CASE NO. 15: In the Matter of the Claim for Attorney's Fees. CLARO M. RECTO, claimant-appellee, vs. ESPERANZA P. DE HARDEN and FRED M. HARDEN, defendants-appellants.
FACTS: Esperanza Harden engaged the services of Atty. Claro M. Recto to appear and act as her counsel in the action which she filed against her husband Fred for increasing the amount of support she was receiving and for preserving her rights in the conjugal partnership between them. She was planning to file a divorce suit in California. In the contract of professional services, Mrs. Harden agreed to pay Recto monthly during the pendency of the litigation and until the termination of the case, twenty-five (25%) per cent of the total increase in allowance or pension which may be awarded to her by the court over and above the amount of P1,500.00 which she now receives monthly from her husband out of the funds of the conjugal partnership. She further stipulated that: should the case be terminated or an amicable settlement thereof be arrived at by the parties before the expiration of two years from the date of the filing of the complaint, she shall continue to pay the said twenty-five (25%) per cent up to the end of said period. That the said monthly payments shall be in whatever amount the court will fix as attorney’s fees. She also agreed to pay said Attorney Claro M. Recto twenty (20%) per cent of the value of the share and participation which she may receive in the funds and properties of the said conjugal partnership. All expenses in connection with the litigation are to be for Mrs. Harden’s account. As agreed, they filed a complain against Mrs. Harden’s husband for support.
Subsequently, the Philippines was invaded by the Japanese and placed under military occupation. Then came the liberation, in the course of which the records of this case were destroyed. Said records were reconstituted at the instance of appellee herein. Thereafter, the proceedings were resumed, the CFI of Manila ruled in their favor. The other party appealed. However, during the pendency of the appeal, Mrs. Harden decided to discontinue all proceedings of the case and "vacate all orders and judgments rendered therein, and abandon and nullify all her claims to the conjugal partnership existing between her and Mr. Harden". So now, Atty. Recto as counsel of Mrs. Harden, is demanding for the amounts the latter has promised as his attorney’s fees. Recto is now claiming from the property under receivership that belonged to Mrs. Harden’s husband, Fred.
ISSUE: Validity of the contract of services, which Mr. and Mrs. Harden assail as void, mainly, upon the ground: (1) that Mrs. Harden cannot bind the conjugal partnership without her husband's consent; (2) that Article 1491 of the Civil Code of the Philippines in effect prohibits contingent fees; (3) that the contract in question has for its purpose to secure a decree of divorce, allegedly in violation of Articles 1305, 1352 and 1409 of the Civil Code of the Philippines; and (4) that the terms of said contract are harsh, inequitable and oppressive.
RULING: 1. The first objection made by the spouses has no foundation. The contract in dispute does not seek to bind the conjugal partnership. By virtue of said contract, Mrs. Harden merely bound herself — or assumed the personal obligation — to pay, by way of contingent fees, 20% of her share in said partnership. The contract neither gives, nor purports to give, Mrs. Harden any right whatsoever, personal or real, in and to her aforesaid share . The amount thereof is simply a basis for the computation of said fees. 2. The second objection is, likewise, untenable. Moreover, it has already been held that contingent fees are not prohibited in the Philippines and are impliedly sanctioned by our Cannons (No. 13) of Professional Ethics. There is absolutely nothing in the records before us to show that appellee herein had, in any manner, taken an unfair or unreasonable advantage of his client Mrs. Harden. 3. The third objection is not borne out, either by the language of the contract between them, or by the intent of the parties thereto. Its purpose was not to secure a divorce, or to facilitate or promote the procurement of a divorce. It merely sought to protect the interest of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal partnership, during the pendency of a divorce suit she intended to file in the United States. What is more, inasmuch as Mr. and Mrs. Harden are admittedly citizens of the United States, their status and the dissolution thereof are governed — pursuant to Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain (which was in force in the Philippines at the time of the execution of the contract in question) and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
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Philippines — by the laws of the United States, which sanction divorce. In short, the contract of services, between Mrs. Harden and herein appellee, is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. 4. The last objection is based upon principles of equity, but, pursuant thereto, one who seeks equity must come with clean hands and the spouses Harden had not done so, for the circumstances surrounding the case show, to our satisfaction, that their aforementioned agreements, ostensibly for the settlement of the differences between husband and wife, were made for the purpose of circumventing or defeating the rights of Recto, under his above-quoted contract of services with Mrs. Harden. Indeed, having secured a judgment in her favor, acknowledging her rights to the assets of the conjugal partnership, which turned out to be worth almost P4,000,000 in addition to litis expensae in the sum of P175,000, it is inconceivable that Mrs. Harden would have waived such rights, as well as the benefits of all orders and judgments in her favor, in consideration of the paltry sum of $5,000 allegedly paid to her by Mr. Harden and the additional sum of $20,000 to be paid by him in installments, at the rate of $500 a month. In fact, no explanation has been given for this most unusual avowed settlement between Mr. and Mrs. Harden. One can not even consider the possibility of a reconciliation between the spouses, the same being inconsistent with the monetary consideration for said alleged settlement. What is more, the records show that the relations between said spouses — which were bad indeed, not only in July, 1941, when Mrs. Harden engaged the services of the appellee, but, even, before, for Mr. and Mrs. Harden were separated since 1938 — had worsened considerably thereafter, as evidence by an action for divorce filed by Mr. Harden in New Jersey, in July 1948, upon the ground of repeated acts of infidelity allegedly committed by Mrs. Harden in 1940 and 1941. 5. Harden’s Contention: She has already been paid by his immediate execution pending appeal of the decision in the civil case wherein he collected the sum of P176,000.00 for all such legal services Supreme Court: Said decision, however, states clearly that the aforementioned sum of P175,000 represents litis expensae, and the contract between the appellee and Mrs. Harden explicitly declares that said litis expensae shall be "in addition to" appellee's share of 25% of the increase in the allowance of Mrs. Harden and his attorney's fees of 20% of her share in the conjugal partnership. The second assignment of error is, therefore, devoid of merit. 6. Harden’s Contention: The contract of services in question provides that appellee's contingent fees shall be 20% of the share of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal partnership. Pursuant to law, the share of Mrs. Harden shall be determined upon the liquidation of said partnership, which has not taken place, as yet. What is more, it cannot be effected until the dissolution of the marriage relation between Mr. and Mrs. Harden. Inasmuch as this relation subsists, it follows that the amount of attorney's fees due to appellee herein should not have been determined in the decision appealed from. Supreme Court: This line of argument overlooks the fact that said contract of services was made, principally, in contemplation of a suit for divorce that, according to Mrs. Harden, she intended to file before a competent court in California, "and of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership between" her and Mr. Harden. Had she filed said action for divorce and secured a decree of divorce, said conjugal partnership would have been dissolved and then liquidated, and the share of Mrs. Harden therein would have been fixed. However, this cannot take place, either now, or in the foreseeable future, owing to the aforementioned agreements between Mr. and Mrs. Harden, which were made for the evident purpose of defeating appellee's claim for attorney's fees. In other words, the occurrence, within the time contemplated by the parties — bearing in mind the nature of, and the circumstances under which they entered into, said contract of services — of the event upon which the amount of said fees depended, was rendered impossible by Mrs. Harden. Hence, whether such event be regarded as a condition or as a period, she may not insist upon its occurrence, prior to the enforcement of the rights of the herein appellee, for "the condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment" (Art. 1186, Civil Code) and "the debtor shall lose every right to make use of the period" when he "violates any undertaking, in consideration of which the creditor agreed to the period." (Art. 1198, Civil Code.)
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CASE NO. 16: PIONEER CONCRETE PHILIPPINES, KLEPZIG, petitioners, vs. ANTONIO D. TODARO, respondent.
INC.,
PIONEER
PHILIPPINES
HOLDINGS,
and
PHILIP
J.
FACTS: Atonion Todaro filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, a complaint for Sum of Money and Damages with Preliminary Attachment against Pioneer International Limited (PIL), Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. (PCPI), Pioneer Philippines Holdings, Inc. (PPHI), John G. McDonald (McDonald) and Philip J. Klepzig (Klepzig). Todaro allegations: 1. That PIL is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Australia and is principally engaged in the ready-mix concrete and concrete aggregates business; PPHI is the company established by PIL to own and hold the stocks of its operating company in the Philippines; PCPI is the company established by PIL to undertake its business of ready-mix concrete, concrete aggregates and quarrying operations in the Philippines; McDonald is the Chief Executive of the Hongkong office of PIL; and, Klepzig is the President and Managing Director of PPHI and PCPI; 2. Todaro has been the managing director of Betonval Readyconcrete, Inc. (Betonval), a company engaged in pre-mixed concrete and concrete aggregate production; he resigned from Betonval in February 1996; in May 1996, PIL contacted Todaro and asked him if he was available to join them in connection with their intention to establish a ready-mix concrete plant and other related operations in the Philippines; 3. Todaro informed PIL of his availability and interest to join them; subsequently, PIL and Todaro came to an agreement wherein the former consented to engage the services of the latter as a consultant for two to three months, after which, he would be employed as the manager of PIL's ready-mix concrete operations should the company decide to invest in the Philippines ; subsequently, PIL started its operations in the Philippines; however, it refused to comply with its undertaking to employ Todaro on a permanent basis. PPHI, PCPI and Klepzig separately moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that: the complaint states no cause of action, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, as the same is within the jurisdiction of the NLRC, and that the complaint should be dismissed on the basis of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Pioneer’s Contention: 1. That there was no perfected employment contract between PIL and herein respondent. 2. PIL's offer was for respondent to be employed as the manager only of its pre-mixed concrete operations and not as the company's managing director or CEO. 3. That when respondent reiterated his intention to become the manager of PIL's overall business venture in the Philippines, he, in effect did not accept PIL's offer of employment and instead made a counter-offer, which, however, was not accepted by PIL. 4. That under Article 1318 of the Civil Code, one of the requisites for a contract to be perfected is the consent of the contracting parties; that under Article 1319 of the same Code, consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract; that the offer must be certain and the acceptance absolute; that a qualified acceptance constitutes a counter-offer. Petitioners assert that since PIL did not accept respondent's counter-offer, there never was any employment contract that was perfected between them. 5. That respondent's claim for damages based on the provisions of Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code is baseless because it was shown that there was no perfected employment contract. 6. That the principle of forum non conveniens dictates that even where exercise of jurisdiction is authorized by law, courts may refuse to entertain a case involving a foreign element where the matter can be better tried and decided elsewhere, either because the main aspects of the case transpired in a foreign jurisdiction or the material witnesses have their residence there and the plaintiff sought the forum merely to secure procedural advantage or to annoy or harass the defendant. 7. Petitioners also argue that one of the factors in determining the most convenient forum for conflicts problem is the power of the court to enforce its decision. Petitioners contend that since the majority of the defendants in the present case are not residents of the Philippines, they are not subject to compulsory processes of the Philippine court handling the case for purposes of requiring their attendance during trial. Even assuming that they can be summoned, their appearance would entail excessive costs. 8. Petitioners further assert that there is no allegation in the complaint from which one can conclude that the evidence to be presented during the trial can be better obtained in the Philippines. Moreover, the events which led to the present controversy occurred outside the Philippines. Petitioners conclude that based on the foregoing factual circumstances, the case should be dismissed under the principle of forum non conveniens. ISSUE: RULING: 1. The issue as to whether or not there was a perfected contract between petitioners and respondent is a matter which is not ripe for determination in the present case; rather, this issue must be taken up during trial, considering that its resolution would necessarily entail an examination of the veracity of the allegations not only of herein respondent as plaintiff but also of petitioners as defendants. 2. In the present case, no employer-employee relationship exists between petitioners and respondent. In fact, in his complaint, private respondent is not seeking any relief under the Labor Code, but seeks payment of damages on account of petitioners' alleged breach of their obligation under their agreement to employ him. It is settled that an action for breach of contractual obligation is intrinsically a civil dispute. In the alternative, respondent seeks redress on the basis of the provisions of Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Hence, it is clear that the present action is within the realm of civil law, and jurisdiction over it belongs to the regular courts.
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3.
Moreover, this Court enunciated in Philsec. Investment Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, that the doctrine of forum non conveniens should not be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include said doctrine as a ground. This Court further ruled that while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the court's desistance; and that the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination, hence it is more properly considered a matter of defense. In the present case, the factual circumstances cited by petitioners which would allegedly justify the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens are matters of defense, the merits of which should properly be threshed out during trial.
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CASE 17:BERNABE L. NAVIDA, JOSE P. ABANGAN, JR., CEFERINO P. ABARQUEZ, ORLANDITO A. ABISON, FELIPE ADAYA, ALBERTO R. AFRICA, BENJAMIN M. ALBAO, FELIPE ALCANTARA, NUMERIANO S. ALCARIA, FERNANDO C. ALEJADO, LEOPOLDO N. ALFONSO, FLORO I. ALMODIEL, ANTONIO B. ALVARADO, ELEANOR AMOLATA, RODOLFO P. ANCORDA, TRIFINO F. ANDRADA, BERT B. ANOCHE, RAMON E. ANTECRISTO, ISAGANI D. ANTINO, DOMINGO ANTOPINA, MANSUETO M. APARICIO, HERMINIGILDO AQUINO, MARCELO S. AQUINO, JR., FELIPE P. ARANIA, ULYSES M. ARAS, ARSENIO ARCE, RUPERTO G. ARINZOL, MIGUEL G. ARINZOL, EDGARADO P. ARONG, RODRIGO D.R. ASTRALABIO, RONNIE BACAYO, SOFRONIO BALINGIT, NELSON M. BALLENA, EMNIANO BALMONTE, MAXIMO M. BANGI, SALVADOR M. BANGI, HERMOGENES T. BARBECHO, ARSENIO B. BARBERO, DIOSDADO BARREDO, VIRGILIO BASAS, ALEJANDR petitioners, vs. HON. TEODORO A. DIZON, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, General Santos City, SHELL OIL CO., DOW CHEMICAL CO., OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CORP., STANDARD FRUIT CO., STANDARD FRUIT & STEAMSHIP CO., DOLE FOOD CO., INC., DOLE FRESH FRUIT CO., DEL MONTE FRESH PRODUCE N.A., DEL MONTE TROPICAL FRUIT CO., CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC. and CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC., respondents. FACTS: Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed in different Texas state courts by citizens of twelve foreign countries, including the Philippines. The thousands of plaintiffs sought damages for injuries they allegedly sustained from their exposure to dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a chemical used to kill nematodes (worms), while working on farms in 23 foreign countries. The cases were eventually transferred to, and consolidated in, the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. The cases therein that involved plaintiffs from the Philippines were "Jorge Colindres Carcamo, et al. v. Shell Oil Co., et al.," which was docketed as Civil Action No. H-94-1359, and "Juan Ramon Valdez, et al. v. Shell Oil Co., et al.," which was docketed as Civil Action No. H-95-1356. The defendants in the consolidated cases prayed for the dismissal of all the actions under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. In a Memorandum and Order dated July 11, 1995, the Federal District Court conditionally granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. Pertinently, the court ordered that Delgado, Jorge Carcamo, Valdez and Isae Carcamo will be dismissed 90 days after the entry of this Memorandum and Order. Civil Case No. 5617 before the RTC of General Santos City and G.R. Nos. 125078 and 125598 In accordance with the above Memorandum and Order, a total of 336 plaintiffs from General Santos City filed a Joint Complaint in the RTC of General Santos City.The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5617. Named as defendants therein were: Shell Oil Co. (SHELL); Dow Chemical Co. (DOW); Occidental Chemical Corp. (OCCIDENTAL); Dole Food Co., Inc., Dole Fresh Fruit Co., Standard Fruit Co., Standard Fruit and Steamship Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as DOLE); Chiquita Brands, Inc. and Chiquita Brands International, Inc. (CHIQUITA); Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A. and Del Monte Tropical Fruit Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as DEL MONTE); Dead Sea Bromine Co., Ltd.; Ameribrom, Inc.; Bromine Compounds, Ltd.; and Amvac Chemical Corp. (The aforementioned defendants are hereinafter collectively referred to as defendant companies.) NAVIDA, et al.,’s Prayers and Contentions: 1. 2. 3. 4.
For the payment of damages in view of the illnesses and injuries to the reproductive systems which they allegedly suffered because of their exposure to DBCP. They claimed, among others, that they were exposed to this chemical during the early 1970's up to the early 1980's when they used the same in the banana plantations where they worked at; and/or when they resided within the agricultural area where such chemical was used. Claimed that their illnesses and injuries were due to the fault or negligence of each of the defendant companies in that they produced, sold and/or otherwise put into the stream of commerce DBCP-containing products. Companies knew, or ought to have known, were highly injurious to the former's health and well-being.
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., arguments: 1. 2. 3.
That the allegedly tortious acts and/or omissions of defendant companies occurred within Philippine territory. The use of and exposure to DBCP that was manufactured, distributed or otherwise put into the stream of commerce by defendant companies happened in the Philippines. Said fact allegedly constitutes reasonable basis for our courts to assume jurisdiction over the case.
DOLE’s Arguments: 1. 2.
That the acts attributed to defendant companies constitute a quasi-delict, which falls under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. That if indeed there is no positive law defining the alleged acts of defendant companies as actionable wrong, Article 9 of the Civil Code dictates that a judge may not refuse to render a decision on the ground of insufficiency of the law.
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3.
4. 5.
That the Philippines is the situs of the tortious acts allegedly committed by defendant companies as NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., point to their alleged exposure to DBCP which occurred in the Philippines, as the cause of the sterility and other reproductive system problems that they allegedly suffered. That the RTC of Davao City gravely erred in relying upon newspaper reports given that newspaper articles are hearsay and without any evidentiary value. Likewise, the alleged legal opinions cited in the newspaper reports were taken judicial notice of, without any notice to the parties.
Chiquita’s Arguments: 1. 2.
3.
ISSUE:
That the courts a quo had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the cases filed before them. The Amended Joint-Complaints sought approximately P2.7 million in damages for each plaintiff claimant, which amount falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC. CHIQUITA avers that the pertinent matter is the place of the alleged exposure to DBCP, not the place of manufacture, packaging, distribution, sale, etc., of the said chemical. This is in consonance with the lex loci delicti commisi theory in determining the situs of a tort, which states that the law of the place where the alleged wrong was committed will govern the action. CHIQUITA and the other defendant companies also submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC by making voluntary appearances and seeking for affirmative reliefs during the course of the proceedings. None of the defendant companies ever objected to the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts a quo over their persons. WON RTC of General Santos had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case
RULING: The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have jurisdiction over Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96, respectively SEC. 19.Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: (8)In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). 60 Corollary thereto, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 09-94, states: 2.The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. In Navida’s Prayer, it is clear that the claim for damages is the main cause of action and that the total amount sought in the complaints is approximately P2.7 million for each of the plaintiff claimants. The RTCs unmistakably have jurisdiction over the cases filed in General Santos City and Davao City, as both claims by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., fall within the purview of the definition of the jurisdiction of the RTC under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. EaIDAT Quite evidently, the allegations in the Amended Joint-Complaints of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., attribute to defendant companies certain acts and/or omissions which led to their exposure to nematocides containing the chemical DBCP. According to NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., such exposure to the said chemical caused ill effects, injuries and illnesses, specifically to their reproductive system. Thus, these allegations in the complaints constitute the cause of action of plaintiff claimants — a quasi-delict, which under the Civil Code is defined as an act, or omission which causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence. To be precise, Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides: Article 2176.Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. As specifically enumerated in the amended complaints, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., point to the acts and/or omissions of the defendant companies in manufacturing, producing, selling, using, and/or otherwise putting into the stream of commerce, nematocides which contain DBCP, "without informing the users of its hazardous effects on health and/or without instructions on its proper use and application.".
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Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the defendant companies constitute a quasi-delict which is the basis for the claim for damages filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., with individual claims of approximately P2.7 million for each plaintiff claimant, which obviously falls within the purview of the civil action jurisdiction of the RTCs. Moreover, the injuries and illnesses, which NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., allegedly suffered resulted from their exposure to DBCP while they were employed in the banana plantations located in the Philippines or while they were residing within the agricultural areas also located in the Philippines. The factual allegations in the Amended Joint-Complaints all point to their cause of action, which undeniably occurred in the Philippines. The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City obviously have reasonable basis to assume jurisdiction over the cases. In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to prove the claims of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., are available only in the Philippines. First, plaintiff claimants are all residents of the Philippines, either in General Santos City or in Davao City. Second, the specific areas where they were allegedly exposed to the chemical DBCP are within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts a quo wherein NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., initially filed their claims for damages. Third, the testimonial and documentary evidence from important witnesses, such as doctors, co-workers, family members and other members of the community, would be easier to gather in the Philippines. Considering the great number of plaintiff claimants involved in this case, it is not far-fetched to assume that voluminous records are involved in the presentation of evidence to support the claim of plaintiff claimants. Thus, these additional factors, coupled with the fact that the alleged cause of action of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., against the defendant companies for damages occurred in the Philippines, demonstrate that, apart from the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City having jurisdiction over the subject matter in the instant civil cases, they are, indeed, the convenient fora for trying these cases.
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CASE NO. 18: KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO., LTD., petitioners, vs. MINORU KITAMURA,respondent. FACTS: Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd. (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and management support in the infrastructure projects of foreign governments, entered into an Independent Contractor Agreement (ICA) with respondent Minoru Kitamura, a Japanese national permanently residing in the Philippines. The agreement provides that respondent was to extend professional services to Nippon for a year starting April 1, 1999. Nippon then assigned respondent to work as the project manager of the Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) Project in the Philippines, following the company's consultancy contract with the Philippine Government. When the STAR Project was near completion, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, this time for the detailed engineering and construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project. MINORU KITAMURA was named as the project manager in the contract. Kazuhiro Hasegawa, Nippon's general manager for its International Division, informed respondent that the company had no more intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by the company only up to the substantial completion of the STAR Project on March 31, 2000, just in time for the ICA's expiry. Threatened with impending unemployment, respondent, through his lawyer, requested a negotiation conference and demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted that respondent's contract was for a fixed term that had already expired, and refused to negotiate for the renewal of the ICA. As he was not able to generate a positive response from the petitioners, respondent consequently initiated on June 1, 2000 Civil Case No. 00-0264 for specific performance and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City. NIPPON’S ARGUMENT: That the ICA had been perfected in Japan and executed by and between Japanese nationals, moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. They asserted that the claim for improper pre-termination of respondent's ICA could only be heard and ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus. In the meantime, on June 20, 2000, the DPWH approved Nippon's request for the replacement of Kitamura by a certain Y. Kotake as project manager of the BBRI Project. ISSUE: Whether the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific performance and damages involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, the "state of the most significant relationship rule," or forum non conveniens. RULING: 1. Asserting that the RTC of Lipa City is an inconvenient forum, petitioners question its jurisdiction to hear and resolve the civil case for specific performance and damages filed by the respondent. The ICA subject of the litigation was entered into and perfected in Tokyo, Japan, by Japanese nationals, and written wholly in the Japanese language. Thus, petitioners posit that local courts have no substantial relationship to the parties following the [state of the] most significant relationship rule in Private International Law. The Court notes that petitioners adopted an additional but different theory when they elevated the case to the appellate court. In the Motion to Dismiss filed with the trial court, petitioners never contended that the RTC is an inconvenient forum. They merely argued that the applicable law which will determine the validity or invalidity of respondent's claim is that of Japan, following the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus. While not abandoning this stance in their petition before the appellate court, petitioners on certiorari significantly invoked the defense of forum non conveniens. On petition for review before this Court, petitioners dropped their other arguments, maintained the forum non conveniens defense, and introduced their new argument that the applicable principle is the [state of the] most significant relationship rule. We only pointed out petitioners' inconstancy in their arguments to emphasize their incorrect assertion of conflict of laws principles. 2. To elucidate, in the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Corresponding to these phases are the following questions: (1) Where can or should litigation be initiated? (2) Which law will the court apply? and (3) Where can the resulting judgment be enforced? Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice of thelex fori will often coincide, the "minimum contacts" for one do not always provide the necessary "significant contacts" for the other. The question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a judgment. In this case, only the first phase is at issue — jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must have jurisdiction over the plaintiff or the petitioner, over the defendant or the respondent, over the subject matter, over the issues of the case and, in cases involving property, over the res or the thing which is the subject of the litigation. In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein, petitioners are actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction. In the instant case, petitioners, in their motion to dismiss, do not claim that the trial court is not properly vested by law with jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for, casefor specific performance and damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation and is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City. What they rather raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and the "state of the most significant relationship rule." The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound. DCASIT Lex loci celebrationis relates to the "law of the place of the ceremony" or the law of the place where a contract is made. The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus means the "law of the place where a contract is executed or to be performed." It controls the nature, construction, and
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validity of the contract and it may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly. Under the "state of the most significant relationship rule," to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine which state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties. This rule takes into account several contacts and evaluates them according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved. Since these three principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for the second phase, the choice of law. They determine which state's law is to be applied in resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for. Further, petitioners' premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact that they have not yet pointed out any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before determining which law should apply, first there should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the application of the conflict of laws rules. Also, when the law of a foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the existence of such law must be pleaded and proved. It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before a court or administrative agency, there are three alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account or apply the law of some other State or States. The court's power to hear cases and controversies is derived from the Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other formal agreements, even in matters regarding rights provided by foreign sovereigns. Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used to deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction herein. FIRST, it is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as a ground . SECOND, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In this case, the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. THIRD, the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more properly considered a matter of defense. Accordingly, since the RTC is vested by law with the power to entertain and hear the civil case filed by respondent and the grounds raised by petitioners to assail that jurisdiction are inappropriate, the trial and appellate courts correctly denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss.
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CASE 19:MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST CO. and/or CHEMICAL BANK, petitioners, vs. RAFAEL MA. GUERRERO, respondent. FACTS: On May 17, 1994, respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero ("Guerrero" for brevity) filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank ("the Bank" for brevity) with the Regional Trial Court of Manila ("RTC" for brevity). Guerrero sought payment of damages allegedly for (1) illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking account with the Bank; (2) a returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to signature verification problems; and (3) unauthorized conversion of his account. Guerrero amended his complaint on April 18, 1995. BANK’S DEFENSE: that by stipulation Guerrero's account is governed by New York law and this law does not permit any of Guerrero's claims except actual damages. The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a NEW YORK ATTORNEY, supported the Bank's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Alyssa Walden's affidavit ("Walden affidavit" for brevity) stated that Guerrero's New York bank account stipulated that the governing law is New York law and that this law bars all of Guerrero's claims except actual damages. The Philippine Consular Office in New York authenticated the Walden affidavit. The Court of Appeals sustained the RTC orders denying the motion for partial summary judgment. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Walden AFFIDAVIT does not serve as PROOF of the New York LAW and jurisprudence relied on by the Bank to support its motion. The Court of Appeals considered the New York law and jurisprudence AS PUBLIC DOCUMENTS defined in Section 19 , Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence, as follows: "SEC. 19.Classes of Documents. — For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private. Public documents are: (a)The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country; xxx xxx xxx." The Court of Appeals opined that the following procedure outlined in Section 24, Rule 132 should be followed in proving foreign law: "SEC. 24.Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy ATTESTED by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a CERTIFICATE that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office." ISSUES: WON THE NEW YORK LAW SHOULD GOVERN THE CASE FILED RULING: First, the Bank argues that in moving for partial summary judgment, it was entitled to use the Walden affidavit to prove that the stipulated foreign law bars the claims for consequential, moral, temperate, nominal and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Consequently, outright dismissal by summary judgment of these claims is warranted. Second, the Bank claims that the Court of Appeals mixed up the requirements of Rule 35 on summary judgments and those of a trial on the merits in considering the Walden affidavit as "hearsay." The Bank points out that the Walden affidavit is not hearsay since Rule 35 expressly permits the use of affidavits. Lastly, the Bank argues that since Guerrero did not submit any opposing affidavit to refute the facts contained in the Walden affidavit, he failed to show the need for a trial on his claims for damages other than actual. The Walden affidavit cannot be considered as proof of New York law on damages not only because it is self-serving but also because it does not state the specific New York law on damages. The Walden affidavit states conclusions from the affiant's personal interpretation and opinion of the facts of the case vis a vis the alleged laws and jurisprudence without citing any law in particular. The citations in the Walden affidavit of various U.S. court decisions do not constitute proof of the official records or decisions of the U.S. courts. While the Bank attached copies of some of the U.S. court decisions cited in the Walden affidavit, these copies do not comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on proof of official records or decisions of foreign courts. The Bank's intention in presenting the Walden affidavit is to prove New York law and jurisprudence . However, because of the failure to comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on how to prove a foreign law and decisions of foreign courts, the Walden affidavit did not prove the current state of New York law and jurisprudence. Thus, the Bank has only alleged, but has not proved, what New York law and jurisprudence are on the matters at issue.
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CASE NO. 20: MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, petitioner, vs. LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE, respondent. FACTS: Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN. Orlando died intestate in the Philippines. Catalan filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Burgos, Pangasinan a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando. While the Special Proceeding was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition. The two cases were subsequently consolidated. Louella alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Orlando. In support of her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against Merope. Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that Merope contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol on 12 December 1959. The RTC had ACQUITTED petitioner of bigamy. The trial court ruled that since the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and since that divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the MARRIAGE between him and petitioner was NOT valid. Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending action with the trial court in Dagupan City filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It considered the pending action to be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of Merope for the crime of bigamy. Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place, Merope had never been married to Eusebio Bristol. The RTC held that the marriage between Merope and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she married Orlando. Without expounding, it reasoned further that her acquittal in the previous bigamy case was fatal to her cause. Thus, the trial court held that Merope was not an interested party who may file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration. Petitioner insists that with her acquittal of the crime of bigamy, the marriage enjoys the presumption of validity. Thus, the trial court concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with Bristol still existed and was valid. By failing to take note of the findings of fact on the nonexistence of the marriage between petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that petitioner was not an interested party in the estate of Orlando. Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case No. 2699-A was dismissed, we had already ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven. ISSUE: WON PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO PROVE THE FACT OF DIVORCE RULING: It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando's divorce under the laws of the United States and the marriage between Merope and Orlando. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce. Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she has the preferential right to be issued the letters of administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of administration may be issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having LEGAL CUSTODY of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. CONCLUSION: Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
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CASE NO. 21:
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, respondent.
FACTS: The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia (first wife) predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting ABSOLUTE Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis (third wife), then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.Thereafter, Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo's estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration. Third wife alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent's surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her. TAaIDH Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo's place of residence prior to his death . He further claimed that Felicidad has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal of the petition. The trial court deniedthe two motions to dismiss. Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, Felicidad filed her opposition thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray andRomualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna. Petitioners also contend that respondent's marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of the latter's marriage to Merry Lee. ISSUE: WON the respondent (third wife) has legal capacity to file petitioner; and WON the case was filed in the correct venue RULING: The petition lacks merit. 1. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another. In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association and Ayala Country Club, Inc., letterenvelopes from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased's children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceased's calling cards stating that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna." From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. 2. Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad's legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad's marriage to Felicisimo
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was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative. The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held: To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 3. In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, the historical background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit: Brief Historical Background On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states: All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38. On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides: ART. 26.All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied) xxx xxx xxx Legislative Intent Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added) As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent. Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case. Petitioners cite Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court's rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
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In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments . It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 71 With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the ANNOTATED text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73 Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation. TIEHDC Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part: SEC. 2.Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: . . . . An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be BENEFITED by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo's capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent's legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
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CASE NO. 22: MINORU FUJIKI, petitioner, vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with FUJIKI’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other. In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; RTC dismissed the petitioner. The RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki. In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy . Fujiki contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35 (4) of the Family Code of the Philippines on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts. In any case, it was also Fujiki's view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.)applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. 13 Thus, Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2 (a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage." 14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage. RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage. The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e., lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2 (a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person" in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, . . . ." The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding. In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas, this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact." WhileCorpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen. Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked." Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to comment on the petition. Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki. Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay. On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition. She would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki. ISSUES: (1)Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable. (2)Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy. (3)Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
RULING: We grant the petition. 1. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
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For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office. To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition, the service of summons, the investigation of the public prosecutor, the setting of pre-trial, the trial and the judgment of the trial court. This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues. " 2. A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen. Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e., "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad. There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35 (4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court. Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
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CASE NO. 23:
LWV CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. MARCELO B. DUPO, respondent.
FACTS: LWV CONSTRUCTION, a domestic corporation which recruits Filipino workers, hired DUPO as Civil Structural Superintendent to work in Saudi Arabia for its principal, Mohammad Al-Mojil Group/Establishment (MMG). On February 26, 1992, DUPO signed his first overseas employment contract, renewable after one year. It was renewed five. All were fixed-period contracts for one year. The sixth and last contract stated that DUPO's employment starts upon reporting to work and ends when he leaves the work site. DUPO left Saudi Arabia on April 30, 1999 and arrived in the Philippines on May 1, 1999. On May 28, 1999, DUPO informed MMG, through the petitioner, that he needs to extend his vacation because his son was hospitalized. He also sought a promotion with salary adjustment. In reply, MMG informed DUPO that his promotion is subject to management's review; that his services are still needed; that he was issued a plane ticket for his return flight to Saudi Arabia on May 31, 1999; and that his decision regarding his employment must be made within seven days, otherwise, MMG "will be compelled to cancel [his] slot". On July 6, 1999, DUPO resigned. In his letter to MMG, he also stated: xxx xxx xxx I am aware that I still have to do a final settlement with the company and hope that during my more than seven (7) [years] services, as the Saudi Law stated, I am entitled for a long service award. xxx xxx xxx According to DUPO, when he followed up his claim for long service award, LWV CONSTRUCTION informed him that MMG did not respond. DUPO filed a complaint for payment of service award against LWV CONSTRUCTION before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch, Cordillera Administrative Region, Baguio City. In support of his claim, DUPO averred in his position paper that: xxx xxx xxx Under the Law of Saudi Arabia, an employee who rendered at least five (5) years in a company within the jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia, is entitled to the so-called long service award which is known to others as longevity pay of at least one half month pay for every year of service. In excess of five years an employee is entitled to one month pay for every year of service. In both cases inclusive of all benefits and allowances. This benefit was offered to complainant before he went on vacation, hence, this was engrained in his mind. He reconstructed the computation of his long service award or longevity pay and he arrived at the following computation exactly the same with the amount he was previously offered [which is US$12,640.33]. DUPO said that he did not grab the offer for he intended to return after his vacation. LWV DEFENSES: 1. For its part, LWV CONSTRUCTION offered payment and prescription as defenses. LWV CONSTRUCTION maintained that MMG "pays its workers theirService Award or Severance Pay every conclusion of their Labor Contracts pursuant to Article 87 of the [Saudi Labor Law]". Under Article 87, "payment of the award is at the end or termination of the Labor Contract concluded for a specific period". Based on the payroll, DUPO was already paid his service award or severance pay for his latest (sixth) employment contract. 2. LWV CONSTRUCTION added that under Article 13 of the Saudi Labor Law, the action to enforce payment of the service award must be filed within one year from the termination of a labor contract for a specific period. DUPO's six contracts ended when he left Saudi Arabia . LWV CONSTRUCTION concluded that the one-year prescriptive period had lapsed because DUPO filed his complaint on December 11, 2000 or one year and seven months after his sixth contract ended. LWV CONSTRUCTION: 1.
2.
LWV CONSTRUCTION points out that the Labor Arbiter awarded longevity pay although the Saudi Labor Law grants no such benefit, and the NLRC confused longevity pay and service award. LWV CONSTRUCTION maintains that the benefit granted by Article 87 of the Saudi Labor Law is service award which was already paid by MMG each time DUPO's contract ended. LWV CONSTRUCTION insists that prescription barred DUPO's claim for service award as the complaint was filed one year and seven months after the sixth contract ended. LWV CONSTRUCTION alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that DUPO's July 6, 1999 claim interrupted the running of the prescriptive period. Such ruling is contrary to Article 13 of the Saudi Labor Law which provides that no case or claim relating to any of the rights provided for under said law shall be heard after the lapse of 12 months from the date of the termination of the contract.
DUPO: 1. 2.
DUPO counters that he is entitled to longevity pay under the provisions of the Saudi Labor Law and quotes extensively the decision of the Court of Appeals. He points out that LWV CONSTRUCTION has not refuted the Labor Arbiter's finding that MMG offered him longevity pay of US$12,640.33 before his one-month vacation in the Philippines in 1999. Thus, he "submits that such offer indeed exists" as he sees no reason for MMG to offer the benefit if no law grants it.
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ISSUE: 1. 2.
WON DUPO is entitled to a service award or longevity pay of US$12,640.33 under the provisions of the Saudi Labor Law. LWV CONSTRUCTION's defenses of payment and prescription.
RULING: 1. We find that DUPO's service award under Article 87 of the Saudi Labor Law has already been paid. Our computation will show that the severance pay received by DUPO was his service award. Article 87 Where the term of a labor contract concluded for a specified period comes to an end or where the employer cancels a contract of unspecified period, the employer shall pay to the workman an award for the period of his service to be computed on the basis of half a month's pay for each of the first five years and one month's pay for each of the subsequent years. The last rate of pay shall be taken as basis for the computation of the award. For fractions of a year, the workman shall be entitled to an award which is proportionate to his service period during that year. Furthermore, the workman shall be entitled to the service award provided for at the beginning of this article in the following cases: A. If he is called to military service. B. If a workman resigns because of marriage or childbirth. C. If the workman is leaving the work as a result of a force majeure beyond his control. DUPO, however, has called the benefit other names such as long service award and longevity pay. On the other hand, LWV CONSTRUCTION claimed that the service award is the same as severance pay. Notably, the Labor Arbiter was unable to specify any law to support his award of longevity pay. He anchored the award on his finding that DUPO's allegations were more credible because his seven-year employment at MMG had sufficiently oriented him on the benefits given to workers. To the NLRC, DUPO is entitled to service award or longevity pay under Article 87 and that longevity pay is different from severance pay. The Court of Appeals agreed. The payroll submitted by LWV CONSTRUCTION showed that DUPO received severance pay of SR2,786 for his sixth employment contract covering the period April 21, 1998 to April 29, 1999. DUPO's service award for the sixth contract is equivalent only to half-month's pay plus the proportionate amount for the additional nine days of service he rendered after one year. DUPO's employment contracts expressly stated that his employment ended upon his departure from work. Each year he departed from work and successively new contracts were executed before he reported for work anew. His service was not cumulative. 2. On the matter of prescription, however, we cannot agree with LWV CONSTRUCTION that DUPO's action has prescribed under Article 13 of the Saudi Labor Law. What applies is Article 291 of our Labor Code which reads: ART. 291. Money claims. — All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred. xxx xxx xxx Article 291 covers all money claims from employer-employee relationship and is broader in scope than claims arising from a specific law. It is not limited to money claims recoverable under the Labor Code, but applies also to claims of overseas contract workers. As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law. However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum has a "borrowing statute". Said statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance. A "borrowing statute" directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law . While there are several kinds of "borrowing statutes", one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute has not run against it. Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides: "If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippine Islands." The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's public policy . . . . To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.
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Thus, in our considered view, DUPO's complaint was filed well within the three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of our Labor Code. This point, however, has already been mooted by our finding that DUPO's service award had been paid, albeit the payroll termed such payment as severance pay.
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CASE NO. 24: ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH-KUWAIT , petitioners,vs. MA. JOSEFA ECHIN, respondent.
FACTS: Josefina Echin was hired by ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf of its principal-co-ATCI Corporation, the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the position of medical technologist under a two-year contract, denominated as a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), with a monthly salary of US$1,200.00. Under the MOA, all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of one (1) year and are covered by Kuwait's Civil Service Board Employment Contract. ECHIN was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from employment on February 11, 2001, she not having allegedly passed the probationary period. As the Ministry denied ECHIN's request for reconsideration, she returned to the Philippines on March 17, 2001, shouldering her own air fare. On July 27, 2001, ECHIN filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint for illegal dismissal against ATCI Corporation ATCI as the local recruitment agency, represented by ATCI Corporation, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the foreign principal.
ATCI AND IKDAL’S ARGUMENT: 1. That their principal, the Ministry, being a foreign government agency, is immune from suit and, as such, the immunity extended to them; and that ECHIN was validly dismissed for her failure to meet the performance rating within the one-year period as required under Kuwait's Civil Service Laws. ATCI Corporations further contended that Ikdal should not be liable as an officer of ATCI Corporation ATCI. 2. ATCI Corporations maintain that they should not be held liable because ECHIN's employment contract specifically stipulates that her employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait. They thus conclude that it was patent error for the labor tribunals and the appellate court to apply the Labor Code provisions governing probationary employment in deciding the present case. 3. That even the Philippine Overseas Employment Act (POEA) Rules relative to master employment contracts (Part III, Sec. 2 of the POEA Rules and Regulations) accord respect to the "customs, practices, company policies and labor laws and legislation of the host country." 4. Assuming arguendo that Philippine labor laws are applicable, given that the foreign principal is a government agency which is immune from suit, as in fact it did not sign any document agreeing to be held jointly and solidarily liable, ATCI Corporation ATCI cannot likewise be held liable, more so since the Ministry's liability had not been judicially determined as jurisdiction was not acquired over it.
ISSUE:
WON ATCI CORP IS LIABLE UNDER THE LABOR CODE FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL
RULING: 1. ATCI Corporation ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade responsibility for the money claims of Overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) which it deploys abroad by the mere expediency of claiming that its foreign principal is a government agency clothed with immunity from suit, or that such foreign principal's liability must first be established before it, as agent, can be held jointly and solidarily liable. In providing for the joint and solidary liability of private recruitment agencies with their foreign principals, Republic Act No. 8042 precisely affords the OFWs with a recourse and assures them of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them. [T]he obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement entered into by and between the local agent and its foreign principal are not coterminous with the term of such agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the same extends up to and until the expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will render nugatory the very purpose for which the law governing the employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad was enacted. To allow ATCI Corporations to simply invoke the immunity from suit of its foreign principal or to wait for the judicial determination of the foreign principal's liability before ATCI Corporation can be held liable renders the law on joint and solidary liability inutile. 2. As to ATCI Corporations' contentions that Philippine labor laws on probationary employment are not applicable since it was expressly provided in ECHIN's employment contract, which she voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her engagement shall be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord respect to such rules, customs and practices of the host country, the same was not substantiated. Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the parties who can establish stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, including the laws which they wish to govern their respective obligations, as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
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It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case, ATCI Corporations failed to discharge. In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE FOREIGN LAW. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law. Unfortunately for ATCI Corporation, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the International Law doctrine of presumedidentity approach or processual presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us. The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To prove the Kuwaiti law, ATCI Corporations submitted the following: MOA between ECHIN and the Ministry, as represented by ATCI, which provides that the employee is subject to a probationary period of one (1) year and that the host country's Civil Service Laws and Regulations apply; a translated copy (Arabic to English) of the termination letter to ECHIN stating that she did not pass the probation terms, without specifying the grounds therefor, and a translated copy of the certificate of termination, both of which documents were certified by Mr. Mustapha Alawi, Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs-Office of Consular Affairs Inslamic Certification and Translation Unit; and ECHIN's letter of reconsideration to the Ministry, wherein she noted that in her first eight (8) months of employment, she was given a rating of "Excellent" albeit it changed due to changes in her shift of work schedule. These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not sufficiently prove that ECHIN was validly terminated as a probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws. Instead of submitting a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated and translated by Embassy officials thereat, as required under the Rules, what ATCI Corporations submitted were mere certifications attesting only to the correctness of the translations of the MOA and the termination letter which does not prove at all that Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from Philippine laws and that under such Kuwaiti laws, ECHIN was validly terminated.
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CASE NO. 25: BANK OF AMERICA NT&SA, BANK OF AMERICA INTERNATIONAL, LTD., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL PADOLINA, EDUARDO LITONJUA, SR., and AURELIO K. LITONJUA, JR., respondents. FACTS: Eduardo K. Litonjua, Sr. and Aurelio J. Litonjua (Litonjuas, for brevity) filed a Complaint the Bank of America NT&SA and Bank of America International, Ltd. alleging that: they were engaged in the shipping business; they owned two vessels: Don Aurelio and El Champion, through their whollyowned corporations; they deposited their revenues from said business together with other funds with the branches of said banks in the United Kingdom and Hongkong up to 1979; with their business doing well, the defendant banks induced them to increase the number of their ships in operation, offering them easy loans to acquire said vessels; thereafter, the defendant banks acquired, through their (Litonjuas') corporations as the borrowers: (a) El Carrier ; (b) El General ; (c) El Challenger ; and (d) El Conqueror ; the vessels were registered in the names of their corporations; the operation and the funds derived therefrom were placed under the complete and exclusive control and disposition of the BANK OF AMERICAs; and the possession of the vessels was also placed by defendant banks in the hands of persons selected and designated by them. The Litonjuas claimed that defendant banks as trustees did not fully render an account of all the income derived from the operation of the vessels as well as of the proceeds of the subsequent foreclosure sale; because of the breach of their fiduciary duties and/or negligence of the BANK OF AMERICAs and/or the persons designated by them in the operation of private respondents' six vessels, the revenues derived from the operation of all the vessels declined drastically; the loans acquired for the purchase of the four additional vessels then matured and remained unpaid, prompting defendant banks to have all the six vessels, including the two vessels originally owned by the private respondents, foreclosed and sold at public auction to answer for the obligations incurred for and in behalf of the operation of the vessels; they (Litonjuas) lost sizeable amounts of their own personal funds equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the acquisition cost of the four vessels and were left with the unpaid balance of their loans with defendant banks. The Litonjuas prayed for the accounting of the revenues derived in the operation of the six vessels and of the proceeds of the sale thereof at the foreclosure proceedings instituted by BANK OF AMERICAs; damages for breach of trust; exemplary damages and attorney's fees. BANK OF AMERICA ARGUMENTS: 1. Defendant banks filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens and lack of cause of action against them. 2. That the borrowers and the registered owners of the vessels are the foreign corporations and not private respondents Litonjuas who are mere stockholders; and 3. That the revenues derived from the operations of all the vessels are deposited in the accounts of the corporations. 4. Hence, BANK OF AMERICAs maintain that these foreign corporations are the legal entities that have the personalities to sue and not herein private respondents; 5. That private respondents, being mere shareholders, have no claim on the vessels as owners since they merely have an inchoate right to whatever may remain upon the dissolution of the said foreign corporations and after all creditors have been fully paid and satisfied; 6. That while private respondents may have allegedly spent amounts equal to 10% of the acquisition costs of the vessels in question, their 10% however represents their investments as stockholders in the foreign corporations. 7. BANK OF AMERICAs posit that while the application of the principle of forum non conveniens is discretionary on the part of the Court, said discretion is limited by the guidelines pertaining to the private as well as public interest factors in determining whether plaintiffs' choice of forum should be disturbed. "Private interest factors include: (a) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (b) the availability of compulsory process for the attendance of unwilling witnesses; (c) the cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses; or (d) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. Public interest factors include: (a) the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; (b) the local interest in having localized controversies decided at home; (c) the avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws or in the application of foreign law; or (d) the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty." In support of their claim that the local court is not the proper forum, BANK OF AMERICAs allege the following: "i) The Bank of America Branches involved, as clearly mentioned in the Complaint, are based in Hongkong and England. As such, the evidence and the witnesses are not readily available in the Philippines; "ii) The loan transactions were obtained, perfected, performed, consummated and partially paid outside the Philippines; "iii) The monies were advanced outside the Philippines. Furthermore, the mortgaged vessels were part of an offshore fleet, not based in the Philippines; "iv) All the loans involved were granted to the Private Respondents' foreign CORPORATIONS; "v) The Restructuring Agreements were ALL governed by the laws of England; "vi) The subsequent sales of the mortgaged vessels and the application of the sales proceeds occurred and transpired outside the Philippines, and the deliveries of the sold mortgaged vessels were likewise made outside the Philippines;
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"vii) The revenues of the vessels and the proceeds of the sales of these vessels were ALL deposited to the Accounts of the foreign CORPORATIONS abroad; and "viii) Bank of America International Ltd. is not licensed nor engaged in trade or business in the Philippines." BANK OF AMERICAs argue further that the loan agreements, security documentation and all subsequent restructuring agreements uniformly, unconditionally and expressly provided that they will be governed by the laws of England; 9. that Philippine Courts would then have to apply English law in resolving whatever issues may be presented to it in the event it recognizes and accepts herein case; 10. that it would then be imposing a significant and unnecessary expense and burden not only upon the parties to the transaction but also to the local court. 11. BANK OF AMERICAs insist that the inconvenience and difficulty of applying English law with respect to a wholly foreign transaction in a case pending in the Philippines may be avoided by its dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens. 12. Finally, BANK OF AMERICAs claim that private respondents have already waived their alleged causes of action in the case at bar for their refusal to contest the foreign civil cases earlier filed by the BANK OF AMERICAs against them in Hongkong and England 8.
ISSUE: 1.
2. 3.
Did the trial court commit grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs have no cause of action against defendants since plaintiffs are merely stockholders of the corporations which are the registered owners of the vessels and the borrowers of BANK OF AMERICAs? Should the complaint be dismissed on the ground of forum non-conveniens? Are private respondents guilty of forum shopping because of the pendency of foreign action?
RULING: 1. No. A case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest. In the case at bar, the complaint contains the three elements of a cause of action. It alleges that: (1) plaintiffs, herein private respondents, have the right to demand for an accounting from defendants (herein BANK OF AMERICAs), as trustees by reason of the fiduciary relationship that was created between the parties involving the vessels in question; (2) BANK OF AMERICAs have the obligation, as trustees, to render such an accounting; and (3) BANK OF AMERICAs failed to do the same. BANK OF AMERICAs insist that they do not have any obligation to the private respondents as they are mere stockholders of the corporation; that the corporate entities have juridical personalities separate and distinct from those of the private respondents. Private respondents maintain that the corporations are wholly owned by them and prior to the incorporation of such entities, they were clients of BANK OF AMERICAs which induced them to acquire loans from said BANK OF AMERICAs to invest on the additional ships. 2. No. Whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. 44 In the case of Communication Materials and Design, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that ". . . [a] Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and, (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision." Evidently, all these requisites are present in the instant case. 3. No. In case at bar, not all the requirements for litis pendentia are present. While there may be identity of parties, notwithstanding the presence of other respondents, as well as the reversal in positions of plaintiffs and defendants, still the other requirements necessary for litis pendentia were not shown by BANK OF AMERICA. It merely mentioned that civil cases were filed in Hongkong and England without however showing the identity of rights asserted and the reliefs sought for as well as the presence of the elements of res judicata should one of the cases be adjudged. While it is true that the BANK OF AMERICAs in their motion for reconsideration (CA Rollo, p. 72), after enumerating the various civil actions instituted abroad, did aver that "Copies of the foreign judgments are hereto attached and made integral parts hereof as Annexes 'B', 'C', 'D' and `E' ", they failed, wittingly or inadvertently, to include a single foreign judgment in their pleadings submitted to this Court as annexes to their petition. How then could We have been expected to rule on this issue even if We were to hold that foreign judgments could be the basis for the application of the aforementioned principle of res judicata?
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CASE NO. 27: EDI-STAFFBUILDERS INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ELEAZAR S. GRAN, respondents. FACTS: Petitioner EDI is a corporation engaged in recruitment and placement of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs). ESI is another recruitment agency which collaborated with EDI to process the documentation and deployment of private respondent to Saudi Arabia. Private respondent Gran was an OFW recruited by EDI, and deployed by ESI to work for OAB, in Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It appears that OAB asked EDI through its October 3, 1993 letter for curricula vitae of qualified applicants for the position of "Computer Specialist." In a facsimile transmission, OAB informed EDI that, from the applicants'curricula vitae submitted to it for evaluation, it selected Gran for the position of "Computer Specialist." The faxed letter also stated that if Gran agrees to the terms and conditions of employment contained in it, one of which was a monthly salary of SR (Saudi Riyal) 2,250.00 (USD 600.00), EDI may arrange for Gran's immediate dispatch. After accepting OAB's offer of employment, Gran signed an employment contract that granted him a monthly salary of USD 850.00 for a period of two years. Gran was then deployed to Riyadh. Upon arrival in Riyadh, Gran questioned the discrepancy in his monthly salary — his employment contract stated USD 850.00; while his Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) Information Sheet indicated USD 600.00 only. However, through the assistance of the EDI office in Riyadh, OAB agreed to pay Gran USD 850.00 a month. After Gran had been working for about five months for OAB, his employment was terminated through OAB's July 9, 1994 letter, on the following grounds: 1. Non-compliance to contract requirements by the recruitment agency primarily on your salary and contract duration. 2. Non-compliance to pre-qualification requirements by the recruitment agency[,] vide OAB letter ref. F-5751-93, dated October 3, 1993. 3. Insubordination or disobedience to Top Management Order and/or instructions (non-submittal of daily activity reports despite several instructions). On July 11, 1994, Gran received from OAB the total amount of SR 2,948.00 representing his final pay, and on the same day, he executed a Declaration releasing OAB from any financial obligation or otherwise, towards him. After his arrival in the Philippines, Gran instituted a complaint for underpayment of wages/salaries and illegal dismissal.
ISSUES: Whether Gran's dismissal is justifiable by reason of incompetence, insubordination, and disobedience RULING: 1. In cases involving OFWs, the rights and obligations among and between the OFW, the local recruiter/agent, and the foreign employer/principal are governed by the employment contract. In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the termination of the employment of Gran. In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of PROVING the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law. Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us. 2. Petitioner claims that Gran was incompetent for the Computer Specialist position because he had "insufficient knowledge in programming and zero knowledge of [the] ACAD system." 45 Petitioner also claims that Gran was justifiably dismissed due to insubordination or disobedience because he continually failed to submit the required "Daily Activity Reports." However, other than the abovementioned letters, no other evidence was presented to show how and why Gran was considered incompetent, insubordinate, or disobedient. Petitioner EDI had clearly failed to overcome the burden of proving that Gran was validly dismissed. Petitioner's imputation of incompetence on private respondent due to his "insufficient knowledge in programming and zero knowledge of the ACAD system" based only on the above mentioned letters, without any other evidence, cannot be given credence. An allegation of incompetence should have a factual foundation. Incompetence may be shown by weighing it against a standard, benchmark, or criterion. However, EDI failed to establish any such bases to show how petitioner found Gran incompetent.
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CASE NO. 27
ASIAVEST LIMITED, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO HERAS, respondents.
FACTS: Asiavest Limited filed a complaint against the defendant Antonio Heras praying that said defendant be ordered to pay to the ASIAVEST LTD the amounts awarded by the Hong Kong Court Judgment: 1) US$1,810,265.40 or its equivalent in Hong Kong currency at the time of payment with legal interest from December 28, 1984 until fully paid; 2) interest on the sum of US$1,500.00 at 9.875% per annum from October 31, 1984 to December 28, 1984; and 3) HK$905.00 at fixed cost in the action; and 4) at least $80,000.00 representing attorney's fees, litigation expenses and cost, with interest thereon from the date of the judgment until fully paid. The case was then set for pre-trial conference. At the conference, the parties could not arrive at any settlement. However, they agreed on the following stipulations of facts: 1. The HERAS admits the existence of the judgment dated December 28, 1984 as well as its amendment dated April 13, 1987, but not necessarily the authenticity or validity thereof; 2. The ASIAVEST LIMITED is not doing business and is not licensed to do business in the Philippines; 3. The residence of HERAS, Antonio Heras, is New Manila, Quezon City. ASIAVEST LIMITED presented only documentary evidence to show rendition, existence, and authentication of such judgment by the proper officials concerned. In addition, the ASIAVEST LIMITED presented testimonial and documentary evidence to show its entitlement to attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation.On the other hand, the HERAS presented two witnesses, namely, Fortunata dela Vega and Russel Warren Lousich. TESTIMONY OF HERAS’ WITNESSES: 1. That no writ of summons or copy of a statement of claim of Asiavest Limited was ever served in the office of the Navegante Shipping Agency Limited and/or for Mr. Antonio Heras, and 2. That no service of the writ of summons was either served on the HERAS at his residence in New Manila, Quezon City. Her (DELA VEGA) knowledge is based on the fact that she was the personal secretary of Mr. Heras during his JD Transit days up to the latter part of 1972 when he shifted or diversified to shipping business in Hong Kong; that she was in-charge of all his letters and correspondence, business commitments, undertakings, conferences and appointments, until October 1984 when Mr. Heras left Hong Kong for good; that she was also the Officerin-Charge or Office Manager of Navegante Shipping Agency LTD, a Hong Kong registered and based company acting as ships agent, up to and until the company closed shop sometime in the first quarter of 1985 when shipping business collapsed worldwide; that the said Company held office at 34-35 Connaught Road, Central Hong Kong and later transferred to Caxton House at Duddel Street, Hong Kong, until the company closed shop in 1985; and that she was certain of such facts because she held office at Caxton House up to the first quarter of 1985. Mr. Lousich was presented as an expert on the laws of Hong Kong, and as a representative of the law office of the HERAS's counsel who made a verification of the record of the case filed by the ASIAVEST LIMITED in Hong Kong against the HERAS as well as the procedure in serving Court processes in Hong Kong. In his affidavit (Exh. "2") which constitutes his direct testimony the said witness stated that: The HERAS was sued on the basis of his personal guarantee of the obligations of Compania Hermanos de Navegacion S.A. There is no record that a writ of summons was served on the person of the HERAS in Hong Kong, or that any such attempt at service was made. Likewise, there is no record that a copy of the judgment of the High Court was furnished or served on the HERAS ; anyway, it is not a legal requirement to do so under Hong Kong laws; e) In an action based on a guarantee, there is no established legal requirement or obligation under Hong Kong laws that the creditor must first bring proceedings against the principal debtor. The creditor can immediately go against the guarantor. The trial court held that since the Hong Kong court judgment had been duly proved, it is a presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties; hence, the party impugning it had the burden to prove want of jurisdiction over his person. HERAS failed to discharge that burden. He did not testify to state categorically and under oath that he never received summons. Even his own witness Lousich admitted that HERAS was served with summons in his Quezon City residence. As to De la Vega's testimony regarding non-service of summons, the same was hearsay and had no probative value. As to HERAS' contention that the Hong Kong court judgment violated the Constitution and the procedural laws of the Philippines because it contained no statements of the facts and the law on which it was based, the trial court ruled that since the issue related to procedural matters, the law of the forum, i.e., Hong Kong laws, should govern. As testified by the expert witness Lousich, such legalities were not required under Hong Kong laws. The trial court also debunked HERAS' contention that the principle of excussion under Article 2058 of the Civil Code of the Philippines was violated. It declared that matters of substance are subject to the law of the place where the transaction occurred; in this case, Hong Kong laws must govern. ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment of the Hong Kong Court has been repelled by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of law or fact, such as to overcome the presumption established in Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in favor of foreign judgments.
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RULING: 1. Hence, once the authenticity of the foreign judgment is proved, the burden to repel it on grounds provided for in paragraph (b) of Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is on the party challenging the foreign judgment — HERAS in this case. At the pre-trial conference, HERAS admitted the existence of the Hong Kong judgment. On the other hand, ASIAVEST presented evidence to prove rendition, existence, and authentication of the judgment by the proper officials. The judgment is thus presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the contrary is shown. Consequently, the first ground relied upon by ASIAVEST has merit. The presumption of validity accorded foreign judgment would be rendered meaningless were the party seeking to enforce it be required to first establish its validity. 2. The main argument raised against the Hong Kong judgment is that the Hong Kong Supreme Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of HERAS. This involves the issue of whether summons was properly and validly served on HERAS. It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon the HERAS are governed by the lex fori or the law of the forum, i.e., the law of Hong Kong in this case. HERAS insisted that according to his witness Mr. Lousich, who was presented as an expert on Hong Kong laws, there was no valid service of summons on him. Lousich declared that the record of the Hong Kong case failed to show that a writ of summons was served upon HERAS in Hong Kong or that any such attempt was made. Neither did the record show that a copy of the judgment of the court was served on HERAS. He stated further that under Hong Kong laws (a) a writ of summons could be served by the solicitor of the claimant or ASIAVEST LIMITED; and (b) where the said writ or claim was not contested, the claimant or ASIAVEST LIMITED was not required to present proof under oath in order to obtain judgment. On cross-examination by counsel for ASIAVEST, Lousich testified that the Hong Kong court authorized service of summons on HERAS outside of its jurisdiction, particularly in the Philippines. He admitted also the existence of an affidavit of one Jose R. Fernandez of the Sycip Salazar Hernandez & Gatmaitan law firm stating that he (Fernandez) served summons on HERAS on 13 November 1984 at No. 6, 1st St., Quezon City, by leaving a copy with HERAS's son-in-law Dionisio Lopez. On redirect examination, Lousich declared that such service of summons would be valid under Hong Kong laws provided that it was in accordance with Philippine laws. There is, however, nothing in the testimony of Mr. Lousich that touched on the specific law of Hong Kong in respect of service of summons either in actions in rem or in personam, and where the HERAS is either a resident or nonresident of Hong Kong . In view of the absence of proof of the Hong Kong law on this particular issue, the presumption of identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption shall come into play. It will thus be presumed that the Hong Kong law on the matter is similar to the Philippine law. An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability. An action in rem is an action against the thing itself instead of against the person. An action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is named as HERAS and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the HERAS is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident HERAS who does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may he resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in Section 8; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication also with leave of court; or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
In the case at bar, the action filed in Hong Kong against HERAS was in personam, since it was based on his personal guarantee of the obligation of the principal debtor. HERAS was the President and part owner of a shipping company in Hong Kong during all those times that she served as his secretary. He had in his employ a staff of twelve. 3 He had "business commitments, undertakings, conferences, and appointments until October 1984 when [he] left Hong Kong for good." HERAS's other witness, Russel Warren Lousich, testified that he had acted as counsel for HERAS "for a number of commercial matters." ASIAVEST then infers that HERAS was a resident of Hong Kong because he maintained a business there. Significantly, in the pre-trial conference, the parties came up with stipulations of facts, among which was that "the residence of HERAS, Antonio Heras, is New Manila, Quezon City." We note that the residence of HERAS insofar as the action for the enforcement of the Hong Kong court judgment is concerned, was never in issue. He never challenged the service of summons on him through a security guard in his Quezon City residence and through a lawyer in his office in that city. In his Motion to Dismiss, he did not question the jurisdiction of the Philippine court over his person on the ground of invalid service of summons. What was in issue was his residence as far as the Hong Kong suit was concerned. We therefore conclude that the stipulated fact that HERAS "is a resident of New Manila, Quezon City, Philippines" refers to his residence at the time jurisdiction over his person was being sought by the Hong Kong court. With that stipulation of fact, ASIAVEST cannot now claim that HERAS was a resident of Hong Kong at the time.
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Accordingly, since HERAS was not a resident of Hong Kong and the action against him was, indisputably, one in personam, summons should have been personally served on him in Hong Kong. The extraterritorial service in the Philippines was therefore invalid and did not confer on the Hong Kong court jurisdiction over his person. It follows that the Hong Kong court judgment cannot be given force and effect here in the Philippines for having been rendered without jurisdiction. Even assuming that HERAS was formerly a resident of Hong Kong, he was no longer so in November 1984 when the extraterritorial service of summons was attempted to be made on him. As declared by his secretary, which statement was not disputed by ASIAVEST, HERAS left Hong Kong in October 1984 "for good." His absence in Hong Kong must have been the reason why summons was not served on him therein; thus, ASIAVEST was constrained to apply for leave to effect service in the Philippines, and upon obtaining a favorable action on the matter, it commissioned the Sycip Salazar Hernandez & Gatmaitan law firm to serve the summons here in the Philippines.
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CASE NO. 28
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert's petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn's marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court.
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert's petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert's.
RTC denied Gerbert's petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law. Article 26 of the Family Code reads: Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
ISSUE: Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
RULING: 1. The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
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As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of theFamily Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of theFamily Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.
The RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
2. The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion — i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens — with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert's petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.
In Gerbert's case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law. DCASIT
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3. Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn's marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree. We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a person's legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not." A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person's legal capacity and status that must be recorded.
Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn's marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
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