Chapter 12 - Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement
Chapter 12 Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement Multiple Choice Questions
1. In the principal-agent framework, the ultimate principal is: I) Managers; II) Board of directors; III) Shareholders; IV) Government A. I and II only B. IV only C. III only D. I, II and IV only
2. The following are agency problems in capital budgeting except: A. Empire building B. Entrenching investment C. Avoiding risks D. Accepting all the positive NPV projects
3. The following are agency problems associated with capital budgeting except: A. Reduced effort B. Maximizing the value of the firm to the shareholders C. Empire building D. Perks
4. The following are agency problems associated with capital budgeting except: I) reduced effort II) perks or private benefits III) empire building IV) entrenching investments V) avoiding risks A. I, II and V only B. I, II, and IV only C. I, II, III and IV only D. I, II, III, IV and V
12-1
Chapter 12 - Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement
5. The following capital expenditure(s) are (is) included in the capital budget: A. Investment in information technology B. Investment in research and development C. Investment in training and personal development D. Investment in a new office building
6. Which of the following capital expenditure may not appear in capital budget? I) Investment in a new plant II) Investment in a new machine III) Investment in training employees A. I only B. II only C. III only D. I and II only
7. The following actions by the managers may result in over-investment problem: I) entrenching investments II) empire building III) investing beyond the point where NPV falls zero A. I only B. II only C. I and II only D. I, II, and III 8. Managers on a fixed salary are subjected to following temptations all the time: I) reduced effort II) perks or private benefits III) empire building IV) entrenching investments V) avoiding risks A. I, II and V only B. I, II, and IV only C. I, II, III and IV only D. I, II, III, IV and V
12-2
Chapter 12 - Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement
9. Agency costs can be thought of as the loss in the value of a firm resulting from the following actions by managers: I) reduced effort II) perks or private benefits III) empire building IV) entrenching investments V) avoiding risks A. I, II and V only B. I, II, and IV only C. I, II, III and IV only D. I, II, III, IV and V
10. Monitoring is done by: I) Shareholders; II) Board of Directors; III) Independent accountants; IV) Lenders A. I only B. I and II only C. I, II, and III only D. I, II, III and IV
11. The ultimate responsibility for monitoring a firm rests with: I) Shareholders; II) Board of Directors; III) Independent accountants; IV) Lenders A. I only B. I and II only C. I, II, and III only D. I, II, III and IV
12. In large public companies monitoring is delegated to: I) Shareholders; II) Board of Directors; III) Independent accountants; IV) Lenders A. I only B. II only C. I, II, and III only D. I, II, III and IV
12-3
Chapter 12 - Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement
13. Agency costs can be reduced by monitoring: I) managers' efforts II) managers' actions III) by intervening when managers veer off course A. I only B. I and II only C. I, II and III only D. III only
14. Free-rider problem in the case of monitoring results in: I) ineffective monitoring by the shareholders II) monitoring being delegated III) no monitoring by a large number of small individual investors A. I only B. II only C. III only D. I, II and III
15. Because monitoring is not perfect, managers compensation plans must be designed provide them incentives to: A. put in a lot of effort B. work long hours C. take actions that make employees happy D. maximize the value of the firm to the shareholders
16. Generally, mangers' compensation is based on: A. the effort they put in B. the number of hours they work C. verifiable results D. none of the above
12-4
Chapter 12 - Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement
17. CEO compensation is the highest in (the): A. U.S.A. B. India C. U.K. D. Germany
18. When stock options are given to managers as incentives, typically the exercise price of these options is set equal to the firm's: A. stock price on the day the options are granted. B. expected stock price in one year from the day the options are granted. C. expected stock price on the expiration date of the options. D. none of the above.
A firm has an average investment of $1000 during the year. During the same time the firm has an after tax earnings of $150.
19. If the cost of capital is 10%, what is the net return on investment? A. 10% B. 5% C. 12% D. None of the above
20. Calculate the economic value added (EVA) for the firm. (Cost of capital is 10%) A. $100 B. $50 C. $120 D. None of the above
A firm has an average investment of $10,000 during the year. During the same time the firm has an after tax income of $2,000.
12-5
Chapter 12 - Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement
21. If the cost of capital is 15%, what is the net return on the investment? A. 5% B. 20% C. 15% D. None of the above
22. Calculate the economic value added (EVA) for the firm. (Cost of capital is 15%) A. $500 B. $1,500 C. $2,000 D. None of the above
A firm has an average investment of $10,000 during the year. During the same period, the firm has an after-tax income of $1000.
23. If the cost of capital is 15%, what is the net return on the investment? A. 15% B. -5% C. 10% D. None of the above
24. Calculate the economic value added (EVA) for the firm. (Cost of capital is 15%) A. -$500 B. $1500 C. $1200 D. None of the above
25. The term Economic Value Added (EVA) is copyrighted by: A. Brealey-Myers B. Brealey-Myers-Allen C. Ross-Westerfield D. Stern-Stewart
12-6
Chapter 12 - Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement
26. Economic Value Added (EVA) is calculated as follows: A. EVA = Income Earned - (cost of debt) * (investment) B. EVA = Income Earned - (cost of equity) * (investment) C. EVA = Income Earned - (cost of capital) * (investment) D. none of the above
27. A firm has an average investment of 100,000 during the year. During the same period, the firm has an after-tax income of $16,000. If the cost of capital is 15%, what is the economic profit? A. +16,000 B. +15,000 C. +1,000 D. None of the above
28. Economic profit (EP) is calculated as follows: A. EP = (ROI - r) * (capital invested) where r = cost of capital B. EP = (ROI + r) * (capital invested) where r = cost of capital C. EP = (ROI) * (capital invested) D. none of the above
29. The following are disadvantages of using EVA as a measure of performance except: A. EVA does not measure present value B. EVA rewards taking project with quick paybacks and penalizes taking projects with longer payback periods C. EVA reduces explicit monitoring by top management D. EVA is difficult to apply for start up ventures
30. The following are advantages of using EVA as a measure of performance except: A. EVA is a substitute for explicit monitoring by top management B. EVA makes the cost of capital visible to the operating management hence reduce capital employed C. EVA does not measure present value D. EVA highlights the parts of business that are not performing
12-7
Chapter 12 - Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement
31. EVA is used for: I) Measuring performance within the firm II) Rewarding performance within the firm III) Improving performance within the firm A. I only B. II only C. I and II only D. I, II, and III
32. The following firms have positive EVAs except: A. Microsoft B. Pfizer C. Wal-Mart Stores D. Intel Corp.
33. The following firms have negative EVAs except: A. Time Warner B. Pfizer C. IBM D. Coca-Cola
34. The plant manager can improve EVA by: I) increasing earnings II) increasing capital employed III) reducing earnings IV) reducing capital employed A. I and II only B. II and III only C. III and IV only D. I and IV only
12-8
Chapter 12 - Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement
35. Generally, firms with high levels of intangible assets tend to report (with other things being the same): A. Lower than actual ROI B. Higher than actual ROI C. Same as the actual ROI D. None of the above
36. Economic rate of return is defined as: A. [(C1 + PV1 - PV0 )]/(PV0) B. [(C1 - (PV1 - PV0 )]/(PV0) C. [(C1 + PV1)]/(PV0) D. None of the above
Consider an asset with the following cash flows: The firm uses straight-line book depreciation. For this project; it writes off $7 per year in years 1, 2 and 3. The discount rate is 10%.
37. Calculate the economic depreciation in years 1, 2 and 3. A. 7, 7, 7 B. 9, 7, 5 C. 10, 7, 3 D. None of the above
38. Calculate the economic income in years 1, 2 and 3. A. 2.1, 1.4, 0.7 B. 7, 7, 7 C. 1.0, 7.1, 3.7 D. None of the above
12-9
Chapter 12 - Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement
39. Calculate the economic rate of return in years 1, 2 and 3. A. 43.3%, 43.3%, 65% B. 10%, 10%, 10% C. 43.3%, 40%, 36.7% D. None of the above
40. According to the survey of senior managers by Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal, the senior managers admitted to the following: I) adjusting their firms' operations and investments in order to manage earnings. II) they were willing to decrease discretionary spending in R&D, advertising or maintenance if necessary to meet earnings target. III) many of them would, if necessary, also defer or reject investment projects with positive NPVs. A. I only B. II only C. I and II only D. I, II, and III
41. A firm produces $65 million of net income on $2,030 million of assets. Given that investors expect a 5% return, what is the economic profit? A. -$65.0 million B. -$36.5 million C. $32.6 million D. $65.1 million
42. A firm produces $124 million of net income on $1,600 million of assets. Through a six sigma project, the firm is able to the assets employed to $1,450 million. Given a 5% cost of capital, what is the increase in the EVA? A. $7.5 million B. $44.0 million C. $51.5 million D. $96.5 million
True / False Questions
12-10
Chapter 12 - Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement
43. Top management, using computers, generally analyzes all the capital budgeting projects every year before deciding on them. True False
44. Agency problems in capital budgeting include—reduced efforts, perks, empire building and entrenching investments. True False
45. Monitoring generally reduces agency costs. True False
46. CEOs of U.S. companies receive the highest level of compensation in terms of long-term incentives and variable bonuses. True False
47. EVA = Income Earned - (Cost of capital) * (Investment). True False
48. EVA can easily be applied to R&D programs and startup ventures. True False
49. Economic Profit = EP = (ROI - r)(capital invested). True False
50. Economic Income = cash flow - economic depreciation. True False
12-11
Chapter 12 - Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement
51. Economic Value Added is a new concept recently introduced into finance. True False
52. Economic profit can be increased by reducing assets employed.
True False
Short Answer Questions
53. What are some of the agency problems associated with capital budgeting?
54. Briefly explain the term "qualified opinion" issued by the auditors.
55. Define the term "Economic Value Added (EVA)."
12-12
Chapter 12 - Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement
56. Define the term "Net earnings."
57. Briefly explain how a plant manager can improve EVA (Economic Value Added)?
58. Define the term "economic rate of return."
59. Define the term "Economic Income."
12-13
Chapter 12 - Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement
60. Why can the financial success of a movie not be easily evaluated using EVA?
12-14
Chapter 12 - Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement
Chapter 12 Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement Answer Key
Multiple Choice Questions
1. In the principal-agent framework, the ultimate principal is: I) Managers; II) Board of directors; III) Shareholders; IV) Government A. I and II only B. IV only C. III only D. I, II and IV only
Type: Easy
2. The following are agency problems in capital budgeting except: A. Empire building B. Entrenching investment C. Avoiding risks D. Accepting all the positive NPV projects
Type: Medium
3. The following are agency problems associated with capital budgeting except: A. Reduced effort B. Maximizing the value of the firm to the shareholders C. Empire building D. Perks
Type: Medium
12-15
Chapter 12 - Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement
4. The following are agency problems associated with capital budgeting except: I) reduced effort II) perks or private benefits III) empire building IV) entrenching investments V) avoiding risks A. I, II and V only B. I, II, and IV only C. I, II, III and IV only D. I, II, III, IV and V
Type: Difficult
5. The following capital expenditure(s) are (is) included in the capital budget: A. Investment in information technology B. Investment in research and development C. Investment in training and personal development D. Investment in a new office building
Type: Medium
6. Which of the following capital expenditure may not appear in capital budget? I) Investment in a new plant II) Investment in a new machine III) Investment in training employees A. I only B. II only C. III only D. I and II only
Type: Medium
12-16
Chapter 12 - Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement
7. The following actions by the managers may result in over-investment problem: I) entrenching investments II) empire building III) investing beyond the point where NPV falls zero A. I only B. II only C. I and II only D. I, II, and III
Type: Medium
8. Managers on a fixed salary are subjected to following temptations all the time: I) reduced effort II) perks or private benefits III) empire building IV) entrenching investments V) avoiding risks A. I, II and V only B. I, II, and IV only C. I, II, III and IV only D. I, II, III, IV and V Type: Difficult
9. Agency costs can be thought of as the loss in the value of a firm resulting from the following actions by managers: I) reduced effort II) perks or private benefits III) empire building IV) entrenching investments V) avoiding risks A. I, II and V only B. I, II, and IV only C. I, II, III and IV only D. I, II, III, IV and V
Type: Difficult
12-17
Chapter 12 - Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement
10. Monitoring is done by: I) Shareholders; II) Board of Directors; III) Independent accountants; IV) Lenders A. I only B. I and II only C. I, II, and III only D. I, II, III and IV
Type: Medium
11. The ultimate responsibility for monitoring a firm rests with: I) Shareholders; II) Board of Directors; III) Independent accountants; IV) Lenders A. I only B. I and II only C. I, II, and III only D. I, II, III and IV
Type: Medium
12. In large public companies monitoring is delegated to: I) Shareholders; II) Board of Directors; III) Independent accountants; IV) Lenders A. I only B. II only C. I, II, and III only D. I, II, III and IV
Type: Medium
12-18
Chapter 12 - Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement
13. Agency costs can be reduced by monitoring: I) managers' efforts II) managers' actions III) by intervening when managers veer off course A. I only B. I and II only C. I, II and III only D. III only
Type: Easy
14. Free-rider problem in the case of monitoring results in: I) ineffective monitoring by the shareholders II) monitoring being delegated III) no monitoring by a large number of small individual investors A. I only B. II only C. III only D. I, II and III
Type: Medium
15. Because monitoring is not perfect, managers compensation plans must be designed provide them incentives to: A. put in a lot of effort B. work long hours C. take actions that make employees happy D. maximize the value of the firm to the shareholders
Type: Medium
12-19
Chapter 12 - Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement
16. Generally, mangers' compensation is based on: A. the effort they put in B. the number of hours they work C. verifiable results D. none of the above
Type: Easy
17. CEO compensation is the highest in (the): A. U.S.A. B. India C. U.K. D. Germany
Type: Easy
18. When stock options are given to managers as incentives, typically the exercise price of these options is set equal to the firm's: A. stock price on the day the options are granted. B. expected stock price in one year from the day the options are granted. C. expected stock price on the expiration date of the options. D. none of the above.
Type: Medium
A firm has an average investment of $1000 during the year. During the same time the firm has an after tax earnings of $150.
12-20
Chapter 12 - Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement
19. If the cost of capital is 10%, what is the net return on investment? A. 10% B. 5% C. 12% D. None of the above (150/1000) - 0.10=0.05 = 5%
Type: Medium
20. Calculate the economic value added (EVA) for the firm. (Cost of capital is 10%) A. $100 B. $50 C. $120 D. None of the above EVA = 150 - (0.10)(1000) = $50
Type: Medium
A firm has an average investment of $10,000 during the year. During the same time the firm has an after tax income of $2,000.
21. If the cost of capital is 15%, what is the net return on the investment? A. 5% B. 20% C. 15% D. None of the above (2,000/10,000) - 0.15 = 0.05 = 5%
Type: Medium
12-21
Chapter 12 - Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement
22. Calculate the economic value added (EVA) for the firm. (Cost of capital is 15%) A. $500 B. $1,500 C. $2,000 D. None of the above EVA = 2000 - (0.15)(10,000) =$500
Type: Medium
A firm has an average investment of $10,000 during the year. During the same period, the firm has an after-tax income of $1000.
23. If the cost of capital is 15%, what is the net return on the investment? A. 15% B. -5% C. 10% D. None of the above Net return on investment = 1000/10000 - 0.15 = - 0.05 or - 5%
Type: Medium
24. Calculate the economic value added (EVA) for the firm. (Cost of capital is 15%) A. -$500 B. $1500 C. $1200 D. None of the above EVA = 1000 - (0.15)(10,000)= - 500;
Type: Medium
12-22
Chapter 12 - Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement
25. The term Economic Value Added (EVA) is copyrighted by: A. Brealey-Myers B. Brealey-Myers-Allen C. Ross-Westerfield D. Stern-Stewart
Type: Easy
26. Economic Value Added (EVA) is calculated as follows: A. EVA = Income Earned - (cost of debt) * (investment) B. EVA = Income Earned - (cost of equity) * (investment) C. EVA = Income Earned - (cost of capital) * (investment) D. none of the above
Type: Medium
27. A firm has an average investment of 100,000 during the year. During the same period, the firm has an after-tax income of $16,000. If the cost of capital is 15%, what is the economic profit? A. +16,000 B. +15,000 C. +1,000 D. None of the above ROI = 16,000/100,000 = 0.16; economic profit = (0.16 - 0.15)(100,000)= 1,000
Type: Medium
28. Economic profit (EP) is calculated as follows: A. EP = (ROI - r) * (capital invested) where r = cost of capital B. EP = (ROI + r) * (capital invested) where r = cost of capital C. EP = (ROI) * (capital invested) D. none of the above
Type: Medium
12-23
Chapter 12 - Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement
29. The following are disadvantages of using EVA as a measure of performance except: A. EVA does not measure present value B. EVA rewards taking project with quick paybacks and penalizes taking projects with longer payback periods C. EVA reduces explicit monitoring by top management D. EVA is difficult to apply for start up ventures
Type: Medium
30. The following are advantages of using EVA as a measure of performance except: A. EVA is a substitute for explicit monitoring by top management B. EVA makes the cost of capital visible to the operating management hence reduce capital employed C. EVA does not measure present value D. EVA highlights the parts of business that are not performing
Type: Medium
31. EVA is used for: I) Measuring performance within the firm II) Rewarding performance within the firm III) Improving performance within the firm A. I only B. II only C. I and II only D. I, II, and III
Type: Medium
32. The following firms have positive EVAs except: A. Microsoft B. Pfizer C. Wal-Mart Stores D. Intel Corp.
Type: Easy
12-24
Chapter 12 - Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement
33. The following firms have negative EVAs except: A. Time Warner B. Pfizer C. IBM D. Coca-Cola
Type: Easy
34. The plant manager can improve EVA by: I) increasing earnings II) increasing capital employed III) reducing earnings IV) reducing capital employed A. I and II only B. II and III only C. III and IV only D. I and IV only
Type: Difficult
35. Generally, firms with high levels of intangible assets tend to report (with other things being the same): A. Lower than actual ROI B. Higher than actual ROI C. Same as the actual ROI D. None of the above
Type: Easy
36. Economic rate of return is defined as: A. [(C1 + PV1 - PV0 )]/(PV0) B. [(C1 - (PV1 - PV0 )]/(PV0) C. [(C1 + PV1)]/(PV0) D. None of the above
Type: Medium
12-25
Chapter 12 - Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement
Consider an asset with the following cash flows: The firm uses straight-line book depreciation. For this project; it writes off $7 per year in years 1, 2 and 3. The discount rate is 10%.
37. Calculate the economic depreciation in years 1, 2 and 3. A. 7, 7, 7 B. 9, 7, 5 C. 10, 7, 3 D. None of the above Economic depreciation = change in PV = 7
Type: Difficult
38. Calculate the economic income in years 1, 2 and 3. A. 2.1, 1.4, 0.7 B. 7, 7, 7 C. 1.0, 7.1, 3.7 D. None of the above Economic depreciation = change in PV = 7 Year 1: Economic income = cash flow - economic depreciation = 9.1 =2.1; Year 2: 8.4 7=1.4; Year 3: 7.7 - 7=0.7
Type: Difficult
12-26
Chapter 12 - Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement
39. Calculate the economic rate of return in years 1, 2 and 3. A. 43.3%, 43.3%, 65% B. 10%, 10%, 10% C. 43.3%, 40%, 36.7% D. None of the above Economic rate of return = Cash flow change in PV/initial PV; PV0 = 21, PV1=14 & PV2 = 7 Year 1: Economic rate of return: = (9.1 - 7)/21= 10%; Year 2: (8.4 - 7)/14=10% Year 3: (7.7 7)/7=10%
Type: Difficult
40. According to the survey of senior managers by Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal, the senior managers admitted to the following: I) adjusting their firms' operations and investments in order to manage earnings. II) they were willing to decrease discretionary spending in R&D, advertising or maintenance if necessary to meet earnings target. III) many of them would, if necessary, also defer or reject investment projects with positive NPVs. A. I only B. II only C. I and II only D. I, II, and III
Type: Difficult
41. A firm produces $65 million of net income on $2,030 million of assets. Given that investors expect a 5% return, what is the economic profit? A. -$65.0 million B. -$36.5 million C. $32.6 million D. $65.1 million 65/2030 = .032 EP = (.032 - .05) × 2030 = -36.5
Type: Difficult
12-27
Chapter 12 - Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement
42. A firm produces $124 million of net income on $1,600 million of assets. Through a six sigma project, the firm is able to the assets employed to $1,450 million. Given a 5% cost of capital, what is the increase in the EVA? A. $7.5 million B. $44.0 million C. $51.5 million D. $96.5 million EVA1 = 124 - (.05 × 1600) = 44; EVA 2 = 124 - (.05 × 1450) = 51.5 Increase in EVA = 51.5 - 44 = 7.5
Type: Difficult
True / False Questions
43. Top management, using computers, generally analyzes all the capital budgeting projects every year before deciding on them. FALSE
Type: Medium
44. Agency problems in capital budgeting include—reduced efforts, perks, empire building and entrenching investments. TRUE
Type: Easy
45. Monitoring generally reduces agency costs. TRUE
Type: Easy
12-28
Chapter 12 - Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement
46. CEOs of U.S. companies receive the highest level of compensation in terms of long-term incentives and variable bonuses. TRUE
Type: Easy
47. EVA = Income Earned - (Cost of capital) * (Investment). TRUE
Type: Medium
48. EVA can easily be applied to R&D programs and startup ventures. FALSE
Type: Difficult
49. Economic Profit = EP = (ROI - r)(capital invested). TRUE
Type: Medium
50. Economic Income = cash flow - economic depreciation. TRUE
Type: Medium
51. Economic Value Added is a new concept recently introduced into finance. FALSE
Type: Medium
12-29
Chapter 12 - Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement
52. Economic profit can be increased by reducing assets employed.
TRUE
Type: Medium
Short Answer Questions
53. What are some of the agency problems associated with capital budgeting? Some of the agency problems encountered in capital budgeting are: • Reduced effort • Perks • Empire building • Entrenching investment • Avoiding risks
Type: Medium
54. Briefly explain the term "qualified opinion" issued by the auditors. When independent auditors find problems associated with the accounting procedures of a firm they issue a "qualified opinion." A qualified opinion is bad news for the company as it suggests that the firm is not following proper accounting procedures.
Type: Easy
55. Define the term "Economic Value Added (EVA)." Economic Value added is defined as income earned by a firm minus the capital costs. EVA measures the additional wealth created in dollar terms.
Type: Easy
12-30
Chapter 12 - Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement
56. Define the term "Net earnings." Net earnings are earnings after taxes but without taking into account interest payments.
Type: Medium
57. Briefly explain how a plant manager can improve EVA (Economic Value Added)? Generally, EVA makes the cost of capital more visible to the plant managers. They can improve the EVA of their division by (a) increasing earnings or (b) reducing capital employed or both.
Type: Medium
58. Define the term "economic rate of return." Economic rate of return is defined as: cash flow plus change in value divided by initial value.
Type: Easy
59. Define the term "Economic Income." Economic income is defined as the cash flow plus the change in the present value of a firm. It can be thought of as cash flow minus economic depreciation.
Type: Easy
12-31
Chapter 12 - Agency Problems, Compensation, and Performance Measurement
60. Why can the financial success of a movie not be easily evaluated using EVA? The EVA of a movie is very likely to be positive, while the NPV may very well be negative. Unfortunately, a movie has a very short life span. If a movie generates a 20% ROI in 4 weeks of running and then produces nothing else, it will likely show a positive EVA but still lose money for the investors. Short lived projects are not suitable to be evaluated using EVA.
Type: Difficult
12-32