DIMITRIADIS GIORGOS
BLACK SEA MILITARY DYNAMICS THE REEMERGENCE OF RUSSIA MILITARY PRESENCE IN BLACK SEA STATES
2011
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Abstract
The present research aims to provide an overview of the Russian war machine as it deploys in the Black Sea region. The reports focus on the region's states that host significant parts of Russia's Military within their territory. The time frame is mainly the 21 st century and generally the post-Soviet period, without omitting the Soviet background in order to provide a complete time line. The aim is to emphasize on the military presence as a report to Russian bases, stations, troops, equipment, hardware and information for the above, and of course the reasons and the procedures of their deployment in each location. What is sure is that for the Russian Federation of the 21 st century, Black Sea region is a top priority, regarding the security, the strategic power, the military upgrade and of course the cooperation with its allies.
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CONTENTS
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
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CHAPTER II: RUSSIAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN ARMENIA
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CHAPTER III: RUSSIAN RADAR STATION IN AZERBAIJAN
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CHAPTER IV: RUSSIAN MILITARY FORCES IN TRANSNISTRIA - MOLDOVA
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CHAPTER V: RUSSIAN NAVAL BASE IN SEVASTOPOL – UKRAINE
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CHAPTER VI: RUSSIAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN ABKHAZIA AND S.OSSETIA – GEORGIA
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CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
For Soviet Union, a powerful army was always a priority, first of all considering its vastness. The need to guard its borders required a huge army, with discipline and strict organization. Its geographical position had a major difference from other big countries, like United States or Canada, who did not have any threats right outside their doors, something that was very easy for USSR to happen, like for example, Japan, China and Germany during the World War II.
Moreover, Soviet Union had to create a strong military image towards both the Soviet Socialist Republics, and its “satellite” states; on one hand to provide them with the security feeling that they are protected by the Union, and on the other hand to prevent them from possible breakaway or rebellious plans.
During the Cold War between the USSR and the United States of America, an enormous endless military buildup started for both of them, including race in conventional arms, in nuclear forces and in intercontinental ballistic capabilities, and by the mid-1980, the Soviet union armed forces was the largest war machine on the planet.
About the structure of the Soviet Armed Forces, Viktor Suvorov 1 gives details from the inside, in his book Inside The Soviet Army. The Land Forces, during peacetime totals about two million troops strength, and include: Motor Rifle Troops, Tank Troops, Artillery and Rocket Troops, Air Defense Troops, Airborne Assault Troops, Diversionary Troops (Spetsnaz) and Fortified Area Troops.
1 Pen name for Vladimir Bogdanovich Rezun, who have worked in Soviet Military Intelligence.
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The Air Forces of USSR were including half a million men and around 10,000 military aircraft and helicopters and were organized in: Sixteen Air Armies, Long-Range Air Force and Military Transport Aviation.
The Navy of the Union was consisted by four Fleets, the Northern, the Pacific, the Baltic and the Black Sea, each one divided into six arms of service: Submarines, Naval Aviation, Surface Ships, Diversionary Spetsnaz Naval SubUnits, coastal Rockets and Artillery Troops, and Marine Infantry.
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, its military very fast came into a condition not only of standstill, but also of partly dissolution. The financing programs were frozen for some years, the number of men was almost halved, and many of the armed bases, equipment and hardware that were located out of the new Russian borders were either abandoned and dismantled, or became property of each new independent state. Some efforts to keep this war machine functioning have been taken place within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), but did not succeed.
Nowadays, the biggest part of the former Soviet Military Forces, and its successor, is the Russian Military Forces, trying to keep up with this, once glorious, historic army. For some post-Soviet periods of time, sections of the army succumbed from the lack of funding, the bad organization, the incapability of upgrading and the political, social and leadership corruption. However, there seem to be efforts for the Russian military to become a global military superpower once again, through the use of the reliable and strong background of the Red Army, the funding for forces upgrade and buildup, and the good relations with military allies in the wider area. The need and actions towards the implementation of the renewal plans were underlined by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin: “We have thoroughly analyzed the recent problems of defense order placing. That is why we decided to place defense order not only for one year but for a three-year period. Manufacturers could plan and organize rhythmic production then. All our large-scale plans on armed forces renovation
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must be materialized. This is the top-priority nationwide goal” he stated. 2
Russia is the largest state and the strongest military presence, within the Black Sea region which Moscow considers as one of the top priorities for security and military stability. Within this region, as a continue of the Soviet presence or not, there are alliances and agreements with states, and presence or the Russian Army in their territories, wherever Moscow considers it is needed. These places are: Abkhazia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, South Ossetia, Transnistria and Ukraine.
2 Russian Armed Forces Must Be Renewed – Putin, Rus Navy, 10/11/2011, http://rusnavy.com/news/navy/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=13588
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CHAPTER II
RUSSIAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN ARMENIA
Preview
Armenia is a relatively small former Soviet Republic, that in August 1990 was the first of the non-Baltic states that declared independence from the Soviet Union. However, the relations between Russia and Armenia were since then, special, and the latter still remains under the sphere of influence of the Federation. An influence that includes the protection of the “small” Armenia from any kind of dangerous neighbors. A sense of safety against the traditional enemy – Turkey; and a favorable referee of the situation with Azerbaijan, preventing a renewal of the war over Nagorno-Karabakh region. These issues are enough for the pro-Russian Armenia to allow its protector to maintain within its territory, military units that patrol the borders with Turkey and Iran. And of course, Russia facing the determination of Georgia for its complete removal from the Federation's influence 3, and the cold relations with Azerbaijan, considers Armenia as “Russia's only ally in the south” 4, as the Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov5 mentioned.
The benchmark of the today's Russian military presence in Armenia is the Russian 102nd Military Base, also known as 102 nd Red Banner Military Base6, located close to the city Gyumri, in the northwest Armenia. The location is 120 kilometers from the capital of the country, Yerevan, and very close to the borders with Turkey.
3 A stance with background to early 2000s, due to the fact that Georgia was always accusing Russia for total support to the separatist regions of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Azaria. Timeline: Georgia, BBC News, 26/5/2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1102575.stm. 4 Armenia And Russia Reassert Bonds Amid Georgia's Crisis, Sergei Blagov, 16/11/2003, Eurasia Net, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav111703.shtml. 5 Russian Foreign Minister from 1998 to 2004, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Igor_Ivanov. 6 102nd Military Base, Warefare.ru, http://warfare.ru/? catid=321&linkid=2227&base=1336&title=102nd-military-base.
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Background
The roots of 102nd Military Base date back to 1941, when within the Odessa Military District of the Soviet Union's Red Army, the 261 st Rifle Division was formed. Until the end of World War II, it was assigned to the 12 th Army of the North Caucasus Front until 1942, to the Black Sea Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front until 1943, and finally to the 45 th Army of the Transcaucasian Front, where it spent most of the part of the World War II period guarding the borders of the USSR with Turkey. After 1945, the 261 st Rifle Division turned into 37th Rifle Division, and remained in this condition all along the post war period, until 1965, when it became the 127 th Motor Rifle Division, the direct precursor of the 102 nd Military Base.7 It must be noted that until 1990, meaning during the Soviet years, the city Gyumri, where the Russian Forces mentioned above were settled, used to be called Leninakan.
After the fall of the Soviet regime, and the independence of Armenia in August 1990, the departure of the majority of the Russian armed forces from Armenia started, bringing significant changes to the 127 th Motor Rifle Division; unit decrease, inside reform and finally renamed to 102 nd Military Base.
In May 15, 1992, an important part of the post-Soviet military cooperation between Russia and Armenia was signed. Collective Security Treaty was including Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan, and registered by the United Nations in 1995. The Council of Collective Security signed a Prolongation of the Treaty in 1999, which was ratified by all the members of the Organization. According to the Prolongation, the Treaty is automatically renewed every five years. According to its Article Two, “In case of a threat to security, territorial integrity and sovereignty of one or several Member States or a threat to international peace and security, Member States will immediately put into action the mechanism of joined consultations with the aim to coordinate their positions and take measures to eliminate the threat that has emerged.” Additionally, the Article 4 mentions that, “In case an act of aggression 7 102nd Military Base, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/102nd_Military_Base
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is committed against any of the Member States all the others Member States will provide it with necessary assistance, including military one, as well as provide support with the means at their disposal in exercise of the right to collective defense in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.” 8 These two articles are by themselves a significant military bond between Russia and Armenia within the framework of the CSTO.
But, apart from the Collective Security Treaty, Armenia and Russia reinforced their alliance in 1997, signing a 25-year basing agreement, which included 18 Russian Mig-299 fighters in Yerevan, along with infantry, armor, artillery, air defense and other supporting regiments near the city of Gyumri. An important detail is that Russia, from the beginning of the agreement, does not pay any fees for the stationing of the Armed Forces in Armenian territory, and on the other hand, all the public utilities of the base, like water and electricity are paid by the Armenian state. Of course for the Armenian side, this situation does not seem as a waste, since not only they have a powerful ally that prevents any aggression from the neighbors, but also have a cooperative supplier of weapons and other equipment for their national army in very low prices. 10
The aforementioned agreement, also included the term of mutual assistance between Armenia and Russia, in case of any military threat against anyone of the agreement's party. It also prescribed the Russian troops guarding of the borders with Turkey and Iran.
Nagorno-Karabakh War, in which both Azerbaijan and Armenia were involved, was intensified in 1991, after the independence of the two countries from the Soviet regime. Armenia supported openly Nagorno-Karabakh, and the next period, the Russian influence in the conflict was clear, mainly on the Armenian side. It must be mentioned that independent fighters, both from Chechnya and Afghan mujahideen participated, fighting on the Azerbaijan's 8 Official Site of CSTO, http://www.dkb.gov.ru/start/index_aengl.htm. 9 The Mikoyan Mig-29 is a fourth-generation jet fighter aircraft that was developed by the Mikoyan Design Bureau in the Soviet Union, and entered service in 1983. 10 Sometimes military equipment may be given free from Russia to Armenia.
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side. As long as Armenia had the discreet support of Russia, and its troops and equipment available, especially after the Collective Security Treaty agreement, were capable enough to face the enemy and continue supporting the breakaway territory, where a majority of Armenians were resided. Most of the Russian equipment and troops mentioned above, were belonging to the 102 nd military Base. As Dr. Sergey Minasyan 11 says, the full compatibility of Armenia's defense system, with the air force and air defense units of the 102 nd Military Base, attach a sufficient protection to the air space of the country; 12 and he continues mentioning that even though the army of Azerbaijan has a numerical superiority -mainly in lighter armored vehicles-, “in the event of launching of hostilities and CSTO mechanisms becoming operative, the Armenian army can be fortified with up to 300 armored vehicles of various types (APC 13 and AIFV14) from the Russian military base No 102 in Gyumr i.”15 A Russian-brokered ceasefire was signed in 1994, leaving Karabakh as well as swathes of Azeri territory around the enclave in Armenian hands.
Present
The 21st century finds the 102nd Military Base in a stable situation, cooperating with Armenians, while protecting them from possible pressure from their neighbors. The estimated number of troops and personnel of the base is around 4,000 16
An important incident that took place in August 2003, was the dismissal of 11 Dr. Sergey Minasyan is Head of the Department of Policy Studies at the Caucasus Institute in Yerevan. He holds a PhD degree in Military History and an MA in International Relations. His main areas of study are regional security in the Caucasus and the settlement of ethnopolitical conflicts. 12 Nagorno-Karabakh After Two Decades Of Conflict: Is Prolongation Of The Status Quo Inevitable?, Sergey Minasyan, Caucasus Institute Research Papers, August 2010, p. 46. 13 APC stands for Armored Personnel Carrier, http://www.military-today.com/apc.htm. 14 AIFV stands for Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicle, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infantry_fighting_vehicle. 15 Nagorno-Karabakh After Two Decades Of Conflict: Is Prolongation Of The Status Quo Inevitable?, Sergey Minasyan, Caucasus Institute Research Papers, August 2010, p. 51. 16 Armenian Official: Russian Troops In Armenia Set For Mission Upgrade, Radio Free Europe – Radio Liberty, 31/07/2010, http://www.rferl.org/content/Armenian_Official_Russian_Troops_In_Armenia_Set_For_Mission_Upg rade_/2114739.html.
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the Russian Base commander. Major General Alexander Titov was sacked from his position by the Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, due to misconduct and inability to manage base issues; according to The Moscow Times, “[...]was dismissed for being aloof from the affairs of his base, negative performance that allowed for theft of military property[...]”.17 General's interim substitute was Staff Chief, Colonel Yuri Pershin. It must be noted that, the sacked Commander was connected with the death of two civilians residents of Gyumri, who tried to penetrate in the Base territory. 18
During the late 2003, and amid the political crisis in Georgia, 19 the Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov met with his Armenian counterpart Vardan Oskanian in Moscow, and signed a number of agreements on the Russian military base as well as on bilateral military cooperation in 2004. As Minister Ivanov commended: "These agreements would allow the 102nd base to feel more comfortable."20 Given the unstable situation in South Caucasus, mainly due to the political crisis of Georgia, the continuous efforts of the latter to be removed from the Russian orbit and the cold relations with Azerbaijan, Russia made this move to strengthen the bonds with its only ally in the region.
In May 2005, Russia and Georgia signed an agreement on the withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgia by 2008. 21 The pull-out from the two remaining bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki, in Georgian territory, started in June 1st, with the dispatch of a 15-car train from Batumi to Armenia, loaded with ammunition, various equipment and anti-aircraft weapons. Questions were raised about whether this move would affect the situation and balance over the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. However, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov 17 Commander Sacked, The Moscow Times, 04/08/2003, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/news-in-brief/236800.html. 18 Commander Of Russian Military Base Located In Armenia Dismissed, Panarmenian.net, 02/08/2003, http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/politics/news/36/. 19 Political crisis in Georgia during the late 200, also known as “Rose Revolution” led the President Eduard Shevardnadze to resignation, after two weeks of people's demonstrations. In the beginning of 2004, the new President of Georgia, (and former Justice Minister) Mikheil Saakashvili, was elected. Georgia's "Rose Revolution", GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/ops/rose.htm. 20 Armenia And Russia Reassert Bonds Amid Georgia's Crisis, Sergei Blagov, 16/11/2003, Eurasia Net, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav111703.shtml. 21 Russia Agrees To Pull Troops From Georgia By 2008, EurasiaNet.org, 29/05/2005, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/pp053005.shtml.
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told that "The withdrawal of part of Russian arms from Georgia to Armenia will not change the balance of forces in the Transcaucasus," followed by statements from Russian officials that the transferred arms and equipment will be kept in storage at Russia's 102nd base in Gyumri, in northern Armenia, and insisted that the Armenian military will not have any access to the weaponry. Azerbaijan, despite the reassuring statements, was still suspicious about this military equipment move to 102nd Military Base in Armenia, with President Aliyev announcing that he would launch a military spending raise so “their army should be strong to solve the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.” On the other side, Azerbaijani analysts and observers believe that Russia's intention was to strengthen its own geopolitical position in the region and not to military equip the Armenian army over issues with Azerbaijan. 22
Later the same year, in October, Defense Minister of Armenia, Serzh Sarkisian insisted that his country was keeping the Russian military base on its soil because of Turkey's "hostile" policies and not the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Following reports of foreign diplomats and representatives, Sarkisian said: “Russian troops are stationed in Armenia at the request of the Armenian state and in accordance with a bilateral agreement, and make up an integral part of our national security. [...] If you want me to specify in relation to which countries the Russian troops could be useful for us, then I'll tell you: countries outside the CIS. More specifically, Turkey. [...] Until now Turkey has pursued a hostile policy towards us. As for what its policy will be in the future, let us wait and see.” 23
The relations between Russia and Armenia follow an upward course. In October 2007, talks were held in Yerevan between Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov and Armenia's leadership; President Robert Kocharian, Prime Minister Serzh Sarkisian and Defense Minister Mikael Harutiunian. Their discussions and the following statements presented the bilateral satisfaction as long as the desire for further cooperation. The talks included possible joint 22 Armenia And Azerbaijan Differ Over Russian Base Pull-Out, EurasiaNet.org, 27/06/2005, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav062805.shtml. 23 102nd Military Base, GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/102military-base.htm.
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Russian-Armenian military exercises, to be held in 2008. After the meetings, the Minister Serdyukov paid a visit to the troops of the 102 nd Military Base.24
"At any rate, consequences of "Five-day war" have distanced Russia from Armenia," Dr. Sergey Minasyan, Head of the Department of Policy Studies at the Caucasus Institute, said, pointing the fact that after the Russian-Georgian War of 2008, the connecting routes through which Russia was military -and not only- supplying Armenia were closed. The alternatives of Iran and Turkey were out of consideration due to strict restrictions. At some level, Russia's 102 nd Military Base is supplied mainly by air through Azerbaijan, a fact that is strange, considering the unsolved Karabakh conflict. 25
In December 2009, a new agreement came to strengthen the ties in the relationships between Armenia and Russia. Armenian Defense Minister Seyran Ohanian and visiting senior Russian official Konstantin Biryulin, have agreed to work together in exporting weapons and other military equipment to third countries. No details about the agreement were given except from the fact that between the two countries there will be “interaction in exporting military production to third countries,” as said in an Armenian Ministry statement. 26
New scenarios for the Moscow-Yerevan Military cooperation came to light in July 2010, when it was announced that there was being planned a new military agreement that would assign Russia and its troops a greater role in ensuring Armenia's security. There were also proposals about Russian units to actively contribute to Armenia's national security. A senior official at the Armenian
Defense
Ministry
noted,
though,
that
the
Russian
troops
headquartered in the northern Armenian city of Gyumri are already tasked with defending Armenia.27 The planned changes in the Russian-Armenian treaty 24 102nd Military Base, GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/102military-base.htm. 25 How Is Russia's 102nd Military Base Supplied?, Azeri Report, 16/10/2009, http://azerireport.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1703. 26 Armenia, Russia Sign Arms Export Deal, Asbarez.com, 17/12/2009, http://asbarez.com/75043/armenia-russia-sign-arms-export-deal-2/. 27 Armenian Official: Russian Troops In Armenia St For Mission Upgrade, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 31/07/2010,
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would simply spell out that mission in more explicit terms, he explained. The treaty that is in action since 1997 and is valid for 25 years is planned not only to be prolonged through this updated version, but also provide further automatic extension in the future.28
The implementation of these plans came in August of 2010, when Moscow and Yerevan agreed the amendments to the already existing treaty, extending the mission of the Russian units until 2044.
Russian President Dmitry
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Medvedev and Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan signed the treaty, with the latter to say after the talks that “The protocol doesn't just allow the Russian military base to stay in Armenia for a longer period, it also extends the sphere of its geographic and strategic responsibility.” 30 The amendments of the new lease plan were ratified by the Armenian Parliament some months later, in April 2011.31
According to the agreement signed in 2006 between Russia and Georgia, Russia had to evacuate the military bases of Batumi and Akhalkalaki, and Georgia from its side, had to allow the military personnel and cargo transit to the Russian 102nd Military Base in Gyumri, Armenia, through its land and airspace. Right after the Russian-Georgian War in 2008, Georgia blocked these connection; however, any official annulment of the agreement has not been ratified, until April 2011, when the Georgian Parliament decided that this blockade should continue officially. Although, it was revealed that Georgia sometimes, still allows some overflights of military cargo through its airspace, mainly when the equipment is sold or given from Russia to Armenia, and not for the Russian Military Base; but even these opportunities for supply are very
28 29 30 31
http://www.rferl.org/content/Armenian_Official_Russian_Troops_In_Armenia_Set_For_Mission_Upg rade_/2114739.html. Russian Troops In Armenia Set For Greater Role, Asbarez.com, 30/07/2010, http://asbarez.com/83848/russian-troops-in-armenia-set-for-greater-role/. Russia Extends Lease On Military Base In Armenia Through 2044, Ria Novosti, 20/08/2010, http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20100820/160276128.html. Russian Base In Armenia To Stay Through 2044, Hurriet Daily News, 26/08/2010, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=russian-base-in-armenia-to-stay-through-2044-2010-0826. Russian military base in Armenia: A security guarantee or limitation of independence? ArmeniaNow.com, 13/04/2011, http://www.armenianow.com/news/28963/russian_military_base_gyumri.
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limited from the Georgian side. Azerbaijan is -partially- the solution that is given to the Russians, which remarkably allows a significant amount of cargo to transit through its territory.32
With separate processes from the treaty extension, between Russia and Armenia, mentioned before, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov signed the defense treaty for the Russian air base, in a Moscow ceremony with his Armenian counterpart Edvard Nalbandyan. The Russian Air Base in Armenia is part of the Russian Forces located in the 102 nd Military Base, but due to its difference of military branch and management, a separate agreement was signed.33
There are 5,000 Russian personnel in Armenia at the moment. The troops and related to them stuff counts around 3,000, and are officially part of the forces of 102nd Military Base. The rest 2,000 are stuff of the Russian Air Defense system in Armenia, as an independent part of the Military Base.
The military hardware of Russia within the Armenian territory includes: 74 T-72 MBT tanks,34 which is the main land weapon of the Base, 17 Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles (AIFV), 148 Armored Personnel Carriers (APC), 84 Artillery pieces, 18 MiG-29 fighters 35 and several batteries of S-300 anti-aircraft missiles. During the aforementioned evacuation of bases in Georgia, 35 more tanks and armored vehicles and 370 more pieces of military hardware are thought to moved within the Russian 102 nd Military Base.36
32 Georgia Doesn't Allow Russian Military Transit To Armenia – But Azerbaijan Does? Eurasianet.org, 19/04/2011, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63331. 33 Russia's Lease of Armenian Air Base Extended Till 2044, Turkish Weekly, 06/07/2011, http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/118368/russia-39-s-lease-of-armenian-air-base-extended-till2044.html. 34 102nd Military Base, Warefare.ru, http://warfare.ru/? catid=321&linkid=2227&base=1336&title=102nd-military-base. 35 The number of the MiG-29's is up to 30, according to other sources. 36 Russian 102nd Military Base, Gyumri, Armenia, Heralding the rise of Russia, http://theriseofrussia.blogspot.com/2009/02/russian-102nd-military-base-gyumri.html.
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CHAPTER III
RUSSIAN RADAR STATION IN AZERBAIJAN
Preview
Qabala Radar, named after the homonymous city in the northern Azerbaijan, is a Daryal (or Pechora) type of radar, whose construction started in 1978 and completed in 1984 by the USSR, entering service in 1985. The Daryal type is bistatic and uses the phased-array technology. It belongs to the category of the early warning radars and occupies an area of 210 hectares. It's range is 3.728 miles or approximately 6.000 kilometers, able to detect missile launches even from Indian Ocean. It gives also the opportunity for enabling a missile defense, since it is able to detect the missile's trajectory. The Qabala Radar Station hosts about 1000 Russian servicemen, and the whole station, including the 30 hectares garbage dump, covers an area of 240 hectares. 37
After the dissolution of USSR, Russian and Azerbaijan started negotiations about Qabala Radar, and in 2002 signed an agreement for lease. Since then and until 2012 Russia is allowed to keep operating the radar for its own defense needs.
Background
Mints Radio Technical Institute (RTI) was primarily founded in 13 August, 1946, when a laboratory headed by the academician physicist A. Mints was opened in the Lebedev Physical Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. In February 1951 it became an independent laboratory of the Academy and six years later, the laboratory turned into Radio Technical Institute of the 37 Qabala Radar, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qabala_Radar.
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Soviet Academy of Sciences. RTI was focusing its researches for developments in two sections. First was in the field of nuclear physics and elementary-particle physics and second, the development and construction of ground-based radars and complexes of radars. This was an important step towards the synchronization of the defense technology, since the radar researches of RTI set off the creation of missile attack warning system (MAW), space monitoring systems (SM) and anti-ballistic missile defense systems, providing new alternatives to the protection from enemies. 38
Within the plans of the Soviet Union aiming to the development of the early warning radar network, in the beginning of the 1970s, the Radio Technical Institute commenced the creation of a new, highly effective radar, the Daryal type, whose main distinguishing features are the very high radiated power, the use of phased-array technology for both transmitting and receiving, and the digital processing of signals. In 1975, the Soviet government ordered the construction of two Daryal type Radars, in new sites within the Soviet territory, one in Pechora39, from where the alternative name for this type of radar comes from, and Qabala, a city in the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. These two new-type radars were planned to complement the Dnestr-M and Dnepr 40 radars network that was still under construction. In January 1979 the network was completed and some months later, the government approved the an upgrade including the modernization of the Dnepr radars, the completion of the Daryal constructions in Pechora and Qabala, and the beginning of construction of new Daryal radars, in Yeniseysk (near Krasnoyarsk) 41, in Balkhash42, in Mishelevka43, in Skrunda44 and in Mukachevo.45 46
By the middle of 1980s, the huge projects carried out by the USSR in this 38 50 Years Of The Mints Radiotechnical Institute,Military Parade, http://milparade.udm.ru/16/7476.htm. 39 In the North Western part of the USSR. 40 Ground based radars of previous technology, constructed by RTI in the 1960s and deployed in different sites within USSR, like Kazakhstan, Siberia, Latvia, Western Ukraine and near Moscow. 41 In the South Central part of USSR. 42 Near the homonymous lake in Kazakhstan. 43 In the South Central part of the USSR. 44 In the North Western part of the USSR (Latvia). 45 In the Western part of the USSR (Ukraine). 46 History And The Current Status Of The Russian Early-Warning System, Pavel Podvig, Science And
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section of defense, would extremely improve its ability for early warning through radar systems. The Daryal facilities in Pechora and Qabala were given to service in 1984 and 1985 respectively and the new ones were under construction in the aforementioned sites. However, the under-construction radars were never meant to be completed. Some of the works on these were suspended due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demand of the new independent democracies, and some due to the ABM Treaty47.
After the change of the political status and the independence of the former Soviet Socialist Democracies, the Azerbaijani presidential decree of 16 December 1991, announced that all the military facilities and installations within its territory, have become property of the new republic. This decree was ratified by Milli Majlis48 on 8 April 1992, followed by a group of experts and scientists that formed in May 1992, in order to study the Qabala Radar effects on the environment.49
In October 1993, Heydar Aliyev became president of Azerbaijan 50, and after releasing the armament from Soviet military depots, he put Azerbaijan in a route of slipping away from Moscow, earlier than other former SSR democracies of the region. He did not allow Russia to introduce or maintain border troops or military bases within the Azerbaijani territory, except from the Qabala Radar. It should be mentioned that the Qabala Radar was used as a first sanctuary for pro-Russian Colonel Suret Huseynov 51, after his failed effort for another coup in order to unseat Aliyev. Colonel finally fled from the county, failing Moscow's plans to take control of Azerbaijan.52
In 2002, after negotiations between the two countries, an official lease was Global Security, Vol.10, 2002. 47 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, signed between USSR and USA in 1972. 48 Milli Majlis is the Azerbaijani National Assembly (Parliament), counting 125 deputies. 49 Weapons Of Mass Destruction, Qabala/Gabala, GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/qabala.htm. 50 After the nationwide referendum of August 1993 that stripped the previous President, Abulfaz Elchibey of his position, amidst the events following the military coup in Ganja, led by Col. Suret Huseynov. 51 Azerbaijani Colonel, ex-Prime Minister and leader of the military coup in Ganja, in 1993. 52 Azerbaijan Since Independence,Svante E. Cornell,
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signed, according to which, Russia has to pay $7 million every year, in order to be allowed to keep the Qabala Radar Station operative and part of the Federation's early-warning defense system. The lease signed in 2002 was planned to be valid until 2012.53
Daryal Radars Technology – Qabala Radar Details
The Qabala Radar in Azerbaijan, belongs to the Daryal (or Daryal-U) type of radars, constructed by the Mints Radio Technical Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Just like the other radars of the same type, it is a bistatic, phased array, early warning system, a technology developed during the 1970s, but still trustworthy and combatant in the modern battlefield.
The term “bistatic”, refers mainly to the structure of the radar's transmitter and receiver. Unlike the more usual type of monostatic radars, where the transmitter and the receiver, share one antenna, bistatic radars employs two sites that are separated by a considerable distance. The transmitter is placed at the one site, and the associated receiver to the second site.
The target
detection is similar to that of the monostatic radar. The target is illuminated by the transmitter, and its echoes are detected and processed by the receiver. However, the target location is more complicated. Of course, for this reason is more accurate to locate the target. This accuracy is based to the bistatic triangle which is formed by the transmitter, the receiver and the target. The distances between the three peaks of the triangle, the total signal propagation time, the orthogonal angle measurements by the receiver and the estimate of the transmitter location are the basic calculations to give the accuracy of the target's position.54
The term “phased array” describing a basic function of this type of radars, is a technology for the deep understanding of which, someone must have some level of knowledge in Physics. However a general description of it, is possible. 53 Qabala Radar, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qabala_Radar. 54 Bistatic Radar, Nicholas J. Willis, Introduction to Radar Systems, edit. Merill Skolnik.
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As Dr. Eli Brookner55 mentions in his text about Phased Array Radars, “Such a radar can track or search for objects without moving its antenna. To steer the beam, it relies on wave interactions among signals from a multitude of small antenna elements.” A flat surface that consists of a number of small identical antennas replaces the “classic” concave-shaped reflector. These small antennas are capable of transmitting and receiving signals with their beams scanning expanses of sky in a significant wide range, without any move of the construction of the radar. This capability of a phased-array radar, like the Qabala Radar, is called electronic beam steering. This requires progressive shifts in signal phase, and every antenna element emits a signal that propagates in all directions, even significantly away from its boresight axis. This way, it makes possible, through the variation of the phases of the signals, to automatically direct the effective radiation pattern to the desired target, and limit the signal emitted to undesirable directions. 56
The term “early warning”, when referring to radar system, means its capability to be used for the long range detection of its targets. This system provides the defenses the maximum time to prepare, alerting them as early as possible before the intruder reaches its target.
These three characteristics amassed in the Qabala Radar System, makes it a trustworthy predictor of possible enemy attacks or invasions, enforcing the defense system of Russia. The radar, able to detect missiles even from the Indian Ocean, having a range of 6,000 kilometers (3,728 miles), has a surveillance cover that includes Turkey, Iran, Iraq, India and the entire Middle East. The station's initial capacity was 50 MW and is able to reach up to 350 MW, operating at a wavelength of 1.5 to 2 meters, or 150 to 200 MHz. Qabala Radar is able to monitor 20 complex and 100 single targets simultaneously.
Present – Current status 55 Dr. Eli Brookner, principal engineering fellow with Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems, is the 2006 recipient of the Dennis J. Picard Medal for Radar Technologies & Applications from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). 56 Phased-Array Radars, Eli Brookner, Scientific Paper.
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In 2002, negotiations between Russia and Azerbaijan governments, resulted into a lease plan according to which, Russia would be able to keep operating the Qabala Radar in favor of its early-warning defense system until 2012. According to sources, the annual payment agreed was 7 million US dollars.57
Vladimir Putin, the president of Russian Federation, watching the debates of the USA about planning to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system in Eastern Europe with the excuse of the possible hostility of Iran, Iraq and North Korea, offered to the US the chance of a cooperation in this defense section by providing the Qabala Radar as a substitute to the initial USA plan that included a radar system in Czech Republic and 10 interceptor rockets in Poland. 58 In September 2007, an experts' delegation from USA, visited the Qabala Radar and was given an extended tour to the facilities. After that, the head of the delegation, General Patrick O'Reilly, mentioned that there were no formal negotiations, adding that the visit took place in order for the US to fully understand the nature and details of the Russian proposal. 59 Although, United States ended up rejecting this proposal, claiming that the existing radar system was not sophisticated enough to cover the demands of their anti-ballistic missile plan. They also insisted in going on with their plan about Czech Republic and Poland, a decision that has been made clear during the meeting between Putin and Bush, when the latter said that “the Czech Republic and Poland need to be an integral part of the system”, in International Herald Tribune.60
As the leasing plan of the Qabala Radar Station approaches to its deadline, Russia starts
negotiations with Azerbaijan about expanding the
agreement. Within the proposals of the Federation are the “[...] plans for the 57 According to the sources: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/qabala.htm, http://www.news.az/articles/politics/38111. However, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, http://www.rferl.org/content/russia_azerbaijan_renegotiate_radar_lease/24277770.html, mentions as annual payment the amount of 10 million US dollars, while ABC.AZ http://abc.az/eng/news_25_07_2011_56261.html, set this price at 14 million US dollars. 58 Russia objected to this plan of defense installations in these countries because their close proximity to its soil could be considered as a possible threat, and could be easily converted in offensive weapons. 59 Azerbaijan: US Experts Visit Qabala Radar, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 18/09/2007, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1078709.html 60 Newsline, Radio Free Europe Radio Libery, 03/07/2007, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1143905.html
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modernization of the radar station,” as Russian Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov have said to RIA-Novosti.61 The latest updates about the negotiations mention that talks are going on, with Azerbaijan putting forward certain proposals, which are being studied, said Lt. General Oleg Ostapenko, Commander of the Russian Space Forces. 62 Baku seems to ask for a higher rent, compensation for the environmental impact on the area, and more employing opportunities for Azeri citizens to the radar and its facilities. Since the Qabala Radar is extremely important for the Russian Defense network, the negotiations continue in order Azerbaijan accepts the proposals and extend the lease plan over 2012.
Related Environmental Concerns
Researches around the environmental affect of the Qabala radar have shown that the operation of it, may be disastrous for the surrounding area and the population residing close to it. As aforementioned, the top power capacity of the station is 350 MW. However, it is not possible to use this amount of power, because when in 1984, 300 MW were being used, one hectare of territory was completely burned. In addition, when installing high voltage lines, over 400 hectares of forest were destroyed, and thousands of trees have been dying as a result of the radar's operation. The average electric field intensity created by the station exceeds the safety levels about three to five times, even to populated areas close to the site.63
An important issue about the Qabala Radar is its cooling system. Around 300 to 400 cubic meters of water are required for this reason, just for an hour of operation. After being used to cool, the water, without any chemical or biological cleansing, ends up to the rivers around. Despite the species of fish that were disappeared from the rivers, and the forest around them dying, it must be 61 Russia Proposes Modernizing Qabala Radar Station, News.az, 25/07/2011, http://www.news.az/articles/politics/41198 62 Russia Seeks Extension For Azerbaijan Radar Lease, 05/10/2011, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20111005/167390222.html 63 Ecological Genocide Russian Radar Causes Ecological Problems, GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/russia/1998/fbten06111998001258.htm
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mentioned that the surrounding population keeps using the rivers' water. Moreover, freon used for this cooling system, reaches the 25 tons per time of cooling.64
Rashida Abdullayeva, Chief of the Public Health committee of Azerbaijan, 65 examined the radar, and underlined the significant impact of the latter to the environment around. After her research, she put together a short booklet documenting simple preventing measures for the station's affects to the population around, because she realized that despite their complaints for symptoms as headaches, dizziness and chronic ailments, there seems to be little awareness for protection from the electromagnetic rays.66
Although, a research referring to PAVE PAWS67 radar system in Cape Cod Air Force Station, Massachusetts, USA, have given different results. This system uses the same technology with Qabala Radar system, and the committee that examined it, found no evidence of a mechanism by which the levels of radio-frequency energy similar to the one emitted from PAVE PAWS (and so, Qabala), could change biological processes. Studies about cancer related to the exposure to this technology revealed that there was no increasing incidents, and the reports of measurements of overall health of the surrounding population were positive.68
64 Ecological Genocide Russian Radar Causes Ecological Problems, GlobalSecurity.org,http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/russia/1998/fbten0611199800125 8.htm 65 Azerbaijan Medical Association, http://www.azerweb.com/en/ngo.php?id=280 66 Caucasus Research Resource Centers, http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.com/2006/12/gabala-radiostation-local-health.html 67 A United States Air Force Space Command radar system. PAVE is the particular Air Force program name. PAWS stands for Phased Array Warning System. 68 News From The National Academies, http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx? RecordID=11205
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CHAPTER IV
RUSSIAN MILITARY FORCES IN TRANSNISTRIA – MOLDOVA
Preview Of Transnistria
The breakaway territory of Transnistria is located between the Dniester river and the eastern Moldovan borders with Ukraine. The Pridnestrovian Moldovian Republic (PMR), as internally called, declared its independence in 1990, after the referendum of January, in Tiraspol, according to the results of which, 90% of the voters favored an autonomous status for the territory, 69 and used the aforementioned name after the War of Transnistria in 1992. Republic of Moldova considers the area as part of the region of Left Bank of Dniester, and not an independent state. Transnistria's sovereignty is also unrecognized by every member state of the United Nations, having absolutely no diplomatic relations with any of them. Only Abkhazia and South Ossetia have recognized PMR, two regions that along with the latter and Nagorno-Karabakh, belong to the category of post-Soviet frozen conflict zones.
War in Transnistria
The language law that have been passed in 1989, making Moldovan 70, with latin alphabet, the official language, inflamed Slavic feelings on the east side of Dnestr river. Politicians there, declared a separate Soviet Republic on 2nd of September, 1990. The secession of Transnistria was proclaimed in September 1990, and the next year, the paramilitary forces of the breakaway territory took over the Moldovan public institutions of the area. The conflicts intensified between the two sides: the pro-Transnistrian forces that were 69 Russians In The Former Soviet Republics, Pål Kolstø, p. 157. 70 Basically Romanian.
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including the Transnistrian Republican Guard, militia and Ukrainian Cossacks units, and supported by parts of the Russian 14th Army; and the pro-Moldovan forces that were including Moldovan troops, police and Romanian volunteers. This happened in 1992, after the escalation of the local clashes between Moldova police and Transnistrian militia, into a civil war level.
Following a number of ad hoc ceasefires, a final one was declared in 21 st of July, 1992. The number of losses of human lives varies, with BBC News estimating at about 700 71, while according to The Japan Times, this civil war cost over 1,000 lives72.
Russian Forces in Moldova – Background
The 14th Army was formed around 1956 as a unit of the Soviet Army. It was also known as 14th Guards Army, and used to be a part of the Odessa Military District73. Primarily the headquarters were in Chisinau, but in 1980s, when Moldova was still a Soviet Socialist Republic, they moved into Tiraspol.
For a long time during the Soviet years, the 14 th Army was of lowreadiness, having barely the size of a full strength division. It was relying upon the 59th Guards “Kramatorskaya” Motorized Rifles Division, which was equipped with T-64BV tanks, MT-LB Multipurpose Vehicles, and and BTR-80 Armoured Personnel Carriers, based in Tiraspol. The force was including the 275 Missile Brigade, with S-200/SA-5 Gammon Missile System, S-75/SA-2 Guideline surface-to-air Missile System, C-125/SA-3 Goa surface-to-air Missile System, and 803 Missile Regiment, with 9M140 “Uragan” surface-to-surface rockets caliber 280mm. There were also a helicopter Detachment with four MI-4s and 71 Trans-Dniester Profile, BBC News, 20/01/2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/3641826.stm 72 Transnistria: relic of a bygone era, by Richard Humphreys, The Japan Times, 8/10/2001, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/fv20011008a2.html 73 The Odessa Military District was a military administrative division formed in 1862 and dissolved in 1998. During this time was part of the Imperial Russian Army, the Soviet Army and the Ukrainian Armed forces, under the same name. Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Odessa_Military_District.
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four MI-24s, and a number of various support and non-combat units. 74 But in December 1991, as defined by the CIS agreement that has been signed, and was concerning the division of the -now collapsed- ex USSR's military property among the former Soviet republics, the 14 th Army's weapons and supplies were given to the government of the Moldovan Republic. In the summer of 1992, Boris Yeltsin, seeing that the conflicts between Moldovan government and separatists became serious and the situation unstable, realized the need for some changes, and removed the 14 th Army's commander, Yuri Netkachov.75 The changes came with the arrival of Lt. General Alexander Lebed 76, thanks to whom, a personnel and equipment renewal that was completed in 1992, took place. An anti-aircraft and helicopter regiments were shifted from Ukraine, a battalion of airborne troops from Belgorod, a reconnaissance battalion, and a motorized rifle regiment from the 27 th Guard Motorized Rifle Division of the Volga Military District.77
In July 1992, peacekeeping forces in order to maintain the ceasefire and prevent any conflicts, were created. A Joint Control Commission was established, made up of Russian, Moldovan and Transnistrian separatists representatives, and a security zone of 225 kilometers by 12 kilometers between the two sides had been set. According to Mihai Gribincea, senior Moldovan diplomat and Political Adviser to the OSCE high Commissioner on National Minorities in the Hague, Netherlands, the peacekeeping forces were counting a total number of 4.800 troops. Six Russian battalions, counting 2.400 troops, three Moldovan battalions, 1.200 troops, and another three battalions 74 War In Moldova, 1992, Alexandru Stratulat & Tom Cooper, http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_281.shtml. 75 The Republic of Moldova: Transniester and the 14th Army,Edward Ozhiganov. From the book of Aleksei Arbatov, Managing Conflict In Former Soviet Union, chapt. 7, p. 174. 76 Alexander Lebed, for many Russians, is thought to be a hero, due to his plain-speaking style, and mainly his efforts to defense the Russian interests. Among his most important military achievements were his refusal to move his 14th Army troops against Boris Yeltsin during the coup of 1991, stating that “i could not care less for democracy, but I would not shoot fellow Russians”, his help to resolve the Moldova – Transnistria issue, and of course, he achieved a ceasefire with Chechens at the end of August 1996. His political moves put him in the State Duma in 1995 and in 1996, after coming third in the Presidential elections with 15%, he delivers his votes to Boris Yeltsin in the second round, preventing a new Communist government. He becomes Secretary of the Security Council and Security Adviser, and in 1998 he wins the governorship of the Krasnoyarsk region. Alexander Lebed was killed in April 2002, in a helicopter crash. BBC News, 28/4/2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1955980.stm. 77 Operational Group Of Russian Forces In Moldova, GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/ogrv-moldova.htm.
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for Transnistria, counting also 1.200 troops. Three groups of military observers, each one for every part of the forces, were formed, to ensure the monitoring of the security zone. After the peacekeeping forces were settled to the area, both sides, Moldovan and separatists, started withdrawing military equipment and staff, releasing the pressure in the area. 78
From the mid-1990's, until today, there have been numerous consultations and debates about the presence of the Russian military within the Moldovan and Transnistrian territory. In August 1994, when Colonel-General Eduard Vorob'yev, the special representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense to the talks, declared that Russia was ready to start an immediate withdrawal of its troops, it turned out that the Moldovan side was not ready for such a change. In fact, Moldovan authorities at that time depended on the presence of Russian troops to contain the separatist ambitions of Tiraspol. Given this predicament, Chisinau agreed finally to a three-year phased withdrawal of the 14th Army, proposed by Moscow.
In October 1994, Russia and Moldova, during a CIS 79 meeting, agreed on the gradual withdrawal of the 14th Army, pending settlement of the political status of Transnistria. Moldova, not trusting Moscow, began to seek international guarantees for the timely withdrawal of the Russian army. First idea that proposed, was the creation of a special international body that would monitor the process of withdrawal. However, this could mean that the new international peacekeeping force would replace the 14 th Army, possibly for a very long period within the territory, and there were no assurances that it would be neutral, so that plan was abandoned. An effort made also within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), where the Moldova representative initiated proposals to include into the terms for Russia's admittance to the European body, the timely withdrawal of the 14 th Army. The Moldovan proposal, however, was rejected, and the withdrawal of troops from Moldova did not become a condition for Russia's membership in European 78 Moldova: Rejecting a New Role for the Former 14th Russian Army, Mihai Gribincea, http://www.tol.org/. 79 Commonwealth of Independent States.
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security structures. Even United States, besides the fact that U.S. Representative to the United Nations Madeleine Albright said that “the departure of Russian troops from Moldova is still one of the major objectives of American policy in this region”, a little later, President Clinton insinuated that for Moldova, the issue of the withdrawal the 14th Army must be resolved in direct negotiations with Russia.80
Despite the General Lebed's resistance to the downgrading of 14 th Army, and the proposal of the Russian Ministry of Defense for 3,500 more units in the Trans-Dniester region, in April 1995, the 14th Army was transformed into an "operational military group", disappearing the position of Lebed as an army commander. Opposed to changes in the status quo of the region, the Russian Duma presented the two main reasons for its position against the withdrawal of the Russian forces. First of all, as E. Ozhiganov mentions, in a referendum in March 26, 1995, the majority of the residents of Transnistria had opposed the departure of the 14th Army.81 Moreover, Duma noted the extreme difficulties, both financial and technical, that a possible ammunition and equipment removal would mean. Under these circumstances, there was little hope for the agreement to be implemented. In mid-1995, General Lebed resigned, in protest over the still-scheduled downgrading of the 14th Army. At that time about 4,000 to 6,000 Russian troops were present in the Trans-Dniester area of Moldova. In June 1995 Major General Valeriy Gennadyevich Yevnevich was appointed by a Russian presidential decree as the new head of the operational group in command of the Russian forces in the Dniester region. 82
It should be mentioned that, searching the historical details about the presence of the Russian Military forces in the region of Transnistria, the particular period between 14th Army and Operational Group of Russian Forces in Moldova, as the Russian peacekeeping forces were called since April 1995, 80 Trans-Dniestria, Irina Selivanova, senior researcher at the Institute of International Economic and Political Research, Russian Academy of Sciences. http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF129/CF-129.chapter4.html. 81 The Republic of Moldova: Transniester and the 14th Army,Edward Ozhiganov. From the book of Aleksei Arbatov, Managing Conflict In Former Soviet Union, chapt. 7, p. 194. 82 Operational Group of Russian Forces in Moldova, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/ogrv-moldova.htm.
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is not so clear. Answering to a question of mine, whether the 14 th Army and the Russian peacekeeping forces were the same units or not, Dr. Pal Kolsto, Professor of Russian and Central European and Balkan Area Studies at the University of Oslo, noted the absence of full transparency in this issue, mentioning however the theory of Vladimir Socor, 83 who talked about possible “revolving door” policy, with military officers and troops just changing uniforms and units, and returning to the region; a kind of overlap. Although, other analysts, like Dr. Graeme P. Herd, Head of the International Security Program at Geneva Center for Security Policy, are sure that clearly “The Russian 14 th Army, under General Lebed, was deployed as a peacekeeping force [...]”. 84
In November 1999, President Boris Yeltsin signed the agreement on adaptation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty 85 during the OSCE summit in Istanbul. According to this document, Russia undertook an obligation to withdraw its forces from Transnistria by the end of 2002. But when a pull-out began in 2001, it was halted when Transnistrians blocked the dispatch of weapons,as BBC News mention. 86 Additional debates to resume the withdrawal failed to reach an agreement.
Present
During the late 2003, Russia tried to promote a settlement plan for the issues between Moldova and PMR. For two reasons, this effort triggered reactions in the Moldovan side,in early 2004; reactions that led even to a wave of opposition protests.87 The first reason was that a big percentage of Moldovan people and leaders, thought Russians as totally pro-Transnistrians, so a plan 83 Political analyst of East European affairs for the Jamestown Foundation and Eurasia Daily Monitor. 84 Moldova and the Dniester Region: Contested Past, Frozen Future, Speculative Futures?, Graeme P. Herd, Conflict Studies Research Centre, p. 4. 85 According to Dr. Jeffrey D. McCausland in his writing Op-Ed: Conventional Arms Control And European Security, “The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, was signed in Paris on November 19, 1990, between members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. […] it is clearly the mos ambitious and far ranging conventional arms control treaty in history.” 86 Trans-Dniester Profile, BBC News, 20/01/2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/3641826.stm. 87 Moldova: Protests to continue in Chisinau, 28/11/2003, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1105151.html.
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made by them, would not be objective, but possibly in favor of the breakaway territory. The second reason was that through this plan would make permanent the Russian military force in Moldova. Under these conditions, talks between the sides stopped and Russia did not complete the full withdrawal of its forces.
Efforts for further negotiations about the Transnistria status -including of course the presence of the Russian forces- were put in suspension in 2006, after only five months of talks (October 2005 -February 2006), that were including negotiators from Moldova, Transnistria, Russia, Ukraine, the OSCE, and additional observers from the United States and the European Union. More meetings of the “5+2” participants, as the involving countries-negotiators are called, took place in 21-23 of July, 2008., 88 but not on an official basis. Since 2006 there were no official talks for the Transnistrian issue. However, it is mentionable that on September 22, 2011, there has been an agreement for launching official negotiations once again, as mentioned by Vladimir Socor in Eurasia Daily Monitor.89
At the present time, the Operational Group of Russian Forces in Moldova consists of the 8th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade, the 1162 nd Anti-Aircraft Rocket Regiment, 15th Signals Regiment and some support units, a total of around 1,500 troops that have two purposes in the territory. Jointly patrol with Moldovan and Transnistrian soldiers, 90 and guard the large former-Soviet, and now Russian ammunition depot of Cobasna area. Cobasna is a commune consisting of three villages, situated in north-eastern Moldova, within the territory of Transnistria.91 During the fourth assessment conference of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, held in Vienna, in 29 th of September 2011, the Moldovan delegation held the chairmanship of the conference by rotation. In its statement, the representatives of Moldova, reminding the 88 Ministry Of Foreign Affairs Of The Russian Federation, Press Release, 24/7/2008, http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/50a8a77c141d0136c3257491002 b38c2?OpenDocument. 89 Russia Agrees to Re-Launch Negotiations on Transnistria After Five-Year Breakdown, Vladimir Socor, Eurasia Daily Monitor, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/? tx_ttnews[tt_news]=38450&cHash=6e7c1b276080e7dba2da3b2f57f87424. 90 In this patrols, Ukrainian military observers are always included. 91 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cobasna.
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commitments of the countries towards the obligations set in the Treaty, 92 repeated their official stance that the Russian ammunition stocks in Cobasna, and the military forces guarding them should be completely withdrawn from the Moldovan territory. Remaining to the same context, the delegation insisted on the need for a transformation of the actual peacekeeping forces into a multinational civilian mission, operating under international orders and observation.93
92 Implying the 1999 agreement on adaptation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, that Russia has signed. 93 Moldova requests completing withdrawal of Russian ammunition from Transnistrian region, Moldova's News, 30/9/2011, http://www.allmoldova.com/en/moldova-news/1249051410.html.
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CHAPTER V
RUSSIAN NAVAL BASE IN SEVASTOPOL – UKRAINE
Background Of Black Sea Fleet
After the annexation of the Crimea to Russia in 1783 94, Catherine the Great established in Sevastopol a Russian naval base 95. A misapprehension about the Unkiar-Skelessi Treaty96 in 1833, between Russia and Ottoman Empire, led the leaders of the western Powers to the conclusion that a secret clause of the aforementioned Treaty was granting Russia the right to send warships through Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits 97. This mistake had as a result the London Straits Convention of 1841, according to which, Ottoman Empire was affirmed to control the Straits and prevent the the pass of any power's warships through them.
The economic and political race between France, England, Turkey and Russia in the Near East and their efforts for influence, market and territory obtainment at that area were the main reasons of the Crimean War in 1853. The battles took place in the Baltic Sea, the White Sea, on the Danube, in the Caucasus and even in the distant Kamchatka peninsula. The principal war battles however took place in the Crimea and there is where Russia lost its fleet, sunk in Sevastopol by the three allies. The Europeans besieged the wellfortified Sevastopol base for about a year 98 before the fall of the Russian defense99 that led to the signature of Treaty of Paris 100, on 18 March 1856. 94 95 96 97
Initially at the Bay of Akhtiar. In 1874. www.encyclopedia.com, Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, Nikolas Gvosdev. What Tsar Nicolas I concerned about was the domino effect of successful revolutions against dynastic states. Russia's intense was to block this “danger” in Anatolia by helping the Ottoman state. 98 An important note about Sevastopol siege is that during it, weapon mortar made its first appearance in battlefields by the Allies, firing an exploding projectile in a high arc, froma position invisible to the enemy. 99 On 11th September 1855 Russians burned the remaining warships. Around 100.000 Russians are said to have died in the defense of Sevastopol. (www.britishbattles.com, The Siege of Sevastopol). 100www.britannica.com, Treaty of Paris.
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According this Treaty, Russia was obliged neither to have any warships in the Black Sea, nor to build any fortresses or naval bases along the coast. This kept the Black Sea demilitarized until 1870 when Russia objected to the Paris Treaty clauses that was preventing her naval presence in the area and started building an new naval power.
At the beginning of World War I, five battleships, two cruisers, seventeen destroyers and a number of auxiliary vessels was the power of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, a power that during the conflicts, engaged several times in actions against the Germans and Turks101.
Revolutionary activities were not absent in the Russian Fleet, with socialist cells organized among its sailors in 1904, leading to the mutiny of the battleship Potemkin102. The next years, Bolsheviks were active among the personnel and in 1921, the 10th Party Congress formed a fleet in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov, using two repaired destroyers and five escort vessels.
Aiming to clarify the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, the Montreux Convention 103 was signed on 20 July 1936, allowing the free and safe pass of any commercial ship through the Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits during peace times. However, this convention did not stop Soviet and NATO naval forces from passing through the straits. It is notable that US Navy ships were often entering Black Sea through the straits in order to demonstrate freedom of navigation.
World War II found the Russian Fleet of the Black Sea consisted by one battleship, six cruisers, seventeen destroyers and numerous cutters, mine layers, minesweepers, torpedo boats and auxiliary vessels 104. Following the succession of defeats of the Red Army in 1941 and 1942, the Black Sea Fleet participated in two actions against the Germans in Caucasus, one while the 101www.encyclopedia.com, Black Sea Fleet, Michael Parrish 102In 1905. 103The Montreux Convention was signed by Great Britain, France, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Australia and Japan. 104www.encyclopedia.com, Black Sea Fleet, Michael Parrish
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latter were invading the area 105 and one while they were retreating106. Both actions were mainly landing of troops and were not characterized “successful”. In 1944 and 1945, the Black Sea Fleet supported the Red Army's southeastern Europe operations.
In the early 1950s, the Black Sea Fleet was expanding, receiving more and more new units. The buildup of the navy continued 107 until the fall of the Soviet Union. The numbers are not exact when it comes for the Soviet naval power in the Black Sea, since, the amount of ships has a range between 300 and 635 and the personnel estimated at between 47,000 and 70,000 108.
Post Soviet Period
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a major issue concerning the Fleet raised between Russia and Ukraine. Although the latter republic had no need and no capability of maintaining such a big fleet 109, the refusal of ceding this huge arsenal to a not-always-friendly neighbor was decisive. As long as the Sevastopol and Odessa ports were Ukrainian territory from that time and on, many meetings and consultations demanded between Moscow and Kiev in order to end up in a commonly accepted solution. In 1992, Boris Yeltsin of Russia and Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine met in Yalta and signed an agreement for the fleet to be under joint command for three years, until 1995. During this time and until 1997, arguments and failing agreements prevailed within the diplomacy talks about this issue. In June 1993, Yeltsin and Kravchuk decided to split the fleet in half, an agreement that immediately fall apart. On November 1995 and February 1996110 two more agreements failed.
105Landing of troops behind enemy lines, in Novorossiysk. 106Landing of troops in Kerch, after Germans defeat in Stalingrad. 107A notable incident of that period is the accident of Novorosiysk, the most disastrous accident of Soviet Navy during peacetime. 108www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mf-black . 109A total amount of 250 ships that period. 110Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev stopped the about-to-be-agreed division due to arguments related to the position of Russian Fleet bases.
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Finally, in May 28nd 1997 Prime Ministers Chernomyrdin and Lazarenko signed three intergovernmental agreements according to which, Russia would rent three harbors for warships and two airfields for a twenty-year period, for the cost of $100 million annually111. Sevastopol that was under Russian control was given to Ukraine and the Russian part of the former Soviet fleet was given bays to that port. Ukraine obtained 18% of the fleet, with the rest 82% remaining Russian. The top limit of the Russian personnel in all bases is 25,000 and nuclear weapons are not allowed to be placed in the leased facilities 112.
Present
The geographical position of the Black Sea, despite the positive climate and conditions comparatively to the rest of the Russian coasts, it probably is the worst strategic location of all the four major Russian Fleets 113 bases. The available exits from the Black Sea are through the 180 miles Bosporus 114 and Dardanelles Straits. In addition, due to the Montreux Convention, Turkey must be informed eight days earlier about the transit through the Straits 115. After passing through Aegean Sea, the options are either towards the West, where the Sicily Straits and the Gibraltar Straits will be found on the route to Atlantic Ocean, or towards the South through Suez Canal, Red Sea and Bab El Mandeb Straits to end up in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean.
In 2001, Russia, along with the other five coastal states of Black Sea 116, signed
the
Black
Sea
Naval
Cooperation
Task
Group,
known
as
BLACKSEAFOR. The aim of this organization is to promote cooperation and interoperability between the naval forces of the member states and some of its initiatives are joint port and naval exercises 117, peacekeeping operations and
111www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mf-black. 112www.defencetalk.com, Russia's Black Sea Fleet, Agence France-Presse. 113The four major Russian Fleets are the Northern, the Pacific, the Baltic and the Black Sea. As an important naval force but not big enough to be characterized as “Fleet” is the Caspian Flotilla. 114Some of the northern parts of Bosporus Straits become 800 yards narrow. 115www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mf-black. 116Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine and Georgia. 117For humanitarian, search and rescue operations.
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humanitarian purposes like mine clearance and environmental protection 118.
The main base of Russian Black Sea Fleet, Sevastopol, that is subject to the 1997 agreement between Moscow and Kiev governments, has been many times issue of discussion and argumentation, mainly for the two implicated states. As mentioned before, Russians leased the port until 2017, paying $100 million dollars to Ukraine every year. Through the last years, both sides were calling upon this agreement during the aforementioned discussions, although they were tending to attach different meanings to its clauses, meanings that were respectively beneficial to each one of them. Until recently, Ukrainian deputies were showing the way out to the Russian Fleet, proposing to start the joint planning of the evacuation of the leased Ukrainian bases and the relocation of the Black Sea Fleet to the Russian coasts 119. However, the Russian side continuously insisted on avoiding even to accept the possibility of the agreement's termination in 2017120 and stayed clear from any official discussions about this option121.
On 21st of April 2010, the ambiguous scenarios about this issue came to an end. Presidents Viktor Yanukovich of Ukraine and Dmitri Medvedev of Russia signed a new agreement extending the leasing of the Ukrainian bases for the Russian Fleet until 2042, with a further extension option to 2047. The deal was that in return for accepting this new agreement, Ukraine will have a discount of thirty percent (30%) on the price of the Russian natural gas imported. More detailed, the new agreement will grant Ukraine a discount of $100 per 1,000 cubic meters of gas in the case the benchmark rate is above $330 or a discount of 30% if the rate is lower than that. Until the new agreement, Ukraine was paying $305 per 1,000 cubic meters 122. 118http://turkishnavy.net/2011/05/12/ten-years-of-blackseafor-a-partial-assessment/. 119Ukrainian First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs pointed out that relocating the Russian Fleet's 14,000-strong personnel and the huge amount of equipment, along with the handover of property to Ukrainian side needs a long time of advance planning. 120Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Kamynin implied in one of his statements that the talks with Ukraine are only about Russian Fleet continue using the Sevastopol base and not about planning to move out in 2017. 121Black Sea Fleet Unveils Ambitious Plans by Vladimir Socor on Eurasia Daily Monitor, 6/8/2007. 122http://news.bbc.co.uk/ Ukraine Extends Russia's Black Sea Fleet lease, BBC News.
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Nevertheless, the Ukrainian government met a lot of critics for this agreement. Viktor Yanukovich who has often -before and after the agreementbeen characterized as a Kremlin stooge by his opponents, noted his strong belief that he did the best for his country and said that the Russian Fleet will be a security guarantee for
Ukraine and the Black Sea. On the other hand,
international analysts noted that with this move, Ukraine buried every chance for entering NATO for the next four decades and many Ukrainian opposition politicians123 claimed that this decision violates the country's constitution 124.
Structure Of The Current Black Sea Fleet – Table 1.
Name of Ship
Project
Type of Ship
Year Board Com Nr. missi oned
Notes
30th Surface Combatant Division (Sevastopol) 11th Anti-Submarine Ships Brigade (Sevastopol) Moskva
1164
Guard Missile Cruiser
121
1983
Kerch
1134B
Major Anti-Submarine
713
1974
Ochakov
1134B
Major Anti-Submarine
707
1973
Smetliny
1090
Patrol
810
1969
Ladny
1135
Patrol
801
1980
Pytlivy
1135M
Patrol
808
1981
In repair
197th Amphibious Ships Brigade (Sevastopol) Nik. Filchenkov
1171
Major Amphibious
152
1975
Saratov
1171
Major Amphibious
150
1966
Orsk
1171
Major Amphibious
148
1962
Novocherkassk
775
Major Amphibious
142
1987
Azov
775M
Major Amphibious
151
1990
Tsezar Kunikov
775
Major Amphibious
158
1984
Yamal
775
Major Amphibious
156
1988
In repair
41st Missile Boats Brigade (Sevastopol) 123Yanukovich's predecessor, Viktor Yushchenko was a pro-Western leader with hopes Ukraine to join NATO. 124http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/ , Russia's Black Sea Fleet To Stay In Ukraine Until 2042, Telegraph, 21/4/2010.
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166th Small Missile Ships Division (Novorossiysk) Bora
1239
Missile Air Cushion
615
1997
Samsun
1239
Missile Air Cushion
616
2000
Mirazh
12341
Small Missile
617
1986
Shtil
12341
Small Missile
620
1978
In repair
295th Missile Boats Division (Sevastopol) R-44
2066
Missile Boat
966
1978
R-60
12411
Missile Boat
955
1987
R-71
12417
Missile Boat
962
1985
R-109
12411
Missile Boat
952
1990
R-239
12411
Missile Boat
953
1989
R-334 Ivanovets 12411M Missile Boat
954
1989
In repair
247th Submarine Battalion(Sevastopol) B-871 Alrosa
877V
Diesel Submarine
554
1990
B-380
641B
Diesel Submarine
572
1982
In repair
86th Warships Brigade (Sevastopol) 400th Anti-Submarine Ships Division (Sevastopol) Alexandrovets
1124
Small Anti-Submarine
059
1982
Suzdalets
1124M
Small Anti-Submarine
071
1983
Muromets
1124M
Small Anti-Submarine
064
1982
Vladimirets
11451
Small Anti-Submarine
060
1990
In repair
418th Minesweepers Division (Sevastopol) Ivan Golubets
266M
Sea Minesweeper
911
1973
Vice-Adm. Zhukov
266M
Sea Minesweeper
909
1978
Turbinist
266M
Sea Minesweeper
912
1972
In repair
Kovrovets
266M
Sea Minesweeper
913
1974
In repair
184th Water Region Patrol Brigade (Novorossiysk) 181th Small Anti-Submarine Ships Division (Novorossiysk) Kasimov
1124M
Small Anti-Submarine
055
1986
Povorino
1124M
Small Anti-Submarine
053
1989
In repair
Eisk
1124M
Small Anti-Submarine
054
1989
In repair In repair
170th Minesweeper Division (Novorossiysk) Lieut. Ilyin
12650
Coastal Minesweeper
438
1982
Mineralnye Vody 12650
Coastal Minesweeper
426
1990 38
Zheleznyakov
12660
Sea Minesweeper
901
1988
Valentin Pikul
266ME
Sea Minesweeper
770
2001
In repair
Apart from the Brigades, Divisions and Battalions mentioned above, it is important to note the 63 rd Brigade of Ships in repair, the 519 th Scout Ships Separate Division, the 9th Sea Supply Vessels Brigade, the 37 th Rescue Vessels Brigade and the 810th Marines Separate Regiment that base in Sevastopol, the 43th Naval Storm Air Separate Regiment in Gvardeiskoe, the 25 th Naval AntiSubmarine Helicopter Separate Regiment and 917 th Composite Air Separate Regiment in Kacha and the 219 th Radio-Electric Counteraction Separate Regiment in Otradnoe.
The Missile Cruiser “Moskva” is possibly the most notable warship of the Black Sea Fleet. Initially named “Slava” 125, it was laid down in November of 1976, but due to its particularity of being the first built of its class, the building time was slower than usual. It was ready in July of 1979 but was commissioned in February of 1983. Displacing 9,380 metric tons -or 11,490 metric tons fully loaded-, Moskva is a large ship with dimensions 186,4 meters in length, 20,8 meters in beam and 6,23 meters in depth. It is powered by two M70 cruise gas turbines of 20,000 hp and four M8KF boost gas turbines of 110,000 hp and its speed is up to 32 knots. It is fully equipped with radar and sonar systems, one helicopter and a number of missiles and guns. Moskva's crew is up to 505 men, including the officers.
Latest Update
In October 2011, through the Defense Minister Mykhaylo Yezhel, Ukrainian government announced the positive answer to the Russian question about the Black Sea Fleet rennovation raised in 2010. Minister Yezhel said that “the average service life of a warship is 25-30 years. It is only natural that the (current) ships will be replaced, and that is the subject of negotiations.” This 125Meaning “Glory” in Russian.
39
was underlined by the minister because the primary lease agreement was not allowing the increase of the ships number, however, under the extension of the lease until 2042, some of the old, outdated ships must be replaced. The BSF is expected to receive 15 new frigades and diesel electric submarines by 2020. 126
126Ukraine Says Will Let Russia Modernize Black Sea Fleet, Ria Novosti, 25/10/2011, http://en.rian.ru/world/20111025/168100444.html.
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CHAPTER VI
RUSSIAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH OSSETIA – GEORGIA*
*The Russian Forces deployed within both the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia will be included in a single chapter of this thesis, because of them both considered as geographical parts of Georgian territory, independent or not.
Introduction
The relations between Russia and Georgia were always facing problems, however the tensions between them were climaxed after the fall of the Soviet Union and the independence of Georgia. The first of the main reasons for the bad relations were the support that Russia gave to the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two regions that Georgia never considered as nothing more than Georgian territory, despite their will for independence. The second reason was the support Georgians gave to Chechens, as Russia claimed.
Preview - Background
South Ossetia
Dating back to 1920s, the South Ossetia issue was causing tensions within the Georgian borders. Abortive attempts to declare its independence were made but not succeeded, due to the fact that the Red Army conquered Georgia, which has been turned into a Soviet Republic. Further efforts of South Ossetia for independence continued also during the Soviet Era. Although, the
41
situation was under control until Georgia's own declaration of independence from the former USSR. This period, in 1990, a conflict broke out, mainly triggered by subsequent repressive efforts by former Georgian Nationalist President Gamsakhurdia. Hostilities between Georgia and South Ossetia broke out in January 1991, leading to the loss of 2.000 – 4.000 and the displacement of tens of thousands of people.
In June 1992, the Sochi agreement 127 was signed introducing plans for the peaceful resolution of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, including a ceasefire and the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the conflict zone. 128 The Agreement created the Joint Control Commission (JCC), and a peacekeeping body, the Joint Peacekeeping Forces group (JPKF) after which, Russian, Georgian and South Ossetian units set up base camps in a security zone around the capital of South Ossetia, Tskhinvali. Initially, the total 1.100 troops of these units were counting 530 Russians, 300 Georgians and 300 South Ossetians 129, however, most of the times, it was the monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), that was patrolling the area. 130
During the next period, while the JPKF were deployed in the region, the situation was not ideal. The units of Georgia and South Ossetia participating to the peacekeeping force were nothing more than former fighters of the conflicts. That happened because the two sides were too disorganized -due to the conflicts and the unstable situation- to provide something better than that. The result was not only limited ability to efficient action but also an increased number of law violations by these peacekeepers -including drug trafficking- who 127Named after the Russian city, situated north of the Russian – Abkhazian borders. 128About the agreement and the ceasefire, Jim Nichol, Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, in his CRS Report for Congress in 22/09/2008, about Russia-Georgia conflict in South Ossetia, mentions the ceasefire of June 1992 as brokered by Russia. On the other hand, Lt. Col. Joe McDonagh, Military Adviser and member of the OSCE mission to Georgia, in the special issue Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Georgia, says “The OSCE Mission to Georgia was established in December 1992 at the invitation of the Georgian Government. The invitation followed the signing of the Sochi Agreement in June 1992 by the Russian Federation and Georgia” implying that the agreement and the ceasefire were proposed and promoted by OSCE and the Georgians. 129Approximately. 130Russia-Georgia conflict in South Ossetia: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests, CRS Report for Congres, Jim Nichol, 22/09/2008 p. 1.
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were almost never punished.
This situation made the Russian peacekeeping units to shoulder the task of maintaining the law and order in the region, and sometimes to take the responsibility of law enforcement, even arresting criminals. However, in 1995, according to Russian Major General Anatolii Merkulov, commander of the JPKF, thanks to internal organizational structure updates in both sides, Georgian and Ossetian131 battalions were renewed and in better condition. With weekly meetings and focusing on issues of law enforcement and economic reconstruction, JPKF and JCC worked on their task , preventing a renewal of the conflict in the widest possible sense.
132
The Joint Peacekeeping Forces Group was consisted by three battalions; the Russian, the Georgian and the Ossetian. According to the official website of the Georgian Government, 133 every battalion was planned to have 500 soldiers, and was able, in case of emergency, to raise this number up to 900. The same source provides us with the official checkpoints of the JPFG. The joint checkpoints that are consisted by one Russian platoon, one Russian observer, one Georgian observer and one Ossetian observer were found in the villages Kekhvi, Frisi, Megvrekisi, Vanati, Kverneti, Tamarasheni, Artsevi and Avnevi. Checkpoint of one Russian platoon, one Georgian platoon, and three observers, one of each country involved were found in Tstveriakho village, while the checkpoint of Eredvi village is Russian, consisted by one Russian platoon. The Georgian checkpoints finally, are at the villages Avnevi and Sarabuki with one platoon each, while in Kekhvi and Tamarasheni each checkpoint has six Georgian peacekeepers.134
The period before the war of August 2008, while Georgia was being 131The Ossetian battalion was cleansed of one-third of those who participated in the military operations in the region. 132Russian Peacekeeping Forces In The Post-Soviet Area, Chapter 8, Alexander Sokolov. From Restructuring The Global Military Sector Volume I: New Wars, edited by Mary Kaldor and Basker Vashee, UNU World Institute. 133Georgia Update, http://georgiaupdate.gov.ge/en/tagliavini. 134Villages that are mentioned twice means that there are two checkpoints at the wider area, in different spots.
43
prepared to take on the separatists, 135 the Georgian Peacekeeping Force in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone which was consisted of regular Georgian Army units, was used as an opportunity for Georgian soldiers to study the area where they would be expected to fight later on. To make sure that as many soldiers as possible could make use of that opportunity, there were very frequent rotations of the Georgian units, which were replaced after only about a month, despite the six months period mentioned in the agreement. 136
Russia, besides the fact that was aware of all these moves of Georgia, did not make any preparations for war, relying on the existing forces in the wider region, before the war, and when entered in it. One of them was the North Caucasus Military District, having a lot of experience due to the years of conflict in Chechnya, two new motorized rifle brigades formed in Dagestan and Karachayevo-Cherkessiya by the time the war with Georgia began, and combat-ready as a default status 137 for many of the formations. Moreover, the District's 42nd Motorized Rifle Division stationed in Chechnya, was the only division in the entire Russian Army fully deployed under a wartime manning chart and staffed only by professional soldiers. However, North Caucasus Military District, was lacking in modern and high-class heavy weapons. Some of their armaments were the T-72 138 and the T-62139 tanks and the BMP-2,140 BMP1,141 BTR-80142 and MT-LB143 vehicles. Unfortunately, there were no modern weapons like T-80 or T-90 tanks.144
The Russian 4th Air Force and Air Defense Army, was the second 135In 2007-2008, military spending reached the 8% of the Georgian GDP, a huge arms procurement took place, large forces of reserves were being trained, Israeli-made unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) were bought to monitor the breakaway territories, Georgian secret services were working to collect intelligence information and United States provided assistance to the training of the Georgian troops. 136The Tanks OF August (edited by Ruslan Pukhov), Timeline Of Russian-Georgian Hostilities in August 2008,Anton Lavrov, p.38. 137The permanently combat-ready regiments were capable of fielding for combat one battalion-size tactical group each, in just 24 hours. 138Main Battle Tank that entered production in the 1970. 139Main Battle Tank produced between 1960's and 1970s. 140Amphibious Infantry Combat Vehicle produced in 1980s. 141Amphibious Infantry Combat Vehicle produced between 1960s and 1970s. 142Armored Personnel Carrier produced in 1986. 143Multi-purpose Light-armored Amphibious Vehicle produced in the late 1960s. 144The Tanks OF August (edited by Ruslan Pukhov), Timeline Of Russian-Georgian Hostilities in August 2008,Anton Lavrov, p.40.
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significant Russian force in the wider region and also had a lot of combat experience after the Chechen wars. Three fighter aviation regiments and one fighter airbase in Armenia; two frontal bomber regiments, three ground attack and one reconnaissance aviation regiment, plus three helicopter regiments and one transport airbase were included into the Army. But the equipment was not upgraded or new, facing the same situation with
North Caucasus Military
District. Only the 487th Helicopter Regiment and the 368th Attack Aviation Regiment in Budennovsk were equipped with upgraded Mi-24PN 145 and Su25SM146 respectively. Finally, Airborne Assault Troops were in a readiness status, available to reinforce the aforementioned forces. 147
Abkhazia
During the Soviet years, Abkhazia was formally under the status of autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, however, its ethnic culture was suppressed in favour of Georgian. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a large number of independence idea of the region became more active creating bonds with Russia, an attitude that in 1992 led the Georgians to send troops and the tension grew. About 2,000 Georgian troops were sent to the area and after a reaction of the local authorities, hundreds were killed due to the following fights. In 1993 the clashes became more violent with Russia supporting the Abkhazian army, which was weak and lacking training.
One year later, a ceasefire was agreed, and the first Russian peacekeepers entered Georgia in July 1994 and after a while, two more battalions were added. The permanent organization scheme of the Russian peacekeeping forces was including three battalions settled in the Abkhazian territory and one in the Georgian territory. The Russian peacekeepers the next period managed to organize checkpoints in crucial spots, like the river Gumista, and also demilitarized the Kodor pass in the mountains, the last place of 145Large Attack Helicopter with transport capabilities operating since 1972. 146 Twin engine Close Air Support jet aircraft active since 1981. 147The Tanks OF August (edited by Ruslan Pukhov), Timeline Of Russian-Georgian Hostilities in August 2008,Anton Lavrov, p.41.
45
Abkhazia still controlled by Georgian forces and populated by Georgian citizens.
But besides these, the peacekeepers some times were lacking the policing functions that the situation demanded. On one hand, Abkhazian authorities were trying to minimize these functions of the peacekeepers saying that the Abkhazian law enforcement organs were able to handle the situation. On the other hand, Georgian side thought that the peacekeepers were not reciprocating to their duties and in 1995 demanded the functions needed. 148
During the next years, many efforts for Russian troops stationing in Gudauta Military Base in Abkhazia took place, with Georgian side to insist towards this scenario, or at least a reduce of heavy ground weapons. The tries failed to implement and the Gudauta Military Base remained in Abkhazian soil.149 Abkhazia declared its independence in 1999.
The period before the Russian-Georgian War, the tension in the Abkhazian region was at a critical point too. Just like in South Ossetia, Russia had to raise its peacekeeping force, reaching up to 3,000 troops. In addition to the 42nd Independent Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 15 th Samara Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade, and 526th and 558th Independent Motorized Rifle Battalions of the 131st Maykop Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade deployed in the wider area, Russia sent another battalion-size tactical group that belonged to the 108th Airborne Assault Regiment of the 7 th Novorossiysk Airborne Assault Division. To the peacekeeping forces, two army Spetsnaz 150 companies were added, and Railway Troops groups repaired the railway tracks to critical areas in order to be possible the faster and more efficient deployment of Russian Army reinforcements.151
148Russian Peacekeeping Forces In The Post-Soviet Area, Chapter 8, Alexander Sokolov. From Restructuring The Global Military Sector Volume I: New Wars, edited by Mary Kaldor and Basker Vashee, UNU World Institute. 149Foreign Military Bases In Eurasia, Zdzislaw Lachowski, SIPRI, p.57. 150Russian Special Purpose Regiment, Special Operation Force. 151The Tanks OF August (edited by Ruslan Pukhov), Timeline Of Russian-Georgian Hostilities in August 2008,Anton Lavrov, p.41-42.
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We can see the notable difference of the Russian Military preparations in the two regions the days before the war; in Abkhazia there was a significant movement and reinforcement of the existing Russian units, while in South Ossetia, Moscow considered the already existing forces in the wider region enough to face the enemy.
After the War – Present
Right after the agreement for a ceasefire and withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgian territory signed by President Medvedev in September 2008, Moscow announced its plans to deploy a significant number of troops at the separatists regions, to prevent any possible “repeat of Georgian aggression” as Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said at a press conference, adding that the forces will remain there for a long time. The total number of troops in both regions was estimated to be 7,600, 3,800 in each one. This plans were not out of the blue, since, in the EU-brokered agreement Russia clearly stated the withdrawal of army from the Georgian soil outside these two areas (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) whose military status was not determined by the deal text.152
The official signature of the agreement with the Abkhazian and South Ossetian leaders came a year later, in September of 2009, when the details and the frame of the Russian forces deployment were determined. Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov signed with his Abkhaz and South Ossetian counterparts, Merab Kishmaria and Yury Tanayev, the agreement that allows Russia to station 1,700 troops 153 in each territory and are valid for 49 years, with the option for continuous five-year renewals after that. 154
152Russia Plans 7,600 Force In Georgia Rebel Regions, Reuters, 09/09/2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/09/09/us-georgia-ossetia-idUSL272497420080909. 153The defense agreements do not include hundreds of additional Russian border guards, who are also stationed in the two territories under prior agreements. 154Moscow Signs Defense Pacts With Breakaway Georgian Regions, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 15/09/2009, http://www.rferl.org/content/Moscow_Threatens_To_Seize_Georgian_Ships_Signs_Defense_Pacts_W ith_Breakaway_Regions/1823404.html.
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South Ossetia – The 4th Russian Military Base
The 4th Military Base, the new Russian Military station in South Ossetia, is located in two different places. The first is in Tskhinvali, the capital of the region, and the second near the city Djava, in the center of Ossetia. The 693rd Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade, which was formed from the 693rd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division previously stationed near Vladikavkaz, was the main body of the 4th Military Base. Two more battalions were added, so the base to be fully manned.
In more specific details, the base is equipped with: 41 T-72 tanks, at least 150 BMP-2, two 2S3 Akatsiya Artillery155 battalions with 152mm howitzer, one battalion of BM-21 Grad 122 MLRS156, and two air defense systems, Buk-M1157 and 2S6M Tunguska.158 For the monitoring of the area, Strekoza UAV159 are used.160
It must be mentioned, that, although it is not part of its main body, the 4 th Military Base has positioned a large number of troops armed with tanks, artillery, rocket launchers and air defense systems in Leningor 161 District, because of the isolation and vulnerability of the location. 162
Abkhazia – The 7th Military Base
Another important strategic difference between Abkhazia and South Ossetia is that in contrary with the latter, there were not large Abkhazian residential areas close to the borders with Georgia, exposed to enemy 155Self-Propelled Artillery in service since 1971. 156Truck-mounted 122mm Multiple Launcher Rocket System in service since 1964. 157Medium range Surface-to-Air Missile system operating since 1979. 158Tracked Surface-to-Air Missiles system, operating since 1982. 159Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. 160The Tanks OF August (edited by Ruslan Pukhov), Post-War Deployment Of Russian Forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Anton Lavrov, p. 119. 161Also known as Akhalgori. 162Russian Military Build Up In South Ossetia, BSR-Russia, 07/06/2010. http://www.bsrrussia.com/en/defence/item/451-russian-military-build-up-in-south-ossetia.html.
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weapons.
Right after the 2008 war, the 131st Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 58th Army became the core of the new 7th Russian Military Base in Abkhazia. The brigade was previously stationed in Maykop. Units of the 131 st Brigade had been on peacekeeping duty in Abkhazia for several years even before the conflict with Georgia. As site for the new base was chosen the old Soviet military airfield at Bambora, near the city Gudauta, where Russians were given 150 hectares by the Abkhazian parliament.
But since Gudauta is somehow remote from the borders with Georgia, one of the battalions of that base held reinforced defensive positions in the Gal (Gulrypsch) District. Another company of the brigade was on constant duty in Kodori Gorge.
Until the end of the war, the main tank of the 131 st Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade was the T-72. But in 2009, it was replaced by the new model of T90,163 and was equipped with 41 of these. Except from the tanks, the 7 th Military Base has over 150 BTR-80 armored personnel carriers -replaced recently with the upgraded version BTR-80A-, two battalions of the 2S3 Akatsiya self propelled 152mm howitzer, one battalion of the BM-21 Grad 122 mm MLRS, and air defense systems Osa-AKM,164 ZSU-23-4 Shilka165 and 2S6M Tunguska.
A significant move of Moscow was the transportation of two battalions of S-300 long range Surface-to-Air Missile Systems, both near the Base in Gudauta and the village Agudzeri, which can provide reliable air defense for Abkhazia and all the Russian military units, controlling not only Abkhazian skies, but the whole wider area. Although, the activation and the official deployment took place in August 2010. There was an instant reaction about this move by
163Third Generation Main Battle tank produced in 1995, first used in battle in 1999 during the invasion of Dagestan. 1646x6 Amphibious Surface-to-Air Missile System in service since 1972. 165Self-propelled Anti-Aircraft gun in service since 1962.
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Georgian side and the West, about the destabilization of the military status. 166 However, the response of Moscow was that this was a plan known for two years during which, the missiles were stationed in the Abkhazian territory. 167
Another ambitious plan of Russia, apart from the 7th Military Base, that is under construction since 2009 is the port of Sukhumi which is planned to be a naval base for small size ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Of course reactions from Georgia and its Western supporters were raised once again considering this move as a threat,168 169 but the port where the naval base may be deployed is not compatible in any way with large battleships due to its limited depth that makes it approachable only to small corvettes and coast guard ships.170
Latest Updates
In October 2011, a new agreement between Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, that was ratified by Duma and President Medvedev, allows the extension of both 7th and 4th Russian Military Bases settlement in Abkhazian and South Ossetian soil respectively, for 49 more years, with an automatic 15year extension after the end of the main deal time. The bases host about 7,000 troops, half of this number in each one. According to Russian high-ranked official, this agreement will make stronger the independence efforts of the two regions from Georgia, adding that “Russia should be consistent in its actions. It has recognized these republics’ independence, now Russia must safeguard it.”171
166Russia Deploys S-300 Missile Systems In Abkhazia, Pravda. Ru, 12/08/2010, http://english.pravda.ru/news/russia/12-08-2010/114589-abkhazia-0/. 167Russia Stationed S-300 Missiles In Abkhazia In 2008, Novinite.com, 13/08/2010, http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=119155. 168Russian Naval Base To Be Built In Abkhazia, Atlantic Council, 27/01/2009, http://www.acus.org/russian-naval-base-be-built-abkhazia. 169Russia's Black Sea Threat, Lt. Col. John A. Mowchan, U.S. Naval Institute, February 2011. 170The Tanks OF August (edited by Ruslan Pukhov), Post-War Deployment Of Russian Forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Anton Lavrov, p. 118. 171Russian Military To Stay In Abkhazia, South Ossetia 49 More Years, EurasiaNet.org, 10/10/2011, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64292.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
Black Sea region is one of Russia's top military priorities. Either because of the clearly visible necessity for stabilization in its own stormy neighborhood, or due to the desire for a power prestige recovery, the Russian Federation seems determined to achieve its goal. But in order to become again a superpower with strong foundations, have to overcome a number of obstacles.
Financial recovery and military funding, is the first obstacle, and it seems that it is something possible to overcome, as the today Russian economy is not anymore like during the post Soviet years, meaning erratic and disorganized, available for embezzlement and large scale money laundry. Of course there is a long way to a healthy economy, but the financial developments are positive, mainly thanks to the exploitation of natural resources of energy.
No matter how trusted and efficient the Soviet military equipment of any kind was, Russia has to be detached from the past. It is acceptable that many of the Soviet hardware can be susceptible to further upgrades and serve decently, but new technology must be funded if Russia wants to acquire an army of new generation, able to respond to the demands of times.
Finally, the leadership of the state and the army, must be organized, determined for changes to the best, and capable to contribute in any possible way; the structure of the leadership network must become steady and trustworthy. The only way is to renew the decayed leadership system, an aged legacy of the dark Soviet years, just like the rusty war machine.
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Additional Texts
Treaty On Conventional Armed Forces In Europe.
The Warsaw Pact.
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