Augustine’s Account of Evil as Privation of Good

Jurnal Teologi Reformed Indonesia 4/1 (Januari 2014): 43-55

Augustine’s Account of Evil as Privation of Good Philip Kheng Hong Djung

Abstract This article examines St. Augustine’s concept of evil as privation of good. The goal is to clear up misunderstandings of this concept and to defend its adequacy. The goal shall be attained by analyzing Augustine’s concept of evil in relation to his understanding of good, which is inseparable from the relationship between the Creator and the creatures. Seen from this perspective, a created thing is said to be good because (1) it is created by God who is supremely good; (2) it perpetually depends on God as the source of its goodness; and (3) it keeps the order or form which God has established for it. On the contrary, (1’) evil is not created by God, hence it is not a substance; (2’) a thing is said to be evil when it does not depend on God as its source of goodness; and (3’) when it perverts the order or form which God has established for it.

A privation theory of evil contends that evil is a “privation of good.” Evil is thus seen as deficiency, lack, or loss of good as sickness is the loss of health or war the loss of peace. Though Augustine was not the originator of this theory, 1 he was certainly a prominent propagator of it. 2 Many discussions on this topic will eventually lead back to Augustine’s account of this theory. 3 There are various responses towards this theory. Some accept it wholeheartedly, 4 some 1

John Hick notes that prior to Augustine, this theory has been discussed by Origen, Athanasius, Basil the Great, and Gregory of Nyssa. John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 47. 2 Besides Augustine, Thomas Aquinas was also a well known proponent of this theory. For discussions of Aquinas’ account of this theory, see e.g., Hick, Evil and God, 93-106. 3 For the discu ssion of Aug ustine’s accoun t of this theory, see e.g., G. R. Evans, Augustine on Evil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 1-6; Hick, Evil and God, 37-89; Adam Swenson, “Privation Theories of Pain,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 66 (2009): 139154. 4 For the proponents of the privation theory of evil, see e.g., Bill Anglin and Stewart Goetz, “Evil is Privation,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13/1 (1982): 3-12; Donald A. Cress, “Augustine’s Privation Account of Evil: A Defense,” Augustinian Studies 20 (1989): 109-128; Austin Farrer, Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited (London: Collins, 1940); Cornelius Plantinga, Jr., Not the Way It’s Supposed to

object to it, 5 and others partially accept it. 6 Those who oppose this theory raise two main objections. First, they argue that evil as privation of good is a denial of the reality of Be: A Breviary of Sin (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 87-89; C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (New York: HarperCollins, 1980), 44; Rowan Williams, “Insubstantial Evil,” in Augustine and His Critics: Essays in Honour of Gerald Bonner, ed. Robert

Dodaro and George Lawless (London/New York: Routledge, 2000), 105-124. 5 For the opponents of the privation theory of evil, see e.g., M. B. Ahern, The Problem of Evil (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), 1-21; Peter A. Angeles, The Problem of God: A Short Introduction (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1974), 131148; Robert F. Brown, “The First Evil Will Must Be Incomprehensible: A Critique of Augustine,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 46 (1978): 315-329; Todd C. Calder, “Is the Privation Theory of Evil Dead?” American Philosophical Quarterly 44, no. 4 (October 2007): 317-381; G. Stanley Kane, “Evil and Privation,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 11/1 (1980): 43-58; John Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997), 221-222; Wallace I. Matson, The Existence of God (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965), 141144; H. J. McCloskey, “God and Evil,” The Philosophical Quarterly 10/39 (April 1960), 97-114; “The Problem of Evil,” Journal of Bible and Religion 30/3 (July 1962): 187-197; Nelson Pike, “God and Evil: A Consideration,” Ethics 68, no. 2 (Jan 1958): 116-124. 6 See Hick, Evil and God , 37-58; Lars Fr. H. Svendsen, A Philosophy of Evil, trans. Kerri A. Pierce (Champaign, IL: Dalkey Archive Press, 2010), 48; Williams, “Insubstantial Evil,” 105-124.

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JURNAL TEOLOGI REFORMED INDONESIA

evil. Peter Angeles, for example, argues that evil as lack of good implies evil as an illusion, not real.7 Again, Wallace Matson says that to assert evil as non-being is to say that evil does not exist.8 In line with Angeles and Matson, H. J. McCloskey contends that the privation theory of evil is a mere tactic to avoid giving a solution to the problem of evil by a mere changing of name. 9 In his later publication, McCloskey slightly alters his view, saying that the privation theory is “a middle course” between saying that it is a mere illusion and that it is fully real. 10 Second, others reject this theory due to its failure to explain the reality of pain and sin. They argue that pain is not a mere lack of pleasure. There is a difference between lacking a healthy body and feeling pain. The same thing can be said of moral evil, that is, sin. There is a difference, they argue, between sin due to the failure to help those who are starving and sin due to homicide. In G. Stanley Kane’s words, “there is a familiar distinction, one of great moral importance, between the failure to perform loving acts on the one hand and the performance of hateful or murderous acts on the other.” 11 The privation meaning of evil seems inadequate to account for those differences. Also, it is argued that in both pains and sins, one may find some “positive character” of evil, not in the sense that there is something good in pains or sins, but in the sense that both appear to create a powerful effect on those who experience them. McCloskey gives an example as follows: “the act of the cold-blooded, sadistic murderer who kills not for gain but from hatred has a positively evil nature, and just as positive a nature as the act of the benevolent man who helps all those who seek his help because he knows it to be right so to act.” 12 Hence Kane’s conclusion: “There are thus at least two sorts 7

Angeles, Problem of God, 137. Matson, Existence of God, 142. 9 McCloskey, “God and Evil,” 100. 10 McCloskey, “Problem of Evil,” 189. 11 Kane, “Evil and Privation,” 51-52. 12 McCloskey, “Problem of Evil,” 189. 8

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of evil - all pains that are evils and all sins of commission - for which the privation theory of the nature of evil is unable to give an adequate account. It is unacceptable, therefore, as a general theory of the nature of evil.”13 Still, for some, this theory is only adequate to account for a certain aspect of evil. John Hick, for example, sees that this theory is only adequate in explaining the metaphysical aspect of evil. Thus, ontologically, it is plausible to say that evil is non-substance, the loss of good. Yet, it is less adequate when it is applied to an empirical aspect of evil, for, he argues, “As an element in human experience, evil is positive and powerful. Empirically, it is not merely the absence of something else but a reality with its own distinctive and often terrifying quality and power.” 14 Rowan Williams, in contrast to Hick, proposes the notion of “insubstantial evil,” in which evil could not be understood in terms of essence or substance, but rather of relationship with God.15 Thus, it is the intention of this article to explore further this subject. On the one hand, it is an attempt to describe Augustine’s understanding of evil as privation of good. On the other hand, through this exposition I intend to clear up misunderstandings and answer the objections against Augustine’s privative meaning of evil. To explicate this subject, I will focus on Augustine’s account found in his City of God and will refer to his other works when it is necessary. 16 The choice 13

Kane, “Evil and Privation,” 48-52; see also Calder, “Privation Theory of Evil,” 372-373. 14 Hick, Evil and God, 181. 15 Williams, “Insubstantial Evil,” 113. 16 The citations of Augustine’s City of God are taken from Augustine, Concerning the City of God Against the Pagans, trans. Henry Bettenson (London: Penguin Books, 2003). Other citations of Augustine’s works are taken from the following editions: Augustine, The Confessions, trans. Maria Boulding, ed. John E. Rotelle (New York: New City Press, 1997); Enchiridion, trans. and ed. Albert C. Outler (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1955); The Nature of the Good Against the Manichees, in Augustine: Earlier Writings, vol. VI of The Library of Christian Classics, trans. John H. S. Burleigh (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1953).

AUGUSTINE’S ACCOUNT OF EVIL AS PRIVATION OF GOOD

of the City of God is made with the following The first description of good is related to considerations. First, theodicy is one of the nature, or created substances. Augustine major themes of this book in which contends that nature or substance, insofar as Augustine discusses this subject extensively. it is created by God, is good. To some extent Second, since this book is Augustine’s mature good is identical with substance. Substance is work, we might expect that his elaboration on good, and evil, as opposite to good, is this subject would be fuller than in his therefore not a substance.18 He does not mean previous works. Finally, in this book substance as substantia which indicates “the Augustine discusses his theodicy in relation to underlying ‘stuff,’ material or spiritual, of the doctrine of creation, which provides a things,” nor does he take it as essentia “which significant clue for understanding his account indicates simply what a thing is.” 19 Instead, of evil as the privation of good.17 substance is taken as referring to the first This article will then argue that category of Aristotle’s Ten Categories,20 that is, Augustine’s privation theory of evil is still substance or being in its primary sense, in adequately applied to explain both the which substance indicates a thing which can metaphysical and empirical aspects of evil stand by itself, in contrast to the other nine when the concept of good is explicated in categories, that is, accidents, which cannot relation to his view of God’s creation. Thus stand alone but predicate a substance. nature, that is, a created thing, is said to be Therefore, to say that good is a substance is to good because (1) it is created by God who is indicate that it can exist independently. On supremely good; (2) it perpetually depends on the contrary, evil is not a substance, but like God as the source of its goodness; and (3) it an accident, 21 and therefore it cannot exist keeps the order or form which God has apart from good. Hence, the ontological established for it. On the contrary, (1’) evil is status of good is a substance, and of evil it is not created by God, hence it is not a not. substance; (2’) a thing is said to be evil when it It takes a while for Augustine to come to does not depend on God as its source of this notion of evil as non-substance.22 In the goodness; and (3’) when it perverts the order past, as he was still a follower of Manior form which God has established for it. In cheanism, Augustine used to hold a dualistic the following sections we will see how view of ultimate reality, that is, good and evil Augustine explicates those notions. which are in constant struggle one with another eternally.23 In this scheme, both God as good and evil are seen as substance in a Evil as Non-Substance materialistic sense, that is, a thing with matter What is evil? Augustine’s straightforward in it. Augustine said that he could not think answer is: evil is privation, lack, or loss of of God “otherwise than in terms of bodily good. Then, what is good? Here, Augustine 18 See, e.g., City of God, XI.9, 22; Enchiridion III.11, does not give us one, but several descriptions IV.12. of good. Consequently, Augustine’s concept 19 Richard Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek of evil is necessarily understood in relation to Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic his concept of good. Therefore, we will deal Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1985), 290. 20 Augustine said that he read and understood with his descriptions of good and derive of Aristotle’s Ten Categories when he was just twenty years old. them his concept of evil. Augustine, Confessions , IV.16.28. 21

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I am greatly indebted to Professor James K. A. Smith, whose comments have led me to see a close relationship between Augustine’s theodicy and his doctrine of creation.

Although e vil does not seem to fit an yone of Aristotle’s nine categories of accidents, but since evil cannot be said as substance, then it has to be treated in the same category as that of accident. See Augustine, Enchiridion, III.11. 22 Augustine, Confessions, IV.15.24. 23 Augustine, Confessions, V.10.20.

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size.”24 Consistently, evil is thought of in the same manner. Hence, evil is “not only a substance, but even a bodily substance,” that is, “a dark, deformed mass; this was either gross, and called earth, or ethereal and rarefied like an airy body.” 25 Augustine said that this materialistic view of substance had hindered him to know truth, for he was not able to perceive that God is spirit 26 and that he is the immutable good. 27 Not until he encountered Neo-Platonic writings was he able to think beyond this physical world, and this philosophical conversion to Platonic thought has served as a stepping stone for his spiritual conversion to Christianity. Hence, after abandoning Manicheanism and adopting Platonism, he was able to see God as spirit, that is, immaterial substance, and the only ultimate reality, from which all things derive their existence.28 God is not only the Creator by whom all things are made, but he is also the “only one Good which will bring happiness to a rational or intellectual creature.”29 When there is only one ultimate reality which is supremely good, one can only locate evil in the creation. However, does it mean that things are created evil? Augustine’s answer for this question is negative. All things are created good. Augustine gives two rationales for this notion. First, all created substances, or all created individual things, are good because they are created by God who is good and has purposed to create good. Since God is good, so, whatever this good God created is good. Augustine succinctly says, Thus we find a valid and appropriate explanation of creation in the goodness of God leading to the creation of good.” 30

24

Augustine, Confessions, V.10.19. Augustine, Confessions, V.10.20. 26 Augustine, Confessions, III.7.12. 27 Augustine, Confessions, VII.1.1. 28 Augustine, Confessions, VII.9.13-14. 29 Augustine, City of God, XII.1. 30 Augustine, City of God, XI.22.

Things are good because they are created by God who is good. Here, Augustine is not troubled by the Euthyphro dilemma as to whether a thing is good because it is created by God, or, it is good, therefore God decides to create it. For Augustine, it is clear that there is one ultimate reality which is supremely good, that is, God, from whom all other goods come. There is no such thing as good by itself, except God. Hence, things are good, because they are created as good by God. From this, it follows that God could not be the author of evil, nor could evil be located as such in nature, that is, the whole physical universe. This is contrary to what the Manicheans believe about nature. They hold that God has to mingle nature which is good with evil in order to constrain evil against him. Thus, to a certain extent God is the cause of evil being present in the world, and evil is found mingled with created beings. To Augustine, such view is absurd, for God is immutable and incorruptible and thus he cannot be harmed by evil. God who is absolutely good does not need to constrain evil in nature, thus evil is nowhere found as something in it. 31 Whatsoever is substance, insofar as it is God’s creation, is therefore good. So, eternal fire is good, because it is a substance created by God, even though the torment itself is evil. 32 Fire is something praiseworthy, Augustine says, for as God’s creation, the flames and splendors of fire are beautiful.33 Even the Devil itself, insofar as it pertains to him as substance, is good. 34 Second, even though all created things are potentially mutable, they are still good. Augustine reasons that created beings or things are mutable or corruptible. There is only one incorruptible substance, that is, God, who is supremely good. Created beings are corruptible because they are not supremely

25

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31

Augustine, City of God, 11.22. Augustine, Nature of Good, xxxviii. 33 Augustine, City of God, XII.4. 34 Augustine, City of God, XI.11. 32


good. They are created not out of God’s own being which is incorruptible, but out of nothing (creatio ex nihilo). It is beyond our limit to discuss Augustine’s concept of nihil. Suffice it to say that Augustine never entertains a notion of nothing as something. 35 If God is the ultimate, the only, and the necessary being, and he did not create this world out of his own essence, but out of nothing, then nothing could not mean something, but absolute nothingness. So, because of creatio ex nihilo, all creatures have their beings inferior to God’s being, yet they are still good. Although they have potency to be corruptible, they are nevertheless good. Augustine applies this mutability to rational beings, that is, human beings and angels, which by their own choice they could either remain at or fall away from the relationship with God. Therefore, they may either stay in the state of blessedness or fall into the state of wretchedness. Yet, despite their mutability and fall into wretchedness, they are still superior to those irrational beings. He says, A sentient nature, when suffering, is better than a stone which is quite incapable of suffering; and in the same way the rational creature, even in wretchedness, is superior to the nature which is bereft both of reason and sense and therefore cannot be the victim of misery. 36

Through these arguments, Augustine excludes the possibility of locating evil in God or in created beings. Evil cannot be associated with God, for he is supremely good, nor can it be with created beings or substances, for they are created by a good God. Evil is therefore not a thing; it is not a substance, for all substances, except that of God, are created by God, and they are therefore good by virtue of creation. Evil is not a substance, but corruption, or defect, of a substance. Corruption of a substance is not a substance, for it cannot exist on its own. Hence, creation is good. Augustine argues,

35 36

Augustine, Nature of Good, xxv. Augustine, City of God, XI.1.

if no one had sinned in the world, the world would have been furnished and fitted only with things naturally good.37

The first sin of human beings was not caused by the fruits of the tree, but humans will have sinned prior to their eating of the forbidden fruits.38 In this point, we need to answer the charge against this notion, namely, that evil as nonbeing or non-substance is identical with the denial of the reality of evil. Here we assert that to say evil as non-substance is by no means to deny the reality of evil, for when Augustine says that evil is “nothing,” it is not in the sense that it does not exist, but that it is not a thing, not a substance which is created by God. To say that evil is not “a positive substance” is not to say that evil does not exist at all, but rather that it cannot exist apart from nature or created substance. Evil can only exist in a good nature, in which it exists parasitically. It corrupts a good nature, but even a corrupted nature insofar as it is nature, is still good. So, as long as there is still nature, evil exists; yet, if nothing is left, evil also ceases to be. Hence, evil is self-destructive. 39 Nevertheless, we may not think of evil as a parasite that lives in a living organism and corrupting its host, because a parasite, albeit small, is still a substance. It is better to understand the relationship of evil to nature or substance as the relationship of an accident or attribute of a thing to the thing itself, such as the greenness of a leaf to the leaf itself. Greenness as such cannot exist apart from the leaf, just as evil never exists apart from good nature. Thus, to say that the greenness of a leaf is nothing is to say that it has no substance by itself, for it cannot exist apart from the leaf; but it is by no means to deny the reality of that greenness. 40 Other similar analogies are plentiful. Augustine likens evil 37

Augustine, City of God, XI.23. Augustine, City of God, XIV.13. 39 Augustine, City of God, XII.6; Confessions, VII.12.18. 40 This analogy came to my mind as I was looking at a pot of an evergreen plant in my office. Insofar as my reading goes, I am not aware that anybody has ever used this analogy. 38

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to a defect of nature, such as a crack in a vessel.41 Another contemporary writer uses an analogy of the hole in a donut.42 Having said this, we do not mean that evil is a quality of a substance, nor is it one of the accidents in Aristotle’s categories. What we want to emphasize is that even though evil exists, it exists not as a substance, but like accidents of a substance, it exists inseparably from a substance. Hence, in all cases, the point is clear: evil is as real as the greenness in a leaf, a crack in a vessel, or the hole in a donut; yet, as the greenness of a leaf cannot exist apart from it, or a crack apart from a vessel, and a hole apart from a doughnut, so evil cannot exist apart from a substance. It is thus sufficient to show that the charge that the privation theory of evil denies the reality of evil is untenable. This charge is due rather to a misunderstanding than to a real case to answer. 43

Evil as Lack of Participation in G od Augustine’s second description of good pertains to the creatures’ relationship with God. Good is thus seen as a participation in God, and evil is thus the deprivation or lack of this participation. The angels were created good, as the angels of light, because they were “illuminated by that light by which they were created.” Therefore, they became light . . . by participation in the changeless light and day, which is the Word of God, but when they turned away from God, they have become in themselves darkness, deprived of participation in the eternal light [italics added]. 44

Augustine goes on to say: “For evil is not a positive substance: the loss of good has been

41

Augustine, City of God, XIV.11. 42 Swenson, “Privation Theories of Pain,” 139. 43 Although Kane opposes the privation theory of evil, he is aware of the fact that the denial of the reality of evil is not a part of this theory. So, this objection is due to a misunderstanding rather than a real case. Kane, “Evil and Privation,” 44. 44 Augustine, City of God, XI.9.

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given the name of ‘evil.’”45 As they lose their participation in God, they lose goodness. The loss of this participation is thus evil. 46 So far Augustine mentions two conditions by which creatures are said to be good, that is, by being created good, and by participating in God. Both conditions are linked with God who is good as the sole cause of creatures being good. Augustine explains as follows: The good, which renders them blessed, is God, by whom they were created; and the participation in his life and the contemplation of his beauty is their never-failing joy.47

There is also both a natural and a functional necessity for creatures, as they are created good, to be participating in God. The separation is not natural, and therefore harmful. Augustine explains: “that God created their nature so good that it is harmful for it to be separated from him.” 48 What is created as good cannot be separated from God who is the source of its goodness. An analogy given by Augustine to illustrate this truth is that of “the eye’s enjoyment of light.” 49 Naturally, eyes are created for enjoying light, and functionally, eyes can only see with light. Without light, a good eye is blind. As harmful the absence of light is to the eye, so is the absence of participation in God harmful to rational beings. This notion of participation in God is particularly applied to “the rational and intelligent” creatures, by which they enjoy the felicity or blessedness of God. 50 Augustine thus speaks of two kinds of good: one by virtue of creation and another by virtue of participation. The former belongs to all created beings, by which nature is good insofar as it is created by God. The latter is extended only to rational creatures, that is, 45

Augustine, City of God, XI.9. Augustine has extensive ly used the language of participation in God in the City of God . See, e.g., VIII.1; X.1,2; XII.21; X IV.13. 47 Augustine, City of God, IX.22. 48 Augustine, City of God, XII.1. 49 Augustine, City of God, VIII.8. 50 Augustine, City of God, XII.1; see also V III.1. 46


angels and humans, by which they are good insofar as they remain in their participation in God as the supreme good and the only source of their goodness. The former is closely related to, but not identical with, the existence of nature. So, insofar as nature exists, it is good, because as long as it exists, it is still a substance, and it is therefore good. The latter, however, is dependent on the creatures’ relationship with God. This good, which is also called blessedness or felicity, is not inherent in its nature, but in its participation with the supreme Good. Rational creatures are blessed because of their “participation in Him,” and they are wretched when “deprived of participation in Him.” 51 The deprivation from this participation of the Good is thus evil. It is the privation or loss of good which comes from God as the source of goodness which the rational creatures continually receive as they participate in him. Augustine’s notion of evil as lack of participation in God is helpful in explaining the nature of original sin. For rational creatures to gain blessedness, or the highest good, they have to be perpetually and fully dependent on God as the sole source of good. This total dependency, by which rational creatures cling to God as their light, requires humility and obedience. Therefore, the first sin is called pride.52 For by pride they reject to adhere to God as the “supreme and real ground of their being;” instead, man regards himself as his own light and turns away from that light which would make man himself a light if he would set his heart on it. 53

Humility and pride are thus paradoxical, for humility that abases oneself before God will result in exaltation, but pride that seeks to exalt oneself will result in abasement. When rational beings exalt themselves and turn away

from their dependence on God, they fall. Failure to remain in this participation has caused them to fall and to be dragged down into a lower degree of existence. Though they do not lose their being, but their being becomes “less real,” and “nearer to nothingness.” 54 For some, it seems implausible to imagine a being which is more or less real, for being is either real or unreal. 55 Either a thing exists or does not exist. A thing cannot more or less exist. We, however, see that such a language is plausible, when we consider two modes of existence of a thing which Augustine seems to imply in this discussion. First, a thing exists by virtue of creation; therefore, so long as it is created by God, it is what it is, and therefore it exists. In this aspect, we can say that either a thing exists or it does not. But, second, a thing also exists by virtue of its participation in God. Although by virtue of God’s creation, a thing exists, it can never exist totally independent from God. Except for God himself, a being that can exist absolutely on his own, all created things have to be dependent on God’s sustenance for their existence. Augustine explains as follows: There can be no being which does not derive its existence from the most high and true God. All are not supremely good, but they approximate to the Supreme good, and even the very lowest goods, which are far distant from the Supreme good, can only derive their existence from the Supreme good.56

In this manner, it is plausible to talk about the more or less existence of a thing. As a rational being draws closer to God, it has a higher degree of existence, and vice versa. We can liken this second aspect of existence to an essential function which constitutes a thing, that is, a function of calculation in a calculator. A calculator is defined by its

51

Augustine, City of God, IX.16. Brown inaccurately identifies pride as the cause of the fall. Instead, pride is certainly the first sin, yet it should be differentiated from the cause of it. Brown, “The First Evil,” 321. 53 Augustine, City of God, XIV.13. 52

54

Augustine, City of God, XIV.13. Donald Cress suggests that the language of “less being” can only be plausible when it is understood in Platonic context. Cress, “Augustine’s Privation,” 110-111. 56 Augustine, Nature of Good, i. 55

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function of calculating. When some of its functions are gone, its existence as a calculator becomes less. When all functions are gone, it is no longer a calculator, although in terms of matter it is there. Augustine certainly does not identify the existence of rational being with the functionality of their body or soul, but with its participation in God their Creator. As human beings, the bearers of the image of God, we become more or less human in terms of our relationship with God. When human beings fall from their participation in God, they have sinned. Falling away from the source of good, they become evil, and therefore less human. Thus, Augustine’s “less real” being is plausible in this sense. Williams is correct on this point, that evil can not merely be seen in terms of “time and space,” but in relation between creatures with their God. 57 However, his opposition to a substantial view of evil is incorrect. 58 Augustine has certainly included both the metaphysical and empirical aspects in his account of evil. As the above explication makes clear, Augustine not only sees evil in terms of the creatures’ relationship with the Creator, but also evil as non-substance.

Evil as Corruption of the Right Measure, Order, and Form Augustine’s third description of good pertains to creatures having the right measure, order, and form that God has established for it. Every created being is good because it has the measure, form, and order that God intends for it. There is no created being without a certain degree of measure, form, or order. A completely formless nature is impossible. Even in the case of hyle, which some have thought to be a “matter completely without form and quality,” it still has a form that we cannot conceive, and the capacity to receive form. It is therefore good, not evil. 59 57

Williams, “Insubstantial Evil,” 110. Williams, “Insubstantial Evil,” 113. 59 Augustine, Nature of Good, xviii. 58

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Or, eternal fire is good, though the torment itself is evil, for fire has its own measure, form, and order. 60 The measure, form, and order of a thing determine whether it is superior or inferior to another thing. All things are good; better in proportion as they are better measured, formed and ordered, less good when there is less of measure, form and order.61

Thus, due to its measure, order, and form, gold is superior to silver; and silver to lead. In this way, the scale of being exists in the universe and everything has its place determined by its measure, form, and order. 62 A thing is said to be corrupted when its measure, form, or order alters or changes to a lesser degree. However, this corruption does not alter its place in the scale of being. Hence corrupted gold is still better than uncorrupted silver. 63 Corrupted or sinful rational and spiritual beings are still superior to uncorrupted non-rational beings. 64 When good is understood in terms of the proper or right measure, form, and order of nature, evil is thus “nothing else than corruption, either of the measure, or the form, or the order, that belong to nature,” 65 or the loss of integrity, beauty, healthy or virtue, or of goodness in a nature that is . . . liable to destruction or diminution through perversion.66

Thus, right and wrong, good and evil, is that of “the rightly ordered” and “the perverted.” 67 Understanding evil as perversion of the proper measure, form, or order of nature is helpful in describing moral evil, that is, sin. Now, when we take this concept of good, that is, proper measure, form, or order, as a standard or goal which God intends for a 60

Augustine, Nature of Good, xxxviii. Augustine, Nature of Good, iii. 62 Augustine, City of God, XII.2. 63 Augustine, Nature of Good, v. 64 Augustine, City of God, XI.1. 65 Augustine, Enchiridion, 4. 66 Augustine, City of God, XII.4. 67 Augustine, City of God, XIX.12. 61


rational being to keep or to maintain, then sin is a failure or perversion to keep or to maintain this goal. The ultimate goal of human beings as God intends for them is to be like God. Their goal is God himself. Sin is therefore “a defection from him who supremely exists to something of a lower degree of reality.” 68 Augustine says, “For we are justified in calling a man good not because he merely knows what is good, but because he loves the Good.”69 Sin is thus the failure to meet this goal. It is to abandon a higher goal and to turn to a lower one. Augustine gives examples of greed, lust, boasting, and pride. There is nothing wrong with gold. Yet when one abandons justice for the sake of gold, it is the sin of greed. There is nothing wrong with an attraction to a beautiful body. Yet it is lust, when the “soul . . . perversely delights in sensual pleasures.” Also, there is nothing wrong with the praise of men. Yet it is a sin of boasting, when one “loves the praise of others and cares nothing for the ‘witness of conscience.’” Last, power is good, but it is a sin of pride, when one “perversely loves one’s own power, and has no thought for the justice of the Omnipotent.” 70 That a right order of nature is inseparable from its end is exemplified in a human being’s love of God. Augustine says, “if the Creator is truly loved, that is, if he himself is loved, and not something else in his stead, then he cannot be wrongly loved.”71 Therefore, a rightly ordered love is nothing but to love God himself. It is sin when human beings turn their end of love from God to creatures. Second, sin as perversion is also understood as an improper use of temporal goods or things. Sin occurs when the will “desires the inferior thing in a perverted and inordinate manner.”72 It is making a bad use of a good thing. 73 Material goods are not evil

in themselves, and they contribute to our benefit, when “we make wise and appropriate use of them.” It is like poison. When it is appropriately applied, it can be a good medicine. On the other hand, things like food, if they are improperly used, may be harmful to the body. 74 McCloskey does not agree with Augustine on this point. For him, evil cannot be a mere absence of a right structure. There exists “a presence of evil structure.”75 Yet, he does not elaborate on what he means by an evil structure and how this evil structure exists in this world. However, we could imagine what he would have meant by it. Suppose that what he means by an evil structure is that there is a society or nation which has been so corrupted to such an extent that all civil and social structures which is necessary for people to live together no longer exist. Also suppose that if such a society ever existed, we still cannot see how that evil structure could be fundamentally different from that of a perverted structure. What we can conclude is that the evil structure is none other than a perverted structure or order in its extreme degree. By defining evil as perversion Augustine locates the source of moral evil, that is, sin, not in nature itself, but in the perverted will of rational beings. Sin is rather internal than external. Human character, emotions, and acts are rather caused by his will than by his external circumstances. If the will is wrongly directed, the emotions will be wrong; if the will is right, the emotions will be not only blameless, but praiseworthy. 76

Williams is correct to say that evil has affected us internally, including our perception, that we are no longer able to see what is good and what is evil.77 Augustine also makes clear that the will of a rational being is good, but the perverted will

68

Augustine, City of God, XII.8. Augustine, City of God, XII.28. 70 Augustine, City of God, XII.8. 71 Augustine, City of God, XV.22. 72 Augustine, City of God, XII.6. 73 Augustine, Nature of Good, xxxvi. 69

74

Augustine, City of God, XI.22. McCloskey, “Problem of Evil,” 190. 76 Augustine, City of God, XIV.6. 77 Williams, “Insubstantial Evil,” 107-108. 75

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is evil. For Augustine, what causes a good will to become evil is inexplicable. An evil act is caused by an evil will. Since what is good cannot cause evil, thus, a good nature cannot cause a will to turn evil. Evil will is therefore caused by evil itself. But, evil itself is an effect, and an effect cannot be a cause. In the final analysis, an “efficient cause” of evil is unknown.78 He thus concludes: “The truth is that one should not try to find an efficient cause for a wrong choice. It is not a matter of efficiency, but of deficiency; the evil will itself is not effective but defective.”79 Since evil has only a deficient cause, it is only known by its absence, as darkness is known by the absence of light, or silence by the absence of sound. To look for an efficient cause of evil is like “trying to see darkness or to hear silence.”80 In this point, Brown has certainly misunderstood Augustine by asserting that Augustine maintains no cause for evil. 81 Augustine does not say that there is no cause of evil, but there is no “efficient” cause of evil. Since evil is not a thing; it is deficiency; it cannot thus have efficient cause but a deficient one. At this point we would like to evaluate the charges made against the privation theory of evil. Some have argued that this theory fails to explain the “positive character” of pain and sin.82 What they mean is that both pain and sin have shown powerful effects. Therefore, sin is not simply a lack of good, nor is pain simply a lack of health. We need to treat the two phenomena separately. First, we shall see how Augustine explains sin, that is, moral evil, as a perversion or lack of a proper order of nature to answer the above charge. It is plausible to think that a thing, which loses or lacks a proper order, is yet powerful and destructive. We can think of a wild and untamed horse. That horse is powerful, but since it is untamed, it is dangerous. We can

also imagine a nuclear power plant that has been damaged by an earthquake, so that its energy can no longer be controlled. That uncontrolled power plant does not lose its energy. Its energy is simply uncontrolled, therefore it is destructive and dangerous. Sin is a perversion of a proper order, the loss of integrity and virtue of a rational being, but it does not mean a loss of energy. Therefore, sins as perversion are destructive and harmful to human nature. 83 Augustine would agree with what Nelson Pike argues, that “intention is not evil,”84 but he would immediately add that a perverted intention or will is evil. A person with a perverted will, such as a mass murderer or a terrorist, is powerful, yet destructive. Kane has raised an objection against this assertion. He argues that privation theory fails to explain the gradation of evil. For example, the sin of those who fail to help people who are starving and the sin of homicide are not the same.85 Augustine would agree with that. When we see sin as perversion, then the former is certainly less perverted than the latter. Augustine’s treatment of pain, however, is more complex. In the City of God Augustine treats the subject of pain under the broader category of suffering. Here we can say that Augustine does not say—at least not explicitly—that all sufferings are categorically evil. So we need to carefully observe his treatment on this subject. Augustine reflects on this particular subject against the background of the sack of Rome, in which, he says, “all the devastation, the butchery, the plundering, the conflagrations, and all the anguish,” had occurred. 86 What then is suffering? Why does it happen even to those who have put their faith in Christ? Augustine’s answer is that sufferings or “temporal ills” are “the recompense of sin.” 87

78

Augustine, City of God, XII.6. Augustine, City of God, XII.7. 80 Augustine, City of God, XII.7. 81 Brown, “The First Evil,” 324. 82 See, e.g., Kane, “Evil and Privation,” McCloskey, “Problem of Evil,” 189. 79

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83

Augustine, City of God, XII.2. Pike, God and Evil, 119. 85 Kane, “Evil and Privation,” 51-52. 86 Augustine, City of God, I.7. 87 Augustine, City of God, I.9. 84

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The sin he refers to is not necessarily a big sin, but even that small and trivial one still deserves punishment. Therefore, he says, “every one of them, however commendable his life, gives way at times to physical desires, and, while avoiding monstrous crimes, the sink of iniquity and the abomination of godlessness, is yet guilty of some sins, infrequent sins, perhaps, or more frequent because more trivial.” 88 This suffering starts from the first sin of Adam and Eve. Hence, as they fell into sins, there started a chain of disasters: mankind is led from that original perversion, a kind of corruption at the root, right up to the disaster of the second death, which has no end. 89

Therefore, for Augustine, one needs to differentiate between sin and suffering as the punishment of sin. The former is evil, for it comes from the corruption of human’s will. The latter is not necessarily evil. Suffering as the punishment which comes from God is certainly not evil. 90 However, suffering or torment as something due to sins is evil. 91 Therefore suffering, when it is seen as an instrument allowed or ordained by God to punish sin justly, is not evil; but suffering as experienced by rational beings due to their sins is evil. Thus suffering can be seen either as “retribution for whatever sins, however small, they had committed,” or as an instrument to “bring their virtue to perfection.”92 That Augustine differentiates suffering is also clear in his treatment of death as the ultimate pain or suffering. Not all deaths are evil. In general death is evil, because it entails “a heavy burden of suffering.” 93 Yet the death of the martyrs is not evil. It is of high value to the extent that even if they had not yet received baptism prior to their death, the

death itself is “of the same value for the remission of their sins as if they had been washed in the sacred font of baptism.” 94 Suicide, however, is categorically evil. It is thus forbidden for Christians to do so. 95 What makes the death of martyrs good and suicide evil could only be perceived in terms of existence and good. For Augustine, good and existence are inseparable. To be good is to maintain one’s existence which God has bestowed. On the contrary, it is evil to annihilate one’s existence. When Christians for the sake of their faith in Christ choose to die, they do so in order to maintain their existence as God has promised. When some choose to commit suicide, they have the intention of annihilating their own existence. It is therefore evil. Whatsoever is good, it exists. To exist is thus desirable for every being.96 So, even wretched persons, when they were given choice, would have chosen to exist even though they had to suffer eternally. Augustine says, “They would certainly be overjoyed to choose perpetual misery in preference to complete annihilation.” 97 To strive for existence is therefore natural for every creature; those plants and animals “wish to exist and to avoid extinction.” 98 Augustine sees that naturally striving for existence is a proper order of life given by the Creator, who supremely exists and who is supremely good and wise. Therefore, to love God is to love our own existence.99 It is understandable then why suicide is seen as abominable, for it violates the proper order of life. Yet, martyrdom is seen differently because another higher order is applied. Our existence is related to our relationship with God. To exist is to have a relationship with God. So, when one is forced to choose between his or her own existence and the relationship with the Creator, then the latter is the right choice, for

88

94

89

95

Augustine, City of God, I.9. Augustine, City of God, XIII.14. 90 Augustine, Nature of Good, xxxvii. 91 Augustine, Nature of Good, xxxviii. 92 Augustine, City of God, XX.2. 93 Augustine, City of God, XIII.9.

Augustine, City of God, XIII.7. Augustine, City of God, I.16-22. 96 Augustine, City of God, XI.27. 97 Augustine, City of God, XI.27. 98 Augustine, City of God, XI.27. 99 Augustine, City of God, XI.28.

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by choosing the relationship with God, one On the other hand, they are evil as has gained his or her existence. Bodily pain is experienced by those who suffer. Third, also “a sense of striving against extinction,” 100 Augustine locates the source of evil in the free which is useful to compel the body to become will of rational beings. Though he falls short better. Therefore, “a wound which gives pain of explaining how a good will could turn into is better than a painless festering.” 101 The an evil one, evil could be found from nowhere body of Christ had wounds, but it did not else but from human free will, which is suffer corruption. So, Augustine does not see created good, yet changeable. that bodily pains are something evil, but, the corruption of the body is certainly so. Bibliography

Conclusion This article has explicated Augustine’s account of evil as the privation of good. Augustine’s account is plausible when one understands the meaning of good. Good for Augustine is inseparable from God who is the Good and the source of good for all creation. In short, there is no good apart from Good, for all created beings are good because they are created by God who is good, and they are good as they stay in participation in Him who is their source of good, and they are good when they live according to a proper order of life established by their Creator. Augustine’s account of evil as the privation of good needs to be understood as inseparable from his explication of good. Evil is non-substance for it is not created. It is also the lack of participation in God and the perversion of a proper order of life. Some features can be said of Augustine’s account of evil. First, it is a totally theistic view of the nature of evil. Augustine leaves no hole in which evil, either moral or natural, could be discussed without somehow relating to God. Second, Augustine makes sin as the primary evil. In other words, sin is categorically evil. All sins are evil, however small they are. The so-called natural evils, e.g., sufferings, disasters, pains, are not necessarily evil. When they are seen as God’s righteous punishment for sins, they are good, because they are instrumental to bring about good. 100 101

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Augustine, Nature of Good, xx. Augustine, Nature of Good, xx.

Ahern, M. B. The Problem of Evil. New York: Schocken Books, 1971. Angeles, Peter A. The Problem of God: A Short Introduction. Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1974. Anglin, Bill and Stewart Goetz. “Evil is Privation.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13, no. 1 (1982): 312. Augustine. Concerning the City of God Against the Pagans. Translated by Henry Bettenson. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2003. ———.

Translated by Maria Boulding. Edited by John E. Rotelle. New York: New City Press, 1997. Confessions.

———. Enchiridion. Translated and edited by Albert C. Outler. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1955. ———. The Nature of the Good Against the Manichees, in Augustine: Earlier Writings, vol. VI of The Library of Christian Classics, translated by John H. S. Burleigh. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1953. Brown, Robert F. “The First Evil Will Must Be Incomprehensible: A Critique of Augustine.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 46 (1978): 315-329. Calder, Todd C. “Is the Privation Theory of Evil Dead?” American Philosophical


Quarterly 44, no. 4 (October 2007): 317-

381. Cress, Donald A. “Augustine’s Privation Account of Evil: A Defense.” Augustinian Studies 20 (1989): 109-128. Evans, G. R. Augustine on Evil. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Farrer, Austin. Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited. London: Collins, 1940. Hick, John. Evil and the God of Love. New York: Harper Collins, 1952. Hospers, John. An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997. Kane, G. Stanley. “Evil and Privation.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 11, no. 1 (1980): 43-58. Lewis, C. S. Mere Christianity. New York: HarperCollins, 1980.

———.“The Problem of Evil.” Journal of Bible and Religion 30, no. 3 (July 1962):187197. Muller, Richard A. Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1985. Pike,

Nelson. “God and Evil: A Consideration.” Ethics 68, no. 2 (Jan 1958):116-124.

Plantinga, Cornelius, Jr. Not the Way It’s Supposed to Be: A Breviary of Sin. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995. Svendsen, Lars Fr. H. A Philosophy of Evil. Translated by Kerri A. Pierce. Champaign, IL: Dalkey Archive Press, 2010. Swenson, Adam. “Privation Theories of Pain.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 66 (2009): 139-154.

Mateson, Wallace I. The Existence of God. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965.

Williams, Rowan. “Insubstantial Evil.” In Augustine and His Critics: Essays in Honour of Gerald Bonner. Edited by McCloskey, H. J. “God and Evil.” The Robert Dodaro and George Lawless, Philosophical Quarterly 10, no. 39 (April 105-124. London/NewYork: Routledge, 1960): 97-114. 2000.

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Augustine’s Account of Evil as Privation of Good

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