Cases Police Power

Page 1 of 18 POLICE POWER CASES

2014006964 Valeriano, Iris Y. Sanchez 09168649597


Table of Contents Case Title

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BINAY V. DOMINGO, 201 SCRA 508

3 5 6 7 8 9 10 13 14 15 17

CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP V. DSWD GR166494 ORTIGAS AND CO. V. CA GR126102 MMDA V BEL AIR ASSOCIATION GR 135962 CITY OF MANILA V JUDGE LAGUIO GR 118127 ABECEDO OPTICAL COMPANY, COMPANY, INC V. CA 329,SCRA, 314 TAXI CAB OPERATORS OF METROMANILA V. BOT 119 SCRA 597 VELASCO V VILLEGAS 120SCRA568 MAGTAJAS V. PRYCE PROPERTIES 234SCRA255 TANO V. SOCRATES GR110249 ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS v. CITY MAYOR 20SCRA849


Binay v. Domingo Facts: Resolution 60 confirming the ongoing burial assistance program initiated by the mayor‘s office. Under this program, bereaved families whose gross family income does not exceed 2k/month will receive a 500php cash relief to be taken out of unappropriated available funds existing in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution 60. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified certified a disbursement of P400,000 for the implementation of the Burial Assistance Program. R 60 was referred to the Commission on Audit for its expected allowance in audit. Based on its preliminary findings, COA disapproved R 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof. The program was stayed by COA Decision No. 1159. Issues: WON R 60 is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause. Held: YES. Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people.

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the munici municipality pality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein." Sec 7 of BP 337: every LGU shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and order in the LGU, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein." Police power: power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers; greatest and most powerful attribute of the government; elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions. COA: there is no perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained under R 60 and the alleged public safety, general welfare. etc. of the th e inhabitants of Makati


Apparently, COA tries to re-define the scope of police power by circumscribing its exercise to "public safety, general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati ." Police power of a municipal corporation: broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police pol ice power. COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. OSG: "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services (Section 9, Art. II, Constitution), the promotion of the general welfare (Section 5, Ibid) social justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human rights. r ights. (Section 11, 11 , Ibid." The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accept accepted ed exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good. There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc. The resolution is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperis pauperism, m, though th ough not n ot complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay Magsaysay 'those who have less l ess in life, should have more in law."


Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. DSWD, 526 SCRA 130 (2007) Facts: Petitioners are domestic corporations corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines. Philippi nes. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of RA 9257, otherwise known as the ―Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003.‖ Section 4(a) of RA 9257 g rants twenty perce nt (20%) discount as privileges for the Senior Citizens. Petitioner contends that said law is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private property. Issue: Whether or not RA R A 9257 is unconstitutional unconstitutional Held: Petition is dismissed. The law is a legitimate exercise exercise of police pol ice power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general gen eral welfare for its object. Accordingly, it has been described as ―the most essential, insistent and the least l imitable of powers, extending as it does to al l the great public needs.‖ It is the power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.‖

For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.


Ortigas & Co. v. Court of Appeals & Dar v. Alonzo-Legasto G.R. No. 126102, December 4, 2000 | 346 SCRA 748 RATIO DECIDENDI A lessee or a possessor in the c oncept of ―holder of the thing‖ may be the real party-ininterest if he/she stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment. A party who impleads another cannot later question the standing of the l atter. FACTS • Ortigas & Co. (Ortigas) sold to Emilia Emilia Hermoso a parcel of land, with with the condition that only a single-family residential residential building shall be erected on the same. • A few years late r, the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) issued a zoning ordinance which effectively reclassified reclassified the land bought by Hermoso from ―residential‖ to ―commercial.‖ • Hermoso lease d the land to Ismael I smael Mathay III (Mathay). Mathay constructed constructed a singlestorey commercial building on the land. • Ortigas sued Hermoso fo r breach of contract and prayed for the demolition of the building. Mathay was subsequently impleaded as a respondent. • The lower court ru led in favor of Ortigas. Mathay Mathay moved for reconsideration, but he was rebuffed. He filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of App Appeals eals (CA), ascribing grave abuse of discretion discretion on the part of the lower court judge. The CA ruled in his favor, hence this review on certiorari filed by Ortigas. ISSUES ◦ W/N the zoning ordinance should be read into the contract between Ortigas Ortigas and Hermoso; ◦ W/N Mathay is a real party-in-inter party-in-interest est considering that he is a mere lessee and there is no privity of contract between him and Ortigas.

W/N Mathay is a real party-in-interest considering that he is a mere lessee and there is no privity of contract between him and Ortigas RESOLUTION the first issue: Although, as a general rule, laws are to be applied prospectively, prospectively, not retroactively, there are exceptions to this, one of which is when the State exercises police power for the common weal. The zoning ordinance issued by the MMDA is an exercise of the State‘s police power, and is therefore applicable retroactively. The CA rightfully read the provisions of the ordinance into the contract between Ortigas and Hermoso.)

YES, Mathay is a real party-in-interest. • First, Mathay is a possessor in the concept of a ―holder of the thing‖ un der Art. 525, CC; therefore, he has an interest in the property. • Second, what Ortigas prayed for is the demolition of the building erected by Mathay Mathay on the property. As the owner of the building, he has h as a material interest in it, and he h e obviously stands either to be benefited or injured after the case is decided. • Lastly, Ortigas imple aded Mathay as a respondent; as such, it can no longer question his standing by virtue of estoppel.


MMDA VS BEL AIR ASSOCIATION GR 135962

March 27, 2000 FACTS:

On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting the f ormer to open its private road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic starting starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter separating separating the subdi subdivision vision from Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. ISSUE:

WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic as an agent of the state endowed with police power. HELD: A ‗local government‘ is a ―political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs‖. It is a ―body politic and corporate‖ – one one

endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity representing representing the inhabitants of its territory (LGC of 1991). Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC of 1991. It empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod and bayan to ― enact ordinances, approve

resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or municipality] municipa lity] and its inhabitants pursuant to Sec.16 of the Code and in the proper exercise exercise of the [LGU‘s corporate powers] provided under the Code.‖ g rants the MMDA police power , let alone legislative There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the LGUs, there is no grant of authority in RA 7924 that allows the MMDA to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is merely a “development authority” and not a political unit of government since it is neither an LGU or a public corporation endowed with elective official, but is merely appointed by legislative power. The MMDA Chairman is not an elective

the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. fo r the welfare of the community . It is In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for

the LGUs, acting through th rough their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal.


CITY OF MANILA VS JUDGE LAGUIO Facts : On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES BU SINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basi basically cally prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels and hotels from operati operating ng in the Malate District which was notoriously n otoriously viewed as a red light distric districtt harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist Development Corporation avers that the ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the t he enumeration of places offering amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not market such nor do they use women as tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police P olice Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized emphasized that the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City. ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid. HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according according to the procedu procedure re prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following following substantive substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.

The police power of the City C ity Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitati l imitation on that its exercise exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In the t he case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.


ABECEDO OPTICAL COMPANY V, CA Municipal Corporation – Proprietary Proprietary Functions – Police Police Power FACTS:Acebed Acebedo o Optical applied for a busines businesss permit to operate in Iligan City. After hearing the sides of local optometrists, Mayor Cabili of Iligan granted the permit but he attached various special conditions which basically made Acebedo‘s dependent upon prescriptions to be issued by local optometrists. Acebedo is not allowed to practic practice e optometry within the city. Acebedo however acquiesced to the said conditions and operated under the permit. Later, Acebedo was charged for violating the said conditions and was subsequently suspended from operating within Iligan. Acebedo then assailed the validity of the attached conditions. The local optometrists argued that Acebedo is estopped in assailing the said conditions because because it acquiesced to the same and that the imposition of the special conditions is a valid exercise of police power; that such conditions were entered upon by the city in its proprietary function hence the permit is actually a contract. ISSUE: Whether or not the specia speciall conditions attached by the mayor is a valid exercise of police power. HELD: NO. Acebedo was applying for a business permit to operate its business and not n ot to practice optometry (the latter being within the jurisdiction PRC Board B oard of Optometry). The conditions attached by the mayor is ultra vires hence cannot be given any legal application therefore estoppel does not apply. It is neither a valid val id exercise exercise of police power. Though the mayor can definitely impose conditions in the granting of permits, he must base such conditions on law or ordinances otherwise the conditions are ultra vires. Lastly, the granting of the license is not a contract, it is a special privilege – estoppels estoppels does not apply.


TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC vs. THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION (1982)

·

On October 10, 1977, BOT issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 that aimed to phase out and replace old dilapidated taxis to insure only safe comfortable units are used by the public, to respond to complaints by metro manila residents regarding the old dilapidated taxis, to make the commuting public more comfortable, have more convenience and safety. 6 years is enough for taxi operators operators to get back cost of unit plus profits. No car beyond 6 years can still be operated o perated as taxi.

·

Taxis model 1971 were considered withdrawn on Dec 31, 1977, applied it to succeedi succeeding ng years just add one year to both dates. They had to surrender the expired taxi‘s taxi‘s plates to the BoT for turnover to Land Transpo Commission.

·

Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation Transportati on (BLT) issued Implementing Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the NCR, to implement the phasing out of the taxis.

·

On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 807553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 77 -42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registrati registration on and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of o f registration, registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation. The issues were in the form of questions that the petitioners presented to the SC through a query.

A.

Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questi questioned oned memorandum circulars in accord with the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby t hereby safeguarding safeguarding the t he petitioners' constitutional right to procedura procedurall due process process? ?

B.

Granting, arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requi requirements rements imposed by Presidential Presidential Decree No. 101, 10 1, would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners' constitutional rights to. (1) Equal protection of the law; (2) Substantive due process; and (3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard?


HELD:

The court here did not answer the queries directly they just dealt with the ff issues 1.

2.

WON the procedural and substanti substantive ve due process rights of the taxi operators were violated NO. WON their equal protection rights were violated NO.

On Procedural and Substantive Due Process: Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power

4. To fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service to be furnis furnished, hed, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles. Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said agency to follow in the exercise of its powers:

Sec. 2. Exercise of powers. — In In the exercise of the powers granted in the preceding section, the Board shall proceed promptly along the method of legislative inquiry. Apart from its own investigati investigation on and studies, the th e Board, in its discretion, may require the cooperation and assistance of the Bureau of Transportation, the Philippine Constabulary, particularly the Highway Patrol Group, the support agencies within the Department of Public Works, Transportation Transportation and Communications Comm unications,, or any other government office or agency that may be able to furnish useful information or data in the formulation of the Board of any policy, plan or program in the implementati implementation on of this Decree. The Board may also call conferences, conferences, require the submission of position papers or other documents, information, or data by operators or other persons that may be affected by the implementation of this Decree, or employ any other suitable means of inquiry. ·

PET claim that they were denied due process because they were not asked to submit position papers or to attend conferences regarding regarding the assai assailed led circ.

o

SC held held that the the PD provides a wide leeway as to how the board will choose choose to gather data in formulating its policy. NOT ALL OPTIONS ARE REQUIRED TO BE DONE FOR POLICY TO BE VALID à the board has the choice of which avenue to pursue in collecting data.

·

PET also claim that 6 year limit was arbitrarily set à oppressi oppressive ve à they want each taxi cab to be inspected regarding their condition WON it was still safe and roadworthy despite despite age.


o

Court held that their their proposed proposed standard standard is not practicable practicable and can open the door to multiple standards and corruption

o

Court furthers aid that 6 years is a reasonable time based on on experience experience and based based on cost cost and fair returns on the units

o

Court held that a uniform standard is best and fair

On Equal Protection of the Law:

PET allege that the circular targets and singles out the taxi industry = violation of their equal protection rights è Court said NO. Circs of the same kind are also being being implemented in other cities cities like Cebu and is also in the process of conducting conducting the same studies and policy formulations in other cities. è Manila was first first because of the heavier traffic pressure pressure and the more constant use of the taxis in MM. è SUBSTANTIA SUBSTANTIALL DISTINCTION à the traffic traffic conditions conditions in the various cities cities

CONCLUSIONS: è Manila has more traffic traffic which means that taxis taxis in Metro Manila are more heavily heavily used and more likely to deteriora deteriorate. te. è The public has a right to convenience, comfort and safety in their public public commute. è The danger posed by the the dilapidated dilapidated and old taxis is a valid valid nuisance that the Board can abate through the circular that it passed. è Absent a clear showing showing of any repugnancy repugnancy of the circular itit is deemed valid. Petition DISMISSED


Velasco v. Villegas [GR L-24153, 14 February 1983] En Banc, Fernando (J): 10 concur, 1 reserving vote, 1 took no part Facts: Ordinance 4964 was issued by the city of Manila prohibiting any operator of any barbershop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room(s) of said barber shop, or in any room(s) within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the t he operator of the barber shop and the rooms where massaging is conducted is the same person. Tomas Velasco, Lourdes Ramirez, Sy Pin, Edmundo Unson, Apolonia Ramirez, and Lourdes Lomibao, as component members of the Sta. Cruz Barbershop Association, Association, filed petition for declaratory relief with the lower court, challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance as it allegedly amounts to a deprivation of property of their means of livelihood without due process of law. The petition was denied by the lower court as its availability being dependent on there being as yet no case involving such issue having been filed. Hence, the appeal . Issue: Whether Ordinance 4964 is a valid police power measure. Held: The objectives behind its enactment are: " (1) To be able to impose payment of the license l icense fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance 3659 as amended by Ordinanc Ordinance e 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers customers." ."

The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. It has made clear the signifi significance cance and scope of such a clause, which delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality. The clause has been given wide application applica tion by municipal authorities and has h as in its relation to the particular circumstances circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such is the progressi progressive ve view of Philippi Philippine ne jurisprudence and it has continued continued to be.


Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. [GR 111097, 20 July 1994] En Banc, Cruz (J): 12 concur Facts: The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a corporation created directly by Presidential Presidential Decree 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including including casinos on land l and and sea within the territorial jurisdiction jurisdiction of the Philippines (the constitutionality of the decree was sustained in Basco v. Philippine P hilippine Amusements and Gambling Corporation). Cagayan de Oro C ity, like other local l ocal political political subdivisi subdivisions, ons, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the polic police e power under what is known as the General Welfare Welfare Clause embodied in in Section 16. Its Sangguniang Panglungsod derives derives its powers, duties and functions under Section 458 of said Code. In 1992, following its success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan C agayan de Oro City. To this end, en d, it leased a portion of a buildi building ng belonging to Pryce Pry ce Properties Corporation Inc., renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season. The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod Panlungsod of Cagayan C agayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On 7 December 1992, it enacted Ordinance 3353 (An Ordinance Prohibiting the issuance of business permit permit and canceling existing business permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operati o peration on of Casino). C asino). On 4 January 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance 3375-93 (An Ordinance prohibiting the operation of Casino and providing penalty for violation therefore). Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of App Appeals, eals, where it was joined jo ined by PAGCOR as intervenor inte rvenor and supplemental petitioner. The Court found the ordinances invalid and issued the wr it prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. Reconsideration of the decision was denied on 1 3 July 1993. Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor filed f iled a petition for review under Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the Sangguniang S angguniang Panlungsod Panlungsod of Cagayan C agayan de Oro can prohibit the establishment of a casino, or gambling, operated by PAGCOR through an ordinance o rdinance or resolution. Held: The morality m orality of gambling is not justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing proscribing or o r penalizing gambling or, for fo r that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Further, there are two kinds of gambling, to wit, w it, the illegal and those authorized by law. Legalized gambling is not a modern m odern concept; it is probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more so. The suggestion that the Local Government Code (LGC) authorize Local Government Units (LGUs) to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction between these two forms of gambling without a clear indication indication that this th is is the will of legislature. Ordinances should not contravene a statute as municipal governments are only agents of the national n ational government. Local councils councils exercise only delegated legislative legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaki l awmaking ng body. The delegate cannot be superior to the princip principal al or exerc e xercise ise powers higher than those of the latter.


Tano v. Socrates [GR 110249, 21 August 1997] En Banc, Davide Jr. (J): 5 concur, 4 join ponencias of Davide & Mendoza, 1 on official leave. Facts: On 15 December 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance 15-92 (taking effect on 1 January 1993; An ordinance banning the shipment shipment of all live fish and lobster outside outside Puerto Princesa Princesa City from 1 January 1993 to 1 January 1998, 1998, and providing exemptions; penalties and for other purposes thereof).

To implement said ordinance, Acting Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office Order 23 (series of 1993) dated 22 January 1993 authorizing the inspection of cargoes shipped out from the Puerto Princesa Airport, Airport, Wharf, and any other port within the jurisdiction of the City. On 19 February 1993, the Sangguniang Lalawigan of Palawan enacted Resolution 33 [A resolution prohibiting prohibiti ng the th e catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms, to wit: F amily: Scaridae (Mameng), Epine Phelus Fasciatus (Suno), Cromileptes Altivelis (Panther or Senorita), Lobster below 200 grams and spawning, Tridacna Gigas (Takllobo), Pinctada Margaritefera (Mother pearl, Oysters, Giant clams, and other species), Penaeus Monodon (Tiger Prawn, Breeder size or mother), Epinephelus Suillus (Loba or Green grouper), and Family: Balistidae (Tropical Aquarium Aquarium Fishes) Fish es) for a period of 5 years in and coming from Palawan waters]. Puerto Princesa City and the province of Palawan Pal awan implemented said said ordinances. Tano, et. al., who were criminally charged with violating Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution 33 and Ordinance 2 of Palawan in Criminal Case 93-05-C of the 1st MCTC of Palawan; and Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, who were charged with violating City Ordinance Ordinance 15-92 15 -92 of Puerto Princesa City and Ordinance 2 of Palawan before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa, questioned the validity validity of the t he said ordinances before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the ordinances in question, which prohibit the fishing of ce rtain marine species in Palawan are constitutional and/or valid. Held: Laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units) enjoy the presump presumption tion of constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. contradiction. In I n short, the conflict with the Constituti Con stitution on must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. Where doubt exists, even if well-founded, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain. In light of the t he principles of decentralization decentralization and devolution enshrined in the Local Government Code (LGC) and the powers granted therein to local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447(a) 4 47(a) (1) (vi), (v i), 458(a)(1)(vi) and 468(a)(1)(vi), which involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the Ordinances cannot be doubted. The ordinance also find full support under Republic Act 7611 (Strategic Environmental Plan for Palawan Act), approved on 19 June 1992; which adopts a comprehensive framework for the sustainable development of Palawan Pal awan compatible compatible with protecting and enhancing the natural resources and endangered environment of the province, which serve to guide the local government of Palawan and the government agencies concerned in the formulation and implementation of plans, programs and projects affecting said province. The first objective (to establish a "closed season" for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years) is well within the devolved power to enforce fishery fishe ry laws in


municipal waters municipal w aters which allows the establishment of "closed seasons." The second objective (to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities) falls within both the general welfare clause of the LGC and the express mandate thereunder to cities and provinces to protect the environment and impose appropriate appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment.


Ermita Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Association v. City of Manila [GR L-24693, 31 July 1967] En Banc, Fernando (J): 7 concur, 2 on leave Facts: On 13 June 1963, Ordinance 4760 was issued by the municipal board of the City of Manila and approved by Vice Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting Mayor of the City of Manila.

The ordinance (1) imposes a P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; (2) requires the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized auth orized representative representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open o pen to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with th e name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate certifica te as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such registration forms and records kept and bound together; (3) provides that the premises and facilities facilities of such hotels, h otels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief C hief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives. The ordinance also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or restaura restaurant nt and laundry; l aundry; while second class motels are required to have a dining room. It prohibited a person less than 18 1 8 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and made it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours. h ours. It provided a penalty of automatic cancellation of the license l icense of the offended party in case of conviction. On 5 July 1963, the Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association (EMHMOA),, its member Hotel del Mar, and a certain Go Chiu filed a petition for prohibition (EMHMOA) against the mayor of the City of Manila in his capacity as he is charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necess ne cessary ary orders for the faithful executi execution on and enforcement e nforcement of such ordinances. There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on 6 July 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction injunction ordering the Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance 4760 from and after 8 July 1963. 19 63. After the submission of the memoranda, ruled that the City C ity of Manila lack authority to regulate motels and rendering Ordinance 4760 unconstitutional unconstitutional and therefore null and void. It made permanent the preliminary injunction injunction issued by the


Mayor and his agents to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance. The Mayor of Manila appealed to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the regulations imposed on motels and hotels (increasing license fees, partially restricting restricting the freedom to contract, and restraining the liberty of individuals) is valid and/or constitutional. Held: Yes. The ordinance was enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. It was made as there is observed an alarming increase in the rate of prostituti prostitution, on, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which provide a necessary atmosphere atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus become the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill seekers. The ordinance proposes to check th e clandestine clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registrati registration on form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open t o public view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests. The increase in the license fees was intended to discourage establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal and to increase the income of the city government. Further, the restriction restric tion on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative representative of any a ny hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, are being devoted. Furthermore, the right of the individu individual al is necessar ne cessarily ily subject to reasonable restraint r estraint by general law for the common good. The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power. State in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.

Cases Police Power

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