Challenges to Neutral and Non-Aligned Countries in Europe and Beyond

Challenges to Neutral & Non-Aligned Countries in Europe and Beyond

Edited by Emily Munro

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The GCSP would like to thank Dr. Fred Tanner (Deputy Director, GCSP) and Emily Munro (Project Officer, GCSP), who organised the round-table. Curtis Budden, Damla Süar, Jennifer Wallace (Faculty Assistant, GCSP) and the Special Programmes team at the GCSP led by Hrair Balian contributed to this final publication, and their support is gratefully acknowledged. A generous contribution from the Directorate for Security Policy, Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport, Switzerland, made both the round-table and the publication possible.

Published by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy Avenue de la Paix 7bis, P.O. Box 1295 1211 Geneva 1, Switzerland www.gcsp.ch © GCSP 2005

Designed by Damla Süar, Geneva, Switzerland, [email protected] Printed by Nove Impression et Conseil, Route de Champ-Colin 2, 1260 Nyon ISBN 2-8399-009 2-8399-0092-0 2-0

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The GCSP would like to thank Dr. Fred Tanner (Deputy Director, GCSP) and Emily Munro (Project Officer, GCSP), who organised the round-table. Curtis Budden, Damla Süar, Jennifer Wallace (Faculty Assistant, GCSP) and the Special Programmes team at the GCSP led by Hrair Balian contributed to this final publication, and their support is gratefully acknowledged. A generous contribution from the Directorate for Security Policy, Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport, Switzerland, made both the round-table and the publication possible.

Published by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy Avenue de la Paix 7bis, P.O. Box 1295 1211 Geneva 1, Switzerland www.gcsp.ch © GCSP 2005

Designed by Damla Süar, Geneva, Switzerland, [email protected] Printed by Nove Impression et Conseil, Route de Champ-Colin 2, 1260 Nyon ISBN 2-8399-009 2-8399-0092-0 2-0

Challenges to Neutral & Non-Aligned Countries in Europe and Beyond “How is a policy of neutrality and non-alignment made compatible with active engagement with the EU and NATO, NA TO, with special reference to robust peace operations and the global fight against terrorism?“

The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) is an international foundation established in 1995 within the framework of the Swiss participation in the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Activities

The GCSP is engaged in 4 areas of activities: Training

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Research

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Conferences and Outreach

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A Foundation Council consisting

Networking

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of representatives of 33 Members States oversees the work of the GCSP. An international Advisory Board, including prominent personalities with expertise in the security field, guides the management on key policy issues.

CONTENTS I N T R O D U C T I O N ........................................................................................................... 4 Raimund Kunz Ambassador, Head, Directorate for Security Policy, Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport, Switzerland A U S T R I A ........................................................................................................................ 7 Thomas Hajnoczi Head, Department of Security Policy, Austrian Foreign Ministry Comments on the Austrian position ............................................................................... 13 Hanspeter Neuhold Professor, Head, Department of International Law and International Relations, University of Vienna, Austria

F I N L A N D ........................................................................................................................ 17 Kari Möttölä Special Advisor, Policy Planning and Research, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Finland Comments on the Finnish position .................................................................................. 23 Tapani Vaahtoranta Director, Finnish Institute of International Affairs

I R E L A N D ........................................................................................................................ 25 Keith McBean Director, International Security Policy Section, Department of Foreign Affairs, Ireland Comments on the Irish position ....................................................................................... 32 Fellow Emeritus, Institute for European Affairs, Patrick Keatinge Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland

S W E D E N ......................................................................................................................... 35 Anders Bjurner Ambassador, Head, Department for European Security Policy, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden Comments on the Swedish position ................................................................................ 41 Bo Huldt Professor, Head, Department of Security Policy, Swedish National Defence College

S W I T Z E R L A N D ............................................................................................................. 47 Paul Seger Ambassador, Head, Directorate of International Law, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland Comments on the Swiss position .................................................................................... 54 Fred Tanner Deputy Director, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland

C O N C L U D I N G R E M A R K S ........................................................................................ 57 Erik Windmar Faculty Member (seconded by the Swedish Government), Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland

Introduction Switzerland had the pleasure of hosting a round-table on neutrality on 15 November 2004 at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP). This was the second meeting on the topic of being a neutral/non-aligned country in Europe: the first event was held in Helsinki at the initiative of the Swiss Embassy and hosted by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, on 26 September 2003. This second round-table was a direct result of the success of the 2003 event, including the debate that was generated amongst the participants and the subsequent interest in the publication that resulted from the meeting (“Neutrality and non-alignment in Europe today”, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Report 6/2003). As in the first round-table, an official and a researcher participated from each of the five neutral/non-aligned countries in Europe: Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland. These participants were not all from neutral countries, but also nonaligned countries; in addition, Switzerland is not a member of the EU. These realities are necessarily reflected in the papers. While discussions focused on being a neutral/non-aligned country in Europe and on developments in the European Union in 2003-2004, especially the drafting of a European Constitution, the GCSP altered the focus of the debate to concentrate on how neutral/non-aligned countries respond to the pressures of involvement in conflict management, peace support, peace-building, and the fight against terrorism. The following papers reflect the debates that took place in November 2004 and respond to the broadly conceived question put to the authors prior to the round-table: “How is a policy of neutrality and non-alignment made compatible with active engagement with the EU and NATO, with special reference to robust peace operations and the global fight against terrorism?” This question helped orient the authors to focus on exigencies of today’s security environment and challenges, if any, to nations with a neutral/nonaligned policy. The European Union framed the discussion for most of the authors, while the centrality of the United Nations in this sphere was also emphasised by some.

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We hope that you find the papers thought-provoking and that they generate a lively debate on the international security policy of neutral/non-aligned countries. Certainly, from the Swiss perspective, the issues discussed in these papers are of particular relevance today. I would like to extend my appreciation to the Geneva Centre for Security Policy for organising this successful event.

Ambassador Raimund Kunz

Head, Directorate for Security Policy, Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport, Switzerland

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Challenges to Neutral & Non-Aligned Countries in Europe and Beyond Austria

Austria Thomas Hajnoczi

Head, Department of Security Policy, Austrian Foreign Ministry The Neutrality Act was adopted by the Austrian parliament in October 1955 as a constitutional law. In paragraph 1 of the Act, Austria declares, upon its free will, its permanent neutrality. Paragraph 2 stipulates that Austria will never in the future accede to any military alliances or permit the establishment of military bases of foreign states on its territory. The origin of the Neutrality Act lay in Austria’s quest for full independence and for the withdrawal of the foreign armed forces that had occupied Austria since 1945. It is not by coincidence that the last soldier of an occupying power left Austrian territory the day before the Austrian parliament passed the Neutrality Act. Neutrality does not form part of the State Treaty, and, consequently, it is not a treaty obligation, but it rests on a sovereign act of Austrian legislation that could be changed like any other legislative act in accordance with the required parliamentary parliamentary procedures. Whereas a legal obligation to maintain neutrality was construed by some Austrian international-law experts in the 1950s and 1960s, on the basis of a formal notification of the Neutrality Act by the Austrian Government to all states with which Austria maintained diplomatic relations in 1955 and their explicit or implicit recognition of the status of neutrality neutrality,, this view is no longer held. With reference to the Neutrality Act, and beyond its legal content, the so-called policy of active neutrality was developed during the period of the East-West conflict, when Austria was situated between two military alliances opposing each other. Given the changed international geopolitical situation since the end of the Cold War, War, the political conditions for Austria’s foreign policy have also been fundamentally changed. When Austria was admitted to the United Nations (UN) in December 1955, the UN Charter became binding for Austria. Though the Austrian Government had called the

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permanent neutrality of Switzerland the model for Austria’s neutrality, neutrality, UN membership set Austria on a different course. It brought up the potential for conflict between obligations deriving from UN membership and neutrality in the then-prevalent interpretation amongst Austrian international-law international-law experts. A pre-eminent professor of international law at that time, A. Verdross, argued that, by admitting Austria to the United Nations without reservations and in full knowledge of the recently declared status of neutrality, UN members had granted Austria a special status in accordance with its neutrality and consequently would not expect Austria to participate in any measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter that might stand in contradiction to Austrian neutrality. The first test to this Verdross Doctrine came in 1966 when the Security Council decided to enact sanctions against Rhodesia. The Austrian Government decided to take part in the sanctions, since the situation was not an interstate conflict and neutrality would not apply. As long as the system of collective security of the United Nations could not be applied because of the antagonism between the Soviet Union and the United States, the Verdross Doctrine was never seriously challenged. After the end of the Cold War, the situation changed. The international response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait led to military action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and the Austrian Government decided to grant over-flight rights to the allied forces fighting in Iraq. Beginning with this decision, Austria has held the legal view that the obligations under the UN Charter take precedence over Austria’s status of neutrality. Austria accords central significance to the role of the United Nations in safeguarding world peace and international security. Participation in the UN’s peacekeeping operations has been amongst the key areas of Austria’ Austria’ss commitment to the organisation since the Congo mission in 1960. Since 1960, about 50,000 soldiers from the Austrian Armed Forces have taken part in UN-authorised operations. Austria’s role in the UN’ Austria’s UN’ss peace missions continued to develop in the 1990s. Since then, Austria has taken part in peace-making operations and has also participated in c ombat

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units since 1999. These are UN-authorised missions conducted under the operative direction of NATO or of a lead nation. Likewise, Austria grants over-flight rights for operations authorised by the United Nations. When Austria applied for European Union (EU) membership in 1989, one essential motivation was that this meant belonging to the zone of European peace and stability. From its beginnings, the European integration process was perceived as a peace project and thus as a security concept. Hence, the EU’s enlargement on 1 May 2004 also yields benefits in terms of security policy. Upon joining the European Union in 1995, the complete body of legal and political rules and procedures of the European Union, the acquis, was incorporated into Austrian law. The Treaty of Maastricht and in particular its clauses concerning the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which formed part of the acquis when Austria joined the EU, foresaw the possibility of a Common Defence Policy (Art. J-4, Treaty of Maastricht) that could eventually lead to a common defence. In 1994, two-thirds of the Austrian electorate voted in favour of joining the European Union under the conditions outlined above. The Austrian parliament decided to add a special provision to the Federal Constitution (Art. 23f) that stipulates that Austria’s participation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy would not be impeded by the Neutrality Act. After the ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Austrian parliament added another clause to the constitution that allows Austria to participate in the full range of the Petersberg Tasks, which include military action in the framework of a crisis-management or peace-making operation. Austria’s participation in the outlined tasks requires a corresponding European Union decision, as well as the consent of the Austrian parliament to deploy Austrian forces. The Resolution by the Austrian parliament on the Security and Defence Doctrine of December 2001 contains the following specific recommendations for the federal government: •

Support of EU reforms, especially with a view to developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy/European Security and Defence Policy (CFSP/ESDP) and safeguarding the Union’s security-policy interests.

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• Active participation in the ESDP in the spirit of solidarity, since the ESDP is currently pursuing the aim of giving the EU the necessary means and capabilities, as well as efficient decision-making structures, for civil and military crisis management. Austria will make an appropriate contribution in terms of quantity, as well as quality, to the Headline Goal and Capability Goals of the EU. • Priority support to any future efforts to realise the possibility of a common European defence envisaged in Article 17 of the EU Treaty. • Close cooperation between the EU and NATO in the spirit of a strategic partnership is regarded as a prerequisite for the success of the ESDP. These recommendations not only make it clear that Austria's participation in the ESDP as it is now is compatible with the Neutrality Act, but they also determine Austria's position with regard to the further development of the ESDP. Hence, Austria entered the negotiations on the draft Constitutional Treaty of the EU with the desire to achieve progress in the further development of the ESDP. The outcome, the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, signed by the heads of state or government of the EU Member States on 29 October 2004 in Rome, contains several important steps towards widening the scope of the ESDP and strengthening the EU’s crisis-management capabilities. Art. III-309 stipulates that: the tasks referred to in Article I-41(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. From the beginning, Austria supported this enlargement of the scope of the Petersberg Tasks.

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Art. I-41(2) states that the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy will: lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. In the case of Austria, that would mean a two-thirds majority for a constitutional law. However, this article contains clear language expressing that, “this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States”. It is worthwhile to recall that this wording derives from the Treaty of Maastricht, in which it was introduced at the request of Ireland in accordance with its neutrality. The demand in Art. I-41(3) that “Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of the common security and defence policy” is totally in line with Austria’s active participation in ESDP operations. Until now, Austria has contributed military forces or police elements to all relevant ESDP operations. The establishment of a European Defence Agency foreseen in the same paragraph was achieved by the Joint Action of 12 July 2004, even before the Constitutional Treaty was signed. Austria is already participating in the first activities of this new Agency. With regard to the permanent structured cooperation mentioned in Art. I-41(6) and further elaborated in Art. III-312, Austria argued in favour of an open, transparent, and inclusive way to shape this new form of cooperation. The final version of this text reflects this approach. While a decision on Austria’s possible participation has to be taken only upon entry into force of the Constitutional Treaty, a guiding principle might be found in Austria’s consistent participation in all sectors of European integration hitherto. Since permanent structured cooperation deals solely with cooperation regarding military capacities and does not create a special framework for military operations, no separate decision-making process would be established. Therefore, no legal problems would arise if Austria intended to participate in a permanent structured form of cooperation.

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During the elaboration of the Constitutional Treaty, Austria supported the inclusion of a provision providing for closer cooperation on mutual defence that would be open to all Member States. At the same time, Austria had to ensure that the final wording was coherent with its neutrality. When the first version of the Constitution from the Italian Presidency was distributed, the foreign ministers of Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden contributed a common proposal. As a result of this proposal, language acceptable to all EU partners was found in taking up a passage from the Maastricht Treaty that aimed to safeguard Ireland’s status as a neutral country. Thus, Art. I-41(7) reads: If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. In accordance with this paragraph, neutral and non-aligned EU members will decide themselves on the nature and amount of their aid and assistance when such a situation arises. The solidarity clause in Art. I-43 stipulates that, “the Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster”. After the terrorist attack in Madrid in March 2004, the European Council of 25-26 March 2004 welcomed “the political commitment of Member States and of the acceding States, taken as of now, to act jointly against terrorist acts, in the spirit [of this article]”. As mentioned in the separate Declaration on Solidarity against Terrorism, “it shall be for each Member State or acceding State to the Union to choose the most appropriate means to comply with this solidarity commitment towards the affected State”. The nature of Austrian neutrality has been altered by Art. 23f of the Austrian Constitution, progress in the development of the ESDP, and the acknowledgement that the obligations under the UN Charter take precedence over Austria’s neutral status. While the Neutrality Act remains in force, it has been reduced, by the developments outlined above, to its core substance: namely, that Austria will not participate in wars, join a military alliance, or permit the stationing of foreign troops on its territory.

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Austrian Commentator

Hanspeter Neuhold

Professor, Head, Department of International Law and International Relations, University of Vienna, Austria In her first statements as Austrian foreign minister, Ursula Plassnig, who took office on 20 October 2004, pledged continuing respect for the country’s neutrality. She also saw no reason for a debate on this pillar of Austria’s foreign and security policy. Her position is remarkable for two reasons: 1. The Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP), the senior partner in the governing coalition,

had in the past been the driving force behind defining Austria’s international status as bündnisfrei (alliance-free), similar to that of Finland and Sweden, and had even proposed that the country join NATO. On 15 October 2004, however, the leadership of the Christian democratic party performed an about-face: permanent neutrality was to be included in an annex to the new Constitution,1 which at that time was discussed by the Convention, while the call for joining the Atlantic Alliance was dropped. 2 2. Surprisingly, in early November 2004, the pacifist Greens, who had opposed Austria’s

membership of the European Union (EU) in the referendum on accession to the Union in 1994, declared that the abolition of the country’s immerwährende (perpetual) neutrality was conceivable in the context of a supranational CFSP. At the same time, the Greens posed utopian conditions: the withdrawal of all EU members from NATO and control of the Common Foreign and Security Policy by the European Parliament. 3

It ought to be recalled that Austria’simmerwährende neutrality was declared in a federal constitutional law in 1995. Eventually, the main political parties failed to agree on the draft constitution submitted by the president of the Convention. 2 These decisions were taken three years after Federal Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel had derided permanent neutrality as a cliché similar to the Lipizzaner (the famous white horses of the Spanish Riding School in Vienna) and Mozartkugeln (chocolate balls also popular with tourists) in a speech on the Austrian national holiday on 26 October (the day on which the law on neutrality was enacted in 1955) in 2001. 3 In addition, the Green Party demanded a positive vote in a referendum on the issue. The neutrality issue surfaced again in the recent debate on Austria’s contribution to an EU battle group that will also be composed of German and Czech units. If a battle group launches a peace-making operation (the third Petersberg Task) in which armed force is used not only in self-defence, the issue of its conformity with international law will arise. Although it would not violate Austria’s neutrality as adapted by Art. 23f of the Austrian Constitution, even a “humanitarian intervention” designed to stop large-scale atrocities like Operation Allied Force in the Kosovo crisis of 1999 would be unlawful without the authorisation of the UN Security Council. See Hanspeter Neuhold, “Collective Security After ‘Operation Allied Force’”, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, vol. 4 (2000), pp. 73-106 (pp. 95-103), and the literature quoted therein. 1

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Two recent developments within the EU have raised major issues for the neutral and non-allied Member States: the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe and the EU’s security strategy, “A Secure Europe in a Better World”. Art. I-41(7), of the Constitutional Treaty signed in Rome on 29 October 2004 contains a collective-defence obligation. 4 It is followed, however, by the so-called Irish clause, according to which the security and defence policy of certain Member States is not prejudiced.5 As a result, the neutral and non-allied members do not have to subscribe to alliance obligations contrary to their status. 6 If they invoke this exemption, they would benefit from a non-reciprocal guarantee arrangement in their favour. 7 Austria is faced with a special problem in this context because, on the one hand, it still defines neutrality in legal terms; on the other hand, it wants to belong to the “core Europe” whenever “variable geometry” is practised. Moreover, political leaders changed their positions on collective defence within the Union in late 2003. 8 Federal Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel initially regarded the assumption of alliance obligations only as a modification of neutrality, then switched to the formula “solidarity within Europe, neutrality in wars outside Europe”. Alfred Gusenbauer, the chairman of the main opposition party, the Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ), at first wanted Austria to participate in every stage of European integration, even at the price of abandoning neutrality. Later on, he opposed the abolition of this status.

The initial text drafted by the European Convention had only provided for an optional alliance inter partes within the Union. It posed no problems from the point of view of neutrality, since the neutral and non-allied members were not required to join this collective-defence regime. However, at their Naples meeting on 28-29 November 2003, the foreign ministers of EU Member States endorsed the more stringent proposal of the Italian Presidency. It obliged all other members to provide assistance by all means in their power to a member that was the victim of armed aggression. Subsequently, the foreign ministers of Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden proposed an alternative, according to which the victim of aggression may only request aid and assistance, which the other Member States may grant or refuse. 5 Already inserted in Art. J-4(4), of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union in order to safeguard Ireland’s neutrality. 6 On the history of the collective-defence obligation in the Constitution, see Waldemar Hummer, “Beistandspflicht – Solidarität – Neutralität”, in Gunther Hauser and Franz Kernic (eds.), Handbuch zur europäischen Sicherheit (in print). 7 Their partners in the EU would have to assist them in case of armed attack but not vice versa. How this asymmetrical security regime will be appreciated by the other member countries is another matter. 8 Hanspeter Neuhold, “Außenpolitik und Demokratie: ‘Immerwährende’ Neutralität durch juristische Mutation?” in Stefan Hammer et alii (eds.), Demokratie und sozialer Rechtsstaat in Europa. Festschrift für Theo Öhlinger (WUV-Universitätsverlag, Vienna 2004), pp. 68-91 (p. 88). 4

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In the campaign before the presidential election in April 2004, the candidate of the ÖVP, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, followed the Schüssel formula. For her social-democratic opponent Heinz Fischer, neutrality was incompatible with a commitment to military assistance, and its abolition was out of the question. Fischer’s more convincing stand on neutrality was seen as one of the main reasons for his eventual victory. Other relevant innovations in the EU Constitution include a solidarity clause in Art. I43. It calls for joint action against terrorist attacks and in c ase of natural or man-made disasters. Since neutrality applies only to armed interstate conflicts, neutral states may provide assistance against non-state terrorist networks without violating the obligations resulting from their status. Participation in permanent structured cooperation under Art. I-41(6) requires military capabilities that fulfil higher criteria, as well the acceptance of commitments with a view to the most demanding missions. Its compatibility with neutrality depends on the concrete operation undertaken, in particular on whether it entails the use of nondefensive armed force against states without the authorisation of the UN Security Council. It also remains to be seen whether the EU Council will include Austria in a group of Member States to which it entrusts specific security tasks under Art. I-41(5). Hopefully, joint disarmament operations mentioned in Art. III-309 will be undertaken with the consent of the parties concerned and therefore entail no difficulties for neutral states. It is also worth mentioning that Austria participated in the first European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions in 2003. These police and peacekeeping operations raised no problems from the point of view of neutrality. The same is true of Austria’s involvement in Partnership for Peace (PfP) with NATO and the NATO-led operations IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina and KFOR in Kosovo.

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The Solana Doctrine has not clarified the vague terms mentioned in the Constitution but instead has added to the terminological inflation and confusion in the ESDP area. For instance, practice will have to show whether “robust intervention” and “preventive engagement” may also include activities conflicting with neutrality or the international legal regime governing the use of force. The provisions of the Constitution on security policy and the EU’s strategic concept received little attention in Austria, both from the political elite and public opinion. If the Constitutional Treaty enters into force and Austria follows the formula of “solidarity within the EU, neutrality outside Europe”, its neutrality will be further eroded and turned on its head, since membership in a collective-defence system, in other words a military alliance, would then be regarded as compatible with this status. The main reason for the reluctance to abandon permanent neutrality is its undiminished popular support in the country.9

In an opinion poll concerning the main fears of the Austrian population conducted in September/ October 2004, 54% mentioned the abandonment of neutrality. The collapse of the health system and organised crime were mentioned most frequently. 9

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Challenges to Neutral & Non-Aligned Countries in Europe and Beyond Finland

Finland Kari Möttölä

Special Advisor, Policy Planning and Research, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Finland Introduction

Doctrinal and institutional modifications contained in the 2004 report of Finnish security and defence policy 1 are directed at retaining and strengthening Finland’s capabilities in pursuit of its national interests and international responsibilities in an intensive and complex environment. During the Cold War, an active policy of neutrality was the key instrument for attaining a voice and status for Finland in international relations, where power was the prevalent broker. For the last ten years, Finnish membership of the European Union (EU) has provided a platform for the country to influence world affairs, where norms, institutions, multilateralism, and integration have gained strategic significance. At the same time, security benefits are predicated on Finland’s ability to contribute to common efforts within the EU and in other European, transatlantic, and global contexts. Doctrinal Modification

Military non-alliance, the remaining core of neutrality, is defined as one of the basic components of Finnish security and defence policy, along with a credible defence capability and participation in international security cooperation, in the 2001 security and defence policy report, as well as in the 2003 programme of the present government.2 In the 2004 report, these instrumental objectives are retained in a modified hierarchy and structure of the overall security doctrine. Military non-alliance is connected with Finland’s “defence solution”: “Finland maintains and develops its defence capability as a militarily non-allied state and monitors the changes in its security environment.”

“Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004”, government report 6/2004, Prime Minister’s Office, publications 18/2004. Online: http://www.vnk.fi/tiedostot/pdf/en/88861.pdf 2 “Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2001”, Report by the Council of State to parliament, 13 June 2001. Online: http://www.defmin.fi/index.phtml/page_id/356/topmenu_id/7/menu_id/356/this_topmenu/354/ lang/3/fs/12 and “Government Programme of Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen’s government”, 24 June 2003. Online: http://www.valtioneuvosto.fi 1

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The report specifies that, in practice, this means not being a member of NATO. The relationship is linked with changes in NATO and its role, reflecting continued instrumentality and flexibility: “Applying for membership of the alliance will remain a possibility in Finland’s security and defence policy also in the future.” The defence plan, which extends to 2012/2016, reasserts the continuity of Finland’s indigenous “defence system” based on general conscription, a modernising territorial defence, and a reserve for wartime manpower (350,000) sufficient for defending the whole country. Restructuring, including a network-centric orientation, driven by financial, technological, and demographic imperatives, is projected to preserve the credibility of national defence capabilities . Contributions to international tasks facilitate the qualitative development of the defence forces. While both the defence solution and the defence system are evolving in a dynamic external context, stronger durability and self-sufficiency are attached to the latter. The basic elements of the present defence system are viewed by both the elite and the public to be necessary, if not the only possible option, for Finland even in the case of military alignment. Continuity is driven by the attention given to geo-strategic stability in the Northern European region. While the policy on NATO membership as presented in the 2004 report is descriptive rather than prescriptive, the fundamental significance of EU membership for Finnish security and defence policy has also been accentuated and mainstreamed in an allparty parliamentary report. 3 The constitutive and functional role of the EU is inserted in the core doctrine: “Finland’s line of action is based on credible national defence, the functioning of society and a consistent foreign policy as well as a strong international position and an active participation as a member of the European Union.” The concept and practice of a policy of neutrality was defined in 1997 as incompatible with the solidarity requirement of the political union, as Finland could “not be impartial in a conflict between the Union and a third party”. 4

Turvallisuuspoliittisen seurantaryhmän raportti, 9 March 2002 (with a summary in Swedish and English). Valtioneuvoston kanslian julkaisusarja 9/2004. Online: http://www.valtioneuvosto.fi/tiedostot/ pdf/fi/68802.pdf 4 “European Security Development and Finnish Defence”, report by the Council of State to parliament on 17 March 1997. The use of the term neutrality was discontinued earlier, in the context of accession. 3

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A relaxed Finnish attitude applies to the possibility of common defence within the Union. It is not expected to be invoked in the prevailing or foreseeable conditions, where NATO remains the tool for a real capability for those seeking a military security guarantee for their territories, including for Finland if it so decided. At the same time, while stressing pragmatic grounds for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), Finland does not exclude participation in common defence, were it to be adopted by the European Council. As for public opinion, support of two-thirds of the population for military non-alliance, and thus opposition to NATO membership, has remained steady, peaking in conflict times (Kosovo, Iraq). Albeit, a majority thinks Finland is eventually tying itself to membership. Of the alignment alternatives, NATO is preferred to the EU, while an EU common defence without NATO is preferred to one relying on NATO. The will to defend the country through military means remains high, as does support for conscription and territorial defence, while a majority prefers to keep defence spending at the present level. 5 Common Foreign and Security Policy/European Security and Defence Policy (CFSP/ESDP) as a Challenge

Working through the CFSP/ESDP not only complements and supports, but also develops, Finland’s security and defence policy. Still, deepening security and defence integration within the Union is a challenge to Finland’s capability for adaptation, though Finland has made no reservations to the treaty obligations related to the ESDP or to the programmatic steps adopted within it. The challenge has to do with the objectives of inclusiveness and openness in the enhancement and implementation of the ESDP even when flexibility is introduced. The purpose is to ensure that Finland has an equal opportunity to contribute to decisions and actions taken in the name of the Union and to certify and verify that unity is the best way towards a more capable EU. Finland has consistently striven to demonstrate that military non-alliance is not a hindrance to a full and positive role within the ESDP. Consequently, situations should

Surveys by the Advisory Board for Defence Information (MTS); in December 2004, the support for military non-alliance was 61% and alignment 34%. Online: http://www.defmin.fi/index.phtml/lang/3/ topmenu_id/6/menu_id/ 141/fs/12; and Finnish Business and Poli cy Forum EVA. Online: http://www.eva. fi/eng/index.php?m=1&did=581 5

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be prevented where opt-out or opt-in models are introduced as part of a common solution, then to be possibly invoked by Member States due to their non-alliance status or other reasons. In the context of the 2003-04 intergovernmental conference, strengthening the EU as a solidarity-based security community guided Finland’s approach to what became the solidarity clause (Art. I-43) and the article obliging states to provide aid and assistance (Art. I-41(7)), as well as the provisions on permanent structured cooperation (Art. I-41 (6)/Art. III-312). A selective application of enhanced cooperation and common defence, as suggested in the Convention’s draft, was not acceptable. Finland also joined a demarche with the other non-allied Member States, rejecting formal binding security guarantees (contained in the first Presidency proposal, following the language of the Brussels Treaty, Art. V) as inconsistent with their security policies and constitutional requirements.6 The finalised article on aid and assistance in the case of armed aggression on the territory of a Member State satisfies Finland’s objectives. While not making the EU into a military alliance, the commitment is mutually binding and constitutes a significant step forward in political solidarity. It is not weakened by the non-deterministic nature of the assistance to be provided. The reference to consistency with the non-alliance policies and NATO commitments recognises the principle of equality. Moreover, the solution does not harm or add ambiguity to transatlantic security relations. The solidarity clause involving the use of military resources in response to a terrorist strike or natural or man-made catastrophes is supported by Finland, albeit the details of the provision of executive assistance to civilian authorities remain to be clarified. Finland has been a participant in all the civilian crisis-management operations of the Union, as well as in the Concordia (2003) and Althea (2004) military operations. Finland did not participate in Artemis (2003). Finland has agreed to contribute forces to a battle group led by Sweden as a framework nation, and joined by Norway and Estonia, and to a German-led battle group with the Netherlands.

A joint letter of 4 December 2003 by Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden; cf. Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja’s article in the Financial Times, 28 October 2003, and his account in “Suomen ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikka anno 2004”, Helsinki 2004; Statement on the meeting of the president and the Foreign and Security Affairs Committee of the government, 11 December 2003. 6

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Interventions and International Law

As another challenge, the growing demands of the ESDP and structured cooperation have created a need to review the national principles and procedures for Finland’s participation in peacekeeping and military crisis-management missions. Under the present legislation, a commitment of troops must be based on the authorisation of the UN Security Council or the OSCE, and Finland shall not take part in coercive military measures governed by Articles 42 and 51 of the Charter. While the executive branch takes the decision to deploy forces, the parliament shall be consulted, and the procedure is more elaborate if the rules of engagement deviate from those in traditional peacekeeping. While cooperation with the parliament will remain a precondition, a policy discussion is under way to accommodate the changing needs. 7 There is a growing cognisance that the EU may need to act without a UN Security Council mandate in humanitarian catastrophes, for example, while acknowledging the priority of the UN and respecting the principles of the Charter. The rapid deployment envisaged for battle groups may render a streamlined decision-making procedure necessary. Moreover, the rules of engagement may need to be revisited. The revised Petersberg Tasks and the scenarios based on the Headline Goal 2010 have left the definition of the upper end of intensity unchanged, but it remains open to interpretation and ad hoc decisions. Relations with NATO and Participation in Partnership for Peace

Finland is deepening bilateral cooperation with NATO on interoperability in the context of the Planning and Review Process of the Partnership for Peace and on security dialogue. Finland has participated in all the NATO-led operations (SFOR, KFOR, ISAF) and assumed leading posts in Kosovo. As a mature partner, Finland contributes to transition support and assistance in the multilateral Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework.

See the debates in parliament on the 2004 report, 28-29 September and 20 December 2004; speech by Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen, 16 November 2004 (Finnish); speech by Chief of Defence Admiral Juhani Kaskeala, 24 November 2004 (Finnish). 7

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A key objective is to transcend and overcome any gap between Finland’s contribution and influence by ensuring a proper role in the strategic and operative planning, as well as command and control, of NATO-led operations and EU-led operations with recourse to NATO assets through the Berlin Plus arrangement. Efforts have increased to place Finnish officers in NATO headquarters and commands relevant for missions and defence transformation. A study by the Ministry of Defence on the effects of military alignment highlights the added value in influence and the relatively low cost of membership. 8 Another key objective is to benefit from interoperability with NATO and the NATO/PfP/ EU interface in capabilities development. This objective refers not only to enhancing the usability and deployability of Finnish forces for crisis-management missions and cooperation in crisis situations but also to transforming the national defence capability. The task of the military is to provide the political leadership with full flexibility so that taking a decision to join the alliance, or its implementation, would not be hindered or prevented by the lack of preparedness or capability of the defence forces to assume membership obligations.

Effects of a possible membership in a military alliance to the development of the Finnish system and to the defence administration (Executive Summary), Ministry of Defence, 27 February 2004. Online: http://www.defmin.fi/chapter_images/2589_1897_Executive_summary[2].pdf 8

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Finnish Commentator Tapani Vaahtoranta

Director, Finnish Institute of International Affairs Obsolete Neutrality

The 2004 report on Finnish security and defence policy is a mixture of new and old thinking. What is new is the emphasis on the challenges the global security environment poses to Finland. The fact that Finland’s defence solution will be based on national territorial defence capability represents the old thinking. The third main element in the report is the strong emphasis on the significance of the European Union (EU) as a means of pursuing Finland’s security interests. During the Cold War, neutrality was a key instrument of Finnish foreign policy, but the concept of neutrality is not mentioned in the report on security and defence policy. The absence of the concept demonstrates that neutrality is no longer regarded as a useful tool in policy-making or in the debate on foreign policy. What is left of Finnish neutrality is its “core”, that is, military non-alignment, which means that Finland’s defence is based on a credible national defence capability and that Finland is not about to join NATO. The scope of the core of neutrality has become so narrow that it means only the policy of non-alliance. As a consequence of the change in Finnish thought on neutrality and military nonalignment, whatever is left today does not complicate Finland’s participation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy/European Security and Defence Policy (CFSP/ESDP). As Kari Möttölä points out, Finland has strived to demonstrate in many ways that its military non-alliance is not a hindrance to a full and positive role within the CFSP/ESDP. Finland has also been able to accept the development of the CFSP and the ESDP. Policy of Non-alliance

In the context of the Constitutional Treaty, Finland accepted the solidarity clause involving military assistance in the case of a terrorist attack, but the mutual assistance clause, as suggested in the Convention’s draft, was not acceptable to Helsinki. Finland’s

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reaction to the defence clause and the motivations behind it are still being debated in Finland. The issue raises questions about why Finland is ready to assist other EU members if they are attacked by terrorists but perhaps not if they are attacked by other states. The policy of military non-alliance seems to explain Finland’s reaction. Finland has been able to accept everything that has been done to develop the CFSP/ESDP, but binding security guarantees is the line that Finland is not willing to cross. Thus, for the first time, the development of the ESDP has created a real difficulty for Finland. This observation leads to a further question about the motivation of the policy of military non-alliance. Why is it that Finland does not join NATO? As Kari Möttölä points out, Finland is doing all it can to deepen its interoperability with NATO, has participated in NATO-led operations, contributes to transition support in the EAPC/PfP framework, and hopes that its contribution is matched with influence within NATO. According to the 2004 report on security and defence policy, applying for NATO membership will remain a possibility in Finland’s policy, but the report does not give explicit reasons for Finland’s attitude towards NATO membership. It is not likely that Finland would give up its policy of military non-alliance. Public opinion has steadily rejected NATO membership. The public attitude has been shaped by historical experiences and decision-makers. An active campaign by the elite would be necessary to change public resistance to NATO membership and to pave the way for a change in policy. This campaign is not, however, forthcoming, since the government and the public are in agreement on this issue. Coercive Military Measures

One change in Finland’s policy may be forthcoming. The development of the ESDP has created a need to review the legislation on Finland’s participation in peacekeeping and military crisis-management missions. It is possible that the authorisation of the United Nations Security Council or the OSCE will not be required by Finland in the future. The government set up a working group to prepare the modification of the legislation. The parliament will make the decision in spring 2005.

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Challenges to Neutral & Non-Aligned Countries in Europe and Beyond Ireland

Ireland Keith McBean1

Director, International Security Policy Section, Department of Foreign Affairs, Ireland Overview – Ireland’s Neutrality

The defining characteristic of Ireland’s policy of military neutrality is the non-membership of military alliances. However, it is arguable that it is not fully accurate to describe Ireland as a “permanent neutral” or “neutralised state” in that this policy is not set out in any international treaty, nor does it have a specific domestic constitutional or legal basis. Rather, Irish neutrality reflects a policy choice adopted by successive Irish governments. It also reflects the policy preference of the overwhelming majority of the Irish people. The foundation of Ireland’s approach to international peace and security is set out in Article 29 of the Constitution of Ireland. Here, the state “affirms its devotion to the ideal of peace and friendly cooperation amongst nations founded on international justice and morality” and “its adherence to the principle of the pacific settlement of international disputes” with “international law as its rule of conduct in relations with other States”. 2 In recent years, a number of Irish governments have made political commitments that they will not join a military alliance without consulting the people first. This commitment was given concrete form in October 2002 when, at the same time as giving their approval for the Treaty of Nice, the Irish people backed a government proposal to amend the Constitution to the effect that Ireland could only take part in an EU common defence with the specific approval of the people expressed in a further referendum.

This paper was not submitted to the Government of Ireland for approval and cannot therefore be interpreted as an authoritative statement of government policy. 2 Constitution of Ireland, enacted 1 July 1937. Available online at htt p://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/upload/ static/256.pdf 1

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Ireland’s Security Environment

The international and European security environment in which Ireland pursues its foreign policy has changed dramatically in recent years. The democratic revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact have greatly reduced the risk of a massive military confrontation in Europe. The international system has witnessed fundamental changes since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of Soviet domination. The major threat is no longer a devastating nuclear war but destructive attacks perpetrated by global terrorist networks that have opted out of the international community. Terrorism today is a real and serious threat to people all over the world. A new form of terrorism that operates globally and aims to have a serious destructive impact is primarily associated with extremist groups that claim inspiration from Islam. Risks and threats have assumed new forms, and their effects are felt more quickly and over a wider area. We cannot close our eyes to the problems that exist even in distant countries. The struggle against new global threats – and their many diverse causes – demands action across a broad range of areas using a broad number of foreign-policy instruments. Combating these threats requires intensified international cooperation and a greater preparedness to tackle problems and their underlying causes. The Irish Government welcomed and supported the new provision in the draft European Constitution under which the European Union (EU) and its Member States would act jointly if a Member State is the subject of a terrorist attack or suffers a natural or man-made disaster. A Declaration makes it clear that it is for each Member State to choose the most appropriate means to comply with its own solidarity obligation to the Member State in question, thereby ensuring that Ireland can determine the nature of its own response in light of its policy tradition. The solidarity clause was given practical effect, insofar as it relates to terrorist attacks, in the Declaration adopted by the European Council in March 2004, during Ireland’s EU Presidency, in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist bombings in Madrid.

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European Security Strategy

It was the increasing focus on the role of the Union in international affairs that led, in 2003, to the decision to draw up a European security strategy. It signals a step towards the Union’s taking a more strategic approach in the area of external action. Approval of a European security strategy at the European Council in December 2003 marked an important step in efforts to ensure that the EU remains a proactive force for international peace and stability, firmly supportive of a strong and effective United Nations (UN), and committed to working with others. The underlying premise behind the European security strategy is the unique role the EU can play in support of peace and security, human rights, and development. Through the European security strategy, the Union has for the first time set out a clear and accessible vision of what its international role is at present and could be in the future. The strategy identifies the global challenges and opportunities facing the Union and the need for a coherent and all-embracing response. It sets the context of a more proactive approach, stemming from an awareness of the need to define a common perception of security threats and of the role the EU can play in tackling them. Ireland has welcomed the proposals that were presented in the security strategy. The clear acknowledgement of the need for a holistic approach to security, going beyond purely military matters, is particularly enlightened. It is also encouraging that the centrality of the United Nations, conflict prevention, and the importance of focusing on the upstream dimension to security problems have all been highlighted. Priority is correctly given to a rule-based international order. The Irish Government can be expected to contribute actively to the pursuit of the objectives contained in the strategy, which are fully consistent with Ireland’s policy of military neutrality. It is, for instance, consistent with the role that Ireland would wish to exercise to help to support conflict prevention, promote justice, sustainable development, and to help to secure and defend stability in our region and globally.

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UN Dimension

From Ireland’s perspective, the focus in the security strategy on the importance of a strong and effective United Nations is particularly welcome. As a result of the focus on “effective multilateralism”, the Union’s relationship with the United Nations has been not just renewed but reinvigorated. In advocating effective multilateralism, the European security strategy underlines that the multilateral approach is not just the right way to conduct business but is indeed, and very clearly, the best way to do so. Moreover, in prioritising cooperation in the crisis-management area, the Union has in many ways been mirroring the priorities of the UN itself. The Union’s Secretary-General/High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, put this succinctly in an address in Dublin in January 2004 when he said, “Ultimately, I believe that the best way Europe can contribute to building a stronger UN is by building a strong and capable Europe; a Europe firmly committed to effective multilateralism.”3 Ireland has especially welcomed the growing UN policy of using regional organisations to assist it in carrying out its peacekeeping and conflict-resolution functions, as particularly acknowledged by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan with reference to the Union’s developing capabilities for civil and military crisis management. In an address in Dublin on 14 October 2004, on the occasion of his recent visit to Ireland, Annan “welcome[d] the development of European Union capabilities in the context of the European Security and Defence Policy, and the progress that Member States are making together in the field of crisis management”. 4 EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management

During its recent EU Presidency, Ireland sought to harness synergies between the EU and the UN by progressing the implementation of the Joint EU-UN Declaration on Cooperation on Crisis Management.

“Address by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)”, National Forum on Europe, Dublin Castle, 8 January 2004. S0005/04. Online: http://ue.eu.int/ ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/78600.pdf 4 “Secretary-General, noting next year’s review of Millennium Development Goals, urges stronger efforts to meet them”, 14 October 2004, press release SG/SM/9542. Available online at http://www. un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sgsm9542.doc.htm 3

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Following the Joint EU-UN Declaration on Cooperation in Crisis Management, signed in September 2003, a paper on the implementation of this Joint Declaration in the area of military crisis management was developed and subsequently endorsed by the European Council in June 2004. The paper examines practical ways that the EU could support the UN in mounting military crisis-management (i.e., peacekeeping/peace enforcement) operations, which, while mandated or authorised by the UN Security Council, would actually be carried out by the regional organisations themselves. Two main modalities of support for the UN in military crisis-management missions were identified in the Irish Presidency paper . First, the EU could establish a “clearing-house” process allowing Member States to exchange information and co-ordinate their contributions to UN operations. This would ensure better coherence in responding to calls by the UN for contributions to peacekeeping missions. The second option is for the EU to deploy an autonomous EU operation in support of the UN, with the emphasis on rapid-response operations. An important element of this option is the so-called battle-groups concept within the EU. The idea is that the Union should have at its disposal a core of rapidly deployable groups that could respond to a crisis situation within 10 days. They could be used as a bridging measure prior to the deployment of a longer-term UN peacekeeping force. At the national level, the Irish Government is currently considering its approach to the battle-groups concept. Options for closer EU-UN cooperation in civilian crisis management, particularly in relation to police operations, are currently being developed.

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European Constitution

The proposals in the security and defence area contained in the draft European Constitution do not call into question Ireland’s traditional policy of military neutrality. Throughout the negotiations, Ireland was open to the proposals to develop the EU’s role in crisis-management activity (the so-called Petersberg Tasks), which could create additional opportunities for Ireland to play a constructive role in the peacekeeping and crisis-management area. Given their particular sensitivity, arrangements in the area of security and defence policy were extensively debated, both in the Convention and at the intergovernmental conference. Member States approached these questions from a variety of perspectives. Some wished to see the Union take an ambitious approach in developing its own structures. Others were keen to ensure that any new arrangements would not undermine what they regard as the central importance of NATO for its members in European security and defence. Other Member States, including Ireland, wished to ensure that their policy of military neutrality or non-alignment would not be compromised by any new arrangements under the Constitution. To this end, Ireland consulted with other neutral and non-aligned Member States and succeeded in ensuring a satisfactory outcome. Common Defence

The Constitution restates that the Common Security and Defence Policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy that will (changed from the current “might”) lead to a common defence when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. However, the existing reassurance that the Union’s policy on a common defence “shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States” is retained. Furthermore, any decision to create a common defence would, as now, have to be ratified by Member States according to their individual constitutional requirements. Ireland’s position on the question of an EU common defence is clear. While Ireland will

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not stand in the way of others, Ireland cannot participate in an EU common defence without the prior consent of the people in a referendum. The government has made it clear that it will not seek to change this requirement. The Constitution also states that if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Nevertheless, it is made clear that this obligation “shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States”. Ireland’s traditional policy of military neutrality would thus not be affected. Structured Cooperation

The Constitution puts in place a new arrangement – known as “permanent structured cooperation” – to enable those Member States that wish to do so to commit to being able to undertake “the most demanding missions”. Detailed arrangements are set out in a Protocol. The Irish Government has indicated that it will further consider its approach to possible Irish participation in structured cooperation in due course. Conclusion

A variety of factors have meant that Ireland has traditionally viewed international security issues through a somewhat different prism than most partners in the European Union. History and geographic location made the Irish experience in the 20th century very different from that of other European nations, large and small. However, Ireland fully accepts that the EU as a global player has its own security interests and concerns, and that as a member of the European Union these are equally Irish interests and c oncerns. Nevertheless, there is no intention to abandon the traditional approach to foreignpolicy issues or the traditional policy of military neutrality that have served Ireland well. Rather, Ireland is working to apply its values and make available its experience and resources to meeting the challenges that face the European Union. It is believed that this is the best way in which Ireland can contribute to the efforts of the European Union to build a safer and more prosperous world based on effective multilateralism.

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Irish Commentator Patrick Keatinge

Fellow Emeritus, Institute for European Affairs, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland The Irish Government’s term of office in the rotating European Union (EU) Presidency (January-June 2004) provides the focus of these remarks. The experience was, on the whole, positive. The resuscitation of multilateralism after the invasion of Iraq and the completion of negotiations on the European Union’s Constitutional Treaty were tasks that went with the grain of Ireland’s policy preferences, and this is reflected in the content and tone of Keith McBean’s paper. At first sight, the high degree of engagement in the EU’s evolving security and defence policy raised little controversy amongst the political parties and even the broader public. Hosting the EU-US summit at the end of June was a likely occasion for public protest, given the major demonstration against the Iraq war in 2003, but only a fraction of those numbers were mobilised for the summit. Ireland, it seems, is amongst the least anti-American states in the EU. 1 Anti-war/pro-neutrality NGO activists sank without trace in the local elections earlier in June, and the issue of the compatibility between the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the government’s policy of “military neutrality” did not feature significantly in the accompanying European Parliament elections. But, although one prominent Green Party critic of the “militarisation” of the EU lost her seat in the European Parliament, the victory of a Sinn Fein candidate in Dublin replaced one champion of the culture of neutrality with another. In the event of the completion of the Northern Ireland peace process in which Sinn Fein would no longer be associated with the IRA, a private army, the party may exploit a finely balanced political spectrum to influence the formation of the next government. Its emphasis on neutrality can be seen in the title of its policy document, “Positive Neutrality in Action: Towards the Achievement of Human Security”. 2 Does this suggest something of the era of Kreisky and Palme? The party calls for neutrality to be “enshrined” in the Irish Constitution, demands withdrawal from NATO’s Partnership

See Richard Sinnot’s paper, “The European and Irish Public-Opinion Environment”, in Joe Carroll and John Travers (eds.), An Indispensable Partnership: EU-US Relations from an Irish Perspective, Institute of European Affairs, Dublin, 2004. 2 Sinn Fein’s 23-page document can be found at http://www.sinnfein.ie/pdf/NeutralityDocument.pdf 1

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for Peace, and urges a repudiation of ESDP commitments through an opt-out protocol in any new EU treaty. Disengagement is not quite absolute, however, since the party also calls for “active promotion of demilitarisation of the EU”. Thus, the defence of an ideal type of “neutrality” (against the onslaught of an ideal type of “superstate”) is guaranteed a prominent place in the forthcoming Irish referendum on the Constitutional Treaty. Hence, the cautious note in official statements on the relevant sections of the document. 3 Although the essence of the ESDP had already been agreed in previous treaties and much is now operational, the Constitutional Treaty presents the full range of commitments in a new context. Its supporters will therefore have to justify the ESDP in a coherent and detailed way – something of a novelty in spite of numerous previous referenda. The continuation of the terminology of the Maastricht Treaty (“the specific character of the security and defence policies of certain Member States”) and the limited extent of the solidarity clause are likely to be stressed, together with the so-called triple lock on Irish participation in the Petersberg Tasks. Although the latter, with their insistence on a UN Security Council mandate, have been criticised as unnecessarily constraining, 4 it remains a sine qua non for the main government party, Fianna Fail , which is Sinn Fein’s closest electoral rival. And what of the more innovative elements of the Constitutional Treaty? Though Ireland has not traditionally been seen as a “defence-industry country”, the predisposition is to participate in the already-established defence agency. 5 The position on the battle-group/ bridging role is not so clear, though helped by the UN context. As with everything else to do with the ESDP, Sinn Fein and the pro-neutrality lobby more generally will not want for a malign interpretation, while the main opposition party, Fine Gael , which regards Ireland as not neutral but “merely unaligned”, will urge the maximum involvement. A successful referendum strategy, following the principle that form follows function, might concentrate more on the purpose of the ESDP (as expressed in the security strategy) and its experience so far, rather than on the detail of the treaty text.

For the opening shot in the campaign, see The European Constitution – An Explanatory Guide, Department of Foreign Affairs, Dublin, 2004. Also see Europe Re-united: A Constitutional Treaty, Institute of European Affairs, Dublin, 2004. 4 See the article by a former chief of staff, Lieut. General Gerry McMahon, in The Irish Times, 20 October 2004. The main opposition party, Fine Gael , has also criticised the triple lock. 5 The significance of dual-use products in the Irish economy is now acknowledged. See Report on Export Licensing of Military and Dual-Use Goods in Ireland , Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, Dublin, 2004. 3

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Challenges to Neutral & Non-Aligned Countries in Europe and Beyond Sweden

Sweden Anders Bjurner

Ambassador, Head, Department for European Security Policy, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden Introduction

Addressing a policy of neutrality and non-alignment towards European and transatlantic security institutions offers the opportunity to look further at the various forms of cooperation and activities that form an integral part of the architecture of international security policy today. Cooperation and solidarity are key words for the Swedish security policy of today. Sweden combines its policy of military non-alignment with a firm and active commitment in support of international peace and security. In principle, Sweden does not formally exclude any security cooperation other than binding agreements on mutual security guarantees. This is a policy of non-participation in military alliances. The policy is meant to achieve three objectives in particular: to preserve our country’s peace and independence, contribute to stability and security in our vicinity, and strengthen international peace and security. There have been considerable changes in our policy during the last ten years. The end of the Cold War has provided Sweden with new opportunities and new means to contribute to peace and security. Another reason is simply that Sweden’s security environment has gone through dramatic improvements, in particular in our neighbourhood. We are today strong supporters of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and maintain broad and close cooperation with NATO within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council/Partnership for Peace (EAPC/PfP). As stated in our recent Defence Policy Bill, any singular act of armed aggression (by a state) against Sweden is considered unlikely for the foreseeable future (i.e., at least for a 10-year period). However, other threats and challenges have increased simultaneously, and these are more complex and

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more difficult to predict. New instruments and new forms of cooperation are needed to avert these threats. That is why the Swedish Government has repeatedly stated that the present threats against international peace and security are best met in solidarity and close cooperation with other states, with the policy of military non-alignment as a basis. The government has also stated that it is difficult to imagine that Sweden would remain neutral in the (improbable) case of armed aggression against another European Union (EU) Member State. But the Swedish Government does not see any external circumstances for requesting any joint defence guarantees either within the EU or NATO. This policy is supported by a majority in parliament, and it also enjoys very strong popular support. According to opinion polls, it has more or less remained the same over the last ten years. In other words, the policy of military non-alignment is not considered a restriction on our participation in military crisis-management operations. However, our participation in crisis-management operations has to be compatible with international law. But that is what most states, aligned or non-aligned, would require. I will now look closer at some of today’s key security-policy challenges and Sweden’s contribution to international efforts to meet them, in particular within the ESDP and the PfP. Sweden’s Contributions to International Crisis Management

It is important that the international community strengthen its capability for crisis management if we are to meet the challenges of today. In this regard, military as well as civilian tools for crisis management need to be enhanced and the necessary resources made available. Sweden is an active contributor to international crisis management through the United Nations (UN), the EU, NATO/PfP, and the OSCE. Sweden attaches the highest priority to participation in international crisis-management efforts. We want to contribute to resolving the crises of greatest concern to the international community.

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Upholding respect for human rights and international law is fundamental to Swedish foreign and security policy. This is reflected in the vital importance we attach to the role of the UN Security Council, not least its key role in mandating international peacesupport operations. A UN mandate, or consent by the state concerned, is as a rule a prerequisite of Swedish participation in international military crisis management in particular if it is a “robust peace operation”. However, there might be cases where such a mandate is not possible to obtain but where action by the international community is desirable nonetheless, for example, in the case of a humanitarian emergency. A UN General Assembly mandate, an invitation from the OSCE, or consent by the parties involved could in such cases serve as a legal basis for a mission. Under any circumstances, a careful analysis of the political and legal aspects will be made on a case-by-case basis to ensure compliance with international law. In this context, it is obvious that the notion of security has changed. It is no longer possible to think only in terms of security of nations; we also need to acknowledge the security of the individual. The Responsibility to Protect report made this clear and provided valuable recommendations. This is a challenge for the international community as a whole, with the ultimate responsibility resting with the UN Security Council. We foresee that this will be reflected in the types of crisis-management operations the international community will carry out in the future. Today, Sweden participates with troops as well as with civilian personnel (observers, civilian police officers, and other experts) in several international peace-support operations under the UN, EU, or NATO. Sweden aims to contribute across the full scale of crisis-management operations, including peace enforcement and with specialised units. The government recently presented a new Defence Policy Bill to parliament, covering 2005-07. A key element of the bill is the strong emphasis on increased capabilities for international peace-support operations, including capabilities for rapid response. The budget for international peace-support operations will gradually be increased from today’s 1.2 billion to 1.7 billion SEK in 2007 (approximately an increase from 130 million to 185 million euros).

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Sweden and the European Union

Membership of the EU constitutes an integral part of Swedish foreign and security policy. We are actively involved in developing the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. Ahead of the Amsterdam negotiations in 1996, Sweden and Finland jointly proposed to include the so-called Petersberg Tasks in the then-new treaty. Over the last few years, the Union has created a capacity for international crisis management. So far, the EU has launched two military crisis-management operations (in Macedonia and the Democratic Republic of Congo), and the planning for Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina is well under way – all of them with Swedish participation. Sweden welcomes the enhancements of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the ESDP, that were introduced with the new EU Constitutional Treaty. A strengthened ESDP will mean a European Union better equipped for more-effective contributions to global peace and stability. There is no contradiction; rather, we see a concordance between active engagement for further development of the Union’s crisis-management capacity and a continued policy of non-alignment. The new treaty will further emphasise the “external and internal” solidarity between the Member States of the EU. Further enhancing the EU’s capabilities is in Sweden’s interest. Such a development provides the EU – and thus also Sweden – with greater possibilities to support the UN in its peace-support activities. This is a cornerstone of Swedish foreign policy. Capabilities are a precondition for an effective ESDP. Sweden welcomes the work within the EU on the development of new military Headline Goals for 2010. We also welcome the development of EU battle groups. Sweden intends to assume responsibility for one EU battle group together with Finland. We are discussing possible contributions by other nations. Our ambition is to make a substantial contribution to that battle group, with around 1,100 personnel. The force should be deployable by 1 January 2008, at the latest.

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The European Defence Agency (EDA) will have a vital role in the further development of the ESDP, especially in the area of capability development. Sweden is pleased that the EDA is now being established and will soon be functional. We foresee that the Agency, by addressing the problem of fragmentation of the European defence industry, will have the possibility to render more-effective support to the ESDP, that is, by promoting cooperation in research and acquisition. Sweden also believes that the civilian capabilities of the EU should be developed further. We have in this context launched an initiative for the development of a civilian rapidreaction capability. In today’s world, global terrorism, with its links to proliferation of WMD and other transnational threats such as failed states, has broadened the threats that the international community is facing. As a political alliance, the EU has a unique ability to meet the challenges these threats pose, as well as a unique ability to deal with their root causes. The EU’s security strategy provides us with an instrument that will contribute to a common European strategic culture and thus strengthen the Union’s ability even further. The EU’s security strategy rightfully focuses on the “new” transnational threats and challenges. Sweden was deeply involved in the development of the strategy. We believe the strategy will be instrumental for focusing on how to achieve coherence by reforming institutions, policies, and attitudes and most importantly improving the EU’s ability to act. The strategy also stresses multilateral cooperation and the primary responsibility of the UN for international security. The security strategy identifies proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as one of the main threats to international peace and security. The EU has for years been active in the area of non-proliferation, and Sweden was the initiator and promoter in the EU of the development of a strategy and action plan regarding non-proliferation. Sweden will continue to be active in this area. The new treaty reflects a deepened solidarity between the EU member countries. Sweden welcomes the solidarity clause. The solidarity clause codifies the solidarity that already exists between the Member States. This deepened solidarity is of central

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importance to Sweden, and it will also be beneficial for national security. For Sweden, it would be natural, as an act of solidarity, to come to a fellow Member State’s assistance in case of a terrorist attack or a natural disaster. We would contribute what is deemed appropriate. Contributions will be decided nationally. Sweden and NATO

Partnership with NATO through the EAPC/PfP continues to be an essential element of Swedish security policy. The EAPC/PfP remains a valuable part of the European security structure. This cooperation is also a concrete expression of the transatlantic link, which is essential to Swedish security. The EAPC/PfP is the main tool for participation by nonNATO member countries in NATO-led peace-support operations. Participation in NATO-led crisis-management operations not only gives Sweden the possibility to contribute to resolving specific regional conflicts, but it is also important for the continued development of the armed forces’ capabilities for crisis management and thus also for national defence. Improved capabilities will also be beneficial for UNor EU-led peace-support operations. Sweden has participated in all NATO-led peace-support operations in the Balkans and in Afghanistan. ISAF is NATO’s first operation out of area. Sweden has participated in the operation since its outset. Discussion on possible implications for our policy of non-alignment was not relevant in this respect. For Sweden, participation was rather a natural consequence of support for the UN, the Afghan people, and for international law – but also for Sweden’s own security (risks of trafficking in arms and drugs, international terrorism, and crime). Conclusion

Contributing to the strengthening of international peace and stability is one of the main goals of Sweden’s foreign and security policy. Sweden is able to, and will continue to, participate actively, fully, and in solidarity in international peace-support activities. Swedish membership of the UN, the EU, the EAPC/PfP, and the OSCE is an important tool for the country’s international engagement.

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Swedish Commentator

Bo Huldt

Professor, Head, Department of Security Policy, Swedish National Defence College Like Austria and Finland, Sweden has been a member of the European Union (EU) since 1995 – the result of a referendum at a fortunate conjuncture of political forces and a passing popular enthusiasm in 1994. Sweden is not, however, a member of the European Monetary Union, the unequivocal outcome of a referendum in an unfortunate moment in September 2003. 1 Despite this setback, and despite scepticism today towards the EU amongst large segments of the Swedish population, there is no doubt that there has been a dramatic shift in Swedish perspectives over the last ten to fifteen years. There is, certainly, general acceptance of a transition from a concept of European security defined in terms of fear and lack of other options to a concept of cooperation and opportunity. During the Cold War, Swedish peacekeeping operations were all UN-led and directed at far-away shores. In the early 1990s, this changed with the war theatre located in the Balkans and with Swedish troops being sent to Bosnia in 1993 in order to prove, as then-Prime Minister Carl Bildt said, that Swedes are good Europeans. NATO’s Partnership for Peace concept was bought enthusiastically in 1994; like the term “peacekeeping”, this justification opened up possibilities previously inconceivable for Swedes. With the rapid development from Amsterdam onwards, the process of adopting the Petersberg Tasks for Union peace operations, also inspired by Finnish and Swedish initiatives in 1996, has been taken by the Swedes in stride. The Swedish battle-cry, “crisis management”, is, of course, legitimate, as this is what we think we have been doing since the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in 1956. The Swedes produced registers of military capabilities for the Headline Goal process during the chairmanship in 2001 and are now quickly digesting the implications of the battle-group concept. As long as this refers to crisis management/peace(-keeping) operations, little controversy is raised.

The murder of Foreign Minister Anna Lindh, an event that provided a dramatic background but probably still had little impact on the result of the referendum per se; still, Lindh both stood for Swedish EU commitment and, an uncommon thing in Swedish politics, was a much beloved minister. 1

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For the Swedes, this transition has involved a complex case of self-imagery. Reduced to small-state status on the European periphery after the Napoleonic Wars (Sweden’s most recent war experience dating back to 1814), Sweden found itself in a strategic position during the Cold War, holding neutral territory separating East and West. This necessitated a high military profile for a small state and resulted in a self-image of substance; Sweden was referred to by strategists as a “medium power”. From the 1960s onwards, this self-image was further improved through a policy of active neutrality, peace- and bridge-building, thus marrying Mars with Pax. With the end of the Cold War, bipolarity, and the Soviet Union, there was a brief period of identity crisis that, however, was quickly overcome through the 1990s challenge of actively transforming the Baltic Sea region from a Cold War zone into a security community in the Karl Deutsch sense. In this effort, Sweden, under the liberal Bildt and the socialist Persson administrations, did the region (and itself) considerable services for the Europeanisation and stability of the North. “ Es ist erreicht ” – but it remains for the Swedes to cut out a role as a member of the European Union for a country that is now (again) a normal small state, although it brings with it memories of both Mars and Pax. Mars, however, is fading with the 2004 Defence Plan dramatically downsizing the armed forces, transforming a several-thousand-strong conscript army into a mixed conscript and semi-professional division-size force supported by modest naval and air components, about the size of those of our Nordic neighbours. The emphasis is now on international operations, as already observed, and on high technology. Territorial defence takes second place, if any, although a vague notion of a possible future reconstruction of national self-defence is part of the project. The Defence Plan has been carried out by the government against the protests of the parliamentary opposition, as well as from professional military and strategic experts for cutting much too deep and quickly and taking great risks while transiting uncharted waters. In the present situation, “solidarity and cooperation” signal a positive and optimistic note for a country that is co-operating loyally within a framework incorporated by the

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UN but that is now also used by the European Union. The Union now also demands “solidarity”, a concept that used to be central to Swedish policies – as declared in the UN General Assembly – involving small states and the Third World but not Europe. Today, the demands on us are more specific, but there is also acceptance of a new reality. The Solana document, i.e., the European security strategy, does not replace the UN Charter in Swedish esteem but has advantages in terms of brevity, clarity, and focus. Solidarity is thus likely to become another justification with which even the most neutralist of Swedes will find it hard to argue. The basic Swedish position in terms of national security is now defined as “military nonalignment”, which means no preagreed military commitments on national defence or mutual defence guarantees given or taken. Otherwise, the Swedes are open to all forms of international cooperation to secure peace and stability. Swedish units and officers participate in NATO exercises and training, units are certified in accordance with NATO standards, and the Royal Swedish Air Force, of course, speaks in English. We are involved in NATO-led operations both in Europe and Asia, the limits so far being set by our problems in fielding enough troops rather than any conflicts with neutrality. A positive mindset prevails, identifying opportunities rather than dangers. Solidarity is now being practised, a joy to behold for old Cold Warriors, by Sweden’s being a member of a political alliance, the European Union, though still holding back from membership of the military alliance, NATO, and also from a European Union in the future becoming a military puissance. Again, solidarity is not questioned, but the interpretation thereof could be both narrow and wide. In the 2004 Swedish Defence Bill, just referred to, the situation is stated as follows: Sweden is militarily nonaligned and does not enter into agreements on defence guarantees of a binding character. There is no contradiction between military nonalignment, as stated here, and the strong solidarity that exists between the members of the Union. It is hard to imagine that Sweden would remain neutral in case of an armed attack against another Union country. It is just as difficult to imagine that the other EU countries would not act in the same way. 2

Sweden Government Bill, 2004/05: 4, p. 23 (author’s translation).

2

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We can always discuss what “armed attack” means – the League of Nations as well as the UN have had difficulties interpreting “aggression”, and NATO has never really been put to the test (if we exclude the 12 September 2001 demonstration of loyalty with a United States under attack by terrorists) – but it is difficult to interpret the juxtaposition of the last two sentences as not implying that if Sweden were in dire need it would expect some solidarity to be shown to it. While it is neither an alliance nor a guarantee, there is still some reassurance. With this, I think the Swedes will find themselves at ease for the time being. During the 1990s, scenarios discussed for the destabilisation of Europe and possible armed conflicts – with the Balkans becoming at least temporarily pacified even if not permanently peaceful, and European integration calling for time, but still seemingly under control – tended to focus on the Russian border areas, from the Baltic to the Caspian. Assumptions were still being made that the only possibility for Russia to present “Europe” with a real threat would require not only a change in government and political orientation but also rebuilding its military capabilities, which could not be done overnight. The idea then emerged that there was now a 10-year period of grace, a NATO as well as a Swedish way of looking at possible future threats. This appears also in the government bill (as well as in Ambassador Bjurner’s paper). However, Sweden’s practical concerns towards Russia can be described as rather more subtle, given Russia’s efforts to lose no more of its empire, to have access to the West, to redraw, if possible, major organisations to better fit Russian interests, and perhaps also to permit membership or substantial influence. The question is whether this process can continue without real conflict as a result. Of this, we know nothing, and should not assume that disaster is inevitable, but we ought to think about it in order to be several moves ahead of our needs and not to assume that all will be well. If we leave these problems aside, it seems clearer each day that the demands made on our European peacekeeping, crisis-management, and intervention forces are already growing at a speed greater than the building of new capabilities. The “Greater” Middle East and Africa are adding new complications, some less demanding, while others present overwhelming challenges.

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Against this background, there has to be a realistic assessment of what can be done by the Europeans, who must also assume that the Balkans will remain their charge for a long time to come, with the United States disengaging. The Swedish statement observes that the budget for international peace-support operations is now rising from 1.2 billion to 1.7 billion crowns (1 euro equals about 10 crowns). While this is to be welcomed, one has to keep in mind that one battalion in the field costs roughly 1 billion crowns per year and that the new Defence Bill thus still offers limited international capabilities. The bill is not quite up to the original 1999 commitments (two battalions or/and other assets in air, land, and naval forces – the costs of which today would have been 3 billion rather than 2 billion), while at the same time it continues sharp reductions of territorial forces for national defence. Defence, even in the shape of crisis management, has not come cheap since the end of the Cold War. The Swedish-led battle group now under consideration (and for professional reasons also highly welcome) will make a very substantial claim on the resources set aside for international operations. By 2007, our peacekeeping budget is thus likely to require 4.5 billion rather than the 1.7 billion now provided. Funding is already today a major problem and looking into the future one can only see growing difficulties. A major problem concerning peace operations has to do with the mandate – namely the question of who provides it. The traditional Swedish view has been that the UN Security Council (UNSC) provides the mandate for these operations. The Balkans tangle – the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) undone in Macedonia and the Kosovo crisis in 1999 – has tended to underline the relevance of regional security concerns overruling global restrictions. There have also been Swedish references to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which, however, has even less decisionmaking capability than the UNSC, when in a real crisis. The Swedish statement recognises these problems; in the end, we may find ourselves in situations where vetoes are used (or threatened) but regional security concerns will still force action. The great power struggle over Iraq in the Security Council at the turn of 2003-04 and its outcome, with the war now still being fought, must also be seen as an indicator of continuing quarrels over what should be done and what will, for various reasons of

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national interest (spurious or not), be considered possible. The world order designed in 1945 did not work under Cold War circumstances. Agreement amongst the major actors today is certainly not as harmonious as to be able to assume that the present world order, still based on the 1945 inheritance, can be relied on always to work as intended. We have no counterpart to the Holy Alliance today, for which we should no doubt be grateful, but nor do we have enough of a consensus within the international community for more-limited action. Still, with all this being said, there is reason to look with some confidence on the European efforts, as mirrored in the European security strategy, to face security in a comprehensive way. This is an opportunity that we should not lose by being backwardlooking or by denigrating what has been achieved within the Union framework. The Swedish statement underlines deepened solidarity, participation, and “being there” with real assets – rather than worrying over the limitations set by “neutrality” or other formulas, self-imposed or prescribed by others. With this, we leave the Cold War frame of mind behind, and with that quite a big chunk of our historical deadweight. This would appear to be a great step for the Swedes, even though they may not all be aware of it.

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Challenges to Neutral & Non-Aligned Countries in Europe and Beyond Switzerland

Switzerland Paul Seger

Ambassador, Head, Directorate of International Law, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland The Swiss Definition of Neutrality

Switzerland defines neutrality primarily as a legal concept to oblige the neutral country to refrain from military participation in armed conflicts between other states. In exchange, the neutral country receives from the warring parties respect for its own territorial integrity. Although neutrality is mentioned in the Swiss Federal Constitution (Articles 173 and 185), it should be noted that it has never been regarded as a constitutional principle or as an aim in itself but rather as a means to protect Swiss independence in peace and security. Switzerland chose its status of permanent neutrality freely and independently. Neutrality was not imposed upon the Swiss Government; it was given recognition by the European powers at the Congresses of Vienna and Paris in 1815. For this reason, the Swiss Confederation has reserved the right to alter its status if circumstances call for it. Neither the 1874 constitution nor the new constitution that entered into force in 2000 makes any modification to this concept of neutrality. Thus, neutrality does not in any way constitute one of the Confederation’s aims; rather, it is a foreign-policy instrument designed to guarantee the country’s independence. Its objective is to enhance national security. It does not prevent Switzerland from taking the necessary steps to protect itself from new threats on the international scene. Therefore, as a foreign-policy tool, neutrality is far from static and offers considerable room for manoeuvre. It can keep pace with global political developments and is able to evolve in such a way as to allow it to take better account of such developments. Indeed, Switzerland has always been adept at modifying its policy of neutrality in line with international exigencies, as well as with its own interests. Recent years have seen the

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emergence of new kinds of threats, e.g., organised crime and international terrorism, and Switzerland has responded by strengthening its international cooperation in matters of security without casting doubt on its determination to remain neutral, e.g., its participation in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme and international peace missions, or its recent accession to the United Nations (UN). Switzerland adapts its policy of neutrality in order to enhance its security through cooperation on the basis of the twin principles of respect for international law and the prohibition of the use of force in international relations. The main aim is to ensure that its military neutrality is clearly established and implemented while respecting the precepts of international law and civilian cooperation. A policy of neutrality based on respect for international law remains the best way for Switzerland to avoid involvement in international conflicts. After the end of the Cold War, and thus even before becoming a member of the UN, Switzerland autonomously applied the Security Council’s resolutions regarding economic sanctions. According to the doctrine and practice established by the Swiss Government in its foreign-policy report of 1993, neutrality does not apply as a matter of principle to sanctions imposed by the Security Council since, from the perspective of the laws of neutrality, such measures are not considered to be “acts of war” but means to restore peace, security, and international order. Thus, Switzerland may participate in UN sanctions without violating its neutrality. Likewise, Switzerland is free to apply non-military sanctions decreed by the European Union (EU) or any other group of states and to do so autonomously. When it became a member of the UN in 2002, Switzerland recognised its obligation under the UN Charter to apply Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions. While it did indeed reaffirm its neutrality on this occasion, its declaration did not at all modify the position it had maintained prior to UN accession. Up to then, Switzerland’s position had been that its neutrality did not apply in cases of decisions made by the Security Council in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations (on action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression) since such decisions were made on behalf of the international community in the interest of restoring international peace and security.

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Switzerland and the EU

The development of relations between Switzerland and the EU, which has involved a series of bilateral agreements, has had no effect on our country’s neutrality either. The second round of agreements (Bilateral Agreements II) strengthens cooperation between police forces and also enhances legal collaboration without jeopardising Swiss neutrality. As for EU enlargement, Switzerland has extended the achievements made in the first and second rounds of the bilateral agreements with the EU to the 10 new states. Again, this implies no change to Swiss neutrality. As we have seen, Switzerland’s status as a permanently neutral country forbids it from taking part in an armed conflict between states or from becoming involved in a situation that might lead it to do so. Membership of the EU, which is an economic and political union, would therefore be compatible with Swiss neutrality insofar as no European military alliance currently exists, nor is there a common and binding European defence policy in effect for all of the Union’s members. There is only the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which has existed since 1999 and which is limited to the management of conflicts without applying to the territorial defence of the EU. At present, therefore, neutrality is compatible with membership of the EU in that there is no contradiction between possible future Swiss membership of the EU and the fact that the Swiss Federal Council applies Swiss neutrality as an instrument of its foreign and security policies. However, if the EU were to evolve into a collective-defence system that required all of its members to participate militarily, permanent neutrality would prevent Switzerland from taking part in such a system. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to focus the discussion on the connection between membership of the EU and our neutrality exclusively on the nature of future EU defence structures, which remain hypothetical. Rather, one should concentrate on the features that Switzerland and the EU have in common with respect to security policy, in particular the fact that both parties would continue to pursue

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the same ideal or goal of peace and security. Thus, it should be possible to develop creative solutions with a view to adapting Swiss neutrality to European security policy. Furthermore, one could ask whether Swiss neutrality as currently applied at the United Nations might be transposed to decisions made by the Council of the European Union. Such a hypothesis would mean that Switzerland would not apply its neutrality when the European Union intervenes in conformity with the UN Charter in the interest of international peace and security. At the same time, if it were unable to come to an agreement on a common course of action, Switzerland would remain entirely free to revert to its policy of neutrality. Switzerland, NATO, and the Fight Against Terrorism

The current international situation, which is characterised by a change in the nature of conflict and an increase in the number of new and unexpected dangers often outside the national framework, calls for international security to be guaranteed by means of enhanced international cooperation. As we have seen, as a neutral country, Switzerland enjoys substantial legal room for manoeuvre. Both peace-building measures and military collaboration with foreign powers are possible, especially within the framework of the UN. On the other hand, an obligation to provide military assistance to another state in the event of war would constitute a violation of its neutrality. Thus, it would be incompatible with its neutrality if Switzerland were to become a member of NATO, even for the purpose of contributing to the fight against international terrorism, since membership of NATO entails an obligation to provide assistance in the event of war. It should be stressed, however, that the question of neutrality only becomes relevant in the context of terrorism if the fight against it amounts to a military operation by one state against the territory of another state without a mandate, authorisation, or approval of the UN Security Council. From the Swiss perspective, terrorism is not a form of warfare but a crime, albeit a particularly atrocious and heinous one. Terrorism should therefore be countered by the conventional methods used to fight serious forms of transnational crime, such as international cooperation through mutual assistance in criminal matters,

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international sanctions, and the like. Switzerland has never considered neutrality as an obstacle to cooperation along these lines with other states or with international organisations with the aim of combating terrorism. While Switzerland applied the non-military international sanctions imposed by the UN on former Yugoslavia, it rejected NATO’s request in the Kosovo war of 1999 to authorise the transit of military equipment through its territory, arguing that this would constitute a violation of its neutrality on the grounds that NATO had not obtained prior authorisation for its actions from the UN Security Council. From the perspective of the laws of neutrality, Switzerland regards the use of armed force by one state or a group of states against the territory of another state as an act of war if such action is undertaken without approval by the UN Security Council. However, as explained above, military sanctions imposed by the UN are not held to constitute an armed conflict between states. In addition, neutrality is not an obstacle to taking part in peace operations mandated either by the UN Security Council or the OSCE. Accordingly, since 1999 the Swiss Army has participated with a company (Swisscoy) of 220 troops in the KFOR operation established by Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999). An amendment to the Federal Law on the Swiss Army accepted by the voters in a referendum in 2001 created the legal basis for sending armed Swiss troops on peace-promoting operations. Such missions must be approved by parliament if the contingent exceeds 100 persons or the engagement lasts for more than three weeks. The armaments provided for these peace contingents are of a defensive nature only and participation in “combat missions for peace enforcement” is prohibited by law. We should also note that, as Swiss participation in the Partnership for Peace programme implies neither membership of NATO nor the obligation to provide assistance, it is compatible with neutrality. However, if at some time in the future the PfP becomes a binding alliance, Switzerland reserves the right to limit its participation in order to preserve its neutrality. Thus, with the exception of membership of NATO, neutrality is compatible with most forms of international military cooperation.

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The Swiss Policy of Neutrality and Emergency Situations

Armed conflicts affecting Swiss security either directly or indirectly are for the most part civil wars and not international conflicts. Neutrality, of course, is not designed to respond to this type of conflict, being applicable exclusively to armed conflicts between states. The risk of international war, which occurred twice in Europe during the last century, is currently greatly reduced thanks to the system of collective security ensured by the United Nations. Nevertheless, civil wars have been on the increase in the early 21st century and contribute greatly to regional instability and emergency situations. In line with its principle of respect for the Geneva Conventions and humanitarian law, Switzerland responds to the challenges posed by emergency situations, as is currently the case in the Darfur region of Sudan. This does not affect its neutrality by any means. As for the second US war in Iraq, we have been confronted with an international conflict to which the laws of neutrality are applicable. Switzerland has nevertheless been able to provide humanitarian aid on the ground in Iraq in accordance with the legal constraints of its status as a neutral country. It should be noted that Swiss humanitarian aid has been stepped up since the declaration of the cessation of hostilities, which legally brought an end to the international conflict and thus rendered Swiss activities in Iraq compatible with its neutrality. Finally, the Swiss policy regarding so-called robust peace operations has already been outlined above: Articles 66 and 66a of the Federal Law on the Army and Military Administration make clear that Swiss troops may be committed to peace-building missions on the basis of a UN or OSCE mandate and that such deployments must be in conformity with Swiss policy on external affairs and security, which rules out any participation in combat missions for the purpose of imposing peace. Swiss Public Opinion

Neutrality is an important element of Swiss national unity, and as such remains a central rallying point for the great majority of the Swiss public. Indeed, the Swiss people’s attachment to neutrality goes beyond their linguistic or regional affiliations.

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Surveys carried out over the years have shown that the overwhelming majority of the population (89%) supports the continuance of a policy of neutrality, support that has not diminished over the last five years. Indeed, the war against Iraq has had the effect of strengthening Swiss public sentiment in favour of neutrality. Abandoning the principle is thus politically unthinkable, particularly as it would require a constitutional referendum. The Swiss Government must therefore affirm its commitment to neutrality while deploying it in the service of a foreign policy characterised by participation and solidarity, and with the aim of working for international peace and security based on international law and multilateralism. As for the Swiss people, to some degree they remain proud of the contribution their country has made on the international stage. Swiss neutrality acts as a “peace ambassador”, for example through the Geneva Initiative for peace in the Middle East, signed in 2003 with the good offices of the Swiss Federal Government, or the Sudan ceasefire accord of January 2002, for which Switzerland conducted the negotiations on allowing the flow of humanitarian aid and guaranteeing a degree of security and refurbishment of infrastructure. Swiss public opinion thus views neutrality as tantamount to solidarity.

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Swiss Commentator Fred Tanner

Deputy Director, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland Since the end of the Cold War, neutrality has lost much of its credibility in international affairs. There are two basic explanations for this. First, with the changing international landscape threats and vulnerabilities have also changed. The notion of security has widened to include non-military challenges and deepened to cover societal and human security. Moreover, in this increasingly globalised and interdependent world, the distinction between internal and external security has become increasingly blurred. The second explanation lies in the emergence of a European-wide zone of peace and stability based on the ideas of liberalism, democratic governance, and tolerance for cultural diversity. This zone is expanding by the double enlargement of the European Union (EU) and NATO. As a consequence, a pluralistic security community is emerging that is not necessarily a function of the degree of integration or commitments towards defence cooperation. Neutrality as an expression of distinctness in security issues is losing currency in this integration context. One of the main challenges to neutrality today is the domestic-international nexus of international terrorism. From a Swiss perspective, counter-terrorism requires close cooperation in the field of law enforcement at the international, national, and cantonal levels. The use of the neutrality argument as a shield against terrorist attacks is based on the questionable assumption that international terrorism would go easy on states that do not actively support the US-led coalition in Iraq or that maintain a policy of equidistance between Israel and the Palestinians. For instance, the largely isolationist Swiss People’s Party claimed in an October 2004 policy paper that a strict policy of neutrality is the best remedy against terrorist attacks on Swiss targets. However, this argument ignores the reality that terrorists may operate in Switzerland because it has many “soft targets” and because Switzerland may be suitable as a logistical and financial base.

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There is still a widespread view within the Swiss political establishment that EU membership is incompatible with Swiss neutrality, particularly with regard to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and its increasing involvement in defence cooperation.1 It is at this point important to distinguish between security cooperation and defence cooperation. 2 Within the EU, national defence remains a competence of the Member States, whereas security policy will increasingly be subsumed by the EU. Curiously, in both fields Switzerland has much closer relations with NATO than with the EU. Neutrality concerns are less of an obstacle to cooperation with NATO because of Switzerland’s formal proviso not to join the Alliance. As a Partnership for Peace (PfP) member, Switzerland co-operates with NATO on interoperability and defence reform (Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process). Moreover, Switzerland contributes to anti-terrorism measures , security-sector reform, and other activities in the context of the Istanbul summit initiatives. In contrast, the Swiss Government has been reluctant to establish formal ties with the ESDP; Switzerland has no liaison officers at the European Union Military Staff, nor is it considered a potential contributor to EU Headline Forces, in contrast to other non-EU and non-NATO countries (such as Ukraine or Russia). Switzerland’s involvement in complex emergencies and conflict areas has ipso facto consequences for its policy of neutrality. Swiss officials argue that Switzerland’s neutrality helps the field work and mission performance of Swiss-based NGOs and relief agencies, and that peacekeeping contingents from neutral states are the most suitable in protecting humanitarian and relief agencies in war-torn environments. 3 The problem with this argument, however, is that “neutral” actors in peace missions will not be able to operate in a political environment that allows them to distinguish themselves from non-neutral forces. In many cases today, there is no longer a clear dividing line between consensual and “interventionist” peace missions. This fact also has consequences for Swiss advocacy of human rights and humanitarian assistance. Such advocacy may compromise Swiss neutrality, because it may, as in the case of Darfur, be considered by the “state at risk” as illegitimate interference. On the other hand, a narrow policy of neutrality would make it impossible to distinguish

Christophe Blocher, “Ein EU-Beitritt aus Schwäche?”, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 21 August 2003. Defence cooperation involves cooperation in the field of armament, m odernisation of armed forces, and operational training. Cooperation in security policy means cooperation in the areas of counterterrorism, training, crisis management, and peace missions. 3 “Zivilgesellschaft in Friedensprozessen stärken”, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 3 November 2004, p. 16, and Peter Arbenz and Andreas Kohlschütter, “Militärischer Schutz für humanitäre Hilfe”, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 14 September 2004, p. 15. 1 2

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between the perpetrator and the victim of human-rights abuse. Also, Switzerland should not be gesinnungsneutral , i.e., neutral with regard to developments outside its borders that touch upon core values shared by Switzerland. In order to maintain its international credibility, the Swiss Government should take sides and condemn actions of those states that excessively violate the human rights of their own citizens.

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Challenges to Neutral & Non-Aligned Countries in Europe and Beyond Concluding Remarks

Concluding Remarks Erik Windmar

Faculty Member (seconded by the Swedish Government), Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland The EU and the Four

The developments amongst the four neutral/non-aligned European Union (EU) members have been quite remarkable since the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was introduced. From being perceived sometimes as the “difficult group in the class”, there is now a feeling that the four countries in general have not only accepted but even endorse the overall work. A good example of this is the commitments made to the EU battle groups. Hardly anyone today questions that neutrality/non-alignment and participation in crisis management go well together. This said, there might be a few challenges ahead. Challenges Ahead

The first that comes to mind is the question of the scope of tasks the EU will have to be prepared to take on in the future and what is to be seen as crisis management and what is not. With the new threat perception, this might be more difficult than before. The answer will be important in many respects, one of which is what the focus of the European Defence Agency should be. For the time being, the mandate of the Agency is within the scope of crisis management but could easily go beyond if the Member States so decide. The reason for this is that cooperation in the field of armament is not normally limited to crisis management. One example would be if the EU or some countries within the Agency decide to build fighter planes. Although they could be used in crisis management, that would, of course, not be the main aim. A more realistic example of a potential challenge for a non-aligned country could be cooperation in a joint Strategic Transport Command. This is a shortfall for most countries and could be a relatively cheap way of solving the problem. But is it possible for a neutral/non-aligned

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country to take part in cooperation where the EU collectively owns the planes? It would also mean that the countries could not entirely control when they want to use the assets for national purposes. Moreover, there are plans to develop structured cooperation. The idea is to create a group of countries that are in favour of taking military cooperation further than is done today. This could be shaped in many ways, but the common denominator is more integrated structures. For the EU to become an effective actor, cooperation needs to be enhanced, and this might be a necessary way. But the question is to what extent the neutral/non-aligned countries can take part in cooperation of this kind. Furthermore, even though no one argues against the need for closer cooperation, structured cooperation could at the same time be seen as a way of preparing for a common defence. The EU security strategy has contributed to explaining what threats the Member States are facing and why broad cooperation is so important. The fact that the EU needs to deal with terrorism is an important part of the security strategy. In relation to this, the solidarity clause in which the Member States say that they shall act in a spirit of solidarity if another Member State is the victim of a terrorist attack can be seen as a deepening sign of commitments among the Member States. 1 This might, however, complicate the discussion that the ESDP is only for external use, and this concerns both military and civilian capabilities. One could argue that the solidarity clause is a new step for the neutral/non-aligned countries. Even though they had previously said something in this direction, the solidarity clause reinforces the commitment. However, the question remains: is there a difference between how the aligned and non-aligned countries interpret the solidarity clause? It might pose a greater challenge for the non-aligned countries since they do not participate in cooperation on mutual defence. Moreover, one cannot rule out that the EU one day will have to use military components to handle terrorism, and if the terrorist attack is sponsored by a state, then the solidarity clause comes close to a mutual-defence clause.

Text from the solidarity clause in the Constitutional Treaty (Art. I-43), yet to be adopted. In a declaration from the European Council, March 2004, the part in the clause covering terrorism was agreed to be implemented by the Member States. 1

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The last point on the EU is the discussion on a collective defence, which will probably become the major issue in the near future. The obvious question is how the neutral/ non-aligned countries will react to that. While this ought to be amongst the biggest challenges to the neutral/non-aligned countries, they seem to be more relaxed than one could expect. One reason for Austria and Ireland to have this attitude might be, as they mention, the possibility for a country to keep its neutrality while at the same time supporting a collective defence. The Irish, however, would need to go through a referendum before joining, but arguing that collective defence and non-alignment are compatible would be a huge challenge to explain to the people. On the question of who would actually take part in a collective defence, there might be a split between the four EU countries. While all four neutral/non-aligned countries are in favour of enhanced cooperation within crisis management, some might be more interested than others to take part in a collective defence. The impression is that Austria is likely to join, Finland would probably join, and Sweden would maybe join, while it is likely that Ireland would opt out. This is, of course, speculative and also depends on when the issue is put on the negotiating table. New Challenges for Switzerland

Having discussed exclusively the consequences of EU developments and their impact on neutrality and non-alignment, this marks a dividing line between the four neutral/nonaligned EU countries and Switzerland. Being outside the EU, Switzerland has chosen a different way. It means that the country will have to rely more on itself when it comes to the new threats, such as terrorism. However, there seems to be a tendency that Switzerland is gradually becoming more and more integrated into international cooperation. Membership of the United Nations and Partnership for Peace (PfP) reinforce this tendency. The Swiss contribution to KFOR could also be seen as a step in this direction and used as an example of how the Swiss, in line with their neutrality, can contribute to peace missions. While these are good signs, one cannot neglect the fact that Switzerland is, in many ways, still quite isolated. Everyone agrees that the best way to fight terrorism is through wide cooperation, but to do this one needs to be integrated into European structures, and this poses a problem for Switzerland.

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Another challenge for Switzerland is how it handles humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies. According to the official Swiss position, this is doable, without questioning a policy of neutrality, if it concerns a civil war. But one could argue that, even if there is a civil war, being involved means taking sides. Furthermore, while a complex emergency may occur in one country, it can seldom be confined to that one country, and instead the roots of the problem are often found outside the borders, making the problem no longer a national one. This could put Switzerland in a situation where it might have to choose between its policy of neutrality and its commitments to the fight against human-rights abuse and genocide. Common Concerns

A topic that is very important for all five neutral/non-aligned countries is whether a mandate is needed for peace missions and, if it is needed, who will provide it. This is also an issue where there might be different nuances between these countries. It is for instance not certain that the other countries agree with the point made by Finland that the EU may need to retain a possibility for mandating its own operations. This would definitively not be an option for Switzerland, which still struggles with UN mandates and whether they could participate in a peace-making mission with a UN mandate. Another general question is if neutrality/non-alignment affects relationships with the United States. The view often expressed by the US is that no one can be neutral in the fight against terrorism and even more strongly that “you are either with us or against us”. While on the one hand it is easy to say that it is what you do that determines your relationship with the US, it is at the same time, sometimes, due to different reasons, more difficult for these neutral/non-aligned countries to support US actions. This is obviously not only the case for these five countries, but when they decline to co-operate or support the US, it might be easier for the Americans to use the populist rhetoric that these countries belong not only to the “old Europe” but to the “very old Europe”. The neutrals/non-aligned are nevertheless very keen on having good relations with the US.

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The Future

So what has been the strategy in the five countries to make the population supportive of enhanced international cooperation? One reason seems to be that these countries, some more than others, have found conditions acceptable for participation. For Sweden, it is mainly the UN and peacekeeping but also to some extent civilian crisis management and conflict prevention. For Ireland, it seems to be the UN and peacekeeping. For both Sweden and Ireland, their EU presidencies really did manage to put emphasis on the relationship between the EU and the UN. In Austria, the need for justification seems maybe less important, but the phrase “solidarity in Europe and neutrality in the world” has been used with some success. In the case of Finland, it was more difficult to find such justifications, but the closest is maybe to say that as long as a territorial defence remains it is easier to support the EU’s work. For Switzerland, work within PfP has opened many doors. Furthermore, by using the expression “preventive action” the Swiss population seems to be less negative to international commitments. Finally, one cannot help wondering why, despite all the international cooperation that has been developed during the last decade, the figures for support of neutrality in all five countries are still so high. When the day comes, and that might not be too far away at least for the four EU countries, to choose between neutrality/non-alignment and being part of a collective defence, this could be seen as a real test of how much support the developments within the EU have amongst the population. But who knows: since politics is the art of possibilities, there might be a way around this issue too.

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Challenges to Neutral and Non-Aligned Countries in Europe and Beyond

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