Republic vs Maddela Issa Gayas
violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the right of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to, their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power. Thus, for instance, no action or proceeding may be instituted for a declaration to the effect that plaintiff or petitioner is married, or single, or a legitimate child, although a finding thereon may be made as a necessary premise to justify a given relief available only to one enjoying said status. At times, the law permits the acquisition of a given status, such as naturalization by judicial decree. But there is no similar legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry. (Tan ( Tan v. Republic, L-14159, April 18, 1960). 1960 ).
G.R. No. L-21664 March 28, 1969 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, petitioners, IMMIGRATION, petitioners, vs. HON. MANOLO L. MADDELA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II, and MIGUELA TAN SUAT, respondents SUAT, respondents G.R. No. L-21665 March 28, 1969 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, petitioners, IMMIGRATION, petitioners, vs. HON. MANOLO L. MADDELA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II and CHAN PO LAN, respondents. LAN, respondents. and Nature:Two (2) separate petitions for certiorari and Nature:Two prohibition with preliminary injunction but are decided jointly because the issues presented proceed from the same factual background. Facts: On April 29, 1963 the Court of First Instance of Quezon (Branch 11), Hon. Manolo L. Maddela presiding, rendered a decision in its Special Proceeding No. 4012.On the same day the same court rendered another similarly worded, decision in its special Proceeding No. 4013, this time in favor of Chan Po Lan. The two cases involve the same petition to have petitioners declared Filipino citizens. Both petitioners were legally married to Filipino citizens and during the trial it has been established to the satisfaction of the Court that both petitioners have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen. The Fiscal representing the Solicitor General if he has any opposition to the petition to which the Fiscal answered that he has no opposition, neither has he any evidence to warrant opposition. Both Po Lan and Tan Suat were declared Filipino citizens by marriage and the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration was ordered to cancel the necessary alien certificate of registration and immigrant certificate of residence of the petitioner and to issue the corresponding identification card. The Solicitor General filed the instant petitions and on August 10, 1963 the SC issued in each case a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain execution and enforcement of the judgment. Issue: Whether petitioners should be declared Filipino citizens Held: Held:
No.
Jurisprudence had already set the question at rest: no person claiming to be a citizen may get a judicial declaration of citizenship. Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for the settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission
Burca vs Republic Anne Republic Anne C. Dela Peña Mo Ya Lim Yao Jamie Bentinganan Oh Hek How Nadine Abenoja Board of Commissioner Jamic Villar Arbolado
Facts: On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of natural mother Mariana Gatchalian. On June 27, 1961, Willian, then twelve years old, arrives in Manila from Hongkong together with a daughter and a son of Santiago. They had with them certificate of registration and identity issued by the Philippine consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the secretary of foreign affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens. On July 6, 1961, the board of special inquiry admitted the Gatchalians as Filipino citizens and issued an identification certificate to William. The boarf of commissioners waws directed by the Secretary of Justice to Review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Filipino citizen such included the case of William. As a result of the decision of the board of special inquiry which recommended for the reversal of the decision of the Board of Commissioners. Acting commissioner issued an order affirming the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. On August 15, 1990, the Commission on Immigration and Deportatiion ordered the arrest of William and was released upon posting P 200,000 cash bond. Thus on the 29thof the same month, he filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC of Manila. A motion to dismiss was filed but denied. Issue: Whether or not William Gatchalian is to be declared as a Filipino citizen Held: Yes.
ID.; CONFLICT OF LAWS; FOREIGN LAW PRESUMED THE SAME WITH PHILIPPINE LAW ABSENCE OF PROOF TO THE CONTRARY. — In Miciano v. Brimo (50 Phil. 867 [1924]; Lim and Lim v. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472; Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46 [1915]),this Court held that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. In the case at bar, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises the presumption that it is the same as that of Philippine law. 18. ID.; MARRIAGE; DOCTRINE OF "PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION" APPLIED IN PHILIPPINE LAW. — Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid where celebrated is valid everywhere. Referring to marriages contracted abroad, Art. 71 of the Civil Code (now Art. 26 of the Family Code) provides that" (a)ll marriages performed outside of the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country . . ." And any doubt as to the validity of the matrimonial unity and the extent as to how far the validity of such marriage may be extended to the consequences of the coverture is answered by Art. 220 of the Civil Code in this manner: "In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression." (Italics supplied ). Bearing in mind the "processual presumption" enunciated in Miciano and other cases, he who asserts that the marriage is not valid under our law bears the burden of proof to present the foreign law. 19. ID.; PROOF OF FILIATION; STATEMENTS OR DECLARATORY REGARDING FAMILY REPUTATION OR TRADITION IN MATTERS OF PEDIGREE; ADMITTED IN CASE AT BAR. — The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on Santiago Gatchalian much more on respondent William Gatchalian who was then a twelve-year old minor. The fact is, as records indicate, Santiago was not pressed by the Citizenship Investigation Board to prove the laws of China relating to marriage, having been content with the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was lost or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of China. Neither was Francisco Gatchalian‟s testimony subjected to the same scrutiny by the Board of Special Inquiry. Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian before the Philippine consular and immigration authorities regarding their marriages, birth and relationship to each other are not self-serving but are admissible in evidence as statements or declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree (Sec. 34, Rule 130). Furthermore, this salutary rule of evidence finds support in substantive law. Thus, Art. 267 of the Civil Code provides: "Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of
status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws." (See also Art. 172 of the Family Code). 20. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT THEREOF IN CASE AT BAR. — Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter. Francisco, in turn, is likewise a Filipino being the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an order dated July 12, 1960. Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens contemplated under Sec. 1, Article IV of the Constitution, which provides: "Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:" (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. . . ." This forecloses any further question about the Philippine citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian.
Nuval Julie Ann Bedrio GREGORIO NUVAL, petitioner-appellant, vs. NORBERTO GURAY, ET AL., respondents. NORBERTO GURAY, appelllee. Nature of the Case: Appeal from the judgment of CFI of La Union, upholding the defense of res judicata and dismissing the quo warranto proceedings against Norbeto Guray FACTS: On May 11, 1928, Nuval filed (in his dual capacity as a voter duly qualified and registered in the election list of the municipality of Luna and as a duly registered candidate) a petition against Guray asking for the exclusion of his name from the election list, not being a qualified voter of said municipality sine he had not resided therein for six months as required by section 431 of the said Administrative Code. CFI Decision: Norberto Guray was a bona fide resident of the municipality of Luna from Janury 1, 1927. As that order was not appealable, Guray's name remained in the election list. In the election on June 5, 1928, Guray was elected as municipal presidentby a plurality of votes, Nuval obtaining second place. On June 18, 1928, Gregorio Nuval filed the present action of quo warranto asking that Guray be declared ineligible had a legal residence of one year previuos to the election as required by the Admin Code. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the judgment rendered in the CFI is res judicata, so as to prevent the institution and prosecution of an action in quo warranto, which is now before us. HELD: 1. No. The petition for exclusion was presented by Nuval in his capacity as qualified voter and as a duly registered candidate, against Guray as a registered
voter. The present proceedings of quo warranto was intreposed by Nuval as a registered candidate voted for the office of municipal president of Luna, against Guray, as an elected candidate for the same office. Therefore, there is no identity of parties in the two cases, since it is not enough that there be an identity of persons, but there must be an identity of capacities in which said persons litigate. (Art. 1259 of the Civil Code; Bowler vs. Estate of Alvarez, 23 Phil., 561; 34 Corpus Juris, p. 756, par. 1165.) In said case for the petition for the exclusion, the object of the litigation was the conclusion of Guray as a voter from the election list, while in the present quo warranto proceeding, the object of the litigation is his exclusion or expulsion from the office to which he has been elected. Neither does there exist, then, any identity in the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter. In the petition for exclusion, the cause of action was thatGuray had no six months' legal residence in the municipality of Luna to be a qualified voter thereof, while in proceedings of quo warranto, the cause is that Guray has not the one year's legal residence required for the eligibility to the office of municipal president of Luna. Neither does there exist, therefore, identity of causes of action. For res judicata may exist the ff are necessary: (a) Identity of parties; (b) identity of things; and (c) identity of issues. There is no identity either of parties, or of things or litigious matter, or of issues or causes of action, there is no res judicata. 2. Whether or not Guray at the time of his election, was ineligible for the office of the residence in said municipality. - He transferred his residence from the municipality of Luna to that of Balaoan. Up to June 27, 1922, Guray had resided in the municipality of Luna, his birthplace, where he had married and had held the office of municipal treasurer. He was appointed municipal treasurer of Balaoan, La Union. The rules of the provincial treasurer require that municipality treasurers live continuously in the municipality where they perform they official duties. In order to qualify, he asked for the cancellation of his name in the election lists of Luna, alleging as a ground therefore the following: "On the ground of transfer of any residence which took place on the 28th day of June, 1922. My correct and new address is Poblacion, Balaoan, La Union". In his cedula certificates for1923 to 1928, he made it appear that his residence was Balaoan. In 1926, his wife and children went back to live in the town of Luna in the house of his wife's parents, due to the high cost of living in that municipality. Guray used to go home to Luna and his children studied in the public school of Luna. In January, 1927, he commenced the construction of a house of which has not yet been completed, and neither be nor his family has lived in it. On February 1, 1928, Norberto Guray applied for and obtained vacation leave to be spent in Luna, and on the 16th of the same month he filed his resignation by telegraph, which was accepted on the same day, also by telegraph. Nothwithstanding that he was already provided with a cedula by himself as municipal treasurer of Balaoan on January 31, 1928, declaring him resident of said town, he obtained another cedula from the municipality of Luna on February 20, 1928, which was
dated January 15, 1928, in which it is presented that he resided in the barrio of Victoria, Luna, La Union. On February 23, 1928, Norberto Guray applied for and obtained the cancellation of his name in the election list of the municipality of Balaoan, and on April 14, 1928, he applied for registration as a voter in Luna, alleging that he had been residing in said municipality for thirty years. For this purpose he made of the cedula certificate antedated. 3. Whether or that to the date when he once more established his residence in the municipality of Luna. It is an established rule that "where a voter abandons his residence in a state and acquires one in another state, he cannot again vote in the state of his former residence until he has qualified by a new period of residence" (20 Corpus Juris, p. 71, par. 28). "The term 'residence' as so used is synonymous with 'domicile,' which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." (People vs. Bender, 144 N. Y. S., 145.) Since Norberto Guray abandoned his first residence Luna and acquired another in Balaoan, in order to vote and be a candidate in Luna, he needed to reacquire residence infor the length of time prescribed by the law, and for such purpose, he needed not only the intention to do so, but his personal presence in said municipality. A change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment of the former (20 Corpus Juris, p. 71) and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. Guray abandoned his legal residencce in the municipality of Luna, transferring it to the municipality of Balaoan by reason and an account of the requirements of the rules of the provincial treasurer of La Union, under whose jurisdiction is said municipality, exercising his right of suffrage in the latter. Guray only abandoned his legal residence in the Municipality of Balaoan, and began to acquire another in the municipality of Luna from Febraury 16, 1928, when he filed his resignation from the office of municipal treasurer of Balaoan which he had been holding, and which resignation was accepted; and on being elected municipal president of Luna in the general elections of June 5, 1928, he had not reacquired the legal residence necessary to be validly elected to said office. SC Decision: Election of Guray as municipal president of Luna is hereby held to be unlawful and quashed and he has no right to take possession of said office, petitioner Gregorio Nuval being the one legally elected to said office with a right to take possession thereof, having secured second place in the election. RULING ON THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION February 1, 1929 Sec 408 of the Election Law, providing the remedy in case a person not eligible should be elected to a provincial or municipal office, does not authorize that it be declared who has been legally elected, thus differing from section 479 of the law, which contains such an authorization, and for the reason, furthermore, that section 477 of the said law provides that only those who have obtained a plurality of votes, and have presented
their certificates of candidacy may be certified as elected to municipal offices. Elective offices are by nature different from the appointive offices. The occupation of the first depends on the will of the elector, while that of the second depends on the will of the authority providing for it. In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by election, what is to be determined is the eligibility of the candidate elect, while in quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by appointment, what is determined is the legality of the appointment. In the first case when the person elected is ineligible, the court cannot declare that the candidate o ccupying the second place has been elected, even if he were eligible, since the law only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes, and has presented his certificate of candidacy. In the second case, the court determines who has been legally appointed and can and ought to declare who is entitled to occupy the office. Judgment is amended, eliminating from the dispositive part thereof, the holding that Gregorio Nuval is the one who has been legally elected, so as to read as follows: By virtue whereof, the election of respondent-appellee Norberto Guray to the office of Municipal president of Luna, is hereby declared unlawful and quashed and, consequently, that he has no right to take possession of said office, with costs against said respondent.
Vellilla Soltan Michael Alisan 2nd set Ujano Issa
- He has no record of conviction and it is his intention to renounce his allegiance to the U.S.A. Court a quo: Denied the petition on the ground that petitioner did not have the residence required by law six months before he filed his petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Issue: Whether petitioner should be allowed to reacquire Philippine citizenship Held: No. The SC agreed with the l ower court‟s decision. Section 3(1), Commonwealth Act No. 63 provides: One of the qualifications for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is that the applicant shall have resided in the Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization. The term "residence" has already been interpreted to mean the actual or constructive permanent home otherwise known as legal residence or domicile (WilfredoUytengsu v. Republic of the Philippines, 95 Phil., 890; 50 Off. Gaz., 4781). A place in a country or state where he lives and stays permanently, and to which he intends to return after a temporary absence, no matter how long, is his domicile.
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[G.R. No.L-22041. May 19, 1966.] MELECIO CLARINIO UJANO, Petitioner-Appellant , v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,Oppositor Appellee. Nature: Petitioner seeks to reacquire his Philippine citizenship in a petition filed before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. Facts: - Petitioner was born 66 years ago of Filipino parents in Magsingal, Ilocos Sur. - He is married to Maxima O. Ujano with whom he has one son, Prospero, who is now of legal age. - 1927- Went to the United States of America in where after a residence of more than 20 years he acquired American citizenship by naturalization. - November 10, 1960- Returned to the Philippines on to which he was admitted merely for a temporary stay. - He owns an agricultural land and a residential house situated in Magsingal, Ilocos Sur worth not less than P5,000.00. - He receives a monthly pension of $115.00 from the Social Security Administration of the United States of America.
In other words, domicile is characterized by animus manendi. So an alien who has been admitted into this country as a temporary visitor, either for business or pleasure, or for reasons of health, though actually present in this country cannot be said to have established his domicile here because the period of his stay is only temporary in nature and must leave when the purpose of his coming is accomplished. In the present case, Petitioner , who is presently a citizen of the United States of America, was admitted into this country as a temporary visitor, a status he has maintained at the time of the filing of the present petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and which continues up to the present. Such being the case, he has not complied with the specific requirement of law regarding six months residence before filing his present petition. The word "residence" used therein imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence coupled with conduct indicative of such intention (Yen v. Republic, L-18885, January 31, 1964; Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil., 645). Indeed, that term cannot refer to the presence in this country of a person who has been admitted only on the strength of a permit for temporary residence. The only way by which petitioner can reacquire his lost Philippine citizenship is by securing a quota for permanent residence so that he may come within the
purview of the residence requirement of Commonwealth Act No. 63.
-Recto filed motion to establish and enforce his charging lien.
Caasi - Anne Marcos - Jamie Jimenez - Nadine Recto Jamic
-defense: The contract of services of recto is invalid: to secure a divorce decree in violation of our laws
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Recto vs Harden In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorce between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities would be involved. RECTO V. HARDEN (1959) Short summary: Recto was hired by American wife to represent her in RP case for protection of her interest in the conjugal property, vs. American husband, in conjunction with the divorce proceeding she's going to file in US. They won in Trial Court, but on appeal, American H & W agreed to settle. Recto now wants to collect fees for services, but as defense, Harden spouses argues that the contract's object was unlawful (Divorce not allowed in RP) so it is invalid, thus, Recto cannot enforce it against them. Court ruled for Recto
CA remanded to the court of origin in order to determine the amount of fees claimed by Attorney Claro M. Recto in his motion dated February 20, 1952. After appropriate proceedings, the lower court rendered a decision dated April 30, 1953, adopting substantially said report of the commissioner, but increasing the contingent fee ofAppellee herein from P369,410.04, the sum recommended in the report, to P384,110.97. Hence, this appeal taken by Mr. and Mrs. Harden. Objections of Mr. AndMrs Harden The first question for determination therein is the validity of the above-quoted contract of services, which the Appellants assail as void, mainly, upon the ground: (1) that Mrs. Harden cannot bind the conjugal partnership without her husband‟s consent; (2) that Article 1491 of the Civil Code of the Philippines in effect prohibits contingent fees; (3) that the contract in question has for its purpose to secure a decree of divorce, allegedly in violation of Articles 1305, 1352 and 1409 of the Civil Code of the Philippines; (4) that the terms of said contract are harsh, inequitable and oppressive.
Facts: SC Decision: Mrs. Harden, US Citizen, engaged services of Claro M. Recto, for suit …to secure an increase in the amount of support she was receiving …to preserve her rights in the properties of the conjugal partnership …in contemplation of a divorce suit she's going to file in the US. Compensation for RECTO: 20% of value of her share of conjugal partnership after liquidation “The contingent fee to which the claimant is entitled under paragraph 3 of the contract, Exhibit JJJ or 20, is 20% of P1,920,554.85 or the sum of P384,110.97. Trial Court: Ruled for Mrs. Harden CA: Upon appeal to CA, Harden Sps. mutually released and forever discharged each other from all actions, debts, duties, and claims to the conjugal partnershipin consideration of the sum of $1. It was further asserted, in Recto’s “manifestation”, that the purpose of the said instruments, executed by Mr. and Mrs. Harden, was to defeat the claim of the former for attorney‟s fees,
The first objection has no foundation in fact, for the contract in dispute does not seek to bind the conjugal partnership. By virtue of said contract, Mrs. Harden merely bound herself — or assumed the personal obligation — to pay, by way of contingent fees, 20% of her share in said partnership. The contract neither gives, nor purports to give, to the Appellee any right whatsoever, personal or real, in and to her aforesaid share. The amount thereof is simply a basis for the computation of said fees. The second objection is, likewise, untenable. Moreover, it has already been held that contingent fees are not prohibited in the Philippines and are impliedly sanctioned by our Cannons (No. 13) of Professional Ethics. (see, also, Ulanday vs. Manila Railroad Co., 45 Phil., 540, 554.) Such is, likewise, the rule in the United States The third objection is not borne out, either by the language of the contract between them, or by the intent of the parties thereto. Its purpose was not to secure a divorce, or to facilitate or promote the procurement of a divorce. It merely sought to protect the interest of Mrs.
Harden in the conjugal partnership, during the pendency of a divorce suit she intended to file in the United States. What is more, inasmuch as Mr. and Mrs. Harden are admittedly citizens of the United States, their status and the dissolution thereof are governed — pursuant to Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain (which was in force in the Philippines at the time of the execution of the contract in question) and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines — by the laws of the United States, which sanction divorce. In short, the contract of services, between Mrs. Harden and herein Appellee, is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. The last objection is based upon principles of equity, but, pursuant thereto, one who seeks equity must come with clean hands (Bastida, et al., vs. DyBuncio& Co., 93 Phil., 195; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary30 C.J.S. 475), and Appellants have not done so, for the circumstances surrounding the case show, to our satisfaction, that their aforementioned agreements, ostensibly for the settlement of the differences between husband and wife, were made for the purpose of circumventing or defeating the rights of herein Appellee, under his abovequoted contract of services with Mrs. Harden. Summary Issue: WON RECTO COULD ENFORCE THE AGREEMENT of services ? Held :Yes Their marital and personal status, and the dissolution of their marriage are governed by the laws of the United States which sanction divorce. This is in pursuant to Art. 15 of the Civil Code The CONTRACT OF SERVICES IS NOT CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS, GOOD CUSTOMS, PUBLIC ORDER, OR PUBLIC POLICY The contract has a lawful object: it is to protect the interests of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal partnership during the pendency of a divorce suit -NOT …to secure divorce …to facilitate or promote procurement of divorce Divorce can be granted to the Sps Harden, they being nationals of country whose laws allow divorce (following the nationality principle in determining the status and dissolution of the marriage)
Barnuevo - Julie Quita - Soltan Llorente - Issa G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000 PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.
Nature: Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals modifying that of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente, as co-owners of whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband and wife. Facts: The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from 1927 to 1957 Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorentewere married in Nabua, Camarines Sur. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in Nabua, Camarines Sur In 1943,Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of New York. Upon the liberation of the Philippines in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife. He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was “living in” and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, CeferinoLlorente. In 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as “CrisologoLlorente,” with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the father‟s name was left blank In 1946, the couple drew a written agreement to the effect that: (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzo‟s salary and all other obligations for Paula‟s daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully.
November 16, 1951Lorenzo filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. The divorce was granted on December 1952.
When Lorenzo returned to the Philippines, he married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation. From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife and had three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente. Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament where he bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children. Lorenzo also filed for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.The Trial Court, finding that the will was duly executed, admitted the will to probate. However, denied the motion for appointment of Alicia for the reason that the testator Lorenzo was still alive. On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo‟s estate in her favor. She contended: (1) that she was Lorenzo‟s surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzo‟s will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property. Alicia also filed in the testate proceeding a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary. Without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paula‟s petition and such order was published in the newspaper “Bicol Star”. Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals ruling: The divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunatois likewise void. The petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour. On the other hand, the petition of Paula Titular Llorente is meritorious. The court declared her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children with Alicia. Paula Llorentewas also appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente.
Alicia filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Trial Court and her appeal with the CA was also denied. However, the CA modified the TC‟s decision declaring that Alicia is co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation. Hence, this petition. Issue: (As identified by the SC) Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente? (Pertinent to our lesson) Is the foreign divorce granted to Lorenzo Llorente valid? Held: The SC did not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court. Applicable Law The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed. Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law. The Civil Code clearly provides: Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was “referred back” to the law of the decedent‟s domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
The SC noted that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that “American law follows the „domiciliary theory‟ hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzo‟s will. First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law. The trial court and the Court of Appeals held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial court‟s opinion was a mere paramour. The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining. Validity of the Foreign Divorce The SC cited various cases (Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr .,Quita v. Court of Appeals,Pilapil v. IbaySomera)wherein it was held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law. Divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons. For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.The divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. However, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court. Validity of the Will The Civil Code provides: Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed . When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular
officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.” (underscoring ours) The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on “family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity.” As a guide, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law.
