REPUBLIC V. CA 135 SCRA 156 (1985)
UMBAY V. ALECHA 135 SCRA 427 (1985)
FACTS: In 1961, CFI Quezon upheld the registration of a parcel of land in the names of Prudencio Maxino and Tarciana Moreles. 1. Subsequently, OCT was issued covering the same. In 1969, the Republic filed a petition to annul said decision citing that the land in question are part of unclassified public forest and the possessory information title relied upon the Maxino spouses covered only 29 hectares and not 885 hectares. 2. CA dismissed the petition on the account that the decision had become final and unappealable.
FACTS: Natalio Enanoria owned a parcel of land (Lot no. 5280) with OCT 10933 issued in 1922. 1. He died in 1924. In 1963, the heirs of Enanoria asked a surveyor to relocate the lot; they discovered that the said property was occupied by Placido Alecha, the owner of the adjoining lot. Despite demands to vacate the subject property, spouses Alecha refused to do so. 2. As a result, the heirs of Enanoria filed a complaint against Alecha, alleging that the latter had usurped their property. 3. The trial court held in favor of the Enannorias however upon appeal, CA reversed the decision and dismission the complaint of the Enanoria heirs.
ISSUE: WON the certificate of title issued to spouses Maxino is valid HELD: It is incontestable that the subject property registered by the Maxinos, is within the public forest and as such, not alienable and disposable nor susceptible of private appropriation. Its inclusion in the public forest was certified by the Director of Forestry in July 1940. The basis of the claim of the Maxinos that is a Spanish title is untenable. First, the composition title is spurious based on the facts alone as it appears the alleged deed of absolute sale is but a quitclaim. Also, it is axiomatic that public forestral lands is not subject to registration. Its inclusion in a title, whether the title be issued during the Spanish regime or under the Torrens system, nullifies the title. As such, possession of public foresrtal lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
ISSUE: Is the complaint of the heirs of Enanoria barred by prescription ? HELD: The SC held that Enanoria’s complaint does not prescribe nor is it barred by laches. Sec 46 of the Land Registration Law (now Sec 47 of the Property Registration Decree PD 1529 effective June 11, 1978) provides that “no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also his hereditary successors because the latter merely step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law and are merely the continuation of the personality of their predecessor-in-interest. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to its legality. “Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, and avoid the possibility of losing his land.”
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Title to land can no longer be acquired by prescription after a Torrens title has been issued for it. The right to recover possession of registered lands is imprescriptible because possession is merely a consequence of ownership. In the present case, the petitioners’ action to recover the subject property cannot be barred by the equitable defense of laches or delay because they became aware of the encroachment only after they hired a surveyor in 1963 to ascertain the true boundaries of the subject property.
PNB V. CA 153 SCRA 435 (1987) FACTS: During his lifetime, Clodualdo Vitug married twice: Gervacia Flores with whom he had 3 children: Victor, Lucina and Julio. Victor is survived by 5 children: Leonardo, Juan, Candida Francisco and Donaciano. 1. Juan is survived by his only daughter Florencia. Donata Montemayor was the 2nd wife with whom he had 8 children: Pragmacio, Maximo, Jesus, Salvador, Prudencia, Anunciacion, Enrique and Francisco. Francisco is survived by 11 children. 2. Clodualdo died intestate in May 1929 and a special proceeding named Donata Montemayor as the administratrix. 3. In November 1952, Donata Montemayor, through her son, Salvador Vitug, mortgaged several parcels of land covered by TCT 2289 in favor of PNB to guarantee a loan granted by the bank to Salvador Jaramilla and Pedro Bacani in the amount of P40,900. 4. Donata also mortgaged other properties (TCT 2887-88) in favor of the same bank to guarantee the payment of a loan her son made in the amount of P35,200. All TCTs of the subject properties were in the name of Donata Montemayor, of legal age, Filipino, widow and a resident of Lubao Pampanga and were free from all liens and encumbrances. 5. Salvador Vitug failed to pay his loan so the bank foreclosed the mortgaged properties and were sold at a public auction in May 1968 to PNB who was the highest bidder. The titles thereto were consolidated in the name of PNB. Likewise, Jaramilla and Bacani failed to settle their loans with the bank so the latter foreclosed the mortgaged properties which were sold at a public action. PNB was the highest bidder. In August 1968, a new title was issued in PNB’s name.
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6. In 1969, PNB sold the properties (TCT 2887-88) to Jesus Vitug, Anunciacion de Guzman, Prudencia Fajardo, Salvador Vitug and Aurora Guttierez. 7. In May 1970, Pragmacio and Maximo file an action for partition and reconveyance before CFI Pampanga against Marcelo Mendiola as the special administrator of the intestate estate of Donata, their siblings, the heirs of Francisco, and PNB. Both claim that the subject properties were conjugal properties of spouses Donata and Clodualdo of which they claim a share of 2/11 of ½ thereof. They assailed the mortgage to PNB and public auction of said properties were null and void. Lower court dismissed the complaint. CA reversed the lower court’s decision and held in favor of brothers Pragmacio and Maximo. ISSUE: Does the presumption of conjugality of properties acquired by the spouses during coverture provided for in art 160 NCC apply to property covered by a Torrens certificate of title in the name of the widow? HELD: In processing the loan applications of Donata Montemayor, the PNB had the right to rely on what appears in the certificates of title and no more. On its face the properties are owned by Donata Montemayor, a widow. The PNB had no reason to doubt nor question the status of said registered owner and her ownership thereof. Indeed, there are no liens and encumbrances covering the same.
A Torrens title concludes all controversy over ownership of the land covered by a final degree of registration. Once the title is registered the owner may rest assured without the necessity of stepping into the portals of the court or sitting in the mirador de su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land. The presumption stipulated in Art. 160 does not apply in this case because it appears on the face of the title that the properties were acquired by Donata when she was already a widow. When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. PNB had a reason to rely on what appears on the certificates of title of the properties mortgaged. For all legal purposes, the PNB is a mortgagee in good faith for at the time the mortgages covering said properties were constituted the PNB was not aware to any flaw of the title of the mortgagor. Indeed, if the PNB knew of the conjugal nature of said properties it would not have approved the mortgage applications covering said properties of Donata Montemayor without requiring the consent of all the other heirs or co-owners thereof. Moreover, when said properties were sold at public auction, the PNB was a purchaser for value in good faith.
The well-known rule in this jurisdiction is that a person dealing with a registered land has a right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man make such inquiry.
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BORNALES V. IAC 166 SCRA 519 (1988) FACTS: In 1927, Sixto Dumulong and his legal wife Isabel MarquezDumulong were awarded a parcel of land in Capiz (OCT 6161). Sixto and Isabel had no children and lived separately since 1920. 1. Subsequently, Sixto cohabited with Placida, who even used Sixto’s surname, and had several children. 2. In March 1978, Placida and her children executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Adjudication and Sale of Real Property involving the subject property. Said property was sold in favor of spouses Bernardo Decrepito and Loreta Dumolong. 3. They were able to acquire the supposed thumbmark of Isabel. But apparently, Isabel never affixed her thumbmark and that the same was not within her knowledge. 4. In November 1978, Placida registered the Deed and a Torrens title was issued in their name. Three months thereafter, Placida and her children sold the land to Bornales. Isabel assailed the sale. 5. Isabel argued that the acquisition of the Torrens title by Placida et al was through fraud. Bornales countered he was not aware of the fraudulent nature of the prior transactions, but since a Torrens was issued he should be considered as a buyer in good faith, hence entitled to some right.
Also, Bornales had been a tenant of the Dumulong’s. He is aware that Placida was not Sixto’s legal spouse and that it was Isabel who has a rightful claim over the land. He should have not bought the land from Placida, considering his knowledge of the fact that Placida could not have own any portion of the land since she was not a legal wife.
ISSUE: May Bornales invoke the indefeasibility of a Torrens title? HELD: No. Having bought the land registered under the Torrens system from Placida who procured title thereto by means of fraud, Bornales cannot invoke the indefeasibility of a certificate of title against Isabel to the extent of her interest therein. Torrens system of land registration should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property. Registration, to be effective, must be made in good faith. It is a settled rule that the defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title does not extend to a transferee (Bornales) who takes it with notice of the flaws in his transferor's (Placida’s) title.
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PNB V. INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK, 199 SCRA 508 (1991) FACTS: Petitioner PNB filed with RTC Alaminos, Pangasinan a petition for the cancellation of a memorandum of encumbrance annotated upon its 16 TCTS 1. Petitioner alleged that spouses Balingit executed a real estate mortgage in favor of PNB to secure a loan the spouses obtained from PNB 2. Annotated subsequent to the memoranda of the mortgage lien of PNB is a “notice of levy re Civil Case Continental Bank v. Spouses Balingit) for a total sum of P96,636.1 at the back of the TCTs 3. Since the spouses defaulted on their loan with PNB, the bank extra- judicially foreclosed the 16 parcels of land. The sheriff’s certificate of sale was registered on April 3, 1972 4. Upon the expiration of the one-year legal redemption period, PNB consolidated in its name the ownership of the subject properties and a new TCT was issued in its name. however, the notice of levy in favor of Continental Bank (now ICB) was carried over and now appears as the sole encumbrance in the new titles of PNB 5. Subsequently, ICB, as successor in interest of Continental Bank, filed an opposition alleging that since it was not aware of the extrajudicial foreclosure, the new and consolidated titles in favor of PNB are null and void 6. RTC Alaminos denied the petition for lack of jurisdiction 7. Petitioner appealed to CA averring that RTC erred in ruling (1) there is an adverse claim or serious objection on the part of the oppositor render the case controversial and as such, should be threshed out in an ordinary case; and (2) it has no jurisdiction over the case
original registration of title to lands, including improvements and interests therein, but also over petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. Sec 2 of PD 1529 removed the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law (Act 496) when acting merely as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has simplified registration proceedings for “or iginal registration” but also “over all petitioners filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. Clearly, therefore, that the lower court had ample jurisdiction to decide the instant case filed by PNB.
ISSUE: WON RTC has jurisdiction over petitions filed under Sec 108 of Property Registration Act HELD: Yes. Under Sec 2 PD 1529, RTCs acting as land registration courts now have exclusive jurisdiction not only over applications for
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VIAJAR V. CA 168 SCRA 405 (1988) FACTS: The spouses Ricardo and Leonor Ladrido were the owners of Lot 7511 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan situated in barangay Cawayan, Pototan, Iloilo (154,267 sqm., TCT T-21940 of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo). Spouses Rosendo and Ana Te were also the registered owners of a parcel of land described in their title as Lot 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan. 1. On 6 September 1973, Rosendo Te, with the conformity of his wife, sold this lot to Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar for P5,000. A Torrens title was later issued in Viajar’s name. 2. Later, Angelica Viajar had Lot 7340 relocated and found out that the property was in the possession of Ricardo Y. Ladrido. Consequently, she demanded its return but Ladrido refused. The piece of real property which used to be Lot 7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan was located in barangay Guibuanogan, Pototan, Iloilo; that it consisted of 20,089 sqm.; that at the time of the cadastral survey in 1926, Lot 7511 and Lot 7340 were separated by the Suague River; that the area of 11,819 sq.ms of what was Lot 7340 has been in the possession of Ladrido; that the area of 14,036 sq.ms., which was formerly the river bed of the Suague River per cadastral survey of 1926, has also been in the possession of Ladrido; and that the Viajars have never been in actual physical possession of Lot 7340. 3. On 15 February 1974, Angelica and Celso Viajar instituted a civil action for recovery of possession and damages against Ricardo Y. Ladrido (Civil Case 9660) with the CFI Iloilo. Summoned to plead, Ladrido filed his answer with a counterclaim. The Viajars filed their reply to the answer. 4. Subsequently, the complaint was amended to implead Rosendo Te as another defendant. The Viajars sought the annulment of the deed of sale and the restitution of the purchase price with interest in the event the possession of defendant Ladrido is sustained. Te filed his answer to the
amended complaint and he counterclaimed for damages. The Viajars answered the counterclaim. 5. During the pendency of the case, Celso Viajar sold his rights over Lot 7340 to his mother and co-plaintiff, Angelica F. Viajar. For this reason, Angelica F. Viajar appears to be the sole registered owner of the lot. 6. On 25 May 1978, Ricardo Ladrido died. He was substituted in the civil action by his wife, Leonor P. Ladrido, and children, namely: Lourdes Ladrido-Ignacio, Eugenio P. Ladrido and Manuel P. Ladrido, as parties defendants. 7. After trial on the merits, a second amended complaint which included damages was admitted. On 10 December 1981, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of Ladrido, dismissing the complaint of Angelica and Celso Viajar with costs against them, declaring Leonor P. Ladrido, Lourdes Ladrido-Ignacio, Eugenio P. Ladrido and Manuel P. Ladrido as owner of the parcel of land indicated as Lots A and B in the sketch plan situated in barangays Cawayan and Guibuanogan, Pototan, Iloilo, and containing an area of 25,855 sq.ms., and pronouncing that as owners of the land, the Ladridos are entitled to the possession thereof. ISSUE: WON the change in the Suague river was gradual HELD: The presumption is that the change in the course of the river was gradual and caused by accretion and erosion (Martinez Cañas vs. Tuason, 5 Phil. 668; Payatas Estate Improvement Co. vs. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55; C.H. Hodges vs. Garcia, 109 Phil. 133). In the present case, the lower court correctly found that the evidence introduced by the Viajars to show that the change in the course of the Suague River was sudden or that it occurred through avulsion is not clear and convincing. The Ladridos have sufficiently established that for many years after 1926 a gradual accretion on the eastern side of Lot 7511 took place by action of the current of the Suague River so that in 1979 an alluvial deposit of 29,912 sq.ms. (2.9912 hectares), more or less, had been added to Lot 7511 (Lot A: 14,036 sq.ms., Lot Page | 6
B, 11,819 sq.ms. and Lot C, which is not in litigation, 4,057 sq.ms). The established facts indicate that the eastern boundary of Lot 7511 was the Suague River based on the cadastral plan. For a period of more than 40 years (before 1940 to 1980) the Suague River overflowed its banks yearly and the property of the defendant gradually received deposits of soil from the effects of the current of the river. The consequent increase in the area of Lot 7511 due to alluvion or accretion was possessed by the defendants whose tenants plowed and planted the same with corn and tobacco. The quondam river bed had been filled by accretion through the years. The land is already plain and there is no indication on the ground of any abandoned river bed. Under the law, accretion which the banks or rivers may gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters becomes the property of the owners of the lands adjoining the banks. (Art. 366, Old Civil Code; Art. 457, New Civil Code which took effect on 30 August 1950 [Lara v. Del Rosario, 94 Phil. 778]. Therefore, the accretion to Lot 7511 which consists of Lots A and B belong to the Ladridos.
owners of the estates bordering thereon.” Accretions of that character are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams and are not affected by the registration laws. It follows that registration does not protect the riparian owner against diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream. Similarly in C.N. Hodges vs. Garcia (109 Phil. 133), it was ruled that if the land in question has become part of one’s estate as a result of accretion, it follows that said land now belongs to him. The fact that the accretion to his land used to pertain to another's estate, which is covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title, cannot preclude the former from being the owner thereof. Registration does not protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the property of the owners of the banks (Art. 366 of the Old Civil Code; Art. 457 of the New). Such accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams and the provisions of the Civil Code in that respect are not affected by the Registration Act.
Section 45 of Act 496 provides that “the obtaining of a decree of registration and the entry of a certificate of title shall be regarded as an agreement running with the land, and binding upon the applicant and all successors in title that the land shall be and always remain registered land, and subject to the provisions of this Act and all Acts amendatory thereof." Section 46 of the same act provides that “No title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession." The rule that registration under the Torrens System does not protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his registered land through gradual changes in the course of an adjoining stream is well settled. In Payatas Estate Improvement Co. vs. Tuason (53 Phil. 55), it was ruled that Article 366 of the Civil Code provides that “any accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effects of the current belong to the Page | 7
CORONEL V. CA,173 SCRA 26 (1987) FACTS: Petitioner Coronel filed a complaint for recover of possession of a parcel of land registered in his name. The complaint was filed against private respondents Merlan et al 1. Coronel alleged that when he purchased the subject property, private respondents were already occupying a portion thereof as “tenants at all” and the latter refused the vacate the premises despite demands 2. Private respondents, on the other hand, averred that the portion they occupied formed 1/3 undivided share which they had inherited and that they never sold their 1/3 share 3. Third-party defendants Novelo et al, denied that they had sold the entire property, they claimed that they only sold their 2/3 undivided share in the property 4. It appears that the subject property was part of a bigger estate which was inherited by Lontoc. When Lontoc died, the property was inherited by: children of Enrique Merlan (Bernardino Merlan), children of Gabriel Merlan (Jose Merlan) and the children of Francisca Merlan (Anuat) 5. In 1950, Bernardino and the Anuats sold their 2/3 undivided share to spouses Manalo 6. Spouses Manalo, in turn, sold their share to Mariano Manalo. A new TCT was then issued in the name of Mariano. The TCT covered the whole property without any mention of the 1/3 share of the private respondents which was not sold to them 7. Relying on the TCT of Mariano Manalo, petitioner Coronel purchased the subject property for P27,000 and a new TCT was issued in his name
The well-known rule in this jurisdiction is that a person dealing with a registered land has a right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further. There is, however, a countervailing doctrine, that mitigates the ironclad application of the principle attaching full faith and credit to a Torrens title. It is inspired by the highest concept of what is fair and what is equitable. The simple possession of a certificate of title, under the Torrens system, does not necessarily make the possessor a true owner of all the property described therein. If a person obtains a title, under the Torrens system, which includes by mistake or oversight, land which cannot be registered under the Torrens system, he does not, by virtue of said certificate aloe, become the owner of the lands included. The petitioner is bound to recognize the lien in favor of the private respondents which was mistakenly excluded and therefore not inscribed in the Torrens title of the subject property.
ISSUE: WON Coronel is the owner of the subject property HELD: No. Coronel’s ownership only pertains to the 2/3 undivided share which he purchased from Mariano Manalo.
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GOLLOY V. CA 173 SCRA 26 (1989) FACTS: Petitioner Golloy has been, for more than 20 years, the registered owner and in possession of a parcel of land covered by TCT 45764. The southwest boundary is owned by p rivate respondents covered by certificate of title 8565. Sometime in 1966, private respondents subdivided their land among themselves and in the course of doing so, private respondents had placed 2 monuments in the southwest portion of the petitioner’s land. As a result, petitioner Golloy filed an action to quiet title (claim ownership over a real property) before the CFI Tarlac. Private respondents filed a motion to dismiss with counterclaim, denying Golloy’s allegation and maintained that they merely subdivided their own property and as such, Golloy had no cause of action. During the pre-trial both parties agreed that the question of the boundaries of their respective properties could be resolved by appointing a surveyor to relocate the disputed area. In May 1968, Jovino Dauz, the surveyor of the Bureau of Lands, reported the following: 1. Petitioner’s land is Lot A of the subdivision plan, Psd-1413, being a portion of the land described in OCT 126 in the name of Augustin Golloy. The land under OCT 126 was surveyed on Mar 1918 and subsequently titled in 1919 2. Private respondents’ land is Lot no. 1, 11-8218 in the name of Domingo Balanga, which was surveyed on Mar 1913 and originally titled and registered on Mar 1918 3. There is overlapping on the boundaries which was due to the defect in the survey on petitioner’s since it did not duly conform with the previously approved of survey of Lot 1, 113218 under OCT 8565 4. Private respondents’ land, TCT 8565, prevails over petitioner’s land since the former was surveyed and titled ahead.
Trial court held in favor of private respondents. CA affirmed the same. ISSUE: Between the two title holders, who is entitled to the land in question? HELD: Petitioner Golloy is entitled to the disputed portion of land. It is undisputed that that Balanga’s property was surveyed and titled earlier than Golloy’s. Having been surveyed and thereafter registered, monuments were placed therein to indicate their respective boundaries. It is hardly persuasive that the private respondents’ predecessor Balanga, believing that she has a rightful claim to the overlapped portions, did not make any move to question the placement of the monuments. She could have easily objected to the placement and point out that the placements of the monuments excluded the overlapped portions from her property. However, no such objections were made. As such, it may be construed that Balanga never believed that she has a right and legal claim to the overlapped portion. Considering that the petitioner and his predecessors have in continuous possession in the concept of an owner, for almost 50 years (from 1919 when it was registered to 1966 when the dispute ensued), the private respondents are guilty of laches. Mere possession of certificate of title under Torrens System is not conclusive as to the holder’s true ownership of all the property described therein for he does by virtue of said c certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally included.
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REPUBLIC V. CA, 83 SCRA 453 (1978) FACTS: Both Republic and respondents de Ocampo and Anglo claim ownership of the subject parcel of land. 1. Republic claims that said properties were bequeathed to the Bureau of Education (now Bureau of Public Schools) by the late Esteban Jalandoni through his will. Said properties were already registered under the Torrens system in the name of Meerkamp & Co prior to being acquired by Jalandoni 2. Respondent de Ocampo based his claim on an application for registration of the same. He claimed the lots were unregistered lands belonging to and possessed by him, by virtue of a donation from one Luis Mosquera 3. Respondent Anglo allegedly purchased the same from De Ocampo in 1966
carries no persuasive force, and may be completely disregarded if the trial court acted without jurisdiction. As held in Reyes v. Borbon: When the attention of the court of land registration is called to the fact that the same land has been registered in the name of two different persons, it is the duty of the said court to order and investigation of that fact and should be done even without requiring the parties to show that a fraud has been committed during the double registration. When it is established that the same has been registered in the name of two different persons, the title should remain in the name of the person securing the first registration. The very purpose of the Torrens system would be destroyed fi the same land may be subsequently brought under a second action for registration.
ISSUE: WON the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain the application for land registration of De Ocampo on the ground that said properties were already registered under the Torrens system before 1919 HELD: No. Authorities are in agreement that a land registration court is without jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already registered in an earlier registration case, and that the second decree entered for the same land is null and void. If there is no valid and final judgment by the land registration to speak of, then the filing of an admittedly late appear from the decision denying the Amended Petition would be immaterial and of no moment insofar as these proceedings are concerned in view of the congenitally fatal infirmity that attaches to the main decision decreeing for the second time, the registration of the same lots in favor of De Ocampo, despite an earlier registration in the name of Meerkamp & Co. Jurisprudence holds that that the appellant’s failure to perfect an appeal on time, although ordinarily decisive,
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