CABALLES v. CA January 15, 2002 | Puno, J. J . | Petition for Review of Certiorari on CA decision| Search and Seizure PETITIONER: Rudy Caballes RESPONDENT: CA, People of the Philippines SUMMARY: Caballes’ Caballes’ passenger jeep was flagged down by two police officers as they deemed the vehicle suspiciously covered with kakawati leaves. When the police checked the cargo they discovered bundles of aluminum conductor wires owned by NAPOCOR. Caballes was charged with the crime of theft. RTC found him guilty. CA affirmed judgment. SC acquitted Caballes stating that the warrantless arrest was invalid as the police did not have probable cause the search, the search was not done following the Plain View Doctrine, and that Caballes’ did not give his consent to the search. DOCTRINE: The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of certain exceptions including the search of a moving vehicle. It is not practicable to secure a warrant as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which t he warrant must be sought. A warrantless search of a vehicle is permissible only if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law -offender or they will find t he instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched. // Object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. // In order to validate an otherwise illegal search, the consent must be voluntary (unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given without duress or coercion). It must be shown by clear and convincing evidence determined from the totality of all the circumstances. FACTS: 1. Two police officers in Pagsanjan, Laguna flagged down a suspicious looking passenger jeep driven by Caballes which was unusually covered with kakawati leaves. Caballes allegedly failed to answer when asked of the contents of the jeep. 2. The police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by the National Power Corp. The police asked Caballes where the wires came from and he said that they came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 km away. Caballes was brought to the police station. Picutres of him and the vehicle with the wires were captured. Caballes was jailed for 7 days. 3. Caballes offered an alibi that he was merely requested to transport the wires by Resty Fernandez. He was promised 1K to do the job. 5 masked men loaded the wires a nd when he crossed the br idge the poli ce officers i ntercepted him. He told them of his st ory but the police officers did not believe him. 4. Caballes was charged with the crime of theft. He pleaded not guilty during arraignment. 5. RTC found him guilty of the crime of theft sentencing him to 2 yrs, 4 mths, and 1 day of Prision Correccional as minimum to 10 yrs of Prision of Prision Mayor , as maximum with award for damages. damages . CA affirmed the judgment but removed the award for damages. 6. Caballes contends that the flagging down of his vehicle by police officers who were on routine patrol, merely on suspicion that it might contain smuggled goods, does not constitute probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure. 7. He did not give any consent, express or implied, to the search of the vehicle. As such, any evidence obtained in violation of his right against unreasonable search and seizure shall be deemed inadmissible. ISSUE: 1. WON the evidence taken from the warrantless search is admissible against Caballes – NO RATIO: 1. Const, Sec 3, Art III provides for the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and properties against unsreasonable searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of such right is barred by the exclusionary rule found in Const, Sec 3 (2), Art III.
2. Search of a Moving Vehicle: The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of 1 certain exceptions including the search of moving vehicles. This is so because it is not practicable to secure a warrant as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. This is also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws provided that the search was made at borders or checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State.
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Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Sec 12, Rule 126, ROC and by prevailing jurisprudence; seizure of evidence in plain view; search of moving vehicles; consented warrantless search; search o f moving vehicles; customs search; stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and exigent and emergency circumstances circumstances
3. In order to conduct a warrantless search, probable cause must exist. The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is resolved according to the facts of each case. 4. Routine inspections are not regarded as violative o f an individual’s right against unreasonable search. A search is permissible in this instance but will be limited to the following: where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; simply looks into a vehicle; flashes a light therein without opening the car’s doors; where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search; where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area. 5. None of the foregoing circumstances is present here. The police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of Caballes’ vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a si mple routine check. 6. A warrantless search of a vehicle is permissible only if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, t hat either the motorist is a law-offender or they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched. The fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute “probable cause” as would justify the conduct of a search without a warrant. In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any confidential report or tipped information that Caballes was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion. 7. Plain View Doctrine: Object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The warrantless seizure was invalid under this doctrince since the cable wires were not exposed to sight because they were placed in sacks and covered with leaves. The police had to ask Caballes what was loaded in his vehicle. 8. Consented Search: In order to validate an otherwise illegal search, the consent must be voluntary (unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given without duress or coercion). It must be shown by clear and convincing evidence determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Caballes did not utter his consent to the search in a voluntary manner. At most, there was only an implied acquiescence, a mere passive conformity, which is no “consent” at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. 9. In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. Here, the evidence is lacking that Caballes intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches. The manner by which the two police officers allegedly obtained the consent of petitioner for them to conduct the search leaves much to be desired. The police approached Caballes and “told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive”. This only amounts to the police informing/imposing upon Caballes that they will search his vehicle. The “consent” given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty. Neither can Caballes’ passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless search.
