its plenary powers expressly granted by the Constitution to regulate the practice of law. In preparing and filing the appeal brief, the question of whether or not Bentulan was paid his legal services is of no moment. As a lawyer, he owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if he is not paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Further, if he believed that Capili’s case was unmeritorious, he should have advised Capili accordingly. The failure to file a brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal constitutes inexcusable negligence. This violates Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: Canon 18 – A lawyer shall service his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03: A lawyer shall not neglect a matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.


URBAN BANK, INC. VS ATTY. MAGDALENO PEÑA, G.R. NO. 145817, OCTOBER 19, 2011

FACTS: In 1994, Isabel Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI) sold a parcel of land to Urban Bank, Inc. (UBI). The land was sold for P240 million. As the land was occupied by unauthorized sub-tenants, ISCI’s lawyer, Atty. Magdaleno Peña had to negotiate with them for them to relocate. But the said occupants, knowing that the land was already transferred to UBI, refused to recognize Peña. ISCI then communicated with UBI so that the latter may authorize Peña to negotiate with the tenants. Peña had to barricade himself inside the property to keep the tenants out who were forcing their way in especially so that the local cops are now sympathetic to them. Peña then had a phone conversation with Teodoro Borlongan, president of UBI, where Peña explained to him the situation. In said conversation, Peña asked authorization from Borlongan to negotiate with the tenants. Peña also asked that he be paid 10% of the purchase price or (P24 million) for his efforts. Borlongan agreed over the phone on the condition that Peña should be able to settle with the tenants otherwise he forfeits said 10% fee. Peña also asked that said authorization be put into writing. The authorization was put into writing but no mention was made as regards the 10% fee, (in short, that part was not written in the written authorization released by UBI). Peña was able to settle and relocate the tenants. After everything was settled and the property is now formally under the possession of UBI, Peña began sending demands to UBI for the latter to pay him the P24 million fee agreed upon, plus his expenses for the relocation of the tenants and the hiring of security guards or an additional P3 million. But UBI refused to make payment hence Peña filed a complaint for recovery against UBI. The trial court ruled in favor of Peña as it found there indeed was a contract of agency created between and UBI and that Peña is entitled to the 10% fee plus the expenses he incurred including litigation expenses. In sum, the trial court awarded him P28 million. The Court of Appeals however reversed the order of the trial court. It ruled that no agency was formed but for his legal services, Peña is entitled to payment but applying the principle of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit, Peña should only be paid P3 million.


ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Magdaleno Peña is entitled to receive the P28 million.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that said amount is unconscionable. Peña is entitled to payment for compensation for services rendered as agent of Urban Bank, but on the basis of the principles of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit. In the first place, other than the self-serving testimony of Peña, there was no other evidence presented to support his claim that Borlongan agreed to pay him that 10% over the phone. The written authorization later issued merely confirms the power granted him to negotiate with the tenants. The written authorization proved the existence of agency but not the existence of any agreement as to how much Peña should be paid. Absent any such agreement, the principle of quantum meruit should be applied. In this case, Peña is entitled to receive what he merit for his services, or as much as he has earned. In dealing with the tenants, Peña didn’t have to perform any extraordinary acts or legal maneuvering. Hence, he is entitled to receive P1.5 million for his legal services. He is also entitled to reimbursement for his expenses in securing the property, to wit, P1.5 million for the security guards he had to hire and another P1.5 million for settling and relocating the 23 tenants. Total of P4.5 million.

The Supreme Court emphasized that lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.


ELPIDIO TIONG VS ATTY. GEORGE FLORENDO, A.C. NO. 4428, DECEMBER 12, 2011

FACTS: Atty. George Florendo has been serving as the lawyer of spouses Elpidio and Ma. Elena Tiong. Elpidio, a US citizen is often times away. For two years, he suspected that his wife and Atty. Florendo were having an affair. Finally in 1995, he was able to listen to a telephone conversation where he heard Atty. Florendo mention amorous words to Ma. Elena. Atty. Florendo confronted the two and both eventually admitted to their illicit relationship. Atty. Florendo and Ma. Elena then executed and signed an affidavit, which was later notarized, stating that they admit of their illicit relationship; that they are seeking the forgiveness of their respective spouse. Elpidio forgave Florendo and Ma. Elena. But nevertheless, Elpidio filed a disbarment case against Florendo. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

Florendo said he can no longer be sanctioned because he was already pardoned.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Florendo is correct.

HELD: No. A petition for suspension or disbarment of a lawyer is a sui generis case. This class of cases is meant to protect the public and the courts of undesirable members of the legal profession. As such, pardon by the offended party of the act complained of does not operate to offset the ground for disbarment or suspension. Florendo’s act of having an affair with his client’s wife manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the ethics of his profession. He violated the trust reposed upon him by his client (Canon 17, Code of Professional Responsibility). His illicit relationship with Ma. Elena amounts to a disgraceful and grossly immoral conduct warranting disciplinary action. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that an attorney may be disbarred or suspended from his office for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct, among others. It cannot be also said, as he claims, that their relationship is merely a moment of indiscretion considering that their affair went on for more than two years. Florendo was suspended for 6 months.


CORAZON NEVADA VS ATTY. RODOLFO CASUGA, A.C. NO. 7591, MARCH 20, 2012 FACTS: In 2007, Corazon Nevada, filed a disbarment case against Atty. Rodolfo Casuga. Nevada alleged the following: 1. That Atty. Casuga acquired several pieces of jewelry from her; the jewelries include diamond earrings and diamond rings amounting P300,000.00. and a Rolex gold watch worth $12,000.00; that Casuga assured her that he will sell them; but despite repeated demands, Casuga never remitted any money nor did he return said jewelries. 2. That in 2006, Casuga, taking advantage of his close relationship with Nevada (they belong to the same religious sect), Casuga represented himself as the hotel administrator of the hotel (Mt. Crest) that Nevada own; that as such, Casuga was able to enter into a contract of lease with one Jung Chul; that he negotiated an office space with Chul in said Hotel for P90,000.00; that Casuga notarized said agreement; that he forged the signature of Edwin Nevada (husband); that he never remitted the P90k to Nevada. In his defense, Casuga said: 3. That Nevada actually pawned said jewelries in a pawnshop; that she later advised Casuga’s wife to redeem said jewelries using Mrs. Casuga’s wife; that Casuga can sell said jewelries and reimburse herself from the proceeds; that he still has possession of said jewelries. 4. That he never received the P90,000.00; that it was received by a certain Pastor Oh; that he was authorized as an agent by Edwin Nevada to enter into said contract of lease. ISSUE: Whether or not there is merit in Atty. Casuga’s defense. HELD: No. Atty. Casuga is in violation of the following: 1. Gross Misconduct: Casuga misrepresented himself as a duly authorized representative of Nevada when in fact he was not. He never adduced evidence showing that he was duly authorized either by Edwin or Corazon. He also dialed to adduce evidence proving that he never received the P90k from Chul. On the contrary, a notarized letter showed that Casuga did receive the money. His misrepresentations constitute gross misconduct and his mere denial does not overcome the evidence presented against him. 2. Violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: It is his duty as a lawyer to account for all moneys and property of his client that may come to his possession. This is still applicable even though said property/money did not come to his possession by virtue of a lawyer-client relationship. He failed to adduce evidence to prove his claim that Nevada pawned said jewelries. He never presented receipts. Further, even assuming that Nevada did pawn said items, Casuga was still duty bound to return said jewelries upon demand by Nevada. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

3. Violation of Notarial Rules: He signed a document (contract of lease) in behalf of another person without authorization. His forgery made him an actual party to the contract. In effect he was notarizing a document in which he is party in violation of the notarial rules (Secs. 1 and 3, Rule IV). 4. Malpractice of Law: As a summation of all the above violations, Casuga is guilty of Malpractice and Misconduct. Such act is punishable under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, the Supreme Court deemed that disbarment is too severe a punishment against Casuga. He was suspended for 4 years from the practice of law. His notarial commission was likewise revoked and he is disqualified to be a notary public while serving his suspension. The Supreme Court emphasized: the penalty of disbarment shall be meted out only when the lawyer’s misconduct borders on the criminal and/or is committed under scandalous circumstance.


SUZETTE DEL MUNDO vs. ATTY. ARNEL C. CAPISTRANO, April 16, 2012 FACTS: On January 8, 2005, Suzette and her friend Ricky S. Tuparan (Tuparan) engaged the legal services of Atty. Capistrano to handle the judicial declaration of nullity of their respective marriages allegedly for a fee of PhP140,000.00 each. On the same date, a Special Retainer Agreement was entered into by and between Suzette and Atty. Capistrano which required an acceptance fee of PhP30,000.00, appearance fee of PhP2,500.00 per hearing and another PhP2,500.00 per pleading. Moreover for every payment that Suzette made, she would inquire from Atty. Capistrano on the status of her case. In response, the latter made her believe that the two cases were already filed before the Regional Trial Court of Malabon City and waiting notice of hearing. Sometime in July 2005, when she could hardly reach Atty. Capistrano, she verified her case from the Clerk of Court of Malabon and discovered that while the case of Tuparan had been filed on January 27, 2005, no petition has yet been filed for her. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano violated the Code of Professional Responsibility RULING: This court finds that Atty. Capistrano committed acts in violation of his sworn duty as a member of the bar. In his Manifestation and Petition for Review, he himself admitted liability for his failure to act on Suzette’s case as well as to account and return the funds she entrusted to him. He only pleaded for the mitigation of his penalty citing the lack of intention to breach his lawyer’s oath; that this is his first offense; and that his profession is the only means of his and his family’s livelihood. He also prayed that the adjudged amount of PhP140,000.00 be reduced to PhP73,500.00 representing the amount of PhP78,500.00 he received less his payment of the sum of PhP5,000.00. Consequently, Commissioner Quisumbing and the IBP-CBD Board of Governors correctly recommended the appropriate penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law for violating the pertinent provisions of the Canons of Professional Responsibility. As stated under Canon Law, CANON 16 – A lawyer shall not hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. RULE 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. RULE 16.02 – A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him. Canon 18- A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. RULE 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. RULE 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information. Furthermore, a lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money of his client that may come to his possession. As trustee of such funds, he is bound to keep them separate and apart from his own. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the filing and processing of a case if not utilized, must be returned immediately upon demand. Failure to return gives rise to a presumption that he has misappropriated it in violation of the trust reposed on him. And the conversion of funds entrusted to him constitutes gross violation of Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

professional ethics and betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano, having clearly violated Canons 16 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is ORDERED to return to Suzette Del Mundo the full amount of PhP73,500.00 within 30 days from notice hereof and DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof of such payment.

IN RE: RODOLFO PACTOLIN, A.C. NO. 7940, APRIL 24, 2012 FACTS: In May 2008, the Supreme Court, in G.R. No. 161455 (Pactolin vs Sandiganbayan), affirmed the conviction of Atty. Rodolfo Pactolin for violation of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (Falsification by a Private Individual). It was duly proved that Pactolin falsified a letter, and presented said letter as evidence in a court of law, in order to make it appear that his fellow councilor acting as OIC-Mayor illegally caused the disbursement of public funds. In said decisions, the Supreme Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for appropriate administrative actions against Pactolin.

ISSUE: What administrative sanctions can be imposed upon Atty. Pactolin considering his conviction?

HELD: Rodolfo Pactolin should be, and is henceforth disbarred. The crime of falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude. Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. As a rule, the Supreme Court exercises the power to disbar with great caution. Being the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, it is imposed only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. But it has always been held that it is Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

appropriate to disbar a lawyer if he is convicted by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Further, Pactolin’s situation is aggravated by the fact that although his conviction has been affirmed, he has not served his sentence yet.

EMILIA O. DHALIWAL vs. ATTY. ABELARDO B. DUMAGUING, A.C. No. 9390 August 1, 2012 FACTS: Emilia O. Dhaliwal (complainant) she engaged the services of Atty. Aberlardo B. Dumaguing (respondent) connection with the purchase of a parcel of land from Fil-Estate Development, Inc. (Fil-Estate). Atty. Dumaguing was then given P342,000.00 for him to consign with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). On September 22, 2000, respondent, on behalf of complainant, filed with the HLURB a complaint for delivery of title and damages against Fil-Estate. A week after, or on September 29, 2000, Atty. Dumaguing withdrew from the HLURB the checks previously consigned. On March 3, 2003, complainant informed the HLURB that respondent is no longer representing her. On March 11, 2003, the HLURB promulgated its Decision, finding the case for delivery of title and damages premature as there was no evidence of full payment. Complainant then demanded Atty. Dumaguing to return her the amount he earlier withdrew but responded did not comply. Dhaliwal filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Dumaguing. Responded admitted all the allegations in the complaint. In his defense, he claims that the amount of P311,819.94 was consigned to the HLURB to cover the full payment of the balance of the purchase price of the lot. Respondent allegedly filed a motion for reconsideration but HLURB has not yet acted upon it. He attached a copy of the said motion in his answer. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Dumaguing should be disbarred. HELD: Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

Yes. It was established that Atty. Dimaguing submitted a false and fabricated piece of evidence because it did not contain proof that the same was filed with the HLURB nor was there proof that the other party was notified. He violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that: Canon 16-A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Rule 16.01-A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Rule 16.02-A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him. Rule 16.03-A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. A lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. He is suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and ordered to return to complainant said amount of P311,819.94 with legal interest.

ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON vs. ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO, A.C. No. 6116 August 1, 2012 FACTS: Atty. Mariano Pefianco (respondent) undertook to give Engr. Gilbert Tumbokon (complainant) 20% commission which the respondent would receive in representing Spouses Amable and Rosalinda Yap, whom the complainant referred. They had a written agreement dated August 11, 1995. However, respondent failed to pay complainant the agreed commission. Instead respondent was informed that Sps. Yap assumed to pay the same after he agreed to reduce his attorney’s fee from 25% to 17%. Complainant demanded the payment of his commission but the respondent ignored. Complainant also alleged that Atty. Pefianco has not lived up to the high moral standards required of his profession. And he also accused respondent of engaging in a money-lending business without required authorization. In respondent’s defense, he claimed that the written agreement dated August 11, 1995 was forged and that Sps. Yap assumed to pay complainant’s commission. Respondent filed Motion to Dismiss. The case was referred tp Intergrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. Respondent was recommended for one (1) year suspension from the practice of law for violation of Lawyer’s Oath Rule 1.01, Canon1; Rule 7.01, Canon 7 and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent filed Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Mariano Pefianco be suspended from the practice of law. RULING: The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code.11 Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the above standards whether in their professional or in their private capacity. In the present case, respondent's defense that forgery had attended the execution of the August 11, 1995 letter was belied by his July 16, 1997 letter admitting to have undertaken the payment of complainant's commission but passing on the responsibility to Sps. Yap. Clearly, respondent has violated Rule 9.02,12 Canon 9 of the Code which prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases which do not obtain in the case at bar. Respondent did not deny abandoning his legal family to cohabit with his mistress whom he begot four (4) children. The settled rule is that betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.13Consequently, We find no reason to disturb the IBP's finding that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath14 and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." However, the court finds the charge of engaging in illegal money lending not to have been sufficiently established. Respondent Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco is found guilty of violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the same Code and suspended from the active practice of law one (1) year

GERLIE M. UY VS. JUDGE ERWIN B. JAVELLANA, A.M. No. MTJ-071666, September 5, 2012 FACTS: This administrative case arose from a verified complaint for "gross ignorance of the law and procedures, gross incompetence, neglect of duty, conduct improper and unbecoming of a judge, grave misconduct and others," filed by Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug of PAO against Presiding Judge Javellana of the Municipal Trial Court, La Castellana, Negros Occidental. COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

JAVELLANA’S DEFENSE Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

In People vs. Cornelio (Malicious Mischief) -

Judge Javellana issued warrant of arrest after the filing of a certain criminal case despite Sec. 16 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.

- The necessity of holding the accused in detention became evident when it was revealed during trial that the same accused were wanted for Attempted Homicide in another case.

In People vs. Lopez ( Malicious Mischief) -

-

Judge Javellana did not apply the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure and instead conducted a preliminary examination and investigation in accordance with the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, then set the case for arraignment and free trial, despite confirming that complainant and her witnesses had no personal knowledge of the material facts alleged in their affidavits, which should had been a ground for dismissal of said case.

- Judge Javellana reiterated that a motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure and he added that he could not dismiss the case outright since the prosecution has not yet fully presented its evidence.

- The Lupong Tagapamayapa was not a jurisdictional requirement and the Judge Javellana did not grant Motion to Dismiss on said ground was the motion to dismiss for non- a prohibited pleading under the compliance with the Lupon Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. requirement under Sec. 18 and 19(a) of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.

In Trespass to Dwelling -

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. HELD: YES. Without any showing that the accused in People v. Cornelio and People v. Lopez, et al. were charged with the special cases of malicious mischief particularly described in Article 328 of the Revised Penal Code the appropriate penalty for the accused would be arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods which under Article 329(a) of the Revised Penal Code, would be imprisonment for two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) months. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

Clearly, these two cases should be governed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

ANASTACIO N. TEODORO III vs. ATTY. ROMEO S. GONZALES A.C. No. 6760, January 30, 2013 FACTS: In his complaint, Anastacio N. Teodoro Ill related that Atty. Gonzales acted as counsel of Araceli Teodoro-Marcial in two civil cases that the latter filed against him. The first ccise, Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, involved the settlement of the intestate estate of Manuela Teodoro. While the settlement Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

proceeding was pending, Atty. Gonzales assisted Teodord-Marcial in filing Civil Case No. 00-99207, for Annulment of Document, Reconveyance and Damages, without indicating the special proceeding earlier tiled. The tiling of the civil cases, according to Anastacio, was a deliberate act of forum shopping that warrants the disbarment of Atty. Gonzales. Atty. Gonzales admitted that he assisted Teodoro-Marcial in tiling the two cases. He asserted, however,, that he did not violate the forum shopping rule as the cases were not identical in terms of parties, subject matter and remedies. Atty. Gonzales also opined that the complainant only filed the disbarment case to harass him. The Investigating Commissioner’s Findings In our Resolution dated March 13, 2006, we referred the disbarment complaint to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation dated July 5, 2010, Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay found Atty. Gonzales administratively liable for forum shopping. According to Commissioner Dulay, both Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 and Civil Case No. 00-99207 hinged on the same substantial issue, i.e., on whether Manuela held the Malate property in trust for Carmen Teodoro-Reyes, Donato T. Teodoro, Jorge I. Teodoro and Teodoro-Marcial. In Special Proceeding No. 9995587, Carmen, Donato, Jorge I. Teodoro, Jorge T. Teodoro and TeodoroMarcial claimed that they are the heirs of Manuela. During her lifetime, Manuela was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Malate, Manila. According to the heirs, Manuela held the lot in trust for them, but she sold it to Anastacio and Rogelio Ng. Thus, the heirs prayed for the issuance of letters of administration so that Manuela’s properties could be inventoried and settled in accordance with law. In Civil Case No. 00-99207, the heirs of Manuela claimed to be the beneficiaries of a trust held by Manuela over the same parcel of land contested in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587. They alleged that during her lifetime, Manuela sold a portion of this land to Anastacio. They asked the trial court to annul the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Manuela; to cancel the resulting Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of Anastacio; and to issue a new one in their names. The commissioner found that a ruling in either case would result in res judicata over the other. Thus, Atty. Gonzales committed forum shopping when he instituted Civil Case No. 00-99207 without indicating that Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 was still pending. In committing forum shopping, Atty. Gonzales disregarded the Supreme Court Circular prohibiting forum shopping and thus violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Commissioner Dulay recommended that Atty. Gonzales be suspended for one month from the practice of law, with a warning that a repetition of a similar offense would merit a more severe penalty. The Board of Governors of the IBP reversed the commissioner’s recommendation. In a resolution dated December 10, 2011, the Board of Governors dismissed the case against Atty. Gonzales for lack of merit. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Gonzales committed forum shopping and thereby violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. HELD: YES, Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, or in anticipation thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means other than appeal or certiorari. There is forum shopping when the elements of litis pendencia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. They are as follows: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties that represent the same interests in both actions, (b) identity of rights or causes of action, and (c) identity of relief sought. Under this test, we find that Atty. Gonzales Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

committed forum shopping when he filed Civil Case No. 00-99207 while Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 was pending. Respondent was fully aware, since he was the counsel for both cases, that he raised the issue of trust with respect to the Malate property in the 1999 Letters of Administration case and that he was raising the same similar issue of trust in the 2000 annulment case xxx To advise his client therefore to execute the affidavit of non-forum shopping for the second case (annulment case) and state that there is no pending case involving the same or similar issue would constitute misconduct which should be subject to disciplinary action. It was his duty to advise his client properly, and his failure to do so, in fact his deliberate assertion that there was no falsity in the affidavit is indicative of a predisposition to take lightly his duty as a lawyer to promote respect and obedience to the law. The Court has repeatedly warned lawyers against resorting to forum shopping since the practice clogs the Court dockets and can lead to conflicting rulings. Willful and deliberate forum shopping has been made punishable either as direct or indirect contempt of court in SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94 dated April 1, 1994. In engaging in forum shopping, Atty. Gonzales violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which directs lawyers to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. He also disregarded his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and the prohibition against unduly delaying a case by misusing court processes. To our mind, however, the supreme penalty of disbarment would be very harsh in light of all the circumstances of this case Lawyers are also censured for minor infractions against the lawyer’s duty to the Court or the client. As earlier stated, Atty. Gonzales’ act of forum shopping disregarded his duty to obey and promote respect for the law and legal processes, as well as the prohibition against unduly delaying a case by misusing court processes. It also violated his duty as an officer of the court to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. WHEREFORE, we find the basis for the complaint meritorious and accordingly CENSURE Atty. Romeo S. Gonzales for resorting to forum shopping. He is WARNED that any future violation of his duties as a lawyer will be dealt with more severely. A copy of this reprimand should be attached to Atty. Romeo S. Gonzales’ personal file in the Office of the Bar Confidant.


A.C. No. 7350 February 18, 2013 PATROCINIO V. AGBULOS vs. ATTY. ROSELLER A. VIRAY FACTS : The case stemmed from a Complaint filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) by complainant Mrs. Patrocinio V. Agbulos against respondent Atty. Roseller A. Viray of Asingan, Pangasinan, for allegedly notarizing a document denominated as Affidavit of Non-Tenancy in violation of the Notarial Law. The said affidavit was supposedly executed by complainant, but the latter denies said execution and claims that the signature and the community tax certificate (CTC) she allegedly presented are not hers. She further claims that the CTC belongs to a certain Christian Anton. Complainant added that she did not personally appear before respondent for the notarization of the document. She, likewise, states that respondent's client, Rolando Dollente (Dollente), benefited from the said falsified affidavit as it contributed to the illegal transfer of a property registered in her name to that of Dollente. ISSUE: Is the respondent guilty of his indiscretion in admitted having prepared and notarized the document in question at the request of his client? RULING: The Court is aware of the practice of not a few lawyers commissioned as notary public to authenticate documents without requiring the physical presence of affiants. However, the adverse consequences of this practice far outweigh whatever convenience is afforded to the absent affiants. Doing away with the essential requirement of physical presence of the affiant does not take into account the likelihood that the documents may be spurious or that the affiants may not be who they purport to be. A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party’s free act and deed. The Court has repeatedly emphasized in a number of cases the important role a notary public performs, to wit: x x x [N]otarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act but one invested with substantive public interest. The notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his duties; otherwise, the public’s confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined. Respondent’s failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only damage to those directly affected by the notarized document but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public and in degrading the function of notarization. He should, thus, be held liable for such negligence not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.23 The responsibility to faithfully observe and respect the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer because of his solemn oath under the Code of Professional Responsibility to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. As to the proper penalty, the Court finds the need to increase that recommended by the IBP which is one month suspension as a lawyer and six months suspension as notary public, considering that respondent himself prepared the document, and he performed the notarial act without the personal appearance of the affiant and without identifying her with competent evidence of her identity. With his indiscretion, he allowed the use of a CTC by someone who did not own it. Worse, he allowed himself to be an instrument of fraud. Based on existing jurisprudence, when a lawyer commissioned as a notary public fails to discharge his duties as such, he is meted the penalties of revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years, and suspension from the practice of law for one year.26 WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Roseller A. Viray GUILTY of breach of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one (1) year; REVOKES his incumbent commission, if any; and PROHIBITS him from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years, effective immediately. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.


A.C. No. 9310 February 27, 2013 VERLEEN TRINIDAD, FLORENTINA LANDER, WALLY CASUBUAN, MINERVA MENDOZA, CELEDONIO ALOJADO, ROSENDO VILLAMIN and AUREA TOLENTINO, vs. ATTY. ANGELITO VILLARIN FACTS : The instant case stemmed from a Complaint for specific performance filed with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) by the buyers of the lots in Don Jose Zavalla Subdivision against the subdivision's owner and developer- Purence Realty Corporation and Roberto Bassig.The HLURB ordered the owner and the developer to deliver the Deeds of Sale and the Transfer Certificates of Title to the winning litigants. The Decision did not evince any directive for the buyers to vacate the property. Purence Realty and Roberto Bassig did not appeal the Decision, thus making it final and executory. Thereafter, the HLURB issued a Writ of Execution. It was at this point that respondent Villarin entered his special appearance to represent Purence Realty. Specifically, he filed an Omnibus Motion to set aside the Decision and to quash the Writ of Execution for being null and void on the ground of lack of jurisdiction due to the improper service of summons on his client. This motion was not acted upon by the HLURB. Respondent sent demand letters to herein complainants. In all of these letters, he demanded that they immediately vacate the property and surrender it to Purence Realty within five days from receipt. Otherwise, he would file the necessary action against them. True enough, Purence Realty, as represented by respondent, filed a Complaint for forcible entry before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) against Trinidad, Lander, Casubuan and Mendoza. Aggrieved, the four complainants filed an administrative case against respondent. A month after, Alojado, Villamin and Tolentino filed a disbarment case against respondent. As found by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and affirmed by its Board of Governors, complainants asserted in their respective verified Complaints that the demand letters sent by Villarin had been issued with malice and intent to harass them. They insisted that the letters also contravened the HLURB Decision ordering his client to permit the buyers to pay the balance of the purchase price of the subdivision lots. Issue : Whether or not the respondent should be administratively sanctioned for sending the demand letters? Ruling: The respondent Atty. Angelito Villarin is clearly proscribed by Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Which requires that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful objectives. Lawyers Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

must not present and offer in evidence any document that they know is false.

A.C. No. 9615 March 5, 2013 GLORIA P. JINON vs. ATTY. LEONARDO E. JIZ FACTS: Gloria P. Jinon (Gloria) engaged the services of Atty.Leonardo E. Jiz (Atty. Jiz) on April 29, 2003 to recover a land title which was a subject of dispute with her sister in law Viola J. Jinon (Viola), for which she immediately paid an acceptance fee of P17,000.00. In their subsequent meeting, Atty. Jiz assured the transfer of the title in Gloria's name. Gloria, upon Atty. Jiz's instructions, remitted the amount of P45,000.00 to answer for the expenses of the transfer. However, when she later inquired about the status of her case, she was surprised to learn from Atty. Jiz that a certain Atty. Caras was handling the same. Moreover, when she visited the property, which has been leased out to one Rose Morado (Rose), she discovered that Atty. Jiz has been collecting the rentals for the period June 2003 up to October 2004, which amounted to P12,000.00. When she demanded for the rentals, Atty. Jiz gave her only P7,000.00, explaining that the balance of P5,000.00 would be added to the expenses needed for the transfer of the title of the property to her name. The foregoing incidents prompted Gloria to terminate the legal services of Atty. Jiz and demand the return of the amounts of P45,000.00 and P5,000.00 through a letter dated September 22, 2004, which has remained unheeded. Atty. Jiz has not complied with his undertaking to recover the land title from Viola and effect its transfer in Gloria’s name, and has failed to return her money despite due demands. Hence, the administrative complaint praying that Atty. Jiz: (1) be ordered to reimburse the total amount of P67,000.00 (P17,000.00 acceptance fee, P45,000.00 for the transfer of title, and P5,000.00 as unremitted rentals for the property); and (2) be meted disciplinary action that the Court may deem fit under the circumstances. In his Answer, Atty. Jiz asseverated that he was not remiss in his legal duties to Gloria. Denying liability to reimburse Gloria for any amount, much less for P45,000.00,he claimed that he had rendered the corresponding legal services to her with fidelity and candor. Hence, he prayed that the complaint against him be dismissed. After the investigation, Commissioner Cecilio A.C. Villanueva (Commissioner Villanueva) of the Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) found Atty. Jiz to have Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

been remiss in his duty in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution stating that Atty. Jiz be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years and Ordered to Restitute complainant the amount of P45,000.00 and 12% interest from the time he received the amount until fully paid within sixty (60) days from notice. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Jiz should be held administratively liable for having been remiss in his duties as a lawyer with respect to the legal services he had undertaken to perform for his client, Gloria. HELD: YES. Atty. Jiz was remiss in his duties as a lawyer in neglecting his client’s case and misappropriating her funds. He is found having clearly violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT COME INTO HIS POSSESSION. RULE 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. xxx xxx xxx RULE 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. xxx xxx xxx CANON 18. – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. xxx xxx xxx RULE 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. xxx xxx xxx Atty. Jiz is suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely and is ordered to return to complainant Gloria P. Jinon the full amount of P45,000.00 with legal interest of 6% per annum from date of demand on September 22, 2004 up to the finality of the decision and 12% per annum from its finality until paid. A.C. No. 9604 March 20, 2013 RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA vs. ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER FACTS: Sometime in October 2004, Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony J. Rustia (Rustia), both employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration, received an Order from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration. The Complaint was allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental. When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in person. When Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature appearing above his name as counsel for Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit to attest to such fact. Using the affidavit from Atty. Bancolo, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia, denying the same, presented as evidence an affidavit by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracia's case and that the Complaint filed with the Office of the Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolo's instructions. Tapay and Rustia later on filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo's law partner. The complainants alleged that they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. The complainants also maintained that not only were respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in falsification of documents used to harass and persecute innocent people. In their answer, respondents admitted that the criminal and administrative cases filed by Divinagracia against complainants before the Office of the Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The cases were assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff to prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings and documents. However, due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings and communications be signed in his name by the secretary of the law office. After investigation, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code and recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the practice of law and Atty. Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise certain responsibilities in their law firm. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Bancolo is guilty of violating Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. HELD: YES. Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. He likewise categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary, notwithstanding his tolerance. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: CANON 9 A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW. Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing. Atty. Bancolo is suspended from the practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. The complaint against Atty. Jarder is dismissed for lack of merit.


Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, et al A.M No. MTJ-07-1691, April 2, 2013 FACTS: The judicial audit team created by the Office of the Court Administrator (or OCA) reported alleged irregularities in the solemnization of marriages in several branches of the MTCC and RTC in Cebu City. Also, certain package fees were offered to interested parties by "fixers" or "facilitators" for instant marriages. A female and a male lawyer of the audit team went undercover as a couple looking to get married. The female lawyer went inside the branch to inquire about the marriage application process. A woman named, Helen, approached and assisted the female lawyer. When the female lawyer asked if the marriage process could be rushed, Helen assured the lawyer that the marriage could be solemnized the next day, but the marriage certificate would only be dated the day the marriage license becomes available. Helen also guaranteed the regularity of the process for a fee of three thousand pesos only. Judge Necessario, Judge Acosta, Judge Tormis and Judge Rosales were asked by the OCA to submit their comments against the formal administrative complaint by the judicial audit team. OCA also suspended the judges pending resolution for the cases against them. In its memorandum and supplemental report, 643 marriage certificates were examined by the judicial audit team and that 280 out of 643 were reported to have been Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code. There is also an unusual number of marriage licenses obtained from the local civil registrars of the towns of. Barili and Liloan, Cebu. Also, There were even marriages solemnized at 9AM with marriage licenses obtained on the same day. OCA recommended the dismissal of the respondent judges and some court employees , and the suspension or adominition of others for being guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages with questionable documents; for failure to make sure that the solemnization fee has been paid; for gross ignorance of law for solemnizing marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code wherein one or both parties were minors during cohabitation and; for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. ISSUE: Whether or not the judges and personnel of the MTCC and RTC in Cebu City are guilty of gross ignorance of the law, gross neglect of duty or gross inefficiency and gross misconduct, and in turn, warrant the most severe penalty of dismissal from service. RULING: The Court held that the judges were guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and gross ignorance of the law and be dismissed from the service. The Court listed the following liabilities of the judges: First, Judges Necessario, Tormis and Rosales solemnized marriages even if the requirements submitted by the couples were incomplete and of questionable character. The actions of the respondent judges constitute gross inefficiency. In Vega v. Asdala, the Court held that inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance, and carelessness. Second, The judges were also found guilty of neglect of duty regarding the payment of solemnization fees. The Court, in Rodrigo-Ebron v. Adolfo, defined neglect of duty as the failure to give one’s attention to a task expected of him and it is gross when, from the gravity of the offense or the frequency of instances, the offense is so serious in its character as to endanger or threaten public welfare. The marriage documents examined by the audit team show that corresponding official receipts for the solemnization fee were missing or payment by batches was made for marriages performed on different dates. Third, Judges Necessario, Tormis, and Rosales also solemnized marriages where a contracting party is a foreigner who did not submit a certificate of legal capacity to marry from his or her embassy. The irregularity in the certificates of legal capacity that are required under Article 21 of the Family Code displayed the gross neglect of duty of the judges. They should have been diligent in scrutinizing the documents required for the marriage license issuance. Any irregularities would have been prevented in the qualifications of parties to contract marriage. Lastly, Judges Necessario, Acosta, and Tormis are likewise guilty of gross ignorance of the law under Article 34 of the Family Code with respect to the marriages they solemnized where legal impediments existed during cohabitation such as the minority status of one party. Moreover, the Court held that the respondent judges violated Canons 2138 and 6139 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which exact competence, integrity and probity in the performance of their duties. The Court previously said that “Ignorance of the law is a mark of incompetence, and where the law involved is elementary, ignorance thereof is considered as an indication of lack of integrity.” In connection with this, the administration of justice is considered a sacred task and upon assumption to office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He or she becomes the visible representation of the law and more importantly of justice. The Court further said that the actuations of these judges are not only condemnable, it is outright shameful. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

SONIA C. DECENA AND REY C. DECENA VS. JUDGE NILO A. MALANYAON A.M NO. RTJ-10-2217, APRIL 8, 2013 FACTS: Sonia and Rey Decena have lodged an administrative complaint for conduct unbecoming a judge against Hon. Nilo A. Malanyaon, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, in Pili, Camarines Sur. The complainants had brought an administrative case in Legaspi City, Albay against Judge Malanyanon's wife, Dr. Amelita C. Malanyaon. The complainants averred that the actuations of Judge Malanyaon during the hearing of his wife’s administrative case in the Civil Service Commission constituted violations of Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippines Judiciary. During the hearing of the administrative case, Judge Malanyaon sat beside his daughter, Atty. Kristina Malanyaon, the counsel of Dr. Amelita in the administrative case filed against her. Judge Malanyaon coached her daughter in making manifestations/motions before the hearing officer, by scribbling on some piece of paper and giving the same to the former, thus prompting her daughter to rise from her seat and/or ask permission from the officer to speak, and then make some manifestations while reading or glancing on the paper given by Judge Malanyaon. When the principal counsel of the complainants, Atty. Zamora, arrived, she inquired regarding the personality of Judge Malanyaon, being seated at the lawyer’s bench beside Atty. Malanyaon, Judge Malanyaon then proudly introduced himself and manifested that he was the “counsel of the respondent’s counsel”. Atty. Zamora proceeded to raise the propriety of Judge Malanyaon’s sitting with and assisting his daughter in that hearing, being a member of the judiciary, to which Judge Malanyaon loudly retorted that he be shown any particular rule that prohibits him from sitting with his daughter at the lawyers’ bench. He insisted that he was merely “assisting” her daughter, who “just passed the bar”, defend the respondent, and was likewise helping the latter defend herself. The Court administrator reiterated a recommendation by recommending that: (a) the administrative case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; and (b) Judge Malanyaon be found guilty of gross misconduct and fined P 50,000.00. ISSUES: Whether or not the actuations of Judge Malanyaon complained of constituted conduct unbecoming of a judge RULING: The Court finds and pronounces JUDGE NILO A. MALANYAON, Presiding Judge of Branch 32 of the Regional Trial Court in Pili, Camarines Sur, administratively liable for conduct unbecoming of a Judge, and penalizes him with a fine ofP40,000.00 The Court held, that the actuations of Judge Malanyaon constituted conduct unbecoming of a judge upon the following reasons set below: First was Judge Malanyaon’s occupying a seat beside his daughter that was reserved for the lawyers during the hearing. Such act displayed his presumptuousness, and probably even his clear intention to thereby exert his influence as a judge of the Regional Trial Court on the hearing officer in order for the latter to favor his wife’s cause. That impression was definitely adverse against the Judiciary, whose every judicial officer was presumed to be a subject of strict scrutiny by the public. Being an incumbent RTC Judge, he always represented the Judiciary, and should have acted with greater circumspection and selfrestraint, simply because the administrative hearing was unavoidably one in which he could not but be partisan. Simple prudence should have counselled him to avoid any form of suspicion of his motives, or to suppress any impression of impropriety on his part as an RTC judge by not going to the hearing himself. Second was Judge Malanyaon’s admission that his presence in that hearing was to advise his daughter on what to do and say during the hearing, to the point of coaching his daughter. In the process, he unabashedly introduced himself as the “counsel of the respondent’s counsel” upon his presence being challenged by the adverse counsel, stating that his daughter was still inexperienced for having just passed her Bar Examinations. Such excuse, seemingly grounded on a “filial” duty towards his wife and his daughter, did not furnish enough reason for him to forsake the ethical conduct expected of him as a sitting judge. He ought to have restrained himself from sitting at that hearing, being all too aware that his sitting would have him cross the line beyond which was the private practice of law. Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

expressly prohibits sitting judges like Judge Malanyaon from engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. Section 11, Canon 4 (Propriety), of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and Rule 5.0730 of the Code of Judicial Conduct reiterate the prohibition from engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. The prohibition is based on sound reasons of public policy, considering that the rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney are inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a sitting judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending favors to their own private interests, and assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions. These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote the public interest. Thus, an attorney who accepts an appointment to the Bench must accept that his right to practice law as a member of the Philippine Bar is thereby suspended, and it shall continue to be so suspended for the entire period of his incumbency as a judge. To the Court, then, Judge Malanyaon engaged in the private practice of law by assisting his daughter at his wife’s administrative case, coaching his daughter in making manifestations or posing motions to the hearing officer, and preparing the questions that he prompted to his daughter in order to demand that Atty. Eduardo Loria, collaborating counsel of the complainants’ principal counsel, should produce his privilege tax receipt. Judge Malanyaon did so voluntarily and knowingly, in light of his unhesitating announcement during the hearing that he was the counsel for Atty. Katrina Malanyaon, the counsel of the respondent, as his response to the query by the opposing counsel why he was seated next to Atty. Malanyaon thereat. Third was Judge Malanyaon’s admission that he had already engaged in the private practice of law even before the incident now the subject of this case by his statement in his comment that “it is strange for complainants to take offense at my presence and accuse me of practicing law during my stint as a judge when before the bad blood between my wife and her sibling and nephew erupted, I helped them out with their legal problems gratis et amore and they did not complain of my practicing law on their behalf.” He thereby manifested his tendencies to disregard the prohibition against the private practice of law during his incumbency on the Bench. Any propensity on the part of a magistrate to ignore the ethical injunction to conduct himself in a manner that would give no ground for reproach is always worthy of condemnation. We should abhor any impropriety on the part of judges, whether committed in or out of their courthouses, for they are not judges only occasionally. Fourth was Judge Malanyaon’s display of arrogance during the hearing, as reflected by his reaction to the opposing counsel’s query on his personality to sit at the counsel table at the hearing, to wit: I am the counsel of the complainant, ah, of the respondent’s counsel, I am Judge Malanyaon. I am assisting her. And so what?!! Judge Malanyaon’s uttering “And so what?” towards the opposing counsel evinced his instant resentment towards the adverse parties’ counsel for rightly challenging his right to be sitting on a place reserved for counsel of the parties. The utterance, for being made in an arrogant tone just after he had introduced himself as a judge, was unbecoming of the judge that he was, and tainted the good image of the Judiciary that he should uphold at all times. It is true that the challenge of the opposing counsel might have slighted him, but that was not enough to cause him to forget that he was still a judge expected to act with utmost sobriety and to speak with self-restraint. He thereby ignored the presence of the hearing officer, appearing to project that he could forsake the decorum that the time and the occasion rightly called for from him and the others just because he was a judge and the other Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

side was not. He should not forget that a judge like himself should be the last person to be perceived by others as a petty and sharp-tongued tyrant. Judge Malanyaon has insisted that his actuations were excused by his filial obligation to assist his daughter, then only a neophyte in the Legal Profession. We would easily understand his insistence in the light of our culture to be always solicitous of the wellbeing of our family members and other close kin, even risking our own safety and lives in their defense. But the situation of Judge Malanyaon was different, for he was a judicial officer who came under the stricture that uniformly applied to all judges of all levels of the judicial hierarchy, forbidding him from engaging in the private practice of law during his incumbency, regardless of whether the beneficiary was his wife or daughter or other members of his own family.


REX POLINAR DAGOHOY vs. ATTY. ARTEMIO V. SAN JUAN, A.C. No. 7944, June 03, 2013 FACTS: Atty. San Juan was administratively charged for gross negligence, in connection with the dismissal of his client's appeal filed before the Court of Appeals (CA). Tomas Dagohoy (Tomas), his client and the father of complainant Rex Polinar Dagohoy, was charged with and convicted of theft by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, of Panabo City, Davao del Norte. According to the complainant, the CA dismissed the appeal for Atty. San Juan’s failure to file the appellant’s brief.5 He further alleged that Atty. San Juan did not file a motion for reconsideration against the CA’s order of dismissal.6 The complainant also accused Atty. San Juan of being untruthful in dealing with him and Tomas. The complainant, in this regard, alleged that Atty. San Juan failed to inform him and Tomas of the real status of Tomas’ appeal and did not disclose to them the real reason for its dismissal. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is liable for committing gross negligence, in connection with the dismissal of his client's appeal filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) HELD: Atty. San Juan’s negligence undoubtedly violates the Lawyer’s Oath that requires him to “conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of (his) knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to (his) clients[.]” He also violated Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, We deny Atty. San Juan's motion to lift the order of suspension. Atty. San Juan's self-imposed compliance with the IBP's recommended penalty of three (3) months suspension was premature. The wordings of the Resolution dated April 16, 2012 show that the Court merely noted: (1) the IBP's findings and the recommended penalty against Atty. San Juan; and (2) the IBP referral of the case back to the Court for its proper disposition. The IBP findings and the stated penalty thereon are merely recommendatory; only the Supreme Court has the power to discipline erring lawyers and to impose against them penalties for unethical conduct. 23 Until finally acted upon by the Supreme Court, the IBP findings and the recommended penalty imposed cannot attain finality until adopted by the Court as its own. Thus, the IBP findings, by themselves, cannot be a proper subject of implementation or compliance.24 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to: 1. NOTE the Report and Recommendation dated January 14, 2013 of the Office of the Bar Confidant; 2. SUSPEND from the practice of law for a period of one ( 1) year Atty. Artemio V. San Juan for violating his Lawyer's Oath and Rules 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with a WARNING that the commission of the same or similar act or acts shall be dealt with more severely; and 3. DENY the motion filed by Atty. Artemio V. San Juan in the letter dated August 28, 2012 that he be allowed to return to the practice of law.


PENA VS. ATTY. PATERNO, A.C. No. 4191, June 10, 2013 FACTS: This is an administrative case filed against respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno for acts violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law. Complainant , the owner of a parcel of land known as Lot 7-C, Psd-74200, located in Bayanbayanan, Parang, Marikina, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-61244, Register of Deeds of Marikina, with an eight-door apartment constructed thereon. The complainant alleged that she gave respondent her owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 61244 to enable respondent to use the same as collateral in constructing a townhouse, and that the title was in the safekeeping of respondent for seven years. Despite repeated demands by complainant, respondent refused to return it. Yet, respondent assured complainant that she was still the owner. Later, complainant discovered that a new building was erected on her property in January 1994, eight years after she gave the title to respondent. Respondent argued that it was unfathomable that after eight years, complainant never took any step to verify the status of her loan application nor visited her property, if it is untrue that she sold the said property. Complainant explained that respondent kept on assuring her that the bank required the submission of her title in order to process her loan application. In the course of investigation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commissioner Sordan stated that respondent enabled Estrella B. Krausto sell complainant's land to Kris built Traders Company, Ltd.17 This was evidenced by Entry No. 150322 in TCT No. 61244 with respect to the sale of the property described therein to Kris built Traders Company, Ltd. for P200,000.00. Respondent alleged that complainant signed the Deed of Sale in her presence inside her office. However, respondent would neither directly confirm nor deny if, indeed, she notarized the instrument in her direct examination, but on cross-examination, she stated that she was not denying that she was the one who notarized the Deed of Sale. Estrella Kraus' affidavit supported respondent's defense. Commissioner Sordan declared that respondent failed to exercise the required diligence and fealty to her office by attesting that the alleged party, Anita Peña, appeared before her and signed the deed when in truth and in fact the said person did not participate in the execution thereof. Moreover, respondent should be faulted for having failed to make the necessary entries pertaining to the deed of sale in her notarial register. Recommended that Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

respondent be disbarred from the practice of law and her name stricken-off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately, and recommended that the notarial commission of respondent, if still existing, be revoked, and that respondent be perpetually disqualified from reappointment as a notary public. ISSUE: Whether or not there was clear and preponderant evidence showing that respondent violated the Canons of Professional Responsibility by(a) deceiving complainant Anita C. Peña; (b) conspiring with Estrella Kraus and Engr. Ernesto Lampa to enable the latter to register the subject property in his name; and (c) knowingly notarizing a falsified contract of sale. HELD: As a member of the bar, respondent failed to live up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly the following Canons: CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes. Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno is DISBARRED from the practice of law, pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as well as for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and the notarial commission of Atty. Christina C. Paterno, if still existing, is perpetually REVOKED.


JULIAN PENILLA, Complainant, v. ATTY. QUINTIN P. ALCID, JR., A.C. No. 9149, September 04, 2013 FACTS: The respondent was complainant’s counsel for the case of breach of contract with the Garin spouses. He filed a criminal case, overcharged him with attorney’s fees and filing fee, and imposed that the Asst. City Prosecutor Jose C. Fortuno would be more in favor of the complainant’s case if they would give liquor to the said judge. The case was rendered unsuccessful. After the hearing, the respondent asked for more fees, and reasoned him with more filing of litigations. He suggested that they should file a civil case and to have the complainant follow up about it in his office. Complainant asserts having made numerous and unsuccessful attempts to follow-up the status of the case and meet with respondent at his office. The complainant went to the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Caloocan City Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court (RTC) and learned that the respondent has been lying to him about the legal fees. The complainant filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) the instant administrative case praying that respondent be found guilty of gross misconduct for violating the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, and for appropriate administrative sanctions to be imposed. IBP-CBD recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for six months “for negligence within the meaning of Canon 18 and transgression of Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,” The IBP-CBD decided that the respondent’s violation of Canon 18 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his negligence, Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. On April 24, 2009, respondent sought reconsideration and asked that the penalty of suspension be reduced to warning or reprimand. After three days, or on April 27, 2009, respondent filed a “Motion to Admit Amended ‘Motion for Reconsideration’ Upon Leave of Office.” The IBP Board of Governors denied respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. Respondent filed a second Motion for Reconsideration which was no longer acted upon. .According to the IBP, the respondent committed professional negligence under Canon 18 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with a modification that we also find respondent guilty of violating Canon 17 and Rule 18.03 of the Code and the Lawyer’s Oath. ISSUE: Is Atty Quintin P. Alcid Jr. Guilty of gross misconduct? RULING: Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

1. The respondent, Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr. was found GUILTY of gross misconduct for violating Canons 17 and 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as the Lawyer’s Oath. 2. The Court hereby imposed upon respondent the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS to commence immediately upon receipt of this Decision. 3. Respondent is further ADMONISHED to be more circumspect and diligent in handling the cases of his clients, and 4. STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

JOSEPHINE L. OROLA, MYRNA L. OROLA, MANUEL L. OROLA, MARY ANGELYN OROLA-BELARGA, MARJORIE MELBA OROLA-CALIP, AND KAREN OROLA, (Heirs of Antonio) vs. ATTY. JOSEPH ADOR RAMOS, A.C. No. 9860, September 11, 2013 FACTS: Atty Joseph Ador Ramos was charged for his violation of (a) Rule 15.03 of the Code, as he undertook to represent conflicting interests in the subject case; and (b) Section 20(e), Rule 138 of the Rules, as he breached the trust and confidence reposed upon him by his clients, the Heirs of Antonio. The Antonio heirs first filed a hearing with the IBP. IBP found the respondent guilty though there was no violation of Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. The IBP imposed against respondent the penalty of six (6) months suspension from the practice of law. ISSUE: Is the respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03 of the Rules of Court? RULING: The Court concurs with the IBP’s finding that respondent violated Rule 15.03 of the Code, but reduced the recommended period of suspension to three (3) months to be more appropriate taking into consideration the following factors: a. Respondent is a first time offender; b. It is undisputed that respondent merely accommodated Maricar’s request out of gratis to temporarily represent her only during the June 16 and July 14, 2006 hearings due to her lawyer’s unavailability; c. It is likewise undisputed that respondent had no knowledge that the late Antonio had any other heirs aside from Maricar whose consent he actually acquired (albeit shortly after his first appearance as counsel for and in behalf of Emilio), hence, it can be said that he acted in good faith; and, d. Complainants admit that respondent did not acquire confidential information from the Heirs of Antonio nor did he use against them any knowledge obtained in the course of his previous employment, hence, the said heirs were not in any manner prejudiced by his subsequent engagement with Emilio. 2. The Court also served the ruling as a Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

warning to the respondent and that the next case would be dealt more severely

JUDGE MANAHAN V. ATTY. FLORES, A.C. NO. 8954, NOVEMBER 13, 2013 FACTS: Respondent Atty. Rodolto Flores (Atty. Flores) was counsel for the defendant in Civil Case No. 1863 captioned as Marsha Aranas plaintiff versus Arnold Balmores defendant a suit for damages filed before the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal and presided by herein complainant Judge Maribeth Rodriguez-Manahan (Judge Manahan). xxx During the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1863, Judge Manahan issued an Order dated January 12, 2011, whereby she voluntarily inhibited from hearing Civil Case No. 1863. The said Order reads in part, viz: “More than mere contempt do his (Atty. Flores) unethical actuations, his traits of dishonesty and discourtesy not only to his own brethren in the legal profession, but also to the bench and judges, would amount to grave misconduct, if not a malpractice of law, a serious ground for disciplinary action of a member of the bar pursuant to Rules 139 a & b.” During the Preliminary Conference, respondent Atty. Flores entered his appearance and was given time to file a Pre-Trial Brief. On May 24, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores filed his Pre-Trial Brief but without proof of MCLE compliance. The preliminary conference was reset several times (August 11, September 8) for failure of respondent Atty. Flores to appear and submit his Pre-Trial Brief indicating thereon his MCLE compliance. The court a quo likewise issued Orders dated September 15 and October 20, 2010 giving respondent Atty. Flores a last chance to submit his Pre-Trial Brief with stern warning that failure to do so shall be considered a waiver on his part. Respondent Atty. Flores later filed his Pre-Trial Brief bearing an MCLE number which was merely superimposed without indicating the date and place of compliance. During the preliminary conference on November 24, 2010, Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

respondent Atty. Flores manifested that he will submit proof of compliance of his MCLE on the following day. On December 1, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores again failed to appear and to submit the said promised proof of MCLE compliance. Instead, sending the courts a manifestation for refusing in proceeding to serve his client dated September 14, 2010. ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Flores is held liable for his unethical and contemptuous actuations against the legal profession, client and judges? RULING: Yes. There is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial court’s order to submit proof of his MCLE compliance notwithstanding the several opportunities given him. "Court orders are to be respected not because the judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the respect and consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the Government. xxx Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that branch the Government to which they belong, as well as to the State which has instituted the judicial system." xxx Atty. Flores also employed intemperate language in his pleadings. As an officer of the court, Atty. Flores is expected to be circumspect in his language. Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins all attorneys to abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts. Atty. Flores failed in this respect. xxx However, we find the recommended penalty too harsh and not commensurate with the infractions committed by the respondent. It appears that this is the first infraction committed by respondent. Also, we are not prepared to impose on the respondent the penalty of one-year suspension for humanitarian reasons. Respondent manifested before this Court that he has been in the practice of law for half a century. Thus, he is already in his twilight years. Considering the foregoing, we deem it proper to fine respondent in the amount of P5,000.00 and to remind him to be more circumspect in his acts and to obey and respect court processes. ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Rodolfo Flores is FINED in the amount of P5,000.00 with STERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

CABUATAN V. ATTY. VENIDA, A.C. NO. 10043, NOVEMBER 20, 2013 FACTS: The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) thru its Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) received a Complaint filed by Aurora H. Cabauatan (complainant) against respondent Atty. Freddie A. Venida for serious misconduct and gross neglect of duty. x x x Complainant alleged that she was the appellant in CA-G.R. [No.] 85024 entitled Aurora Cabauatan, PlaintiffAppellant vs. Philippine National Bank, Defendant-Appellee. The case was originally handled by a different lawyer but she decided to change her counsel and engaged the services of the Respondent x x x. Complainant was then furnished by the Respondent of the pleadings he prepared, such as "Appearance as Counsel/Dismissal of the Previous Counsel and a Motion for Extension of time to File a Memorandum." Complainant made several followups on her case until she lost contact with the Respondent. Complainant alleged the gross, reckless and inexcusable negligence of the Respondent that led to the case is “x x x deemed ABANDONED and DISMISSED on authority of Sec. 1(e), Rule 50 of the 1996 Rules of Civil Procedure. x x x” Certified on March 31, 2006. Respondent did not submit any pleading with Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

the Court of Appeals. It is likewise very noticeable that the Respondent was not among those furnished with a copy of the Entry of Judgment hence it is crystal clear that he never submitted his Entry of Appearance with the Court of Appeals [insofar] as the case of the Complainant is concerned. Respondent assured the Complainant that he was doing his best in dealing with the case, nevertheless, later on Complainant lost contact with him. x x x including the fact that he was not one of the parties furnished with a copy of the Entry of Judgment proved the inaction and negligence of the Respondent. x x x ISSUE: Is respondent can be held liable for his gross negligence and inaction against his clients’ case? RULING: Yes, It is beyond dispute that complainant engaged the services of respondent to handle her case which was then on appeal before the Court of Appeals. Indeed, when a lawyer takes a client's cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latter's rights. Complainant also established that she made several follow-ups with the respondent but the latter merely ignored her or made her believe that he was diligently handling her case. Thus, complainant was surprised when she received a notice from the Court of Appeals informing her that her appeal had been abandoned and her case dismissed. The dismissal had become final and executory. This is a clear violation of Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to keep their clients informed of the status of their case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients' request for information. The Code of Professional Responsibility pertinently provides: Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. Canon 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. x x x x Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Freddie A. Venida is SUSPENDED from the practice o law for one year effective immediately, with WARNING that a similar violation will be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report to this Court the date of his receipt of this Resolution to enable this Court to determine when his suspension shall take effect. Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of the Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED. CONCHITA BALTAZAR,ET AL. V. ATTY. JUAN B. BAÑEZ, JR ., A.C. NO. 9091, December 11, 2013 FACTS: Complainants engaged the legal services of Atty. Bañez, Jr. in connection with the recovery of their properties from Fevidal. Complainants signed a contract of legal services, where they would not pay acceptance and appearance fees to Atty. Bañez Jr., but that the docket fees would instead be shared by the parties. Under the contract, complainants would Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

pay him 50% of whatever would be recovered of the properties. Later, however, complainants terminated his services and entered into an amicable settlement with Fevidal. Atty. Bañez, Jr. opposed the withdrawal of their complaint in court. Thus, complainants filed a case against him alleging that the motion of Atty. Baez, Jr. for the recording of his attorney’s charging lien was the “legal problem” preventing them from enjoying the fruits of their property. ISSUE: Whether the contract of legal services entered into between the complainants and Atty. Bañez, Jr. is champertous. HELD: Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court allows an attorney to intervene in a case to protect his rights concerning the payment of his compensation. According to the discretion of the court, the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money rendered in a case in which his services have been retained by the client. In this case, however, the contract for legal services is in the nature of a champertous contract – an agreement whereby an attorney undertakes to pay the expenses of the proceedings to enforce the client’s rights in exchange for some bargain to have a part of the thing in dispute. Such contracts are contrary to public policy and are thus void or inexistent. They are also contrary to Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that lawyers shall not lend money to a client, except when in the interest of justice, they have to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter they are handling for the client. Thus, the Court held that Atty. Bañez, Jr. violated Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG VS. ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA A.C. NO. 5581 JAN. 14, 2014 FACTS: Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

In complaint of Banasig, she narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan, entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila. Bansig is the sister of Gracemarie R. Bunagan, legal wife of respondent. However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted another marriage on January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Registration Officer of San Juan, Manila. Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in full legal existence when he contracted his second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had never been annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority. Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which renders him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar. In a Resolution dated February 18, 2002, the Court resolved to require respondent to file a comment on the instant complaint. Respondent failed to appear before the mandatory conference and hearings set by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), despite several notices ISSUE: 1. Whether the respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court due to the act of committing bigamy. Violating the code of Professional Responsibility Rule 1.01, Canon 7, and Rule 7.03 His act of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. 2. The failure of respondent to answer the charges against him despite numerous notices. Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of the Court, which is under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. HELD: The certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being admissible in evidence, clearly indicate that respondent contracted the second marriage while the first marriage is subsisting. By itself, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of two marriages entered into by respondent. The certified xerox copies should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing the name of respondent are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar. And respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a Court’s Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively." Respondent’s obstinate refusal to comply with the Court’s orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof." In View of all foregoing , the judge finds respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera, guilty of grossly immoral conduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken of the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

EDGARDO AREOLA VS. ATTY. MARIA VILMA MENDOZA A.C. NO. 10135. JANUARY 15, 2014 FACTS: Edgardo D. Areola (Areola) filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), from the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) for violation of her attorney’s oath of office, deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, and for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He said that he’s filing the said complaint in behalf of his co-detainees Allan Seronda, Aaron Arca, Joselito Mirador, Spouses Danilo Perez and Elizabeth Perez. Areola claimed that when Atty. Mendoza visited the Antipolo City Jail and called all detainees with pending cases before the RTC, Atty. Mendoza stated the following in her speech: “O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang-areglo ay maging praktikal sana kayo kung gusto ninyong makalaya agad. Upang makatiyak kayo na hindi masasayang ang pera ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay o ng kamag-anak ninyo ang pera at ako na ang bahalang maglagay kay Judge Martin at Fiscal banqui; at kayong mga detenidong mga babae na no bail ang kaso sa drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon.” In her unverified Answer, Atty. Mendoza asseverated that the filing of the administrative complaint against her is a harassment tactic by Areola as the latter had also filed several administrative cases against judges in the courts including the jail warden where Areola was previously detained. Nonetheless, Atty. Mendoza admitted in her Answer that she advised her clients and their relatives to approach the judge and the fiscal “to beg and cry” so that their motions would be granted and their cases against them would be dismissed. To the Investigating Commissioner, this is highly unethical and improper as the act of Atty. Mendoza degrades the image of and lessens the confidence of the public in the judiciary. The Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Mendoza be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) months. ISSUE: 1. Atty. Mendoza is guilty of her attorney’s oath of office, deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court—No for lack of evidence 2. Atty. Mendoza is guilty of violating Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility—Yes. HELD: 1st Issue No. The Court finds that the instant Complaint against Atty. Mendoza profoundly lacks evidence to support the allegations contained therein. All Areola has are empty assertions against Atty. Mendoza that she demanded money from his co-detainees.The Court agrees with the IBP that Areola is not the proper party to file the Complaint against Atty. Mendoza. He is not even a client of Atty. Mendoza. He claims that he filed the Complaint on behalf of his co-detainees, but it is apparent that no document was submitted which would show that they authorized Areola to file a Complaint. Consequently, the Court rejects Areola’s statements, especially as regards Atty. Mendoza’s alleged demands of money. 2nd issue Yes. Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza GUILTY of giving improper advice to her clients in violation of Rule Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Mendoza admitted that she advised her clients to approach the judge and plead for compassion so that their motions would be granted. Atty. Mendoza made it appear that the judge is easily moved if a party resorts to dramatic antics such as begging and crying in order for their cases to be dismissed. It is the mandate of Rule 1.02 that “a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.” Rule 15.07 states that “a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness.” Atty. Mendoza’s improper advice only lessens the confidence of the public in our legal system. Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors according to the merits of a case. Atty. Mendoza’s careless remark is uncalled for. It must be remembered that a lawyer’s duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice. To that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his client’s cause, is condemnable and unethical. Penalty: penalty of REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely Basis of the Penalty: In several administrative cases, the Court has refrained from imposing the actual penalties in the presence of mitigating factors. Factors such as the respondent’s length of service, the respondent’s acknowledgement of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations, respondent’s advanced age, among other things, have had varying significance in the Court’s determination of the imposable penalty. The Court takes note of Atty. Mendoza’s lack of ill-motive in the present case and her being a PAO lawyer as her main source of livelihood. Furthermore, the complaint filed by Areola is clearly baseless and the only reason why this was ever given consideration was due to Atty. Mendoza’s own admission. For these reasons, the Court deems it just to modify and reduce the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors.


NATIVIDAD P. NAVARRO VS. ATTY. IVAN M. SOLIDUM JR., A.C. 9872, January 28, 2014

FACTS:

In April 2006, Hilda Presbitero engaged the services of Atty. Ivan Solidum, Jr. to help her in the quieting of her title over a parcel of land. Presbitero paid Solidum P50,000.00 as acceptance fee. In May 2006, Ma. Theresa Yulo, daughter of Presbitero also engaged the services of Solidum for the registration of a parcel of land. Yulo however asked the help of her sister, Natividad Navarro, to finance the case. Hence, Navarro gave Solidum Php200,000.00 for the registration expenses. Meanwhile, Solidum in May and June 2006, obtained a total of Php2 million from Navarro. The loan was covered by two Memorandum of Agreement (MOAs). The MOA was prepared by Solidum. The MOA stated that the monthly interest shall be 10%. Solidum also borrowed Php 1 million from Presbitero during the same period. He again drafted a MOA containing the same terms and conditions as with Navarro. As additional security for the loan, Solidum mortgaged his 263hectare land for P1 million in favor of Presbitero. Nothing happened in the quieting of title case field by Presbitero since Solidum did nothing after receiving the acceptance fee. In the land registration case of Yulo financed by Navarro, Navarro later found out that the land was already registered to someone else. Navarro Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

claims that she should not have financed the case if only Solidum advised her of the status of the land. Anent the loans, Solidum failed to pay them. Instead, he questioned the terms of the loans as he claimed that the interest rate of said loans at 10% is unconscionable. Navarro and Presbitero later filed an administrative case against Solidum.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ivan Solidum, Jr. should be disbarred.

HELD: Yes.

Although Solidum acted in his private capacity when he obtained a total of Php3 million from Navarro and Presbitero, he may still be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. In this case, such act displayed by Solidum merited his disbarment. Solidum is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional capacity with respect to his client, Presbitero, and in his private capacity with respect to Navarro. Both Presbitero and Navarro allowed Splidum to draft the terms of the loan agreements. Solidum drafted the MOAs knowing that the interest rates were exorbitant. Later, using his knowledge of the law, he assailed the validity of the same MOAs he prepared.

In the case of Navarro, who financed the Yulo case, Solidum also violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. This is notwithstanding the fact that Navarro is not actually his client in the Yulo case but was only the financier of the Yulo case.

In Presbitero’s case, since Presbitero is his client, Solidum also violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

that a lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Even though Solidum secured the loan with a mortgage and a MOA, Presbitero’s interest was not fully protected because the property Solidum mortgaged was overvalued. He claimed that his 263-hectare land was worth P1 million but in fact Solidum sold it later for only P150,000.00. Clearly, Presbitero was disadvantaged by Solidum’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation. He took advantage of his knowledge of the law as well as the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client. Solidum was disbarred by the Supreme Court.


CARLITO ANG V. ATTY. JAMES JOSEPH GUPANA, A.C. NO. 4545. FEBRUARY 5, 2014. FACTS: The case stemmed from an affidavit-complaint 3 filed by complainant Carlito Ang against respondent. Ang alleged that on May 31, 1991, he and the other heirs of the late Candelaria Magpayo, namely Purificacion Diamante and William Magpayo, executed an Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs and Partition4 involving Lot No. 2066-B-2-B which had an area of 6,258 square meters and was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (T-22409)6433. He was given his share of 2,003 square meters designated as Lot No. 2066-B-2-B-4, together with all the improvements thereon. 5 However, when he tried to secure a TCT in his name, he found out that said TCT No. (T22409)-6433 had already been cancelled and in lieu thereof, new TCTs 6 had been issued in the names of William Magpayo, Antonio Diamante, Patricia Diamante, Lolita D. Canque, Gregorio Diamante, Jr. and Fe D. Montero. Ang alleged that there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent had a direct participation in the commission of forgeries and falsifications because he was the one who prepared and notarized the Affidavit of Loss 7 and Deed of Absolute Sale8 that led to the transfer and issuance of the new TCTs. Ang pointed out that the Deed of Absolute Sale which was allegedly executed by Candelaria Magpayo on April 17, 1989, was antedated and Candelaria Magpayo’s signature was forged as clearly shown by the Certification 9 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu. Further, the certified true copy of page 37, Book No. XII, Series of 1989 of respondent’s Notarial Report indubitably showed that Doc. No. 181 did not refer to the Deed of Absolute Sale, but to an affidavit. As to the Affidavit of Loss, which was allegedly executed by the late Candelaria Magpayo on April 29, 1994, it could not have been executed by her as she Diedthree years prior to the execution of the said affidavit of loss. Ang further alleged that on September 22, 1995, respondent made himself the attorney-in-fact of William Magpayo, Antonio Diamante, Patricia Diamante, Lolita Canque, Gregorio Diamante, Jr. and Fe D. Montero, and pursuant to the Special Power of Attorney in his favor, executed a Deed of Sale selling Lot No. 2066-B-2-B-4 to Lim Kim So Mercantile Co. on October 10, 1995. Ang complained that the sale was made even though a civil case involving the said parcel of land was pending before the RTC of Mandaue City, Cebu. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

In his Comment, respondent denied any wrongdoing and argued that Ang is merely using the present administrative complaint as a tool to force the defendants in a pending civil case and their counsel, herein respondent, to accede to his wishes. Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, to whom the case was referred for investigation, report and recommendation, submitted her Report and Recommendation finding respondent administratively liable. She recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three months. She held that respondent committed an unethical act when he allowed himself to be an instrument in the disposal of the subject property through a deed of sale executed between him as attorney-in-fact of his client and Lim Kim So Mercantile Co. despite his knowledge that said property is the subject of a pending litigation before the RTC of Mandaue City, Cebu.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Gupana is disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public?

HELD: Under the law, the party acknowledging must appear before the notary public or any other person authorized to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents. In this case, the jurat of the Affidavit of Loss stated that Candelaria subscribed to the affidavit before Atty. Gupana on April 29, 1994, at Mandaue City. Candelaria, however, was already dead since March 26, 1991. Hence, it is clear that the jurat was made in violation of the notarial law. The notarization of a document is not an empty act or routine. A notary public’s function should not be trivialized and a notary public must discharge his powers and duties which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity. As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, Atty. Gupana is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy impressed with public interest. Thus, the Supreme Court held that Atty. Gupana’s revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years and suspension from the practice of law for one year are in order.


WILBERTO C. TALISIC V. ATTY. PRIMO R. RINEN, A.C. NO. 8761, FEBRUARY 12, 2014. FACTS: Wilberto claimed that his mother Aurora died on May 7, 1987, leaving behind as heirs her spouse, Celedonio Talisic, and their three children, namely: Arlene Talisic Villarazo, Wilberto and Alvin Corpuz Talisic. It was only after his father’s death on November 2, 2000 that Wilberto and his siblings knew of the transfer of the subject parcel via the subject deed. While Wilberto believed that his father’s signature on the deed was authentic, his and his siblings’ supposed signatures were merely forged. Wilberto also pointed out that even his name was erroneously indicated in the deed as "Wilfredo". For his defense, Atty. Rinen denied the charge against him and explained that it was only on April 7, 1994 that he came to know of the transaction Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

between the Spouses Durante and the Talisics, when they approached him in his office as the then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court, Real, Quezon, to have the subject deed prepared and notarized. His clerk of court prepared the deed and upon its completion, ushered the parties to his office for the administration of oath. 6 The deed contained his certification that at the time of the document’s execution, "no notary public was available to expedite the transaction of the parties." Notarial fees paid by the parties were also covered by a receipt issued by the Treasurer of the Municipality of Real, Quezon.7 After due proceedings, Investigating Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III (Commissioner Abelita) issued the Report and Recommendation 8 dated November 20, 2012 for the cancellation of Atty. Rinen’s notarial commission and his suspension from notarial practice for a period of one year. 9 The report indicated that per Atty. Rinen’s admission, the subject deed was prepared in his office and acknowledged before him. Although there was no evidence of forgery on his part, he was negligent in not requiring from the parties to the deed their presentation of documents as proof of identity. Atty. Rinen’s failure to properly satisfy his duties as a notary public was also shown by the inconsistencies in the dates that appear on the deed, to wit: "1994 as to the execution; 1995 when notarized; [and] entered as Series of 1992 in the notarial book x x x." ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Rinen be disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public?

HELD: The Court said yes. In Bautista v. Atty. Bernabe, the Court held that “[a] notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The presence of the parties to the deed will enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant.” Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. It converts a private document into a public one, making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of public instruments would be undermined.


In this case, Atty. Rinen did not deny his failure to personally verify the identity of all parties who purportedly signed the subject document and whom, as he claimed, appeared before him on April 7, 1994. Such failure was further shown by the fact that the pertinent details of the community tax certificates of Wilberto and his sister, as proof of their identity, remained unspecified in the deed’s acknowledgment portion. Clearly, there was a failure on the part of Atty. Rinen to exercise the due diligence that was required of him as a notary public ex–officio. Thus, Atty. Rinen’s notarial commission as revoked and he were disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for one year.


NESTOR FIGUERAS AND BIENVENIDO VICTORIA, JR. V. ATTY. DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ,A.C. NO. 9116, MARCH 12, 2014. FACTS: Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. is the entity in charge of the affairs of the homeowners of Congressional Village in Quezon City. On January 7, 1993, the Spouses Federico and Victoria Santander filed a civil suit for damages against the Association and Ely Mabanag 8 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104 for building a concrete wall which abutted their property and denied them of their right of way. The spouses Santander likewise alleged that said concrete wall was built in violation of Quezon City Ordinance No. 8633, S-71 which prohibits the closing, obstructing, preventing or otherwise refusing to the public or vehicular traffic the use of or free access to any subdivision or community street.9 The Law Firm of Gonzalez Sinense Jimenez and Associates was the legal counsel for the Association, with respondent as the counsel of record and handling lawyer. After trial and hearing, the RTC rendered a decision 10 on October 4, 1996 in favor of the Spouses Santander. The Association, represented by said law firm, appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). On February 5, 1999, the CA issued a Resolution 11 in CA-G.R. CV No. 55577 dismissing the appeal on the ground that the original period to file the appellant’s brief had expired 95 days even before the first motion for extension of time to file said brief was filed. The CA also stated that the grounds adduced for the said motion as well as the six subsequent motions for extension of time to file brief were not meritorious. The CA resolution became final. Eight years later or on April 11, 2007, complainants Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido Victoria, Jr., as members of the Association, filed a Complaint 12 for Disbarment against respondent before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03, Canon 12; Canon 17; and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 thereof for his negligence in handling the appeal and willful violation of his duties as an officer of the court. In his Verified Answer with Counter Complaint, 13 respondent denied administrative liability. He claimed that although his law firm represented the homeowner’s association in CA-G.R. CV No. 55577, the case was actually handled by an associate lawyer in his law office. As the partner in charge of the case, he exercised general supervision over the handling counsel and signed the pleadings prepared by said handling lawyer. Upon discovery of the omissions of the handling lawyer, appropriate sanctions were imposed on the handling lawyer and he thereafter personally took responsibility and Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

spent personal funds to negotiate a settlement with Federico Santander at no cost to the Association. No damage whatsoever was caused to the Association. Respondent likewise alleged that after he defeated complainant Figueras in the election for President of the homeowner’s association in 1996, Figueras and his compadre, complainant Victoria, stopped paying their association dues and other assessments. Complainants and other delinquent members of the association were sanctioned by the Board of Directors and were sued by the association before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). In retaliation, complainants filed the present disbarment case against him and several other cases against him and other officers of the association before the HLURB to question, among others, the legitimacy of the Association, the election of its officers, and the sanctions imposed by the Association. Thus, he concluded that the disbarment case was filed to harass him. Respondent added that complainants have no personality to file the disbarment complaint as they were not his clients; hence, there was likewise no jurisdiction over the complaint on the part of the IBP-CBD.

ISSUE: .Whether or not the procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must initiate the suit does applies in disbarment cases. HELD: The Supreme Court held that the complainants have personality to file the disbarment case. In Heck v. Judge Santos, the Court held that “[a]ny interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings.” The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges. Further, the Supreme Court held that a lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latter’s interest with utmost diligence. In failing to file the appellant’s brief on behalf of his client, Atty. Jimenez had fallen far short of his duties as counsel as set forth in Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which exhorts every member of the Bar not to unduly delay a case and to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. However, the Supreme Court only suspended Atty. Jimenez from the practice of law for one.


RE: MELCHOR TIONGSON, HEAD WATCHER, DURING THE 2011 BAR EXAMINATIONS, B.M. NO. 2482, APRIL 1, 2014. FACTS: The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) designated Tiongson, an employee of the Court of Appeals (CA), to serve as head watcher for the 2011 Bar Examinations on 6, 13, 20 and 27 November 2011. Tiongson, together with the designated watchers, namely, Eleonor V. Padilla (Padilla), Christian Jay S. Puruganan (Puruganan) and Aleli M. Padre (Padre), were assigned to Room No. 314 of St. Martin De Porres Building in UST. On 13 November 2011 or during the second Sunday of the bar examinations, Tiongson brought his digital camera inside Room No. 314. Padilla, Puruganan and Padre alleged that after the morning examination in Civil Law, while they were counting the pages of the questionnaire, Tiongson took pictures of the Civil Law questionnaire using his digital camera. Tiongson allegedly repeated the same act and took pictures of the Mercantile Law questionnaire after the afternoon examination. On the same day, Padilla reported Tiongson’s actions to Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa, who immediately investigated the report. Padilla, Puruganan and Padre subsequently executed separate affidavits confirming Tiongson’s actions. Upon demand by the OBC to explain, Tiongson admitted that he brought his digital camera inside the bar examination room. He explained that he did not surrender his new digital camera to the badge counter personnel because the counter personnel might be negligent in handling his camera. In a Memorandum dated 16 November 2011 addressed to the CA Clerk of Court Atty. Teresita R. Marigomen, the OBC revoked and cancelled Tiongson’s Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

designation as head watcher for the remaining Sundays of the bar examinations. In a Resolution dated 10 April 2012, the Court, upon recommendation of the Committee on Continuing Legal Education and Bar Matters, required Tiongson to file his comment. In his Comment dated 25 May 2012, Tiongson restated his admission that he brought his digital camera inside the bar examination room. Tiongson reiterated his explanation for bringing his camera and apologized for his infraction.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tiongson is liable for misconduct? HELD: The Court held that in administrative proceedings, substantial evidence is the quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt, and this requirement is satisfied if there is reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct. Misconduct means transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by an employee. Any transgression or deviation from the established norm of conduct, work related or not, amounts to a misconduct. In this case, there was substantial evidence to prove that Tiongson committed a misconduct. Tiongson was held liable for simple misconduct only, because the elements of grave misconduct were not proven with substantial evidence, and Tiongson admitted his infraction before the Office of the Bar Confidant. As a CA employee, Tiongson disregarded his duty to uphold the strict standards required of every court employee, that is, to be an example of integrity, uprightness and obedience to the judiciary. A.C. No. 3405, March 18, 2014 JULIETA B. NARAG vs. ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG FACTS: On November 13, 1989, Julieta B. Narag (Julieta) filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against her husband, herein respondent, whom she accused of having violated Rule 1.011 in relation to Canons 12 and 63 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. She claimed that the respondent, who was then a college instructor in St. Louis College of Tuguegarao and a member of theSangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan, maintained an amorous relationship with a certain Gina Espita (Gina) – a 17–year old first year college student. Julieta further claimed that the respondent had already abandoned her and their children to live with Gina. The respondent denied the charge against him, claiming that the allegations set forth by Julieta were mere fabrications; that Julieta was just extremely jealous, which made her concoct stories against him. On June 29, 1998, the Court rendered a Decision, which directed the disbarment of the respondent. The Court opined that the respondent committed an act of gross immorality when he abandoned his family in order to live with Gina. The Court pointed out that the respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the legal profession. A Motion for the Re–opening of the Administrative Investigation, or in the Alternative, Reconsideration of the Decision was filed by the respondent on August 25, 1998. He averred that he was denied due process of law during the administrative investigation as he Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

was allegedly unjustly disallowed to testify in his behalf and adduce additional vital documentary evidence. Finding no substantial arguments to warrant the reversal of the questioned decision, the Court denied the motion with finality in the Resolution dated September 22, 1998. On November 29, 2013, the respondent filed the instant petition for reinstatement to the Bar. The respondent alleged that he has expressed extreme repentance and remorse to his wife and their children for his misgivings. He claimed that his wife Julieta and their children had already forgiven him on June 10, 2010 at their residence in Tuguegarao City. The respondent presented an undated affidavit prepared by his son, Dominador, Jr., purportedly attesting to the truth of the respondent’s claim. The respondent averred that he has been disbarred for 15 years already and that he has been punished enough. He alleged that he is already 80 years old, weak and wracked with debilitating osteo–arthritic pains. That he has very limited mobility due to his arthritis and his right knee injury. He further claimed that he enlisted in the Philippine Air Force Reserve Command where he now holds the rank of Lieutenant Colonel; that as member of the Reserve Command, he enlisted in various rescue, relief and recovery missions. The respondent likewise submitted the various recommendations, testimonials and affidavits in support of his petition for readmission. ISSUE: “Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court. The action will depend on whether or not the Court decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will continue to be preserved even with the applicant’s reentry as a counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character, a fit and proper person to practice law. The Court will take into consideration the applicant’s character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.” The extreme penalty of disbarment was meted on the respondent on account of his having committed a grossly immoral conduct, i.e., abandoning his wife and children to live with his much younger paramour. Indeed, nothing could be more reprehensible than betraying one’s own family in order to satisfy an irrational and insatiable desire to be with another woman. The respondent’s act was plainly selfish and clearly evinces his inappropriateness to be part of the noble legal profession. More than 15 years after being disbarred, the respondent now professes that he had already repented and expressed remorse over the perfidy that he had brought upon his wife and their children. That such repentance and remorse, the respondent asserts, together with the long years that he had endured his penalty, is now sufficient to enable him to be readmitted to the practice of law. RULING: The Court, in deciding whether the respondent should indeed be readmitted to the practice of law, must be convinced that he had indeed been reformed; that he had already rid himself of any grossly immoral act which would make him inept for the practice of law. However, it appears that the respondent, while still legally married to Julieta, is still living with his paramour – the woman for whose sake he abandoned his family. This only proves to show that the respondent has not yet learned from his prior misgivings. That he was supposedly forgiven by his wife and their children would likewise not be sufficient ground to grant respondent’s plea. It is noted that only his son, Dominador, Jr., signed the affidavit which was supposed to evidence the Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

forgiveness bestowed upon the respondent. Thus, with regard to Julieta and the six other children of the respondent, the claim that they had likewise forgiven the respondent is hearsay. In any case, that the family of the respondent had forgiven him does not discount the fact that he is still committing a grossly immoral conduct; he is still living with a woman other than his wife. Likewise, that the respondent executed a holographic will wherein he bequeaths all his properties to his wife and their children is quite immaterial and would not be demonstrative that he had indeed changed his ways. Verily, nothing would stop the respondent from later on executing another last will and testament of a different tenor once he had been readmitted to the legal profession. In fine, the Court is not convinced that the respondent had shown remorse over his transgressions and that he had already changed his ways as would merit his reinstatement to the legal profession. Time and again the Court has stressed that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is enjoyed only by those who continue to display unassailable character. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition for Reinstatement to the Bar filed by Dominador M. Narag is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED.


QUIACHON V. ATTY. RAMOS, A.C. NO. 9317, June 4, 2014 FACTS: A disbarment case was filed by Quiachon against her lawyer Atty. Ramos who represented her in a labor case before NLRC and a special proceeding case before the RTC. Complainant charges respondent with gross negligence and deceit in violation of Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. IBP conducted an investigation on the disbursement case filed by the complainant against her lawyer and the report found out that the respondent had been remiss in failing to update complainant in what had happened to the cases being handled by respondent in behalf of complainant. There was a failure to inform complainant (the client) of the status of the cases that thereafter prevented the client from exercising her options. There was neglect in that regard. However inspite of finding neglect on respondent’s part, the complainant during the pendency of the proceedings, withdrew the disbarment case. ISSUE: Whether the withdrawal of the disbarment case will terminate or abate the jurisdiction of the IBP and of this Court to continue an administrative proceeding against a lawyer-respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar. HELD: No. The withdrawal of a disbarment case against a lawyer does not terminate or abate the jurisdiction of the IBP and of this Court to continue an administrative proceeding against a lawyer-respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar. The complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to the case, but a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court. In this case, Atty. Ramos violated Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, the appropriate penalty should be imposed despite the desistance of complainant or the withdrawal of the charges.


ATTY. ALAN F. PAGUIA V. ATTY. MANUEL T. MOLINA , A.C. NO. 9881, JUNE 4, 2014.

FACTS: The case involves a conflict between neighbors in a four-unit compound named "Times Square" at Times Street, Quezon City. The neighbors are the following: 1) Mr. And Mrs. Gregorio M. Abreu, clients of Atty. Paguia; 2) Mr. And Mrs. Wilson Lim, clients of respondent Molina; 3) Dr. and Mrs. Eduardo Yap; and Dr. Belinda San Juan.


The clients of Atty. Molina entered into a contract with the other unit owners save for Mr. Abreu. The agreement, covered by a document titled "Times Square Preamble," establishes a set of internal rules for the neighbors on matters such as the use of the common right of way to the exit gate, assignment of parking areas, and security. Mr. Abreu, the client of complainant, Atty. Paguia, was not a party to the contract since the former did not agree with the terms concerning the parking arrangements. On 4 February 2010, Atty. Paguia filed a Complaint for Dishonesty with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline against Atty. Molina for allegedly giving legal advice to the latter’s clients to the effect that the Times Square Preamble was binding on Mr. Abreu, who was never a party to the contract.

In his Answer, Atty. Molina downplayed the case as a petty quarrel among neighbors. He maintained that the Times Square Preamble was entered into for purposes of maintaining order in the residential compound. All homeowners, except Mr. Abreu, signed the document.

Respondent further stated in his Answer that Mr. and Mrs. Gregorio Abreu filed two cases against his clients, Mr. And Mrs. William Lim, on the belief that Mr. Abreu was not bound by the Times Square Preamble. The first case, was filed with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), which was an action to declare the Times Square Preamble invalid. The second suit was an action for declaratory relief. Both cases, according to respondent, were dismissed. Respondent further claimed that another case had been filed in court, this time by his client, the Lims. They were prompted to file a suit since Mr. Abreu had allegedly taken matters into his own hands by placing two vehicles directly in front of the gate of the Lims, thus blocking the latter’s egress to Times Street. The Lims filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, a Complaint for Injunction and Damages, coupled with a prayer for the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-08-63579. According to respondent, the RTC granted the relief prayed for in an Order dated 12 December 2008

ISSUE: Whether or not an administrative complaint for dishonesty against Atty. Molina will prosper?


HELD: The Supreme Court in dismissing the complaint held that when it comes to administrative cases against lawyers, two things are to be considered: quantum of proof, which requires clearly preponderant evidence; and burden of proof, which is on the complainant. Here, the complaint was without factual basis. The allegation of giving legal advice was not substantiated in this case, either in the complaint or in the corresponding hearings. Bare allegations are not proof. Even if Atty. Molina did provide his clients legal advice, he still cannot be held administratively liable without any showing that his act was attended with bad faith or malice. The default rule is presumption of good faith.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR V. SARAH P. AMPONG, ETC., A.M. NO. P-13-3132, JUNE 4, 2014.

FACTS: Sometime in August 1994, the CSC instituted an administrative case against Ampong for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for having impersonated or taken the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers on behalf of one Evelyn B. Junio-Decir (Decir). On March 21, 1996, after Ampong herself admitted to having committed the charges against her, the CSC rendered a resolution dismissing her from service, imposing all accessory penalties attendant to such dismissal, and revoking her Professional Board Examination for Teachers (PBET) rating. Ampong moved for reconsideration on the ground that when the said administrative case was filed, she was already appointed to the judiciary; as such, she posited that the CSC no longer had any jurisdiction over her. Ampong’s motion was later denied, thus, prompting her to file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals (CA). On November 30, 2004, the CA denied Ampong’s petition and affirmed her dismissal from service on the ground that she never raised the issue of jurisdiction until after the CSC ruled against her and, thus, she is estopped from assailing the same.5 Similarly, on August 26, 2008, the Court En Banc denied her petition for review on certiorari and, thus, affirmed her dismissal from service in G.R. No. 167916, entitled "Sarah P. Ampong v. Civil Service Commission, CSC-Regional Office No. 11"6 (August 26, 2008 Decision). Notwithstanding said Decision, the Financial Management Office (FMO) of the OCA, which did not receive any official directive regarding Ampong’s Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

dismissal, continued to release her salaries and allowances. However, in view of Judge Infante’s letter notifying the OCA of such situation, the FMO issued a Memorandum7 dated September 7, 2011 informing the OCA that starting June 2011, it had started to withhold Ampong’s salaries and allowances.8 In her Comment dated September 25, 2012, Ampong prayed that the Court revisit its ruling in G.R. No. 167916 despite its finality because it might lead to unwarranted complications in its enforcement. Moreover, Ampong reiterated her argument that the CSC did not have any jurisdiction over the case against her ISSUE: Whether or not Ampong be held liable for dishonesty?

HELD: The Supreme Court has already held in its August 26, 2008 Decision that Ampong was administratively liable for dishonesty in impersonating and taking the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers on behalf of one Decir. Under section 58(a) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS), the penalty of dismissal carries with it the following administrative disabilities: (a) cancellation of civil service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of retirement benefits; and (c) perpetual disqualification from re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled corporation or government financial institution. Ampong should be made to similarly suffer the same. Every employee of the Judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness, and honesty. Court personnel are enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice. Here, Ampong failed to meet these stringent standards set for a judicial employee and does not, therefore, deserve to remain with the Judiciary

ADELIA V. QUIACHON vs. ATTY. JOSEPH ADORA. RAMOS, A.C. NO. 9317, JUNE 4, 2014 (FORMERLY CBD CASE NO. 12-3615) FACTS: This is a disbarment case filed by Adelia V. Quiachon (complainant), against her lawyer, Atty. Joseph Ador A. Ramos (respondent). The latter represented complainant, who was then the plaintiff in a labor case filed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and in a special proceeding Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

case filed before the Regional Trial Court (R TC). Complainant charges respondent with gross negligence and deceit in violation of Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Labor Arbiter (LA) granted complainant a favorable decision on 26 November 2007. Upon appeal, it was reversed and set aside by the NLRC in its Decision dated 25 July 2008. 3 On 24 October 2008, the NLRC also denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent on complainant's behalf. A Petition for Certiorari was filed before the Court of Appeals (CA), but it affirmed the NLRC's reversal of the LA's Decision. The Notice of the CA Decision was received by respondent on 23 November 2010. After the Petition was filed before the CA, complainant would always ask respondent about the status of her case. The latter always told her that there was no decision yet. Sometime in August 2011, while complainant was in respondent’s office waiting for him to arrive, she noticed a mailman delivering an envelope with the title of her labor case printed thereon. Complainant asked the secretary of respondent to open the envelope and was surprised to discover that it contained the Entry of Judgment of the CA’s Decision. Thereafter, complainant tried repeatedly to contact respondent, but to no avail. When she finally got to talk to him, respondent assured her that "it was alright" as they still had six months to appeal the case to the Supreme Court. After that final meeting, no updates on the labor case were ever communicated to complainant. With respect to the special proceeding case, the RTC of Roxas City dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed, but it was also denied. Once again, respondent did nothing to reverse the RTC Decision. Consequently, the Entry of Judgment was received on 28 October 2008. On 28 November 2011, complainant Complaint5 against respondent.

filed

the

instant

disbarment

In his Comment, respondent averred that complainant was informed of the status of the case. He claimed that he had told complainant that he "cannot cite any error of law or abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals’ decision that necessitates a Petition for Review with the Supreme Court;" thus, he supposedly advised her to "respect the decision of the Court of Appeals." Respondent prayed that a Decision be rendered dismissing the instant disbarment Complaint for lack of merit. During the pendency of the proceedings, complainant withdrew the disbarment case ISSUE: Whether or not the withdrawal of a disbarment case against a lawyer will terminate or abate the jurisdiction of the IBP and of this Court to continue an administrative proceeding against a lawyer-respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar? Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

HELD: The court said no. The Supreme Court held that the withdrawal of a disbarment case against a lawyer does not terminate or abate the jurisdiction of the IBP and of this Court to continue an administrative proceeding against a lawyer-respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar. The complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to the case, but a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court. In this case, Atty. Ramos violated Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, the appropriate penalty should be imposed despite the desistance of complainant or the withdrawal of the charges.


ERLINDA FOSTER VS. JAIME AGTANG, A.C. NO. 10579, December 10, 2014 Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

FACTS: In 2009, Erlinda Foster engaged the services of Atty. Jaime Agtang in a realty dispute in Ilocos Norte. Agtang’s acceptance fee was P20,000.00 plus P5,000.00 for incidental expenses. For the case, Agtang collected P150,000.00 from Foster as filing fee. He also advised Foster to shell out a total of P50,000.00 for them to bribe the judge and get a favorable decision. Although reluctant, Foster gave in to Agtang’s demands. various occasions, Agtang borrowed money from Foster for his personal use, i.e., car repair. Such loan amounted to P122,000.00. Foster, being prudent, asked for receipts for all funds she handed over to Agtang. Later however, Foster learned that she lost the case due to Agtang’s negligence and incompetence in drafting the complaint. She also found out that the filing fee therefor was only P22,410 (not P150k). Further, it turned out that Agtang was once the lawyer of the opposing party. When she asked Agtang to return her the balance, the said lawyer failed to do so hence, she filed an administrative complaint against Agtang. IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) eventually ordered Agtang to return the balance of the filing fee (P127,590.00) as well as the money he borrowed from Foster (P122,000.00). It was also recommended that Agtang be suspended for three months only.

ISSUE: Whether or not the recommendation by the IBP-BOG is proper.

HELD: No. The recommended penalty of 3 months suspension is too light. Agtang was disbarred by the Supreme Court. Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, provides that “a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” In this case, Agtang is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled Foster into believing that the filing fees for her case were worth more Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such as the high value of the land involved and the extra expenses to be incurred by court employees. In other words, he resorted to overpricing, an act customarily related to depravity and dishonesty. When asked to return the balance, he failed and refused to do so and even had the temerity that it was all the client’s idea. . A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. It is clear that Agtang failed to fulfill this duty. He received various amounts from Foster but he could not account for all of them. Worse, he could not deny the authenticity of the receipts presented by Foster. Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “a lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.” In the first place, Agtang should have never borrowed from Foster, his client. Second, his refusal to pay reflects his baseness. Deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. The acts of the Agtang constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney. His incompetence and appalling indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and society render him unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in him as a member of the Bar. SIDE ISSUE: May the Court order Agtang to return the money he borrowed from Foster? No. The Court held that it cannot order the lawyer to return money to complainant if he or she acted in a private capacity because its findings in administrative cases have no bearing on liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer’s professional engagement. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The only concern of the Court is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Its findings Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

have no material bearing on other judicial actions which the parties may choose against each other. To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since administrative cases are filed directly with the Court.

Attorney; Disbarment cases; Initiation. Complainants who are members of the Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. filed a Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Jimenez for violating Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his negligence in handling an appeal in a case involving the Association and willful violation of his duties as an officer of the court. The Supreme Court held that the complainants have personality to file the disbarment case. In Heck v. Judge Santos, the Court held that “[a]ny interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings.” The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges. Further, the Supreme Court held that a lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

latter’s interest with utmost diligence. In failing to file the appellant’s brief on behalf of his client, Atty. Jimenez had fallen far short of his duties as counsel as set forth in Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which exhorts every member of the Bar not to unduly delay a case and to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. However, the Supreme Court only suspended Atty. Jimenez from the practice of law for one month. Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido Victoria, Jr. v. Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez, A.C. No. 9116, March 12, 2014. Attorney; Fidelity to Client. Atty. Guaren was charged with violating the Canon of Professional Responsibility when he accepted the titling of complainants’ lot and despite the acceptance of P7,000, failed to perform his obligation and allowing 5 years to elapse without any progress in the titling of complainants’ lot. The Supreme Court reiterated that the practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. In this case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of P7,000 as partial payment of his acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform his obligation to file the case for the titling of complainants’ lot despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren breached his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him. Thus, Atty. Guaren violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and was suspended from the practice of law for six months.Stephan Brunet and Virginia Romanillo Brunet v. Atty. Ronald L. Guaren,A.C. No. 10164, March 10, 2014. Attorney; Neglect of Duty. Atty. Agleron was charged with violating Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him. The Supreme Court held that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to serve his client with competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. In this case, Atty. Agleron admitted his failure to file the complaint despite the fact that it was already prepared and signed. He attributed his non-filing of the appropriate charges on the failure of complainant to remit the full payment of the filing fee and pay the 30% of the attorney’s fee. Such justification, however, is not a valid excuse that would exonerate him from liability. As stated, every case that is entrusted to a lawyer deserves his full attention whether he accepts this for a fee or free. Even assuming that complainant had not remitted the full payment of the filing fee, he should Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

have found a way to speak to his client and inform him about the insufficiency of the filing fee so he could file the complaint. Atty. Agleron obviously lacked professionalism in dealing with complainant and showed incompetence when he failed to file the appropriate charges. A lawyer should never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence renders him liable for disciplinary action such as suspension ranging from three months to two years. In this case, Atty. Agleron was suspended from the practice of law three months. Ermelinda Lad Vda. De Dominguez, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, Vicente A. Pichon v. Atty. Arnulfo M. Agleron Sr.,A.C. No. 5359, March 10, 2014. Attorney; Notarization; Personal Appearance. A petition for disbarment was filed against Atty. Cabucana, Jr. for falsification of public document. The requirement of personal appearance of the affiant is required under the Notarial Law and Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004. The Supreme Court held that as a notary public, Atty. Cabucana, Jr. should not notarize a document unless the person who signs it is the same person executing it and personally appearing before him to attest to the truth of its contents. This is to enable him to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party’s free and voluntary act and deed. Thus, Atty. Cabucana, Jr. was found violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and suspended from the practice of law for three months. His notarial commission was revoked and he was prohibited from being commissioned as a notary public for two years. Licerio Dizon v. Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr.,A.C. No. 10185, March 12, 2014. Judge; Violation of Administrative Rules; Unprofessional Conduct. Judge Larida, Jr. was charged for committing various anomalies and irregularities. The Supreme Court held that Judge Larida, Jr. committed several lapses, specifically the non-submission to the Court of the required inventory of locally-funded employees, and his allowing Marticio to draft court orders. Such lapses manifested a wrong attitude towards administrative rules and regulations issued for the governance and administration of the lower courts, to the extent of disregarding them, as well as a laxity in the control of his Branch and in the supervision of its functioning staff. The omission to submit the inventory should not be blamed on Atty. Calma as the Branch Clerk of Court. Although it was very likely that Judge Larida, Jr. had tasked Atty. Calma to do and submit the inventory in his behalf, Judge Larida, Jr. as the Presiding Judge himself remained to be the officer directly burdened with the responsibility for doing so. Further, for knowingly allowing detailed employees to solicit commissions from bonding companies, Judge Larida, Jr. contravened the Code of Judicial Conduct, which imposed on him the duty to take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which he would have become aware. Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Edwin C. Larida, Jr., RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City,A.M. No. RTJ-08-2151, March 11, 2014.


Judge; Gross Ignorance of the Law. An administrative complaint was filed against Judge Bitas for fixing the accused’s bail and reducing the same motu proprio. In this case, Miralles was charged with Qualified Trafficking, which under Section 10 (C) of R.A. No. 9208 is punishable by life imprisonment and a fine of not less than P2,000,000 but not more than P5,000,000. Thus, by reason of the penalty prescribed by law, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion which can be exercised only by Judge Bitas after the evidence is submitted in a hearing. The hearing of the application for bail in capital offenses is absolutely indispensable before a judge can properly determine whether the prosecution’s evidence is weak or strong. The Supreme Court held that not only did Judge Bitas deviate from the requirement of a hearing where there is an application for bail, he also granted bail to Miralles without neither conducting a hearing nor a motion for application for bail. Judge Bitas’ acts are not mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment on his part, but a patent disregard of well-known rules. When an error is so gross and patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law. Ma. Liza M. Jorda, City Prosecutor’s Office, Tacloban City v. Judge Crisologo S. Bitas, RTC, Branch 7, Tacloban City; Prosecutor Leo C. Tabao v. Judge Crisologo S. Bitas, RTC, Branch 7, Tacloban City,A.M. No. RTJ-14-2376/A.M. No. RTJ-14-2377. March 5, 2014. Court personnel; simple misconduct. An administrative case was filed against Melchor Tiongson, a Court of Appeals (CA) employee who was assigned to be the head watcher during the 2011 bar examinations. The complaint alleged that she brought a digital camera inside the bar examination rooms, in violation of the Instructions to Head Watchers. The Court held that in administrative proceedings, substantial evidence is the quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt, and this requirement is satisfied if there is reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct. Misconduct means transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by an employee. Any transgression or deviation from the established norm of conduct, work related or not, amounts to a misconduct. In this case, there was substantial evidence to prove that Tiongson committed a misconduct. Tiongson was held liable for simple misconduct only, because the elements of grave misconduct were not proven with substantial evidence, and Tiongson admitted his infraction before the Office of the Bar Confidant. As a CA employee, Tiongson disregarded his duty to uphold the strict standards required of every court employee, that is, to be an example of integrity, uprightness and obedience to the judiciary. Re: Melchor Tiongson, Head Watcher, During the 2011 Bar Examinations, B.M. No. 2482, April 1, 2014. Judges; bias and partiality must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. The Court held that the truth about Judge Austria’s alleged partiality cannot be determined by simply relying on the verified complaint. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, in light especially of a judge’s sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without respect Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

to the person, and to give equal right to the poor and rich. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge; mere suspicion of partiality is not enough. In this case, aside from being speculative and judicial in character, the circumstances cited by the complainant were grounded on mere opinion and surmises. The complainant also failed to adduce proof indicating the judge’s predisposition to decide the case in favor of one party. Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2, Batangas City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014. Judges; decision-making; 90-day requirement. An administrative case was filed against Judge Bustamante when it was found out upon judicial audit that he had a number of cases pending for decision, some of which the reglementary period have already lapsed. The Court held that decisionmaking, among other duties, is the primordial and most important duty of a member of the bench. The speedy disposition of cases in the courts is a primary aim of the judiciary so the ends of justice may not be compromised and the judiciary will be true to its commitment to provide litigants their constitutional right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of their cases. The Constitution, Code of Judicial Conduct, and jurisprudence consistently mandate that a judge must decide cases within 90 days from submission. A member of the bench cannot pay mere lip service to the 90-day requirement; he/she should instead persevere in its implementation. Heavy caseload and demanding workload are not valid reasons to fall behind the mandatory period for disposition of cases. Having failed to decide a case within the required period, without any order of extension granted by the Court, Judge Bustamante was held liable for undue delay that merits administrative sanction. Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Borromeo R. Bustamante, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Alaminos City, Pangasinan, A.M. No. MTJ-121806, April 7, 2014. Judges; impropriety. An administrative complaint was filed against Judge Austria for impropriety for posting her details as judge in Friendster and posting a picture with an indecent attire for the public’s consumption. The Court held that she was guilty of impropriety. While judges are not prohibited from becoming members of and from taking part in social networking activities, they do not shed off their status as judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities and duties that every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday activities. Judge Austria was guilty of impropriety when she posted her pictures in a manner viewable by the public. Joining Friendster per se does not violate the New Code of Judicial Conduct. However, Judge Austria disregarded the propriety and appearance of propriety required of her when she posted Friendster photos of herself wearing an “off-shouldered” suggestive dress and made this available for public viewing. Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2, Batangas City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014. Judges; irregular or erroneous order or decision; appropriate remedy. The Court held that in administrative cases, the complainant bears the onus of proving the averments of his complaint by substantial evidence. In this case, Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

the allegations of grave abuse of authority, irregularity in the performance of duty, grave bias and partiality, and lack of circumspection are devoid of merit because the complainant failed to establish Judge Austria’s bad faith, malice or ill will. The complainant merely pointed to circumstances based on mere conjectures and suppositions. These, by themselves, however, are not sufficient to prove the accusations. Even granting that the judge erred in the exercise of her judicial functions, these are legal errors correctible not by a disciplinary action, but by judicial remedies that are readily available to the complainant. An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration or an appeal. Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2, Batangas City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014. Attorney; Disbarment; Effect of withdrawal. A disbarment case was filed by Quiachon against her lawyer Atty. Ramos who represented her in a labor case before NLRC and a special proceeding case before the RTC. During the pendency of the proceedings, complainant withdrew the disbarment case. The Supreme Court held that the withdrawal of a disbarment case against a lawyer does not terminate or abate the jurisdiction of the IBP and of this Court to continue an administrative proceeding against a lawyer-respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar. The complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to the case, but a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court. In this case, Atty. Ramos violated Canon Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, the appropriate penalty should be imposed despite the desistance of complainant or the withdrawal of the charges. Adelia V. Quiachon v. Atty. Joseph Ador A. Ramos, A.C. No. 9317, June 4, 2014. Attorney; Quantum of proof in administrative cases. An administrative complaint for dishonesty was filed against Atty. Molina for having advised his clients to enforce a contract on complainant’s client who was never a party to the agreement. The Supreme Court in dismissing the complaint held that when it comes to administrative cases against lawyers, two things are to be considered: quantum of proof, which requires clearly preponderant evidence; and burden of proof, which is on the complainant. Here, the complaint was without factual basis. The allegation of giving legal advice was not substantiated in this case, either in the complaint or in the corresponding hearings. Bare allegations are not proof. Even if Atty. Molina did provide his clients legal advice, he still cannot be held administratively liable without any showing that his act was attended with bad faith or malice. The default rule is presumption of good faith. Atty. Alan F. Paguia v. Atty. Manuel T. Molina, A.C. No. 9881, June 4, 2014. Court personnel; Dishonesty. Ampong was dismissed from the Civil Service Commission for dishonesty, however, remained employed in the RTC. The Supreme Court has already held in its August 26, 2008 Decision that Ampong was administratively liable for dishonesty in impersonating and taking the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers on behalf of Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

one Decir. Under section 58(a) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS), the penalty of dismissal carries with it the following administrative disabilities: (a) cancellation of civil service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of retirement benefits; and (c) perpetual disqualification from re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled corporation or government financial institution. Ampong should be made to similarly suffer the same. Every employee of the Judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness, and honesty. Court personnel are enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice. Here, Ampong failed to meet these stringent standards set for a judicial employee and does not, therefore, deserve to remain with the Judiciary. Office of the Court Administrator v. Sarah P. Ampong, etc., A.M. No. P-133132, June 4, 2014. Court personnel; Simple neglect of duty. Sheriff Macusi was charged with misfeasance, nonfeasance or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for failing to act on a writ of execution. The Supreme Court held that the 30-day period imposed for the execution of the writ after the judgment has been received by the sheriff, as well as the periodic report every 30 days, is mandatory. Contrary to such rule, Sheriff Macusi submitted only one return of writ of execution in his Partial Report and did not file any other report to the court. Sheriffs play an important part in the administration of justice because they are tasked to execute the final judgment of courts. Thus, Sheriff Macusi was held to be remiss in his duties and thus liable for simple neglect of duty which is the failure to give attention to a task, or the disregard of a duty due to carelessness or indifference. Alberto Valdez v. Desiderio W. Macusi, Jr., Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 25, Tabuk, Kalinga, A.M. No. P-13-3123, June 10, 2014. Judge; Time within which certain acts must be done; Exception. An administrative complaint was filed against MCTC Judge Regencia. The Supreme Court held that pursuant to Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of judges. If judges do not possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable to the prejudice of the litigants. In this case, the civil case was already submitted for resolution. Being an ejectment case, it is governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure which clearly sets a period of 30 days from the submission of the last affidavit or position paper within which a decision must be issued. Despite this, Judge Regencia rendered judgment only more than 2 years later. While rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases and, thus, should be regarded as mandatory, the Court has nevertheless been mindful of the plight of judges and has been understanding of circumstances that may hinder them from promptly disposing of their businesses and, as such, has allowed extensions of time due to justifiable reasons. However, Judge Regencia failed to proffer any Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

acceptable reason in delaying the disposition of the ejectment case, thus, making her administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision. Gershon N. Dulang v. Judge Mary Jocylen G. Regencia, MCTC, AsturiasBalamban, Cebu, A.M. No. MTJ-14-1841, June 2, 2014. Attorney; a lawyer shall not assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. He likewise categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Clearly, he violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which provides: CANON 9 – A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW. Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing. Atty. Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court, a counsel’s signature serves as a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay. Thus, by affixing one’s signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal effect to the document. For violating rule 9.01 of the CPR, Atty. Bacolo was meted with the penalty the suspension from the practice of law for one year. Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia v. Attys. Charlie Bancolo and Janus Jarder; A.C. No. 9604. March 20, 2013. Attorney; disbarment complaint; outright dismissal is warranted if the complaint, on its face, lacks merit. For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the complainant upon the dismissal of the Complaint for disbarment he instituted against the respondent lawyers. Complainant claims he was denied due process because (1) she was not allowed to file a Reply and (2) the Court deviated from usual procedure when it resolved the disbarment Complaint without first declaring the case to have been submitted for resolution.

The Supreme Court has the power to outrightly dismiss a Complaint for disbarment when on its face, it is clearly wanting in merit. Thus, in International Militia of People against Corruption & Terrorism v. Chief Justice Davide, Jr. (Ret.), the Court, after finding the Complaint insufficient in form and substance, dismissed the same outright for utter lack of merit. In the Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

instant case, the Court did not dismiss outright the disbarment Complaint. In fact, it even required the respondents to file their respective Answers. Then, after a judicious study of the records, it proceeded to resolve the same although not in complainant’s favor. Based on the Complaint and the supporting affidavits attached thereto, and the respective Comments of the respondents, the Court found that the presumption of innocence accorded to respondents was not overcome. Moreover, the Court no longer required complainant to file a Reply since it has the discretion not to require the filing of the same when it can already judiciously resolve the case based on the pleadings thus far submitted. And contrary to complainant’s mistaken notion, not all petitions or complaints reach the reply or memorandum stage. Depending on the merits of the case, the Court has the discretion either to proceed with the case by first requiring the parties to file their respective responsive pleadings or to dismiss the same outright. Likewise, the Court can proceed to resolve the case without need of informing the parties that the case is already submitted for resolution. Jasper Junno F. Rodica v. Atty. Manuel M. Lazaro, et al.; A.C. No. 9259. March 12, 2013. Attorney; duty to exercise due diligence. The Court reiterated its ruling in Del Mundo v. Capistrano that “when a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latter’s rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his client and makes him answerable not just to client but also to the legal profession, the court and society.” Respondent’s infractions were aggravated by his failure to comply with CBD’s directives for him to file his pleadings on time and to religiously attend hearings, demonstrating not only his irresponsibility but also his disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers. Such conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer who is called upon to obey court orders and processes and is expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives as an officer of the court. As a member of the bar, he ought to have known that the orders of the CBD as the investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases against lawyers were not mere requests but directives which should have been complied with promptly and completely. Gloria P. Jinon v. Atty. Leonardo E. Jiz; A.C. No. 9615. March 5, 2013. Attorney; duty to hold in trust money received from client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for the processing of transfer of land title, but not used for the purpose, should be returned to the client immediately. The Court held in Dhaliwal v. Dumaguing that a lawyer’s failure to return the funds he holds on behalf of a client, despite latter’s demand, gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use and constitutes a gross violation of general morality and professional ethics. Gloria P. Jinon v. Atty. Leonardo E. Jiz; A.C. No. 9615. March 5, 2013. Court personnel; simple neglect of duty; failure of branch clerk of court to keep and maintain a general docket. Branch clerk of court Mr. Teves Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

admitted that he failed to keep and maintain a general docket of cases assigned to their branch. As such, he failed to comply with his duty under Section 8, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, thus: Sec. 8. General docket. – The clerk shall keep a general docket, each page of which shall be numbered and prepared for receiving all the entries in a single case, and shall enter therein all cases, numbered consecutively in the order in which they were received, and under the heading of each case, a complete title thereof, the date of each paper filed or issued, of each order or judgment entered, and of each other step taken in the case so that by reference a single page the history of the case may be seen. With this infraction, Mr. Teves was held liable for simple neglect of duty. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-121818. March 12, 2013. Court personnel; simple neglect of duty; failure of branch clerk of court to schedule the promulgation of cases. In the Datan case, Mr. Teves, instead of scheduling the case for promulgation, just gave the accused a copy of the unpromulgated decision at the time when the presiding judge was serving her suspension. Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court states that: Sec. 6. Promulgation of judgment. – The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court x x x. Clearly, as found by the OCA, Mr. Teves is guilty of simple neglect of duty. It is his duty to calendar the case for promulgation in accordance with the Rules of Court. He did not only fail to do so. Rather, he, in fact, served copies of the decision to the accused without the judgment having been promulgated first. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ12-1818. March 12, 2013. Court personnel; simple neglect of duty; imposable penalty. Simple neglect of duty is defined as the “failure of an employee to give one’s attention to a task expected of him, and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.” Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense penalized with suspension for one month and one day to six months for the first offense, and dismissal for the second. In the determination of the proper penalty, the Court looked into Mr. Teves’ past administrative cases. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

Considering his past infractions and having been warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely, Mr. Teves still has not reformed. He has remained undeterred in disregarding the law and he appears to be unfazed by the previous penalties and warnings he received. Mr. Teves’ repeated infractions seriously compromise efficiency and hamper public service which the Court can no longer tolerate. As such, he was meted with the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013. Judges; duty to adopt an efficient system to monitor the status of cases. The OCA found that the court failed to maintain a general docket book to keep track of the cases under it. Although the duty is vested with Mr. Teves as the Branch Clerk of Court, it is the duty of Judge Tormis to make sure that the members of her staff perform their duties. The OCA also found that Mr. Teves repeatedly submitted inaccurate reports as to the actual number of cases pending with their court. This is brought about by their failure to adopt an efficient system of monitoring their cases. Again, this is the primary responsibility of Judge Tormis. Finally, the OCA noted that Judge Tormis failed to conduct an actual physical inventory of cases to keep abreast of the status of the pending cases and to be informed that every case is in proper order. Judge Tormis is guilty of violating Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars for her failure to comply with her duty to provide an efficient court management system in her court which includes the preparation and use of docket inventory and monthly report of cases as tools thereof. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013. Judges; gross ignorance of the law; when the law is sufficiently basic, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judge Tormis issued the warrant of arrest in violation of the Rule on Summary Procedure that the accused should first be notified of the charges against him and given the opportunity to file his counter-affidavits and other countervailing evidence. The Revised Rules on Summary Procedure has been in effect since November 15, 1991. It finds application in a substantial number of civil and criminal cases. Judge Tormis cannot claim to be unfamiliar with the same. Every judge is required to observe the law. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; and anything less than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In short, when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-121818. March 12, 2013. Judges; gross inefficiency; gross ignorance of the law; imposable penalties. Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC dated September 11, 2001, violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars, and gross inefficiency are categorized as less serious charges with the following sanctions: (a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. Moreover, gross ignorance of the law is classified as serious charge under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, and penalized under Section 11 (a), Rule 140 of the same Rules by: (1) Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall, in no case, include accrued leave credits; (2) Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3), but not exceeding six (6) months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00. In determining the proper imposable penalty, we also consider Judge Tormis’ work history which reflects how she performed her judicial functions. We find that there are several administrative cases already filed against her, with most of these cases being decided against her. These cases show her inability to properly discharge her judicial duties. Considering her past infractions and taking into account the number of irregularities she committed in this present case, Judge Tormis was meted with the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presideing Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013. Judges; motion to inhibit; grounds. As held in Sps. Hizon v. Sps. dela Fuente, “an inhibition must be for just and valid reason.” Complainant’s mere imputation that the case was decided by the magistrates of the Court with extreme bias and prejudice is baseless and clearly unfounded. Jasper Junno F. Rodica v. Atty. Manuel M. Lazaro, et al.; A.C. No. 9259. March 12, 2013. Judges; undue delay in deciding cases. The honor and integrity of the judicial system is measured not only by the fairness and correctness of decisions rendered, but also by the efficiency with which disputes are resolved. Under the 1987 Constitution, trial judges are mandated to decide and resolve cases within 90 days from submission for decision or resolution. Corollary to this constitutional mandate, Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to perform all judicial duties efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness. The mandate to promptly dispose of cases or matters also applies to motions or interlocutory matters or incidents pending before the magistrate. Unreasonable delay of a judge in resolving a pending incident is a violation of the norms of judicial conduct and constitutes gross inefficiency that warrants the imposition of an administrative sanction against the defaulting magistrate. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ12-1818. March 12, 2013; Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City / Paulino Bural, Sr. v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City; A.M. No. RTJ-13-2342 / A.M. No. RTJ-12-2318. March 6, 2013. Judge Fuentes III concedes that there is no valid justification for the delay in resolving the cases pending in his court. Indeed, his frequent travels to his residence in Ozamis City, which led to travel fatigue and poor health, will not absolve him from liability. If a judge is unable to comply with the period for deciding cases or matters, he can, for good reasons, ask for an extension. Without an extension granted by the Court, the failure to decide even a single case within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency that merits administrative sanction. Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City / Paulino Bural, Sr. v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City; A.M. No. RTJ-13-2342 / A.M. No. RTJ-12-2318. March 6, 2013. Judges; undue delay in deciding cases; administrative sanctions. An inexcusable failure to decide a case within the prescribed 90-day period constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions such as suspension from office without pay or fine on the defaulting judge. The fines imposed vary in each case, depending on the following factors: (1) the number of cases not decided within the reglamentary period; (2) the presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances; (3) the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay; (4) the health and age of the judge; and (5) other analogous circumstances. In this case, the fine was reduced considering that this was the first infraction of Judge Fuentes III in his more than 15 years in the service. The Court likewise took into consideration the fact that the respondent judge exerted earnest efforts to fully comply with the Court’s directives as contained in the resolution. Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City / Paulino Bural, Sr. v. Judge Fernando G. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 49, Tagbilaran City; A.M. No. RTJ-13-2342 / A.M. No. RTJ-12-2318. March 6, 2013. Judges; undue delay in deciding cases; suspension from office is not a justification for the delay. Respondent judge claimed that the delay was the Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

consequence of the three suspension orders issued against her as she was suspended for an aggregate period of almost one year and six months. Records reveal, however, that Judge Tormis was repeatedly suspended in cases wherein she committed a breach of her duty as a member of the Bench. She cannot, therefore, be allowed to use the same to justify another violation of her solemn oath to dispense justice. Even if she was allowed to avail of this excuse, as aptly observed by the OCA, several of the cases that she failed to dispose of had been overdue for decision or resolution even prior to said suspensions. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Cebu City and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court, same court; A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. March 12, 2013. Jurisdiction of the Court over administrative proceedings. An administrative matter was instituted against Judge Grageda, based on the result of a judicial audit conducted after his retirement. According to the Supreme Court, for it to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative proceeding, the complaint must be filed during the incumbency of the respondent public official or employee. This is because the filing of an administrative case is predicated on the holding of a position or office in the government service. However, once jurisdiction has attached, the same is not lost by the mere fact that the public official or employee was no longer in office during the pendency of the case. In present case, Judge Grageda’s retirement effectively barred the Court from pursuing the instant administrative proceeding that was instituted after his tenure in office, and divested the Court, much less the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), of any jurisdiction to still subject him to the rules and regulations of the judiciary and/or to penalize him for the infractions committed while he was still in the service. Accordingly, the complaint against retired Judge Grageda was dismissed. Office of the Court Administrator v. Jesus L. Grageda; A.M. No. RTJ-10-2235. March 11, 2013. Attorney; Applicability of the Code of Professional Responsibility to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks. Private respondents were charged before the Court of Tax Appeals for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended. However, the CTA dismissed the case since the prosecution failed to present certified true copies of the documentary evidence submitted contrary to Section 7, Rule 130 and Section 127, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The Run After the Smugglers (RATS) Group, Revenue Collection Monitoring Group (RCMG), as counsel for the BOC, filed a petition for certiorari but the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period. The Supreme Court held that the display of patent violations of even the elementary rules shows that the case against respondents was doomed by design from the start. This stance taken by the lawyers in government service rouses the Court’s vigilance against inefficiency in the administration Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

of justice. Verily, the lawyers representing the offices under the executive branch should be reminded that they still remain as officers of the court from whom a high sense of competence and fervor is expected. The Court will not close its eyes to this sense of apathy in RATS lawyers, lest the government’s goal of revenue enhancement continues to suffer the blows of smuggling and similar activities. The Court reminded the lawyers in the BOC that the canons embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility equally apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks. Thus, RATS lawyers should exert every effort and consider it their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. People of the Philippines v. The Hon. Juanito C. Castaneda, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 208290, December 11, 2013 Attorney; Champertous contract. Complainants engaged the legal services of Atty. Bañez, Jr. in connection with the recovery of their properties from Fevidal. Complainants signed a contract of legal services, where they would not pay acceptance and appearance fees to Atty. Bañez Jr., but that the docket fees would instead be shared by the parties. Under the contract, complainants would pay him 50% of whatever would be recovered of the properties. Later, however, complainants terminated his services and entered into an amicable settlement with Fevidal. Atty. Bañez, Jr. opposed the withdrawal of their complaint in court. Thus, complainants filed a case against him alleging that the motion of Atty. Baez, Jr. for the recording of his attorney’s charging lien was the “legal problem” preventing them from enjoying the fruits of their property. Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court allows an attorney to intervene in a case to protect his rights concerning the payment of his compensation. According to the discretion of the court, the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money rendered in a case in which his services have been retained by the client. In this case, however, the contract for legal services is in the nature of a champertous contract – an agreement whereby an attorney undertakes to pay the expenses of the proceedings to enforce the client’s rights in exchange for some bargain to have a part of the thing in dispute. Such contracts are contrary to public policy and are thus void or inexistent. They are also contrary to Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that lawyers shall not lend money to a client, except when in the interest of justice, they have to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter they are handling for the client. Thus, the Court held that Atty. Bañez, Jr. violated Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Conchita Baltazar,et al. v. Atty. Juan B. Bañez, Jr., A.C. No. 9091, December 11, 2013. Attorney; Disbarment proceedings. A disbarment case was filed against Atty. Macapagal. He was charged with dishonesty (1) when he stated in the defendants’ Answer in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 that the parties therein are Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

strangers to each other; (2) when he introduced a falsified Certificate of Marriage as part of his evidence in Civil Case No. A-95-22906; and (3) when he knowingly filed a totally baseless pleading captioned as Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the same case. The Supreme Court held that these issues are proper subjects of and must be threshed out in a judicial action. However, since Atty. Macapagal failed to file a comment and his position paper despite his receipt of Notice, he was reprimanded for failing to give due respect to the Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Nestor V. Felipe, et al. v. Atty. Ciriaco A. Macapagal, A.C. No. 4549, December 2, 2013. Attorney; Disobedience to court directives. Complainant Sy charged Respondent Esponilla, Legal Researcher and then Officer-In-Charge of Br. 54 of RTC Manila, and Atty. Buendia, clerk of court and ex-officio sheriff of RTC Manila with Gross Misconduct, Negligence and Dishonesty. The complaint was in connection with the irregular withdrawal of deposits for monthly rentals in a civil case based on a purported Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw Rental Deposits filed by Atty. Bayhon in the civil case. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Bayhon violated the Lawyer’s Oath and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for failing to explain, in good faith the circumstances surrounding the filing of the Ex-Parte Motion which he himself filed, for proffering misleading claims in the course of the subject administrative investigation, and for not having shown and proved that he exerted his best efforts to secure and submit a copy of the Ex-Parte Motion – all in violation of the resolutions issued by the Court. Atty. Bayhon was suspended for six (6) months from the practice of law. Elpidio Sy, President, Systems Realty Development Corporation v. Edgar Esponilla, Legal Researcher and Officer-in-Charge, et al., A.M. No. P-06-2261, December 11, 2013. Attorney; Due diligence in handling client’s case. Respondents were charged for gross negligence in handling the labor complaints of complainant. The Supreme Court held that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is required to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He is likewise expected to act with honesty in all his dealings, especially with the courts. These principles are embodied in Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, Canon 17 and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In this case, Atty. Quesada’s failure to attend the scheduled conference hearings, despite due notice and without any proper justification, exhibits his inexcusable lack of care and diligence in managing Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

his client’s cause in violation of Canon 17 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code. Felipe C. Dagala v. Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. and Atty. Amado T. Adquilen, A.C. No. 5044, December 2, 2013. Attorney; Duty to represent a client must be within the bounds of law. The Supreme Court issued a Resolution dismissing the administrative complaint of Tomas Merdegia against Court of Appeals Justice Veloso. The Resolution directed Atty. Adaza II, Merdegia’s counsel, to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt. The Supreme Court held Atty. Adaza II guilty of indirect contempt. Atty. Adaza prepared the administrative complaint after Justice Veloso refused to inhibit himself from a case he was handling. The complaint and the motion for inhibition were both based on the same main cause: the alleged partiality of Justice Veloso during the oral arguments of Merdegia’s case. The resolution dismissing the motion for inhibition should have disposed of the issue of Justice Veloso’s bias. If they doubted the legality of the Resolution, they could have filed a petition for certiorari. Administrative complaints against justices cannot and should not substitute for appeal and other judicial remedies against an assailed decision or ruling. While a lawyer has a duty to represent his client with zeal, he must do so within the bounds provided by law. He is also duty-bound to impress upon his client the propriety of the legal action the latter wants to undertake, and to encourage compliance with the law and legal processes. Atty. Adaza failed to impress upon his client the features of the Philippine adversarial system, the substance of the law on ethics and respect for the judicial system, and his own failure to heed what his duties as a professional and as an officer of the Court demand of him in acting for his client before the courts. Re: Verified Complaint of Tomas S. Merdegia against Hon. Vicente S.E. Veloso, etc./Re: Resolution dated October 8, 2013 in OCA IPI No. 12-205-CA-J against Atty. Homobono Adaza II, IPI No. 12-205-CA-J/A.C. No. 10300, December 10, 2013. Attorney; Gross misconduct. Heenan filed a complaint against Atty. Espejo for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath due to the latter’s failure to pay a loan. The Supreme Court found Atty. Espejo guilty of gross misconduct. The deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned. Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients. The prompt payment of financial obligations is one of the duties of a lawyer. The fact that Atty. Espejo obtained the loan and issued the worthless checks in her private capacity and not as an attorney of Heenan is of no moment. A lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but also for gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity. While the Court may not ordinarily discipline a lawyer for misconduct committed in his non-professional or private capacity, the Court may be justified in suspending or removing him Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

as an attorney where his misconduct outside of the lawyer’ professional dealings is so gross in character as to show him morally unfit and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer. Thus, Atty. Espejo was suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years. Victoria C. Heenan v. Atty. Erlinda Espejo, A.C. No. 10050, December 3, 2013. Judge; Gross Ignorance of the Law. Complainant claimed that since Judge Cajigal’s appointment as presiding judge of RTC, Branch 96, Quezon City, the latter has displayed gross inefficiency by failing to resolve within the prescribed period a number of incidents. Moreover, complainant questions the propriety of the Judge’s decision in a case he is involved in. The Supreme Court held that the charges of ignorance of the law are bereft of merit. Judge Cajigal’s order was issued in the proper exercise of his judicial functions, and as such, is not subject to administrative disciplinary action; especially considering that the complainant failed to establish bad faith on the part of the judge. Well entrenched is the rule that a judge may not be administratively sanctioned for mere errors of judgment in the absence of showing of any bad faith, fraud, malice, gross ignorance, corrupt purpose, or a deliberate intent to do an injustice on his or her part. Moreover, as a matter of public policy, a judge cannot be subjected to liability for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. Narciso G. Dulalia v. Judge Afable E. Cajigal, RTC, Br. 96, Quezon City, A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 10-3492-RTJ, December 4, 2013. Judge; Voluntary inhibition. Rallos charges Justice Hernando with bias because he voluntarily inhibited himself in CA-G.R. CEB SP. No. 06676 only after the promulgation of the March 28, 2012 and April 13, 2012 resolutions. The Supreme Court held that the fact that Justice Hernando voluntarily inhibited himself after writing the assailed resolutions did not establish his bias against Rallos and her co-heirs considering that the inhibition was for the precise objective of eliminating suspicions of undue influence. The justification of Justice Hernando was commendable, and should be viewed as a truly just and valid ground for his self-disqualification as a judicial officer in a specific case. Further, Rallos insists that she was entitled to be informed about the inhibitions of the Justices and about their reasons for the inhibitions. The Court held that there is nothing in Rule V or in any other part of the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals that specifically requires that the party-litigants be informed of the mandatory or voluntary inhibition of a Justice. Nevertheless, a party-litigant who desires to be informed of the inhibition of a Justice and of the reason for the inhibition must file a motion for inhibition in the manner provided under Section 3, Rule V of the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

However, the Court held that henceforth all the parties in any action or proceedings should be immediately notified of any mandatory disqualification or voluntary inhibition of the Justice who has participated in any action of the court, stating the reason for the mandatory disqualification or voluntary inhibition. The requirement of notice is a measure to ensure that the disqualification or inhibition has not been resorted to in order to cause injustice to or to prejudice any party or cause. Re: Letters of Lucena B. Rallos, for alleged acts/incidents/occurences relative to the resolutions(s) issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 06676 by Court of Appeals Executive Justice Pampio Abarintos and Associate Justices Ramol Paul Hernando and Victoria Isabel Paredes/Re: Complaint filed by Lucena B. Rallos against Justices Gabriel T. Ingles, Pamela Ann Maxino, and Carmelita S. Manahan, IPI No. 12-203-CAJ/A.M. No. 12-9-08-CA, December 10, 2013. Attorney; lifting of indefinite suspension. Professional misconduct involving the misuse of constitutional provisions for the purpose of insulting Members of the Supreme Court is a serious breach of the rigid standards that a member of good standing of the legal profession must faithfully comply with. Thus, the penalty of indefinite suspension was imposed. However, in the past two years during which Atty. Lozano has been suspended, he has repeatedly expressed his willingness to admit his error, to observe the rules and standards in the practice of law, and to serve the ends of justice if he should be reinstated. And in these two years, this Court has not been informed of any act that would indicate that Atty. Lozano had acted in any unscrupulous practices unsuitable to a member of the bar. While the Court will not hesitate to discipline its erring officers, it will not prolong a penalty after it has been shown that the purpose for imposing it had already been served. Re: subpoena Duces Tecum dated January 11, 2010 of Acting Director Aleu A. Amante, PIAB-C, Office of the Ombudsman/Re: Order of the Office of the Ombudsman referring the complaint of Attys. Oliver O. Lozano & Evangeline J. Lozano-Endriano against Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno(ret.). A.M. No. 10-113-SC & A.M. NO. 10-9-9-SC, March 20, 2012. Court personnel; administrative case; quantum of evidence. The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service govern the conduct of disciplinary and non-disciplinary proceedings in administrative cases. In Section 3, it provides that, “Administrative investigations shall be conducted without necessarily adhering strictly to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings.” The weight of evidence required in administrative investigations is substantial evidence. For these reasons, only substantial evidence is required to find Malunao guilty of the administrative offense charged against her. In the hierarchy of evidentiary values, substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable man might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, is the lowest standard of proof provided under the Rules of Court. In assessing whether there is substantial evidence in administrative investigations such as this case, the Court is not bound by technical rules of Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

procedure and evidence. Dela Cruz’s Sinumpaang Salaysay, the joint affidavit of arrest executed by the NBI agents, the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, photocopy of the marked money, the Complaint Sheet, and the photographs of Malunao entering Dela Cruz’s house, and the contents of Malunao’s bag after receipt of the money, all prove by subsantial evidence the guilt of Malunao for the offense of grave misconduct. Sheryll C. Dela Cruz vs. Pamela P. Malunao, Clerk III, RTC, Branch 28, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya. A.M. No. P-11-2019, March 20, 2012. Court personnel; grave misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his position or office to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. Section 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel states: “Court personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit based on any or explicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions.” Respondent’s use of her position as Clerk III in Branch 28 to solicit money from Dela Cruz with the promise of a favorable decision violates Section 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and constitutes the offense of grave misconduct meriting the penalty of dismissal. Sheryll C. Dela Cruz vs. Pamela P. Malunao, Clerk III, RTC, Branch 28, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya. A.M. No. P-11-2019, March 20, 2012. Judges; judicial clemency. In A.M. No. 07-7-17-SC (Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency), the Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, thus: “1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of nonreformation. 2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reform. 3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself. 4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service. 5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.” Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the Court finds merit in petitioner’s request. A review of the records reveals that petitioner has exhibited remorse for her past misdeeds, which occurred more than ten (10) years ago. While she was found to have belatedly filed her motions for additional time to resolve the cases then pending in her sala, the Court noted that she had disposed of the same within the extended period sought, except in A.M. No. 99-2-79-RTC where she submitted her compliance beyond the approved 45-day extended period. Nevertheless, petitioner has subsequently shown diligence in the performance of her duties and has not committed any similar act or omission. In the Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator, her prompt compliance with the judicial audit requirements of pending cases was acknowledged and she was even commended for her good performance in the effective management of her court and in the handling of court records. Moreover, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Bohol Chapter has shown its high regard for petitioner per the letter of support signed by a number of its members addressed to the IBP dated October 15, 1999 during the pendency of her administrative cases and the IBP Resolution No. 11, Series of 2009 endorsing her application for lateral transfer to the RTC of Tagbilaran City. Re: Petition for judicial clemency of Judge Irma Zita V. Masamayor. A.M. No. 12-2-6-SC, March 6, 2012. Administrative Complaint; moot and academic. The Court dismissed the complaint filed by Inter-Petal Recreational Corporation against Chief Justice Renato Corona for being moot and academic after considering the judgment of the Senate sitting as an Impeachment Court, which found the Chief Justice guilty of the charge under Article II of the Articles of Impeachment, with the penalty of removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines as provided in Section 3(7), Article XI of the Constitution. Re: Complaint Against the Honorable Chief Justice Renato C. Corona dated September 14, 2011 filed by Inter-Petal Recreational Corporation, A.M. No. 12-6-10-SC. June 13, 2012 Attorneys; disbarment cases imprescriptible. The defense of prescription is untenable. The Court has held that administrative cases against lawyers do not prescribe. The lapse of considerable time from the commission of the offending act to the institution of the administrative complaint will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer. Otherwise, members of the bar would only be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco vs. Atty. Pablo Bernardo, A.C. No. 6368, June 13, 2012. Attorney; False and untruthful statements in pleadings. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for it. Lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Magat’s act clearly falls short of the standards set by the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 10.01, which provides: Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. The Court ruled that there was a deliberate intent on the part of Atty. Magat to mislead the court when he filed the motion to dismiss the criminal charges on the basis of double jeopardy. Atty. Magat should not make any false and untruthful statements in his pleadings. If it were true that there was a similar case for slight physical injuries that was really filed in court, all he had to do was to secure a certification from that court that, indeed, a case was filed. Rodrigo Molina vs. Atty. Ceferino Magat A.C. No. 1900. June 13, 2012. Attorney; Neglect etc.Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is that lawyer’s duty to serve the client with competence and diligence. Respondent has failed to fulfill this duty. When the RTC ruled against complainant and her husband, they filed a Notice of Appeal. Consequently, what should apply is the rule on ordinary appealed cases or Rule 44 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Rule 44 requires that the appellant’s brief be filed after the records of the case have been elevated to the CA. Respondent, as a litigator, was expected to know this procedure. Canon 5 of the Code reads: CANON 5 — A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence. The supposed lack of time given to respondent to acquaint himself with the facts of the case does not excuse his negligence. Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation. While it is true that respondent was not complainant’s lawyer from the trial to the appellate court stage, this fact did not excuse him from his duty to diligently study a case he had agreed to handle. If he felt he did not have enough time to study the pertinent matters involved, as he was Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

approached by complainant’s husband only two days before the expiration of the period for filing the Appellant’s Brief, respondent should have filed a motion for extension of time to file the proper pleading instead of whatever pleading he could come up with, just to beat the deadline set by the Court of Appeals. Also, as counsel, he had the duty to inform his clients of the status of their case. His failure to do so amounted to a violation of Rule 18.04 of the Code, which reads: 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information. If it were true that all attempts to contact his client proved futile, the least respondent could have done was to inform the CA by filing a Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance as counsel. He could have thus explained why he was no longer the counsel of complainant and her husband in the case and informed the court that he could no longer contact them. His failure to take this measure proves his negligence. The failure of respondent to file the proper pleading and a comment on Duigan’s Motion to Dismiss is negligence on his part. Under 18.03 of the Code, a lawyer is liable for negligence in handling the client’s case, viz: Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them, otherwise their negligence in fulfilling their duty would render them liable for disciplinary action. Respondent has failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer. When a lawyer violates his duties to his client, he engages in unethical and unprofessional conduct for which he should be held accountable. Emilia R. Hernandez vs. Atty. Venancio B. Padilla, A.C. No. 9387, June 20, 2012. Contempt; unauthorized practice of law. In Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court ruled that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill. The OCA was able to establish the pattern in Karaan’s unauthorized practice of law. He would require the parties to execute a special power of attorney in his favor to allow him to join them as one of the plaintiffs as their attorney-in-fact. Then, he would file the necessary complaint and other pleadings “acting for and in his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact, agent or representative” of the parties. The fact that Karaan did not indicate in the pleadings that he was a member of the Bar, or any PTR, Attorney’s Roll, or MCLE Compliance Number does not detract from the fact that, by his actions, he was actually engaged in the practice of law. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

Under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a person assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority, is liable for indirect contempt of court. Under Section 7 of the same rules, a respondent adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. If a respondent is adjudged guilty of contempt committed against a lower court, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) month, or both. Juvy P. Ciocon-Reer, et al., vs. Judge Antonio C. Lubao, RTC Br. 22, General Santos City, A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3210RTJ, June 20, 2012. Court personnel; discourtesy. Unless specifically provided by the rules, clerks of court have no authority to pass upon the substantive or formal correctness of pleadings and motions that parties file with the court. Compliance with the rules is the responsibility of the parties and their counsels. And whether these conform to the rules concerning substance and form is an issue that only the judge of the court has authority to determine. The duty of clerks of courts to receive pleadings, motions, and other court-bound papers is purely ministerial. Although they may on inspection advise the parties or their counsels of possible defects in the documents they want to file, which may be regarded as part of public service, they cannot upon insistence of the filing party refuse to receive the same. Canon IV, Section 2 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel provides that court personnel shall carry out their responsibilities as public servants in as courteous a manner as possible. Atty. Ramos was counsel in a case before Teves’ branch. He was an officer of the court who expressed a desire to have the presiding judge, to whom he addressed his motion, see and consider the same. Teves arrogated onto himself the power to decide with finality that the presiding judge was not to be bothered with that motion. He denied Atty. Ramos the courtesy of letting the presiding judge decide the issue between him and the lawyer. As held in Macalua v. Tiu, Jr., an employee of the judiciary is expected to accord respect for the person and right of others at all times, and his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy and dignity. These are absent in this case. Civil Service Resolution 99-1936 classifies discourtesy in the course of official duties as a light offense, the penalty for which is reprimand for the first offense, suspension of 1-30 days for the second offense, and dismissal for the third offense. In two consolidated administrative cases, one for grave misconduct and immorality and the other for insubordination, the Court meted out on Teves the penalty of suspension for six months in its resolution of October 5, 2011. The Court of course decided these cases and warned Teves to change his ways more than a year after the September 8, 2008 incident with Atty. Ramos. Consequently, it could not be said that he ignored with respect to that incident the warnings given him in the subsequently decided cases. Still those cases show Teves’ propensity for misbehavior. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

Thus, the Court imposed on Reynaldo S. Teves, Branch Clerk of Court of Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, the penalty of 30 days suspension with warning that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with more severely. Atty. Edward Anthony B. Ramos vs. Reynaldo S. Teves, Clerk of Court III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City. A.M. No. P-12-3061, June 27, 2012. Court personnel; disgraceful and immoral conduct. The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the women and men who work in the judiciary, from the judge to the lowest of its personnel. Like the rest of the personnel of the Court, the shuttle bus drivers are expected to observe the norms and ethics of conduct of public officials and employees. Judiciary employees should be circumspect in how they conduct themselves inside and outside the office. Any scandalous behavior or any act that may erode the people’s esteem for the judiciary is unbecoming of an employee. Court employees are supposed to be well-mannered, civil and considerate in their actuations. Laribo Jr.’s utterances, are by themselves, malicious and cast aspersion upon Diomampo’s character. The Court cannot countenance such behavior. The Court sanctioned Laribo Jr. for his disgraceful and immoral conduct. Since such conduct is classified as a grave offense, the penalty for the first offense is suspension from 6 months and 1 day to one year. But the Court tempered OCA’s recommended penalty and imposed a penalty of one month suspension, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely, taking into account that this is Laribo’s Jr. first infraction. Shirley D. Diomampo, Records Officer II, Sandiganbayan vs. Felipe C. Laribo Jr., Shuttle Bus Driver, Sandiganbayan. A.M. No. SB-12-18-P. June 13, 2012. Court personnel; dishonesty. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees enunciates the State’s policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. And no other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an employee than the judiciary. Persons involved in the dispensation of justice, from the highest official to the lowest clerk, must live up to the strictest standards of integrity, probity, uprightness and diligence in the public service. As the assumption of public office is impressed with paramount public interest, which requires the highest standards of ethics, persons aspiring for public office must observe honesty, candor and faithful compliance with the law. Respondent committed dishonesty by causing the unauthorized insertion of an additional sentence in the trial court’s order. Dishonesty has been defined as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud. It implies untrustworthiness, lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle on the part of the individual who failed to exercise fairness and straightforwardness in his or her dealings. By her act, she has compromised and undermined the public’s faith in the records of the court below and, Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

ultimately, the integrity of the Judiciary. To tolerate such act would open the floodgates to fraud by court personnel. The insertion of an additional sentence in an order of the trial court, regardless of the reason is not among respondent’s duties. A legal researcher’s duty focuses mainly on verifying legal authorities, drafting memoranda on evidence, outlining facts and issues in cases set for pre-trial, and keeping track of the status of cases. In Salvador v. Serrano, the Court held that courts have the inherent power to amend and control their process and orders to make them conformable to law and justice. But such power rests upon the judge and not to clerks of court who only perform adjudicative support functions and non-adjudicative functions. In the same vein, the power to amend court orders cannot be performed by a legal researcher. It is well to remind that court personnel are obliged to accord the integrity of court records of paramount importance, as these are vital instruments in the dispensation of justice. Judge Amado Caguioa (ret.) vs. Elizabeth Aucena, Court Legal Researcher II, Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Baguio City. A.M. No. P-09-2646, June 18, 2012. Under Section 52 (A) (1), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, promulgated by the Civil Service Commission through Resolution No. 99-1936 dated August 31, 1999 and implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 19, series of 1999, dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal from the service for the first offense. However, the Court, in certain instances, has not imposed the penalty of dismissal due to the presence of mitigating factors such as the length of service, being a firsttime offender, acknowledgment of the infractions, and remorse by the respondent. The Court has also ruled that where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by labor ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe. It is not only for the law’s concern for the workingman; there is, in addition, his family to consider. Unemployment brings untold hardships and sorrows on those dependent on wage earners. Considering that this is respondent’s first offense in her twenty-two (22) years of service in the Judiciary, the admission of her act and her sincere apology for her mistake, her firm resolve not to commit the same mistake in the future, and taking into account that she is a widow and the only one supporting her five children, the recommended penalty of suspension for a period of six (6) months is in order. Judge Amado Caguioa (ret.) vs. Elizabeth Aucena, Court Legal Researcher II, Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Baguio City. A.M. No. P-09-2646, June 18, 2012. Court personnel; dishonesty.For Aguam to assert that she herself took and passed the examination when in fact somebody else took it for her constitutes dishonesty. Every employee of the Judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Like any public servant, she must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of her official duties but also in her personal and private dealings with other people, to preserve the court’s good name and standing. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court personnel have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice. Here, Aguam failed to meet these stringent standards set for a judicial employee and does not therefore deserve to remain with the Judiciary. In Cruz v. Civil Service Commission, Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana, and Concerned Citizen v. Dominga Nawen Abad, the Court dismissed the employees found guilty of similar offenses. In Cruz, Zenaida Paitim masqueraded as Gilda Cruz and took the Civil Service examination in behalf of Cruz. The Court said that both Paitim and Cruz merited the penalty of dismissal. In Sta. Ana, somebody else took the Civil Service examination for Sta. Ana. The Court dismissed Sta. Ana for dishonesty. In Abad, the evidence disproved Abad’s claim that she personally took the examination. The Court held that for Abad to assert that she herself took the examination when in fact somebody else took it for her constitutes dishonesty. Thus, Abad was for her offense. The Court found no reason to deviate from these consistent rulings. Under Section 52(A)(1) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense. Under Section 58(a) of the same rules, the penalty of dismissal carries with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service. The OCA properly excluded forfeiture of accrued leave credits, pursuant to the Court’s ruling in Sta. Ana and Abad. The Court also consistently held that the proper penalty to be imposed on employees found guilty of an offense of this nature is dismissal from the service. Lourdes Celavite-Vidal vs. Noraida A. Aguam, A.M. No. SCC-10-13-P, June 26, 2012. Court personnel; Disrespectful behavior. Section 2, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, requires that court personnel shall carry out their responsibilities as public servants in as courteous a manner as possible. The image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work there. Court personnel must at all times act with strict propriety and proper decorum so as to earn and rebuild the public’s trust in the judiciary as an institution. The Court would never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice, which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary. Under Rule XIV, Section 23 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, discourtesy in the course of official dutiesis classified as a light offense. A first-time violation of this rule warrants the penalty of reprimand. Considering a) respondent’s apology and admission of his mistakes; b) his retirement from service on 1 July 2011 after long years of employment in the Judiciary; and c) this case being the first complaint Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

against him, he should be held liable for discourtesy and be meted out the penalty of reprimand. Respondent committed other lapses in the performance of his duties as Clerk of Court. Instead of strictly observing the required number of working hours in the civil service, he left his post in the middle of the day to attend a social event. Worse, he chose to return to the office and enter the judge’s chambers while under the influence of alcohol. His behavior constitutes a direct violation of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, particularly Section 1, Canon IV on the Performance of Duties, which states: “Court personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly and with diligence. They shall commit themselves exclusively to the business and responsibilities of their office during working hours.” Judge Ethelwolda Jaravata vs. Precioso Orencia, Clerk of Court, MTC, Agoo, La Union A.M. No. P12-3035, June 13, 2012. Court personnel; falsification. Falsification of a DTR by a court personnel is a grave offense. The act of falsifying an official document is in itself grave because of its possible deleterious effects on government service. At the same time, it is also an act of dishonesty, which violates fundamental principles of public accountability and integrity. Under Civil Service regulations, falsification of an official document and dishonesty are distinct offenses, but both may be committed in one act. The constitutionalization of public accountabilityshows the kind of standards of public officers that are woven into the fabric of our legal system. Public office is a public trust, which embodies a set of standards such as responsibility, integrity and efficiency. Reality may depart from these standards, but our society has consciously embedded them in our laws, so that they may be demanded and enforced as legal principles. This Court, in the exercise of its administrative jurisdiction, should articulate and apply these principles to its own personnel, as a way of bridging actual reality to the norms we envision for our public service. The Supreme Court exercised its administrative jurisdiction despite respondent Kasilag’s resignation, more than two years after he was directed to file his Comment. The resignation of a public servant does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he or she shall still be answerable. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions— that of separation from service — may no longer be imposed, there are other penalties which may be imposed namely, the disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits. There are no mitigating circumstances for respondent Kasilag. Dishonesty and the act of falsifying detract from the notion of public accountability, as implemented by our laws. We apply the law as it is written. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Jaime Kasilag, Sheriff IV, Regionatl Trial Court, Branch 27, Manila. A.M. No. P-082573, June 19, 2012.


Court Personnel; gross insubordination. Respondent failed to explain why, despite her receipt of the Notices, she did not comply with the directives of this Court to submit her comment. The records show that the OCA had sent notices to her at RTC–Branch 93 of San Pedro, Laguna, where she is the branch sheriff. While she apologized to this Court for her failure to submit her comment, she did not explain the reasons for her non-submission thereof and only averred that it was the first time she learned of the Complaint against her. The OCA did not find her explanation satisfactory, because she did submit her Comment, but only after a Show-Cause Order had been issued to her– and almost a year after the first directive requiring her to file the Comment. Respondent’s prolonged and repeated refusal to comply with the directives of the Supreme Court constituted willful disrespect of its lawful orders, as well as those of the OCA. Respondent committed the infraction twice, yet failed to fully explain the circumstances that led to the repeated omissions. Hence, there no reason to overturn or mitigate the penalty recommended by the OCA. Ricardo Dela Cruz et al., vs. Ma. Gross insubordination is the indifference of a respondent to an administrative complaint and to resolutions requiring a comment thereon. The offense is deemed punishable, because every employee in the judiciary should not only be an example of integrity, uprightness, and honesty; more than anyone else, they are bound to manifest utmost respect and obedience to their superiors’ orders and instructions.Ricardo Dela Cruz et al., vs. Ma. Consuelo Jole A. Fajardo, Sheriff IV, RTC, Br. 93, San Pedro, Laguna. A.M. No. P-123064, June 18, 2012. Court personnel; gross misconduct and dishonesty. The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel stresses that employees of the judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the people’s confidence in it. No other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an employee than in the Judiciary. Thus, the failure of judicial employees to live up to their avowed duty constitutes a transgression of the trust reposed in them as court officers and inevitably leads to the exercise of disciplinary authority. By these standards, respondent was found wanting, as she never denied the allegations that she had stolen and encashed the ₱30,000 check payable to Judge Rojas. She did not even refute the allegations of Dauz and Corpuz that she misrepresented to both of them that she had authority to encash the check. Worse, neither did she ever deny the allegations pertaining to her previous acts of stealing from and paying off her obligations to other trial court judges. She has virtually admitted her wrongdoing. Whether or not respondent has fully settled her obligation to Judge Rojas, and to the other trial court judges for that matter, will not exonerate her from any administrative wrongdoing. This Court in Villaseñor v. De Leon has emphasized that full payment of an obligation does not discharge the administrative liability, because disciplinary actions involve not purely private matters, but acts unbecoming of a public employee. The Court ruled Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

that respondent’s admitted acts of pocketing checks and later encashing them for her benefit constitute grave misconduct. The Court has defined grave misconduct as follows: Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer; and the misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, such as willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. Furthermore, stealing the checks and encashing them are considered acts of gross dishonesty. Dishonesty is defined as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the personnel who work therein. Court employees are enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the court of justice. Both gross misconduct and dishonesty are grave offenses that are punishable by dismissal even for the first offense. Penalties include forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service. The mere expedient of resigning from the service will not extricate a court employee from the consequences of his or her acts. The Court has often ruled that resignation should not be used either as an escape or as an easy way out to evade an administrative liability or an administrative sanction. Thus, respondent was still held administratively liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty.Her resignation, however, would affect the penalties the Court may impose. The penalty of dismissal arising from the offense was rendered moot by virtue of her resignation. Thus, the recommendation of the OCA is appropriate under the circumstances. The Court imposed upon respondent the penalty of a fine in the amount of ₱40,000 with forfeiture of all benefits due her, except accrued leave credits, if any. The ₱40,000 fine shall be deducted from any such accrued leave credits, with respondent to be personally held liable for any deficiency that is directly payable to the Court. She was further declared disqualified from any future government service. The Court emphasized that all court employees, being public servants in an office dispensing justice, must always act with a high degree of professionalism and responsibility. Their conduct must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but must also be in accordance with the law and court regulations. To maintain the people’s respect and faith in the judiciary, court employees should be models of uprightness, fairness and honesty. They should avoid any act or conduct that would diminish public trust and confidence in the courts. Executive Judge Melanio C. Rojas, Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

Jr. RTC Branch 25, Tagudin, Ilocos Sur vs. Ana Marivic L. Mina, Clerk III, RTC, Bracnh 25, Tagudin Ilocos Sur. A.M. No. P-10-2867, June 19, 2012 Court personnel; misconduct defined. In Arcenio v. Pagorogon, the Court defined misconduct as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. As differentiated from simple misconduct, in grave misconduct the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. In this case, respondent was a mere Utility Worker who had no authority to take custody of the office attendance logbook, the DTRs of his office mates, let alone case records. Yet, respondent, taking advantage of his position as a Utility Worker and the access to the court records and documents which such position afforded him, repeatedly wrought havoc on the proper administration of justice by taking case records outside of the court’s premises and preoccupying his office mates with the time-consuming task of locating documents. Without doubt his actions constitute grave misconduct which merits the penalty of dismissal. However, in view of his resignation, the Court found it proper to instead impose on respondent the penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000 with forfeiture of benefits except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. This of course is without prejudice to any criminal liability he may have already incurred. As regards the 68 missing court records to date have not yet been found, the Court deemed it proper to order complainant to explain why she should not be disciplinarily dealt with in view of the apparent failure on her part to exercise due care in the custody of the said case records. Our courts of justice, regarded by the public as their haven for truth and justice, cannot afford and does not have the luxury of offering excuses to litigants for negligence in its role of safekeeping and preserving the records of cases pending before it. The consequences of such failure or negligence, if there be any, are simply too damaging not just for the parties involved but worse, for our court system as a whole. Clerk of Court Arlyn A. Hermano vs. Edwin D. Cardeno, Utility worker I, Municipal Trial Court, Cabuyao, Laguna. A.M. No. P-12-3036, June 20, 2012. Court Personnel; Procedure in the service and execution of court writs and processes. There was a valid substituted service of summons in this case. As a rule, personal service of summons is preferred as against substituted service and substituted service can only be resorted to by the process server if personal service cannot be made promptly. Most importantly, the proof of substituted service of summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

is in charge of the office or regular place of business, of the defendant. It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the officer’s return. Based on the records, Sheriff Villar exhausted efforts to personally serve the summons to Spouses Tiu as indicated in his Sheriff’s Return of Summons. When it was apparent that the summons could not be served personally on the spouses, Sheriff Villar served the summons through Bauco, their employee, at the office address of the couple’s business. It was evident that Bauco was competent and of sufficient age to receive the summons on their behalf as she represented herself to be their General Manager and Caretaker. The Sheriff also complied with the requirement of prior coordination as mandated in Administrative Circular No. 12 which lays down the guidelines and procedure in the service and execution of court writs and processes in the reorganized courts. Documentary evidence indeed discloses that Sheriff Villar of Pasay City coordinated with the Sheriff of Pasig City before he implemented the writ of preliminary attachment. In the Certification, the Clerk of Court of Pasig City attested to the fact that Sheriff Villar formally coordinated with their office in connection with the implementation of the writ of attachment. Attached to said certification is a certified true copy of Sheriff Villar’s request for coordination on which the word “received” was stamped by the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-officio Sheriff, RTC Pasig City. By law, sheriffs are obligated to maintain possession of the seized properties absent any instruction to the contrary. In this case, the writ of preliminary attachment authorizing the trial court to legally hold the attached items was set aside by the RTC Order dated July 8, 2010 specifically ordering Sheriff Villar to immediately release the seized items to Spouses Tiu. The instruction of the trial court was clear and simple. Sheriff Villar was to return the seized properties to Spouses Tiu. He should have followed the court’s order immediately. He had no discretion to wait for the finality of the court’s order of dismissal before discharging the order of attachment. Nevertheless, Sheriff Villar showed no deliberate defiance of, or disobedience to, the court’s order of release. Records show that he took the proper step under the circumstances and filed with the trial court his Sheriff’s Report with Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Clarificatory Order. There was nothing amiss in consulting the judge before taking action on a matter of which he is not an expert. Spouses Rainier Tiu and Jennifer Tiu vs. Virgilio Villar, Sheriff IV, RTC, OCC Pasay City. A.M. No. P-11-2986, June 13, 2012 Judge; delay in rendering decisions. Judges are continuously reminded to resolve cases with dispatch to avoid any delay in the administration of justice. Thus, under Section 9 (1), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is considered a less serious charge. The Supreme Court ruled that the prudent course of action would have been for Judge Asis to request an extension for acting on Civil Case No. 05-35013 Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

instead of disposing the case only after being prompted to file a comment on the present Complaint. The Court nevertheless deemed it proper to reduce the fine, considering the existence of factors that mitigated the commission of the offense, namely: (a) this is his first infraction, and (b) his delay in the disposition of the case resulted from his serious medical conditions. Leticia Jacinto vs. Judge Josephus Joannes H. Asis, MeTC, Br. 40, Quezon City A.M. No. MTJ-12-1811, June 13, 2012 Judge; delay in rendering decision. Section 15(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, mandates that cases or matters filed with the lower courts must be decided or resolved withinthree months from the date they are submitted for decision or resolution. With respect to cases falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure, first level courts are only allowed 30 days following the receipt of the last affidavit and position paper, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, within which to render judgment. As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory. Judges are oft-reminded of their duty to promptly act upon cases and matters pending before their courts. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, directs judges to dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Canons 6 and 7 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics further exhort judges to be prompt and punctual in the disposition and resolution of cases and matters pending before their courts. In addition, Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January 28, 1988 once more reminds all magistrates to observe scrupulously the periods prescribed in Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution, and to act promptly on all motions and interlocutory matters pending before their courts. Prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of judges. If they do not possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable to the prejudice of litigants. Accordingly, judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of their obligation to promptly administer justice. Unfortunately, respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards of duty and responsibility that her position requires. The case was submitted for resolution on July 19, 2006, yet it was still pending when complainant filed the present administrative complaint on June 4, 2010, and remained unresolved per complainant’s manifestation filed on September 8, 2010. More than four years after being submitted for resolution, the case was still awaiting decision by respondent. Respondent irrefragably failed to decide the case within the 30-day period prescribed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. This action is contrary to the rationale behind the Rule on Summary Procedure, which was precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of cases. Indeed, Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

respondent even failed to decide the case within the three-month period mandated in general by the Constitution for lower courts to decide or resolve cases. Records do not show that respondent made any previous attempt to report and request for extension of time to resolve the case. Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10SC, classifies undue delay in rendering a decision as a less serious charge for which the penalty is suspension from office without salary and other benefits for one month to three months, or a fine of P10,000.00 to P20,000.00. Given that respondent had been previously dismissed from the service, the penalty of suspension is already inapplicable. Instead, the Court imposed upon respondent, for her undue delay in resolving the case, a fine in the maximum amount of P20,000.00, to be deducted from her accrued leave credits Fe Valdez vs. Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 60, Mandaluyong City. A.M. No. MTJ-11-1796, June 13, 2012. Judge; gross abuse of authority and gross ignorance. In this case, the contempt charge was commenced not through a verified petition, but by Judge Belen motu proprio through the issuance of an order requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to show cause why he should not be cited for indirect contempt. As such, the requirements of the rules that the verified petition for contempt be docketed, heard and decided separately or consolidated with the principal action find no application. Consequently, Judge Belen was justified in not directing the contempt charge against State Prosecutor Comilang to be docketed separately or consolidated with the principal action. However, Judge Belen blatantly violated the injunctive writ issued by the CA enjoining the implementation of his May 30, 2005 Order and December 12, 2005 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 94069. As pointed out by the OCA, the CA’s disquisition is clear and categorical. In complete disobedience to the said Resolution, however, Judge Belen proceeded to issue (1) the Order requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his refusal to file the supersedeas bond and to require his presence in court on September 26, 2007, as well as to explain why he should not be cited for indirect contempt; (2) the September 26, 2007 Order seeking State Prosecutor Comilang’s explanation for his defiance of the subpoena requiring his presence at the hearing of even date, and directing, once again, his attendance at the next hearing on October 1, 2007 and to explain once more why he should not be cited for indirect contempt; and (3) the October 1, 2007 Order finding State Prosecutor Comilang guilty of indirect contempt and sentencing him to pay a fine of P30,000.00 and to suffer two days’ imprisonment. In requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his nonfiling of a supersedeas bond, in issuing subpoenas to compel his attendance before court hearings relative to the contempt proceedings, and finally, in finding him guilty of indirect contempt for his non-compliance with the issued subpoenas, Judge Belen effectively defeated the status quo which the writ of preliminary injunction aimed to preserve. State Prosecutors II Josef Albert T.


Judges are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in good faith as judicial competence requires no less. Moreover, refusal to honor an injunctive order of a higher court constitutes contempt, as in this case, where Judge Belen, in contumaciously defying the injunctive order issued by the CA, was found guilty of indirect contempt. Judge Belen’s actuations cannot be considered as mere errors of judgment that can be easily brushed aside. Obstinate disregard of basic and established rule of law or procedure amounts to inexcusable abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law. Likewise, citing State Prosecutor Comilang for indirect contempt notwithstanding the effectivity of the CA-issued writ of injunction demonstrated his vexatious attitude and bad faith towards the former, for which he must be held accountable and subjected to disciplinary action. Our conception of good judges has been, and is, of men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance with law. Hence considering the foregoing disquisitions and Judge Belen’s previous infractions, which are all of serious nature and for which he had been severely warned, the Court adopted the recommendation of the OCA to mete the ultimate penalty of dismissal against Judge Belen for grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law. The Court can no longer afford to be lenient in this case, lest it give the public the impression that incompetence and repeated offenders are tolerated in the judiciary. State Prosecutors II Josef Albert T. Comilang and Ms. Victoria Sunega-Lagman vs. Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, RTC, Branch 36, Calamba City. A.M. No. RTJ10-2216, June 26, 2012. Judge; gross ignorance of the law. Not all administrative complaints against judges merit a corresponding penalty. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. The remedy of the complainants in this case is judicial in nature. Hence, the denial of their motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s Resolution dismissing the administrative case against Judge Lubao is in order. The records would show that Judge Lubao had been very careful in his actions on the case, as his branch clerk of court even wrote the Post Office of General Santos City asking for certification as to when the Order, sent under Registry Receipt, was received by the defendants. There was no evidence that Judge Lubao acted arbitrarily or in bad faith. Further, Judge Lubao could not be faulted for trying to give all the parties an opportunity to be heard considering that the records of the case would show that the court a quo summarily dismissed the case without issuing summons to the defendants. Juvy P. Ciocon-Reer, et al., vs. Judge Antonio C. Lubao, RTC Br. 22, General Santos City, A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3210-RTJ, June 20, 2012. Judge; gross ignorance of the law. The respondent deserves to be sanctioned for gross ignorance of the law. With her inaction on the petition for contempt, she betrayed her unbecoming lack of familiarity with basic procedural rules such as what was involved in the contempt proceedings before her court. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

She should have known that while the petitioners have the responsibility to move ex parte to have the case scheduled for preliminary conference, the court (through the branch clerk of court) has the duty to schedule the case for pre-trial in the event that the petitioners fail to file the motion. The respondent cannot pass the blame for the lack of movement in the case to her staff who, she claims, were monitoring the case. As presiding judge, she should account for the anomaly that since the respondents filed their answer, the petition for contempt had been gathering dust or had not moved in the respondent’s court. Clearly, the respondent fell short of the standards of competence and legal proficiency expected of magistrates of the law in her handling of the petition for contempt. As in Magpali v. Pardo, she should be fined P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. It bears stressing that when the law is so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.” Eladio D.Perfecto vs. Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esideria, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2258, June 20, 2012. Judges; inhibition. Judicial remedies were available to complainant in the main cases. The allegations in the instant complaint are a mere rehash of the allegations in complainant’s Urgent Omnibus Motion to Expunge Motion for Clarification and Recall the Resolution dated November 13, 2002 and the Urgent Motion to Inhibit and the Resolve Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus Motion filed in the main cases. These were in fact decided already on October 19, 2011. The Complainant charges Justice Sereno of unfairly refusing to inhibit herself from taking part in the deliberation in the main cases notwithstanding that Justice Carpio’s former law office supposedly worked for her appointment in the Supreme Court. The charge is purely conjectural and the Court, in its April 17, 2012 per curiam decision in A.C. No. 6332 has already ruled that the charge has no “extrinsic factual evidence to support it.” Re: Letter-Complaint Against Hon. Justices Antonio T. Carpio and Maria Loudes P.A Sereno dated September 16, 2011 filed by Atty. Magdaleno M. Pena, A.M. No. 12-6-11-SC. June 13, 2012. Judges; undue delay in rendering a decision or order. Delay in case disposition is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the judiciary and the lowering of its standards. Failure to decide cases within the reglementary period, without strong and justifiable reasons, constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanction on the defaulting judge. In this case, the decision was purportedly issued on 7 April 2011, or more than four months since the last submission of the parties’ position paper. The pretrial Order was purportedly issued on 26 January 2010, or more than three months since the pretrial. Section 8 of the Rules on Summary Procedure provides that within five days after the termination of the preliminary conference, the court shall issue an order stating the matters taken up therein. Further, paragraph 8, Title I(A) of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, entitled “Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of PreAtty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

Trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures,” mandates that a judge must issue a pretrial order within 10 days after the termination of the pretrial. Since the ejectment case fell under the Rules on Summary Procedure, respondent judge should have handled it with promptness and haste. The reason for the adoption of those Rules is precisely to prevent undue delays in the disposition of cases, an offense for which respondent judge may be held administratively liable. Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies undue delay in rendering a decision or order as a less serious charge, which under Section 1(b) of the same Rule is punishable with suspension from office, without salary and other benefits, for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or a fine of more than ₱10,000, but not exceeding ₱20,000. Considering that the instant administrative charge is only the third against respondent judge (the first has been dismissed, while the second is still pending), and considering his relatively long tenure in the judiciary starting in 1997, he may be reasonably meted out a penalty of ₱5,000 for being administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision. Pilar S. Tanoco vs. Judge Inocencio B. Saguin, Jr. MTCC Br. 3, Cabanatuan City. A.M. No. MTJ-12-1812. June 20, 2012. Judge; unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases. Judges have the sworn duty to administer justice without undue delay, for justice delayed is justice denied. They have always been exhorted to observe strict adherence to the rule on speedy disposition of cases, as delay in case disposition is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the judicial system. Under the 1987 Constitution, trial judges are mandated to decide and resolve cases within 90 days from submission. Corollary to this constitutional mandate, Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to perform all judicial duties efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Javellana, the Court held that a judge cannot choose his deadline for deciding cases pending before him. Without an extension granted by the Court, the failure to decide even a single case within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency that merits administrative sanction. If a judge is unable to comply with the period for deciding cases or matters, he can, for good reasons, ask for an extension. An inexcusable failure to decide a case within the prescribed 90-day period constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions such as suspension from office without pay or fine on the defaulting judge. The fines imposed vary in each case, depending chiefly on the number of cases not decided within the reglementary period and other factors, such as the presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay, the health and age of the judge, and other analogous circumstances. In this case, records are bereft of showing that Judge Buenavista sought for an extension of time to decide and resolve most of the cases pending before him, save only for one instance. Having therefore failed to decide cases and resolve incidents within the required period constituted gross inefficiency, Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

warranting the imposition of a fine of P10,000.00 which the Court finds reasonable under the circumstances. Re: Report of the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional trial Court, Branches 72 and 22, Narvacan Ilocos Sur. A.M. No. 06-9-525-RTC, June 13, 2012. Public Officials; SALNs. While no prohibition could stand against access to official records, such as the SALN, the same is undoubtedly subject to regulation. Section 8 (c) and (d) of R.A. No. 6713 provides for the limitation and prohibition on the regulated access to SALNs of government officials and employees as well as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 6713. The power to regulate the access by the public to these documents stems from the inherent power of the Court, as custodian of these personal documents, to control its very office to the end that damage to, or loss of, the records may be avoided; that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the books and documents and other employees may be prevented; and that the right of other persons entitled to make inspection may be insured. In this connection, Section 11 of the R.A 6173 provides for the penalties in case there should be a misuse of the SALN and the information contained therein. The Court found no reason to deny the public access to the SALN, PDS and CV of the Justices of the Court and other magistrates of the Judiciary subject, of course, to the limitations and prohibitions provided in R.A. No. 6713, its implementing rules and regulations, and in the guidelines set forth in the decretal portion. The Court noted the valid concerns of the other magistrates regarding the possible illicit motives of some individuals in their requests for access to such personal information and their publication. However, custodians of public documents must not concern themselves with the motives, reasons and objects of the persons seeking access to the records. The moral or material injury which their misuse might inflict on others is the requestor’s responsibility and lookout. Any publication is made subject to the consequences of the law. While public officers in the custody or control of public records have the discretion to regulate the manner in which records may be inspected, examined or copied by interested persons, such discretion does not carry with it the authority to prohibit access, inspection, examination, or copying of the records. After all, public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. The Supreme Court also provided the following guidelines: 1. All requests shall be filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals; for the lower courts, with the Office of the Court Administrator; and for attached agencies, with their respective heads of offices. 2. Requests shall cover only copies of the latest SALN, PDS and CV of the members, officials and employees of the Judiciary, and may cover only Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

previous records if so specifically requested and considered as justified, as determined by the officials mentioned in par. 1 above, under the terms of these guidelines and the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 6713. 3. In the case of requests for copies of SALN of the Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, the authority to disclose shall be made by the Court En Banc. 4. Every request shall explain the requesting party’s specific purpose and their individual interests sought to be served; shall state the commitment that the request shall only be for the stated purpose; and shall be submitted in a duly accomplished request form secured from the SC website. The use of the information secured shall only be for the stated purpose. 5. In the case of requesting individuals other than members of the media, their interests should go beyond pure or mere curiosity. 6. In the case of the members of the media, the request shall additionally be supported by proof under oath of their media affiliation and by a similar certification of the accreditation of their respective organizations as legitimate media practitioners. 7. The requesting party, whether as individuals or as members of the media, must have no derogatory record of having misused any requested information previously furnished to them. Re: Request for copy of 2008 Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth [SALN] and Personal Data Sheet or Curriculum Vitae of the Justices of the Supreme Court and Officers and Employees of the Judiciary/ Re; Request of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism [PCIJ] for the 2008 Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth [SALN] and Personal Data Sheets of the Court of Appeals Justices, A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC/A.M. No. 09-8-07-CA. June 13, 2012. Retirement under R.A 910; Retirement vs. Resignation. Resignation and retirement are two distinct concepts carrying different meanings and legal consequences in our jurisdiction. While an employee can resign at any time, retirement entails the compliance with certain age and service requirements specified by law and jurisprudence. Resignation stems from the employee’s own intent and volition to resign and relinquish his/her post. Retirement takes effect by operation of law. In terms of severance to one’s employment, resignation absolutely cuts-off the employment relationship in general; in retirement, the employment relationship endures for the purpose of the grant of retirement benefits. RA No. 910, as amended allows the grant of retirement benefits to a justice or judge who has either retired from judicial service or resigned from judicial office. In case of retirement, a justice or judge must show compliance with the age and service requirements as provided in RA No. 910, as amended. The second sentence of Section 1 imposes the following minimum requirements for optional retirement: (a) must have attained the age of sixty (60) years old; and Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

(b) must have rendered at least fifteen (15) years service in the Government, the last three (3) of which shall have been continuously rendered in the Judiciary. Strict compliance with the age and service requirements under the law is the rule and the grant of exception remains to be on a case to case basis. The Court allows seeming exceptions to these fixed rules for certain judges and justices only and whenever there are ample reasons to grant such exception. On the other hand, resignation under RA No. 910, as amended must be by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office. In Britanico, it was held that the resignation contemplated under RA No. 910, as amended must have the element of involuntariness on the part of the justice or judge. More than physical or mental disability to discharge the judicial office, the involuntariness must spring from the intent of the justice or judge who would not have parted with his/her judicial employment were it not for the presence of circumstances and/or factors beyond his/her control. In either of the two instances above-mentioned, Judge Macarambon’s case does not render him eligible to retire under RA No. 910,as amended. First, Judge Macarambon failed to satisfy the age requirement since he was less than 60 years of age when he resigned from his judicial office before transferring to the COMELEC. Likewise, he failed to satisfy the service requirement not having been in continuous service with the Judiciary for three (3) years prior to his retirement. Second, Judge Macarambon’s resignation was not by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office. His separation from judicial employment was of his own accord and volition. Thus, the ruling in Britanico cannot be properly applied to his case since his resignation was voluntary. Third, there are no exceptional reasons to justify Judge Macarambon’s request. Judge Macarambon failed to present similar circumstances, i.e., the presence of available and sufficient accumulated leave credits which we may tack in to comply with the age requirement. A verification from the Leave Division, OCA shows that at the time he left the Court Judge Macarambon only had 514 vacation leaves and 79 sick leaves which are insufficient to cover the gap in the age of retirement. Moreover, these accumulated leave credits were all forwarded to the COMELEC upon his transfer. Finally, unlike in Britanico, the nature of his separation from his judicial office was voluntary. However, although Judge Macarambon is not qualified to retire under RA No. 910, as amended, he may retire under RA No. 1616 based on the documents he had presented before the Court which meets the age and service requirements under the said law. Re: Application for Retirement of Judge Moslemen Macarambon under Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Republic Act No. 9946, A.M. No. 14061-RET, June 19, 2012. Attorney; Notarization; Importance. An administrative case was filed against Atty. Rinen for falsification of an Extra Judicial Partition with Sale which allowed the transfer to Spouses Durante of a parcel of land. In Bautista v. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

Atty. Bernabe, the Court held that “[a] notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The presence of the parties to the deed will enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant.” Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. It converts a private document into a public one, making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of public instruments would be undermined. In this case, Atty. Rinen did not deny his failure to personally verify the identity of all parties who purportedly signed the subject document and whom, as he claimed, appeared before him on April 7, 1994. Such failure was further shown by the fact that the pertinent details of the community tax certificates of Wilberto and his sister, as proof of their identity, remained unspecified in the deed’s acknowledgment portion. Clearly, there was a failure on the part of Atty. Rinen to exercise the due diligence that was required of him as a notary public ex–officio. Thus, Atty. Rinen’s notarial commission as revoked and he was disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for one year. Wilberto C. Talisic v. Atty. Primo R. Rinen, A.C. No. 8761, February 12, 2014. Attorney; Notarization not an empty act. Complainant charged Atty. Gupana of forgeries and falsifications in the notarization of certain documents. The Supreme Court found Atty. Gupana administratively liable under Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known as the Notarial Law, for violation of his notarial duties when he failed to require the personal presence of Candelaria Magpayo when he notarized the Affidavit of Loss which Candelaria allegedly executed on April 29, 1994. Under the law, the party acknowledging must appear before the notary public or any other person authorized to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents. In this case, the jurat of the Affidavit of Loss stated that Candelaria subscribed to the affidavit before Atty. Gupana on April 29, 1994, at Mandaue City. Candelaria, however, was already dead since March 26, 1991. Hence, it is clear that the jurat was made in violation of the notarial law. The notarization of a document is not an empty act or routine. A notary public’s function should not be trivialized and a notary public must discharge his powers and duties which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity. As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, Atty. Gupana is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy impressed with public interest. Thus, the Supreme Court held that Atty. Gupana’s revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years and suspension Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

from the practice of law for one year are in order. Carlito Ang v. Atty. James Joseph Gupana, A.C. No. 4545. February 5, 2014. Court Personnel; Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service. An administrative complaint was filed against Salamanca, Clerk III of a Metropolitan Trial Court for unauthorized/unexplained absences and other infractions: (1) failure to account for and turn over the partial settlement amount of a civil obligation; and (2) failure to account for and turn over the payment for legal fees she received in a case. The Supreme Court held that the acts of Salamanca constitute dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Dishonesty is defined as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud. It implies untrustworthiness, lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle on the part of the individual who failed to exercise fairness and straightforwardness in his or her dealings. Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service, on the other hand, pertains to any conduct that is detrimental or derogatory or naturally or probably bringing about a wrong result; it refers to acts or omissions that violate the norm of public accountability and diminish – or tend to diminish – the people’s faith in the Judiciary. However, Salamanca’s dishonesty does not consist of her failure to remit court funds because the money she received from the litigants did not acquire the status of court funds as no official receipt therefor was issued by her. While Salamanca’s complained acts involved technically private money, the deceit she pulled off disrupted the public’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary and its personnel. Her conduct tarnished the image and integrity of her public office and violated the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, Section 4(c) which commands that public officials and employees shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to public safety and public interest. Executive Judge Ma. Ofelia S. Contreras-Soriano v. Clerk III Liza D. Salamanca, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 55, Malabon City, A.M. No. P-133119. February 10, 2014. Court Personnel; Duty to Submit Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN). Sheriff Collado was charged with failing to disclose in her SALN for the years 2004 and 2005 certain time deposits, among others. The Supreme Court cited Section 8 of RA 6713 which requires all public officials and employees to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of their assets and liabilities. The requirement of SALN submission is aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption, as well as at maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. With such disclosure, the public would, to a reasonable extent, be able to monitor the affluence of public officials, and, in such manner, provides a check and balance mechanism to verify their undisclosed properties and/or sources of income. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

The Supreme Court held that based on Section 8 of RA 6713, “all other assets such as investments, cash on hand or in banks, stocks, bonds, and the like”, should be declared by the public official in his or her SALN. In this case, however, it was established that she only declared the original amount of her time deposits in her SALN for the years 2004 and 2005, and did not disclose the interests which had eventually accrued on the same. Accordingly, Collado fell short of the legal requirement stated under Section 8 of RA 6713 and thus should be held administratively liable for said infraction. Angelito R. Marquez, et al. v. Judge Venancio M. Ovejera, etc., et al., A.M. No. P-11-2903, February 5, 2014. Court Personnel; Grave Misconduct. A complaint was filed against Susbilla-De Vera for soliciting money to supposedly facilitate a legal proceeding in court. The court held Susbilla-De Vera guilty of the most serious administrative offense of grave misconduct. To deserve the trust and confidence of the people, Susbilla-De Vera was expected to have her dealings with the public to be always sincere and above board. She should not lead others to believe that despite her status as a minor court employee she had the capacity to influence the outcomes of judicial matters. Her acts did not live up to the expectation, for the records unquestionably showed how she had deliberately and fraudulently misrepresented her ability to assist the complainant in the adoption of her niece and nephew. Section 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel has enjoined all court personnel from soliciting or accepting any gift, favor or benefit based on any or explicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions. The Court thus warranted her dismissal from service. Veronica F. Galindez v. Zosima Susbilla-De Vera, A.M. No. P-13-3126, February 4, 2014. Court Personnel; Grave Misconduct. An administrative case was filed against respondents who are employees of the Court of Appeals for “transacting” with party–litigants with a pending case before the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the court personnel’s act of soliciting or receiving money from litigants constitutes grave misconduct. The sole act of receiving money from litigants, whatever the reason may be, is antithesis to being a court employee. The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel requires that court personnel avoid conflicts of interest in performing official duties. It mandates that court personnel should not receive tips or other remunerations for assisting or attending to parties engaged in transactions or involved in actions or proceedings with the judiciary. Further, court personnel cannot take advantage of the vulnerability of party–litigants. In this case, respondents were found guilty of grave misconduct and thus, dismissed from service with forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification from holding public office in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government–owned or controlled corporations. Anacleto O. Villahermosa, Sr., et al. v. Victor Sacia, Executive Assistant IV and Efren R. Rivamonte, etc., A.M. No. CA-14-28-P, February 11, 2014. Judge; Notarization; Prohibition. An administrative complaint was filed against Judge Rojo for notarizing affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

marriage he solemnized, in violation of Circular No. 1–90 dated February 26, 1990. Circular No. 1–90 allows municipal trial court judges to act as notaries public ex officio and notarize documents only if connected with their official functions and duties. The Supreme Court held Judge Rojo guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and Circular No. 1–90, and of gross ignorance of the law. Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were documents not connected with the exercise of his official functions and duties as solemnizing officer. He also notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that lawyers or notaries public were lacking in his court’s territorial jurisdiction. As a solemnizing officer, the judge’s only duty involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to examine whether the parties have indeed lived together for at least five years without legal impediment to marry. The Guidelines does not state that the judge can notarize the parties’ affidavit of cohabitation. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to examine the parties’ requirements for marriage. If the solemnizing officer notarized the affidavit of cohabitation, he cannot objectively examine and review the affidavit’s statements before performing the marriage ceremony. Thus, Judge Rojo was suspended for six months from office.Rex M. Tupal v. Judge Remegio V. Rojo, etc., A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842. February 24, 2014. Attorney; confidentiality of proceedings against attorneys; exception. Atty. Fortun filed a petition for contempt against respondents for publicizing the disbarment case against him in media. Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that “proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential. However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases.” The purpose of the rule is not only to enable the Court to make its investigations free from any extraneous influence or interference, but also to protect the personal and professional reputation of attorneys and judges from the baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive, and irresponsible clients and litigants; it is also to deter the press from publishing administrative cases or portions thereto without authority. Malicious and unauthorized publication or verbatim reproduction of administrative complaints against lawyers in newspapers by editors and/or reporters may be actionable. Such premature publication constitutes a contempt of court, punishable by either a fine or imprisonment or both at the discretion of the Court. However, Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court is not a restriction on the freedom of the press. If there is a legitimate public interest, media is not prohibited from making a fair, true, and accurate news report of a disbarment complaint. In the absence of a legitimate public interest in a disbarment complaint, members of the media must preserve the confidentiality of disbarment proceedings during its pendency. In this case, the filing of a disbarment complaint against Atty. Fortun is itself a matter of public concern considering that it arose from the Maguindanao Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

Massacre case. The interest of the public is not on Atty. Fortun himself but primarily on his involvement and participation as defense counsel in the Maguindanao Massacre case. Thus, since the disbarment complaint is a matter of public interest, media had a right to publish such fact under freedom of the press. Philip Sigrid A. Fortun vs. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas, et al., G.R. No. 194578. February 13, 2013.

Attorney; full discharge of duties to client; limitations. Atty. Villarin is expected to champion the cause of his client with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense – including the institution of an ejectment case – that is recognized by our property laws. In Legarda v. Court of Appeals, the court held that in the full discharge of their duties to the client, lawyers shall not be afraid of the possibility that they may displease the general public. Nevertheless, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides the limitation that lawyers shall perform their duty to the client within the bounds of law. They should only make such defense when they believe it to be honestly debatable under the law. In this case, Atty. Villarin’s act of issuing demand letters, moved by the understanding of a void HLURB Decision, is legally sanctioned. If his theory holds water, the notice to vacate becomes necessary in order to file an action for ejectment. Hence, he did not resort to any fraud or chicanery prohibited by the Code just to maintain his client’s disputed ownership over the subdivision lots. However, the facts show that Atty. Villarin brazenly typified one of the complainants as an illegal occupant when the final and executory HLURB Decision had already recognized her as a subdivision lot buyer. Given that he knew such falsity, he thus advances the interest of his client through means that are not in keeping with fairness and honesty. This is proscribed by Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful objectives. Lawyers must not present and offer in evidence any document that they know is false. Verleen Trinidad, Florentina Lander, Wally Casubuan, Minerva Mendoza, Celedonio Alojado, et al. vs. Atty. Angelito Villarin, A.C. No. 9310. February 27, 2013. Attorney; notarial practice; necessity of affiant’s personal appearance; nature of notarization; penalties when a notary public fails to discharge his duties. A notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the very same person who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein. Without the personal appearance of the person who actually executed the document, the notary public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party’s free act or deed. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

The notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his duties; otherwise, the public’s confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined Respondent’s failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only damage to those directly affected by the notarized document but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public and in degrading the function of notarization. He should, thus, be held liable for such negligence not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer. The responsibility to faithfully observe and respect the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer because of his solemn oath under the Code of Professional Responsibility to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. Based on existing jurisprudence, when a lawyer commissioned as a notary public fails to discharge his duties as such, he is meted the penalties of revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years, and suspension from the practice of law for one year. Patrocinio V. Agbulos vs. Atty. Roseller A. Viray, A.C. No. 7350. February 18, 2013. Court personnel; discourteous acts. Section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution states that a public office is a public trust. “It enjoins public officers and employees to serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and to, at all times, remain accountable to the people.” As front liners of the justice system, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs must always strive to maintain public trust in the performance of their duties. As agents of the law, they are “called upon to discharge their duties with due care and utmost diligence because in serving the court’s writs and processes and implementing the orders of the court, they cannot afford to err without affecting the integrity of their office and the efficient administration of justice.”

Sheriff Gelbolingo’s failure to properly respond to the letters is tantamount to discourtesy. A simple note as to where their personal effects were temporarily stored could have assured Sasing that their belongings were not confiscated but merely stored for safekeeping. The Court is fully aware that a sheriff’s schedule can be hectic, but she could have easily relayed the information to the other court staff to address Sasing’s concerns. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

The administrative offense committed by Sheriff Gelbolingo is discourtesy in the course of official duties which, under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Rule IV, Section 52(C)(1), is a light offense. The penalty imposable for such an offense is either a reprimand for the first offense, a suspension from 1 day to 30 days for the second offense, and dismissal from public service for the third offense. In this case, the court admonished Sheriff Gelbolingo considering there was an effort on her part to meet with Sasing twice, but the latter did not appear on the second scheduled meeting. Ray Antonio C. Sasing vs. Celestial Venus G. Gelbolingo, Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, A.M. No. P-12-3032. February 20, 2013.

Court personnel; public office is a public trust; simple neglect of duty. No less than the Constitution itself mandates that all public officers and employees should serve with responsibility, integrity and efficiency, for public office is a public trust. The Court has repeatedly reminded those who work in the Judiciary to be examples of responsibility, competence and efficiency; they must discharge their duties with due care and utmost diligence, since they are officers of the Court and agents of the law. “Indeed, any conduct, act or omission on the part of those who would violate the norm[s] of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary shall not be countenanced.” In this case, Mendoza charged Esguerra, a process server in the RTC, with Negligence and Dereliction of Duty. The court held that Esguerra was guilty of simple neglect of duty. Esguerra cannot blame the Civil Docket Clerk for the delay in the service of the July 7, 2008 Order. If indeed a copy of the July 7, 2008 Order had been handed to Esguerra only on August 8, 2008, a Friday, “he should not have proceeded to mail the same; but instead, should have served the Order personally to the parties, particularly to the herein complainant.” Even the Notice of Dismissal dated August 21, 2008 was mailed only on September 19, 2008, three (3) weeks after it was endorsed to him sometime on August 22 or 25, 2008. These acts clearly demonstrate lack of sufficient or reasonable diligence on the part of the respondent. Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel mandates that “Court personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly and with diligence.” Clearly, Esguerra had been remiss in the performance of his duties and has shown lack of dedication to the functions of his office. Esguerra’s acts displayed a conduct falling short of the stringent standards required of court employees. Erlinda C. Mendoza vs. Pedro S. Esguerra, Process Server, RTC, Br. 89, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, A.M. No. P-11-2967. February 13, 2013. Internal Rules of the CA (IRCA); preliminary injunction; requirement of a hearing. Section 4 of Rule VI of the 2009 IRCA provides that “[T]he requirement of a hearing for preliminary injunction is satisfied with the issuance of a resolution served upon the party sought to be enjoined Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

requiring him to comment on the said application within the period of not more than ten (10) days from notice.” In this case, the CA was justified in dispensing with the requisite hearing on the application for injunctive writ, since the so-called “new and substantial matters” raised in the third urgent motion in CA-G.R. SP No. 122784 and in the supplement thereto were in fact not previously unknown to respondents Ricafort, and they had already been previously ordered to comment on the said application, at the time when the said “subsequent” matters were already obtaining. Ethelwoldo E. Fernandez, Antonio A. Henson & Angel S. Ong vs. Court of Appeals Asso. Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr., Isaias P. Dicdican, A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J. February 19, 2013. Judge; anonymous complaints against judges must be supported by public records of indubitable integrity; unbecoming conduct. Under Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, anonymous complaints may be filed against judges, but they must be supported by public records of indubitable integrity. Courts have acted in such instances needing no corroboration by evidence to be offered by the complainant. Thus, for anonymous complaints, the burden of proof in administrative proceedings which usually rests with the complainant, must be buttressed by indubitable public records and by what is sufficiently proven during the investigation. If the burden of proof is not overcome, the respondent is under no obligation to prove his defense. In this case, no evidence was attached to the letter-complaint. The complainant never appeared, and no public records were brought forth during the investigation. Judge Achas denied all the charges made against him, only admitting that he was separated de facto from his wife and that he reared fighting cocks. For going out in public with a woman not his wife, Judge Achas has clearly failed to abide by Canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for Philippine Judiciary. Regarding his involvement in cockfighting, however, there is no clear evidence. Although Judge Achas denied engaging in cockfighting and betting, he admitted rearing fighting cocks for leisure. While rearing fighting cocks is not illegal, Judge Achas should avoid mingling with a crowd of cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors as it undoubtedly impairs the respect due him. As a judge, he must impose upon himself personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its occupant than does the judicial office. Judges in particular must be individuals of competence, honesty and probity, charged as they are with safeguarding the integrity of the court and its proceedings. He should behave at all times so as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and avoid impropriety and the appearance of Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

impropriety in all his activities. His personal behavior outside the court, and not only while in the performance of his official duties, must be beyond reproach, for he is perceived to be the personification of law and justice. Thus, any demeaning act of a judge degrades the institution he represents. Anonymous vs. Judge Rio C. Achas, MTCC Branch 2, Ozamiz City, Misamis Occidental, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801. February 27, 2013. Judge; definition of ponencia; ponente if present can act upon an urgent motion alone or with another member present. There is nothing in the Internal Rules of the CA (IRCA) which would have required the Division Clerk of Court to transmit the urgent motion for action only to the two present regular members of the 14th Division, as the complainants seem to believe. The complainants would have been correct if the absent member of the Division was not the ponente herself but either of the other members. This implies that the ponente if present can act upon the urgent motion alone or with another member present, provided that the action or resolution “is submitted on the next working day to the absent member or members of the Division for ratification, modification or recall.” A preliminary injunction is not a ponencia but an order granted at any stage of an action prior to final judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a particular act. It is settled that as an ancillary or preventive remedy, a writ of preliminary injunction may be resorted to by a party to protect or preserve his rights and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action. Its object is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case are passed upon. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. On the other hand, ponencia refers to the rendition of a decision in a case on the merits, which disposes of the main controversy. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by the 14th Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 122784 did not settle the controversy therein, but is a mere interlocutory order to restore the status quo ante, that is, the state of things prior to the RTC’s Order of December 21, 2011. Ethelwoldo E. Fernandez, Antonio A. Henson & Angel S. Ong vs. Court of Appeals Asso. Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr., Isaias P. Dicdican, A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J. February 19, 2013. Judge; government employee vis-à-vis government officer; liberal treatment upon retirement claims of judges and justices. In a letter, former Chief Justice Panganiban requested that the government service which he rendered from January 1962 to December 1965 in the Department of Education, its Secretary, and the Board of National Education, be creditable so that he can meet the present service requirement of fifteen (15) years for entitlement to retirement benefits. Under the old Administrative Code (Act No. 2657), a government “employee” includes any person in the service of the Government or any branch thereof of whatever grade or class. A government “officer,” on the other hand, refers to officials whose duties involve the exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions of government, whether such duties are precisely defined or Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

not. Clearly, the law, then and now, did not require a specific job description and job specification. Thus, the absence of a specific position in a governmental structure is not a hindrance for the Court to give weight to CJ Panganiban’s government service as legal counsel and consultant. The Supreme Court has unquestionably followed the practice of liberal treatment in passing upon retirement claims of judges and justices, thus: (1) waiving the lack of required length of service in cases of disability or death while in actual service19 or distinctive service; (2) adding accumulated leave credits to the actual length of government service in order to qualify one for retirement; (3) tacking post-retirement service in order to complete the years of government service required; (4) extending the full benefits of retirement upon compassionate and humanitarian considerations; and (5) considering legal counseling work for a government body or institution as creditable government service. Re: Request of (Ret.) Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban for Re-Computation of his Creditable Service for the Purpose of Re-Computing his Retirement Benefits, A.M. No. 10-9-15-SC. February 12, 2013. Judge; gross ignorance of the law; mandatory inhibition; no liability for damages in the exercise of judicial functions. The court held that Judge Dinopol is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. To be held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but must have also been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption. Gross ignorance of the law is considered as a serious offense under Rule 140, Section 8, and is punishable under Section 11. Moreover, one of the plaintiffs in the Civil Case assigned to the judge, is a relative by affinity within the sixth degree, Judge Dinopol should have inhibited himself from taking cognizance of the case as mandated by Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. However, Judge Dinopol is not liable for damages. In Alzua v. Johnson, the court explained that in civil actions for damages, judges of superior and general jurisdiction are not liable to answer for what they do in the exercise of their judicial functions, provided they are acting within their legal powers and jurisdiction. Eduardo Panes, Jr. et al. vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City/Joewe Palad vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City/Roque C. Facura, et al. vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City/Eden V. Castro vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City/Rosalinda G. Farofaldane vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City/Engr. Roque C. Facura, et al. vs. Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City, A.M. OCA-IPI No. 072618-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-2619-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-2652RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-2720-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 07-2721-RTJ/A.M. No. OCA-IPI No. 08-2808-RTJ. February 12, 2013.


Judge; instituting administrative proceedings against justices. Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, there are three ways by which administrative proceedings may be instituted against justices of the CA and the Sandiganbayan and judges of regular and special courts: (1) motu proprio by the Supreme Court; (2) upon verified complaint (as in this complaint) with affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations; or (3) upon an anonymous complaint supported by public records of indubitable integrity. In this case, complainants have no personality to assail the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the CA’s former Special 14th Division since they were not parties in the lower court. Thus, they are not permitted to harass the CA Justices who issued the same. For even granting that the issuance of the writ was erroneous, as a matter of public policy a magistrate cannot be held administratively liable for every discretionary but erroneous order he issues. The settled rule is that “a Judge cannot be held to account civilly, criminally or administratively for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith.” The issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction in the consolidated CA petitions was discretionary, interlocutory and preservative in nature, and equally importantly, it was a collective and deliberated action of the former Special 14th Division. Moreover, as an established rule, an administrative, civil or criminal action against a judge cannot be a substitute for an appeal. Ethelwoldo E. Fernandez, Antonio A. Henson & Angel S. Ong vs. Court of Appeals Asso. Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr., Isaias P. Dicdican, A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J. February 19, 2013. Judge; judicial conduct; definition of just debts; willful failure to pay a just debt is a ground for disciplinary action against judges. Manlapaz charged Judge Sabillo with serious and gross misconduct for failure to return an amount arising from a transaction. The Court has repeatedly stressed that it is not a collection agency for the unpaid debts of its officials and employees, but has nevertheless provided for Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court that holds its officials and employees administratively liable in unpaid debt situations. This Section provides that willful failure to pay a just debt is a ground for disciplinary action against judges and justices. Just debts, as defined in Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292, refer to (1) claims adjudicated by a court of law; or (2) claims, the existence and justness of which are admitted by the debtor. Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies willful failure to pay a just debt as a serious charge. While reference to a debt necessarily implies a transaction that is private and outside of official transactions, the rules do not thereby intrude into public officials’ private lives; they simply look at their actions from the prism of public service and consider these acts unbecoming of a public official. These rules take into account that these are actions of officials who are entrusted with public duties and who, even in their private capacities, should continually act to reflect their status as public servants. Employees of the Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

judiciary should be living examples of uprightness not only in the performance of official duties but also in their personal and private dealings with others so as to preserve at all times the good name and standing of the courts in the community. Here, the complainant’s claim is a just debt. The willfulness of Judge Sabillo in not paying is shown by his continuous failure to settle despite demand letters sent to him. Thus, the court imposed the penalty of fine. Victoriano G. Manlapaz vs. Judge Manuel T. Sabillo, MCTC, Lamitan, Basilan, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1771. February 13, 2013. Judge; judicial audit; court’s jurisdiction over an administrative case; presumption of regularity. The OCA submitted its memorandum to then Acting Chief Justice Antonio T. Carpio on 10 July 2012 — more than two years and seven months after Judge Grageda compulsorily retired. During his incumbency, Judge Grageda was never given the chance to explain the alleged violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars. Up to the present, the OCA has not commenced any formal investigation or asked Judge Grageda to comment on the matter. Thus, the complaint against Judge Grageda must be dismissed. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Mantua, the court held that “this Court concedes that there are no promulgated rules on the conduct of judicial audit. However, the absence of such rules should not serve as license to recommend the imposition of penalties to retired judges who, during their incumbency, were never given a chance to explain the circumstances behind the results of the judicial audit. Judicial audit reports and the memoranda which follow them should state not only recommended penalties and plans of action for the violations of audited courts, but also give commendations when they are due. To avoid similar scenarios, manual judicial audits may be conducted at least six months before a judge’s compulsory retirement. We recognize that effective monitoring of a judge’s observance of the time limits required in the disposition of cases is hampered by limited resources. These limitations, however, should not be used to violate Judge Mantua’s right to due process.” For the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an administrative case, the complaint must be filed during the incumbency of the respondent. Once jurisdiction is acquired, it is not lost by reason of respondent’s cessation from office. In this case, Judge Grageda’s compulsory retirement divested the OCA of its right to institute a new administrative case against him after his compulsory retirement. The Court can no longer acquire administrative jurisdiction over him by filing a new administrative case against him after he has ceased to be a public official. The remedy is to file the appropriate civil or criminal case against him for the alleged transgression. Moreover, to hold Judge Grageda liable, there must be substantial evidence that he committed an offense. Otherwise, the presumption is that he regularly performed his duties. In Go v. Judge Achas, the Court held that, “In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

respondent has regularly performed his duties will prevail. Even in administrative cases, if a court employee or magistrate is to be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against him should be competent.” Missing Exhibits and Court Properties in Regional Trial Court, Br. 4, Panabo City, Davao del Norte, A.M. No. 10-2-41-RTC. February 27, 2013. Judge; undue delay. The court held that Judge Amdengan committed undue delay in rendering a Decision in the ejectment case. An action for ejectment is governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure, Section 10 which provides that “within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall render judgment.” This provision is mandatory, considering the nature of an ejectment case. Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or an order is classified as a less serious charge, punishable by either suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000. The court considered his candid admission and acceptance of his infraction as factors in imposing only a fine. Atty. Manuel J. Jimenez, Jr. vs. Presiding Judge Michael M. Amdengan, Municipal Trail Court, Angono Rizal, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818. February 13, 2013. Attorney; Accountability for Money Received from Client. Atty. Lawsin undertook to process the registration and eventually deliver, within a period of 6 months, the certificate of title over a certain parcel of land (subject land) in favor of complainant acting as the representative of the Heirs of the late Isabel Segovia. Atty. Lawsin received from complainant the amounts of P15,000 and P39,000 to cover for the litigation and land registration expenses, respectively. Atty. Lawsin, however, failed to fulfil his undertaking and failed to return the money to complainant. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Lawsin’s failure to properly account for and duly return his client’s money despite due demand is tantamount to a violation of Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code. Complainant’s purported act of “maligning” him does not justify the latter’s failure to properly account for and return his client’s money upon due demand. Verily, a lawyer’s duty to his client is one essentially imbued with trust so much so that it is incumbent upon the former to exhaust all reasonable efforts towards its faithful compliance. Azucena Segovia-Ribaya v. Atty. Bartolome C. Lawsin, A.C. No. 7965, November 13, 2013. Attorney; Administrative Proceedings; Sole Issue. Complainants filed a complaint for dishonesty against respondent, a retired judge, for knowingly making untruthful statements in the complaint he filed against them. The Supreme Court held that in administrative cases, the only issue within the ambit of the Court’s disciplinary authority is whether a lawyer is fit to remain a member of the Bar. Other issues are proper subjects of judicial action. On its face, the 12 September 2006 complaint filed by the Spouses Williams against Atty. Enriquez does not merit an administrative case. In order for the Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

Court to determine whether Atty. Enriquez is guilty of dishonesty, the issue of ownership must first be settled. The issue of ownership of real property must be settled in a judicial, not administrative, case. Sps. David Williams and Marissa Williams v. Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez, A.C. No. 7329, November 27, 2013. Attorney; Gross Neglect of Duty. A complaint was filed against Atty. Venida for serious misconduct and gross neglect of duty. Complainant alleged that she engaged the services of respondent to handle her case before the CA but the respondent had been remiss. Thus, her case was dismissed. The Supreme Court held that this is a clear violation of Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to keep their clients informed of the status of their case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients’ request for information. Respondent’s refusal to obey the orders of the IBP is not only irresponsible, but also constitutes utter disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers. His conduct is unbecoming of a lawyer, for lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives being themselves officers of the court. Aurora H. Cabauatan v. Atty. Freddie A. Venida, A.C. No. 10043, November 20, 2013. Attorney; Mishandling of Client’s Case. Complainant-Spouses filed an administrative case against Atty. Dublin for gross negligence and dereliction of duty for mishandling their case. The Supreme Court held Atty. Dublin guilty of mishandling Civil Case No. 23,396-95. Records show that the 10-day period given to him to submit his formal offer of documentary evidence pursuant to the RTC Order lapsed without any compliance from him. Atty. Dublin violated the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Canon 18 and Rule 18.03. Respondent admitted that he deliberately failed to timely file the formal offer of exhibits because he believed that the exhibits were fabricated and the same would be refused admission by the RTC. However, if respondent truly believed that the exhibits to be presented in evidence by his clients were fabricated, then he had the option to withdraw from the case. Canon 22 allows a lawyer to withdraw his services for good cause such as “[w]hen the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct with the matter he is handling” or “[w]hen the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules.” Thus, Atty. Dublin was imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for 6 months. Sps. George A. Warriner and Aurora R. Warriner v. Atty. Reni M. Dublin, A.C. No. 5239, November 18, 2013. Attorney; Notary Public; Notarial Register. Complainants filed a complaint against Atty. Kilaan for falsification of documents, dishonesty and deceit. Complainants alleged that Atty. Kilaan intercalated certain entries in the application for issuance of Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) to operate a public utility jeepney filed before the LTFRB. Complainants also alleged that the Verification in Batingwed’s application for CPC was notarized by Atty. Kilaan as Doc. No: 253, Page No. 51, Book No. VIII, Series of 2003. However, upon verification of Atty. Kilaan’s Notarial Registry submitted to the RTC, the Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

said notarial entry actually refers to a Deed of Sale and not the Verification of Batingwed’s application. It is settled that it is the notary public who is personally accountable for the accuracy of the entries in his Notarial Register. The Court is not persuaded by respondent’s explanation that he is burdened with cases thus he was constrained to delegate the recording of his notarial acts in his Notarial Register to his secretary. Rule VI, Sections I and 2 of the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice require a notary public to keep and maintain a Notarial Register wherein he will record his every notarial act. His failure to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register concerning his notarial acts is a ground for revocation of his notarial commission. Since Atty. Kilaan failed to make the proper entries in his Notarial Register, his notarial commission may be properly revoked. Mariano Agadan, et al. v. Atty. Richard Baltazar Kilaan, A.C. No. 9385, November 11, 2013. Attorney; Respect to Courts. Complainant alleged that Atty. Flores failed to give due respect to the court by failing to obey court orders, by failing to submit proof of his compliance with the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) requirement, and for using intemperate language in his pleadings. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Flores failed to obey the court’s order to submit proof of his MCLE compliance notwithstanding the several opportunities given him. Court orders are to be respected not because the judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the respect and consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the Government. This is absolutely essential if our Government is to be a government of laws and not of men. Respect must be had not because of the incumbents to the positions, but because of the authority that vests in them. Moreover, Atty. Flores employed intemperate language in his pleadings. As an officer of the court, Atty. Flores is expected to be circumspect in his language. Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins all attorneys to abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behaviour before the Courts. Hon. Maribeth Rodriguez-Manahan, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo, Rizal v. Atty. Rodolfo Flores, A.C. No. 8954, November 13, 2013. Court Personnel; Dishonesty. Complainants accused respondent sheriff of grave misconduct, dishonesty and conduct unbecoming an officer of the court for unlawfully and forcibly acquiring part of their lot. The Supreme Court held that respondent is guilty of simple dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, but not of grave misconduct. Dishonesty is “intentionally making a false statement on any material fact” and “a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.” Respondent did not have a hand in the re-survey conducted by the DAR in 2003 which resulted in the increased land area of his lot. Nonetheless, respondent’s acts thereafter displayed his lack of honesty, fairness, and straightforwardness, not only with his neighbors, but also with the concerned government agencies/officials. Respondent’s deportment under the Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

circumstances likewise constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Respondent appears to have illegally forced his way into the disputed area. As a Sheriff, he is expected to be familiar with court procedure and processes, especially those concerning the execution of orders and decisions of the courts. Heirs of Celestino Teves, represented by Paul John Teves Abad, Elsa C. Aquino and Filimon E. Fernan v. Augusto Felicidario, A.M. No. P-12-3089, November 13, 2013. Court Personnel; Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty. Complainant alleged that the respondent failed to execute the decision in a land registration case despite receiving an amount for the implementation of the Alias Writ. The Supreme Court held that the deposit and payment of expenses incurred in enforcing writs are governed by Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as revised by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC. The rule clearly requires that the sheriff executing a writ shall provide an estimate of the expenses to be incurred, and such estimated amount must be approved by the court. Upon approval, the interested party shall then deposit the amount with the clerk of court and ex officio sheriff. The expenses shall be disbursed to the assigned deputy sheriff to execute the writ, subject to liquidation upon the return of the writ. In this case, the money which respondent had demanded and received from complainant was not among those prescribed and authorized by the Rules of Court as it was not even accounted for earlier in his Manifestation. He merely reported his receipt of the P20,000 in his liquidation of expenses only after complainant demanded an accounting and in compliance to Judge’s directive. The Court has ruled that any amount received by the sheriff in excess of the lawful fees allowed by the Rules of Court is an unlawful exaction and renders him liable for grave misconduct and gross dishonesty. Eleanor P. Olivan v. Arnel A. Rubio, etc., A.M. No. P-13-3063, November 26, 2013. Court Personnel; Gross Dishonesty. An administrative complaint was filed against Ibay, Clerk II of MTCC, for stealing a check. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of substantial defense to refute the charges against her, Ibay is liable for the loss of the check and the forgery of De Ocampo’s signature, leading to the check’s encashment. The case against Ibay is bolstered by the fact that Judge Eduarte found striking similarities between her handwriting in the inventory of cases and the forged endorsement in the check. Thus, there is substantial evidence to dismiss Ibay on the ground of dishonesty. Section 52(A) (1) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides that dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal from the service even when committed for the first time. Persons involved in the dispensation of justice, from the highest official to the lowest clerk, must live up to the strictest standards of integrity, probity, uprightness, honesty and diligence in the public service. The Supreme Court will not tolerate dishonesty, for the judiciary deserves the best from all its employees. Executive Judge Henedino P. Eduarte, RTC, Br. 20, Cauayan, Isabela v. Elizabeth T. Ibay, Clerk II, MTCC, Cauayan, Isabela, A.C. No. P-12-3100, November 12, 2013. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

Judges; Absence Without Approved Leave. Judge Villacorta III was granted authority to travel until February 3, 2011. However, he only returned to work on February 16, without securing an extension of his authority to travel abroad. This happened again for a second time. The Supreme Court held that OCA Circular No. 49-2003 (Guidelines on Requests for Travel Abroad and Extensions for Travel/Stay Abroad) requires that a request must be made for an extension of the period to travel/stay abroad, and that the request be received by the OCA ten (10) working days before the expiration of the original travel authority. Failure to do so would make the absences beyond the original period unauthorized. In this case, Judge Villacorta was in a position to file an application for leave to cover his extended stay abroad. Section 50 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 41, series of 1998, states that an official or an employee who is absent without approved leave shall not be entitled to receive the salary corresponding to the period of the unauthorized leave of absence. Re: Unauthorized Travel Abroad of Judge Cleto R. Villacorta III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio City, A.M. No. 11-9-167-RTC, November 11, 2013. Judges; Judicial Clemency in Administrative Cases. Judge Pacalna was held administratively liable for dishonesty, serious misconduct and gross ignorance of the law or procedure, and for violation the Code of Judicial Conduct. He then filed a Petition for Judicial Clemency. The Supreme Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency: (1) There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of nonreformation; (2) Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reformation; (3) The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself; (4) There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service; (5) There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency. In this case, Judge Pacalna’s petition is not supported by any single proof of his professed repentance and therefore, must be denied. Mamasaw Sultan Ali v. Judge Baguinda-Ali Pacalna, et al., A.M. No. MTJ-03-1505, November 27, 2013. Judges; Retirement Benefits. The surviving spouse of Judge Gruba applied for retirement/gratuity benefits under Republic Act No. 910. The 5-year lump sum gratuity due to Judge Gruba was paid to his heirs. On January 13, 2010, Congress amended Republic Act No. 910 and passed Republic Act No. 9946 which provided for more benefits, including survivorship pension benefits, among others. On January 11, 2012, Mrs. Gruba applied for survivorship pension benefits under Republic Act No. 9946. In a Resolution dated January Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

17, 2012, this Court approved the application of Mrs. Gruba. She received ₱1,026,748.00 for survivorship pension benefits from January 1, 2011 to April 2012. Later, however, the Supreme Court revoked the resolution dated January 17, 2012. The Supreme Court held that the law accommodates the heirs of Judge Gruba by entitling them to receive the improved gratuity benefits under Republic Act No. 9946, but it is clear that Mrs. Gruba is not entitled to the survivorship pension benefits. However, despite the fact that Mrs. Gruba is not entitled to receive survivorship pension, she no longer needs to return the survivorship pension benefits she received from January 2011 to April 2012 amounting to ₱1,026,748.00. The Supreme Court, in the past, has decided pro hac vice that a surviving spouse who received survivorship pension benefits in good faith no longer needs to refund such pensions. Re: Application for Survivorship Pension Benefits Under Republic Act 9946 of Mrs. Pacita A. Gruba, Surviving Spouse of the Late Manuel K. Gruba, Former CTA Associate Judge, A.M. No. 14155-Ret. November 19, 2013.

Attorney; forum shopping as contempt of court. A disbarment complaint against Atty. Gonzales was filed for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility for the forum shopping he allegedly committed. The court held that the respondent was guilty of forum shopping. Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct that tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes this obligation. The Court has repeatedly warned lawyers against resorting to forum shopping since the practice clogs the Court dockets and can lead to conflicting rulings. Willful and deliberate forum shopping has been made punishable either as direct or indirect contempt of court. In engaging in forum shopping, Atty. Gonzales violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which directs lawyers to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. He also disregarded his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and the prohibition against unduly delaying a case by misusing court processes. Thus, the court subjected Atty. Gonzales to censure. Anastacio N. Teodoro III vs. Atty. Romeo S. Gonzales. A.C. No. 6760. January 30, 2013 Attorney; neglect. Complainant filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Gacott who allegedly deceived the complainant and her husband into signing a “preparatory” Deed of Sale that respondent converted into a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his relatives. The respondent is reminded that his duty under Canon 16 is to “hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.” Allowing a party to take the original TCTs of properties owned by another – an act that could result in damage – should merit a finding of legal malpractice. While it was his legal staff who allowed the complainant to borrow the TCTs Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

and it does not appear that the respondent was aware or present when the complainant borrowed the TCTs, the court still held the respondent liable, as the TCTs were entrusted to his care and custody; he failed to exercise due diligence in caring for his client’s properties that were in his custody. Moreover, Canon 18, Rule 18.03 requires that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. What amounts to carelessness or negligence in a lawyer’s discharge of his duty to his client is incapable of an exact formulation, but the Court has consistently held that the mere failure of a lawyer to perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation. In Canoy v. Ortiz, the court held that a lawyer’s failure to file a position paper was per se a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Similar to Canoy, the respondent clearly failed in his duty to his client when, without any explanation, he failed to file the Motion for Leave to Intervene on behalf of the spouses Ylaya. Fe A. Ylaya vs. Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott. A.C. No. 6475. January 30, 2013 Attorney; lack of diligence. Complainant filed a case for disbarment against Atty. Cefra for violating Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rules 138 and139 of the Rules of Court. The court held that Atty. Cefra was guilty of negligence in handling the complainants’ case. His acts in the present administrative case also reveal his lack of diligence in performing his duties as an officer of the Court. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that “a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.” It further states that “a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.” In addition, a lawyer has the duty to “keep the client informed of the status of his case.” Atty. Cefra failed to live up to these standards as shown by the following: (1) Atty. Cefra failed to submit a formal offer of documentary evidence within the period given by the RTC; (2) He failed to comply with the two orders of the RTC directing him to submit a formal offer of documentary evidence; (3) Atty. Cefra failed to file an appropriate motion or appeal, or avail of any remedial measure to contest the RTC’s decision; (4) He failed to file an appropriate motion or appeal, or avail of any remedial measure to contest the RTC’s decision which was adverse to complainants. Thus, the above acts showing Atty. Cefra’s lack of diligence and inattention to his duties as a lawyer warrant disciplinary sanction. The court has repeatedly held that “[t]he practice of law is a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the legal qualifications for it. Lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.” Sps. Arcing and Cresing Bautista, et al. vs. Atty. Arturo Cefra A.C. No. 5530. January 28, 2013. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

Attorney; reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys; guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency; good moral character requirement. In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency, the Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, to wit: (a) There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of nonreformation. (b) Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reform. (c) The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself. (d) There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service. (e) There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency. Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the applicant must, like any other candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character. In a previous Decision, the Court disbarred respondent from the practice of law for having contracted a bigamous marriage with complainant Teves and a third marriage with one Constantino while his first marriage to Esparza was still subsisting. These acts, according to the court, constituted gross immoral conduct. In this case, the court held that Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his indiscretion in the legal profession and in his personal life. He has asked forgiveness from his children by complainant Teves and maintained a cordial relationship with them as shown by the herein attached pictures. After his disbarment, respondent returned to his hometown in Enrile, Cagayan and devoted his time tending an orchard and taking care of his ailing mother until her death in 2008. In 2009, he was appointed as Private Secretary to the Mayor of Enrile, Cagayan and thereafter, assumed the position of Local Assessment Operations Officer II/Office-In-Charge in the Assessor’s Office, which office he continues to serve to date. Moreover, he is a part-time instructor at the University of Cagayan Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

Valley and F.L. Vargas College during the School Year 2011-2012. Respondent likewise took an active part in socio-civic activities by helping his neighbors and friends who are in dire need. Certain documents also attest to Respondent’s reformed ways such as: (1) Affidavit of Candida P. Mabborang; (2) Affidavit of Reymar P. Ramirez; (3) Affidavit of Roberto D. Tallud; (4) Certification from the Municipal Local Government Office. Furthermore, respondent’s plea for reinstatement is duly supported by the IBP- Cagayan Chapter and by his former and present colleagues. His parish priest certified that he is faithful to and puts to actual practice the doctrines of the Catholic Church. He is also observed to be a regular churchgoer. Respondent has already settled his previous marital squabbles, as in fact, no opposition to the instant suit was tendered by complainant Teves. He sends regular support to his children in compliance with the Decision dated February 27, 2004. The Court notes the eight (8) long years that had elapsed from the time respondent was disbarred and recognizes his achievement as the first lawyer product of Lemu National High School, and his fourteen (14) years of dedicated government service from 1986 to July 2000 as Legal Officer of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports; Supervising Civil Service Attorney of the Civil Service Commission; Ombudsman Graft Investigation Officer; and State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice. From the attestations and certifications presented, the Court finds that respondent has sufficiently atoned for his transgressions. At 58 years of age, he still has productive years ahead of him that could significantly contribute to the upliftment of the law profession and the betterment of society. While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline and even remove its errant officers, concomitant to it is its duty to show compassion to those who have reformed their ways as in this case. Thus, the court reinstated respondent to the practice of law. He was, however, reminded that such privilege is burdened with conditions whereby adherence to the rigid standards of intellect, moral uprightness, and strict compliance with the rules and the law are continuing requirements. Florence Teves Macarubbo vs. Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo; Re: Petition (for Extraordinary Mercy) of Edmundo L. Macarubbo. A.C. No. 6148. January 22, 2013 Court personnel; refusal to perform duty. Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel enjoins court personnel to perform their official duties properly and with diligence at all times. Clerks of Court are primarily responsible for the speedy and efficient service of all court processes and writs. Hence, they cannot be allowed to slacken on their work since they are charged with the duty of keeping the records and the seal of the court, issuing processes, entering judgments and orders, and giving certified copies of records upon request. As such, they are expected to possess a high Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

degree of discipline and efficiency in the performance of their functions to help ensure that the cause of justice is done without delay. As an officer of the court, respondent Clerk of Court was duty-bound to use reasonable skill and diligence in the performance of her officially-designated duties as clerk of court, failing which, warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions. In this case, respondent unjustifiably failed to issue the alias writs of execution to implement the judgment in a Civil Case, despite orders from the RTC. Moreover, she failed to file the required comment in disregard of the duty of every employee in the judiciary to obey the orders and processes of the Court without delay. Such act evinces lack of interest in clearing her name, constituting an implied admission of the charges. Mariano T. Ong vs. Eva G. Basiya-Saratan, Clerk of Court, RTC, Br. 32, Iloilo City. A.M. No. P-12-3090. January 7, 2013 Judge; disciplinary proceedings against judges; presumption of regularity. Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that errors, if any, committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through available judicial remedies. Disciplinary proceedings against judges do not complement, supplement or substitute judicial remedies and, thus, cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by their erroneous orders or judgments. Even if the CA decision or portions thereof turn out to be erroneous, administrative liability will only attach upon proof that the actions of the respondent CA Justices were motivated by bad faith, dishonesty or hatred, or attended by fraud or corruption, which were not sufficiently shown to exist in this case. Neither was bias as well as partiality established. Acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice must be clearly shown before he can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. In the same vein, bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment or order is adverse to a party. Here, other than AMALI’s bare and self-serving claim, no act clearly indicative of bias and partiality was alleged except for the claim that respondent CA Justices misapplied the law and jurisprudence. Thus, the presumption that the respondent judge has regularly performed his duties shall prevail. Re: Verified complaint of AMA Land, Inc. against Hon. Danton Q. Bueser, et al. A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 12-202CA-J. January 15, 2013 Judge; gross ignorance of law. Judge Sarmiento, Jr. was charged with gross ignorance of the law, manifest partiality and dereliction and neglect of duty. The court held that the judge did not commit gross ignorance of the law. Gross ignorance of the law on the part of a judge presupposes an appalling lack of familiarity with simple rules of law or procedures and well-established jurisprudence which tends to erode the public trust in the competence and fairness of the court which he personifies. The complaint states that respondent judge, in arbitrary defiance of his own September 25, 2006 Decision which constitutes res judicata or a bar to him to pass upon the issue Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

of Geoffrey, Jr’s. custody, granted, via his March 15, 2011 Order, provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr. to Eltesa. The Decision adverted to refers to the judgment on compromise agreement. Respondent judge cannot be held guilty of the charges hurled by the complainant against him since there is no finding of strong reasons to rule otherwise. The preference of a child over 7 years of age as to whom he desired to live with shall be respected. Moreover, custody, even if previously granted by a competent court in favor of a parent, is not permanent. Geoffrey Beckett vs. Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr., RTC, Branch 24, Cebu City. A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326. January 30, 2013

Judge; misconduct. Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or a standard of behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be established. In this case, the actions of the Sandiganbayan Justices respecting the execution of the final judgment against accused Velasco were shown to be in respectful deference to the Court’s action on the various petitions filed by the former. Records are bereft of evidence showing any trace of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of the rules as to hold the Sandiganbayan Justices administratively liable for grave misconduct. Re: Complaint of Leonardo A. Velasco against Associate Justices Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr., et al. A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 10-25-SB-J. January 15, 2013 Judge; no abuse of authority when judge did not renew a temporary appointment. Complainant, a former Court Stenographer III at the RTC, failed to show any proof that she was entitled to a permanent position. Other than her allegation that she was given two “very satisfactory” and one “satisfactory” rating, there was no evidence presented that she has met the prescribed qualification standard for the position. “Such standard is a mix of the formal education, experience, training, civil service eligibility, physical health and attitude that the job requires.” Respondent judge, who is the immediate supervisor of complainant, is in the best position to observe the fitness, propriety and efficiency of the employee for the position. It should be impressed upon complainant that her appointment in the Judiciary is not a vested right. It is not an entitlement that she can claim simply for the reason that she had been in the service for almost two years. The subsequent filing of complaint against Atty. Borja (officer-in-charge of the PAO-Virac) manifests complainant’s propensity to file complaints whenever she does not get what she wants. Such attitude should not be tolerated. Otherwise, judges will be placed in hostage situations by employees who will Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

threaten to file complaints whenever they do not get their way with their judges. Since there is no proof that respondent judge abused her position, the case against her should be dismissed. Respondent judge should, however, be reminded to be circumspect in her actuations so as not to give the impression that she is guilty of favoritism. Kareen P. Magtagñob vs. Judge Genie G. Gapas-Agbada. OCA IPI No. 11-3631-RTJ. January 16, 2013

Attorney; Contingent Fee. Spouses Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya on a contingency basis. The Supreme Court held that spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed on a contingent fee of ₱2,000.00 and not, as asserted by the latter, one-half of the subject lot. The stipulation contained in the amended complaint filed by Atty. Lacaya clearly stated that the spouses Cadavedo hired the former on a contingency basis; the Spouses Cadavedo undertook to pay their lawyer ₱2,000.00 as attorney’s fees should the case be decided in their favor. Granting arguendo that the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya indeed entered into an oral contingent fee agreement securing to the latter one-half of the subject lot, the agreement is void. The agreement is champertous and is contrary to public policy. Any agreement by a lawyer to “conduct the litigation in his own account, to pay the expenses thereof or to save his client therefrom and to receive as his fee a portion of the proceeds of the judgment is obnoxious to the law.” The rule of the profession that forbids a lawyer from contracting with his client for part of the thing in litigation in exchange for conducting the case at the lawyer’s expense is designed to prevent the lawyer from acquiring an interest between him and his client. The Conjugal Partnership of the Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo (both deceased), substituted by their Heirs, namely: Herminia, Pastora, Heirs of Fructiosa, Heirs of Raquel, Evangeline, Vicente, Jr., and Armand, all surnamed Cadavedo, G.R. No. 173188. January 15, 2014. Attorney; Disbarment; Deceitful and Dishonest Conduct. A Complaint for Disbarment was filed against Atty. Solidum, Jr. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Solidum, Jr. violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to the performance of a lawyer’s professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. The Supreme Court found Atty. Solidum, Jr. guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional capacity with respect to his client, Presbitero, and in his private capacity with respect to complainant Navarro. Both Presbitero and Navarro allowed Atty. Solidum, Jr. to draft the terms of the loan agreements. Atty. Solidum, Jr. drafted the MOAs knowing that the interest rates were exorbitant. Later, using his knowledge of the law, he assailed the validity of the same MOAs he prepared. He issued checks that were drawn from his son’s account whose Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

name was similar to his without informing complainants. Further, there is nothing in the records that will show that he paid or undertook to pay the loans he obtained from complainants. The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client. Atty. Solidum, Jr. failed to fulfill this duty. Natividad P. Navarro and Hilda S. Presbitero v. Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr., A.C. No. 9872, January 28, 2014. Attorney; Disbarment; Gross Immoral Conduct. A Petition for Disbarment was filed against Atty. Celera for contracting a second marriage when his first marriage with Complainant was still subsisting. The Supreme Court held that for purposes of the disbarment proceeding, the Marriage Certificates bearing the name of Atty. Celera are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar. Atty. Celera exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Rose Bunagan-Bansig v. Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera, A.C. No. 5581, January 14, 2014. Attorney; Disbarment; Willful Disobedience. A Petition for Disbarment was filed against Atty. Celera for contracting a second marriage when his first marriage with Complainant was still subsisting. Atty. Celara failed to file a Comment despite numerous Notices from the Court, stating that he never received such Notices. When said excuse seemed no longer feasible, Atty. Celera just disappeared. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Celera’s acts were deliberate, maneuvering the liberality of the Court in order to delay the disposition of the case and to evade the consequences of his actions. Ultimately, what is apparent is respondent’s deplorable disregard of the judicial process which this Court cannot countenance. Atty. Celera’s acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Atty. Celera’s conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A Court’s Resolution is “not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively.” Rose Bunagan-Bansig v. Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera, A.C. No. 5581, January 14, 2014. Attorney; Malpractice. A Complaint was filed against Atty. Mendoza of the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) for violation of the attorney’s oath, deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, and for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. One of the charges against Atty. Mendoza which she admitted is telling her clients — “Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon.” The Supreme Court held that Atty. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

Mendoza made irresponsible advices to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is the mandate of Rule 1.02 that “a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.” Rule 15.07 states that “a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness.” However, while her remark was inappropriate and unbecoming, her comment was not disparaging and reproachful so as to cause dishonor and disgrace to the Judiciary. Thus, she was only reprimanded and sternly warned. Edgardo Areola v. Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza, A.C. No. 10135, January 15, 2014. Court Personnel; Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct. A complaint for grave misconduct was filed against Mylene H. Dela Cruz, Clerk III of the Regional Trial Court. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, Republic Act 6713, enunciates the State’s policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. And no other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an employee than in the judiciary. The Supreme Court held that in this case, Dela Cruz failed to live up to these exacting standards. The inculpatory acts committed by Dela Cruz are so grave as to call for the most severe administrative penalty. Dishonesty and grave misconduct, both being in the nature of a grave offense, carry the extreme penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service. This penalty is in accordance with Sections 52 and 58 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. Atty. Rhea R. Alcantara-Aquino v. Mylene H. Dela Cruz, etc., A.M. No. P-13-3141. January 21, 2014. Court Personnel; Grave Misconduct. A Complaint for Grave Misconduct and Making Untruthful Statements was filed against Alfredo Pallanan, Sheriff IV, assigned at the Regional Trial Court. Complainant alleged that Pallanan should not have implemented the writ of execution in the unlawful detainer case since there was a pending motion for reconsideration with the court. Misconduct has been defined as “a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.” The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, all of which must be established by substantial evidence, and must necessarily be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. The Supreme Court ruled that Pallanan did not commit grave misconduct. In ejectment cases, the rulings of the courts are immediately executory and can only be stayed via compliance with Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Such provision was not complied here. The sheriff’s duty in the execution of a writ is purely ministerial; he is to execute the order of the court strictly to the letter. He has no discretion whether to execute the judgment or not. When the writ is placed in his hands, it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary, to Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to implement it in accordance with its mandate. It is only by doing so could he ensure that the order is executed without undue delay. This holds especially true herein where the nature of the case requires immediate execution. Absent a TRO, an order of quashal, or compliance with Sec. 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, respondent sheriff has no alternative but to enforce the writ. Atty. Virgillo P. Alconera v. Alfredo T. Pallanan, A.M. No. P-12-3069, January 20, 2014. Court personnel; Simple neglect of duty. The audit of the financial transactions of Maniquis, former Officer-in-Charge, Clerk of Court III, and that of his successor Atty. Buencamino (Atty. Buencamino), Clerk of Court IV uncovered shortages in the books of accounts of the Metropolitan Trial Court. Mapue, Clerk III, admitted her fault. The Supreme Court held that the admission of Mapue of her liability does not exculpate Atty. Buencamino from her own negligence. A clerk of court has general administrative supervision over all the personnel of the court. The administrative functions of a clerk of court are as vital to the prompt and proper administration of justice as his judicial duties. As custodian of court funds and revenues, the clerk of court is primarily accountable for all funds that are collected for the court, whether personally received by him or by a duly appointed cashier who is under his supervision and control. Atty. Buencamino was remiss in the performance of her duties as clerk of court. Atty. Buencamino failed to supervise Mapue and to properly manage the court funds entrusted to her, enabling Mapue to misappropriate part of the funds. Atty. Buencamino’s failure to properly supervise and manage the financial transactions in her court constitutes simple neglect of duty. Simple neglect of duty is the failure to give attention to a task, or the disregard of a duty due to carelessness or indifference. It is a less grave offense punishable by suspension for one month and one day to six months for the first offense. Office of the Court Administrator v. Atty. Mona Lisa A. Buencamino, etc., et al./Re: Report on the financial audit conducted in the Metropolitan Trial Court etc., A.M. No. P-05-2051/A.M. No. 05-4-118-MeTC. January 21, 2014.

Attorney; Attorney’s Fees. The case initially concerned the execution of a final decision with the Court of Appeals in a labor litigation. Petitioner Malvar, however, entered into a compromise agreement with the respondents pending appeal without informing her counsel. Malvar’s counsel filed a Motion to Intervene to Protect Attorney’s Rights. The Supreme Court, on considerations of equity and fairness, disapproved of the tendencies of clients compromising their cases behind the backs of their attorneys for the purpose of unreasonably reducing or completely setting to naught the stipulated contingent fees. Thus, the Court granted the Motion for Intervention to Protect Attorney’s Rights as a measure of protecting the Intervenor’s right to his stipulated professional fees. The Court did so in the Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

interest of protecting the rights of the practicing Bar rendering professional services on contingent fee basis. Although the compromise agreement was still approved by the Court, the payment of the counsel’s adequate and reasonable compensation could not be annulled by the settlement of the litigation without the counsel’s participation and conformity. He remains entitled to the compensation, and his rights are safeguarded by the Court because its members are officers of the Court who are as entitled to judicial protection against injustice or imposition of fraud committed by the client as much as the client is against their abuses as her counsel. In other words, the duty of the Court is not only to ensure that the attorney acts in a proper and lawful manner, but also to see to it that the attorney is paid his just fees. Even if the compensation of the attorney is dependent only on winning the litigation, the subsequent withdrawal of the case upon the client’s initiative would not deprive the attorney of the legitimate compensation for professional services rendered. Czarina T. Malvar v. Kraft Foods Phils., Inc., et al., G.R. No. 183952, September 9, 2013. Attorney; Attorney-Client Relationship. A disbarment complaint was filed against respondent Atty. Ramos for representing conflicting interests in the same case. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Ramos violated Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Under the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount interest in the administration of justice. Atty. Ramos’ justification that no confidential information was relayed to him is not an excuse since the rule on conflict of interests provides an absolute prohibition from representation with respect to opposing parties in the same case. Thus, a lawyer cannot change his representation from one party to the latter’s opponent in the same case. Joseph L. Orola, et al. v. Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos, A.C. No. 9860, September 11, 2013. Attorney; Gross Misconduct. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Alcid, Jr. violated Canon 18 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Alcid, Jr. violated his oath under Canon 18 to “serve his client with competence and diligence” when he filed a criminal case for estafa when the facts of the case would have warranted the filing of a civil case for breach of contract. To be sure, after the complaint for estafa was dismissed, Atty. Alcid, Jr. committed another similar blunder by filing a civil case for specific performance and damages before the RTC, when he should have filed it with the MTC due to the amount involved. Atty. Alcid, Jr. did not also apprise complainant of the status of the cases. Atty. Alcid, Jr. is not only guilty of incompetence in handling the cases. His lack of professionalism in Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

dealing with complainant is gross and inexcusable. The legal profession dictates that it is not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a lawyer to accord the highest degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the protection of the client’s interest. The most thorough groundwork and study must be undertaken in order to safeguard the interest of the client. Atty. Alcid, Jr. has defied and failed to perform such duty and his omission is tantamount to a desecration of the Lawyer’s Oath. Julian Penilla v. Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr., A.C. No. 9149, September 4, 2013. Attorney; Practice of Law. Petitioner Medado passed the bar examinations in 1979. He took the Attorney’s Oath thereafter, and was scheduled to sign the Roll of Attorneys, but failed to do so because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. Several years later, he found such Notice and realized he never signed the Roll of Attorneys. Medado filed this Petition to allow him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys. The Supreme Court held that while an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his acts as it negates malice or evil motive, a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences. Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Such Canon also applies to law students and Bar candidates. Medado was imposed a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign one (1) year after receipt of the Court’s Resolution. In Re: Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys, B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013. Court Personnel; Gross Dishonesty; Gross Misconduct. The audit team discovered cash shortages in the books of accounts of the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Lipa City. As clerk of court, Atty. Apusen is primarily accountable for all funds collected for the court, whether personally received by him or by a duly appointed cashier who is under his supervision and control. As custodian of court funds, revenues, records, properties and premises, he is liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of said funds and properties. Being a cash clerk, Savadera is an accountable officer entrusted with the great responsibility of collecting money belonging to the funds of the court. Clearly, she miserably failed in such responsibility upon the occurrence of the shortages. The Supreme Court held that no position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its holder than a judicial office. Those connected with the dispensation of justice, from the highest official to the lowliest clerk, carry a heavy burden of responsibility. As frontliners in the administration of justice, they should live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity. They must bear in mind that the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work there. Office of the Court Administrator v. Donabel M. Savadera, et al., A.M. No. P-041903, September 10, 2013. Judge; Delay in deciding cases. Judge Lazaro was accused of undue delay in the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss a civil case considering that she had resolved the Motion to Dismiss beyond the 90-day period prescribed for the Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

purpose without filing any request for the extension of the period. The Supreme Court held that the 90-day period within which a sitting trial Judge should decide a case or resolve a pending matter is mandatory. If the Judge cannot decide or resolve within the period, she can be allowed additional time to do so, provided she files a written request for the extension of her time to decide the case or resolve the pending matter. The rule, albeit mandatory, is to be implemented with an awareness of the limitations that may prevent a Judge from being efficient. Under the circumstances specific to this case, it would be unkind and inconsiderate on the part of the Court to disregard Judge Lazaro’s limitations and exact a rigid and literal compliance with the rule. With her undeniably heavy inherited docket and the large volume of her official workload, she most probably failed to note the need for her to apply for the extension of the 90-day period to resolve the Motion to Dismiss. Danilo E. Lubaton v. Judge Mary Josephine P. Lazaro, Regional Trial Court, Br. 74, Antipolo, Rizal, A.M. RTJ-12-2320, September 2, 2013. Judge; Delay in deciding cases. Judge Baluma was asked to explain his failure to act on the twenty-three (23) cases submitted for decision/resolution. The Supreme Court held that it has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Every judge should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant in the performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute. Failure to decide a case within the reglementary period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions on the defaulting judge. Judge Baluma’s gross inefficiency, evident in his undue delay in deciding 23 cases within the reglementary period, merits the imposition of administrative sanctions. Re: Cases Submitted for Decision before Hon. Teofilo D. Baluma, Former Judge, Branch 1, Regional Trial Court, Tagbilaran City, Bohol, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2355, September 2, 2013.

Judge; Gross Inefficiency. Judge Soriano failed to decide thirty-six (36) cases submitted for decision in MTC and MTCC, which were all due for decision at the time he compulsorily retired. The Supreme Court held that Judge Soriano has been remiss in the performance of his judicial duties. Judge Soriano’s unreasonable delay in deciding cases and resolving incidents and motions, and his failure to decide the remaining cases before his compulsory retirement constitutes gross inefficiency which cannot be tolerated. Inexcusable failure to decide cases within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of an administrative sanction on the defaulting judge. Judge Soriano’s inefficiency in managing his caseload was compounded by gross negligence as evinced by the loss of the records of at least four (4) cases which could no longer be located or reconstituted despite diligent efforts by his successor. Judge Soriano was responsible for managing his court efficiently to ensure the prompt delivery Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

of court services, especially the speedy disposition of cases. Thus, Judge Soriano was found guilty of gross inefficiency and gross ignorance of the law, and fined P40,000 to be taken from the amount withheld from his retirement benefits. Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Santiago E. Soriano, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1683, September 11, 2013.

Attorney; Gross Immoral Conduct. Respondent Pedreña, a Public Attorney, was charged for sexual harassment. The Supreme Court held that the records show that the respondent rubbed the complainant’s right leg with his hand; tried to insert his finger into her firmly closed hand; grabbed her hand and forcibly placed it on his crotch area; and pressed his finger against her private part. Given the circumstances in which he committed them, his acts were not merely offensive and undesirable but repulsive, disgraceful and grossly immoral. They constituted misconduct on the part of any lawyer. In this regard, immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency. Atty. Pedreña’s misconduct was aggravated by the fact that he was then a Public Attorney mandated to provide free legal service to indigent litigants, and by the fact that complainant was then such a client. He also disregarded his oath as a public officer to serve others and to be accountable at all times, because he thereby took advantage of her vulnerability as a client then in desperate need of his legal assistance. Thus, respondent was meted out the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years. Jocelyn De Leon v. Atty. Tyrone Pedrena, A.C. No. 9401, October 22, 2013. Attorney; Gross Misconduct. A complaint for disbarment was filed against Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Atty. Salvador N. Pe, Jr. for falsifying an inexistent decision of the RTC. The Supreme Court held that the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for having authored the falsification of the decision in a non-existent court proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.” Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can justify a lawyer’s disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of justice in this country, given the purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status of a person. Thus, the Court disbarred the respondent. Atty. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

Oscar L. Embido, etc. v. Atty. Salvador N. Pe, Jr., etc., A.M. No. 6732, October 22, 2013. Attorney; Gross Negligence. Respondent Villaseca was charged for gross and inexcusable negligence in handling a criminal case, as a consequence of which the complainants were convicted. The Supreme Court held that Atty. Villaseca’s failure to submit a demurrer to evidence constitutes inexcusable negligence; it showed his lack of devotion and zeal in preserving his clients’ cause. Furthermore, Atty. Villaseca’s failure to present any testimonial, object or documentary evidence for the defense reveals his lack of diligence in performing his duties as an officer of the Court; it showed his indifference towards the cause of his clients. Considering that the liberty and livelihood of his clients were at stake, Atty. Villaseca should have exerted efforts to rebut the presented prosecution evidence. The Court emphasized that while a lawyer has complete discretion on what legal strategy to employ in a case entrusted to him, he must present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law to support his client’s cause. Mary Ann T. Mattus v. Albert T. Villaseca, A.C. No. 7922, October 1, 2013. Attorney; Lawyer-Client Relationship. Respondent Gagate was accused of gross ignorance of the law and unethical practice of law. The Supreme Court emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. To this end, he is enjoined to employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful objectives. These principles are embodied in Canon 17, Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code. Thus, the Court found that the respondent failed to exercise the required diligence in handling complainant’s cause since he: (1) failed to represent her competently and diligently by acting and proffering professional advice beyond the proper bounds of law; and, (2) abandoned his client’s cause while the grave coercion case against them was pending. Maria Cristina Zabaljauregui Pitcher v. Atty. Rustico B. Gagate, A.C. No. 9532, October 8, 2013. Attorney; Lawyer-Client Relationship. Respondent Obias was charged for grave misconduct and/or gross malpractice. The Supreme Court held that since respondent publicly held herself out as lawyer, the mere fact that she also acted as a real estate broker did not divest her of the responsibilities attendant to the legal profession. In this regard, the legal advice and/or legal documentation that she offered and/or rendered regarding the real estate transaction subject of this case should not be deemed removed from the category of legal services. Case law instructs that if a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

permits or acquiesces with employment is established.

the

consultation,

then

the

professional

Moreover, according to the Court, respondent grossly violated the trust and confidence reposed in her by her clients, in contravention of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code. Records disclose that instead of delivering the deed of sale covering the subject property to her clients, she wilfully notarized a deed of sale over the same property in favor of another person. It is a core ethical principle that lawyers owe fidelity to their clients’ cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. Thus, respondent was disbarred by the Court. Ma. Jennifer Tria-Samonte v. Epifania “Fanny” Obias, A.C. No. 4945, October 8, 2013. Judiciary; Accountability. Respondent Arnejo, a stenographer of the RTC, was accused of receiving payment for the TSN on 22 July 2010 and remitting the money to the cashier of the Clerk of Court only on 19 and 23 December 2010. The Supreme Court held that the respondent violated the Code of Conduct of Court Personnel and Code of Ethics for Government Officials and Employees. The Court will not tolerate the practice of asking for advance payment from litigants, much less the unauthorized acceptance of judicial fees. Section 11, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, specifically provides that payment for requests of copies of the TSN shall be made to the Clerk of Court. Clearly, therefore, payment cannot be made to respondent, as it is an official transaction, and, as such, must be made to the Clerk of Court. Respondent, being a stenographer, is not authorized to accept payment for judicial fees, even if two-thirds of those fees would be paid to her. Moreover, the issuance of an acknowledgment receipt cannot be construed as having been done in good faith, considering the fact that respondent only remitted the payment for the TSN five (5) months after her receipt of the supposed judicial fee, or only after the instant Complaint had been filed against her. Her belated remittance was tainted with bad faith. Joefil Baguio v. Maria Fe Arnejo, Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Cebu City, A.M. No. P-13-3155, October 21, 2013. Judiciary; Applicability of Sec. 7, Rule III, IRR of R.A. No. 10154. The issue presented in this case is whether or not Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. (RA) 10154 applies to the employees of the Judiciary. The Supreme Court ruled that the subject provision which requires retiring government employees to secure a prior clearance of pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from, among others, the CSC – should not be made to apply to employees of the Judiciary. To deem it otherwise would disregard the Court’s constitutionally-enshrined power of administrative supervision over its personnel. Besides, retiring court personnel are already required to secure a prior clearance of the pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from the Court which makes the CSC clearance a superfluous and non-expeditious requirement contrary to the declared state policy of RA 10154. The Court, however, noted that since the Constitution only accords the Judiciary administrative supervision over its personnel, a different treatment of the clearance Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

requirement obtains with respect to criminal cases. As such, a clearance requirement which pertains to criminal cases may be imposed by the appropriate government agency, i.e., the Office of the Ombudsman, on retiring court personnel as it is a matter beyond the ambit of the Judiciary’s power of administrative supervision. Re: Request for guidance/clarification on Section 7, Rule III of Republic Act No. 10154 Requiring Retiring Government Employees to Secure a Clearance of Pendency/Non-Pendency of Case/s from the Civil Service Commission, A.M. No. 13-09-08-SC, October 1, 2013. Judiciary; Duty of Sheriff to Promptly Serve Summons. Sherriff Nery was accused of failing to serve summons to the defendant in a case where he asked for transportation expense, and despite being given an amount. The Supreme Court found the respondent guilty. Summons to the defendant in a case shall forthwith be issued by the clerk of court upon the filing of the complaint and the payment of the requisite legal fees. Once issued by the clerk of court, it is the duty of the sheriff, process server or any other person serving court processes to serve the summons to the defendant efficiently and expeditiously. Failure to do so constitutes simple neglect of duty, which is the failure of an employee to give one’s attention to a task expected of him, and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference. Moreover, sheriffs are not allowed to receive any payments from the parties in the course of the performance of their duties. They cannot just unilaterally demand sums of money from the parties without observing the proper procedural steps under Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. Atty. Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao v. Naeptali Angelo V. Nery, Sheriff III, Branch 30, Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, A.M. No. P13-3153, October 14, 2013. Judge; Gross Ignorance of the Law. Judge Clemens was charged for gross ignorance of the law and violation of the Child Witness Examination Rule. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit since the acts of Judge Clemens were far from being ill-motivated and in bad faith as to justify any administrative liability on his part. A complete reading of the TSN reveals that he was vigilant in his conduct of the proceedings. In the instances mentioned in the Complaint-Affidavit, he had been attentive to the manifestations made by Atty. Tacorda and had acted accordingly and with dispatch. Further, contrary to the allegations of Atty. Tacorda, the TSN showed that the respondent Judge was very much concerned with following the proper conduct of trial and ensuring that the One-Day Examination of Witness Rule was followed; but at the same time, he was sensitive to the fact that the witness was already exhausted, having testified for almost three (3) hours. Atty. Jerome Norman L. Tacorda for: Odel L. Gedraga v. Judge Reynaldo B. Clemens, presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Br. 31, Calbayog City, Western Samar, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2359, October 23, 2013. Judge; Gross Ignorance of the Law. Complainant filed a case against Judge Patricio accusing him of gross ignorance of the law, manifest bias and partiality for refusing to execute a judgment which was already final and Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

executory. The rule is that once a judgment attains finality, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. Thus, the Supreme Court held that Judge Patricio demonstrated ignorance of such rule by repeatedly refusing to execute the final and executory judgment of conviction against the accused. The rules on execution are comprehensive enough for a judge not to know how to apply them or to be confused by any auxiliary incidents. The issuance of a writ of execution for a final and executory judgment is ministerial. In other words, a judge is not given the discretion whether or not to implement the judgment. He is to effect execution without delay and supervise implementation strictly in accordance with the judgment. Judge Patricio’s acts unmistakably exhibit gross ignorance of the law. Jesus D. Carbajosa v. Judge Hannibal R. Patricio, Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, President Roxas, Capiz, A.M. No. MTJ-13-1834, October 2, 2013. Judge; Gross Misconduct. Judge Pardo was accused of corruption. Judge Pardo did not deny that Rosendo, a litigant who had a pending application for probation in his sala, went to his house, had a “drinking spree” with him and stayed there for more than two hours. The Supreme Court held Judge Pardo liable for gross misconduct. Citing jurisprudence, the Court held that a judge’s acts of meeting with litigants outside the office premises beyond office hours and sending a member of his staff to talk with complainant constitute gross misconduct. Moreover, a judge was held liable for misconduct when he entertained a litigant in his home and received benefits given by the litigant. Atty. Jessie Tuldague and Atty. Alfredo Baldajo, Jr. v. Judge Moises Pardo and Jaime Calpatura, etc. / Atty. Jessie Tuldague and Atty. Alfredo Baldajo, Jr. v. Jaime Calpatura, etc. / Re: Report on the Judicial Audit and Investigation Conducted in the RTC, Cabarroguis, Quirino, A.M. No. RTJ05-1962/ A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2243-P/ A.M. No. 05-10-661-RTC, October 25, 2013. Judge; Grave Misconduct; Gross Neglect of Duty; Gross Dishonesty; Penalty. Grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty and gross dishonesty of which Judge Salubre, Edig, Palero and Aventurado are found guilty, even if committed for the first time, are punishable by dismissal and carries with it the forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service. As to Judge Salubre and Edig, however, in view of their deaths, the supreme penalty of dismissal cannot be imposed on them anymore. It is only the penalty of dismissal that is rendered futile by their passing since they are not in the service anymore, but it is still within the Court’s power to forfeit their retirement benefits. Report on the financial audit conducted in the MTCC, Tagum City, Davao del Norte / Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Ismael L. Salubre, et al., A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3138-P/A.M. No. MTJ-05-1618, October 22, 2013. Judge; Remedy for Correcting Actions of Judge. A complaint for gross ignorance of the law, grave misconduct, oppression, bias and partiality was filed against Judge Omelio. The Supreme Court reiterated the rule that the filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for correcting Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

the actions of a judge perceived to have gone beyond the norms of propriety, where a sufficient remedy exists. The actions against judges should not be considered as complementary or suppletory to, or substitute for, the judicial remedies which can be availed of by a party in a case. Moreover, the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case rests on the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case, since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involves findings of fact left to the said court for its conclusive determination. Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with, except when there is grave abuse of discretion. Ma. Regina S. Peralta v. Judge George E. Omelio / Romualdo G. Mendoza v. Judge George E. Omelio / Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra v. Judge George E. Omelio, A.M. No. RTJ-112259/A.M. No. RTJ-11-2264/A.M. No. RTJ-11-2273, October 22, 2013.

Attorney; failure to account Responsibility provides:

for

money.

The

Code

of

Professional

Canon 16-A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Rule 16.01-A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Rule 16.02-A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him. Rule 16.03-A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the purpose, should be immediately returned. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. Emilia O. Dhaliwal vs. Atty. Abelardo B. Dumaguing. A.C. No. 9390, August 1, 2012. Attorney; grave misconduct and dishonesty. The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the officers of the court and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. The Court cited the case of In Re: Sotto and ruled that “One of the qualifications required of a candidate for admission to the bar is the possession of good moral character, and, when one who has already been admitted to the bar clearly shows, by a series of acts, that he does not follow such moral principles as should govern the conduct of an upright person, and that, in his Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

dealings with his clients and with the courts, he disregards the rule of professional ethics required to be observed by every attorney, it is the duty of the court, as guardian of the interests of society, as well as of the preservation of the ideal standard of professional conduct, to make use of its powers to deprive him of his professional attributes which he so unworthily abused. Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law, legal processes but also mandates the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with clients and the moneys entrusted to them pursuant to their fiduciary relationship. Pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, respondent may either be disbarred or suspended for committing deceitful and dishonest acts. This rule provides that in any of the following circumstances, to wit: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct; (4) grossly immoral conduct;(5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7) wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; or (8) corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so; the Court is vested with the authority and discretion to impose either the extreme penalty of disbarment or mere suspension. Grace M. Anacta vs. Atty. Eduardo D. Resurrecction. A.C. No. 9074, August 14, 2012. Attorney; immorality. The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code. Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the above standards whether in their professional or in their private capacity. The settled rule is that betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. Respondent violated the Lawyer’s Oath14 and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in “unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” Engr.Gilbert Tumbokon vs. Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco. A.C. No. 6116, August 1, 2012 Attorney; representing conflicting interest. Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer cannot represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature of their relationship, sound public policy dictates that he be prohibited from representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. An attorney may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. This rule is so absolute that good faith and honest intention on the erring lawyer’s part does not make it inoperative. The reason for this is that a lawyer acquires knowledge of his former client’s doings, whether documented or not, that he would ordinarily not have acquired were it not for the trust and confidence that his client placed on him in the light of their relationship. It would simply be impossible for the lawyer to identify and erase such entrusted knowledge with faultless precision or lock the same into an iron box when suing the former client on behalf of a new one. Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc., represented by Gabriel H. Abad vs. Atty. Richard V. Funk. A.C. No. 9094, August 15, 2012 Attorney; sharing of fees with non- lawyers. Respondent’s defense that forgery had attended the execution of the August 11, 1995 letter was belied by his July 16, 1997 letter admitting to have undertaken the payment of complainant’s commission but passing on the responsibility to Sps. Yap. Clearly, respondent has violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code which prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases which do not obtain in the case at bar. Engr. Gilbert Tumbokon vs. Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco. A.C. No. 6116, August 1, 2012. Court personnel; disgraceful and immoral conduct. Immorality has been defined to include not only sexual matters but also conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare. Respondent engaged in sexual relations with a married man which not only violate the moral standards expected of employees of the Judiciary but is also a desecration of the sanctity of the institution of marriage. The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of court personnel must be free from any whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his duties in the judicial branch but also to his behavior outside the court as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality; a court employee is also judged by his private morals. The exacting standards of morality and decency have been strictly adhered to and laid down by the Court to those in the service of the Judiciary. Respondent, as a court stenographer, did not live up to her commitment to lead a moral life. Public office is a public trust. The good of the service and the degree of morality, which every official and employee in the public service must observe, if respect and confidence are to be maintained by the Government in the enforcement of the law, demand that no untoward Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

conduct affecting morality, integrity, and efficiency while holding office should be left without proper and commensurate sanction, all attendant circumstances taken into account. Judge Armando S. Adlawan, Presiding Judge, 6th MCTC, Bonifacio-Don Mariano Marcos, Misamis Occidental vs. Estrella P. Capilitan, 6th MCTC, Bonifacio-Don Mariano Marcos, Misamis Occidental. A.M. No. P-12-3080. August 29, 2012 Court personnel; dishonesty and falsification of public document. Willful concealment of facts in the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) constitutes mental dishonesty amounting to misconduct. Likewise, making a false statement in one’s PDS amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an official document. Dishonesty has been defined as intentionally making a false statement on any material fact. Dishonesty evinces a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. Civil service rules mandate the accomplishment of the PDS as a requirement for employment in the government. Hence, making false statements in one’s PDS is ultimately connected with one’s employment in the government. The employee making false statements in his or her PDS becomes liable for falsification. Moreover, for respondent to be meted the penalty of dismissal, her dishonesty need not be committed in the performance of official duty. As the Court has previously ruled: “The rationale for the rule is that if a government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office. The Government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and well, because by reason of his government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of the government other than the office where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and possesses a certain influence and power which renders the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and actuations. When official documents are falsified, intent to injure a third person is irrelevant because the principal thing punished is the violation of public faith and the destruction of the truth as claimed in that document.The act undermines the integrity of government records and therein lies the prejudice to public service. The act need not result in disruption of service or loss to the government. It is the act of dishonesty itself that taints the integrity of government service. A government officer’s dishonesty affects the morale of the service, even when it stems from the employee’s personal dealings. Such conduct should not be tolerated from government officials, even when official duties are performed well. Employment in the judiciary demands the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency from its personnel. All judiciary employees Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

are expected to conduct themselves with propriety and decorum at all times . An act that falls short of the exacting standards set for public officers, especially those in the judiciary, shall not be countenanced. Manolito C. Villordon vs. Marilyn C. Avila, Court Interpreter I, Municipal Trial Court in Cities. Branch 3, Cebu City. A.M. No. P-10-2809, August 10, 2012 Court personnel; neglect of duty. Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure to give attention to a task or the disregard of a duty due to carelessness or indifference. The Court ruled in Pilipina v. Roxas: “The Court cannot countenance neglect of duty for even simple neglect of duty lessens the people’s confidence in the judiciary and ultimately in the administration of justice. By the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, public servants must faithfully adhere to, hold sacred and render inviolate the constitutional principle that a public office is a public trust; that all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. Memoranda of Judge Eliza B. Yu issued to Legal Researcher Marie Joy P. Lagman and to Court Stenographer Soledad J. Bassig, all of Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 47, Pasay City. A.M. No. P-12-3033, August 15, 2012. Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. Rule 39, Section 14 of the Rules of Court clearly mandates the sheriff or other proper officer to file a return and when necessary, periodic reports, with the court which issued the writ of execution. The writ of execution shall be returned to the court immediately after the judgment had been partially or fully satisfied. In case the writ is still unsatisfied or only partially satisfied 30 days after the officer’s receipt of the same, said officer shall file a report with the court stating the reasons therefor. Subsequently, the officer shall periodically file with the court a report on the proceedings taken to enforce the writ every 30 days until said writ is fully satisfied or its effectivity expires. The officer is further required to furnish the parties with copies of the return and periodic reports. Difficulties or obstacles in the satisfaction of a final judgment and execution of a writ do not excuse respondent’s total inaction. Neither the Rules nor jurisprudence recognizes any exception from the periodic filing of reports by sheriffs It is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of law. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party. Therefore, sheriffs ought to know that they have a sworn responsibility to serve writs of execution with utmost dispatch. When writs are placed in their hands, it is their ministerial duty to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute them in accordance with their mandate. Unless restrained by a court order, they should see to it that the execution of judgments is not unduly delayed. Accordingly, they must comply with their mandated ministerial duty as speedily as possible. As agents of the law, high standards are expected of sheriffs Canon IV, Section 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel that reads, “Court personnel shall at all times perform official duties properly and with Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

diligence.” Astorga and Repol Law Offices, represented by Atty. Arnold B. Lugares vs. Leodel N. Roxas, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati City. A.M. No. P-12-3029, August 15, 2012. Attorney; representation of non-client. Atty. Espejo’s claim that he drafted and signed the pleading just to extend assistance to Rodica deserves scant consideration. It is true that under Rules 2.01and 2.02, Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed, and in such cases, even if he does not accept a case, shall not refuse to render legal advise to the person concerned if only to the extent necessary to safeguard the latter’s right. However, in this case, Rodica cannot be considered as defenseless or oppressed considering that she is properly represented by counsel in the RTC case. Needless to state, her rights are amply safeguarded. It would have been different had Rodica not been represented by any lawyer, which, however, is not the case. The Court wonders why Atty. Espejo, knowing fully well that Rodica is not their law firm’s client and without the knowledge and consent of his superiors, gave in to Rodica’s request for him to indicate in the said motion the names of his law firm, Atty. Manuel and Atty. Michelle for the purpose of “giving more weight and credit to the pleading.” As a member of the bar, Atty. Espejo ought to know that motions and pleadings filed in courts are acted upon in accordance with their merit or lack of it, and not on the reputation of the law firm or the lawyer filing the same. More importantly, he should have thought that in so doing, he was actually assisting Rodica in misrepresenting before the RTC that she was being represented by the said law firm and lawyers, when in truth she was not. It is well to remind Atty. Espejo that before being a friend to Rodica, he is first and foremost an officer of the court. Hence, he is expected to maintain a high standard of honesty and fair dealings and must conduct himself beyond reproach at all times. He must likewise ensure that he acts within the bounds of reason and common sense, always aware that he is an instrument of truth and justice. Jasper Junno F. Rodica vs. Atty. Manuel M. Lazaro, et al. A.C. No. 9259, August 23, 2012 Attorney; accounting of funds. When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose, he should promptly account to the client how the money was spent. If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client. His failure either to render an accounting or to return the money (if the intended purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his client’s funds or properties as they fall due or upon demand. His failure to return the client’s money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by the client. The Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action. Hector Trenas vs. People of the Philippines. G.R. No. 195002. January 25, 2012. Attorney; mistake of counsel. The general rule is that the mistake of a counsel binds the client, and it is only in instances wherein the negligence is so gross or palpable that courts must step in to grant relief to the aggrieved client. It can be gleaned from the circumstances that petitioner was given opportunities to defend his case and was granted concomitant reliefs by the court. Thus, it cannot be said that the mistake and negligence of his former counsel were so gross and palpable to have deprived him of due process. Cresencio C. Milla vs. People of the Philippines and Carlo V. Lopez. G.R. No. 188726. January 25, 2012. Court personnel; dishonesty. Every employee of the Judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Like any public servant, she must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of her official duties but in her personal and private dealings with other people, to preserve the court’s good name and standing. The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court personnel have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice. Under Section 52(A)(1) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense. Under Section 58 of the same rules, dismissal carries with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service. Thus, the respondent is dismissed for dishonesty when she made someone take the Civil Service Sub-professional Examination on her behalf. Concerned Citizen vs. Domingo Nawen Abad, etc. A.M. No. P-11-2907. January 31, 2012. Court personnel; grave abuse of authority. By the very nature of his duties, a sheriff performs a very sensitive function in the dispensation of justice. He is duty-bound to know the basic rules relative to the implementation of writs of execution, and should, at all times show a high degree of professionalism in the performance of his duties. Administrative Circular No. 12 was promulgated in order to streamline the service and execution of court writs and processes in courts and to better serve the public good and facilitate the administration of justice. Paragraph 2 of Administrative Circular No. 12 provides that “All Clerks of Court of the Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, and/or their deputy sheriffs shall serve all court processes and execute all writs of their respective courts within their territorial jurisdiction.” Furthermore, paragraph 5 of the same circular provides that “No sheriff or deputy sheriff shall execute a court writ outside Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

his territorial jurisdiction without first notifying in writing, and seeking the assistance of, the sheriff of the place where the execution shall take place.” It is clear that respondent’s act of implementing the subject writs in San Fernando City, when his territorial jurisdiction is confined only to Angeles City, is a violation of the Circular and tantamount to abuse of authority. While respondent claimed that he personally informed the OCC of San Fernando City, he, however, failed to prove that he made written notice as required by Administrative Circular No. 12. A mere submission of the copies of the court processes to the OCC will not suffice as to the written notice requirement. The requirement of notice is based on the rudiments of justice and fair play. It frowns upon arbitrariness and oppressive conduct in the execution of an otherwise legitimate act. Luis P. Pineda vs. Neil T. torres, sheriff II, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Angeles City. A.M. No. P12-3027. January 30, 2012 Court personnel; gross neglect of duty. A clerk of court performs a very delicate function as the custodian of the funds and revenues, records, property, and premises of the court. He is liable for any loss, shortage, destruction, or impairment of said funds and property. Even the undue delay in the remittance of amounts collected by them at the very least constitutes misfeasance. The safekeeping of funds and collections is essential to the goal of an orderly administration of justice and no protestation of good faith can override the mandatory nature of the Circulars designed to promote full accountability for government funds. Supreme Court Circular No. 13-92 mandates that all fiduciary collections shall be deposited immediately by the Clerk of Court concerned, upon receipt thereof, with an authorized government depository bank which is the Land Bank of the Philippines. The respondents’ failure to remit their collection constitutes gross neglect of duty, dishonesty, and grave misconduct. Moreover, the failure of a public officer to remit funds upon demand by an authorized officer shall be prima facie evidence that the public officer has put such missing funds or property to personal use. Re: Report on Financial Audit Conducted at MCTC, SantiagoSan Esteban, Ilocos Sur. A.M. No. P-11-2950. January 17, 2012 Judges; administrative liability. Disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions brought against any judge in relation to the performance of his official functions are neither complementary to nor suppletory of appropriate judicial remedies, nor a substitute for such remedies. Any party who may feel aggrieved should resort to these remedies, and exhaust them, instead of resorting to disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions. A judge’s failure to correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily incur administrative liability, for to hold him administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming he has erred, will be nothing short of harassment and will make his position doubly unbearable. His judicial office will then be rendered untenable, because no one called upon to try the facts or to interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. Administrative sanction and criminal liability should be imposed only when the error is so gross, deliberate and malicious, or is committed with evident Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

bad faith, or only in clear cases of violations by him of the standards and norms of propriety and good behavior prescribed by law and the rules of procedure, or fixed and defined by pertinent jurisprudence. Re: Verified complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, Chairman of the Board/CEO etc. against Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., et al. A.M. No. 11-184-CA-J. January 31, 2012. Attorney; falsification. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed or suspended on the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a case without authority so to do. The crime of falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude. Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. Disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Re: SC Decision date May 20, 2008 in G.R. No. 161455 under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court vs. Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin. A.C. No. 7940, April 24, 2012. Attorney; groundless imputation of bribery. As officers of the court, lawyers are duty-bound to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers. They are to abstain from offensive or menacing language or behavior before the court and must refrain from attributing to a judge motives that are not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case. Atty. Peña cannot be excused for uttering snide and accusatory remarks at the expense of the reputation and integrity of members of this Court, and for using those unsubstantiated claims as basis for the subject Motion for Inhibition. Not only has respondent Peña failed to show sincere remorse for his malicious insinuations of bribery and wrongdoing against Justice Carpio, he in fact continually availed of such unethical tactics in moving for the inhibition of eleven Justices of the Court. Indeed, his pattern of behavior can no longer be seen as isolated incidents that the Court can pardon given certain mitigating circumstances. Respondent Peña has blatantly and consistently cast unfounded aspersions against judicial officers in utter disregard of his duties and responsibilities to the Court.


Respondent Peña’s actions betray a similar disrespectful attitude towards the Court that cannot be countenanced especially for those privileged enough to practice law in the country. In re: Supreme Court Resolution dated 28 April 2003 in G.R. Nos. 145817 and 145822. A.C. No. 6332, April 17, 2012. Attorney; lack of diligence. When a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the latter’s rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and society. His workload does not justify neglect in handling one’s case because it is settled that a lawyer must only accept cases as much as he can efficiently handle. Suzette Del Mundo vs. Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano. A.C. No. 6903, April 16, 2012. Attorney; obligation to hold in trust money of his client. A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money of his client that may come to his possession. As trustee of such funds, he is bound to keep them separate and apart from his own. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the filing and processing of a case if not utilized, must be returned immediately upon demand. Failure to return gives rise to a presumption that he has misappropriated it in violation of the trust reposed on him. And the conversion of funds entrusted to him constitutes gross violation of professional ethics and betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Suzette Del Mundo vs. Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano. A.C. No. 6903, April 16, 2012. Attorney; representation of conflicting interests. “The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action.” The prohibition also applies even if the “lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated.” To be held accountable under this rule, it is “enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer’s respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.” Aniñon vs. Sabistsana. A.C. No. 5098, April 11, 2012. Attorney; submission of falsified internal court documents. The falsification, subject of the instant administrative case, lies in the fact that respondent Peña submitted to the Court a document he was absolutely certain, at the time of such submission, was a copy of the Agenda of the then ponente. Candor and truthfulness are some of the qualities exacted and expected from members of the legal profession. Thus, lawyers shall commit no falsehood, nor shall they mislead or allow the court to be misled by any Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

artifice. As disciples of truth, their lofty vocation is to correctly inform the court of the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions. Courts are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. In the instant case, the submission of a document purporting to be a copy of the Agenda of a member of this Court is an act of dishonesty that puts into doubt the ability of respondent to uphold his duty as a disciple of truth. Respondent led the Court to believe that what he submitted was a faithful reproduction of the ponente’s Agenda, just to support the subject Motion to Inhibit. The original of the purported copy was later found to have been inexistent in the court’s records. The Court noted that respondent Peña has not explained, to the Court’s satisfaction, how he managed to obtain internal and confidential documents. Respondent Peña is sanctioned for knowingly using confidential and internal court records and documents, which he suspiciously obtained in bolstering his case. His unbridled access to internal court documents has not been properly explained. The cavalier explanation of respondent Peña that this Court’s confidential documents would simply find themselves conveniently falling into respondent’s lap through registered mail and that the envelopes containing them could no longer be traced is unworthy of belief. This gives the Court reason to infer that laws and its own internal rules have been violated over and over again by some court personnel, whom respondent Peña now aids and abets by feigning ignorance of how the internal documents could have reached him. It is not unreasonable to even conclude that criminal liabilities have been incurred in relation to the Revised Penal Code and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, with Atty. Peña benefitting from the same. Respondent’s actions clearly merit no other penalty than disbarment. In re: Supreme Court Resolution dated 28 April 2003 in G.R. Nos. 145817 and 145822. A.C. No. 6332, April 17, 2012. Court personnel; conduct unbecoming of a court personnel. Respondent is liable for conduct unbecoming a court employee for his continued refusal to coordinate with complainants in the implementation of the writ of possession, despite numerous attempts on their part to get in touch with him. It may be recalled that complainants endeavored, no less than four (4) times, to communicate with respondent for the proper and expeditious execution of the writ, but each time, respondent rebuffed their efforts. Finally, on25 April 2011, the day respondent finally implemented the writ, respondent refused to allow Ms. De Jesus to inform complainants of the intended implementation and opted to be accompanied by an ordinary bank employee to witness the enforcement of the writ. The persistent refusal of respondent to cooperate with complainants in the implementation of the writ runs afoul of the exacting standards required of those in the judiciary. Time and again, the Court has emphasized the heavy Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

burden of responsibility which court officials and employees are mandated to perform. They are constantly reminded that any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must be avoided. This is so because the image of the court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work there. The conduct of even minor employees mirrors the image of the courts they serve; thus, they are required to preserve the judiciary’s good name and standing as a true temple of justice. Attys. Gonzalez, et al. vs. Calo. A.M. No. P-12-3028, April 11, 2012. Court personnel; disgraceful and immoral conduct. Immorality has been defined to include not only sexual matters but also “conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.” There is no doubt that engaging in sexual relations with a married man is not only a violation of the moral standards expected of employees of the judiciary, but is also a desecration of the sanctity of the institution of marriage which this Court abhors and is, thus, punishable. Evelyn J. Jailorina vs. Richelle TaneoRegner, Demo II, RTC, OCC, San Mateo, Rizal. A.M. No. P-11-2948, April 23, 2012. Court personnel; dishonesty. Falsification of daily time record constitutes dishonesty. Dishonesty is defined as the “disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.” Section 52(A), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (MC No. 19, dated September 14, 1999) classifies dishonesty as a grave offense punishable by dismissal even for first time offenses. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Araya. A.M. No. P12-3053, April 11, 2012. Court personnel; grave misconduct. The behavior of all employees and officials involved in the administration of justice, from judges to the most junior clerks, is circumscribed with a heavy responsibility. Their conduct must be guided by strict propriety and decorum at all times in order to merit and maintain the public’s respect for and trust in the judiciary. Needless to say, all court personnel must conduct themselves in a manner exemplifying integrity, honesty and uprightness. Respondent’s shouting at complainant within the court premises, reporting complainant to the police after she was reprimanded for her solicitation, and refusing to talk with complainant judge are not only acts of discourtesy and disrespect but likewise an unethical conduct sanctioned by Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.


High-strung and belligerent behavior has no place in government service where the personnel are enjoined to act with self-restraint and civility at all times even when confronted with rudeness and insolence. Such conduct is exacted from them so that they will earn and keep the public’s respect for and confidence in the judicial service. This standard is applied with respect to a court employee’s dealings not only with the public but also with his or her co-workers in the service. Conduct violative of this standard quickly and surely erodes respect for the courts Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer; and the misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, such as willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules. Thus, considering respondent’s transgressions, i.e., disrespectful conduct, solicitation, and influence peddling of bail bonds, there is no question that respondent is guilty of grave misconduct. Judge Salvador R. Santos, Jr. vs. Editha R. Mangahas. A.M. No. P-09-2720, April 17, 2012. Court personnel; habitual tardiness. Under Sec. 52 (C) (4), Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1999, habitual tardiness is penalized as follows: First offense Reprimand; Second offense Suspension for 1-30 days; Third offense Dismissal from the service. Since it was proven that the present case is the second offense of Gareza for being habitually tardy, the OCA correctly recommended for the penalty of suspension for 30 days with warning that a similar offense in the future would be meted a more severe penalty. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Sheriff Gareza. A.M. No. P-123058, April 25, 2012. Court personnel; official and personal conduct. Respondent took more than six years to pay their obligation to the complainant. Also, one of the land titles that respondents gave as collateral turned out to have been encumbered. While they have already paid their obligation, such payment was conditioned upon the complainant’s execution of an Affidavit of Desistance. All these facts constitute conduct that reflects badly on the judiciary, diminishing the honor and integrity of the offices they hold. This is especially true because respondents were admittedly given the loans because they were considered prominent persons in the community; and that they were considered as such, presumably because they worked in the judiciary. In Villaseñor v. De Leon, the Court emphasized that “to preserve decency within the judiciary, court personnel must comply with just contractual obligations, act fairly and adhere to high ethical standards”. In that case, the Court said that respondent was “expected to be a paragon of uprightness, fairness and honesty not only in all her official conduct but also in her personal actuations, including business and commercial transactions, so as to avoid becoming her court’s albatross of infamy.” Re: Complaint filed by Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

Paz De Vera Lazaro against Edna Magallanes and Bonifacio Magallanes. A.M. No. P-11-3003, April 25, 2012. Court personnel; neglect of duty. Settled is the role of clerks of court as judicial officers entrusted with the delicate function with regard to collection of legal fees. They are expected to correctly and effectively implement regulations relating to proper administration of court funds. Delay in the remittance of collection constitutes neglect of duty. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Nini. A.M. No. P-11-3002, April 11, 2012. Court personnel; neglect of duty. The following are the duties of a sheriff: first, to give notice of the writ and demand that the judgment obligor and all persons claiming under him vacate the property within three (3) days; second, to enforce the writ by removing the judgment obligor and all persons claiming under the latter; third, to remove the latter’s personal belongings in the property as well as destroy, demolish or remove the improvements constructed thereon upon special court order; and fourth, to execute and make a return on the writ within 30 days from receipt of the writ and every thirty (30) days thereafter until it is satisfied in full or until its effectivity expires. Respondent was clearly remiss in the performance of his mandated duties: he unilaterally gave the occupants 3 months, instead of the three (3) days provided by the Rules, to vacate the property; when he did evict the occupants from the premises, a room containing their personal effects was padlocked, therefore delaying the demolition of the improvements introduced on the property; finally, respondent failed to make a return on the writ of possession after he implemented the same. Attys. Gonzalez, et al. vs. Calo. A.M. No. P-12-3028, April 11, 2012. Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. Simple neglect of duty is the failure to give attention to a task, or the disregard of a duty due to carelessness or indifference. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Sarmiento, et al. A.M. No. P-11-2912, April 10, 2012. Court personnel; unauthorized absences. Under the Civil Service rules, an employee should submit in advance, whenever possible, an application for a vacation leave of absence for action by the proper chief of agency prior to the effective date of the leave. It is clear from the facts that Dacsig had failed to acquire the necessary leave permits. He offers no excuse or explanation for failing to obtain the necessary authorization for his leaves. Thus, he is guilty of taking unauthorized absences. Rule IV, Section 52 (A) (17) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, provides that the penalty for frequent unauthorized absences of a first offender is suspension for six months and one day to one year. Judge Andrew P. Dulnuan vs. Esteban D. Dacsig, Clerk of Court II, MCTC, MagddelaNagtipunan, Quirinio. A.M. No. P-11-3004, April 18, 2012.


Judge; gross ignorance. Civil Case No. 632, a case for ejectment, is covered by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. It is equally undisputed that in summary procedure, a preliminary conference should be held not later than 30 days after the last answer has been filed. Considering that no preliminary conference at all was held in Civil Case No. 632, Judge Literato evidently failed to comply with a basic rule of procedure for which he should accordingly be held accountable. Judge Literato’s inaction in Civil Case No. 632 for 322 days constitutes utter disregard for the summary nature of an ejectment case. Competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of our courts. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles. Basic legal procedures must be at the palm of a judge’s hands. In sum, Judge Literato is administratively guilty of gross ignorance of the Rule on Summary Procedure and undue delay in rendering a decision. Dr. Ramie G. Hipe vs. Judge Rolando T. Literato, Municipal Trial Court, Mainit, Surigao Del Norte. A.M. No. MTJ-11-1781, April 25, 2012. Judge; gross misconduct. In Guerrero vs. Judge Deray, the Court held that a judge “who deliberately and continuously fails and refuses to comply with the resolution of [the Supreme] Court is guilty of gross misconduct and insubordination.” In the present case, the Court found that Judge Go failed to heed the Court’s pronouncements. He did not file the required comment to the Court’s showcause resolutions despite several opportunities granted him. His willful disobedience and disregard to the show-cause resolutions constitutes grave and serious misconduct affecting his fitness and worthiness of the honor and integrity attached to his office. It is noteworthy that Judge Go was afforded several opportunities to explain his failure to decide the subject cases long pending before his court and to comply with the directives of this Court, but he has failed, and continuously refuses to heed the same. This continued refusal to abide by lawful directives issued by this Court is glaring proof that he has become disinterested to remain with the judicial system to which he purports to belong. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Go, et al. A.M. No. MTJ-07-1667, April 10, 2012. Judge; gross misconduct and dishonesty. In this case, Judge Indar issued decisions on numerous annulment of marriage cases which do not exist in the records of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15 or the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City. There is nothing to show that (1) proceedings were had on the questioned cases; (2) docket fees had been paid; (3) the parties were notified of a scheduled hearing as calendared; (4) hearings had been conducted; or (5) the cases were submitted for decision. Judge Indar, who had sworn to faithfully uphold the law, issued decisions on the questioned annulment of marriage cases, without any showing that such cases underwent trial and complied with the statutory and jurisprudential Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

requisites for voiding marriages. Such act undoubtedly constitutes gross misconduct. Among the questioned annulment decrees is Judge Indar’s Decision dated 23 May 2007, in Spec. Proc. No. 06-581, entitled “Chona Chanco Aguiling v. Alan V. Aguiling.” Despite the fact that no proceedings were conducted in the case, Judge Indar declared categorically, in response to the Australian Embassy letter, that the Decision annulling the marriage is valid and that petitioner is free to marry. In effect, Judge Indar confirms the truthfulness of the contents of the annulment decree, highlighting Judge Indar’s appalling dishonesty. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Indar. A.M. No. RTJ-102232, April 10, 2012. Judge; performing or agreeing to perform functions or services outside of their official functions. Judge Molato is to be reprimanded for agreeing to serve as one of Lucky Corporation’s alternate bank signatories even if he may not have performed such service for the corporation. He has no business agreeing to the performance of such service. His offense constitutes a violation of Administrative Circular 5 which in essence prohibits public officials from performing or agreeing to perform functions or services outside of their official functions for the reason that the entire time of the officials and employees of the judiciary shall be devoted to their official work to ensure the efficient and speedy administration of justice. Ramoncito and Juliana Luarca vs. Judge Ireneo B. Molato, MTC, Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro/ Jeny Agbay vs. Judge Ireneo B. Molato, MTC, Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. A.M. No. MTJ-08-1711/A.M. No. MTJ-08-1716, April 23, 2012.

Notary public; duty to ascertain the identities of the parties executing the document. A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of which are the acknowledgement and affirmation of documents or instruments. In the performance of these notarial acts, the notary public must be mindful of the significance of the notarial seal affixed on documents. The notarial seal converts a document from a private to a public instrument, after which it may be presented as evidence without need for proof of its genuineness and due execution. Thus, notarization should not be treated as an empty, meaningless or routinary act. A notary public’s function should not be trivialized and a notary public must discharge his powers and duties which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity. A notary public exercises duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness. Notaries must inform themselves of the facts they certify to; most importantly, they should not take part or allow themselves to be part of illegal transactions. The Court cautioned all notaries public to be very careful and diligent in ascertaining the true identities of the parties executing the document before them, especially when it involves disposition of a property, as this Court will Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

deal with such cases more severely in the future. Maria vs. Cortez. A.C. No. 7880, April 11, 2012. Attorney; bigamy; gross immorality. A disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities in filing the case.Respondent’s regard for marriage contracts as ordinary agreements indicates either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of marriage or his gross ignorance of the law on what course of action to take to annul a marriage under the old Civil Code provisions. Respondent entered into marriage twice while his first marriage was still subsisting. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Manuel G. Villatuya vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012. Attorney; conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.Section 27, Rule 138 provides that “a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.” In a disbarment case, the Court will no longer review a final judgment of conviction. The crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. The lawyer’s final conviction of the crime of direct bribery clearly falls under one of the grounds for disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138. Disbarment follows as a consequence of the lawyer’s conviction of the crime. Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. vs. Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa. A.C. No. 7360, July 24, 2012. Attorney; inexcusable negligence. The failure of counsel to file the requisite appellant’s brief amounted to inexcusable negligence in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilabon, it was held that an attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. On account of respondent’s failure to protect the interest of complainant, respondent Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

indeed violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The practice of law is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. This Court has been exacting in its expectations for the members of the Bar to always uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence of the public. Isaac C. Basilio, Perlita Pedrozo and Jun Basilio vs. Atty. Virgil R. Castro A.C. No. 6910. July 11, 2012 Attorney; representation of conflicting interest. Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. Rule 15.03 also provides that “A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of facts.” in Hilado v. David, the Court held that “an attorney is employed — that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor — when he is listening to his client’s preliminary statement of his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s cause in open court.” Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. The question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar’s wife, not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. The prohibition against representation of conflicting interests applies although the attorney’s intentions were honest and he acted in good faith. Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. vs. Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa. A.C. No. 7360, July 24, 2012. Attorney; sharing of fees. A lawyer is proscribed by Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services rendered with a person not licensed to practice law. In Tan Tek Beng v. David , it was rule that an agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to share the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Manuel G. Villatuya vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012. Attorney; solicitation of clients. Based on the facts of the case, respondent violated Rule 2.03 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit. A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises, though, when the business is Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for the lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law Rule 15.08 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the former is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations related to the practice of law. The reason is that certain ethical considerations governing the attorney-client relationship may be operative in one and not in the other. Manuel G. Villatuya vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012. Court Personnel; conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service refers to acts or omissions that violate the norm of public accountability and diminish – or tend to diminish – the people’s faith in the Judiciary. If an employee’s questioned conduct tarnished the image and integrity of his public office, he is liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The basis for his liability is Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. The Code, particularly its Section 4(c), commands that public officials and employees shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to public safety and public interest. The strictest standards have always been valued in judicial service. Everyone involved in the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, is expected to live up to the strictest norm of competence, honesty and integrity in the public service. The conduct of every court personnel must be beyond reproach and free from suspicion that may cause to sully the image of the Judiciary. They must totally avoid any impression of impropriety, misdeed or misdemeanor not only in the performance of their official duties but also in conducting themselves outside or beyond the duties and functions of their office. Court personnel are enjoined to conduct themselves toward maintaining the prestige and integrity of the Judiciary for the very image of the latter is necessarily mirrored in their conduct, both official and otherwise. They must not forget that they are an integral part of that organ of the government sacredly tasked in dispensing justice. Their conduct and behavior, therefore, should not only be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility but at all times be defined by propriety and decorum, and above all else beyond any suspicion. The Court does not hesitate to condemn and sanction such improper conduct, act or omission of those involved in the administration of justice that violates the norm of public accountability and diminishes or tends to diminish the faith of the public in the Judiciary. Filomena B. Consolacion vs. Lydia S. Gambito, Court Stenographer, MCTC, Binalonan, Pangasinan/Judge Emma S. Ines-Parajas vs. Lydia S. Gambito, Court Stenographer, MCTC, Binalonan, Pangasinan A.M. No. P-06-2186 & A.M. No. P-12-3026. July 3, 2012 Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

Court personnel; dishonesty and grave misconduct. In Alenio v. Cunting, the Court defined dishonesty and grave misconduct as the “disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and straightforwardness.” Misconduct, on the other hand, is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment. The misconduct must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public officer’s official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office. Taking monetary evidence without proper authority constitutes theft. In Judge San Jose, Jr. v. Camurongan, the Court held that, “The act of taking monetary exhibits without authority from their custodian constitutes theft. Thievery, no matter how petty, has no place in the judiciary.” Office of the Court Administrator vs. Ma. Irissa G. Musni, Court Legal Researcher II RTC, Judicial Region III, Branch 36, Gapan City, Nueva Ecija A.M. No. P-11-3024, July 17, 2012. Court personnel; dishonesty, gross neglect, grave misconduct. Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution declares that a public office is a public trust, and all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. The demand for moral uprightness is more pronounced for the members and personnel of the judiciary who are involved in the dispensation of justice. The conduct of court members and personnel must not only be characterized with propriety and decorum but must also be above suspicion, for any act of impropriety ca seriously erode or diminish the people’s confidence in the judiciary. As frontliners in the administration of justice, they should live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity in the public service. Clerks of Court act as custodians of the court’s funds, revenues, records, property and premises and are thus, liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of such funds and property. In Re: Report on the Judicial and Financial Audit of RTC-Br. 4, Panabo, Davao Del Norte, it was held that the failure of the Clerk of Court to remit the court funds constitutes gross neglect of duty, dishonesty, and grave misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. In this case, Peradilla is guilty of dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, and grave misconduct for her: (1) non-remittance of collections of judiciary funds; (2) non-issuance of official receipts and non reporting in the Monthly Reports and Collections and Deposits of some of the collections; and (3) erroneous reporting in the Monthly Reports and Collections and Deposits of some of the collections. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Lunalinda M. Peradilla, Clerk of Court II, MCTC, E1 NidoLinapacan, Palawan A.M. No. P-09-2647, July 17, 2012. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

Court personnel; simple misconduct. The Sheriff disregarded the procedure for the execution of judgments as mandated by Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. A sheriff is mandated to make an estimate of the expenses which shall be approved by the court. It is only after the approval of the court that an interested party shall deposit the amount with the clerk of court. Upon the return of the writ, the sheriff must submit a liquidation and return to the interested party any unspent amount. The Sheriff’s act of receiving money from the party for the expenses to be incurred in the execution of the writs, without first making an estimate and securing prior approval from the MTCC, as well as his failure to render accounting after its execution, are clear violations of the rule. Even if conceding that the sum demanded by Sheriff is reasonable, this does not justify his deviation from the procedure laid down by the rule. Neither the acquiescence nor consent of the complainant, before or after the implementation of the writ will absolve him from liability. The mere act of receiving the money without the prior approval of the court and without him issuing a receipt therefor is considered as a misconduct in office. Sheriffs are reminded that they are not allowed to receive any voluntary payments from parties in the course of the performance of their duties. Corollarily, a sheriff cannot just unilaterally demand sums of money from a party-litigant without observing the proper procedural steps. Even assuming that such payments were indeed given and received in good faith, such fact alone would not dispel the suspicion that such payments were made for less than noble purposes. Sheriffs and their deputies are the front-line representatives of the justice system, and if, through their lack of care and diligence in the implementation of judicial writs, they lose the trust reposed on them, they inevitably diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary. The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work there, from the judge to the lowest employee. As such, the Court will not tolerate or condone any conduct of judicial agents or employees which would tend to or actually diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary. Lambayong Teachers and Employees Cooperative, represented in this act by its Manager, Gudelio S. Valeroso vs. Carlos P. Diaz, in his capacity as Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 20, Tacurong City A.M. No. P-06-2246, July 11, 2012. Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. The manner in which a writ of execution is to be returned to the court, as well as the requisite reports to be made by the sheriff or officer, is explicitly outlined in Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In accordance with this rule, periodic reporting must be done by the sheriff regularly and consistently every thirty (30) days until the judgment is fully satisfied. It is mandatory for the sheriff to make a return of the writ of execution, so that the court and the litigants may be apprised of the proceedings undertaken in the enforcement of the writ. The return will enable the courts to take the necessary steps to ensure the speedy execution of decisions. The failure of a sheriff to make periodic reports on the status of a writ of execution warrants administrative liability.


The Court faults respondent for not submitting his periodic reports on the progress of his implementation of the writ. He is guilty of simple neglect of duty, defined as “the failure of an employee to give one’s attention to a task expected of him, and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.”As officers of the court, sheriffs are charged with the knowledge of what proper action to take in case there are questions on the writ needing to be clarified; they are charged as well with the knowledge of what they are bound to comply with.Sheriffs are expected to know the rules of procedure pertaining to their functions as officers of the court,relative to the implementation of writs of execution, and should at all times show a high degree of professionalism in the performance of their duties. Any act deviating from the procedure laid down by the Rules of Court is misconduct that warrants disciplinary action. Rhea Airene P. Katague, et al. vs. Jerry A. Ledesma, Sheriff IV, RTC, Br. 48, Bacolod City A.M. No. P-12-3067. July 4, 2012. Court personnel; simple neglect of duty. The duty of a process server is vital to the administration of justice. A process server’s primary duty is to serve court notices which precisely requires utmost care on his part by ensuring that all notices assigned to him are duly served on the parties. Unjustified delay in performing this task constitutes neglect of duty and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions. All employees in the judiciary should be examples of responsibility, competence and efficiency. It is through the process server that defendants learn of the action brought against them by the complainant. It is also through the service of summons by the process server that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the defendant. It is therefore important that summonses, other writs and court processes be served expeditiously. Heavy workload is not an adequate excuse to be remiss in the diligent performance of one’s public duties as a public servant. Otherwise, every government employee charged with negligence and dereliction of duty will always use this as a convenient excuse to escape punishment to the great prejudice of public service The Court has defined dishonesty as the ‘disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.’ Dishonesty is not simply bad judgment or negligence. Dishonesty is a question of intention. In ascertaining the intention of a person accused of dishonesty, consideration must be taken not only of the facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the respondent, but also of his state of mind at the time the offense was committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could have had at that moment. It was never alleged, much less established, that Dela Cruz was impelled by some evil design or corrupt motives to commit said errors or to favor any party or litigant. Hence, he was found guilty only of negligence in the performance of his tasks, and not of Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

dishonesty. Simple neglect of duty is defined as “the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference.” Judge Pelagia Dalmacio-Joaquin vs. Nicomedes Dela Cruz, Process Server, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. A.M. No. P-06-2241. July 10, 2012 Judge; gross ignorance of the law. Judge Clapis is also liable for gross ignorance of the law for conducting bail hearings without a petition for bail being filed by the accused and without affording the prosecution an opportunity to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong. His Order granting bail indicates that he merely used as basis the affidavit of one prosecution witness that was submitted earlier. Clearly, he failed to observe the proper procedure in granting bail. His act is not a mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment but a patent disregard of well-known rules. When an error is so gross and patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law. If judges are allowed to wantonly misuse the powers vested in them by the law, there will not only be confusion in the administration of justice but also oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due process. Judges are reminded that having accepted the exalted position of a judge, they owe it to the public to uphold the exacting standard of conduct demanded from them. Criselda C. Gacad vs. Judge Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr., RTC, Br. 3, Nabunturan, Compostela Valley A.M. No. RJ-10-2257. July 17, 2012 Judge; gross misconduct. In Kaw v. Osorio, the Court held that while the respondent judge, in that case, may not be held liable for extortion and corruption as it was not substantially proven, he should be made accountable for gross misconduct. The acts of the Judge in meeting a litigant in a case pending before his sala, and telling her, “Sige, kay ako na bahala gamuson nato ni sila” (Okay, leave it all to me, we shall crush them) constitute gross misconduct. Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior in connection with one’s performance of official functions and duties. For grave or gross misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by the intention to violate the law, or a persistent disregard of well-known rules. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment. The arbitrary actions of respondent judge, taken together, give doubt as to his impartiality, integrity and propriety. His acts amount to gross misconduct constituting violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, particularly Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 2 and Sections 2 and 4 of Canon 3 and Section 1 of Canon 4 It is an ironclad principle that a judge must not only be impartial; he must also appear to be impartial at all times. Being in constant scrutiny by the public, his language, both written and spoken, must be guarded and measured lest the best of intentions be misconstrued. Needless to state, any gross misconduct seriously undermines the faith and confidence of the Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

people in the judiciary. Criselda C. Gacad vs. Judge Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr., RTC, Br. 3, Nabunturan, Compostela Valley A.M. No. RJ-10-2257. July 17, 2012 Judge; undue delay. The Revised Rules on Summary Procedure was promulgated to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases that it covers. The respondent failed to abide by this purpose in the way that he handled and acted on the subject unlawful detainer case. Under Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, a preliminary conference should be held not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed. The respondent set the case for preliminary conference at a time way beyond the required thirty (30)-day period. Another of the respondent’s procedural lapses relates to the frequent resetting of the date of the preliminary conference. Clearly, the respondent failed to exert his authority in expediting the proceedings of the unlawful detainer case. Sound practice requires a judge to remain, at all times, in full control of the proceedings in his court and to adopt a firm policy against unnecessary postponements. In numerous occasions, the Court admonished judges to be prompt in the performance of their solemn duty as dispensers of justice because undue delay in the administration of justice erodes the people’s faith in the judicial system. Delay not only reinforces the belief of the people that the wheels of justice in this country grind slowly, it also invites suspicion, however unfair, of ulterior motives on the part of the Judge. Judges should always be mindful of their duty to render justice within the periods prescribed by law. Murphy Chu, et al. vs. Hon. Mario B. Capellan, Assisting Judge, MeTC, Br. 40, Quezon City. A.M. No. MTJ-11-1779, July 16, 2012. Attorney; Attorney-client relationship. Respondent Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes, Jr. was charged for gross negligence in violation of Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Supreme Court held him guilty of gross negligence. The relationship between an attorney and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this light, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. Verily, a lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. A lawyer’s duty of competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsel’s care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so. While such negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has consistently held that the lawyer’s mere failure to perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation. Thus, the court suspended respondent for Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

six (6) months. Josefina Caranza Vda de Saldivar v. Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes, Jr., A.C. No. 7749, July 8, 2013 Attorney; Conflict of interest. The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations wherein a lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it after consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty. Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client’s case, including the weak and strong points of the case. Knowledge and information gathered in the course of the relationship must be treated as sacred and guarded with care. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of justice. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. Contrary to Atty. Era’s ill-conceived attempt to explain his disloyalty to Samson and his group, the termination of the attorney-client relationship does not justify a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The spirit behind this rule is that the client’s confidence once given should not be stripped by the mere expiration of the professional employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do anything that will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which the lawyer previously represented the client. Nor should the lawyer disclose or use any of the client’s confidences acquired in the previous relation. Thus, Atty. Era was found guilty of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and was suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years. Ferdinand A. Samson v. Atty. Edgardo O. Era, A.C. No. 6664, July 16, 2013. Attorney; Disbarment and suspension of lawyers; Burden of proof. The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on the shoulders of the complainant. The Court exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes the complaint by clearly preponderant evidence that warrants the imposition of the harsh penalty. As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges made against him until the contrary is proved. An attorney is further presumed as an officer of the Court to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath. In this case, complainants failed to discharge their burden of proving that respondents ordered their secretary to stamp a much later date instead of the actual date of receipt for the purpose of extending the ten-day period within which to file a Motion for Reconsideration under the NLRC Rules of Procedure. Such claim is merely anchored on speculation and conjecture and not backed by any clear preponderant evidence necessary to justify the imposition of administrative penalty on a member of the Bar. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

Jaime Joven and Reynaldo C. Rasing v. Atty. Pablo R. Cruz and Frankie O. Magsalin III, A.C. No. 7686, July 31, 2013. Attorney; Honesty; Practice of law is not a right but a privilege. Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to assist in the administration of justice. They act as vanguards of our legal system, protecting and upholding truth and the rule of law. They are expected to act with honesty in all their dealings, especially with the court. Verily, the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins lawyers from committing or consenting to any falsehood in court or from allowing the courts to be misled by any artifice. Moreover, they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. Indeed, the practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed upon by the State upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a practitioner’s honorable membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of litigation and in their relations with their clients, the opposing parties, the other counsels and the courts. They are bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their clients. Sonic Steel Industries, Inc. v. Atty. Nonnatus P. Chua, A.C. No. 6942, July 17, 2013. Court personnel; Gross dishonesty; Misrepresentation of eligibility; Penalty. Respondent, a court stenographer III, was charged with gross dishonesty in connection with her Civil Service eligibility where she was accused of causing another person to take the Civil Service Eligibility Examination in her stead. Before the Decision was imposed, however, respondent already resigned. The Supreme Court held that the respondent’s resignation from the service did not cause the Court to lose its jurisdiction to proceed against her in this administrative case. Her cessation from office by virtue of her intervening resignation did not warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint against her, for the act complained of had been committed when she was still in the service. Nor did such cessation from office render the administrative case moot and academic. Otherwise, exacting responsibility for administrative liabilities incurred would be easily avoided or evaded. Respondent’s dismissal from the service is the appropriate penalty, with her eligibility to be cancelled, her retirement benefits to be forfeited, and her disqualification from re-employment in the government service to be perpetual. Her intervening resignation necessarily means that the penalty of dismissal could no longer be implemented against her. Instead, fine is imposed, the determination of the amount of which is subject to the sound discretion of the Court. Concerned Citizen V. Nonita v. Catena, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Br. 50, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, A.M. OCA IPI No. 021321-P, July 16, 2013. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

Court personnel; Misconduct; Penalty under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service; Effect of death in an administrative case. Misconduct is “a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behavior, wilful in character, improper or wrong behavior.” A misconduct is “grave” or gross” if it is “out of all measure; beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful” or “such conduct as is not to be excused.” Respondent Ong’s and Buencamino’s acts of using the levied car for personal errands and losing it while under their safekeeping constitute grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty. These are flagrant and shameful acts and should not be countenanced. Respondents’ acts warrant the penalty of dismissal as provided in Rule 10, Section 46 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. As for respondent Buencamino, his death is not a ground for the dismissal of the Complaint against him. Respondent Buencamino’s acts take away the public’s faith in the judiciary, and these acts should be sanctioned despite his death. Sheriffs are reminded that they are “repositories of public trust and are under obligation to perform the duties of their office honestly, faithfully, and to the best of their abilities.” Being “frontline officials of the justice system,” sheriffs and deputy sheriffs “must always strive to maintain public trust in the performance of their duties.” Office of the Court Administrator v. Noel R. Ong, Deputy Sheriff, Br. 49, et al., A.M. No. P-09-2690, July 9, 2013. Court personnel; Simple neglect of duty; Penalty under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases; Mitigating circumstances. The Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) charged respondent Sheriff lV Famero with Gross Neglect of Duty amounting to Gross Misconduct for refusing to implement the Writ of Execution issued in a civil case involving DBP. The Supreme Court held that the respondent cannot fully be excused for his failure to make periodic reports in the proceedings taken on the writ, as mandated by Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. For the respondent’s lapses in the procedures in the implementation of the writ of execution, he was found guilty of simple neglect of duty, defined as the failure of an employee to give attention to the task expected of him. Under Section 52(B)(1) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense punishable by suspension from office for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense. In the imposition of the appropriate penalty, Section 53 of the same Rules allows the disciplining authority to consider mitigating circumstances in favor of the respondent. The court considered his length of service in the Judiciary, acknowledgment of infractions, remorse and other family circumstances, among others, in determining the proper penalty. He was also found to be entitled to the following mitigating circumstances: (1) his more than 24 years of service in the Judiciary; (2) a clear record other than for the present infraction which is his first offense, (3) the resistance of the informal settlers to leave the property; (4) fear for his life; and (5) his well-grounded recognition that he Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

could not undertake any demolition without the appropriate court order. After considering the attendant facts and the mitigating circumstances, the court also considered that the efficiency of court operations may ensue if the respondent’s work were to be left unattended by reason of his suspension. Thus, he was imposed the penalty of fine instead of suspension from service. Development Bank of the Philippines, etc. Vs. Damvin V. Famero, Sheriff IV, RTC, Br. 43, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, A.M. No. P-0-2789, July 31, 2013. Judge; Gross Inefficiency; Duties include prompt disposition or resolution of cases. As a frontline official of the Judiciary, a trial judge should always act with efficiency and probity. He is duty-bound not only to be faithful to the law, but also to maintain professional competence. The pursuit of excellence ought always to be his guiding principle. Such dedication is the least that he can do to sustain the trust and confidence that the public have reposed in him and the institution he represents. The Court cannot overstress its policy on prompt disposition or resolution of cases. Nonetheless, the Court has been mindful of the plight of our judges and understanding of circumstances that may hinder them from promptly disposing of their businesses. Hence, the Court has allowed extensions of time to decide cases beyond the 90-day period. All that a judge needs to do is to request and justify an extension of time to decide the cases, and the Court has almost invariably granted such request. Judge Carbonell’s failure to decide several cases within the reglementary period, without justifiable and credible reasons, constituted gross inefficiency. Considering that Judge Carbonell has retired due to disability, his poor health condition may have greatly contributed to his inability to efficiently perform his duties as a trial judge. That mitigated his administrative liability, for which reason the Court reduced the recommended penalty of fine from P50,000 to P20,000. Re: Failure of Former Judge Antonio A. Carbonell to Decide Cases Submitted for Decision and Resolve Pending Motions in the RTC, Branch 27, San Fernando, La Union, A.M. No. 08-5-305-RTC, July 9, 2013. Attorney; the failure to file a brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal constitutes inexcusable negligence. In Dalisay Capili v. Atty. Alfredo L. Bentulan, the Court held that the failure to file a brief resulting in the dismissal of an appeal constitutes inexcusable negligence. In this case, the Court cannot accept as an excuse the alleged lapse committed by his client in failing to provide him a copy of the case records. In the first place, securing a copy of the case records was within Atty. San Juan’s control and is a task that the lawyer undertakes. Second, Atty. San Juan, unlike his client, knows or should have known, that filing an appellant’s brief within the reglementary period is critical in the perfection of an appeal. The preparation and the filing of the appellant’s brief are matters of procedure that fully fell within the exclusive control and responsibility of Atty. San Juan. It was incumbent upon him to execute all acts Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

and procedures necessary and incidental to the perfection of his client’s appeal. Third, Atty. San Juan lacked candor in dealing with his client. He omitted to inform Tomas of the progress of his appeal with the Court of Appeals. Worse, he did not disclose to Tomas the real reason for the Court of Appeal’s dismissal of the appeal. Neither did Atty. San Juan file a motion for reconsideration, or otherwise resort to available legal remedies that might have protected his client’s interest. Atty. San Juan’s negligence undoubtedly violates the Lawyer’s Oath that requires him to “conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of (his) knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to (his) clients[.]” He also violated Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rex Polinar Dagohoy v. Atty. Artemio V. San Juan. A.C. No. 7944, June 3, 2013. Attorney; IBP findings and recommended penalties in administrative cases against lawyers are only recommendatory. IBP’s recommended penalty of three (3) months suspension from the practice of law is not commensurate to the gravity of the infractions committed. These infractions warrant the imposition of a stiffer sanction. The following acts and omissions of Atty. San Juan were considered: first, the negligence in handling his client’s appeal; second, his failure to act candidly and effectively in communicating information to his client; and more importantly, third, the serious and irreparable consequence of his admitted negligence which deprived his client of legal remedies in addressing his conviction. In Pineda v. Atty. Macapagal, the Court imposed a one (1) year suspension from the practice of law on a lawyer who, like Atty. San Juan, had been found guilty of gross negligence in handling his client’s case. With this case as the norm, Atty. San Juan should be meted a suspension of one (1) year from the practice of law for his negligence and inadequacies in handling his client’s case. Moreover, IBP’s findings and stated penalty are merely recommendatory; only the Supreme Court has the power to discipline erring lawyers and to impose against them penalties for unethical conduct. Until finally acted upon by the Supreme Court, the IBP findings and the recommended penalty imposed cannot attain finality until adopted by the Court as its own. Thus, the IBP findings, by themselves, cannot be a proper subject of implementation or compliance. Rex Polinar Dagohoy v. Atty. Artemio V. San Juan. A.C. No. 7944, June 3, 2013. Court personnel; dishonesty. Ismael Hadji Ali, a court stenographer I at the Shari’a Circuit Court, represented that he took and passed the Civil Service Professional Examination but evidence showed that another person took the exam for him. Per CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, Series of 1991, the use of spurious Civil Service eligibility constitutes dishonesty, among others. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

Dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary. Hadji Ali failed to observe the strict standards and behavior required of an employee in the judiciary. He has shown unfitness for public office. Pursuant to the Civil Service Rules, Hadji Ali was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. Civil Service Commission v. Ismael A. Hadji Ali, et al., A.M. No. SCC-08-11-P, June 18, 2013. Court personnel; dishonesty and grave misconduct. Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior as well as gross negligence by a public officer. To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment. The misconduct must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public officer’s official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office. Dishonesty is the “disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and straightforwardness.” In this case, respondent deceived complainant’s family who were led to believe that he is the legal representative of the Hodges Estate. Boasting of his position as a court officer, a City Sheriff at that, complainant’s family completely relied on his repeated assurance that they will not be ejected from the premises. In Re: Complaint Filed by Paz De Vera Lazaro Against Edna Magallanes, Court Stenographer III, RTC Br. 28 and Bonifacio G. Magallanes, Process Server, RTC Br. 30, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, the Court stressed that to preserve decency within the judiciary, court personnel must comply with just contractual obligations, act fairly and adhere to high ethical standards. In that case, the court held that court employees are expected to be paragons of uprightness, fairness and honesty not only in their official conduct but also in their personal dealings, including business and commercial transactions to avoid becoming the court’s albatross of infamy. More importantly, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 671350 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees mandates that public officials and employees shall remain true to the people at all times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged. They shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest. Rodolfo C. Sabidong v. Nicolasito S. Solas. A.M. No. P-011448, June 25, 2013. Court personnel; Prohibition in acquiring property involved in litigation within the jurisdiction of their courts. Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

prohibits court officers such as clerks of court from acquiring property involved in litigation within the jurisdiction or territory of their courts. The rationale is that public policy disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar control exercised by these persons. “In so providing, the Code tends to prevent fraud, or more precisely, tends not to give occasion for fraud, which is what can and must be done.” For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. Where the property is acquired after the termination of the case, no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches. In this case, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on November 21, 1994, the Decision in Civil Case No. 14706 which was promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long become final. Be that as it may, it cannot be said that the property is no longer “in litigation” at that time considering that it was part of the Hodges Estate then under settlement proceedings. A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. A property forming part of the estate under judicial settlement continues to be subject of litigation until the probate court issues an order declaring the estate proceedings closed and terminated. The rule is that as long as the order for the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. Rodolfo C. Sabidong v. Nicolasito S. Solas. A.M. No. P-01-1448, June 25, 2013. Attorney; practice of law; notary. The practice of law is imbued with public interest and “a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State – the administration of justice – as an officer of the court.” Accordingly, ‘”lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.” Similarly, the duties of notaries public are dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. “Notarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for notarization converts a private document to a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution.” In misrepresenting himself as a notary public, respondent exposed partylitigants, courts, other lawyers and the general public to the perils of ordinary documents posing as public instruments. Respondent committed acts of deceit and falsehood in open violation of the explicit pronouncements of the Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

Code of Professional Responsibility. Evidently, respondent’s conduct falls miserably short of the high standards of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing required from lawyers. Thus, he should be sanctioned. Efigenia M. Tenoso vs. Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez. A.C. No. 8384. April 11, 2013 Court personnel; dishonesty. In Civil Service Commission v. Perocho, Jr., the Court defined dishonesty as “intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination, registration, appointment or promotion. Thus, dishonesty, like bad faith, is not simply bad judgment or negligence. Dishonesty is a question of intention. In ascertaining the intention of a person accused of dishonesty, consideration must be taken not only of the facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the respondent, but also of his state of mind at the time the offense was committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could have had at that moment.” Evidence showed that respondent was not the one who took the Civil Service Sub-Professional Examinations. The Court, citing the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, stressed that its employees should hold the highest standard of integrity for they are a reflection of the esteemed institution which they serve. It certainly cannot countenance any form of dishonesty perpetrated by its employees. Civil Service Commission vs. Merle Ramoneda-Pita. A.M. No. P-08-2531. April 11, 2013 Court Personnel; simple neglect of duty. In this case, the personnel in charge of the court records failed to elevate the case records to the Court of Appeals within the prescribed period due to the alleged “heavy workload.” The Court held that he was guilty of simple neglect of duty. Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel commands court personnel to perform their duties properly and with diligence at all times. The administration of justice is an inviolable task and it demands the highest degree of efficiency, dedication and professionalism. The Court is not unaware of the heavy workload of court personnel, given the number of cases filed and pending before it. However, unless proven to exist in an insurmountable degree, this circumstance cannot serve as an “excuse to evade administrative liability; otherwise, every government employee faced with negligence and dereliction of duty would resort to that excuse to evade punishment, to the detriment of the public service.” Clearly, Salazar is guilty of simple neglect of duty, which is defined as the failure to give proper attention to a task expected of an employee, thus signifying a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference. In the determination of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating, aggravating and alternative circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime shall be considered. The Court has mitigated imposable penalties for various special reasons. It has considered length of service in the judiciary, acknowledgement of infractions, remorse and family circumstances, among Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

others, in determining the applicable penalty. In this case, while Salazar is a second time offender for simple neglect of duty, her long years of service in the judiciary and the admission of her negligence are circumstances to mitigate her culpability. Judge Renato A. Fuentes, RTC, Br. 17, Davao City vs. Atty. Rogelio F. Fabro, etc., et al. A.M. No. P-10-2791. April 17, 2013 Judge; Court Personnel; Grave misconduct; Gross neglect of duty; Gross inefficiency. In Obañana, Jr. v. Ricafort, the court held that: Any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must be avoided. This Court shall not countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary. First, the judges involved solemnized marriages even if the requirements submitted by the couples were incomplete and questionable. Their actions constitute gross inefficiency. In Vega v. Asdala, the Court held that inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance, and carelessness. Second, the judges were also found guilty of neglect of duty regarding the payment of solemnization fees. The Court, in Rodrigo-Ebron v. Adolfo, defined neglect of duty as the failure to give one’s attention to a task expected of him and it is gross when, from the gravity of the offense or the frequency of instances, the offense is so serious in its character as to endanger or threaten public welfare. The marriage documents show that official receipts for the solemnization fee were missing or payment by batches was made for marriages performed on different dates. Third, the judges also solemnized marriages where a contracting party is a foreigner who did not submit a certificate of legal capacity to marry from his or her embassy. This irregularity displayed the gross neglect of duty of the judges. Fourth, the judges are also guilty of gross ignorance of the law under Article 34 of the Family Code with respect to the marriages they solemnized where legal impediments existed during cohabitation such as the minority status of one party. On the other hand, the court interpreter is guilty of grave misconduct when she said she can facilitate the marriage and the requirements on the same day. She proposed an open-dated marriage in exchange for a fee of P3,000. Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel prohibits court personnel from soliciting or accepting gifts, favor or benefit based on any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions. Administrative Cases in the Civil Service defines grave misconduct as “a grave offense that carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service even on a first offense. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, et al. A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691. April 2, 2013 Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

Judge; Gross ignorance of the law. The respondent judges violated Canons 21 and 6 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which exact competence, integrity and probity in the performance of their duties. Ignorance of the law is a mark of incompetence, and where the law involved is elementary, ignorance thereof is considered as an indication of lack of integrity. In connection with this, the administration of justice is considered a sacred task and upon assumption to office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He or she becomes the visible representation of the law and more importantly of justice. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, et al. A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691. April 2, 2013 Public officer; Presumption of regularity. In People v. Jansen, the Court held that the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law. However, in Sevilla v. Cardenas, the presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The visible superimpositions on the marriage licenses should have alerted the solemnizing judges to the irregularity of the issuance. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, et al. A.M. No. MTJ07-1691. April 2, 2013 Judge; Prohibition against private practice of law. Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibits sitting judges like Judge Malanyaon from engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. Section 11 Canon 4 (Propriety), of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct reiterate the prohibition from engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. The prohibition is based on sound reasons of public policy, considering that the rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney are inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a sitting judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending favors to their own private interests, and assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions. These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote the public interest. Thus, an attorney who accepts an appointment to the Bench must accept that his right to practice law as a member of the Philippine Bar is thereby suspended, and it shall continue to be so suspended for the entire period of his incumbency as a judge. The term practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or to participation in court proceedings, but extends to the preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a litigation, the giving of legal advice to clients or persons needing the same, the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

secured, and the preparation of papers incident to actions and special proceedings. In this case, Judge Malanyaon engaged in the private practice of law by assisting his daughter at his wife’s administrative case, coaching his daughter in making manifestations or posing motions to the hearing officer, and preparing the questions that he prompted to his daughter. Sonia C. Decena and Rey C. Decena vs. Judge Nilo A. Malanyaon, RTC, Br. 32, Pili, Camarines Sur. A.M. RTJ-10-2217. April 8, 2013 Public Officers; public office is a public trust; public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. In this case, Gesultura, a Cashier II in the Office of the Clerk of Court in the RTC, was dismissed for an anomaly involving the Judiciary Development Fund and the General Fund. The Court held that public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. Those charged with the dispensation of justice, from justices and judges to the lowliest clerks, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Not only must their conduct at all times be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, it must be beyond suspicion. No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from the occupant than does the judicial office. The safekeeping of funds and collections is essential to the goal of an orderly administration of justice. The act of misappropriating judiciary funds constitutes dishonesty and grave misconduct which are grave offenses punishable by dismissal upon the commission of even the first offense. Time and again, we have reminded court personnel tasked with collections of court funds, such as Clerks of Courts and cash clerks, to deposit immediately with authorized government depositories the various funds they have collected, because they are not authorized to keep funds in their custody. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Develyn Gesultura. A.M. No. P-04-1785. April 2, 2013 Administrative cases against lawyers; prescriptive period . The two-year prescriptive period for initiating a complaint against a lawyer for disbarment or suspension provided under Section 1, Rule VIII of the Rules of Procedure of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline should be construed to mean two years from the date of discovery of the professional misconduct. Nesa Isenhardt vs. Atty. Leonardo M. Real, A.C. No. 8254, February 15, 2012. Attorney; disqualification as notary public. A notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signs it is the same person who executed it, personally appearing before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein. This is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party’s free act. The duties of a notary Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

public is dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. It is not a meaningless ministerial act of acknowledging documents executed by parties who are willing to pay the fees for notarization. It is of no moment that the subject SPA was not utilized by the grantee for the purpose it was intended because the property was allegedly transferred from complainant to her brother by virtue of a deed of sale consummated between them. What is being penalized is respondent’s act of notarizing a document despite the absence of one of the parties. A notarized document is by law entitled to full credit upon its face and it is for this reason that notaries public must observe the basic requirements in notarizing documents. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in notarized documents will be undermined. Nesa Isenhardt vs. Atty. Leonardo M. Real, A.C. No. 8254, February 15, 2012. Attorney; government service; applicability of Code of Professional Responsibility. The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the government service. Where a lawyer’s misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds. Martin Lahn III and James P. Concepcion vs. Labor Arbiter Jovencio Li. Mayor, Jr., A.C. No. 7430, February 15, 2012. Attorney; gross ignorance of the law. The respondent labor arbiter, being part of the quasi-judicial system of our government, performs official functions that are akin to those of judges. Accordingly, the present controversy may be approximated to administrative cases of judges whose decisions, including the manner of rendering the same, were made subject of administrative cases. While a judge may not always be held liable for ignorance of the law for every erroneous order that he renders, it is also axiomatic that when the legal principle involved is sufficiently basic, lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. The unfounded insistence of the respondent on his supposed authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, taken together with the delay in the resolution of the said motion for reconsideration, would clearly show that the respondent deliberately intended to cause prejudice to the complainants. Martin Lahn III and James P. Concepcion vs. Labor Arbiter Jovencio Li. Mayor, Jr., A.C. No. 7430, February 15, 2012. Court personnel; dishonesty. Dishonesty has been defined as the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in government service. Given the total absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that respondent clerk of court punched his DTR to make it appear he was at the office on February 26, 2010 when he was in fact absent still prevails. Dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary. Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

Public service requires utmost integrity and discipline. A public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity, for no less than the Constitution declares that a public office is a public trust, and all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, and serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. Leave Division, Office of the Adrministrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator vs. Leoncio K. Gutierrez III, Clerk III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City. A.M. No. P-11-2951, February 15, 2012. Court personnel; dishonesty, misrepresentation . OCA Circular No. 49-2003 provides that court personnel who wish to travel abroad must secure a travel authority from the Office of the Court Administrator. Section 67 of the Omnibus Rules on Leave provides that any violation of the leave laws, rules or regulations, or any misrepresentation or deception in connection with an application for leave shall be a ground for disciplinary action. The respondent court stenographer traveled without securing a travel authority and did not state her foreign travel in her leave application. She is guilty of violating at least two office rules and regulations. This shows deception amounting to dishonesty. Dishonesty means the concealment of truth in a matter of fact relevant to one’s office or connected with the performance of his duties. It is an absence of integrity, a disposition to betray, cheat, deceive or defraud, bad faith. The discrepancy in the respondent’s date of birth in her records does not amount to dishonesty, as she made no false statement. No deliberate intent to mislead, deceive or defraud appears from the cited circumstances of this case. The respondent’s date of birth is not a fact directly relevant to her functions or qualification to office or connected with the performance of her duties. Sheila G. Del Rosario, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Br. 36, Santiago City, Isabela vs. Mary Anne C. Pascua, Court Stenographer III, same court. A.M. No. P-11-2999. February 27, 2012. Court personnel; habitual absenteeism. Administrative Circular No. 14-2002 provides that an employee is considered habitually absent if the employee incurred unauthorized absences exceeding the 2.5 days allowed per month for three months in a semester or at least three consecutive months during the year. In imposing penalty of habitual absenteeism in administrative cases, however, the court may take into consideration mitigating circumstances. The presence of factors such as length of service in the judiciary, acknowledgment of infractions and feeling of remorse, and family circumstances, among other things, play an important role in the imposition of penalties. Judge Lucina Alpez Dayaon, etc. vs. Jesusa V. De Leon. A.M. No. P-11-2926, February 1, 2012 Judge; gross ignorance of law and undue delay. Well- settled is the rule that an injunction cannot be issued to transfer possession or control of a property to another when the legal title is in dispute between the parties and the legal title has not been clearly established. In this case, respondent judge evidently disregarded this established doctrine when he granted the Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

preliminary injunction in favor of Pagels whose legal title is disputed. When the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence. When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his functions, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. A judge may also be administratively liable if shown to have been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption in ignoring, contradicting or failing to apply settled law and jurisprudence. Atty. Rene Medina, et al. vs. Judge Victor Canoy, et al. A.M. RTJ-11-2298, February 22, 2012. Judges; delay in conducting summary hearing to extend the 72-hr TRO; gross ignorance of law; requirement of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption. Judges are not administratively responsible for what they may do in the exercise of their judicial functions when acting within their legal powers and jurisdiction. Not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the subject decision, order or actuation of the respondent judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. Complainants failed to adduce proof to show that respondent judge was motivated by bad faith, ill will or malicious motive when he granted the TRO and preliminary injunction. In addition, respondent judge should not be penalized for failing to conduct the required summary hearing within 72 hours from the issuance of the original TRO. Though the Rules require the presiding judge to conduct a summary hearing before the expiration of the 72 hours, it could not be complied with because of the remoteness and inaccessibility of the trial court from the parties’ addresses. Sps. Democrito and Olivia Lago vs. Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. RTC, Br. 43, Gingoog City. A.M. No. RTJ-10-2255, February 8, 2012. Judges; immorality vs. simple misconduct. The New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary provides that, as a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. In particular, judges must conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office. Occupying as he does an exalted position in the administration of justice, a judge must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him. Thus, the judge must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice. There was no evidence that respondent judge engaged in scandalous conduct that would Atty. GIL P. VILORIA, Jr. PALE Instructor, S.Y. 2015-2016

warrant the imposition of disciplinary action against him. His admission of homosexuality does not make him automatically immoral. However, respondent judge is guilty of simple misconduct in causing the registration of title in his son’s name with the intention of defrauding a possible judgmentobligee. Simple misconduct is a transgression of some established rule of action, an unlawful behavior, or negligence committed by a public officer. Aida R. Campos, et al. vs. Judge Eliseo M. Campos, MTC, Bayugan, Agusan del Sur. A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761, February 8, 2012. Judges; undue delay in rendering a decision. Judges must resolve matters pending before them promptly and expeditiously within the constitutionally mandated three-month period. If they cannot comply with the same, they should ask for an extension from the Supreme Court upon meritorious grounds. The rule is that the reglementary period for deciding cases should be observed by all judges, unless they have been granted additional time. Judges must dispose of the court’s business promptly. Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it to disrepute. Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions on them. Although there are no promulgated rules on the conduct of judicial audit, the absence of such rules should not serve as license to recommend the imposition of penalties to retired judges who, during their incumbency, were never given a chance to explain the circumstances behind the results of the judicial audit. Judicial audit reports and the memoranda which follow them should state not only recommended penalties and plans of action for the violations of audited courts, but also give commendations when they are due. To avoid similar scenarios, manual judicial audits may be conducted at least six months before a judge’s compulsory retirement. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Celso L. Mantua, Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Palompon, Leyte. A.M. No. RTJ-11-2291. February 8, 2012.


CONSOLIDATED CASES IN PALE.docx

Recommend Documents