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British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 Countering Insurgency Army Code 71876 October 2009
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This work is Crown copyright and the intellectual property rights fo this publication belong exclusively to the Ministry of Defence (MOD). No material or information contained in this publication should be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form outside MOD establishments except as authorised by both the sponsor and the MOD where appropriate. This document is issued for the information of such persons who need to know its contents in the course of their official duties. Any person finding this document should hand it into a British Forces unit or to a British police station for its safe return to the Ministry of Defence, D MOD Sy, LONDON, SW1A 2HB, with particulars of how and where found. THE UNAUTHORIZED RETENTION OR DESTRUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT COULD BE AN OFFENCE UNDER THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACTS OF 1911-1989. This publication is issued under the overall direction of the Chief o the General Staff. It is an MOD Approved Code of Practice (ACOP). Where issues of health and safety are concerned it takes into account the provisions of the Health & Safety at Work Act 1974. The contents provide clear military information concerning the mos up to date experience and best practice available for commanders and troops to use in their operations and training. If you are prosecuted for a breach of health and safety law, and it is proved that you have not followed the relevant provisions of the ACOP, a court may find you criminally liable unless you can show that you have complied with the requirements of health and safety legislation since it is a breach of this legislation which renders a person criminally liable. Breaches or omissions of the ACOP coul result in disciplinary action under the provisions of the Army Act. Amendment No Date Amendment No Date Sign up to vote on this title
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FOREWORD
It is over eight years since the Army last published counterinsurgency doctrine. Much has changed since then. This manual is a short guide insurgency, and the principles and and approaches needed to counter counter it. It ha been written to complement allied and joint doctrine and the authors have been careful to ensure that the principles and framework that are explained in Part A are entirely coherent with those in UK joint doctrine and that of ou principal allies, in particular USA, Canada Canada and Australia. For maximum effec effec Part A should be read as a single continuous narrative while Part B can be read in its constituent chapters.
AFM Countering Insurgency describes how the British Army plans and conducts counterinsurgency counterinsurgency operations operations at the the tactical level. level. It explains tha efforts must be focused on securing the local population and gaining and maintaining popular support. This is a task for the host nation, its securit forces, British forces and our allies, in concert with our partners acros government. The doctrine explains why this is not not simply simply a militar undertaking but a battle of political wills with a number of lines of operation acting in concert. It is axiomatic axiomatic that security security forces of all types lead i providing an environment sufficiently stable to allow the other instruments o governance can be brought to bear to improve the lives of the loca population. Providing effective security is a complex, dangerous, dangerous, and bloo business; it takes time and resources and it tests the resolve of all involved These are enduring characteristics of counterinsurgency.
Doctrine is ‘what is taught’, and to be effective it needs to be read and understood. Pragmatism is needed, however, in its application. Ever counterinsurgency campaign is different from the last, but history and experience show that a thorough knowledge of the doctrine and a clea understanding of the operational environment are two essential prerequisites Doctrine provides commanders at the tactical level with the basis on which to build this understanding, and requires them to use their experience and Sign up to vote on this title judgement to develop the right approach to the particular circumstances i useful level an Useful at which they find themselves. themselves. As such it is focussed theNotbrigade below and educationally for the ICSC(L) student. While the authors of thi publication have consulted widely with experienced practitioners and
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CONTENTS
Foreword Part A – The Fundamentals Chapter 1 – Introduction Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Section 5 Section 6 Section 7 Section 8 CASE STUDY 1 :
The Basics Definitions Operating Within A Sovereign Nation The Psychological Dimension Enduring Characteristics Characteristics Building Host Nation Capacity and Capabilities Capabiliti es Countering Insurgency The Importance of Time The Development of Doctrine for Countering Insurgency; the British Experience
Chapter 2 – Insurgency Section 1 Introduction and Definitions Section 2 Causes, Aims and Elements Causes Aims Mechanism for Motivation Elements of an Insurgency Section 3 Insurgent Vulnerabilities Vulnerabilities Annex A The Categorisation Categorisation of Insurgency CASE STUDY 2:
The Growth of Religious Extremism
Chapter 3 - The Principles of Counterinsurgency Section 1 Introduction and Principles Primacy of Political Purpose Unity of Effort Understand the Human Terrain Secure the Population Sign up to vote on this title Neutralise the Insurgent UsefulSupport Not useful Gain and Maintain Popular Operate in Accordance with the Law Integrate Intelligence
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A Successful Campaign: Oman (Dhofar) 1965-1975 PART - B
Chapter 5 – Intelligence Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Section 5 Section 6 Section 7
Introduction The Insurgent Intelligence Preparation of the Environment The Intelligence/Operations Intelligence/Operations Cycle (F3EA) The Intelligence Staff Constraints Counter Intelligence And Security Intelligence
Chapter 6 – Influence Activity Section 1 Introduction Section 2 Influence Activities Section 3 Manning, Staff Processes & Planning Considerations Considerati ons Section 4 Delivering Influence At Formation/Unit Formation/Unit Level Section 5 Counter Influence Considerations for the Tactical Estimate Annex A Influence Considerations Annex B Illustrative Manning For Influence Activity Staff At Divisional Level Annex C Illustrative Staff Structure for Influence Activity At Brigade Level Annex D Influence Activity Coordination Boards at the Brigade and Battlegroup Level Annex E Operational Terminology Chapter 7 - Planning Considerations For Counterinsurgency Section 1 Introduction Section 2 The Importance of Operational Design Section 3 Operational Operationa l Level Approaches at the Tactical Level Section 4 Campaign and Tactical Plans Logistics Section 5 Annex A Command and control Structures Annex B Measures of Effectiveness CASE STUDY 4: An Unsuccessful Unsuccessf ul Campaign; and Aden, Sign upSouth to vote Arabia on this title 1963-1967 Useful Not useful Chapter 8 – Execution
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Chapter 10 - Military Capacity Building Section 1 Fundamentals Principles Section 2 Preparing for the Task Planning Selection of Personnel Training Section 3 Recruitment of Forces Section 4 Training Planning Transition to Self Reliance Section 5 Operations Transition to Operations Partnering Transition to Self Reliance Annex A Nomenclature Annex B Overwatch Chapter 11 – Learning and Adapting Section 1 Introduction Section 2 Approach to Training and Education Section 3 Pre-Deployment Pre-Deployment Training Section 4 Individual and Specialist Training Section 5 Cultural Understanding Chapter 12 – Legal Aspects of Countering Insurgency Definitions Legal Framework Use of Force Rules of Engagement Detention Operations Rule of the Legal advisor CASE STUDY 6: A Complicated Campaign – Mozambique 1976-1992 A Potential Campaign – 2009 Onwards CASE STUDY 7: GLOSSARY Sign up to vote on this title
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CHAPTER 1 THE FUNDAMENTALS SECTION 1 – BASICS
1-1. Counterinsurgency Counterinsurgency is Warfare. Warfare. Contents Until recently, the word counterinsurgency appeared to be Section 1 – Basics synonymous with low-intensity Section 2 – Definitions operations, or operations other than war. Section 3 - Operating Within A It conjured up images of British soldiers Sovereign Nation in the Malayan jungle, or on the streets Section 4 – The Psychological of Northern Ireland. The U.S. military’s Dimension – Influence Activity experience in Iraq 2003-2008, and the Section 5 – Enduring British campaign in Helmand Province in Characteristics Afghanistan since 2006 have Section 6 – Building Host demonstrated that military operations Nation Capacity against irregular insurgents can be as Section 7 – Countering intense as combat in conventional Insurgency warfare. The intensity of operations is Section 8 – The Importance of not the issue at stake. stake. Insurgency and Time counterinsurgency are two sides of a very complex form of warfare, where a group or groups resort to violence and arms to achieve political political objectives. objectives. Typical objectives objectives are replacing an government, securing the status quo and challenging a nascent or emerging Today’s hybrid threats – any adversaries that simultaneously and adaptively e a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and c behaviour in the same battlespace to obtain their political objectives – are con seeking to exploit what what they perceive to be the vulnerabilities vulnerabilities of regular forces do this by using terrorism and subversion, by blending into the population am which security forces operate, and by exploiting their most effective weapon w the influence that they can extend through through the media. media. Counterinsurgency is w Sign up to vote on this title it is distinctly political, not primarily military; and it involves the peop Useful Not government, and and the military. The strength ofthe relationship relations hipuseful between thes groups generally determines the outcome of the campaign.
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1-3. Security. Security. The principal principal security security task task is to secure secure the population fro violence. By securing the population population and by stabilising the situation, situation, governance ca be re-established re-established for the benefit of the population. population. A stable, sustainable secur situation is a pre-requisite for improving both governance and the population prospects. Securing the population has several several essential essential elements. elements. While it may b possible to take some risk with each of them, experience shows that delay dangerous. The essential security security elements of counterinsurgency are:
Security for the Population. Population. The success or failure of an insurgency largely dependent dependent on the attitude of the population. Insurgents use force to brin parts of the population under consensual or involuntary control; the ho government’s task task is to secure the population population from such such influence. This require active security measures, which include controlling movement, imposing curfew in times when the threat is high, conducting a census to establish who the peop are, introducing positive identification methods such as identity cards an biometric measurement, measurement, and building security infrastructure such as gated
Presence. Presence . In counterinsurgency, presence matters. The population has be secured where where it lives, and it must be secured on a permanent basis. basis. means that the military commander must establish and maintain a continuous an effective presence presence on the ground. ground. The accepted accepted rule of thumb thumb is 20 securi personnel (soldiers, police, para-militaries and auxiliaries) for every 1000 peop in the area area of operation. operation. If insufficient insufficient security security personnel are availabl availabl commanders may have to devise plans to reduce areas of operation to provid the optimum force force ratio. Experience shows that it is easier to deal deal with insurgen when the security forces live amongst the population than when they have deploy to an area on a temporary basis.
Continuity. Continuity. The population population is the one constant in the equation equation and continuity of approach approach to the population is essential. essential. Continuity helps to avo mistakes being repeated, it allows relationships between the population and th security forces to be developed and maintained, and acknowledging the need fo continuity addresses in part the fact that the long term solution to an insurgenc rests with the host nation, its government and its people. people. Continuity also help build confidence with allies. The use of purpose-designed purpose-designed standing standin g HQs manne Sign up to vote on this title on a trickle basis, together with individual officer and soldier tours of as lon Useful Not useful duration as is acceptable will promote continuity.
Intelligence
Intelligence is essential in any operation but especially especially so
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Embedded Training Teams. Teams. Host nation forces invariably require and development. development. Where British training teams teams are deployed, experience experience that they are at their most effective when they are embedded with the formation that they are training, and when they bring with them the e capabilities of ISTAR, joint fires, command and control, and CSS, part medical and logistics. Training the host host nation’s security security forces and par and mentoring them on operations is an essential part of achieving lon security which the host nation can sustain. Those selected to train host security forces themselves require to be trained in cultural awareness and specifics so that they can fit in with their charges from the outset.
Influence. Influence. Counterinsurgency is about gaining and securing the sup the people both in the theatre of operations and at home. Influence therefore underpins everything which British forces undertake be counterinsurgency is as much about the battle of perceptions as it is about operations targeted against insurgents.
Education. Education. Those who who have to put counterinsurgency counterinsurgency doctrine doctrine into p have to know know what the doctrine says. says. This requirement requirement is not limited doctrine; commanders must also be versed in the doctrine of other natio which they they are likely to operate. They need need to have the the knowle confidence to adapt doctrine to meet the challenges that they face. flexibility and pragmatism in its application, doctrine becomes dogma, seized upon by mental emasculates who lack virility of judgment, and w only too grateful to rest assured that their actions, however inept, find justi in a book, which, if they think at all, is in their opinion, written in order to ex them from doing so.” 1 Counterinsurgency warfare is complex and is no suited to learning the basics in the heat heat of the campaign. That is the time t the approach to meet the demands of the situation based on a understanding of the doctrine, doctrine, approaches, and best best practice. This places onus on the Army and Defence to provide comprehensive educati counterinsurgency.
1-4. A Framework for Counterinsurgency Counterinsurgency.. A number number of conceptual conceptual fram have been developed which provide a way of thinking thetitle principal the Sign up to about vote on this tasks in counterinsurgency. counterinsurgency. The framework adopted manual manual is a Useful in Not useful this model of Shape-Secure-Develop, which groups together the main tasks which may be called upon to carry out during the campaign under each of its
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be prepared for periods periods of intense fighting. No counterinsurgency counterinsurgency exists at just just on point on the continuum of operations. Its intensity will vary in time and place. At an one point in the campaign there might be a humanitarian crisis in one district, and violent outbreak outbreak by insurgents in another. At any one place place in the theatre operations, in one week there might be an operation to clear, secure and hold village, and a development task to restore electricity and water supplies the wee after.
1-6. Stabilisation and Counterinsurgency Counterinsurgency.. JDP 3-40 Security and Stabilisatio – the Military Contribution describes the relationship between stabilisation an counterinsurgency. counterinsurgency. JDP 3-40 uses Figure 1.1 to illustrate the likely relationsh between stabilisation stabilisation and and counterinsurgency. counterinsurgency. It shows how a counterinsurgen operation sits within the three major sectors of a stabilisation campaig Governance, Security, and Development. Although the provision of securi contributes to all three sectors, it will inevitably be the main effort, particularly in th initial stages of a campaign. campaign. The size of the ‘COIN ‘COIN bubble’ will depend depend on the s of the insurgency insurgency and it will vary vary as the campaign campaign develops. develops. How it changes changes w depend on the capacity of other government departments and intergovernmental an non-governmental non-governmental organisations. organisations. These depend, depend, in turn, on the contribution security forces can make make to developmental developmental and governance governance activities. A key aspe of all stabilisation tasks will be to prepare the host nation to take responsibility for i own security, development development and and governance. Within this sector, sector, the security fo will inevitably have a significant role to play in training and mentoring, throug embedded partnering, the host nation’s security forces to provide security.
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Intervention by a Joint Force as part of a UK coalition operation.
Provision of specialist military capabilities to develop and then un host nation capacity.
Direct support to the host nation government through advisors, t and mentoring teams.
Provision of advisors to augment existing UK representation.
1-8. In some circumstances, for example after a regime change, or in a of complete state failure, security forces may be called upon to dischar responsibilities of an occupying power in accordance with their obligations international law. In such cases cases opposition opposition should be expected expected from disa disa disenfranchised, or displaced groups, and the use of coercion, intimidatio armed force are likely until security is established and governance can be exe JDP 3-40 describes this as irregular activity, or the use or threat, of force, by ir forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority. 2 This m focuses on the most difficult and demanding scenario, that of counter insurgency. SECTION 2 – DEFINITIONS
‘Of course events in real life don’t lend themselves to such clear cut definitions
1-9. Security. Security. Almost without exception, exception, the issue at stake in counterinsurg counterinsurg the establishment establishment or re-establishment re-establishment of security. Once security is in in place, further operation can develop. develop. For the purpose of this publication, publication, security is defined as follo
Security is the condition where there is sufficient protection against acts to enable effective civic and civil life to continue.
Sustainable Security is that condition where security can be mai over time through the host nation’s security, c iv iv ic ic and civil institution 5 reduced direct intervention from allies or partners. partners.
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1-10. Insurgency. Insurgency. For the purposes of this manual, insurgency is defined Useful Not useful or organised, violent subversion used to effect prevent political control challenge to established authority’ . Insurgencies have many aims, common of which are: to gain control of territory, seek resolution of a grieva
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affiliation in order to fight a common enemy. enemy. Insurgents use a mixture of subversio subversio propaganda, terrorism and armed force to achieve their objectives and may hav close links to criminal activity.
1-11. Counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency is defined as “Those military, la enforcement, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defe insurgency, while addressing the root causes”. causes”. Successful counterinsurgenc requires a multifaceted approach that addresses the political, economic, socia cultural and security dimensions of the unrest. SECTION 3 - OPERATING IN A SOVEREIGN NATION
1-12. Policy Assumption. Assumption. The approach approach to counterinsurgency described in th publication is based on the assumption that Her Majesty’s Government will us British Armed Forces and its other instruments of power to conduct discretiona military operations in support of policy; to support a legally recognised recognised state in th restoration and maintenance of law and order, good governance and wher necessary, essential services. services. It should be noted that there may may be occasions whe a state is recognised by some governments and organisations but not others.
1-13. Legitimacy. In the context of counterinsurgency operations, legitimacy is population’s acceptance of its government’s right to govern or of a group or agenc to enforce decisions. Without legitimacy, legitimacy, a political settlement settlement will not end Legitimacy is neither tangible nor nor easily quantifiable. quantifiable. Popular votes do not alwa confer or reflect legitimacy. Legitimacy comes comes from the idea that authority authority is genuin and effective, and is used used fairly and legally. Legitimacy is the central concern o parties directly involved in a conflict. Equally important is the international international an domestic community’s community’s views of the legitimacy of any intervention operation.
1-14. Complexity. Complexity. Globalisation, the proliferation of information information and informatio technology, and a myriad of state and non-state actors make the operation environment very complex. complex. At first glance the many actors and rapidly changin changin influences may appear unmanageable, unmanageable, often contradictory, and confusing. confusing. situation is not made any easier by their variation in time and place; what seems vit today may not be tomorrow; something which is important in one place may hav Sign up to vote on this title little significance significance elsewhere. In many many cases, violence stems from corruptio Useful Not useful organised crime – in particular narcotics – tribal issues, religious disputes, lan ownership and and power struggles struggles between warlords. However complex complex the situatio ense needs to be made made of it. One starting point is to recognise th
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SECTION 4 - THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSION – INFLUENCE ACTIV
1-16. The need to win and maintain maintain popular support in the theatre of of ope and at home is vital to both sides. sides. Gaining and Maintaining Maintaining Popular Popular Supp principle of counterinsurgency counterinsurgency and is discussed discussed in Chapter Chapter 3. The idea of ‘ support’ is acknowledgement that counterinsurgency operations have a very psychological dimension. All actions taken by military forces, whether whether or n involve the use of force, have an effect, and such effects as can be dete require to be considered considered as plans are drawn up and and operations undertaken. undertaken. same way, actions carried out by the enemy require careful consideration weaknesses and inconsistencies they offer can be exploited.
1-17. The contest for the support of the population provides counterinsurgen its principal distinguishing characteristic; it is concerned primarily with mould population’s perceptions. This is a difficult and intangible intangible business. business. It is one even more complicated when operating in a country whose culture is n understood by the intervening forces. forces. It places a premium on developing awareness and maintaining continuity in approach. Each counterinsu campaign requires an agreed single vision of the future for the host nation consistent across any coalition or alliance. alliance. The ‘vision’ is a competing ‘narrati ‘narrati statement of what the UK UK with allies and civilian civilian partners is trying to achiev narrative should be stronger than the insurgent’s message, should seek to pe rather than coerce, should emphasise security and development within its te should be reflected in the UK Information Information Strategy. The importance importance of Activity is described below while the details of how to conduct it are cov Chapter 6.
1-18. The Narrative: Mobilising the Population. The narrative is centra counterinsurgency effort. The narrative must must be a carefully carefully crafted message message aims to strengthen the legitimacy and build the authority of the indig government in the eyes eyes of the population. population. It has to resonate with population, use their words and imagery in a way that taps into deep c undercurrents. The narrative aims to convince the people that the indi government, supported by international forces and can deliver a Sign organisations, up to vote on this title future in terms of security, justice justice and material wealth. wealth. Commanders Commanders must s Useful Not useful operate within the context of the campaign narrative. 1-19.
Shaping Perceptions.
It should be assumed that every decision
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The UK approach to operating in the cognitive and information domains is calle Influence Activities 6 . These activities are best described as the combined combined actions Information Operations, Operations, Media Operations Operations and CIMIC. They link ‘word’ and ‘dee and Influence Activities are undertaken in the context of coordinated UK governme action. The complex web of of effects and perceptions is woven woven by the sum of activitie from the strategic to the tactical. tactical. There is no doubt doubt that the battle to gain and and secu the support of the key audiences is difficult to execute but crucial to campaig success.
SECTION 5 – THE ENDURING CHARACTERISTICS OF COUNTERINSURGENC
1-20. Direct Military Action May Be Required. Required. Some non-military organisation involved in countering insurgency may consider that the need to take direct milita action and undertake undertake high intensity security security operations is a sign of of failure. This is n the case. There will be times when the only method method of providing providing security for th population is through direct military action which involves neutralising an irreconcilable insurgents insurgents by whatever legal legal means are appropriate. appropriate. Commande and their staff have a remit to explain to the non-military groups the importance an value of direct military military action, when it is needed, and how it is to be applied. might be through Clear-Hold-Build operations as explained in Chapter 4 or any othe method most most appropriate in the circumstances. circumstances. Direct military action action may be th least palatable course of action, but with the necessary safeguards in place to lim civilian casualties and damage, it may be the only option to regain control of a insurgent area.
1-21. Both Sides Have a Political Imperative. Imperative. Although the root cause insurgency may be religious, ethnic, political, sectarian or nationalist the outcom invariably requires requires a political resolution. The insurgent insurgent is unlikely to be satis without some form of political change. change. This may not need to go as far as th overthrow of a government; formal recognition of a grievance and significant an lasting action to address it may be be sufficient. The counterinsurgent, counterinsurgent, on the oth hand, should not be satisfied until security and the instruments of government are re established allowing normal civil and civic activity to continue.
to 1-22. The Population is Central to the Outcome. Outcome.Sign The population povote pulation is central up to on this title outcome of the campaign. campaign. This means means that security securityUseful has to be restored restored to allo Not useful normal civic and civil life to continue. continue. The support of the population is as important important the insurgent as it is to the counterinsurgent. counterinsurgent. The support support of the population
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situation may be, violence is only a symptom of deeper problems which have resolved before the situation can can improve. Security measures measures alone will not s insurgency.
SECTION 6 - BUILDING HOST NATION CAPACITY AND CAPABILITIE
1-24. Host Nation Capability. Capability. In order to produce the mass required required to eve defeat an insurgency, coalition forces may have to recruit and train the host n security forces at the same same time as conducting conducting a range of operations. operations. The i stake will be how quickly indigenous forces can take the lead and sustain s operations. It is generally a matter matter of balance. Development programmes required to professionalise armed forces and the police. police. These take time to h effect but there will come a point when when the aphorism that ‘it is better the loca tolerably than that you do it perfectly’8 will apply and transition to the host n forces should take place. In the meantime, meantime, developing developing the host nation’s forces requires very careful attention. attention. They will be the forces ultimately resp for security. Until they can take take the lead, external external support support will be re Developing the host nation’s forces is not not just an issue issue of ‘train and and equip’ nascent forces will require highly capable, well-equipped mentoring teams wh embedded throughout, and have critical enablers such as ISTAR, joint fires, m care and logistics in direct support.
1-25. Transition to Host Nation Primacy. Primacy. The process of transition un counterinsurgency. In overall terms where where armed forces have to act to supp civil authority they should transfer such security responsibilities to the civil po soon as conditions conditions allow. Any sense of a permanent permanent presence presence by allies or par likely to be exploited by insurgents and critics both home and abroad.
1-26. Guidelines for Working with the Host Nation. Nation. The difficulties of within a coalition in support of of a weak host host nation are significant. Coordina wide variety of international opinions with those of the host nation requires a deal of diplomatic diplomatic and political political effort. Nevertheless, it is important to have guidelines as a start point which can be considered when integrating British with the host nation and other coalition coalition partners. The guidelines discussed discussed be as applicable at the tactical level as they are at the Signoperational: up to vote on this title
useful. The inter Useful Not The Interests of an Ally Should Take Second Place Place. an ally should, unless absolutely necessary, take second place to those host nation. nation. This reinforces reinforces the the notion notion of host nation sovereign
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between the host host nation government government and the coalition. Much depends depends on th efficacy of the host nation nation institutions. For example in Malaya where the Hig Commissioner derived his authority from the UK Government, the instrumen of the Malayan Federation had to be significantly reorganised to deal with th Communist insurgency in a more coordinated and effective manner.
Allies Should Co-Ordinate their Efforts Through One Focal Poin The ally should be able to co-ordinate its effort through a single focal poi which can represent it to the t he host nation’s government in order to help formula overall policy.
Allies Should be Represented at Every Level. Level. The coalition needs be represented in an advisory capacity at as many levels of the ho government’s administration as as possible. In this way way the alliance alliance or coalitio coalitio can exercise some essential influence over the legitimate use of its resource avoid duplication duplication of effort and and minimise minimise waste. The key is full co-operatio co-operatio between the host nation and the ally and the integration of a full range of civ and military resources and efforts. This will inevitably require some prioritisatio when resources are stretched.
All Organisations and Institutions Should have a Commo Understanding of the Problem. Problem. Developing a common common understanding very necessary condition to reach but but in practice is difficult to achieve. This because domestic political contexts and objectives may vary betwee international partners, and between agencies and organisations. organisations. One of first tasks to undertake is the development of pragmatic work-around solution to overcome inevitable national restrictions applied to sharing intelligence.
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Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus
Although unity of command is the ideal for military and civilian agencies partic in a counterinsurgency operation, political considerations usually dictate divi the necessary authorities amongst amongst a variety of actors. Division of civil civil and power places a premium on the creation of a clear, common understanding political and security goals and how the counterinsurgent forces and agencies to achieve them. Only then does unity unity of effort become a viable substitute for command.
During the Iraq War the civil-military command structure divided responsibili security and other lines of operation first between the Coalition Provisional Au and Combined-Joint Task Force 7 and later between the U.S. Ambassa Baghdad and the Commander Commander of of Multi-National Force-Iraq. The civilrelationship was not always a smooth one as the personalities of various l created friction that occasionally hampered a smooth working relationship be the CPA, CPA, Embassy Embassy and military military staffs. The civil-military civil-military relationship relationship dramatically when Ambassador Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus as their positions as U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and Commander of Multi-National Iraq in early 2007. General Petraeus Petraeus was responsible for security matters Ambassador Crocker had primacy over the political, economic, and diplomat of operation. Nothing had formally changed changed in the command and control s from that under which previous leaders operated; however, the ability of Amba Crocker and General Petraeus to form a smooth working relationship was es to the creation of effective unity of effort during the “surge” operations of 2007-
Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus worked closely together from meetings with principal Iraqi and Coalition figures to the creation of civilworking groups that hammered out the essentials of a joint campaign pla supporting activities that that chartered the way ahead in the war effort. Petraeus invited key Embassy staff to participate in his daily battlefield upda assessment briefings which gave both military and civilian personnel a better each other’s activities and progress (or lack thereof) in key key areas. General P and Ambassador Crocker would jointly host Congressional delegations, ke Sign up to vote on this title leaders and other dignitaries in both informal social settings and more Not useful Useful the briefings that made it clear that they they were of one mind mind on essential issue not readily apparent why their relationship worked so much better than tho preceded them but it was clearly a more effective partnership. partnership. Personalities
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SECTION 7 - COUNTERING INSURGENCY THE NEED TO ACT
1-27. The presence presence of an illegal armed force should be intolerable to an government. An insurgency will gather strength strength quickly if it has a viable viable strategy th can take advantage advantage of any inertia in the host nation’s nation’s government. government. The longer takes for the host nation government to act, the more rapidly the insurgency w grow. As the insurgency insurgency grows stronger, the government government and the the economy tend weaken, drawing the country towards towards state failure. If nothing is done done the host natio natio government will become ineffective, the security situation will become intolerable an the economy will collapse.
1-28. In order to prevent prevent a friendly state from failing, the international commun might decide to act act in its support. Ideally, any intervention intervention should be at the invitatio of the host nation government and support its legitimate aims; however this may n always be possible and a coalition may be formed to conduct a mandate such as UN Resolution to prevent a humanitarian humanitarian crisis. Whatever the circumstances, counterinsurgent must act legally, fairly and decisively. SCALES OF EFFORT: PRESENCE MATTERS
1-29. Presence matters in counterinsurgency counterinsurgency if security security is to be be established established sustained. Only when force levels are high enough can security be both both generate and sustained effectively. effectively. Evidence from many many previous campaigns campaigns indicates indicates that ratio of twenty counterinsurgency forces – host nation police, military, an paramilitary and allied or partner counterparts – per thousand head of population required to establish an effective presence. 9 The present-day conundrum is to strik the right balance between host nation and allied forces, and between regular, polic para-military and auxiliary forces. As it is unlikely that any any contemporary contemporary coalitio can deploy and sustain such numbers it is essential that the host nation securi forces are developed so that they they become become capable capable of fulfilling this role. development of host nation security forces is known as Military Capacity Buildin (MCB) and must be an early early priority in any counterinsurgency counterinsurgency campaign. campaign. Chapter 1 Sign up to vote on this title explains MCB in more detail. Useful Not useful By separating and dissipating our effort from Iraq, we were unable to surge at the same same time as the Americans. Americans. Our over-commitment over-commitment has
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RECONCILIATION AND REINTEGRATION
1-30. Countering insurgency insurgency requires requires some some sort of political accommo Reconciliation is a two-way process, best undertaken from a position of st Reintegration is the process by which individual insurgents forsake their struggle and come across to the government side disarmed, demobilise accepted into normal life. They will need need employment employment and some some form of franchise. Reconciliation normally normally occurs once one side side has the upper ha there is little prospect of its opponent achieving its political objectives without cost. It involves the host nation government government taking taking account account of some insurgents’ aspirations on condition that the insurgent ceases to promote the violence and and supports the overall political settlement. settlement. Reconciliation is ce securing longer term stability and it will have to be underpinned by a wide ra political, economic and security measures if it is to be sustained.
1-31. Reconciliation is a delicate process that takes takes a great deal deal of of effort and should be initiated by by politicians rather than soldiers. soldiers. However, the forces must be acutely aware of any reconciliation and should be prepared to a support the process. process. Former insurgents who have reintegrated are often often vul in the early stages. stages. Reconciliation is briefly discussed in Chapter Chapter 8. THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE LINES OF OPERATION
1-32. UK policy will determine the in-theatre in-theatre balance balance of British politic diplomatic assistance, armed forces deployed deployed and economic economic investment. balance is likely to be dynamic and adjusted as conditions on the ground cha general terms, it is possible to identify three theoretical approaches that b national political, military and developmental effort to a counterinsurgency cam
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Vignette: Direct and Indirect Approaches: Al Qa’im 2004-2006
Al Qa’im is a city in Iraq of over 100,000 people that lies along the Euphrates River on the Syrian th st border. In November 2005, the 3/6 Marines, 2/1 Marines and an Iraqi Army Brigade conducted an operation named STEEL CURTAIN that successfully destroyed elements of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in the city. The operation is nota notable ble because of the success of the Clear-Hold-Build Clear-Hold-Build approach, approach, the way protected the population and U.S. forces partnering with the Iraqi Army. This approach proved to be 1 more successful than earlier attempts where force levels insufficient to gain any lasting effect. Indirect Approach The USMC had previously cleared the city in 2004 and had attempted to carry out clear and hold tactics. AQI and other insurgents insurgents retaliated by applying immense immense pressure on USMC and and Iraqi security forces in and around the city. The Marines, hampered by casualties and the hostility of the community, pulled out and created Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in t hree locations outside the city. By late summer 2004 they they had switched to an ‘indirect approach.’ approach.’
Following the USMC withdrawal from the city, the local Albu Mahal tribe, having lost their ability to control the local black market and smuggling, and who did not like AQI enforcing strict Islamic law, turned against AQI and formed their own tr ibal militia, the Hamza battalion. The USMC r emained outside the city and provided support. Coalition forces and Hamza traded intelligence but AQI put increasing pressure on the tribal battalion, coercing or intimidating other tribes to fight until the Albu Mahal tribe was a beleaguered beleaguered minority. The Marines were forced to stand back as the Hamza battalion eventually eventually pulled out of the city. AQI seized control of Al Qa’im in early September 2005 an declared the Islamic Republic of Qa’im. Direct Approach - Clear-Hold-Build It was clear from these events that the ‘indirect approach’ approach’ was the wrong approach. approach. By early November 2005, having learned some valuable lessons from their recent experiences, the USMC adopted an enduring clear-hold-build clear-hold-build policy. They began a clearing operation on 5 Nov 2005.
The 3/6 Marines under the command of Lt Col J D Alford, next set out to hold and build with Iraqi forces. The unit, along with an Iraqi Army (IA) Brigade, dispersed throughout the city into outposts, living, eating and patrolling in partnering teams. The Marines and the Iraqis each provided one platoon; the platoons carried out constant patrolling, day and night, interacting with the community an gaining valuable intelligence. Lt Col Alford’s ‘Focus of Efforts’ concentrated on six areas: Training and supporting the IA where his approach was to ‘put an IA face out front, IA in the lead and recruit locally.’ Sign up to vote on this title Using paired USMC and IA Combined Action Platoons that lived, ate and worked together; Useful Not useful each patrol was combined and shared intelligence. Building the Iraqi Police Force from the ground up with the Sheikhs’ support; rebuilding key infrastructure and using a police transition team to help develop the police force.
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1-33. The Indirect Approach. Approach. The military contribution to an indirect appr likely to be small and based on specific capabilities such as Special Force intelligence. The role will will be to provide provide expert advice and assistance to nation’s security forces. forces. The principal contribution contribution to the counterinsurgency counterinsurgency ef be through the provision of political advice and economic and develo assistance to the the host government. government. The best example example of the indirect appr some would say the best example of British counterinsurgency – is the supp British government provided provided to the Sultan of of Oman 1970-1975. 1970-1975. US support to Salvadorian government in the 1980s is another successful example.
1-34. The Direct Approach. Approach. The direct approach approach requires the involvement coalition and indigenous security forces in order to re-establish legitimate au The Kenyan Emergency 1952-1956, although currently viewed as controve terms of the tactics adopted, is a good example of a successful direct app Aden (1963-1967), on the other hand, is an example of where despite a hard military operation, changes in British foreign policy eventually undermined ef maintain security and retain control.
1-35. The Balanced Approach. Approach. A balanced balanced approach is where politic economic development development and military assistance are integrated comprehensively political control to meet the three main challenges of engaging or re-engag political process, securing the population and developing governance and ec conditions to secure stability. Having a broad, politically politically led approach which which c integrated all the government’s government’s efforts proved proved effective in Malaya. Malaya. The United Surge in Iraq 2007-08 was part of a similarly balanced, integrated appro restore security in Iraq and provide the Iraqi Government with the political free required to encourage and obtain cross-party accommodation. SECTION 8 - THE IMPORTANCE OF TIME
1-36. Time as a Factor . Countering insurgency takes time. It takes tim government to recognise and respond to the scale of the insurgent problem; time for it to build up the intelligence picture that will allow political,securi Sign up to it vote on this time title to deve economic measures to be developed and targeted; takes Useful law, Not useful physical capacity in ministries; it takes time to re-establish order and sec takes time for political accommodations accommodations to be be made. Reflecting the psycho dimension of the problem, it takes time to change mindsets, and time to g
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1-38. Time and the Population. Population. The support support of the population population is the key success for both both sides. The population is not a single entity; entity; affiliations, views an interests will vary. Nevertheless, the side which eventually gains and holds holds popul support will ultimately win. It takes time to convince convince the population population that one side side ha established a strong, strong, potentially winning position. History shows - for example, Chinese in Malaya – that it is unusual for many significant elements of the populatio to declare their support support for the counterinsurgent counterinsurgent early in the campaign. Rather, it often the case that people wait to see which side seems likely to win, despite the fa this will perpetuate insecurity and instability.
1-39. The ‘Half-Life’ of Intervention. Intervention. Intervening forces forces have been noted to hav 10 a ‘half-life’ where they may be seen favourably when they first arrive but, as tim goes on, they are increasingly portrayed as occupiers. occupiers. They can be portrayed a being a major part of the problem, particularly if their actions cause civilian cas casualtie and they fail to make demonstrable progress in improving the situation. 11 perception must be considered from the start of a campaign, and countered prevent the notion from becoming reality. The first step in this regard regard is to secure th population. By establishing establishing a strong local local presence, presence, by taking the fight to insurgent, and by demonstrating resolve and perseverance, the population’s sense security will improve and with it, its support support for security forces. This will take time achieve, months months not weeks. The result, however, however, will be to take advantage advantage of th dynamic created by the initial intervention, and to avoid falling victim to the ‘half-lif phenomenon. What is dubbed the war on terror is in grim reality, a prolonged, worldwide irregular campaign - a struggle between the forces of violent extremism and moderation. In the long-term effort against terrorist networks and other extremists we know that direct military force will continue to have a role. But we also understand that over the long term we cannot kill or capture our way to victory. Where possible, kinetic operations should be subordinate to measures to promote better governance, economic programs to spur development and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented from which the Sign up toofvote on this title terrorists recruit. It will take the patient accumulation quiet successes over a long time to discredit and defeat extremist movements and their Useful Not useful ideology. US Secretary of State for Defense - 2008
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1-41. Time and Sovereignty. Sovereignty. Due consideration consideration should be taken of how t nation’s view of its own sovereignty sovereignty changes over time. Its relationship with i or partners may very well change as its confidence grows and its ca increases. This may may not always be for the better. In general, increasing hos sovereignty should be a positive development if confidence and capability are linked. The danger comes comes if the host nation exercises its sovereignty sovereignty in a w outstrips its national capacity. capacity. This situation may may expose political political divisions b the host nation’s government and the alliance or coalition:
Acting Before Being Fully Prepared. Prepared. In order to reinforce its se sovereignty a host nation’s government will wish to be seen to be using indigenous forces to create security. security. If the host nation acts rashly be forces are trained and equipped to undertake such operations, it is likely This could lead to confidence being lost in both the host nation’s politic military capability and could set the overall campaign back by years.
Failing to Create Sufficient Capacity. Capacity. If the the host nation canno enough capacity it may well be dependent on long term allied or support. As long as the host nation nation is reliant on external external support it is un be seen as a viable state in its own right.
In both cases it is important that every level of command is aware that th nation’s sense of sovereignty is likely to change over time, and that this may the conduct of military operations as part of the overall counterinsurgency plan
1-42. Time, Domestic Opinion and Campaign Progress. Progress. Public opi closely linked to campaign progress. If demonstrable progress towards a leg and popular end state is not made, and costs (in blood and treasure) mount, c in public opinion within alliance or coalition countries may well influence n commitment. One outcome outcome may may be a foreshortening foreshortening of a national national contributio contributio natural reaction from the counterinsurgent forces is to generate a strong se urgency to achieve achieve near term goals which, in turn, turn, will demonstrate progress progress so often the case in counterinsurgency, a balance has to be struck between s early, easy successes, trying to win the campaign during one military rouleme recognising that mindsets take time to change. Sign up to vote on this title
1-43. Compressed Levels of War . The reality is that a campaign Not useful is unlike Useful won in months. However, months months of slow or no progress progress may set it b jeopardise campaign campaign success completely. Worse still, still, single incidents, h
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CASE STUDY 1
THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE FOR COUNTERING INSURGENC THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE BRIGADIER GAVIN BULLOCH
PREAMBLE
1. It is curious to record that despite the extensive experience gained British Army in counterinsurgency during the twentieth century, relatively lit been recorded as official doctrine in military publications. A large amount h written about counterinsurgency unofficially and, partly through this, military d has evolved and developed. developed. Official doctrine, when when published, has always behind events, and in the last decades of the last century it took nearly twenty to replace the previously extant publication.
2. The slow development of any counterinsurgency doctrine can be mar utilising the dates for official military publications as a chronological guide to t in which doctrine has developed during the last hundred years. DOCTRINE BEFORE 1939
3. In 1896 a soldier, Colonel Charles Callwell, who was later Director Operations in the First World War, wrote the book “Small Wars – Their Princip Practice” from which he drew together some doctrinal strands on cou insurgency or rebellion, by using a number of examples from previous cam By today’s standards standards the book is both too simple and unsophisticated. unsophisticated. It als many factors that that would be considered considered important, such as as intelligence. Never the book was widely read, republished in 1904 after the Boer War, and taugh Staff College until the early 1920s.
4. The first official linkage between general conflict, the civil authorities law came in 1914 when the Manual of Military Law recorded some legal princi which imperial policing was to be conducted. conducted. These principles seemed to sat on requirements of the day when General Sir JohnSign Maxwell was lefttitle to carry up to vote on this political instruction during the 1916 Easter Uprising in Dublin. However, the Useful Not useful under very great strain in 1919 after the rioting at Amritsar Amritsar in India. Until th principle of 'minimum force' only applied if the situation was still under the co
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Ministry of Defence (2009) British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 Countering Insurgency, Army Code 71876 October 2009.
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army field manual
DGTS-COIN-Final Revise
Transforming the British Army:
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6. During the 1920s, two developments arising from imperial policing were trie both were in some part successful and helped in maintaining control around th Empire. The first was the development and use of auxiliary forces, in effect th creation of a 'third force' between between the Police and Armed Forces. The attempt bridge this gap was started in Palestine by the formation of a Gendarmerie, and oth forces were established elsewhere. In general terms this third force option wa effective only when the situation situation was quiescent. quiescent. When trouble came, these force were largely ineffective and were subsequently disbanded. disbanded.
7. The second development was the use of air power in counterinsurgenc situations. Countering insurgency insurgency was a tactic employed employed by the newly formed Roy Air Force, partly to maintain its raison d'etre after the First World War and also allow the Treasury to save money by using air power to police remote and dista parts of the Empire Empire without deploying so many troops. troops. Large empty portions of th Middle East, Iraq, Sudan and parts of the North West Frontier of India we subsequently controlled controlled by the RAF. This doctrinal approach approach was sponsored sponsored by A Vice Marshal John Salmond in the early 1920s but it gradually lost favour during th 1930s when it was seen clearly that aircraft can only bomb and shoot once th intimidating and deterrent effect of air power had worn off. Following a seriou uprising in the NW Frontier region of India in the mid 1930s the Army quickly re established overall overall control of operations operations in these areas. The Air Force Force as the s proponent of countering insurgency was perceived as too crude and blunt to b effective as an instrument instrument of policy. In today’s parlance, it has become become Supporting Component within Component within a wider counterinsurgency approach.
8. In 1923 the government issued a policy document entitled "Duties in Aid of th Civil Powers" which Powers" which became the basis of all military dealings with the Civil Power both at home and abroad, until until 1937 when it was updated and and revised. As the tit implies, it was useful in regard to supporting a Civil Power, but of not much use advising on countering countering insurgency in its more general general sense. Indeed the involve and rather mechanical process of dispersing unlawful crowds was still in use up t 1955.
Quarterly published an article written by a Major B C Denning 9. The Army Quarterly published 1927 entitled “Modern Problems of Guerrilla Warfare” . up Hetoadvocated that the m Sign vote on this title effective remedy to counter insurgencies would be to remove cause usefulof grievanc Useful the Not although he gave gave no hint of how to do do this. He did, however, advocate advocate the need an intelligence organisation, and the use of ID cards to control population movemen
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