CANON 6 1. GENERAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY (GBTC); WORLDWIDE INSURANCE AND SURETY COMPANY (WORLDWIDE); MIDLAND INSURANCE CORPORATION (MIDLAND); AND STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC. (STANDARD) v. THE OMBUDSMAN; OMB-GIO RAUL E. TOTANES AND ASSISTANT SOLICITOR GENERAL MAGDANGAL M. DE LEON G.R. No. 125440, January 31, 2000, THIRD DIVISION, (GONZAGA-REYES, J.) To be liable under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the five aforementioned elements must concur. In the absence of proof that respondent ASG de Leon acted with manifest partiality in pursuing the official stand of the OSG in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939, respondent ASG de Leon cannot be liable under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Thus, the failure of petitioners to prove the fifth element is fatal to their cause. General Bank and Trust Company (GBTC), Worldwide Insurance and Surety Company (Worldwide), Midland Insurance Corporation (Midland) and Standard Insurance Co., Inc. (Standard) filed a complaint against respondent ASG de Leon for violating Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). What prompted petitioners to file a complaint against respondent ASG de Leon with the Ombudsman is the alleged "inconsistent position" of said respondent in Spec. Proc. No. 107812 and in Civil Case No. 0005 filed with Sandiganbayan. Civil Case No. 0005 is an ill-gotten wealth case filed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) through the OSG on July 17, 1987. This case was instituted against Lucio Tan, former President Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, et. al. Petitioners point out that in Civil Case No. 0005, the first of the causes of actions therein as stated in Par. 14 (a)-(1) to (3) alleges that: (A)The Marcos-dominated Central Bank Closure of GBTC under MB Resolution, March 25, 1977 ; (B) The LUCIO TAN'S (sic) takeover of GBTC under MB Resolution, March 29, 1977 ; are illegal, fraudulent and arbitrary, made thru conspiracy with and taking advantage of the close relationship between the LUCIO TAN Group and the deposed President and Wife, other CB officials, with the help and manipulation of then CB Governor Gregorio S. Licaros and former PNB President Panfilo O. Domingo xxx. The charge that respondent ASG de Leon espoused conflicting interests rests on the contention of petitioners that said respondent's act of defending the legality of the Central Bank closure of GBTC amounts to defending the interest of Lucio Tan and the Central Bank. Petitioners maintain that the position taken by the OSG
represented by respondent ASG de Leon in Spec. Proc. No. 107812 is "against the 'interest of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines' ". Petitioners wrote respondent ASG de Leon that he inhibit himself from appearing in Spec. Proc. No. 107812 and to defend the interest of the Government of the Philippines as against the interest of Lucio Tan in Civil Case No. 0005. When respondent ASG de Leon for OSG continued to represent the Central Bank in Spec. Proc. No. 107812, petitioners then filed the complaint against respondent with the Office of the Ombudsman. On investigation of the Ombudsman, it was dismissed. The Motion for reconsideration was also denied. ISSUE: Is ASG De Leon liable for violating RA 3019 for representing conflicting interest? RULING: No We affirm the finding that respondent ASG de Leon cannot be held criminally liable for violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. In defending the Central Bank, respondent was performing his legal duty to defend the interest of the Government and was merely pursuing the position taken by it. Whatever legal services respondent ASG de Leon rendered in favor of the Central Bank in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939 were made in his official capacity as a member of the legal staff of the OSG. We note that in all of the pleadings filed by the OSG in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939, the signature of respondent ASG de Leon appeared therein as Solicitor and later on as Assistant Solicitor General. However, it must be noted that these pleadings also bore the signatures of the Solicitor General and other members of the legal staff of the Office of the Solicitor General. Hence, the acts of respondent ASG de Leon had the imprimatur of the OSG which had consistently defended the interest of the Central Bank in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939. Four Solicitor Generals, Estelito Mendoza, Sedfrey Ordoñez, Frank Chavez and Raul I. Goco have maintained the policy of defending the closure of GBTC by the Central Bank and respondent ASG de Leon merely acted with the other officials of the OSG in representing the State. To be liable under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the five aforementioned elements must concur. In the absence of proof that respondent ASG de Leon acted with manifest partiality in pursuing the official stand of the OSG in Spec. Proc. No. 107812/CA-G.R. CV No. 39939, respondent ASG de Leon cannot be liable under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Thus, the failure of petitioners to prove the fifth element is fatal to their cause. 2. LORENZO JOSE v. CA AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-38581, March 31, 1976, FIRST DIVISION (Muñoz-Palma, J.) Key Doctrine: “A prosecuting officer, as the representative of a sovereignty whose obligation and interest in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case but that justice shall be done, has the solemn responsibility to assure the public that while guilt shall not escape, innocence shall not suffer.” Jose was arrested by the local police leading to the filing of several criminal cases against him to wit: illegal discharge of firearm, robbery and illegal possession of explosives. These 3 cases were jointly tried after which Hon. Honorio Romero acquitted accused Lorenzo Jose of illegal discharge of firearm and robbery, but convicted him for illegal possession of the handgrenade that was found on his person at the time of his arrest. Jose appealed and 9 days thereafter he filed a motion praying that the case be reopened to permit him to present, pursuant to a reservation he had made in the course of the trial, a permit to possess the handgrenade in question. The trial court denied the motion mainly on the ground that it had lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the perfection of the appeal. The records were then elevated to the CA where Jose raised the issues of (1) an erroneous conviction for illegal possession of explosives when there was no proof of an essential element of the crime, and (2) erroneous denial of his motion to reopen the case for the reception of his permit to possess the handgrenade. Jose prayed for his acquittal or in the alternative for the remand of the case back to the trial court for a new trial. The CA affirmed the conviction and declaring that no reversible error was committed by the latter when it denied the reopening of the case as the court had lost its "power to change, modify, or alter its decision. A motion for reconsideration was filed by Jose to review the ruling of CA. The Solicitor General opposed the granting of the foregoing motion for reconsideration claiming that there was neither a denial of "substantial justice nor error of any sort on the part of respondent Court of Appeals, affirming the judgment of conviction," and that it being admitted by petitioner that the evidence sought to be introduced by him at the new trial is not newly discovered evidence, the denial of the new trial "visibly appears as correct". A manifestation was submitted by the Solicitor General informing the Court that in view of the "persistence of Jose both before this Honorable Court and CA as to his alleged existing appointment as PC Agent and/or authority to possess handgrenade," in the interest of justice, he was constrained to make pertinent inquiries from the PC Chief, Gen. Fidel V. Ramos who in reply sent
his letter stating that Jose was appointed as a PC Agent of the Pampanga Constabulary Command with Code Number P-36-68 and Code Name "Safari" with expiration on December 31, 1968, the pertinent portion of which We quote: "This Headquarters will, from time to time, provide you firearms and such other equipment which it may deem necessary for your personal protection on the need basis which will be covered by separate written authority." ISSUE: May the case of Jose be reopened given the circumstance that he was appointed as a constabulary? HELD: YES. At the outset, We give due credit to the Solicitor General and his staff for upholding the timehonored principle set forth in perspicuous terms by this Court in Suarez vs. Platon, et al., that a prosecuting officer, as the representative of a sovereignty whose obligation and interest in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case but that justice shall be done, has the solemn responsibility to assure the public that while guilt shall not escape, innocence shall not suffer. The Solicitor General now concedes that the interests of justice will best be served by remanding this case to the court of origin for a new trial. We do not question the correctness of the findings of the Court of Appeals that the evidence sought to be presented by Jose do not fall under the category of newly-discovered evidence because the same his alleged appointment as an agent of the Philippine Constabulary and a permit to possess a handgrenade were supposed to be known to petitioner and existing at the time of trial and not discovered only thereafter. Surely, the Rules of Court were conceived and promulgated to aid and not to obstruct the proper administration of justice, to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hands that dispense justice, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. Thus Jose was facing a criminal prosecution for illegal possession of a handgrenade in the court below. He claimed to be an agent of the Philippine Constabulary with a permit to possess explosives such as the handgrenade in question. However, he found himself in a situation where he had to make a choice reveal his identity as an undercover agent of the Philippine Constabulary assigned to perform intelligence work on subversive activities and
face possible reprisals or even liquidation at the hands of the dissidents considering that Floridablanca, the site of the incident, was in the heart of "Huklandia", or ride on the hope of a possible exoneration or acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution. Without revealing his identity as an agent of the Philippine Constabulary, he claimed before the trial judge that he had a permit to possess the handgrenade and prayed for time to present the same. The permit however could not be produced because it would reveal his intelligence work activities. Came the judgment of conviction and with it the staggering impact of a five-year imprisonment. The competent authorities then realized that it was unjust for this man to go to jail for a crime he had not committed, hence, came the desired evidence concerning petitioner's appointment as a Philippine Constabulary agent and his authority to possess a handgrenade for the protection of his person, but, it was too late according to the trial court because in the meantime the accused had perfected his appeal. CANON 7 1. ATTY. AILEEN R. MAGLANA v. ATTY. JOSE VICENTE R. OPINION B.M. No. 2713, 10 June 2013, Brion, J.
considering that he also ran for Governor and lost in the immediately preceding term. Atty. Opinion stated that he received an opinion dated April 2, 2013 from Governor Vicente M. Joyas, Chairman of the IBP Executive Committee, pertinently stating that his having lost the Governorship elections for Eastern Visayas in 2011 does not disqualify his Chapter from seeking an election for Governorship. After heated debates on the proper interpretation of the rotation rule to the present case, Governor Enage eventually ruled that Atty. Opinion was disqualified from running for the position. Some delegates protested and moved for the election’s suspension and the issue be resolved by the IBP BOG. This motion was however was denied and the election proceeded. Upon counting the ballots, Atty. Maglana was declared as the duly elected Governor. Atty. Opinion filed an election protest with the IBP BOG, raising among others the point that IBP Samar Chapter had waived its turn in the rotation when it did not field a candidate for Governor in the 2007, 2009 and 2011 elections. Atty. Maglana, in her Comment, stated that Samar Chapter did not waive its turn in the rotation. She also noted that Bar Matter No. 586 mandates the strict implementation of the rotation rule. The IBP BOG granted Atty. Opinion’s election protest.
Despite the call for strict implementation of the Rotation Rule under BM No. 586, it admits an exception under Section 39, Article VI of the IBP amended by-laws, allowing a chapter to waive its turn in the rotation order, subject to its right to reclaim the governorship at any time before the rotation is completed.
ISSUE.
FACTS.
HELD.
On May 25, 2013, thirteen delegates of the IBP Eastern Visayas Region gathered at the Session Hall of the RTC, Branch 24 in Maasin, Leyte, to elect the Governor of their region for the 2013-2015 term. Upon a motion duly seconded, Atty. Maglana - the incumbent President of IBP Samar Chapter - was nominated for the position of Governor. Atty. Maglana then moved to declare that only IBP Samar Chapter was qualifiedto be voted upon for the position of Governor, to the exclusion of all the other eight (8) chapters. Atty. Maglana cited the rotation rule under Bar Matter No. 491 and argued that since 1989 or the start of the implementation of the rotation rule, only IBP Samar Chapter had not served as Governor for IBP Eastern Visayas.
YES. In its Resolution in Bar Matter No. 586the Court decreed without amending Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws that the rotation rule should be strictly implemented "so that all prior elections for governor in the region shall be reckoned with or considered in determining who should be the governor to be selected from the different chapters to represent the region in the Board of Governors.” This rule, however, admits of an exception which allows a chapter to waive its turn in the rotation order, subject to its right to reclaim the governorship at any time before the rotation is completed.
Atty. Opinion, the candidate of the IBP Eastern Samar Chapter, thereafter, took the floor and manifested that before he decided to run for Governor, he sought the opinion of the IBP if he was still qualified to run
Did the IBP Samar Chapter waived its turn in the rotation order so that it can no longer claim its right to the governorship position for the 2013-2015 term?
We cannot sustain Atty. Maglana’s arguments, that: (1) the first rotation cycle in IBP Eastern Visayas region had not been completed in 2007; and (2) that the rotation cycle can only be completed once a nominee from IBP Samar Chapter had served as governor for the 20132015 term, for two reasons.
First, the IBP BOG established x x x[that] Samar either did not field any candidate from 1989 to 2007 or it failed to invoke the rotation rule to challenge the nominations of those candidates whose chapters had already been represented in the rotation cycle.Because of this waiver of its turn in the first rotation cycle, we conclude that the first rotation cycle had been completed in 2007.
of the IBP Western Visayas Region. The presidents composing of IBP Western Visayas Region filed their Comments-in-Intervention, praying for the lifting of the TRO without prejudice to the resolution on the Urgent Motion. Atty. Daquilanea espoused the view that upon the completion of a rotational cycle, elections should be open to all chapters of the region subject to the exclusionary rule.
Second, Atty. Maglana cannot simply reclaim IBP Samar Chapter’s right to the governorship in the 20132015 term because it is contrary to Section 39, Article VI, as amended, of the IBP By-Laws. This provision states that the chapter which has waived its turn in the rotation cycle may reclaim its right to the governorship at any time before the rotation is completed. Having been established that the first rotational cycle had been completed in the 2005-2007 term, the IBP Samar Chapter can no longer belatedly reclaim its right to the governorship in the 20132015 term as it should have exercised its claim on or before the completion of the first rotation cycle in 2007.
Issue
2. IN THE MATTER OF THE BREWING CONTROVERSIES IN THE ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES. A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC, December 04, 2012, EN BANC Key Doctrine: Election through ‘rotation by exclusion’ is the more established rule in the IBP. The rule prescribes that once a member of the chapter would be excluded in the next turn until all have taken their turns in the rotation cycle. Once a full rotation cycle ends and a fresh cycle commences, all the chapters in the region are once again entitled to vie but subject again to the rule on rotation by exclusion. Facts This case has its origin in the 2010 resolution of the same title1. In the 2010 resolution, the court held that the “rotation rule” under Sec. 37 and 39 of the IBP ByLaws should be strictly implemented, “so that all prior elections for governor in the region shall be reckoned with or considered in determining who should be the governor to be selected from the different chapters to represent the region in the Board of Governors.” Gov. Fortunato of the IBP Western Visayas Region and Atty. Daquilanea sought the clarification on the application of the said rule in their respective regions. Later on, CJ Corona issued a TRO (pending the resolution of the motion for clarification) on the election 1 I have included my digest of the 2010 case below.
In the nominations for the Governor of IBPWestern Visayas and the start of a new rotational cycle, is it a) once again open to all chapters subject to the rule on “rotation by exclusion”; or b) limited only to the chapter first in the previous rotation cycle, following the previous sequence or “rotation by pre-ordained sequence.”? Ruling The rule should be rotation by exclusion as it is the more established rule in the IBP. The rule prescribes that once a member of the chapter is elected as Governor, his chapter would be excluded in the next turn until all have taken their turns in the rotation cycle. Once a full rotation cycle ends and a fresh cycle commences, all the chapters in the region are once again entitled to vie but subject again to the rule on rotation by exclusion. This allows for a more democratic election process. The rule provides for freedom of choice while upholding the equitable principle of rotation which assures the every member-chapter has its turn in every rotation cycle. On the other hand, rotation by pre-ordained sequence, or election based on the same order as the previous cycle, tends to defeat the purpose of an election. The element of choice – which is crucial to a democratic process – is virtually removed. Only one chapter could vie for election at every turn as the entire sequence, from first to last, is already predetermined by the order in the previous rotation cycle. This concept of rotation by preordained sequence negates freedom of choice, which is the bedrock of any democratic election process2. The Court takes notice of the predictability of the rotation by succession scheme. Through the rotation by exclusion scheme, the elections would be more genuine as 2 EG. if the previous cycle is province A – B – C, after the term of C, A would be the one who will be eligible for election as distinguished from rotation by exclusion where after the term of C, all of them shall be again qualified to run for a new cycle subject to the exclusion that after their election, the remaining chapters shall be the ones eligible. Thus, under the latter, after C, it is A or B that should be eligible.
the opportunity to serve as Governor at any time is once again open to all chapters, unless, of course, a chapter has already served in the new cycle. While predictability is not altogether avoided, as in the case where only one chapter remains in the cycle, still, as previously noted by the Court “the rotation rule should be applied in harmony with, and not in derogation of, the sovereign will of the electorate as expressed through the ballot.” NB – *another issue. Atty. Vinluan, the Executive VP of the IBP was removed from his position due to the 2010 resolution, IBP Southern-Luzon argued that since the Court removed its member, Atty. Vinluan, for the 20072009 term, it should not now be prejudiced and disallowed to vie for the position of Executive Vice-President of the IBP for the 2011-2013 term as to do so would be a violation of the rotation rule. Gov. Fortunato however argues that Atty. Vinluan was actually able to serve his 2007-2009 term as Executive Vice President even if he was later on disqualified by the Court in December 14, 2010 Resolution. To allow IBP-Southern Luzon to vie for the position of Executive Vice President of the IBP for the 2011-2013 term would allow said chapter to serve twice as Executive Vice President. The court ordered the IBP Board of Governors to file a comment on this issue. In the matter of the brewing controversies in the election in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC, December 14, 2010, EN BANC, CORONA, C.J. Facts A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC and A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC originated from three (3) separate Protests filed regarding the elections for the Regional Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for the Greater Manila Region (hereafter, GMR), Western Visayas, and Western Mindanao held in April 2007 for a term of two (2) years starting July 1, 2007. The GMR Election Protest (Atty. Elpidio Soriano v. Atty. Manuel M. Maramba) Atty. Victoria Loanzon, Treasurer of the IBPQuezon City Chapter (IBP-QC Chapter) requested the office of the IBP President Atty. Feliciano Bautista, seeking an interpretation of Section 8 on the Chapter ByLaws of Article IV and Sec. 31, Article V of the IBP ByLaws in reference to the qualification of the delegates who would vote in the election for GMR Governor on April 25, 2009. Through Resolution No. XVIII-2009, the Board of Governors headed by Atty. Bautista, held that “the additional delegate(s) shall be elected by the Board of
Officers of the Chapter only from among the remaining duly elected officers and members of the Board.” Believing that the resolution imposed an additional qualification for the Delegates to be elected by the Board of Officers of IBP Chapters that are entitled to more than two (2) delegates the QC chapter requested the recall of Resolution No. XVIII-2009. On April 23, 2009, five (5) members of the Board of Governors headed by Exec. V.P. Rogelio Vinluan recalled the said resolution and resolved further that the election of the additional delegate(s) for Chapters entitled to more than two (2) delegates shall be elected by the Board of Officers of the Chapter from among the general membership who are in good standing. The IBP-QC chapter then nominated Atty. Elpidio G. Soriano III as candidate for the position of Governor for the Greater Manila Region (GMR). At the same time, the chapter elected its Delegates for the election of the IBP Governor for GMR to be held on April 25, 2009. On April 25, 2009, GMR Governor Magsino, acknowledged the Resolution No. XVIII-2009 and declared declared Atty. Loanzon and Atty. Laqui as Delegates of the IBP-QC Chapter, entitled to vote in the election of the GMR Governor. Although his declaration was challenged, Gov. Magsino defended that the resolution of Vinluan was void since there was no Quorum during the special meeting. Thereafter, the elections were held. Atty. Soriano and Atty. Maramba were nominated for the position of IBP Governor for GMR. After the casting of votes and counting of ballots, including those cast by Loanzon and Laqui (the alleged non-delegates), Atty. Maramba was declared winner by garnering a vote of 13 as against Atty. Soriano's 12 The Western Mindanao Region Election Protest (Atty. Benjamin B. Lanto v. Atty. Nasser Marohomsalic) During the April 25, 2009 meeting for the nomination/election of the candidates for the Regional Governor of Western Mindanao, Atty. Lanto, from IBPLanao del Sur Chapter, informed the delegates that the Board of Officers of his Chapter--through a resolution signed by all its officers except for Chapter President Atty. Macalawi--officially nominated Lanto for Regional Governor of Western Mindanao. Despite said resolution, Macalawi nominated Atty. Nasser Marohomsalic for Regional Governor of Western Mindanao. The nomination of Marohomsalic was recognized and accepted by the presiding officer, outgoing Gov. Carlos L. Valdez
Jr. Lanto and Marohomsalic each received five (5) votes after the votes were counted. On April 27, 2009, Lanto filed a Protest questioning Marohomsalic's nomination and the counting of votes in his favor and claiming that under Section 6, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, only one nominee shall come from any IBP chapter. He asserted that the Chapter's Board of Officers, not the Chapter President, by a majority vote shall determine the Chapter's official nominee for Governor of its region. The Western Visayas Region Election Protest (Atty. Cornelio P. Aldon and Atty. Benjamin Ortega v. Atty. Erwin Fortunato) Atty. Erwin Fortunato of the IBP-Romblon Chapter was proclaimed the duly elected Regional Governor for Western Visayas in the April 25, 2009 elections. In separate protests, Atty. Cornelio P. Aldon of IBP-Antique Chapter and Atty. Benjamin Ortega of IBPNegros Occidental Chapter claimed they were nominated by their respective chapters for Governor of Western Visayas but were not allowed to be elected on account of the "Rotation Rule" under Sections 37 and 39 of the IBP By-Laws. Despite their disqualification, Ortega obtained three (3) votes, Aldon obtained one (1) vote; and Fortunato, the eventual winner, obtained five votes, with one (1) delegate opting to abstain. Aldon and Ortega argued that the rotation rule is merely directory and not mandatory and claimed a failure of elections, as nominees from the other chapters were disqualified Resolutions of the protests (by the Board of Governors) In its subsequent resolutions, the protests of Atty. Fortunato and Soriano III were upheld. Atty. Fortunato was declared as the duly elected IBP Gov. of Western Visayas. A new election of the IBP GMR was ordered where Soriano III won as IBP Governor. In the case of Atty. Lanto, the protest of Atty. Marohomsalic was denied and further on declared Atty. Lanto as the duly elected IBP Governor of the Western Mindanao Region. Election of the next IBP Executive Vice President (EVP) On May 9 2009, two (2) simultaneous elections for the Executive Vice President for the 2009-2011 term was held - one was called and presided over by Executive Vice President Rogelio Vinluan, while the other election for the same position was presided over by outgoing IBP Pres. Feliciano Bautista. GMR Gov. Soriano was elected as the next Executive vice president during the elections
presided over by Atty. Vinluan while in the meeting presided by Bautista, Atty. Roan Libarios was elected as the next IBP EVP. Because of the disputes relating to the elections for Governor of the GMR, EVP of the IBP and other IBP Positions the SC through an En Banc Resolution created a Special Committee to investigate. Issue 1. What is the correct interpretation of Section 31, Article V of the IBP By Laws? 2. Who was validly elected Governor for the Greater Manila Region? 3. Who was validly elected Governor for Western Visayas Region? 4. Who was validly elected Governor for Western Mindanao Region? 5. Who was validly elected IBP Executive Vice President for the next term? 6. WON Atty. Rogelio Vinluan is guilty under the administrative complaint for "grave professional misconduct, violation of attorney's oath, and acts inimical to the IBP” Ruling 1. There is a manifest intention in Sec. 31, Art. V of the By-Laws to reserve membership in the House of Delegates (which is the deliberative body of the IBP) for the elected officers of the Chapter since they have already received the mandate of the general membership of the Chapter. Thus, Attys. Loanzon and Laqui were properly recognized as delegates of the QC Chapter. 2. Given that Atty. Loanzon and Atty. Laqui were valid delegates, Atty. Maramba is the duly elected IBP Gov. of the GMR. Furthermore, Atty. Soriano III is disqualified under principle of rotation of the governorship (Bar Matter No. 586, May 14, 1991). Governorship shall rotate once in as many terms as the number of chapters there are in the region, to give every chapter a chance to represent the region in the Board of Governors.1 3. Atty. Erwin Fortunato of the Romblon Chapter was duly elected as Governor for the Western Visayas Region not only because he obtained the highest number of votes among the three (3) candidates for the position, but also because under the rotation rule, it is now the turn of the Romblon Chapter to represent the Western Visayas Region in the IBP Board of Governors.
4. It was Atty. Nasser Marohomsalic not Atty. Benjamin Lanto that is qualified to be elected Governor of Western Mindanao Region. The special committee reported that the resolution declaring Atty. Lanto as a delegate cannot be held valid since there was a withdrawal of nine (9) signatures from the Resolution, left only four (4) votes in support of Lanto's nomination - a puny minority of the 14member Board of Officers of the Lanao del Sur Chapter. 5. The elections for the IBP Executive Vice President separately held on May 9, 2009 by the Vinluan Group were null and void for lack of quorum. The presence of five (5) Governors-elect is needed to constitute a quorum of the 9member Board of Governors-elect who shall elect the Executive Vice President. In the case of Vinluan group, Atty. Soriano (GMR) and Atty. Lanto (Western Mindanao Region) were among the six Governors who elected Atty. Soriano as EVP, but since Soriano and Lanto were not validly elected IBP Governors the election held was null and void. 6. The Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "(a) lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Added to this, Rule 7.03, Canon 7 requires that "(a) lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Atty. Vinluan who presided the special meeting on April 23, 2009 violated Sec. 42, Art. VI of the By-Laws which provides that it is the President who shall call a special meeting, and it is also the President who shall preside over the meeting, not Atty. Vinluan, the EVP. Thus, the resolution of the meeting recalling Resolution No. XVIII-2009 was null and void since the meeting was illegal. Furthermore, under Vinluan, a Board Resolution was passed declaring Pres. Bautista "unfit to preside" over the election and "designating EVP Vinluan to preside over the election" in lieu of Pres. Bautista. This resolution according to the SC, was uncalled and unwarranted, and caused disunity and disorder in the IBP. The acts of Atty. Vinluan's Group in defying President Bautista, due to Atty. Vinluan's desire to propel his fraternity brother, Atty. Elpidio G. Soriano, to the next presidency of the IBP, smacked of politicking, which is strongly condemned and strictly prohibited by the IBP By-Laws and the Bar Integration Rule. With the premises considered, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan et. Al. are all found GUILTY of grave professional misconduct arising from their actuations in connection with the controversies in the elections in the
IBP and are hereby disqualified to run as national officers of the IBP in any subsequent election. 3. ATTY. OSCAR L. EMBIDO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, WESTERN VISA YAS, REGIONAL OFFICE NBI-WEVRO), FOR SAN PEDRO, ILOILO CITY vs. ATTY. SALVADOR N. PE, JR., ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, SAN JOSE, ANTIQUE A.C. No. 6732, October 22, 2013, DECISION (BERSAMIN, J.) Key doctrine: A lawyer who forges a court decision and represents it as that of a court of law is guilty of the gravest misconduct and deserves the supreme penalty of disbarment. Facts: On July 7, 2004, Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya, Clerk of Court of the RTC, received a written communication from Mr. Ballam Delaney Hunt, a Solicitor in the United Kingdom (UK). The letter requested a copy of the decision dated February 12, 1997 rendered by Judge Rafael O. Penuela in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna, whose petitioner was one Shirley Quioyo. Judge Penuela instructed the civil docket clerk to retrieve the records of Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna. It was then discovered that the RTC had no record of Special Proceedings No. 084 wherein Shirley Quioyo was the petitioner. Instead, the court files revealed that Judge Penuela had decided Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rolando Austria, whose petitioner was one Serena Catin Austria. Informed that the requested decision and case records did not exist,Mr. Hunt sent a letter dated October 12, 2004 attaching a machine copy of the purported decision in Special Proceedings No. 084 that had been presented by Shirley Quioyo in court proceedings in the UK. After comparing the two documents and ascertaining that the document attached to the October 12, 2004 letter was a falsified court document, Judge Penuela wrote Mr. Hunt to apprise him of the situation. In the meanwhile, Dy Quioyo, a brother of Shirley Quioyo, executed an affidavit on March 4, 2005,wherein he stated that it was the respondent who had facilitated the issuance of the falsified decision in Special Proceedings No. 084 for a fee of P60,000.00. The allegations against
the respondent were substantially corroborated by Mary Rose Quioyo, a sister of Shirley Quioyo, in an affidavit. The NBI invited the respondent to explain his side,but he invoked his constitutional right to remain silent. After conducting its investigation, the NBI forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman for Visayas the records of the investigation, with a recommendation that the respondent be prosecuted for falsification of public document and for violation of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).The NBI likewise recommended to the Office of the Court Administrator that disbarment proceedings be commenced against the respondent. Respondent denied any participation in the falsification. He insisted that Dy Quioyo had sought his opinion on Shirley’s petition for the annulment of her marriage; that he had given advice on the pertinent laws involved and the different grounds for the annulment of marriage; that in June 2004, Dy Quioyo had gone back to him to present a copy of what appeared to be a court decision; and that he had also learned from Atty. Angeles Orquia, Jr. that one Mrs. Florencia Jalipa, a resident of Igbalangao, Bugasong, Antique, had executed a sworn statement before Police Investigator Herminio Dayrit with the assistance of Atty. Orquia, Jr. to the effect that her late husband, Manuel Jalipa, had been responsible for making the falsified document at the instance of Dy Quioyo. In its Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors suspended the respondent from the practice of law for six years. Issue: Whether respondent was guilty of misconduct? Ruling: Yes. Respondent’s denial and his implication against Dy Quioyo in the illicit generation of the falsified decision are not persuasive. Dy Quioyo’s categorical declaration on the respondent’s personal responsibility for the falsified decision, which by nature was positive evidence, was not overcome by the respondent’s blanket denial, which by nature was negative evidence. The respondent relied on the sworn statement supposedly executed by Mrs. Jalipa that declared that her deceased husband had been instrumental in the falsification of the forged decision. But such reliance was outrightly worthless, for the sworn statement of the wife was rendered unreliable due to its patently hearsay character. In addition, the unworthiness of the sworn statement as proof of authorship of the falsification by the
husband is immediately exposed and betrayed by the falsified decision being an almost verbatim reproduction of the authentic decision penned by Judge Penuela in the real Special Proceedings Case No. 084. In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for having authored the falsification of the decision in a non-existent court proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession." Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND PRONOUNCES ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR. guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and DISBARS him effective upon receipt of this decision. CANON 8 SPOUSES WILLIE and AMELIA UMAGUING, Complainants, vs. ATTY. WALLEN R. DE VERA, Respondent. A.C. No. 10451, February 4, 2015 Note: Should be under Canon 10, not 8 Mariecris Umaguing, daughter of complainants, ran for the position of SK Chairman in 2007 but lost to her rival Bungag by one vote. Because of this, complainants lodged an election protest and enlisted the services of Atty. De Vera. On November 7, 2007, complainants were asked by Atty. De Vera to pay his acceptance fee of P30,000 plus various court appearance fees and miscellaneous expenses in the amount ofP30,000.00. According to the complainants, Atty. De Vera had more than enough time to prepare and file the case but the former only took action when the November 8, 2008 deadline was looming. Atty. De Vera then rushed the preparation of the necessary documents and attachments for the election protest. Two (2) of these attachments are the Affidavits of material witnesses Mark Anthony Lachica and Angela Almera which were personally prepared by Atty. De Vera. At the time that the aforesaid affidavits were to be signed by Lachica and
Almera, they were unfortunately unavailable. To remedy this, Atty. DeVera allegedly instructed Abeth Lalong-Isip and Hendricson Fielding to look for the nearest kin of Lachica and Almera and ask them to sign over the names.They were signed by Papin and Almera-Almacen, respectively. Atty. De Vera then had all the documents notarized before one Atty. Donato Manguiat. Later, however, Lachica discovered the falsification and immediately disowned the signature affixed in the affidavit and submitted his own Affidavit, declaring that he did not authorize Papin to sign the document on his behalf. Lachica’s affidavit was presented to the MeTC and drew the ire of Presiding Judge Edgardo Belosillo who ruled that the affidavits filed by Atty. De Vera were falsified. Judge Belosillo pointed out that while Atty. De Vera filed a pleading to rectify this error seeking, among others, the withdrawal of Lachica’s and Almera’s affidavits, it was observed that such was a mere flimsy excuse since Atty. De Vera had ample amount of time to have the affidavits personally signed by the affiants but still hastily filed the election protest with full knowledge that the affidavits at hand were falsified. In further breach of his oath as a lawyer, the complainants pointed out that Atty. De Vera did not appear before the MeTC, although promptly notified, for a certain December 11, 2007 hearing; and did not offer any explanation as to why he was not able to attend. Atty. De Vera explained that he was hesitant in handling the particular case because of the alleged favoritism of Judge Belosillo. According to Atty. De Vera, Judge Belosillo received P60,000.00 from the defense counsel, Atty. Carmelo Culvera, in order to acquire a favorable decision for his client. Atty. De Vera averred that he would only appear for the case if the complainants would give him P80,000.00, which he would in turn, give to Judge Belosillo to secure a favorable decision for Umaguing. For lack of trust and confidence in the integrity and competency of Atty. De Vera, as well as his breach of fiduciary relations, the complainants asked the former to withdraw as their counsel and to reimburse them the P60,000.00 in excessive fees he collected from them, considering that he only appeared twice for the case. Atty. De Vera explained that the signing of Lachica’s falsified Affidavit was done without his knowledge and likewise stated that it was Papin who should be indicted and charged with the corresponding criminal offense. He pointed out that along with his Formal Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel, complainants executed a document entitled "Release Waiver &
Discharge," which, to him, discharges him and his law firm from all causes of action that complainants may have against him, including the instant administrative case. The IBP imposed a suspension of one month for knowingly submitting a falsified document in court. Issue: Should Atty. De Vera be held administratively liable? Held: The Court agrees with the IBP in holding that Atty. De Vera sanctioned the submission of a falsified affidavitbefore the court in his desire to beat the November 8, 2008 deadline for filing the election protest of Umaguing. The assertion that Atty. De Vera authorized the falsification of Almera’s affidavit is rendered more believable by the absence of Atty. De Vera’s comment on the same. In his Motion for Reconsideration, no specific denial was proffered by Atty. De Vera on this score. Instead, he only asserted that he was not the one who notarized the subject affidavits but another notary public. Unfortunately for Atty. De Vera, the Court views the same to be a mere general denial which cannot overcome Elsa Almera-Almacen’s positive testimony that he indeed participated in the procurement of her signature and the signing of the affidavit, all in support of the claim of falsification. The final lining to it all is that Almera’s affidavit was submitted to the MeTC in the election protest case. The belated retraction of the questioned affidavits, does not, for this Court, merit significant consideration as its submission appears to be a mere afterthought, prompted only by the discovery of the falsification. Truth be told, it is highly improbable for Atty. De Vera to have remained in the dark about the authenticity of the documents he himself submitted to the court when his professional duty requires him to represent his client with zeal and within the bounds of the law. Likewise, he is prohibited from handling any legal matter without adequate preparation or allowing his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case. On a related point, the Court deems it apt to clarify that the document captioned "Release Waiver & Discharge" which Atty. De Vera, in his Counter-Affidavit, claimed to have discharged him from all causes of action that complainants may have against him, such as the present case, would not deny the Court its power to sanction him administratively. It was held in Ylaya v. Gacott that:A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven.
All told, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by submitting a falsified document before a court. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera is found GUILTY of violating the Lawyer's Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the practice of law, effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a stem warning that any repetition of the same or similar acts will be punished more severely. Moreover, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainants Spouses Willie and Amelia Umaguing the amount ofP60,000.00 which he admittedly received from the latter as fees intrinsically linked to his professional engagement within ninety (90) days from the finality of this Decision. CANON 9 1. ATTY. AURELIO C. ANGELES, JR., PROVINCIAL LEGAL OFFICER, BATAAN CAPITOL, BALANGA CITY, BATAAN, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. RENATO C. BAGAY, RESPONDENT. 2014-12003 | A.C. No. 8103 MENDOZA, J.: SECOND DIVISION DOCTRINES: Section 9 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a “Notary Public” refers to any person commissioned to perform o cial acts under these Rules. A notary public’s secretary is obviously not commissioned to perform the o cial acts of a notary public. A person who is commissioned as a notary public takes full responsibility for all the entries in his notarial register. He cannot relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the buck to his secretary. Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Notarial commission is a privilege and a significant responsibility. It is a privilege granted only to those who are qualified to perform duties imbued with public interest. As we have declared on several occasions, It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notary public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative o ces in general. FACTS: Atty. Aurelio (Angeles), Provincial Legal O cer of Bataan wrote a letter to the Hon. Remigio Escalada, Executive Judge of RTC Bataan regarding the alleged notarization by Atty. Renato Bagay of 18 documents from
March 13, 2008 to April 8, 2008 when he was out of the country. These documents were forwarded to the Provincial Legal O ce by the Provincial Treasurer who knew that Renato was in Mexico to attend a Prayer and Life Workshop in Mexico, and accompanied by a davits of the persons who executed the documents who all alleged that they did not see Renato notarize them and that it was either the secretary who signed them or the documents came out of the o ce already signed. Verification with the Bureau of Immigration revealed that Renato was out of the country from March 13, 208 to April 8, 2008. The judge indorsed the letter to the IBP Bataan, which in turn endorsed it to the IBP National O ce. It was then referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline for investigation and report. The IBP endorsed the letter to the O ce of the Bar Confidant in view of the manifestation by Atty. Angeles that his letter was not meant as a compliant but merely to clarify the status of the documents allegedly notarized by Renato. The Court then required Renato to comment. In his comment, Renato averred that it was his secretary who caused the notarization of the documents without his knowledge and authority and he had already terminated her services. The Court referred the matter to the IBP for investigation and report, and only Renato submitted his position paper in view of the manifestation of Atty. Angeles that he be excused from participating in the case. The Investigating Commissioner recommended that Renato be suspended from the practice of law for two years, in view of his admission that he employed an o ce secretary who had access to his o ce, his notarial seal and records without proper training, thus he failed to live up to his obligation under the Rules on Notarial Practice. The IBP adopted the recommendation of the Commissioner. Renato in his motion for reconsideration argued that his case should be treated with leniency since he admitted and owned up to his shortcomings and it was done without wrong intention. His case should be a case of simple negligence ISSUE: The sole issue to resolve in this case is whether the notarization of documents by the secretary of respondent while he was out of the country constituted negligence. The Court answers in the a rmative. HELD: Respondent admitted in his comment and motion for reconsideration that the 18 documents were notarized under his notarial seal by his o ce secretary while he was out of the country. This clearly constitutes negligence considering that respondent is responsible for the acts of his secretary. Section 9 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a “Notary Public” refers to any person commissioned to perform o cial acts under these Rules. A notary public’s secretary is obviously not
commissioned to perform the o cial acts of a notary public. Respondent cannot take refuge in his claim that it was his secretary’s act which he did not authorize. He is responsible for the acts of the secretary which he employed. He left his o ce open to the public while leaving his secretary in charge. He kept his notarial seal and register within the reach of his secretary, fully aware that his secretary could use these items to notarize documents and copy his signature. Such blatant negligence cannot be countenanced by this Court and it is far from being a simple negligence. There is an inescapable likelihood that respondent’s flimsy excuse was a mere afterthought and such carelessness exhibited by him could be a conscious act of what his secretary did. Respondent must fully bear the consequence of his negligence. A person who is commissioned as a notary public takes full responsibility for all the entries in his notarial register. He cannot relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the buck to his secretary. As to his plea of leniency, the Court cannot consider it. Respondent claims that for the 21 years that he has been practicing law, he acted as a notary public without any blemish and this was his first and only infraction. His experience, however, should have placed him on guard and could have prevented possible violations of his notarial duty. By his sheer negligence, 18 documents were notarized by an unauthorized person and the public was deceived. Such prejudicial act towards the public cannot be tolerated by this Court. Thus, the penalty of revocation of notarial commission and disqualification from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years is appropriate. Because of the negligence of respondent, the Court also holds him liable for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). His failure to solemnly perform his duty as a notary public not only damaged those directly a ected by the notarized documents but also undermined the integrity of a notary public and degraded the function of notarization. He should, thus, be held liable for such negligence not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer. Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any Respondent violated Canon 9 of the CPR which requires lawyers not to directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Due to his negligence that allowed his secretary to sign on his behalf as notary public, he allowed an unauthorized person to practice law. By leaving his o ce open despite his absence in the country and with his secretary in charge, he virtually allowed his secretary to notarize documents without any restraint. Respondent also violated his obligation under Canon 7 of the CPR, which directs every lawyer to uphold
at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The people who came into his o ce while he was away, were clueless as to the illegality of the activity being conducted therein. They expected that their documents would be converted into public documents. Instead, they later found out that the notarization of their documents was a mere sham and without any force and e ect. By prejudicing the persons whose documents were notarized by an unauthorized person, their faith in the integrity and dignity of the legal profession was eroded. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, an additional penalty of suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months is in order. Respondent should remember that a notarial commission is a privilege and a significant responsibility. It is a privilege granted only to those who are qualified to perform duties imbued with public interest. As we have declared on several occasions, notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notary public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative o ces in general It must be underscored that notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of public instruments would be undermined Let this serve as a reminder to the members of the legal profession that the Court will not take lightly complaints of unauthorized acts of notarization, especially when the trust and confidence reposed by the public in our legal system hang in the balance. WHEREFORE, the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ADOPTED with MODIFICATION. Finding Atty. Renato C. Bagay grossly negligent in his duty as a notary public, the Court REVOKES his notarial commission and DISQUALIFIES him from being commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2) years. The Court also SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for three (3) months e ective immediately, with a WARNING that the repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with even more severely. The respondent is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable this Court to determine when his suspension shall take e ect. Let copies of this Decision be furnished to O ce of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty. Renato C. Bagay’s personal record; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and all courts in the country for their information and guidance. 2. PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA & VICTORIANO TENAZAS, PETITIONERSVS.BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, & QUINTIN MUNING, RESPONDENTS. [ G.R. No. L-23959, November 29, 1971; J. JBL Reyes ] KEY DOCTRINE. The Rules on “compensation of attorney’s agreement as to fees” implies existence of an attorneyclient relationship as a condition to the recovery of attorney's fees. Therefore, non-lawyers cannot collect attorney’s fees. FACTS. The petitioners were complainants in a labor case, which ordered with finality the reinstatement of complainants Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas. The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) rendered the following attorney’s fees to be taken from the back wages: Atty Cipriano Cid and Associates (10%), Quintin Muning (10%) and Atty. Atanacio Pacis (5%). The award of 10% to Quintin Muning, who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought to be voided in the present petition. ISSUE: Can a non-lawyer collect attorney’s fees? RULING: No. The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said court on behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation for such representation.Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, providing for “compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees” implies the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of attorney's fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative in court be a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees. Certainly public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn, to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as being subject to judicial disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients and the public. The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated; that acting as an attorney with authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, and the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit
of an act or an act done in violation of law; and that if were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures. 3. Tapay v. Bancolo (March 20, 2013) Canon 10 THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD. EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, FGU INSURANCE GROUP WORKERS & EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, AND INSULAR LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU v. THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M. OLBES AND COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS G.R. No. L-25291, January 30, 1971, (RUIZ CASTRO, J.) Two of the lawyers of the Unions (The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU) under FFW, then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia; the latter was formerly the secretarytreasurer of the FFW and acting president of the Insular Life/FGU unions and the Insular Life Building Employees Association. Garcia, as such acting president, in a circular issued in his name and signed by him, tried to dissuade the members of the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU), to no avail. Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of the Department of Justice. Thereafter, the respondent Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of 1956 as assistant corporate secretary and legal assistant in their Legal Department while Enaje was hired on or about February 19, 1957 as personnel manager of the Companies, and was likewise made chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining with the Unions. The Unions voted to declare a strike in protest against what they considered the Companies' unfair labor practices. A fist fight ensued between the strikers and Garcia. Thereafter, several criminal complaints were filed against the strikers. Those with no criminal charges were allowed to return to work. The CIR prosecutor filed unfair labor practice against the companies. The CIR dismissed the complaint of the Unions. ISSUE: RULING: It must be recalled that previous to the petitioners' submission of proposals for an amended renewal of their
respective collective bargaining agreements to the respondents, the latter hired Felipe Enage and Ramon Garcia, former legal counsels of the petitioners, as personnel manager and assistant corporate secretary, respectively, with attractive compensations. After the notice to strike was served on the Companies and negotiations were in progress in the Department of Labor, the respondents reclassified 87 employees as supervisors without increase in salary or in responsibility, in effect compelling these employees to resign from their unions. And during the negotiations in the Department of Labor, despite the fact that the petitioners granted the respondents' demand that the former drop their demand for union shop and inspite of urgings by the conciliators of the Department of Labor, the respondents adamantly refused to answer the Unions' demands in toto.
criminal charges who were readmitted were Generoso Abel la, Enrique Guidote, Emilio Carreon, Antonio Castillo, Fedcrico Barretto, Manuel Chuidian and Nestor Cipriano. And despite the fact that the fiscal's office found no probable cause against the petitioning strikers, the Companies adamantly refused admission to them on the pretext that they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents," without stating specifically the inimical acts allegedly committed. They were soon to admit, however, that these alleged inimical acts were the same criminal charges which were dismissed by the fiscal and by the courts.
Incidentally, Enage was the chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining between the former and the Unions. After the petitioners went on strike, the strikers were individually sent copies of Exhibit A, enticing them to abandon their strike by inducing them to return to work upon promise of special privileges. Two days later, the respondents, thru their president and manager, respondent Jose M. Olbes, brought three truckloads of non-strikers and others, escorted by armed men, who, despite the presence of eight entrances to the three buildings occupied by the Companies, entered thru only one gate less than two meters wide and in the process, crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the premises of the Insular Life Building. This resulted in injuries on the part of the picketers and the strike-breakers. Then the respondents brought against the picketers criminal charges, only three of which were not dismissed, and these three only for slight misdemeanors. As a result of these criminal actions, the respondents were able to obtain an injunction from the court of first instance restraining the strikers from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies' buildings.
1. SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, et al. v. HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, et al. IN RE: CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTYS. VICENTE SANTIAGO, JOSE BELTRAN SOTTO, GRACIANO REGALA AND ASSOCIATES, ERLITO UY, JUANITO CALING; AND MORTON MEADS
On the same day that the injunction was issued, the letter, Exhibit B, was sent — again individually and by registered special delivery mail — to the strikers, threatening them with dismissal if they did not report for work on or before June 2, 1958. But when most of the petitioners reported for work. the respondents thru a screening committee — of which Ramon Garcia was a member — refused to admit 63 members of the Unions on the ground of "pending criminal charges." However, when almost all were cleared of criminal charges by the fiscal's office, the respondents adamantly refused admission to 34 officials and union members. It is not, however, disputed that all non-strikers with pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident of May 23,1958 were readmitted immediately by the respondents. Among the non-strikers with pending
*There was no connection with Canon 10 in relation to the lawyers. Canon 11
G.R. No. L-27072, January 9, 1970, RESOLUTION (Sanchez, J.) Key Doctrine: “A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice." Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve.” The first contempt proceeding arose from the third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, who pictures petitioners as "vulturous executives". He speaks of this Court as a "civilized, democratic tribunal", but by innuendo would suggest that it is not. In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes the Court’s decision as "false, erroneous and illegal" in a presumptuous manner. He there charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined the case even before the joining of an issue. He accuses in a reckless manner two justices of the Court for being interested in the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his brother is the vice president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the decision, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was appointed secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, "a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President, a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered." In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that
"it would seem that the principles thus established [the moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority] by the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself." He puts forth the claim that lesser and further removed conditions have been known to create favoritism, only to conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro "would be less likely to engender favoritism or prejudice for or against a particular cause or party." Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which could make their actuation suspect. He makes it plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not free from the appearance of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect their judgment. He points out that courts must be above suspicion at all times like Caesar's wife, warns that loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to happen in our country, "although the process has already begun. Another contempt proceeding is with regard to Atty. Sotto who accuses petitioners of having made "false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur." He brands such efforts as "scattershot desperation". He describes a proposition of petitioners as "corrupt on its face", laying bare "the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners." He charges petitioners with opportunistically changing their claims and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. Such language is not arguably protected; it is the surfacing of a feeling of contempt towards a litigant; it offends the court before which it is made. It is no excuse to say that these statements were taken out of context. ISSUE: Are Attys. Santiago and Sotto guilty of contempt? HELD: YES. It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 which contained language that is as disrespectful. But we cannot erase the fact that it has been made. He explained that he deleted this paragraph in his rough draft, which paragraph was included in the motion filed in this Court only because of mere inadvertence. This explanation does not make much of a distinguishing difference; it erects no shield. Not only because it was belatedly made but also because his signature appeared on the motion to inhibit which included paragraph 6. And this paragraph 6 describes with derision "many of our judicial
authorities" who "believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before them, and that no matter what the circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity." It depicts them as seemingly "incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue." After citing acts of two judges of first instance, he paused to ask: "What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials are just amoral?" What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in law. The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. For, inhibition is also asked of, we repeat, "any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any members of any board petitioner or their agents or principals, including the President." The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief. We are thus called upon to repeat what we have said in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (1967), 20 SCRA 441, 444, as follows: "By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become commonplace. Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: 'To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.' As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that '[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.' That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against 'unjust criticism and clamor.' And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be 'with all good fidelity x x x to the courts.' Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts 'can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold.'"
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice." Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people." Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice." The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet, this Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the administration of justice. The stricture in Section 3(d) of Rule 71 of the Rules - against improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice - is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of court. As to Atty. Sotto: We have analyzed the lines surrounding said statements. They do not in any manner justify the inclusion of offensive language in the pleadings, It has been said that "[a] lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession." It is Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar "[t]o abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged." It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor General or his assistants may not be considered offended parties in this case. This Court may motu propio start proceedings of this nature. There should be no doubt about the power of this Court to punish him for contempt under the circumstances. For, inherent in courts is the power "[t]o control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto." We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has misbehaved, under Section 3(a), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties; and that he too has committed, under Section 3(d) of the same rule, improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice. He is, therefore, guilty of contempt. 2. HON. MARIBETH RODRIGUEZ-MANAHAN, Presiding Judge, MTC, San Mateo, Rizal v. ATTY. RODOLFO FLORES
A.C. No. 8954, 13 November 2013, Del Castillo, J. A lawyer is entitled to voice his criticism within the context of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which must be exercised responsibly. After all, every right carries with it the corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. FACTS. During the proceedings of Civil Case No. 1863,where Atty. Flores was counsel for defendant, Judge Manahan issued an Order3 where she voluntarily inhibited from said case in view of the administrative complaint it filed against Atty. Flores. Upon investigation, it was found that during the preliminary conference in Civil Case No. 1863, Atty. Flores entered his appearance and filed his PreTrial Brief without proof of MCLE compliance hence it was expunged from the records. The preliminary conference was reset several times for failure of Atty. Flores to appear and submit his Brief indicating his MCLE compliance. He was given a last chance to submit his Brief with the stern warning that failure to do so shall be considered waiver on his part. Meanwhile, respondent Atty. Flores filed a Manifestation in Court dated September 14, 2010 stating among others, the following allegations: 4. When you took your oath as member of the Bar, you promised to serve truth, justice and fair play. Do you think you are being truthful, just and fair by serving a cheater? 5. Ignorance of the law excuses no one for which reason even Erap was convicted by the Sandiganbayan.1âwphi1But even worse is a lawyer who violates the law. 6. Last but not the least, God said Thou shall not lie. Again the Philippine Constitution commands: Give every Filipino his due. The act of refusal by the plaintiff is violative of the foregoing divine and human laws. 3
More than mere contempt do his (Atty. Flores) unethical actuations, his traits of dishonesty and discourtesy not only to his own brethren in the legal profession, but also to the bench and judges, would amount to grave misconduct, if not a malpractice of law, a serious ground for disciplinary action of a member of the bar pursuant to Rules 139 a & b.
Respondent Atty. Flores later filed his Pre-Trial Brief bearing an MCLE number which was merely superimposed without indicating the date and place of compliance. Thereafter it filed a Letter stating as follows: If only to give your Honor another chance to prove your pro plaintiff sentiment, I am hereby filing the attached Motion which you may once more assign to the waste basket of nonchalance. With the small respect that still remains, I have asked the defendant to look for another lawyer to represent him for I am no longer interested in this case because I feel I cannot do anything right in your sala. The Investigating Judge found Atty. Flores to have failed to give due respect to the court by failing to obey court orders, by failing to submit proof of his compliance with the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) requirement, and for using intemperate language in his pleadings. The Investigating Judge recommended that Atty. Flores be suspended from the practice of law for one year ISSUE. Should Atty. Flores be held liable for its failure to give due respect to the court and for using intemperate language in his pleadings? HELD.
enjoins all attorneys to abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts. Atty. Flores failed in this respect. At this juncture, it is well to remind respondent that:While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client full devotion to his client's genuine interest and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of law. A lawyer is entitled to voice his criticism within the context of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which must be exercised responsibly. After all, every right carries with it the corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. The lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and orderly administration of justice. It must be done within the confines of reason and common sense. However, we find the recommended penalty too harsh and not commensurate with the infractions committed by the respondent. It appears that this is the first infraction committed by respondent. Also, we are not prepared to impose on the respondent the penalty of oneyear suspension for humanitarian reasons. Respondent manifested before this Court that he has been in the practice of law for half a century. Thus, he is already in his twilight years. Considering the foregoing, we deem it proper to fine respondent in the amount of P5,000.00 and to remind him to be more circumspect in his acts and to obey and respect court processes.
YES. There is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial court’s order to submit proof of his MCLE compliance notwithstanding the several opportunities given him. "Court orders are to be respected not because the judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the respect and consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the Government. This is absolutely essential if our Government is to be a government of laws and not of men. Respect must be had not because of the incumbents to the positions, but because of the authority that vests in them. Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that branchof Government to which they belong, as well as to the State which has instituted the judicial system."
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Rodolfo Flores is FINED in the amount of P5,000.00 with STERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Atty. Flores also employed intemperate language in his pleadings. As an officer of the court, Atty. Flores is expected to be circumspect in his language. Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Canon 15 DARIA O. DAGING, COMPLAINANT,VS.ATTY. RIZ TINGALON L. DAVIS, RESPONDENT.
Canon 12 1. Zualo v. CFI 2. Figueras v. Victoria Canon 13 Royong v. Oblena Canon 14 Areola v. Mendoza
[ A.C. No. 9395, November 12, 2014; J. Del Castillo]
KEY DOCTRINE The prohibition against conflicting interests is absolute and the rule applies even if the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests. FACTS This is a complaint for disbarment of Atty. Davis. Complainant (Daging) was the owner and operator of Nashville Country Music Lounge. She leased the space for the lounge from a certain Benjie Pinlac along Otek St. in Baguio City. Meanwhile, Daging received a Retainer Proposal from Atty. Davis which eventually resulted in a Retainer Agreement with Davis’ firm. Having been delinquent in paying the monthly rentals, Pinlac terminated the lease and made a certain Novie Balageo take over the operation of the bar. Atty. Davis allegedly because a business partner of Balageo in operating the bar under a new name, Amarillo Music Bar. When Daging filed an ejectment case against Pinlac and Bagaleo, Atty. Davis represented Bagaleo in spite of the existence of the Retainer Agreement between them. Hence, this complaint. ISSUE Did Atty. Davis represent conflicting interests in handling the ejectment case? RULING Yes. Atty. Davis transgressed Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the CPR, which provides that “a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.” The prohibition against conflicting interests is absolute and the rule applies even if the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests. This is to encourage clients to entrust their secrets to their lawyers. Atty. Davis’ act brings the law profession into public disrepute and suspicion and undermines the integrity of justice. As to both parties being clients of the law firm of Atty. Davis, he could have simply advised both to engage the services of another laywer. The penalty for representing conflicting interests may either be a reprimand or suspension from the practice of law ranging from six months to two years. Here, the Court adopted IBP’s recommendation of 6-months suspension from the practice of law from the respondent’s receipt of the Resolution. 2. Foronda v. Alvarez 3. JOSEPHINE L. OROLA, MYRNA L. OROLA, MANUEL L. OROLA, MARY ANGELYN OROLABELARGA, MARJORIE MELBA OROLA-CALIP, AND KAREN OROLA, COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. JOSEPH ADOR RAMOS, RESPONDENT. A.C. No. 9860, September 11, 2013
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. In the settlement of Trinidad Laserna-Orola’s (Trinidad) estate, the Heirs of Trinidad were represented by Atty. Villa while Atty. Azarraga represented Maricar, Karen, and the other heirs of the late Antonio (son of Trinidad) with respondent Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos as collaborating counsel. In the course of the proceedings, the Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio moved for the removal of EmilioOrola, the husband of Trinidad, as administrator and, in his stead, sought the appointment of Manuel Orola, which the RTC granted. Subsequently, respondent filed an Entry of Appearance as collaborating counsel for Emilio in the same case and moved for the reconsideration of the RTC Order. Due to the respondent’s new engagement, complainants (Heirs of Trinidad and Karen) filed a disbarment complaint before the IBP, claiming that he violatedRule 15.03 of the Code, as he undertook to represent conflicting interests in the subject case, and Section 20, Rule 138 as he breached the trust and confidence reposed upon him by his clients, the Heirs of Antonio. Complainants claimed that while Maricar, the surviving spouse of Antonio and the mother of Karen, consented to the withdrawal of respondent’s appearance, the same was obtained only on October 18, 2007, or after he had already entered his appearance for Emilio on October 10, 2007. In this accord, respondent failed to disclose such fact to all the affected heirs and, as such, was not able to obtain their written consent as required under the Rules. In his defense, respondent contended that he never appeared as counsel for the Heirs of Trinidad or for the Heirs of Antonio. He averred that he only accommodated Maricar's request to temporarily appear on her behalf as their counsel of record could not attend the scheduled June 16 and July 14, 2006 hearings and that his appearances thereat were free of charge. In fact, he obtained Maricar’s permission for him to withdraw from the case as no further communications transpired after these two hearings. Finally, he clarified that his representation for Emilio in the subject case was more of a mediator, rather than a litigator, and that since no settlement was forged between the parties, he formally withdrew his appearance on December 6, 2007. In support of his assertions, respondent submitted the affidavits of Maricar and Atty. Azarragarelative to his limited appearance and his consultation with Maricar prior to his engagement as counsel for Emilio.
The IBP found respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests only with respect to Karen. The Investigating Commissioner observed that while respondent's withdrawal of appearance was with the express conformity of Maricar, respondent nonetheless failed to obtain the consent of Karen, who was already of age and one of the Heirs of Antonio, as mandated under Rule 15.03 of the Code.On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner held that there was no violation of Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules as complainants themselves admitted that respondent “did not acquire confidential information from his former client nor did he use against the latter any knowledge obtained in the course of his previous employment.” A penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six months was imposed against respondent. ISSUE: Is respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code? RULING: YES. The Court agrees with the IBP’s finding that respondent represented conflicting interests and, perforce, must be held administratively liable therefor. (3month suspension) Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Under the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client.” This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict
of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.(Hornilla v. Salunat) It must, however, be noted that a lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. In this case, when respondent proceeded to represent Emilio, who was removed for committing acts prejudicial to the interest of the heirs, for the purpose of seeking his reinstatement as administrator in the same case, he clearly worked against the very interest of the Heirs of Antonio – particularly, Karen – in violation of the abovestated rule.Respondent's justification that no confidential information was relayed to him cannot fully exculpate him for the charges against him since the rule on conflict of interests, as enunciated in Hornilla, provides an absolute prohibition from representation with respect to opposing parties in the same case. That respondent’s previous appearances for and in behalf of the Heirs of Antonio was only a friendly accommodation cannot equally be given any credence since the aforesaid rule holds even if the inconsistency is remote or merely probable or even if the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests. Neither can respondent's asseveration that his engagement by Emilio was more of a mediator than a litigator and for the purpose of forging a settlement among the family members render the rule inoperative. In fact, even on that assertion, his conduct is likewise improper since Rule 15.04, Canon 15 of the Code similarly requires the lawyer to obtain the written consent of all concerned before he may act as mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in settling disputes. Irrefragably, respondent failed in this respect as the records show that respondent was remiss in his duty to make a full disclosure of his impending engagement as Emilio’s counsel to all the Heirs of Antonio – particularly, Karen – and equally secure their express written consent before consummating the same. Canon 16 CESAR A. ESPIRITU, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JUAN CABREDO IV, RESPONDENT. Adm. Case No. 5831, January 13, 2003
Money or other trust property of the client coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported by the latter and accounted for promptly and should not, under any circumstances, be commingled with his own or be used by him.
RULING: Yes. Respondent is administratively liable for his failure to account for P51, 161.00 received from his client and to restitute it without any reason; he should be suspended for one year.
Two promissory notes were issued by Esphar Medical Center, (Esphar) Inc. and its president Cesar Espiritu and a certain John Doe, obligating themselves to pay solidarily, in favor of Gencars and Citimotors. The PNs were secure by two separate chattel mortgage on two vehicles. Espharet al. defaulted in their obligation and consequently, BPI-FSB, as holder of the said promissory note, sought to foreclose the two mortgage. The BPI Family Savings Bank Inc. filed two complaints for replevin and damages against Esphar, Espiritu and John Doe. Subsequently, Espiritu engaged the services of Atty. Cabredo, herein respondent, to represent him in the two civil cases. While the cases were pending in court, Atty. Cabredo advised Esphar to remit money and update payments to BPI-FSB through the trial court. Accordingly, Esphar’s representative, delivered a total of P51,161.00 to Atty. Cabredo’s office. Later on, when Atty. Cabredo failed to appear at a hearing of the civil cases, the management of Esphar found out that he did not deliver the sum of P51,161.00 to the court or BPI-FSB. The management of Esphar then agreed to settle the cases amicably. For this reason, a joint motion to dismiss was filed by the parties, and the cases were dismissed. Thereafter, Espiritu filed a complaint against Atty. Cabredo for fraud.
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
In his answer, respondent Cabredo admitted that his secretary, Rose Tria, had indeed received P51,161.00 from Esphar, but claimed that Tria failed to inform him about it. It was only when he read Esphar’s first demand letter dated that he learned for the first time about the receipt of the money. Respondent claimed that he failed to get complainant’s subsequent demand letters because of lapses on the part of his staff. He thus shifted the blame on his staff. Acting on the complaint, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline scheduled a hearing. However, the respondent failed to appear five times despite notice thus, making the case submitted for resolution based on the pleadings submitted by the parties. Respondent was found guilty of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended that the latter be suspended from the practice of law for three months and ordered to return the amount of P51,161.00 to Esphar. ISSUE: Is respondent administratively liable for his failure to account for the money he received from his client?
The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary; it requires a high degree of fidelity and good faith. Hence, in dealing with trust property, a lawyer should be very scrupulous. Money or other trust property of the client coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported by the latter and accounted for promptly and should not, under any circumstances, be commingled with his own or be used by him. In this case, respondent claims that he did not know about the receipt by his secretary on the amount of P51,161.00 received from Esphar until he read the first demand letter of the company. However, even after receiving this notice and two other demand letters, respondent never returned the money of complainant nor paid it to the bank. Indeed, it is improbable that respondent’s secretary failed to inform complainant about the receipt of such a substantial sum of money. In failing to account for the money of his client, respondent violated not only the Code of Professional Responsibility but also his oath to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. Like judges, lawyers must not only be proper but they must also appear to be so. This way, the people’s faith in the justice system would remain unshaken. It appears that respondent, while now a practicing lawyer, was a former judge. Thus, he should have known the ethical precepts guiding lawyers who handle money given to them in trust by their clients and the necessary consequences for violation thereof.From the evidence presented by complainant, which respondent failed to rebut, it is clear that the breach of trust committed by respondent amounted to deceit, as well as a violation of his oath, for which he should be penalized with either disbarment or suspension.
