CASE
DIGESTS:
1. JOSE ALLAN TAN, Complainant, vs PEDRO S. DIAMANTE, Respondent. A.C. No. 7766, August 5, 2014 Facts: This is an administrative case filed by Jose Allan Tan against his lawyer Pedro Diamante. Complainant secured the services of respondent in order to pursue a case for partition of property against the heirs of the late spouses Luis and Natividad Valencia-Tan. Respondent accepted the engagement however the case was dismissed. Respondent knew of the dismissal as early as August 14, 2007 but complainant was only informed of such fact on August 24, 2007. Respondent allegedly asked for the amount of P10, 000.00 for the payment of appeal fees and other costs, but since complainant could not produce the said amount at that time, respondent, instead, asked and was given the amount of P500.00 purportedly as payment of the reservation fee for the filing of a notice of appeal before the RTC. On September 12, 2007, Tan handed the amount of P10, 000.00 to respondent, who on even date, filed a notice of appeal before the RTC. In an Order dated September 18, 2007, the RTC dismissed complainant’s appeal for having been filed out of the time prescribed. Respondent, however, did not disclose such fact and, instead, showed complainant an Order dated November 9, 2007 purportedly issued by the RTC directing the submission of the results of a DNA testing to prove his filiation to the late Luis Tan. When complainant went to the RTC to follow up his case, it was then that he discovered that the November 9, 2007 Order was spurious, as certified by the RTC’s Clerk of Court. Complainant also found out that, contrary to the representations of respondent, his appeal had long been dismissed. Aggrieved, he filed the instant administrative complaint for disbarment against respondent. Issue: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR Held: Yes. Under Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, it is the lawyer’s duty to keep his client constantly updated on the developments of his case as it is crucial in maintaining the latter’s confidence. A lawyer’s inexcusable neglect to serve his client’s interests with utmost diligence and competence as well as his engaging in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct in order to conceal such neglect should never be countenanced, and thus, administratively sanctioned. Respondent committed acts of falsification in order to misrepresent to his client, i.e., complainant, that he still had an available remedy in his case, when in reality, his case had long been dismissed for failure to timely file an appeal, thus, causing undue prejudice to the latter. To the Court, respondent’s acts are so reprehensible,
and his violations of the CPR are so flagrant, exhibiting his moral unfitness and inability to discharge his duties as a member of the bar. His actions erode rather than enhance the public perception of the legal profession. Therefore, in view of the totality of his violations, as well as the damage and prejudice caused to his client, respondent deserves the ultimate punishment of disbarment .
2. ELPIDIO TIONG, Complainant, vs GEORGE M. FLORENDO, Respondent A.C. No. 4428, December 12, 2011 Facts: Complainant Elpidio P. Tiong, an American Citizen, and his wife, Ma. Elena T. Tiong, are real estate lessors in Baguio City. In 1991, they engaged the services of respondent Atty. George M. Florendo not only as legal counsel but also as administrator of their businesses. Complainant suspected that respondent was having an affair with the former’s wife. His suspicions were affirmed when he heard the two talking on the phone and saying I love you. He asked his wife if they were having an affair which the latter denied but subsequently admitted. The parties met again at the Mandarin Restaurant in Baguio City and, in the presence of a Notary Public, Atty. Liberato Tadeo, respondent and Ma. Elena executed and signed an affidavit attesting to their illicit relationship and seeking their respective spouses' forgiveness. Despite this, complainant filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against respondent. Issue: Whether the pardon extended by complainant in the Affidavit is sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the present disbarment case against respondent for gross immoral conduct. Held: No. It has been consistently held by the Court that possession of good moral character is not only a condition for admission to the Bar but is a continuing requirement to maintain one's good standing in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of law practitioners to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the Bar.9 Consequently, any errant behaviour on the part of a lawyer, be it in his public or private activities, which tends to show him deficient in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant his suspension or disbarment. In this case, respondent admitted his illicit relationship with a married woman not his wife, and worse, that of his client. Contrary to respondent's claim, their consortium cannot be classified as a mere "moment of indiscretion"10 considering that it lasted for two (2) years and was only aborted when complainant overheard their amorous phone conversation.
It bears to stress that a case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the courts. It is not an investigation into the acts of respondent as a husband but on his conduct as an officer of the Court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar.15 Hence, the Affidavit dated March 15, 1995, which is akin to an affidavit of desistance, cannot have the effect of abating the instant proceedings.
3. MELVYN G. GARCIA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. SESBRENO, Respondent A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457, February 3, 2015
RAUL
H.
Facts: Respondent’s services was availed of by the complainant’s children in an action for support. Complainant claims that respondent cannot practice law because he was convicted of the crime of homicide. A crime complainant claims to be one involving moral turpitude. Respondent on the other hand claims that his sentence was commuted and the phrase "with the inherent accessory penalties provided by law" was deleted. He argued that even if the accessory penalty was not deleted, the disqualification applies only during the term of the sentence. He further alleged that homicide does not involve moral turpitude. Issue: Whether or not homicide is a crime involving moral turpitude Held: In this case yes. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended as attorney by this Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. This Court has ruled that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. The IBP-CBD correctly stated that
the victims in the homicide involving respondent were just at the wrong place and time. They did not do anything that justified the indiscriminate firing done by respondent that eventually led to their death. We cannot accept respondent’s argument that the executive clemency restored his full civil and political rights. The Order of Commutation did not state that the pardon was absolute and unconditional. The accessory penalties were not mentioned when the original sentence was recited in the Order of Commutation and they were also not mentioned in stating the commuted sentence.
4. JOVITO S. OLAZO, Complainant, vs. JUSTICE (Ret.), Respondent. A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC, December 7, 2010
DANTE
O.
TINGA
Facts: The respondent is charged of violating Rule 6.02, Rule 6.03 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests. The complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel of land. The Committee on Awards was headed by the Director of Lands and the respondent was one of the Committee members, in his official capacity as the Congressman of Taguig and Pateros (from 1987 to 1998); the respondent’s district includes the areas covered by the proclamations. The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02 The complainant alleged that the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over the complainant’s father, Miguel P. Olazo, for the latter to contest the complainant’s sales application and claim the subject land for himself. The complainant further claimed that the respondent brokered the transfer of rights of the subject land between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is the nephew of the respondent’s deceased wife.
As a result of the respondent’s abuse of his official functions, the complainant’s sales application was denied. The conveyance of rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and his sales application were subsequently given due course by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03 The second charge involves another parcel of land within the proclaimed areas belonging to Manuel Olazo, the complainant’s brother. The complainant alleged that the respondent persuaded Miguel Olazo to direct Manuel to convey his rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a result of the respondent’s promptings, the rights to the land were transferred to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01 The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct considering his knowledge that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a qualified beneficiary under Memorandum No. 119. The complainant averred that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona fide resident of the proclaimed areas and does not qualify for an award. Thus, the approval of his sales application by the Committee on Awards amounted to a violation of the objectives of Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum No. 119. Issue: Whether or not respondent was guilty of violating the Code of Judicial Ethics Held: We find the absence of any concrete proof that the respondent abused his position as a Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards in the manner defined under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The circumstances do not show that the respondent did in any way promote, advance or use his private interests in the discharge of his official duties. To repeat, since the sales application was not brought before the Committee on Awards when the respondent was still a member, no sufficient basis exists to conclude that he used his position to obtain personal benefits. We note in this regard that the denial of the complainant’s sales application over the subject land was made by the DENR, not by the Committee on Awards. As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously interfered with the sales application covering Manuel’s land when the former was still a member of the Committee on Awards. The complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the respondent was engaged in the practice of law. At face value, the legal service rendered by the respondent was limited only in the preparation of a single document. In Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc., we specifically described private practice of law as one that contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.
In any event, even granting that respondent’s act fell within the definition of practice of law, the available pieces of evidence are insufficient to show that the legal representation was made before the Committee on Awards, or that the Assurance was intended to be presented before it. These are matters for the complainant to prove and we cannot consider any uncertainty in this regard against the respondent’s favor.
