LOPEZ VS DE LOS REYES G.R. NO. L-34361, NOVEMBER 5, 1930 TOPIC: WHAT IS A CONSTITUTION?
its adjournment or periodical dissolution. It follows, that imprisonment must terminate with the adjournment."
FACTS
Dissenting and concurring opinions
On October 23, 1929, Candido Lopez attacked and assaulted, without any justification, the Jose D. Dimayuga, who was a member of the House of Representatives, while said Dimayuga was going to the hall of the House of Representative to attend to the sessions which were then about to begin, as a result, Dimayuga was unable to attend the sessions on that day and those of the two days next following, by reason of the threats which Mr. Candido Lopez made against Dimayuga. A warrant of arrest was issued against Lopez for contempt by the Speaker of the House of Representative.
The people of the Philippine Islands have never adopted a constitution, and no constitutional convention had ever been held here. The primary power to adopt a constitution is vested in the people and not in the legislature. The Constitution of the United States was the final result of a constitutional convention composed of delegates from the different states by whom it was prepared and then submitted to the different states for adoption. All of the state constitutions are the results of constitutional conventions.
Thus, this is an application for the writ of habeas corpus to relieve the petitioner from restraint of his liberty, by a ranking officer of the Constabulary, under a warrant of arrest issued by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, pursuant to resolutions of the House finding the petitioner guilty of contempt.
ISSUE Whether the Philippine House of Representatives has power to order the commitment of persons guilty of contempt against it DECISION The Philippine Legislature has practically the same powers in the Philippine Islands, within the sphere in which it may operate, a s the Congress of the United States. There is as much necessity for the House in a territorial legislature to possess the power to punish for contempt as there is for the Houses in the Congress of the United States and the Houses in the State Legislatures to possess this power. Accordingly, we rule that a limited power to punish persons not members for contempt resides in the House of Representatives of the Philippine Legislature. However, the United States Supreme Court has twice definitely held that the power is limited to imprisonment during the session of the legislative body affected by the contempt. The language of the higher court in the case first cited was: "And although the legislative power continues perpetual, the legislative body ceases to exist on the moment of
Definitions of Constitution State vs. County Treasurer A constitution is not the beginning of a country, nor the origin of appropriate rights. It is not the fountain of law, nor the incipient state of government. It grants no rights to the people, but it is the creature of their power, the instrument of their convenience. Designed for their protection in the enjoyment of the rights and powers they possessed before the constitution was made, it is but the f ramework of political government, and necessarily based on the preexisting rights, habits, and modes of thought. Judge Story A constitution is defined to be a fundamental law or basis of government. It is established by the people, in their original sovereign capacity, to promote their own happiness, and permanently to secure their rights, property, independence, and common welfare. Vanhornes's Lessee vs. Dorrance A constitution is the form of government, delineated by the mighty hand of the people, in which certain first principles of fundamental laws are established. The constitution is certain and fixed. It contains the permanent will of the people, and is the supreme law of the land. It is paramount to the legislature, and can be revoked or altered only by the authority that made it. Eakin vs. Raub A constitution is an act of extraordinary legislation by which the people establish the structure and
mechanism of their government, and in which they prescribe fundamental rules to regulate the motions of the several parts. Lynn vs. Polk A constitution is the written charter enacted and adopted by the people of a state through a combination of representatives, or in any way the people may choose to act, by which a government for them is obtained and established, and by which the people give organic and corporate form to that ideal thing, a state, for all time to come, or during the life of the state. Livermore vs. Waite The term "constitution" implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and, while it contains provision for revision, it indicates the will of the people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well a s the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature.
Ruling Case Law, vol. 6 p. 16, says: A constitution is a system of fundamental la ws or principles for the government of a nation, society, corporation or other aggregation of individuals, and it may be either written or unwritten. The United States decisions lay down the rule that where the Legislature, acting and sitting under a constitution, has the inherent power to punish for contempt, that a conviction for that offense is not a bar to a prosecution in the court for the crime of assault and battery, which in the instant case would correspond to article 587 of the Penal Code. Be that as it may, none of those decisions are in point. First, for the simple reason that the Legislature of the Philippine Islands is not sitting or acting under a constitution, but is a creature of an Act of Congress of the United States, which has no power to adopt or even amend the Constitution of the United States or any State of the United States, much less to adopt a constitution for the Philippine Islands. Second, that the people of the Philippine Islands have never adopted or held a constitutional convention. Third, none of those decisions are founded upon Act No. 1755 or any similar provision. They are all based upon the inherent power of a legislature under a constitution. Fourth, to permit the exercise of that alleged inherent power of the Philippine Legislature under an Act of Congress would subject the offender to three different penalties. One by the Legislature itself, one under
Act No. 1755, and the third under article 587 of the Penal Code, and all for an act committed outside of the legislative halls, and while the Legislature was not sitting in actual session.
BELTRAN | INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION NITAFAN V CIR NO. L-78780 | JULY 23, 1987
Petitioner: David G. Nitafan, Wenceslao M. Polo and Maximo A. Savellan, Jr. Respondents: Commissioner of Internal Revenue and The Financial Officer, Supreme Court of the Philippines
Doctrine: The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution.
Facts: -
-
-
The Chief Justice has previously issued a directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office to continue the deduction of withholding taxes from salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court and other members of the judiciary. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court en banc on 4 December 1987. The petitioners (David G. Nitafan, Wenceslao M. Polo and Maximo A Savellan, Jr.) are duly appointed and qualified judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53 respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila. The petitioners seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the respondents (Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court),
from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries -
They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."
Issue/s:W/N the members of the Judiciary are exempt from income tax Provision/s: Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased . (Emphasis supplied).
-
-
The ruling that "the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a diminution thereof, and so violates the Constitution", in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David must be declared discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and should share the burden of general income taxation equitably.
Disposition: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Prohibition is hereby dismissed.
BETOYA | INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION Held/Ruling/Ratio: NO -
-
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.
FILOTEO JR V. SANDIGANBAYAN
263 SCRA 222 | OCTOBER 16, 1996 PETITIONER: JOSE D. FILOTEO RESPONDENT: SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Doctrine Petitioner's contention that Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution should be given retroactive effect for being favorable to him as an accused, cannot be sustained. While Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that “penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal," what is being construed here is a constitutional provision specifically contained in the Bill of Rights which is obviously not a penal statute. A bill of rights is a declaration and enumeration of the individual rights and privileges which the Constitution is designed to protect against violations by the government, or by individuals or groups of individuals. It is a charter of liberties for the individual and a limitation upon the power of the state. Penal laws, on the other hand, strictly and
properly are those imposing punishment for an offense committed against the state which the executive of the state has the power to pardon. In other words, a penal law denotes punishment imposed and enforced by the state for a crime or offense against its law
Facts
On May 3, 1982 in Meycauayan, Bulacan, an incident of high-way robbery was commited when a Postal Delivery Truck of the Bureau of Postal was stopped along MacArthur Highway and robbed by means of violence, threat, and intimidation taking away 1) Postal Delivery Truck, 2) Social Security System Medicare Checks and Vouchers, 3) Social Security System Pension Checks and Vouchers, 4) Treasury Warrants, 5) Several Mail Matters from abroad; in the total amount of P253,728.29 more or less, belonging to US Government Pensionados, SSS Pensionados, SSS Medicare Beneficiaries and Private Individuals from Bulacan, Pampanga, Bataan, Zambales and Olongapo City Accused for the incident were petitioner Jose Filoteo, a police investigator of the Western Police District in Metro Manila, and Martin Mateo, Jr. y Mijares, PC/Sgt. Bernardo Relator, Jr. y Retino, CIC Ed Saguindel y Pabinguit, Ex-PC/Sgt. Danilo Miravalles y Marcelo and civilians Ricardo Perez, Reynaldo Frias, Raul Mendoza, Angel Liwanag, Severino Castro and Gerardo Escalada, but only Filoteo filed the current petition. Various testimonies and affidavits were filed by the accused and the witnesses of the crime regarding the happenings at the moment in time when the crime occurred, but what is of importance is the event upon capture of these respondents and the events confessions made on May 30, 1982. Filoteo was informed about his right to have a counsel, but he rejected this. Despite having a lawyer as a father-in-law, he proceeded with the pre-trials and extra judicial confessions without a lawyer. He stated in his extra-judicial confession that he was guilty of preparing the vehicles their team used in the robbery, and that he left
the share of his sum of checks to his kumare whom he instructed not to open the bag. Filoteo then asserts, during the trial period, that his extra-judicial statements were obtained through torture, duress, maltreatment, and intimidation, and therefore should be inadmissible as evidence in the court. This capture of Filoteo happened prior to the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, and therefore although he has been told about his rights to have a counsel, he was not told of his right to remain silent and the officers then were not compelled to assign him a counsel to waive such right to deny a counsel (since your right of a counsel can only be denied in signing a waiver with a counsel). Filoteo asserts that the 1987 Constitution should be applied to him retroactively.
Issues
W/N 1987 Constitution should be retroactively applied to petitioner W/N the extrajudicial confession which lays out in detail his complicity in the crime should be admissible in court despite the absence of counsel
Provisions Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution: (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel . (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation; or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as
well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices and their families."
Held
By parity of reasoning, the specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver by an accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation must be made with the assistance of counsel may not be applied retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confession was made prior to the effectivity of said Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of the right to counsel during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should, by such argumentation, be admissible. Although a number of cases held that extrajudicial confessions made while the 1973 Constitution was in force and effect, should have been made with the assistance of counsel, the definitive ruling was enunciated only on April 26, 1983 when this Court, through Morales, Jr . vs. Enrile, issued the guidelines to be observed by law enforcers during custodial investigation. The Court specifically ruled that "the right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel”. Pursuant to the above doctrine, petitioner may not claim the benefits of the Morales ruling because he executed his extrajudicial confession and his waiver to the right to counsel on May 30, 1982, or before April 26, 1983.
Disposition WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, but the first paragraph of the dispositive portion of the assailed Decision is partially MODIFIED to read as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Jose Filoteo, Jr. y Diendo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principal in the crime of robbery as defined in Arts. 293 and 295 and penalized under Art. 294, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code Code IMPOSING on him an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional , as minimum, to ten
(10) years of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay his proportionate share of the costs of the action. All other parts of the disposition are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
VHALERIE S. BULURAN | WHO INTERPRETS THE CONSTITUTION ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION G.R. NO. L-45081 | JULY 15, 1936 Petitioner: Jose A. Angara Respondent: the Electoral Commission, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio C. Mayor Doctrine: The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. Facts: -
-
-
-
Candidates for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas for elections of Sept. 17, 1935 are Jose Angara, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio C. Mayor Jose Angara won by majority of votes and took oath of office On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a resolution (No. 8) confirming the election of Angara to the body. Pedro Ysnua filed a motion of protest before the Electoral Commission on Dec 8 Dec 9, Electoral commission adopted a resolution in which it fixed a d ate for the last day of the filing of protest. Dec 20, Angara filed a motion to dismiss the protest alleging that Resolution 8 o of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative (b) that the aforesaid resolution o has for its object, and is the
-
-
-
-
accepted formula for, the limitation of said period (c) that the protest in question was o filed out of the prescribed period Ysnua filed an answer to the motion of dismissal, alleging that there is no constitutional provision barring a presentation of protest in which angara replied. Electoral commission promulgated a resolution on Jan, 23, 1936 denying the motion to dismiss the protest Angara, filed for issuance of the writ prayed for. February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf of the respondent Electoral Commission Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own behalf c ontending that the Electoral Commission had the sole power of regulating proceedings.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof. No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members. Section 4 of Article VI of the 1935 Constitution SEC. 4.: The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." Sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure., states that the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person.
Issue:
Held:
Whether the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts
Yes
--Whether the said Electoral Commission acted in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?
Provisions: Art. II (Current Art. 8 sec. 1 and 2 of 1987 Constitution)
Section 1. The judicial power shall be v ested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof. The Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the governments as stated in Sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure The Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly as stated in Section 4 of Article VI of the 1935 Constitution That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete. The framers of our constitution adopted the American type where the written constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. Upon principle, reason and authority, the supreme court has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission. The National Assembly of the election, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protests against the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed.
RA 2126 authorized the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City owned by petitioner and 2 others. On August 3, 1959, RA 2616 took effect without executive approval. It is stated that the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate is hereby authorized. The lands involved constitute a portion of the Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision totaling to 109 hectares, registered in the name of petitioner.
--No, the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua against the election of Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
On November 15, 1960, respondent Land Tenure Administration was directed by the Executive Secretary to institute the proceeding for the expropriation. On November 17, 1960, petitioner filed a special action for prohibition with preliminary injunction praying that the act be declared unconstitutional, and a preliminary injunction to restrain respondents from instituting such expropriation proceeding. RTC rendered decision holding that RA 2616 is
Disposition:
unconstitutional and granted the writ of prohibition.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Issue: W/N RA 2616 is unconstitutional
VIN CHING
No. Petitioner failed to prove denial of equal
LANGUAGE OF THE
Ruling:
CONSTITUTION
protection. Eminent domain, in general, is an
TUASON V. LAND OF TENURE ADMINISTRATION
inherent power of any government to adequately
GR NO. L67766
respond to the demands of public need and interest.
FEBRUARY 18, 1970
PETITIONER: J.M. TUASON & CO.
The Constitution itself, supposedly the supreme law
RESPONDENT: THE LAND TENURE
on private property rights, declares it to be so, and
ADMINISTRATION, SOLICITOR GENERAL, AND
leaves it to Congress, not to the judiciary, to make
AUDITOR GENERAL
the choice of the lands to be taken to attain the objective the constituent assembly aimed to achieve.
Doctrine: Language of the Constitution Facts: In this special civil action for prohibition to nullify a legislative act directing the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate, Quezon City, the Court is called upon to inquire further into how far the power of
The use of the word “may” means that the National
Legislature will use the power sought to confer upon it, and only when, the necessity for its exercise will have arisen.
Provisions:
Congress under the Constitution to authorize upon payment of just compensation.
Art XIII, Sec. 4 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
The State shall, by law, undertake a n agrarian reform
resolution dated August 9, 19881 and are being
program founded on the right of far mers and regular
resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25,
farmworkers to receive a just share of the fruits
1987
thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural
-It is alleged that Section 13, Article VII prohibits
lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable
public respondents, as members of the Cabinet,
retention limits as the Congress may prescribe,
along with the other public officials enumerated in
taking into account ecological, developmental, or
the list attached to the petitions from holding any
equity considerations, and subject to the payment of
other office or employment during their tenure.
just compensation. In determining retention limits, the
State
shall
landowners.
The
respect
the
State
shall
rights
of
further
small
provide
incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
-Petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines further seeks in G.R. No. 83815 the issuance of the extraordinary writs of prohibition and mandamus, as well as a temporary restraining order directing public
Disposition: WHEREFORE, the motion for the
respondents therein to cease and desist from
reconsideration of our decision of February 18, 1970,
holding, in addition to their primary positions, dual
filed by petitioner-appellee, is denied.
or multiple positions other than those authorized by the 1987 Constitution and from receiving any
CUARESMA | LANGUAGE OF THE CONSTITUTION
salaries, allowances, per diems and other forms o f
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V. THE EXECUTIVE
privileges and the like appurtenant to their
SECRETARY
questioned positions, and compelling public
G.R. NO. 83896
FEBRUARY 22, 1991
respondents to return, reimburse or refund any and all amounts or benefits that they may have received
DOCTRINE:
from such positions.
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is
-In sum, the constitutionality of Executive Order No.
the intention underlying the provision under
284 is being challenged by petitioners on the
consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court
principal submission that it adds exceptions to
in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
Section 13, Article VII other th an those provided in
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption,
the Constitution.
and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in
- According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase
the light of the history of the times, and the
"unless otherwise provided in this Constitution," the
condition and circumstances under which the
only exceptions against holding any other office or
Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain
employment in Government are those provided in
the reason which induced the framers of the
the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-President may
Constitution to enact the particular provision and
be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under
the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in
Section 3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the
order to construe the whole as to make the words
Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the
consonant to that reason and calculated to effect
Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1),
that purpose.
Article VIII.
FACTS:
-Petitioners further argue that the exception to the prohibition in Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB on the
-These two (2) petitions were consolidated per
Civil Service Commission applies to officers and
employees of the Civil Service in general and that
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members
said exceptions do not apply and cannot be
of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
extended to Section 13, Article VII which applies
not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
specifically to the President, Vice-President,
hold any other office or employment during their
Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or
tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
assistants.
indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
ISSUE:
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional
PROVISION/S:
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987. The pertinent provisions of the assailed Executive Order are: Sec. 1.
Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary
functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet,
Article IX-B, Section 7, par. (2)8 provides: Sec. 7.
.....
undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Execu tive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
more than two positions in the government and
functions of his position, no appointive official shall
government corporations and receive the
hold any other office or employment in the
corresponding compensation therefor; Provided,
government or any subdivision, agency or
that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies
instrumentality thereof, including government-
or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of
owned or controlled corporations or their
which the President is the Chairman.
subsidiaries.
Sec. 2.
RULING/RATIO:
If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary
or assistant secretary or other appointive official of the Executive Department holds more positions than what is allowed in Section 1 hereof, they (sic) must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his primary position. Sec. 3.
In order to fully protect the interest of the
YES -The practice of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants as members of the governing bodies or boards of various government agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations, became prevalent during the time legislative powers
government in government-owned or controlled
in this country were exercised by former President
corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of the
Ferdinand E. Marcos pursuant to his martial law
members of the boards of such corporation should
authority.
either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary. Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution:
-There was a proliferation of newly-cr eated agencies, instrumentalities and government-owned and controlled corporations created by presidential decrees and other modes of presidential issuances
where Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants
-Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil
were designated to head or sit as members of the
service are allowed to hold other office or
board with the corresponding salaries, emoluments,
employment in the government during their tenure
per diems, allowances and other perquisites of
when such is allowed by law or by the primary
office. Most of these instrumentalities have
functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet,
remained up to the present time.
their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In
-This practice of holding multiple offices or positions
other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay
in the government soon led to abuses by
down the general rule applicable to all elective and
unscrupulous public officials who took advantage of
appointive public officials and employees, while
this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. In fact,
Section 13, Article VII i s meant to be the exception
the holding of multiple offices in government was
applicable only to the President, the Vice- President,
strongly denounced on the floor of the Batasang
Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
Pambansa.
assistants.
-As keenly observed by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz
-Moreover, respondents' reading of the provisions in
during the deliberations in these cases, one of the
question would render certain parts of the
strongest selling points of the 1987 Constitution
Constitution inoperative. This observation applies
during the campaign for its ratification was the
particularly to the Vice-President who, under Section
assurance given by its proponents that the
13 of Article VII is allowed to hold other office or
scandalous practice of Cabinet members holding
employment when so authorized by the
multiple positions in the government and collecting
Constitution, but who as an elective public offi cial
unconscionably excessive compensation therefrom
under Sec. 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB is absolutely
would be discontinued.
ineligible "for appointment or designation in any
-The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and
capacity to any public office or position during his tenure."
his official family in so far as holding other offic es or
-Surely, to say that the phrase "unless otherwise
employment in the government or elsewhere is
provided in this Constitution" found in Section 13,
concerned.
Article VII has reference to Section 7, par. (1) of
-It is quite notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications to hold other office or employment, the prohibition pertains to an office or employment in the government and government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. In striking contrast is the wording of Section 13, Article
Article I-XB would render meaningless the specific provisions of the Constitution authorizing the VicePresident to become a member of the Cabinet,15 and to act as President without relinquishing the Vice-Presidency where the President shall not nave been chosen or fails to qualify.
VII which states that "(T)he President, Vice-
-The ex-officio position being actually and in legal
President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
contemplation part of the principal office, it follows
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
that the official concerned has no right to receive
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
additional compensation for his services in the said
employment during their tenure." In the latter
position. The reason is that these services are
provision, the disqualification is absolute, not being
already paid for and covered by the compensation
qualified by the phrase "in the Government." The
attached to his principal office.
prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is therefore all-embracing and covers both
-It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of
public and private office or employment.
Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as
an ex-officio member thereof, he is actually and in
legal contemplation performing the primary function of his principal office in defining policy in monetary and banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra
compensation, whether it be in the form of a per them or an honorarium or an a llowance, or some other such euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.
-During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de facto officers and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services
In April 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salary as member of the Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount, he instituted an action in Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Co nstitution. It provides in its Article VIII, Section 9 that the members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts “shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.
rendered.46 It has been held that "in cases where there is no de jure, officer, a de facto officer, who, in
PROVISION:
good faith has had possession of the office and has
Constitution
Article
VIII,
Section
9
of
1935
discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office. This doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on equitable grounds since it seems unjust that the public should benefit by the services of an officer de facto and then be freed from all liability to pay any one for such services.
DISPOSITION:
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior, until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. They shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Until the Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual
WHEREFORE, subject to the qualification above-
compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each
stated, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order
Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos.
No. 284 is hereby declared null and void and is accordingly set aside.
.PERFECTO v MEER 85 Phil 552 (1950) LANGUAGE OF THE CONSTITUTION PETITIONER: GREGORIO PERFECTO
ISSUE: Whether or not the imposition of an income tax upon this salary in 1946 amount to a diminution RULING:
RESPONDENT: BIBIANO L. MEER Yes, the imposition of the income tax upon the salary DOCTRINE: The imposition of income tax upon the
of Justice Perfecto amount to a diminution thereof.
salary of judges is a diminution thereof, and violates
The prohibition is general, contains no excepting
the Constitution.
words, and appears to be directed against all diminution, whether for one purpose or another.
FACTS:
The fathers of the Constitution intended to prohibit diminution by taxation as well as otherwise, that
they regarded the independence of the judges as of
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
far greater importance than any revenue that could
Respondents
come from taxing their salaries. Thus, taxing the
constitutionality of the appointment.
salary of a judge as a part of his income is a violation
•
of the Constitution.
contend,
and
maintain
the
Commission on Appointments was allowed by the Court to intervene
•
DISPOSITION:
There are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint, specifically, these are: 1. The
We vote for the reversal of the judgment
heads
of
the
executive
appealed from and the dismissal of plaintiff's
departments, ambassadors, other public
complaint.
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
Judgment affirmed.
appointments are vested in him in this
DE SILVA, PAULO
Constitution;
SARMIENTO V. MISON
2. All other officers of the Government
G.R. NO. 79974 DECEMBER 17, 1987
whose appointments are not otherwise
PETITIONER: ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND
provided for by law;
JUANITO G. ARCILLA
3. Those whom the President may be
RESPONDENT: SALVADOR MISON
authorized by law to appoint; 4. Officers
lower
in
rank
4
whose
Doctrine: Intent of the framers of the constitution
appointments the Congress may by law
and of the people adopting it must be given effect. —
vest in the President alone.
The
fundamental
principle
of
constitutional
construction is to give ef fect to the intent of the
•
framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be
the consent of the Commission on Appointments. •
given is that which is embodied and expressed in the construe
the
applicable
constitutional
provisions, not in accordance with how the executive or the legislative department may want them
Issue: •
Whether or not the President can appoint Mison without
construed, but in accordance with what they say and
submitting
his
nomination
to
the
Commission on Appointments
provide.
Provision:
Facts: •
The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention.
constitutional provisions themselves. The Court will thus
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with
Respondent Salvador Mison was appointed by
Sec. 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution:
former President Cory Aquino as Commissioner of •
the Bureau of Customs. •
Petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of theIntegrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, question the appointment
on
the
grounds
that
it
was
unconstitutional by reason of it not having been
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are
vested
in
him
in
this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers
Doctrine:
of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislation act is necessary to enforce constitutional mandate, the presumption
Ruling: •
now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
Yes, under the 1987 Constitution, Heads of Bureau
executing, if the constitutional provisions are treated
are removed from the list of officers that needed
as requiring legislation instead of self-executory, the
confirmation
legislature would have the power to ignore and
from
the
Commission
On
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental
Appointment. •
President Cory acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing respondent
law.
Facts:
Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without
submitting
his
nomination
to
the
●
Government
Commission on Appointments for confirmation. •
Insurance
System
Philippine Government, decided to sell
and statutory construction that an express
through public bidding 30% to 51% of the
enumeration of subjects excludes others not
issued and outstanding shares of Manila
enumerated, it would follow that only those
Hotel Corporation. ●
first group require the consent of the Commission
The winning bidder, or the eventual “strategic
on Appointments. •
Service
(GSIS), pursuant to the privatization of the
By following the accepted rule in constitutional
appointments to positions expressly stated in the
The controversy arose when respondent
partner”,
will
provide
management expertise or an international
it is evident that the position of Commissioner of
marketing/
the Bureau of Customs is not included in the scope
financial
of the first group of appointments. The 1987
profitability and performance of the Manila
Constitution,deliberately excluded the position of
Hotel.
"heads of bureaus" from appointments that need
●
reservation support
to
system, strengthen
and the
In close bidding held on September 18,1995 only two (2) bidders disputed: petitioner
the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation which offered to buy 51% of
Disposition:
the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in
share, and Renong Berhad, A Malaysian
intervention should be, as they are, hereby
firm, which bid for the same number of
DISMISSED. Without costs.
shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.24 more than the bid of the petitioner.
FORTUNO | SELF -EXECUTING PROVISIONS
●
Prior to the declaration of Renong Berhad
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V. GSIS
as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila
G.R. NO. 122156 | FEBRUARY 3, 1997
Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent
PETITIONER: MANILA PRINCE HOTEL
a manager’s cheque as bid security which
RESPONDENT: GSIS
the GSIS refused to accept
●
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the
referred to the legislature for action. Unless it is
tender of the matching bid and that the sale
expressly provided that a legislation act is necessary
may
Renong
to enforce constitutional mandate, the presumption
Bernard, petitioner filed a petition before
now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
the court
executing, if the constitutional provisions are treated
be
consummated
with
as requiring legislation instead of self-executory, the
Issue/s:
legislature would have the power to ignore and Whether or not Sec. 10, second paragraph, Article
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental
XIII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
law.
provision
Disposition: Provision/s: WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE
Sec.10, second paragraph, Article XIII of the 1987
INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
Constitution
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
Section 10. Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwelling demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner.
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase
No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be
the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
undertaken without adequate consultation with
Corporation at P44.00 per share a nd thereafter to
them and the communities where they are to be
execute the necessary agreements and documents
relocated.
to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
Ruling:
necessary for the purpose.
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that: SO ORDERED. It is a self - executing provision. Since
the
Constitution
is
the
fundamental,
GACULA, KYLE Y.
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
OPOSA V FACTORAN
deemed in every statute and contract, A provision
PETITIONER: OPOSA
which lays down general principle, such as those
RESPONDENT: THEN SEC OF DENR FACTORAN
found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self - executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or
Doctrine: Intergenerational responsibility gives minors in this case a legal standing.
that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is
self-executing. A constitutional provision is self-executing if the
nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is
Principal petitioners are minors represented by their parents Impleaded as Plaintiffs PENI ( Phil Eco Netwrok Inc) whose cause is protection of natural resources Defendant is former DENR Sec Factoran Jr Taxpayers class suit citing Art 2 Sec 16 that all taxpayers have a right to a balanced and healthy ecology and entitled to enjoyment of country’s virgin tropical forests
Instant petition seeks to cancel all existing Timber licenses in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving TLA Minor petitioners content that continued granting of timber license is a impairment of natural resource property and violated Art 2 Sec 16 Defendant on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question The RTC judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by consti
ISSUE: 1. 2.
W/N Minors have legal standing? W/N granting the petition would lead to impairment of contracts?
HELD: 1.
2.
YES through the concept of intergenerational responsibility. Every gen has the responsibility to preserve ecology to ensure the protection of the same right for the next generations to come. The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates disposition of the forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights. Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the exercise by the police power of the State.
