Asian Ethnicity, Ethnicity, 2013 Vol. 14, No. 4, 434– 448, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14631369.2012.7 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14631369.2012.710079
Census enumeration, religious identity and communal polarization in India R.B. Bhagat* Department of Migration and Urban Studies, International Institute for Population Sciences, India
Census is considered to be a scientific exercise. However, it leaves a deep impact on religious and ethnic identities. This is because through census enumeration not only are boundaries of communities fixed, but also actual size and growth are known. This adds a new sense to the identities of the religious communities in the sphere of democratic politics. In India, the census was started around 1872 during the British rule, seven decades after the first census was held in Great Britain in 1801. The question on religion was included right from the first Indian census, unlike the British census which only included it in 2001. This paper shows that the inclusion of the question on religion, and the consequent publication of data on sizee and gro siz growth wth of po popul pulati ation on by rel religi igion on du durin ring g Bri Britis tish h rul rule, e, inv invoke oked d sha sharp rp communal reactions. The demographic issues found a core place in the communal disc di scou ours rsee th that at co cont ntin inue ued d in in inde depe pend nden entt In Indi dia. a. Th Thee pa pape perr ar argu gues es th that at th thee demogr dem ograph aphic ic dat data a on rel religio igion n was one of th thee imp import ortant ant fac factor torss tha thatt rai raised sed Hindu–Muslim consciousness and shaped the Hindu and Muslim relationship in both bot h colo colonial nial and post postcolon colonial ial Indi India. a. As a resu result, lt, sever several al demo demograp graphic hic myth mythss have found a place in the communal discourse shaping the political imagination of India. Keywords: census; communalism; demography; Hindus; Muslims; identity
Introduction
The relationship between identity and enumeration is not simple as we generally believe. It is true that identity must precede enumeration, as enumeration cannot begin in a vacuum, but the classification adopted and the enumeration that follows can ca n ha have ve a de deep ep im impa pact ct on th thee na natu ture re an and d ch char arac acter teris isti tics cs of id iden enti titi ties. es. In India dia is considered a country with strong religious and caste identities. G.S. Ghurye was the first to point out that asking questions on caste in the census had heightened the caste consciousness.1 Ghurye’s work was followed by the seminal work of Bernard Cohn on census and the objectification of communities in South Asia, and several other writings, most importantly, by two of his students, namely Arjun Appadurai and Nicholas Dirks.2 Mo Most st of th thee wo work rk ha hass be been en do done ne by an anth thro ropo polo logi gist stss wh who o we were re mo more re concerned about caste. In demographic literature, a few works on the impact of census enumeration on caste and a commentary on religion also have appeared. 3
*Email:
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© 2013 Taylor & Francis
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When we look at the history of the nations, we find that census as a product of modern nation states started in several countries of Europe during the eighteenth century.4 In Great Britain, for example, the motivation to introduce some type of census of the population was concern over the extent of poverty and the resultant poor relief necessitated by it. The first census was held in 1801 and a census was held every 10 years thereafter. On the other hand, the Indian census was started almost seven decades later during British rule, around 1872.5 It is worthwhile remembering that, while economic issues were predominant in the commencement of the census in Great Britain, the census-taking in India had a different purpose altogether. More precisely, the reason behind the population census in India was the desire of the British government to learn about Indian people in order to control and govern them.6 Just a few years before the first census, work had also started on gazetteers, which culminated later in several volumes of the Imperial Gazetteers of India. Both gazetteers and census reports covered a large number of subjects dealing with the land and people of India. However, as these publications were initiated under a nonrepresentative government, neither public opinion nor the institutions existed to limit the subjects investigated. It is worthwhile to note that the British parliament rejected the first proposal for a national census in 1753 which was finally passed in 1800. Also, the census in Great Britain exhibited either disinterest in religion or extreme reluctance to explore this field.7 However, the British census introduced a few questions on ethnicity for the first time in the 1991 census and the question on religion was also included in the 2001 census. On the other hand, the question on religion has not been asked in the American census to date.8 In contrast to the census practice in Great Britain and the United Sates, in India the question on religion has been asked since the very beginning, and population data were published by religious categories and associated characteristics. The present work deals with the question on religion in the Indian census, the classificatory scheme followed and the fall-out from the availability of demographic data by religion in Indian politics. The paper argues that the demographic data on religion has played an important role in raising Hindu–Muslim consciousness in a new form and in shaping the Hindu and Muslim relationship in both colonial and postcolonial India. As a result, several demographic myths have found a place in the communal discourse shaping the political imagination of India. This paper attempts to show the impact of census enumeration on Hindu–Muslim identities and their relationship in India.
Religious categories and census enumeration
A census is not only a passive exercise of counting people, but is actively engaged in capturing reality through categories and their definitions. Categories are also the outcome of the perception of census officials, their earlier experience in dealing with such categories, or a negotiated outcome with those confronted in the counting.9 The categories and their definitions used in Indian censuses during British rule were rooted in the British perception of Indian society, which was looked upon as a pre-capitalist entity largely constituting primordial communities. This had also happened elsewhere. For example, in colonial Southern Rhodesia,
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the African community was defined in precisely the same way – as the opposite of capitalist social relations.10 India is a land of numerous communities. It consists of many castes, religions, and other social groups. However, one of the remarkable features of Indian communities until the beginning of colonial rule was that they had existed as ‘fuzzy’ communities since time immemorial. These ‘fuzzy’ communities were indistinct groups with neither internal cohesion nor well-known externalities and, as such, they were without overt communication. Further, each ‘fuzzy’ community did not know how far it extended or what was its strength in numbers; therefore it had less accurate and less aggressive self-awareness. 11 Looked at this way, the ‘fuzzy’ communities also did not require any developed theory of ‘otherness’.12 Counting of them, which began in the late nineteenth century, congealed them into distinct, discrete and mutually exclusive groups.13 Similar situations were also found in other colonial countries. For example, in Malaysia, the Malays did not form a homogeneous ethnic group in spite of their common orientation to Islam. There were clear differences between the Malays in Kelantan and Kedah in the northeast (who were closely linked to Aceh and Pattani), the Buginese in Perak, the Minangkabau in Negri Sembilan, and the Malays in Johor or Riau.14 Similarly, neither the Baba and Nonya Chinese who lived in Melaka for centuries, or the Cantonese, nor the Hakka, Hokkeien or Teochew Chinese in Malaysia saw themselves as one ethnic group or as belonging together. 15 However, the colonial perception that communities belonged to either one or other ethnic group was applied through administrative practices. The administrative differentiations, resulting from the perception of the foreign government that the ethnic groups followed different cultures, were also applied in practices of special rights and obligations. With the integration of these practices into everyday life, the colonial perception of ethnic differences in the form of mutually exclusive groups became a reality and, through census categories, the colonial power designated ethnic groups as Chinese, Indian and Malay: groups which were homogeneous and mutually exclusive.16 According to Anderson, census is one of the institutions of power along with map and museum invented before the mid-nineteenth century, and one that turned out to be a very powerful instrument of domination during colonial rule. 17 The colonial census was entirely different in terms of its purpose and coverage from the earlier attempts of enumerations in the medieval period. Guha found that the enumeration of landholding gentry classified by their ethnic status was undertaken during the Moghul rule. The horsemen and infantry were also enumerated for fiscal or administrative reasons.18 However, the pre-British enumeration was for limited purposes and did not classify the entire population in neatly mutually exclusive categories. By contrast, the census initiated during colonial rule provided clear definitions and boundaries of religious and caste communities.19 As a result the so-called ‘fuzzy’ communities dissolved into the enumerated communities and further into political communities – a new source of political mobilization in British as well as in independent India. In the census tables and reports of British India, religion was classified as Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Buddhist, Jain, Sikh, Parsi, Jewish, and Animist. The category of Animism was employed for the various forms of beliefs of the aboriginal tribes who had not yet come under the influence of either Hinduism or any other major religions of India. Even the sects within each religion, such as Hindu Brahmanic, Arya and
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Brahmo among Hindus, Shia, Sunnis, Wahabbis among Muslims, Aglican, Baptist, Lutheran, Methodist, Presbyterian and Roman Catholics, etc. were enumerated among Christians. Religion was not only presented in a separate table but also used to cross-classify various attributes of social structure such as education, occupation and caste, tribe or race in numerous tables.20 It seems that, of the census commissioners during British rule, several were trained anthropologists, and were interested in understanding as many social and cultural variations as possible in order to pin down the core religious beliefs and practices. However, census officials faced enormous difficulties and took great pains to classify the Indian population into homogeneous and mutually exclusive religious communities. The census reports of each province, as well as all-India reports, mentioned a plethora of instances when the scheme of census classification could not be applied due to the interwoven nature of social structure. There were problems in defining the term Hindu as Hindu communities usually defined themselves with reference to their specific modes of worship, such as Shaivites (worshippers of Shiva) or Shakts (worshippers of the Mother Goddess) or Vaishnavas (worshippers of various incarnations – Ram, Krishna, etc. – of Vishnu) and so on. In fact, the essentials of Hindu beliefs and practices are found in a large number of philosophical or sacredotal texts. The range of Hindu beliefs and practices are so far and wide that they defy categorization by any scholar.21 On the other hand, it is believed that the Indian Muslims, in contrast to the Hindus, constitute an Ummah (global community), held together in close bonds of allegiance to the doctrine set out in the Koran. However, the actual structure of Muslim society in India displays a fairly complex hierarchy which can best be understood through a historical survey of the spread of Islam in the Indian subcontinent.22 Notwithstanding the complex nature of Indian society, efforts have been made to define a Hindu as a native of India who is not of European, Armenian, Moghul, Persian or other foreign descent, who is a member of a recognised caste, who acknowledges the spiritual authority of Brahmans (priestly caste), who venerates or at least refuses to kill or harm kine, and does not profess any creed or religion which the Brahman forbids him to profess.23
Further, Hindus had been defined in relation to Muslims. The census superintendent of the United Province of Agra and Oudh, quoting George Grierson, mentions that ‘Hindi means any native of India, whilst Hindu means a non-Musalman native of India’.24 The 1911 census had further tried to segregate non-genuine from the genuine Hindus25 on the basis of following criteria: (1) Deny the supremacy of the Brahmans (priestly caste) (2) Do not receive the mantra (sacred words and phrases having mystical effects) from a Brahmans or other recognised Hindu Guru (religious teacher) (3) Deny the authority of the Vedas (ancient Hindu religious texts) (4) Do not worship the great Hindu Gods (5) Are not served by good Brahmans as family priests (6) Have no Brahman priests at all (7) Are denied access to the interior of ordinary Hindu temples
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(8) Cause pollution (a) by touch, (b) within certain distance (9) Bury their dead (10) Eat beef and do not revere the cow. The above criteria were not fully applied in the 1911 census as they were opposed by many Indians and the criteria were later dropped from the census. While enumerating and classifying the various religious communities, the census commissioners had found that the boundary lines between Hindus on the one hand and Sikhs and Jains on the other were indeterminate. They also observed that, among several Hindus and Muslim groups located in different parts of the country, the social and cultural practices with regard to marriage, festivals, food, and burial were similar. As a result, one of the census commissioners had remarked, ‘religions of India as we have already seen are by no means mutually exclusive’.26 Because of the interwoven nature of religious groups, there were practical difficulties in identifying religious categories. The census officials in their own way solved this problem. The enumerators were asked to record all persons who said they were Hindus, Musalman or Christians, etc., and those who did not profess to belong to any recognized religion were entered under the name of their caste or tribe. In the course of tabulation all such persons were treated as Hindu if they belonged to a recognized Hindu caste, however low it might be.27 It was also observed by the census commissioners that the line of cleavage in India was more social than religious. For example, the remarks of the census commissioner of the 1911 census are very pertinent to quote: In India the line of cleavage is social rather than religious, and tendency of the people themselves is to classify their neighbours, not according to their beliefs, but according to their social status and manner of living. No one is interested in what his neighbor believes, but he is very much interested in knowing whether he can eat with or take water from his hands.28
Demographic issues and Hindu–Muslim polarisation in colonial India
The categorization of religious and ethnic communities and their enumeration have deep social and political impacts in India. We find that the very syndrome of majority and minority in religious terms was not known, but was made through the consciousness of population numeracy in the event of census exercises that began in the late nineteenth century.29 After the census, numbers became a political tool as Hindus came to know that they constituted a majority. The beginning of the census also coincided with the electoral process first started in municipal bodies and later in legislative assemblies during British rule. This raised the importance of the figures of religion in seeking representation for the various religious communities in the emerging political institutions.30 The colonial census data also sparked off communal debates on the size and growth of population belonging to different religious communities. Table 1 presents the decadal growth rates among Hindus and Muslims for the period 1881 to 1941. The Hindu population had a substantially low growth rate between 1891 and 1901, and even declined between 1911 and 1921. The low growth rate or decline in the Hindu population created turbulence in the relationship between Hindus and Muslims. In 1909, U.N. Mukherji of Calcutta published a series
Asian Ethnicity Table 1.
Census Year 1881 1891 1901 1911 1921 1931 1941
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Total population of Hindus and Muslims and their growth rates in British India
Total (in million)
Hindus (in million)
Muslim (in million)
Decadal growth rate % Hindus
250.2 279.6 283.9 303.0 305.7 337.8 388.9
187.8 207.5 208.8 217.2 216.2 238.6 270.2
49.9 57.1 62.1 67.8 71.0 79.3 94.4
10.50 0.62 4.00 –0.46 10.40 13.20
Decadal growth rate % Muslim
HinduMuslim growth differentials
14.20 8.90 9.20 4.70 11.60 19.00
3.70 8.28 5.20 5.16 1.20 5.80
Source: Davis, The Population of India and Pakistan, 178–9 .
of articles in Bengalee, which was later published in a pamphlet entitled, ‘Hindus: A Dying Race’.31 On the basis of figures from the 1901 census, Mukherji drew attention towards the declining proportion of Hindus in the total population. He also stirred up fears of Hindus being swallowed up in the next 420 years and convinced Swami Shradhanand, a prominent Hindu leader, to take up the work of reconversion from Mohammedan and Christianity to Hinduism. Swami Shradhanand, alarmed by the growth of Muslim population, also wrote an influential book entitled Hindu Sangsthan: Saviour of Dying Race in 1926. 32 Thus, the idea of demographic decline became a core feature of Hindu communalism in later years. This idea was further entrenched by a spectre of fear raised by some colonial rulers. For example, H.H. Risley, one of the powerful British officials asked can the figures of the last census [1901] be regarded in any sense the forerunner of an Islamic or Christian revival which will threaten the citadel of Hinduism or will Hinduism hold its own in the future as it has done through the long ages of the past? 33
These assertions were made in spite of the fact that they could arouse tremendous communal antagonisms and point to the colonial responsibility of census in India. Along with size of population by religion, the distribution of population of religious communities also acquired new significance in colonial governance. Based on the geographical distribution of the Muslim population, the division of Bengal was attempted in 1905 (see Figure 1). A new province of East Bengal and Assam was created with a predominance of Muslims, fomenting antagonism between Hindus and Muslims, and was revoked later due to wide protest. The political implications of religious division of a territory became obvious when the then Viceroy, Lord Curzon, offered in Dacca the East Bengal Muslims the prospect of a unity which they had not enjoyed since the days of the old Musalman Viceroys and Kings.34 Therefore, the census exercise during colonial rule instilled a geographical and demographic consciousness among religious communities – an awareness of their geographical concentration as well as their demographic strength. The demographic basis of communal consciousness was further consolidated through the political instrument of separate electorates wherein religious minorities were given separate seats in the legislative bodies according to the proportion of their
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Figure 1. Division of the Province of Bengal during British Rule. Source: J.E. Schwartzberg, A Historical Atlas of South Asia.
population in the provinces. It is believed by some Indian historians that the roots of communal competition can be traced to the Morley-Minto Reforms (1909), which extended communal electorate to the urban local bodies. Even the seats in Govt. medical college Lahore were distributed in the ratio of 40:40:20 amongst Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs in Punjab.35 As a result Hindu–Muslim division was sharpened and a spirit of political exclusiveness was fostered. The impact was particularly marked on Muslims who saw the advantage of pressing for special safeguards and concessions in accordance with numerical strength, social status, local influence and the social requirements of their community.36 The census officials of the colonial period were aware of the implications of the census for religion and also the criticism of it by the Indian people. However, the census officials defended the inclusion of the question of religion in successive censuses. The census commissioner of the 1931 census wrote the following: India is the most religious country in the world, and must be regarded as the justification for the importance attached to religion in census of India as compared for example with that of US of Americas where culture is comparatively independent of religion.37
The census commissioner of the 1931 census further defended the census on religion as follows: it has been argued that the census statistics of religion tend to perpetuate communal divisions: the census cannot, however, hide its head in the sand like the proverbial ostrich but must record as accurately as possible facts as they exist and there is no question of the existence of communal differences which are reflected at present in political constituencies.38
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Census enumeration of religious identity in independent India
India has adopted a constitution based on the principles of secularism and democracy. Apparently it seems paradoxical to ask about the religion of its citizens. However, the question on religion in the census of independent India was asked in the spirit of the constitution. The census was advised to record any person’s caste, religion or race to the extent necessary for providing information relating to certain disadvantaged groups referred to in the constitution, such as the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes.39 As the constitution enjoins that no persons professing a religion other than Hinduism, Sikhism and Buddhism shall be deemed to be a member of a scheduled caste, it was imperative on the part of the census to ask a question on religion in order to determine the scheduled caste status of a person. As such, the census of India has a pretext and justification for including a question on religion in the name of social justice. Thus, the Indian republic considers the religious and caste identities important in the process of nation building at the same time as professing to be a secular state. The secular versus non-secular character of the state has been an issue of intense debate in recent decades.40 While the census in independent India continued the question on religion it discontinued the question on caste after the 1951 census except for the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. With respect to religion also, only demographic data like size of religious groups by sex and rural and urban areas were published and socioeconomic data like literacy and education and occupation were discontinued until the 2001 census. The demographic data by religious groups found a prominent place in census tables and have even expanded to include the question of fertility since the 1971 census. The lack of publication of data on education and occupation exclusively focused attention on the demographic differentials in growth of population by religion in several decades in independent India. Further the publication of data on smaller religious groups like Parsis and Jews and other smaller groups was also discontinued after the 1961 census.41 India was projected through census tabulations and publications to be a country of six major religious groups: Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists. In addition, two more groups, namely ‘other’ and ‘religion not stated’, were added in the religious classification.42 In contrast to the actual tabulation of religious data into six religious groups, the 2001 census reported that there were as many as 1,700 religion names that had appeared in the recent censuses. However, the codification of as many as 1,700 religious groups into six major religions nullifies the very purpose of census, as declared by the census commissioner of 2001: The sensitivity attached to the response for the question on religion is in a way the attempts of the people of India, particularly very small groups, to express their keen desire of maintaining their unique identity in social order. Census of India provided once again the opportunity to the people India to exercise their right and get into the official records. This also served as an opportunity for the government to know officially of the new cults/faiths, which are emerging or being adopted by the people in small or big numbers.43
Although the proportions of ‘other’ are too low to matter demographically, they are still important to understand the diversity of religions and faiths in India. On the other hand, the numerical dominance of religious groups is so strong that India is ultimately projected as a country of two main religious groups, namely Hindus as
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majority (828 million comprising of 81% of the total as per 2001 census) and Muslims as the largest minority (138 million constituting 12% of the total). Amartya Sen argues that the statistical majority of India’s Hindu population is based on membership of the community, and does not reflect the level of actual religious belief or faith.44 A Hindu can be an agnostic or even an atheist and it may be true for members of other religious groups as well. Thus, the notion of Hindu majority or Muslim minority is a statistical artifact based on the principle of classification applied in the census.
Demographic anxiety: myth and reality
The demographic anxiety about Hindus being outnumbered continued in independent India. Such anxiety is expressed more in view of the nature of electoral politics in the country.45 A recent book published by Joshi, Bajaj and Srinivasan made this point, and tried to estimate the proportion of Muslim and Christian population (foreign religion) vis-a `-vis Indian religionists, raising fears about Hindus turning into a minority in South Asia by the mid twenty-first century, in spite of the fact that several demographers have refuted such assertions.46 Based on a study of population growth differentials between Hindus and Muslims from 1951 to 1971, Visaria observed that, ‘even if the differentials in the rate of growth of Hindus and Muslims persist, India will not become a Muslim-majority nation for centuries to come. Further, the differentials observed so far most unlikely to continue in future.’47 In another study, Bhatia concluded that there is no sound reason to believe that Muslims will become the majority community in India. 48 Further, based on the differentials of Hindu–Muslim growth rates, the highest ever recorded between 1981 and 1991, Kulkarni estimated that if the observed differentials in Hindu–Muslim growth rates continue in the future, it would take about 250 years for the Muslim population to catch up with the Hindu population numerically, let alone become a majority.49 Bhat believes that the Muslim population can at the most reach up to 20% of the total before it stabilizes by the end of this century. ‘Thus the fear of that Muslims would outnumber Hindus in India, as a whole is totally unwarranted.’50 However, in certain parts of Northeast India, Muslim population growth is substantially higher, not because of high fertility but due to cross border migration both of refugees and economic migrants.51 Even the Muslim societies across the world do not show stable levels of fertility. The fertility level of Indonesia is lower than that of India. The recent spectacular fertility decline in Bangladesh and Iran is also missed in the discourse on Hindu– Muslim fertility differentials in India.52 Census reports of the British period mentioned several reasons for higher population growth among Muslims. These included nourishing dietary practices, fewer marriage restrictions, widow remarriage and uncommon early marriages. Muslims had a slightly lower literacy level than Hindus. The literacy rate was about 4% among Muslims in the ages 10 þ compared to 7% among Hindus at the beginning of twentieth century. The latest data available, from the 2001 Census, showed that literacy rate was 59% among Muslims compared to 65% among Hindus. In many districts where Muslims constitute a substantial population (30% and more), the gap in literacy level between Hindus and Muslims was as high as 30% and more compared to less than 10% at the national level.53 In the meantime, the socio-economic backwardness of Muslims got fresh impetus with the recommendations of the Sacher
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Committee (Prime Minister’s High Level Committee), which lead to wider recognition of and pressure to improve the socio-economic conditions of Muslims, and also a debate on the reservation of jobs for Muslims in government services.54 This has also led to comparing Muslims with the scheduled castes on the planks of social justice. Muslims are now increasingly viewed as a deprived group – a fundamental change in their identity delinking them from the sectarian and communal roots of the past. But how far it will be sustained depends upon Indian politics which leaves no stone unturned to exploit the caste and religious identities. The practice of polygyny among Muslims (i.e. a husband having more than one wife) is raised time and again, attributing to it their relatively higher fertility. However, the popular perception of polygyny leading to high fertility is demographically incorrect. In fact, polygyny leads to lower fertility.55 Moreover, it is also not true that in actual practice a Muslim man has more wives than a Hindu. It was reported in the 1911 census that ‘a Mohammedan may have four wives but in practice he was generally monogamous’. 56 A study on polygynous marriages by the census also shows that the incidence of polygyny was slightly lower (5 to 6%) among Muslims compared to Hindus.57 In addition, polygyny has been practised among the wealthier sections of both Hindus and Muslims and has little association with religion.58 Similarly, there is little truth in the assertion that Islam is a barrier to family planning.59 In a situation of communal antagonism these facts are glossed over. For example, the National Family Health Survey–2 (NFHS-2) shows that only 2% of women oppose the use of family planning on the ground of religion.60 The more recent NFHS-3 report also reiterates the fact that there is a high unmet need of family planning among currently married Muslim women (19%) compared to Hindus (12%).61 The unmet need for both spacing methods (like condom, IUD and pill) and terminal methods (sterilisation) is higher among Muslims than Hindus. It is therefore evident that the demand for family planning among Muslims is less satisfied. Also, more Muslims than Hindus get family planning services from private sources.62 Furthermore, the increase in the use of modern family planning methods among Muslims was faster compared to Hindus during the three rounds of NFHS surveys during 1992–1993 and 2005–2006. More importantly, the differential between Hindus and Muslim fertility is not very large. The NFHS-2 shows that on average Muslim women gave birth to one child more than Hindus during 1998–1999, a rate which narrowed down to half a child during 2005–2006 as reported by NFHS-3. Further, it is important to note that between the three rounds of NFHS surveys the fertility decline among Muslims was faster than the decline among Hindus. The total fertility rate among Hindus declined from 3.3 to 2.8 during 1992–93 to 1998–99, and further to 2.6 in 2005–06, compared to the decline from 4.4 to 3.6 and to 3.1 during the respective period among Muslims. The faster increase in the acceptance of family planning and also the faster fertility decline among Muslims are generally glossed over in the debate of Hindu– Muslim population growth and fertility differentials that takes place after almost every census. Efforts are also made by some quarters now and then to inject demographic issues into the communal discourse and even violence. 63 Thus, Hindu–Muslims differentials in population growth and fertility have been a core feature of communalism since the colonial census and have continued in recent years. This is sometimes also perpetuated by academic scholars who believe in the particularized role of religion influencing higher fertility among Muslims. Such
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biases are harmful to communal harmony and anathema to the spread of family planning among Muslims.
Conclusion
India is a country of immense religious and ethnic diversity. There are six major religious groups, namely Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Buddhists, and Jains. On the other hand there are large numbers of small religious groups who could not be classified in any of the six categories and are kept under the rubric of ‘other’. It is important to remember that each religious group in India consists of numerous sects and caste groups. The application of the principles of census, i.e. categorization and enumeration of religious groups in numerical terms, induced them to view themselves differently in the nascent democratic set-up, and made them conscious of the numbers of other religious groups as well. The purpose of the census was not to incite rivalry among the religious communities, but to understand them: for governance in colonial India, or for identifying the disadvantaged groups among the religious communities, in order to eradicate discriminatory practices in independent India. Nevertheless, the fallout from enumeration in the democratic politics remained significant. Higher population growth and higher fertility among Muslims have always formed a part of the political ideology and issues like poverty and education by and large have been evaded in communal discourse. However, in recent years there have been several efforts to highlight the social and economic conditions of religious groups. This has led agencies like the Census and National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) to publish data on education and employment by religion, which is potentially helpful in building an alternative discourse, reflecting educational backwardness and unemployment across the religious communities in general and across Hindus and Muslims in particular. It is up to the political process to use or abuse the census. Notes on contributor Ram B. Bhagat PhD is currently working as Professor and Head, Department of Migration and Urban Studies, International Institute for Population Sciences (Deemed to be University), Mumbai. His research interest include demography and ethnicity; migration and urbanization; population, health and environment. He was a member on the IUSSP panel on Demography of Armed Conflict, 2006–09 and the Co-ordinator of ENVIS Centre on Population and Environment at the International Institute for Population Sciences, Mumbai, funded by the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India from 2007–12. Author’s postal address: Department of Migration and Urban Studies, International Institute for Population Sciences, Mumbai-400088, India.
Notes 1. 2. 3. 4.
Ghurye, Caste and Race in India, 279. See Cohn, ‘‘The Census, Social Structure and Objectification’’; Appadurai, ‘‘Number in the Colonial Imagination’’; Dirks, Castes of Mind , 302. See Bhagat, ‘‘Census and Construction of Communalism,’’ 4352–6; ‘‘Census and Caste Enumeration,’’ 119–34. In Europe, a modern census was taken in Iceland in 1703, followed by Sweden in 1750, Great Britain in 1801, Austria in 1818, Greece in 1826, and Italy in 1861. In Norway, the first modern census was taken in 1801, but there was also a census in 1769, which was not so good (personal communication from Helge Brunborg, Statistics Norway). The first
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6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.
23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48.
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census in United States was however held earlier, in 1790. See also Encyclopedia Americana, American Corporation, New York, 1829. It was decided by the British government as early as 1856 to hold a census in 1861 in India. But the census could not be held due to the uprising of 1857. In 1865, the government of India and the home government again agreed that a general population census would be taken in 1871. But the years 1867–72 were actually spent in census taking. This series of censuses was in fact known as census of 1872, which was neither a synchronous census nor covered the entire territory controlled by the British. See Srivastava, Indian Census in Perspective, 9. Jones, ‘‘Religious Identity and Indian Census,’’ 78. Ibid., 76. See also Peach, ‘‘Social Geography,’’ 284. Peach, ‘‘Discovering White Ethnicity,’’ 623. Bhagat, ‘‘Role of Census,’’ 686–91. Jones, ‘‘Religious Identity and Indian Census,’’ 85. Ranger, ‘‘Power, Religion and Community,’’ 221–40. Das, India Invented , 201. Kaviraj, ‘‘The Imaginary Institution,’’ 20. Das, India Invented , 201–02. Korff, ‘‘Globalisation and Communal Identities,’’ 274. Shamsul, ‘‘From Urban to Rural,’’ 391. Korff, ‘‘Globalisation and Communal Identities,’’ 274. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 163. Guha, ‘‘The Politics of Identity and Enumeration,’’ 148–67. Bhagat, ‘‘Census and Caste Enumeration,’’ 119–34. Census of India 1911, Vol. 1, India, Report; Census of India 1931. Vol. I, India, Report. Kumar, ‘‘Secularism in a Multi Religious Society,’’ 22. Ibid., 26. The largest religious group after Hindus, Muslims are divided into Asrafs and Ajlafs. Asrafs are the noble sections that trace their origin from foreign immigrants and consist of Sayyad, Shaik, Moghul and Pathan. The Ajlaf groups are mainly the converts and constitute several occupation groups – like Julaha (weaver), Darzi (tailor) Quassab (butcher), Nai or Hajjam (barber) Mirasi (musician) and Bhangi (sweeper), etc. See Ansari, Muslim Castes in Uttar Pradesh; Ahmad, Caste and Social Stratification. Census of India 1911, Vol XV, United Province of Agra and Oudh, Report, 119. Census of India 1911, Vol. XV, United Province of Agra and Oudh, Report, 280. Census of India 1911, Vol. X. Central Provinces and Berar, Part 1, Report , 116. Ibid., 129. Census of India 1911, Vol. 1, India, Part II, Tables, 37. Census of India 1911, Vol. 1, India, Report. Das, India Invented , 201. Census of India 1931, Vol. XVII, Punjab, Part I: Report , 290. Mukherji, Hindus: A Dying Race. Also see Datta, ‘‘Dying Hindus,’’ 1305–19. Shradhranand, Hindu Sangsthan. Datta, ‘‘Dying Hindus,’’ 1305–19. Sarkar, Modern India 1885 – 1947 , 106. Hasan, ‘‘Communalisation in the Provinces,’’ 1922–6, 1395–1407. Ibid. Census of India 1931, Vol. I, India, Report, 379. Ibid., 379. Mahatme, Concepts and Procedures. Sen, The Argumentative Indian, 294–316. Kanitkar, ‘‘Minority Religious Communities in India.’’ Census of India 2001, The First Report on Religion. Ibid., xiv. Sen, The Argumentative Indian, 308–309. Prakash, They Count their Gains; Panandiker and Umashankere, ‘‘Fertility Control,’’ 89– 104. Joshi, Srinivas, and Bajaj, Religious Demography of India. Visaria, ‘‘Religious Differentials in Fertility,’’ 372. Bhatia, ‘‘Population Growth,’’ 121–9.
446 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55.
56. 57. 58. 59.
60. 61. 62. 63.
R.B. Bhagat Kulkarni, Differentials in the Population Growth. Bhat, ‘‘Religion in Demographic Transition,’’ 59–137. Bose, ‘‘Beyond Hindu–Muslim Growth Rates,’’ 370–74. United Nations, Demographic Year Book; Das Gupta and Narayana, ‘‘Bangladesh’s Fertility Decline,’’ 101–28; Abbasi-Shavazi, ‘‘The Fertility Revolution in Iran,’’ 373. Bose, ‘‘Beyond Hindu–Muslim Growth Rates,’’ 370–74. Sacher Committee, Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community. Basu, ‘‘The Politicization of Fertility,’’ 5–18; Muhsam, ‘‘Fertility of Polygamous Marriages,’’ 3–16; Bongaarts, Frank, and Lesthaeghe, ‘‘The Proximate Determinants of Fertility,’’ 511–37. Census of India 1911, Vol. 1, India, Report, 246. Census of India, Polygynous Marriages. Jeffery and Jeffery, Population, Gender and Politics, 222. Khan, Birth Control . Furthermore, some past and recent jurists ( Faqihs) have mentioned some of the reasons that permit married couples to plan their families. These include keeping away from illegal income, protecting the health of the wife and providing children with all material and spiritual needs. There is a Hadith that says that it is better to leave your children rich than leave them poor like beggars. See Tantawai, ‘‘Birth Planning.’’ International Institute for Population Sciences and Macro, India – National Family Health Survey, 1998–99 (NFHS-2), 159. International Institute for Population Sciences and Macro, India – National Family Health Survey (NFHS-3), 2005–06, 158. Mishra, ‘‘Muslim/Non-Muslim Differentials.’’ Sengupta, Kumar, and Gandevia, Communal Riots in Gujarat 2002, 74.
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C o p y r i g h t o f A s i a n E t h n i c i t y i s t h e p r o p e r t y o f R o u t l e d g e a n d i t s c o n t e n t m a y n o t b e c o p i e d o r e m a i l e d t o m u l t i p l e s i t e s o r p o s t e d t o a l i s t s e r v w i t h o u t t h e c o p y r i g h t h o l d e r ' s e x p r e s s w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . H o w e v e r , u s e r s m a y p r i n t , d o w n l o a d , o r e m a i l a r t i c l e s f o r i n d i v i d u a l u s e .
