The Bhopal Gas Disaster – A Case Study THE ISSUE Developing countries are particularly vulnerable to industrial crises. However, industrial accidents such as Bhopal are not just an Indian or even a Third World problem but are industrial disasters waiting to happen, whether they are in the form of "mini-Bhopals", smaller industrial accidents that occur with disturbing frequency in chemical plants in both developed and developing countries, and "slowmotion Bhopals", unseen chronic poisoning from industrial pollution that causes irreversible pain, suffering, and death. These are the key issues we face in a world where toxins are used and developed without fully knowing the harm that can come from their use or abuse. DESCRIPTION Developing countries, such as India, are particularly vulnerable as they lack the infrastructure (e.g. communication, training, education etc.) required to maintain technology but are nevertheless, eager to set up and maintain industrial plants. As a result, they compete globally to attract multinational companies for their investment and capital, and in this process, often tend to ignore the safety and health violations that many MNC's engage in. "Developing countries confer upon MNC's a competitive advantage because they offer low-cost labor, access to markets, and lower operating costs. Once there, companies have little incentive to minimize environmental and human risks. Lax environmental and safety regulation, inadequate capital investment in safety equipment, and poor communications between companies and governments compound the problem". The Bhopal facility was part of India's Green Revolution aimed to increase the productivity of crops. Considered an essential factor in the effort to achieve self-sufficiency in agricultural production, pesticide production use increased dramatically during the late 1960's and early 1970's. The decision to manufacture the pesticides in India, as opposed to relying on imports was based on India's goal of preserving foreign exchange and its policy of industrialization. In 1969, Union Carbide (UCC-the parent company) set up a small plant (Union Carbide India Ltd.- UCIL) in Bhopal, the capital city of Madhya Pradesh, to formulate pesticides. Bhopal was chosen as the site for the Carbide plant because of its central location in India, a railway system that spanned the country, a large lake which provided a reliable source of water, and sufficient electricity and labor to sustain a large scale industrial plant. The MIC facility was located in the existing Carbide plant to the north of the city, adjacent to an existing residential neighborhood and barely two kilometers from the railway station. Union Carbide claims that the "squatter settlements" around the plant arrived only after it did. However, "all three of the worst-affected communities in the disaster apparently existed before the Union Carbide plant opened". Until 1979, the Indian subsidiary of Carbide used to import MIC or methyl isocyanate from the parent company. After 1979, it started to manufacture its own MIC. MIC is one of many "intermediates" used in pesticide production and is a dangerous chemical. It is a little lighter than water but twice as heavy as air, meaning that when it escapes into the atmosphere it remains close to the ground. It has the ability to react with many substances: water acids, metals, and the small deposits of corrosive materials that accumulate in pipes, tanks, and valves. The MIC in Bhopal was used for the production of various pesticides, mainly Sevin brand carbaryl insecticide and Temik brand aldicarb pesticide. All the pesticides produced at UCIL were sold in the Indian market. According to many, Bhopal is the site of the greatest industrial disaster in history. On the night of December 23, 1984, a dangerous chemical reaction occurred in the Union Carbide factory when a large amount of water got into the MIC storage tank # 610. The leak was first detected by workers about 11:30 p.m. when their eyes began to tear and burn. They informed their supervisor who failed to take action until it was too late. In that time, a large amount, about 40 tons of Methyl Isocyanate (MIC), poured out of the tank for nearly two hours and escaped into the air, spreading within eight kilometers downwind, over the city of nearly 900,000. Thousands of people were killed (estimates ranging as high as 4,000) in their sleep or as they fled in terror, and hundreds of thousands remain injured or affected (estimates range as high as 400,000) to this day. The most seriously affected areas were the densely populated shanty towns immediately surrounding the plant -- Jayaprakash Nagar, Kazi Camp, Chola Kenchi, and the Railway Colony. The victims were almost entirely the poorest members of the population. This poisonous gas, caused death and left the survivors with lingering disability and diseases. Not much is known about the future medical damage of MIC, but according to an international medical commission, the victims suffer from serious health problems that are being misdiagnosed or ignored by
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local doctors. Exposure to MIC has resulted in damage to the eyes and lungs and has caused respiratory ailments such as chronic bronchitis and emphysema, gastrointestinal problems like hyperacidity and chronic gastritis, ophthalmic problems like chronic conjunctivitis and early cataracts, vision problems, neurological disorders such as memory and motor skills, psychiatric problems of various types including varying grades of anxiety and depression, musculoskeletal problems and gynecological problems among the victims. It is estimated that children born in Bhopal after the disaster face twice the risk of dying as do children elsewhere, partly because parents cannot care for them adequately. Surprisingly enough, despite the serious health problems and the deaths that have occurred, Union Carbide claims that the MIC is merely a "mild throat and ear irritant". The Bhopal disaster was the result of a combination of legal, technological, organizational, and human errors. The immediate cause of the chemical reaction was the seepage of water (500 liters)into the MIC storage tank. The results of this reaction were exacerbated by the failure of containment and safety measures and by a complete absence of community information and emergency procedures. The long term effects were made worse by the absence of systems to care for and compensate the victims. Furthermore, safety standards and maintenance procedures at the plant had been deteriorating and ignored for months. A listing of the defects of the MIC unit runs as follows: -Gauges measuring temperature and pressure in the various parts of the unit, including the crucial MIC storage tanks, were so notoriously unreliable that workers ignored early signs of trouble. -The refrigeration unit for keeping MIC at low temperatures (and therefore less likely to undergo overheating and expansion should a contaminant enter the tank) had been shut off for some time. -The gas scrubber, designed to neutralize any escaping MIC, had been shut off for maintenance. Even had it been operative, post-disaster inquiries revealed, the maximum pressure it could handle was only one-quarter that which was actually reached in the accident. -The flare tower, designed to burn off MIC escaping from the scrubber, was also turned off, waiting for replacement of a corroded piece of pipe. The tower, however, was inadequately designed for its task, as it was capable of handling only a quarter of the volume of gas released (Weir, pp.41-42). -The water curtain, designed to neutralize any remaining gas, was too short to reach the top of the flare tower, from where the MIC was billowing. -The lack of effective warning systems; the alarm on the storage tank failed to signal the increase in temperature on the night of the disaster. MIC storage tank number 610 was filled beyond recommended capacity; and -a storage tank which was supposed to be held in reserve for excess MIC already contained the MIC. Ironically, in Bhopal, the people living around the Union Carbide plant were warned of potential hazards in a series of local newspaper articles, but residents ignored these warnings because they did not know how to react to them, while local officials dismissed them as sensationalist reporting (Technology Review, p.73). Interestingly enough, Carbide tried to hide its poor safety and maintenance record along with the other faults already mentioned, by claiming publicly that the company was the victim of sabotage by a 'disgruntled employee'. Yet, Carbide didn't release the name of this employee or bring charges against him/her. However, there is evidence to the contrary which supports the view that Carbide (both the parent company and its Indian subsidiary) was a negligent company that failed to improve its deteriorating plant. Incidentally, in a report (May 1982) of the Indian subsidiary conducted by a threemember safety team from the Union Carbide headquarters in the U.S., indicated that "a serious potential for sizeable releases of toxic materials in the MIC unit either due to equipment failure, operating problems, or maintenance problems thus requiring various changes to reduce the danger of the plant; there is no evidence the recommendations were ever implemented" (Weir, pp.40-41). Furthermore, "Carbide persistently shows 'wanton and wilful disregard for the health and safety of its workers and the communities in which it operates'"(New Statesman and Society, "Surviving..." p.5). Additionally, a scientific report published by two U.S. organizations, the National Toxic Campaign and the international Council on Public Affairs, Union Carbide continues to be " 'a major discharger of toxic substances into the environment, and a major generator of hazardous waste'. In 1988, the company generated more than 300 million pounds of hazardous waste - an increase of 70 million compared with 1987" (New Statesman and Society, "Surviving..." p.5). Carbide had dropped the safety standards at the Bhopal plant well below those it maintained at a nearly identical facility in West Virginia. It is also important to note here that Carbide was able to operate its deteriorating plant because industrial safety and environmental laws and regulations were lacking or were not strictly enforced by the state of Madhya Pradesh or the Indian government making them indirectly responsible for the tragedy at Bhopal.
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