pulled out my address book the other night ou know the one he one you use to keep up with the rest of the world that doesn’t move every three years get the phon e numb er of a ma n I’d I’d served with as a lieutenant in the 82d. As flipped the alphabetical pages, cam e to realize realize just how many of my comrade s have ridden off off into the civilian civilian world. There’s nothing new about what’s happening to our Army. Army. After After Appomattox, the Gran d Army of the the Repub lic, lic, like that of DESERT STORM, had its chest-swelling victory victory parade, put aw ay its weapons, and sent 1,034 1,034 000 volunteers and militia militia home to thankful wives and families. families. But then a certain atrophy set in as the na tion tion came to view the role of its its military differently. differently. Fairfax Fairfax Downey, in his book Indian-fighting (1941), presents this hauntingly familiar picture of the the 1869 -era army: “Faili “Failing ng to comp ensate for hard present, the future generally offered by the Army was anything but brilliant brilliant and all-embracing. all-embracing. A soldier, soldier, who com pleted long years years of ser-
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
GORDON R. SULLIVAN
General, United States Army Chief of Staff
vice h onorably, might look forward to pension. sion. O n the o ther hand, a few few sprees or a attempted desertion might bring him a “bobtail” or dishonorable discharge The Congression al appropriation appropriation bill of 1869 had cut down the numb er of of infantry infantry regiments from forty-five forty-five to twenty-five. twenty-five. This required the elimination of many officers officers more quickly than casualties were accom plishing plishing that end. end. Along with a certain numb er of incompetents dispos ed of, of, the Service lost able officers with fine records men who had, they lieved, lieved, dev oted their lives to a military career, with retirement on half-pay half-pay to be coun ted upon in their old age. For the survivors survivors promotion was stagnated for years.” This period saw regiments removed from their outposts against aggression on the frontier, and sent to “quell riots in Chicago and New Orleans.” Proud, seasoned units furled their colors and disappeared, while others operated undermanned and poorly equipped. The n came the Indian Wars .D. Brewer
Official:
MILTON H. HAMILTON
Administrative Assistant to the Secretary the Army 02780
The Professional Professional Development Develop ment Bullet Bulletin in of the Armor Branch PB Editor-in-Chief MAJ J.D. BREWER
Features
Managing Editor CLEMENS JO Commandant MG PAUL
FUNK
Fort Carbon Cav Cav Squadron Squad ron
Rehearsal In War: Preparlng o Breach by M ajor Lawrence M. Steiner Jr Tank Company Security Securi ty Operations 12 Tank by Majo r Patrick . Stalling
ARMOR (ISSN (ISSN 0004. 0004.2420) 2420) is publishe bimonthly by the Army Armor Center, 4401 Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 21. Disclaimer: Information contained in ARMOR represents th professional opinions of the authors authors an does not necessarily reflect the official Army or TRADOC position, nor does it change or supersede any Information presented in other official Army publications. Official distribution is limited to one copy or each armored brigade headquarters, armored cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron headquarters, quarters, rec onnaissan ce squadron hea dquarters, quarters, arm ored cavalry troop, troop, armor company, and motorized motorized brigade hea dquarters of the United States Army. In addition, Army libraries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM staff agencies with responsibility for armored, fire, direct ground combat systems, organizations, and the training of personnel for such organizations may request tw copies by sending a m ilitary letter to the editor-in-chief. Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only those materials for which the U.S. Am y Armo Armo Center has proponency. That proponency Includes: all armored, direct-fire ground combat systems that do no serve primm'ly as infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these systems or by 19-series enlisted soldiers; any miscellaneous items of equipment which armor and armored cavalry organizations use exclusively; training for all SC la 128, an 12C officers and for all CMF-19-series nlisted soldiers; soldiers; an d inform ation concerning the training, training, logistics, history, and leadership of armor and armored cavalry units at the brigadelregiment level and below, below, to include Threat units a t those levels. Material may be reprinted, provided credit given to ARMOR and to th author, except where copyright is indicated.
November-December 1992, Vol. CI No
Last to Llve-Flre Llve-Flre MOA3 Tank
The CounterreconnalssanceBattle: CounterreconnalssanceBattle: Managing Managing ho Monrter Monr ter by Captain Kenneth
26
Deal Jr
From Behind Beh ind the Dragon's Teeth: HItler' HIt ler' Folly? Or Wa8 It?
by Capta in Kevin R. R. Au stra
14th AD In Seven Months of Combat, 14th Liberated Thousands in Nazi Empire 36
The Two-Man Tank
ts Fightabilit Fig htability y and Endurance
39
Armor's Own Own Prlvate Idaho
by Robin Fletcher
by Major James James Brew er
TOW and Dragon Employment In the Armor Team befenre by Captain Sande
45
Schlesinger
Women In Armor and Cavalry by Cap tain Kell John Ward
Who Was "Old Bill?" 48
Armor Center Center Tank Tank Deslgn De slgn Contest
Departments 2
50
53
Letters Contacts Commander's Hatch Driver's Driver 's Sea The The Armor Center Hotlln Books
~
Operatlve Word:
must be responsive to our soldiers who identify and surface issues and ideas that enhance the limited li mited time available for performance formance oriented trainin to attain or sustain perishab per ishable le technical skills. The "operative wore in SS Schneider's well written letter is "focus." As a battalion commander going into a gunnery cycle, was able to "focus" "focus " the battalion ba ttalion leaders on the 'commander'r intenr int enr and what determined success for th battalion. The staff put together a normal n ormal 15-day 15 -day Annual Training plan and a contingency plan that used an extended extend ed window for an incremental A pe-
FOCUS
Dear Sir: the ead with great interest the May-June issue by SSG Christopher F. Schneider, a fellow Guardsman from Indi. ana. I, for one, believe his comments are valid vali d concerning concerning the way we train. wa impressed with the candor displayed in his h is soldierly commentary on how training is conducted and what he would like to see changed in the training environment. If leaders going to be successful, we
A R M O R EditorialOffice
Editor-in-Chief Major J. D. Brewer Managing Editor Jo Clemens Editorial Assistant Vivian Thompson Production Assistant Mary Hager Contributing Artist SP ody Harmon
2249 2610 2610 2610 :
Y 40121-5210.
Fort
ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improve speed and accuracy in editing. manuscripts pts shoul be originals or clear copies. either typed printed printe d out out double-spac e-spaced ed in near-l nea r-lette etterqu rqunlit nlity y printer prin ter mode. mode. also accept stories on 5-1/4" floppy dirks MultiMate. WordS~,Microsoft WordS~,Microsoft WORD, WordPerfect. XyWrite, Xerox Writer, urd ASCII (please include double-spaced printout). Please tape captions to y illustrations illustrations suhnitted suhnitted PAID SUBSCRIPI'IONS/ST. GEORGE-ST. JOAN AWARDS: Report delivery problems changes address or
MS onnie Bright. Secretary-Treasurer. P.O. Bo 607, Ky. 40121 01 502)942-8624. FAX (502) 942-6219.
Knox.
ISTRIBUTION: Report deliwy problems or changes address to MS.Mary Hager, DS 464-2619 commercial: (502)624-2610. Requests to be added to the free distribution l i s t should be in the form letter to the Editor-in-Chief, ARMOR HOTLINE
ycles). riod for gunnery completion This was not a new idea, as most battalions that had D E l T M60A3 at Camp Shelby followed a similar schedule. We conducted our D E l T during AT-89; by the way, that AT was a 'succes success' s' according to our soldiers, soldiers, The three-week AT is also outlined in FC 17-12 RC. Th extended window allowed for a normal 15-day AT period with overlap of seven days between cycles for issue an tu mi n of of equipmen equipment. t. The battalion task organized with HHC (-) Continued on Page
U.S. A R M Y A R M O R SCHOOL 2249
MAILING ADDRESS: ARMOR K~ox.
~~
SN 464-TANK
Armor Hollim 24-hour s e M c e to provide assistance with quertions concerning doctrine, doctrine, training, ogmizaI ogm izaIion ions, s, and equipment equipment of the Annor An nor Force. Force.
Commandant (A'IZK-CG) 2121 MG Paul E. Funk ssistant Commandant (ATSB-AC) 7555 BG Larry R. Jordan hief of Strrff, Armor School (ATSB-DAS) 1050 COL John Sylvester Command Sergeant Major 4952 CSM Richard L. Ross Armor School Sergeant Major 5405 SGM Douglas K. Memll Maintenance Department (ATSB-MA) 8346 COL Gary M. Tobin Command and Staff Department (ATSB-CS) 5855 CO Pat O'Ned Weapons Department (ATSB-WP) CO E. G. Fish I1 1055 Training Development Division (ATS B-TD) 7250 COL Joseph D. Molinari Directorate of Combat D evelopmen ts (ATZK-CD) 5050 COL Edward A. Bryla NCO Academy (A'IZK-NC) CSM Taft D. Webster Sr. 5150 Reserve Component Spt Div (A'IZK-PTE) 5953 LTC Billy W. Thomas Office of the Chief of Armor (A'IZK-AR) 7809 COL Don Elder FAX 7585 TRADOC System Manager for Armored Gun System (ATZK-TS) 7955 COL Charles Moler Mounted Warfighting Battlespace Lab (A'IZK-MW) 2139 COL David L. Porter ARMOR
ovember-December
1992-
Paul E. Funk Commanding General Army Armor Center
rucial Role is C rucial In Sett Se tting ing the Ar y’s y’s Stand ards
Th
NCO’s
Another one of my an friends retired from our Army the other day. CS Jo T. Hill ha re turned to his roots in Georgia, but he left legacy of selflessness. self lessness. dedication, soldier skill, and leadership that I’ll never forget. T. is also possessed sessed of one of of the the keenest minds that I’ve ever come across. In the Hamburger Hamburger Study Stu dy of of Combat LeaderLead ership, the characteristic possessed by successful leaders in battle which mnscended mnsce nded all others, ot hers, and and which which wa the hardest to find, wlls form of intelligence telligence most most of us call common sense t is trait possessed by Hill in in greater measure than about anyone I know. He comes com es from long tradition of NCO greatness, and he is simply simply the best First Sergeant Dolan rode with the the 5th
main body, three troops
Cavalry, as they approached Red Canyon on September 29,1879. From the ridges on both flanks, te lndian warriors opened fire on the column, then attacked, some 400 strong, and were rapidly cutting he advance guard and surrounding them. Al though skirm’shers deployed an returnedfi fire re , troopers were falling from their saddles amid the rain enemy bullets, an First Sergeant Dolan saw the detachment commander tumble to the dirt from sniper*s round. Dolan’s troop commander, Captain J.S. Payne, had been lefi behind as the advance guard guard fell fe ll back back toward the main body. Hi horse was dead and his revolver empty. Spurring his mount, moun t, Dolan Dolan risked withering withering fir from the fast-closing Utes to ride to his troop commander. Jumping from the saddle, he saluted and offered Payne his horse, which the com~~
ARMOR
ovember-December
1992
mander refused. Just bcfore the Utes closed the circle on them, young trooper that Dolan ha signaled arrived with an extra horse and the three soldiers escaped to the securiry the main body. Tw hours later, First Sergeant Dolan would be dead, but is commander would forever recall the NCO’s gallantry and steadiness under
Noncommissioned officers have throughout the history of our Army re scue of of both the been riding to the rescue soldiers soldiers they they lead lead and the commander they support. support. Whether it’s it’s the the fmtterm private that they teach the fundamentals of of soldiering, or the second lieutenant they gently show the leadership, our NCOs provide the force steady and last that keeps the backbone that keeps us strong. If there there is a good idea that has found its wa into daily operation,
there’s good chance it either began wa nurtured by a noncommissioned sioned officer. officer. Because he’s not proud to listen to others, the NCO will normally fmd the smartest, safest way to teach soldier skills. Because he maintains his own personal job skills, the NCO NCO of today can show s how his soldiers how how something is done rather than just tell him. In basic mining, young recruit gets his fmt and most lasting impression of what it means to soldier from his drill sergeant. mat stnrched, spit-shined, competent leader will will set th recruit’s standard for the remainder of his career and, consciously or unconsciously, he will seek to emulate what he sees. Officers, be it through summer camp, OCS. or West Point, will also come to view soldier-
ing through the behavior they observe in NCOs. lieutenant lieutenant taking taking command of his first platoon quickly learns to watch watch his platoon sergeant, serge ant, listen twice as much as speaks, emulate emulate his NCO NCO’s ’s self s elfles lesss dedication to soldiers’ welfare. Although Although offi o fficer cerss ma may y outwardly outwardly appear to command the most attention, it is the day-today interaction between booper and his sergeant that will ultimately determine a soldier’s performance. From the early morning accountability formations in dark motor pools to the demand that some finance clerk get his squad member’s pay stnight, to the late night walkthroughs of sleeping bmcks, noncommissioned officers offic ers train and maintain the force for ce best by their example o selfless dedication.
Cav Sq uadron Fort Carson Cav Soldlers of 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, were the last active Army unit to live-fire the M60A3 tank recently as the unit prepared to transition to M2 and M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicles. The changeover is the latest step in the modernization of the 4th Infantry Division, based Fort Carson. Th division recently traded in Improved TOW Vehicles and M11 3 APCs for Bradleys. Bradleys. The M60A3 was the most recent version of a m ain battle tank that ha been the Army’s frontline standard since the Vietnam era. The first tank in the M60 series developed from the 90-mm-gun M48 of the 19508, with the substitution of the 105-mm gun, a license-built British design, in an improved hull. The M60A1 sa the passing of the M48’s dome-like turret in favor of the more wedge-shaped wedge-shaped M60 turret so familiar today. The M60A2 was an unusual excursion, an attempt to replace a
And the chances ar pretty good that young young soldie soldierr brought brought up in in such proficient, committed tradition will likely someday come rolling up to his stranded troop commander, in th throes of great battle. and offer hi his track. sewed with CS Hill in the Mesopotamia,, where we al serts of Mesopotamia worked as a team to whip the Republication Guard. Every single characteri acteristi sticc of leadership leadership that we we generate ate was amply live lived d by him him on the it wa our battlefield as peace. His great energy and Esourcefulnes sourc efulness, s, his wonderful sense humor, and hi keen intellect just flat f lat made 3AD much better unit. He is friend, and every other soldier’s friend. too (even when he’s being tough on them), and shall miss him.
Last to Live-Fire M60A3 Tank
high-pressure tank gun with a gunmissile system. Reliability problems plagued this design, and the tank was issued only to units in Germany. The short, 152-mm gun tube tube on the was capable of firing
both fixed ammunition rounds and
the Shillelagh missile.
With the introdu ction of the A3 version, version, the M60 reverted to 105mm tank gun, with laser rangefinder and tan k therm al sight. sight.
I.
ARMOR
ovember-December 1992
ecting the
ight
co
CSM Richard L. Ross, USAARMC Command Sergeant Majoc and MS Kenneth Kenn eth Preston, Weapons Department, USAARMS Noncommissioned officers and officers in a variety variet y of of leadership leaders hip positions throughout the U.S.Army have differing thoughts and ideas on selecting a master gunner candidate. With the exception of of a small percentage, NCOs selected to attend the Master Gunner Course are the “cream of the crop’’ the NCO corps in unit. However, have we, as their leadership, ensured we’ve given them every opportunity for success? succes s? Look Look at the following questions and se how they apply to your organization: *How often the master gunner candidate candida te in in a battalion battalion or squadron to decline attending school for a variety of of reasons? reaso ns? *How *How often often has this this occurred within a couple of of weeks prior to attending school? *How often have have w we e had to select NCOs attend school to keep from having a shortfall?
ARMOR
*How often have have we had had to accept lower-quality NCO to attend school due to short notice? *How often, due to short notice, have we not sent our best qualified NCOs and and sent a substitute su bstitute in in his place? *What is the success rate of NCOs my unit completing the master ner course?
the answers to any
these questions caused light to come on, we may may have identified identified a problem. I’v seen units that have an outstanding master gunner gunner selection selection process. process. m selection process does not mean have to detail a master gunner train the candidate candidat e for for several severa l weeks or months to pass the course. If this were the case, then we we have a course that that*s *s missed the boat. We currently current ly have management tool tool in place pl ace in our units to help eliminate the problems asssociated with the questions listed above.
November-December 1992
units, we’ve established order merit lists ( O W ) or soldiers tending NCOES schools. The purpose of the OML is to identify the priority of soldiers s oldiers selected to attend school within the unit. he OM also gives the soldiers soldie rs involved a “heads-up” to the time frame of when when they will will go to school. This “heads-up allows the to complete any preparatory requirements (Le. (Le. math math testin te sting, g, TABE test, TCGST, tc.), take care of finances, and ensure family matters are in good order to attending school. Normally, the OML managed at company/troop level by the first sergeant. An OM for master gunner candidates should include the unit’s best tank trainers. Selection of those mas ter gunner candidates cand idates mus mustt include the followingconsiderations.
*Rank of SGT
SFC
Continued Con tinued on Page 50
Rehearsal Preparing by Major Lawrence
War: Breach
Sterner, Jr.
The Result On February 1991, the opening day the ground offensive o Operation DESERT STORM, ask Force 234 (DREADNOUGHT) conducted a delib erate attack on prepared positions defended by a battalion of the Iraqi 26th Infantry Division. The assault included a breach of engineer obstacles across nm ow front front and and a expansion of “breach-head” by disrupting th defense, reducing trenches and destroying enemy positions in depth. At the end of that day, it was evident that th attack was extremely than
task force had met its initial objec-
tives at the cost of only one soldier wounded by enemy artillery. Enemy losses were estimated at 250 prisoners and 40 killed action. 2-34 Armor rapidly established four of the 16 cleared lanes through the obstacles made by by the 1s Infantry Division (Mechanized). The remainder were made by the other breaching organhation in the 1st Brigade, Task Force 5-16 Infantry, and by task forces in the 2d Brigade. This overwhelming success allowed the rest of the division and, significantly, th 1s British Armored Division, to continue the attack into Iraq a day ahead of schedule.
Key to Success Rehearsals ar a part of doctrine, stressed heavily at the N ational Training Center, and TF 2-34 Armor found them to invaluable in in preparing f or
the breach operation. In their various forms and at all levels, rehearsals contributed immemurably to the success achieved on the 24th of February. Throughout the time spent in getting ready for the attack, rehearsals were an integral part of the task force’s life. These included leader participation participation map exercises and “sand table” walkthroughs that ensured familiarity with the plan and explored various contingencies that might be required based on enemy actions. every level from company to brigade, rehearsals led to total understanding and continual refinement refinement of of the plan, both important to it eventual successful execution. Perhaps more impomnt, however, were the actual rehearsals the plan that were conducted from platoon to task force level. Practicing in in the desert sand with with the personnel and equipment to be used in the attack impressed upon each and every soldier, from from priv ate to task force commander, his role and relationship to other people, vehicles and units in the task force. Th focus below, however, will be on changes made to the way the task force was to actually operate based on the lessons leaned through these training exercises. While some of these relate leader actions and planning, most ar “physical” in nature and were only identified through “hands-on” rehearsal. While the lessons outlined below ma not be completely applicable to any future conflict, they they do co m the importanc importanc of rehearsals, even in war, and may provide techniques useful to others. They also reflect the kinds of prob-
ARMOR
lems that might be identified and overcome through effective planning when reheard timdopportunity not available.
Background
he Plan
with any training, there must be case, the goal became mission accomplishment. The m ission, stated i 2-34 Armor OPORD Desert Storm 4-91 dated 26 January January 19 91 wa as follows: MISSION: 2-34 Armor moves on Lane Delta to attack in zone along Axis Gauntlet to penetrate IRAQI de fenses vie OB hT695386; establishesfour breach lanes; attacks laterally to the W est to clea r IRAQ IRAQII force from OBJ continues the attack along Axis Ace or Axis Saturn to seize OBJ 9K. 01 Pass 1-34 Annor through the BREACH LANES. ZEUS o BP 105 as Move Move a ong ong BD reserve. Move along A x i s MARS to BP 15 as BDE reserve. Move on AXIS VICTORY during BDE Movement to Contact to destroy an objective in mind. In this
RGFC.
Although the mission seems long and somewhat complex, it was basically sequential. While th implied task clearing and “proofing” th lanes was to be done at the same time time as reduction of the defenses, the task organization available allowed for this to be accomplished effectively, Dreadnought’s force and its structure ar shown at Figure The amount of time available for planning allowed for detailed and comprehensive picture of the enemy es imates positions. Intelligence
November-December 1992
yielded the graphics of their defense as shown in Figure 2. Although the picture wa clear, there was no definitive analysis concerning the content and extent of the obstacles, nor of defensive preparations. Given the uncertainty, planning and mining assumed th worst ines, wire, full strength defenders dug in, coordinated trench systems. Excerpts from the “Commander’s Intent” give the key points behind he plan of attack We will have achieved success if and clear four fo ur secure lanes we breach and and are able to secure the zone. .The heart the plan is that we must focus company-sized units on platoons. Additionally, except for the attack on OB 3K [the initial assault], we will seek to clear the enemy in zone by tacking his positions from the flanks and rear Movement is the key to survivability. The plan for the attack was simple in concept, yet complex in th details of clearing the trenches while keeping to the commander’s intent. Therein lay the importance of rehea rsals in in en suring adherence to the plan. Again, quoting from from the ord er: Following hour [artillery] preparation 3K with Aces [Tm an Bulldog [Tm B] abreast. Wolfpack [Tm will
TF 2-34
Figure 2. Intelligence Estimates of Enem y Dispositions Dispositions support by firing following clearance clearance intermediate OBJ AXE. Orange [Tm A] will follow Bulldog prepared to assume the mission of either lead team. Bulldog and Aces will assault through the enemy positions using plows, infantry and ACES (Armored Combat Engineer Vehicles) Ve hicles) to to destroy des troy the enemy in the trench. the graphics at Figure show, the initial assault and passage of
Armor Task Organization
Team
Team
Team
Team
A N 1 6 I n (-) 2/812/34 Ar
B/2/34 Ar (-) 31NSl16 Inf 21Nl Eng Eng 1 CEV AC 1 AVLM
Ar (-) 3/Dl5116 Inf lN l En CEV AC 1 AVLM
D/5/16 Inf (-) llC12/3 4 Ar AC 1 AVLM
An En
(.
D7 Dozers AVLB
Task Force Control HQ Tanks Scout Platoon 1IlINl Eng
Mortar Platoon
Alpha FIST
Decon Squad GSR Section 1lNU3 ADA Smoke Platoon
Figure
ARMOR
November-December 1992
task foxe through the breach was designed to get the scout platoon and Team protecting to the northeast and northwest. other three maneuver teams would be on line prepared to continue the attack to clear the remaining objectives. Getting into this configuration rapidly and without confusion wa the focus of the maneuver rehearsals.
The Concept Rehearsa
Maneuver
he 2d B attalion, 34th Armor closed in 1ID’s tactical assembly area, TA Roosevelt, on 17 January 1991. It was expected that there would be some time to train fo th attack and there was plenty to do to get ready. Prior to the actual mining, two actions were required: (1) Task organize with elements of 5-16 Infantry and other organizations in the division (specifically engineers) and (2) Receive and mount mine plows and rollers that had been shipped earlier from the port of Dammam. Training progressed from crew and platoon to battalion, with com plexit of the events increasing with mch
The details of the obstacles and trenches conformed as close as possible to what the intelligenc in telligence e comm commuunity determined was rtctually on th
“training
Figure
TF 2-34 Armor Armor Maneuv Ma neuver er Graphics
subsequent itemtion. For example, companies compan ies began with basic movement formations and progressed to detailed tailed s of of the brea breach ch opemtion. At the task task force level, rehearsals started with maneuver units only and evolved into full d r e s s rehearsals including combat service support assets
with medical casualties/evacuation/triage and simulated vehicle recovery, To make the training as realistic as possible, Company A, Engineers, th first engineer enginee r company attached t th task force, force , built a replication o 3K in the vicinity of the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) in the TAA.
the focus of maneuver rehearsals, particularly at the task force level. Modifications Modificat ions to the “objective” were made after several rehearsals in order to train leader leaderss to m t effe effecctively to the unexpecte un expected. d. During the night preceding one rehearsal, for example, the engineers built a berm in front of the simulated simu lated minefield. ety of of thi sort, as well as increased comple complexit xity y of of each each r , ensur ensured ed that leaders and soldiers did not become overconfide ov erconfident nt “robots,” “robots,” movi moving ng dong prescribed routes without thinking about what was going on around them. Other training events became rehearsals in the sense that actions related to the actual attack were practiced and refined before they wen used. used. One key key training tr aining event wa brigade movement to contact where Task Force Dreadnought practiced the formation to be followed in its movement ment to the attack. atta ck. In addition, hasty refuel on move was attempted during the movement ment to contact mining. min ing. Problems encountered led to ch changes anges in the em ployment of combat comb at service support (CSS) assets. Later, these changes allowed for a successful refuel operation during combat comba t within 2,000 meters of Iraqi positions. Practicing night CSS linkup and resupply resup ply operations wa dso beneficid and contrib uted to effective resupply night night after afte r the initial initia l attack was complete. Lessons Lesson s learned through through th rehemls came from various
Figure Schematic of the Rehearsal Area Area
ARMOR
ovember-December
7992
sources sourc es (private to commander) commander ) and at all levels lev els of training. The after-action review (AAR) from crew to task force, as well as observation from nonparticipants (both from within and external to the task force), were beneficial. ficial . In In the end, the improvements outlined below were important to successful cessfu l execution of the plan. Lessons
Having never before bef ore worked with with mine rollers and plows, just practicing with them at the crew level as n e c essary to effecti e ffective ve use. use. There T here were, in addition, some peculiarities that re quired adjustments. *The mine plows are raised and lowered mechanically, using nylon straps that “roll” up and out. In plowing through triple strand concertina obstacles these these straps were cut by the wire, not allowing the plow to be as overcome raised. This problem by welding “wire cutters” to the plows in front fro nt of of the straps. Simply angle iron with notches, they worked in a similar manner to those mounted on jeeps in Vietnam. *Repeated use would also shear off on of the bolts bol ts that held held the th e plows plow s i place. Lack of spare parts for the attachments led to improvisation imp rovisation and the use of center guide bolts. *A “dogbone,” “dogbo ne,” mounted between the two sections se ctions of the th e plow in th center of the th e tank, tank, was designed to detonate tiltrods missed by the plow. One of the modifications we we received was a “roller dogbone” that created magnetic field to detonate magnetic mines. This roller, as delivered, hung too low and bounced on the ground even when the plow was not in use. The crews reruTanged its mounting chains to save the rubber roller from undue wear. *One *On e problem problem that th at as not solved was the disparity between th optimu speeds for the antimagnetic roller rolle r and the plow. plow. To T o operate effectively, the roller needed 12 miles per hour. Plowing, on the other hand, was best done at miles per hour. IW3l’T-
ARMOR
suggested that we move fast making the breach, and the lanes were cleared cleared effectively. .While .While mine plow are not a hindrance during normal operations (except for excessive sprocket wear “cupping”) “cupp ing”),, mine rollers had to be removed when not in use. Practice ensured rapid dismounting after th breach and placement placement on their lowboy lowb oy trailers, prepared for an future need *It as initially envisioned that the minerollers would be final “proof of the th e lanes lane s made made by by the th e plows. Each lead team, however, had had only onl y one roller and three plows to make tw lanes. Putting two plows on one lane and the last plow and roller on th other allowed for a backup breach tank on each lane. lan e. In order orde r to proo the other lane with the roller, this tank would have had to turn around aroun d and go back through in the opposite oppos ite direction. This was not necessarily problem, but a tank with rollers is slow and this would would take t ake a combat vehicle out of th fight for some time. Fortunately A/1 Eng came to the task force with “mine “mine rake,” mounted Combat Engineer Vehicle (CEV). The rake was faster than the roller and wa used to proof proof the lanes, allowing th roller tank to stay in th fight. Marking the lanes for subsequent units to follow wa also important and required some practice and refinement. This task belonged to the engineer platoons attached to the lead teams. Quality control was enhanced by making the breach breach teams’ execuex ecutive officers responsible for correct marking. After several rehearsals, they became proficient, emplacing the system tem efficiently. eff iciently. *The original plan plan called for marking the entrance to each lane with an orange orang e aircraft recognition panel (VS17 mounted on a tripod made from concertina pickets. This arrangement, unstable and usually unrecognizable, gave way to plywood plywood panels pa nels marked with with a very large letter corresponding to the lane. After the lanes were proofed, the attached engineer company commander wa responsible for
November-December 1992
emplacing additional plywood markers along the route to the lane and extending for two kilometers back ward friendly lines. *Within breach, orange “highway cones” were placed along the left side of each lane by the engineers. This was effective, but it took several reh eml s an AA reinforcements ingrain this system into drivers and vehicle commanders, especially medical and maintenance personnel who used th lanes the most after th combat vehicles made mad e their way through. Another somewhat unique problem was clearing th trenches after th breaches were made. Using dismounted infantry was possibility, but it would have been been slow and po tentially costly. Two solutions, met the commander’s intent for speed and avoided using scarce infanhy in this dangerous role. *Using the Mine Clearing Line Charge (h4ICLIC) mounted on an M60-series M60-s eries Armored Vehicle Launched Launched Bridge Br idge (AVLB) chassis wa considered early as means to make th breach lanes. lanes. Demonstration Demonstr ation showed, however, that setup as slow and that the charge was not long enough to cover what was expected to be the depth of the minefield. Th backup MICLIC was relegated to role. However, th charge did great job on trenches tren ches and was used used for that purpose. *Rehearsals confirmed that th best method for clearing trenches to use an ACE to simply cave them in and bury an enemy that persisted in defending them. ACE operators ecame adept at doing so and they worked as well in execution as in practice, swift and thorough. *ACES, designed to save manpower, have only one crewman and no ment. They were vulnerable in their trench-clearing mode and required protection. This le to assignment of two “wingman” Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles Veh icles to to each ACE. ACE. The Bradleys and ACES worked together to find an optimum formation, one that allowed the 2s to fire their 25-
mm cann c annons ons ahead of th to keep th enemy down, and to fire behind it in case some enemy escaped the trench. Vehicle recognition was im portant to the operation , not only to prevent fratricide, but keep proper team alignm ent and fo r medical evacuation. While certain systems were in place as matter of SOP before war began, certain modifications had had to be made in ord er for the them m to be effective n pmtic e. 01ID institute system of numbers and chevrons painted on th sides of vehicles that allowed recognition down to platoon level. These markings were extremely important in keeping teams aligned as the task force maneuvered in the objective Unfortunately, previously developed load plans that hung duffle bags on the sides of vehicles obscured the markings. Not only did units have to modify load plans, but the infantry platoons had to store both and areas. “B bags on buc ks i rear .Given .Given Allied air superiority, superio rity, it was decided that al friendly vehicles would display the orange VS-17 panel, or facsimile, on top. Not having enough panels, the task force bought orange paint on the local economy and painted rectangles on vehicles without panels. test the effectiveness of the overall system, the task force Liaison Officer ( K O ) rranged for an A-10 Thunderbolt to oveffly rehearsal. He could readily identify all the m arkings. arkings. .Solving .Solving the problem of recogni reco gnizing zing friendly vehicles from the air created new problem. Task fane SO wa that the VS-17 panels would be used to identify vehicle that required medical medical evacua evacuati tion. on. Further Further found that mnge flags would work in lieu of the VS-17 panels, although they had to be placed higher on vehicle anten nas in in o rder to be seen effectively by medical personnel. Navigation proved to be as difficult in the desert as it was predicted to be. Cautioned otherwise, task force units still came to rely too heavily on the 10
Magellan Global Positioning System (GPS). Other means of navigation had to be found, even when considering limited objective The The scou t platoon. in conduc con ducting ting rehearsal of potential dismounted night reconnaissance of the objective reaffmed the need to back up th GPS. Halfway to the o bjective the satellites “disappeared,” and the scouts were totally lost. No one had bothered to take a compass reading reading or m aintain the pace. The lesson was learned and not forgotten. .Identify .Identifying ing the actual site for the breach would not be an easy task, even if the GPS wa working, but would be much worse if it was not. It was important to hit the right spot be cause th plan wa dependent upon knowing the location of the trenches and starting into them at th right place. Moreover, there were four breach sites in relatively close proximity to be cleared by four different battalions. Confusion could could have been disastrou s. An An “on order” wh ite phosphorus round from the direct support field artillery battalion solved this problem and worked well in th execution. .Finally, as Team moved up to support-by-fire positions, rehearsals pointed out the difficulty of identifying Team C and keeping fires to their left. In manner similar to the method for identifying the breach th mortars area, it w as decided to to suppress the enemy platoon to th left of the breach area and keep Team fires in the same area and farther to the left
Combat SewIce Support (CSS) lntegration lntegration Perhaps the greatest benefit gained from the task force level rehearsals,
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besides maneuver execution, was practice and refinement of CSS operation s and their synchronization with the maneuver plan. While this took away from routine logistics preparations for combat, the gains far outw eighed the costs Rehearsals included, in part, the combat tnins (S4, main aid station, fuel and ammunition trucks) and the unit maintenance collection collection point (b attalion m aintenance assets). These el emen ts practiced their movement to th objective area as part of the movement to contact, and the subsequent move through the breach lanes to set up resupply, maintenance, and medical ope rations on on th e far side. There was, however, another piece that gained the most from the rehearsals. In planning for th attack, it w as eviden t that that the critical point in th battle would be getting through breach and the actions im mediately thereafter. It wa important, therefore, to mass key CSS assets at this critical phase of the battle. Task force planners created “breach support team” to ensure this priority of effort wa met. This team consisted of five M88A1 recovery vehicles (the remaining two being attached to the lead maneuver teams) and jump aid station. It was positioned within one kilometer of th lead team s for quick response to jmblems encountered during th attack. The purpose of the recovery assets was initially to ensure that the breach lanes were cleared of my disabled combat vehicles that the attack could continue and following forces would have unobstructed lanes. Their second task was to proceed through the breach immediately behind the l combat combat elements elements and perform battle damage assessment and repair (BDAR) n vehicle casualties. The jump aid station was to move through the breach with the recovery vehicles and perfom its medical treatment mission close to the combat elements. elements. Rehearsals determined that the concept wa sound. Not used to tactical maneuver in this type of mission, the November-December 1992
lessons learned by maintenance and medical crews and leaders were more pronounced, yet similar to, those lea ne d by their combat comrades. comrades. Fo example, lane recognition, going into and evacuating frodthrough th breach, and the requirement to stay in the cleared lanes were new skills that did not come readily but stuck hard once the consequences were made clear. After several rehemls, the CSS team, down to the individual crewmen, became familiar with its place in th scheme of maneuver. The team operated efficiently and effectively with full understanding of its relationship to the maneuver units and the expected natureAocation of its mission on th battlefield. In execution during battle, it worked as smoothly as the final practice, a testimony to the benefit gained through rehearsal with th maneu ver units While the general lessons learned by th CSS elements mirrored those leaned by the combat teams, there were others related specifically to th CSS functional functional areas: .Until .Until rehearsed rehea rsed with the expected expe cted number and type casualties, simulated by “tagged” combat vehicle crewmen, th battalion aid station did no fully gnsp magnitude of th problem it faced. The medical platoon participated early rehearsals before the rest of the CSS team. They began with the complete aid station, consisting of both M577 command vehicles, vehicles, and progressed to the more complex split of the “main” and “jump” as directed in the plan. This progressive method allowed better supervision in th initial stages of training, effectively identified problems, and led to the development of solutions. Specific areas requiring improvement include setup, triage, and the knowledge of evacuation routes and destinations. B when the aid station th last rehearsal, when was split, it was evident in talking to th simulated cas ualties that they were impressed with th performance of their medical support and confident
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that they would be well taken care of should the nee arise. .Given .Given the forw ard location locatio n of th jum p aid station station (JAS) on th far side of th breach, rehearsals showed that it was not staffed sufficiently to perform several functions related to its mission. Th JAS did not have enough personnel to secure itself once the M88s left it in position, nor did it have qualified soldiers to effect casualty reporting and to conduct th chemical decontamination of casualties if required. These deficiencies could only be solved by augmenting the JAS with personnel to perform these specific tasks. The problem as to identify the augmentees and to determine how they would be transported through the breach. Solutions were as follows: (1) personnel were available to do th reporting; (2) Cooks were not needed during the attack since we were to eat MREs, and enough volunteers came forth to be mined in chemical decontamination of casualties and to double security; (3 There was enough mom in the M88s to transport the additional soldiers through the breach and drop them off at the site of he JAS. .Command .Command and contro l for movement of the breach support team, well as control of th recoveryD3DAR mission, was vested in the battalion maintenance technician who rode in th lead M88. It became apparent in s that that the the tea team m need needed ed radio communications net separate from th normal adminbog net so as not to interfe re wit command and control the standard CSS elements. Fortunately, the plan called for th battalion S3 in conjunction with the engineer company commander, to control movement through the breach, and he had a spare radio with him in th battalion TAC. An unused frequency from engineer company as given for this purpose and ensured positive control of th breach support team, both in ordering it through the breach and in accomplishing its missions.
November-December 7992
Th
Bottom Line
Rehearsals work. Task Force Dreadnought’s performance was vastly improved through the sequential progression of training eve nts conducted in preparation for it attack on the Iraqi d efenses. Ultimately, the successful, efficient conduct of the attack under fire proved the value of an extensive, comp rehen sive program of rehearsals. While there may not always be 30 days available to train and rehearse for an operation (particularly th NTC), the concepts used by Task Force 2-34 Armor still apply. Applications also exist regarding th types of, and perhaps the specific, lessons leaned through the rehearsals. Given limited amount of time, it will be th task of the unit’s leadership to se priorities concerning the focus, type, level and extent of its rehearsals. Choosing well can mean the differenc e between between victory and defeat.
Major Lawrence M. Steiner Jr. graduated from the University sity of of Minnesota Minne sota in 197 4. He was commissioned in Armor and graduated from from the Armor Officer Basic Course. After serving with the 3d Bn., 32d Armor in Germany, he attended the Armor Officer Advanced Course and commanded tw companies in the 4th Bn., 37th Armor at Fort Knox. After teaching ROTC and receiving a Masters Degree in Logistics Management at Fort Lee, Va., he attended the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. Subsequent to his next assignment with the 8th Army staff in Korea, he was assigned to Fort Riley, Kan. and served as the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (Mechan (Me chan ized). Currentl Currently, y, he is the execu e xecutive tive officer of 2d Bn., 34th Armor at Fort Riley.
Tank Co pany Securi Secu rity ty Operat Op erations ions by
Major P a t r i c k A. S t a l l l n g s
Introduction Stationary tank units are vulnerable to infantry using infiltration tactics, particularly close terrain. Infantry units ar well-armed with very effective antiarm or weapons, and can cause great damage if allowed to get close to the tanks. The tank company must be able to detect and destroy infantry attacks in order to conserve combat power. The current tank company organization hcks he equipment and personnel for handling an infiltrating dismounted threat. Equipment needs include sensor systems, thermal night vision devices, and other security-reIated equipment. Personnel shomges rue best addressed by ensuring that task organization provides the tank company adequate dismounted secutablish tablish ob servation posts. Additionally, current company defensive doctrine does not give enough detail and guidance on security operations in the battle position or assembly area Doctrine needs to include more definitive direction to the company commander on how to organize and implement his security operations. Personal experience experience at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Polk, and Fort Hood has demonstrated effectiveness of well-trained, dismounted soldiers armed with modem antitank weapons against armor in static positions. A dismoun ted night, attack by infiltrating infantry can be devastating to an armor company's defense, resulting in unacceptably high losses. Historical experience and an a nalysis of current light infantry antiarmor doctrine demonstrate that that the potential potential for such a threat is not just a mining phenomenon. Historically, infantry often attacked armor with hand12
held weapons alone. With appropriate equipment and and doctrine, these attacks have been very successful. Currently, some Third World nations with technolog ical and num erical deficiencies in weapons systems compensate by using masses of people armed with inexpensive weapons to provide comb at power.' Even in more developed countries, such as th United States, China, and North Korea, doctrine prescribes infiltration tactics by infantry units to attack and disrupt defending units. We can expect armed forces at all levels of the operational continuum to conduct infiltration attacks.
Historical P e r s p e c t i v e first moment action was whe was marker tank in the Tobruk breakout and a very brave German jumped on my back fl ap s armed with Molotov cocktail and crowbar must admit that ever since then I've suffered a certain amount 'infantry terror.'
Brigadier Richard Simpkin survived his encounter with an infantry antiarmor attack with the help of an alert wingman. There are numerous examples of other armored troopers who did not. Some of these examples are valuable lessons in the value of denying infantry the ability to find, close with, and attack m o r . The first infantry attacks against tanks occurred shortly after tanks were introduced onto th battlefie ld i WWI. Recovering from th initial shock of being attacked by armor, infantry soldiers improvised ways to attack tanks, including closing with the tanks and using phosphorus grenades, bundles of fragmentation grenades, and shots through th vision slits to stop the tank or kill th crew? Due to
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the slow speed and thin armor of those early tanks, these tactics were fairly successful. In the spring of 1917, the Germans introduced the "K ullet, solid core round capable of penetrating m o r , providing the infantry with their first organic antiarmor capability. In the Spanish Civil War 20 years later, the technologically backward separatists in northern Spain used sacks of explosives with time fuses against armor in close terrain. These first satchel charges required the attacker to close with the tank, start th fuse, and throw the charge on the tank. This highly dangerous maneuver as often fatal to both participants, but demonstrated again the vulnerability of armor to determined though lightly-equipped lightly-equipped enemy: World War I1 insp inspir ired ed the the m of numerous infantry weapons specifically designed to destroy tanks. he German blitzkrieg and th apparent invincibility of tank lent special urgency to developing way for light forces to conduct antiarmor operations. The combatants introduced three key antiarmor weapons during this period. In late 1930s. the British fielded first hollow-charge antitank th weapon. a rifle grenade fo the Enfield rifle. rifle. This weapon, forerunner of modem HEAT round, based on the shaped charge still used in many antiarmor systems today? Later, th Germans developed the Panzerfaust, small hand-held recoilless launcher for a hollow-charge hollow-charge projectile. Within 50 yards, it was very effective against tanks. Panzerfaust was also also the first antiarmor system designed to be thrown away once it was fmd.6 About the same time the Germans were fielding th Panzerfaust, th Americans created their own handNovember-December 1992
held, recoilless antitank weapon, the bazooka. AIso firing a shapedcharge warhead, it was, for most of Worl Wa very effective against German heavier version of the bamor. zooka was developed too late for use in World War 11, but saw widespread use in the Korean War? The main main similarity similarity betwee between n these hand-held antitank weapons wa th short sho rt range required for maxim maximum um ef fectiveness. The requirement to get close to the target tank produced remarkably similar tactics tactic s among among infantry forc forces es in World War 1 German example of of these tactics is described Sajer in his book Th Forgotten Soldier. Sajer was in the Gross Deutschland Division on the Russian Front in 1943. His antitank training prescribed digging in and allowing tanks to overru his his position, and included instructo operate the tions tions on ho Panzer Panzerfau faust, st, and and how how to mount moving tank to attach a magnetic mine between the turret tu rret and hull. soldier trained to wait until a tank was five to ten meters from his fighting position before leaping out and running to the tank’s side or rear to engage gage!! These The se dangerous dangerous tactics tactics were used across the Russian Front to great effect? Another World War II example of men attacking tanks occurred during th 1st British Airborne Division’s fight to retain the bridges at Amhem. The First Division’s nv e and and lightly equipped soldiers sold iers found found themselves facing 56-ton Tiger tanks. Using hand-held antiarmor weapo weapons, ns, antitank guns guns no larger larger than than 75mm. and improvised antiarmor weapons, the airborne soldiers sol diers attacked and destroyed 60 tanks in the close confines of the city.” They accomplished this by using stealth st ealth and cover to engage the tanks from the top, rear, and sides. A common thread thread in in World War is the tactic of closing with tanks to take advantage of of blind spots an maximize the effect eff ectss of light weapweapons, and the use of stealth steal th and and sur-
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prise to engage tanks from th flanks an rear.‘’ The tanker’s tanker’s reaction to the dismounted antiarmor threat was to look for infantry protection against infantry and antiarmor a ntiarmor systems. One solution used by by American commanders command ers in Normandy was to have a rifle squad accompany their platoons of tanks. These infantry infantry squads moved moved forward of the tanks and suppressed the crews of enemy antitank antitan k guns. This allowed tanks to maneuver through obstacles and close terrain to engage engage the enem with the tank’s superior firepower.’* This combined arms approach to armor security was a tried and true tact tactic ic in World War 11 In the Korean War, during the linkup between UN. Forces driving north from Pusan and east from Inchon, Task Force Lynch, an American infantry unit driving toward Osan, encountered an armored armored North Korean unit attempting attempting to block block its its advance. Task Force Lynch Lynch attacked attack ed with infantry and destroyed two T-34s with recoilles recoillesss rifle and 3.5-inch bazook fire. th da ended, when more enemy armor was observed, the infantry stroyed at least four tanks with ba zooka fire. The attack continued the next morning morning,, whe whe three more T-34s were destroyed with bazookas.” The Chinese and North Koreans also used infantry infantry forces to attack attac k tanks. tanks. They mounted an attack on Task Force Crombez as it attempted to relieve the 23rd Regimental Combat Team in Chipyong-ni. Their technique was to approach the column in close terrain and use satchel charges, bazookas, and bangalore torpedoes to destroy or disable tanks. During During the Vietnam War, War, the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese, faced with the necessity of attacking armored forces with lightly armed infantry, infiltrated as close as possible to firebases firebas es and and defensive defen sive positions and then massed antitank and rocketpropelled grenade gren ade fires on armored targets.14 targets.14 Often, the Vietnames Vietnamese e were able to to locate loc ate American American positions posit ions b
November-December 7992
the noise of of maintenance mainte nance operation^.'^ The noise of maintenance maintenance and sustainment activities activiti es in in armored units still make avoiding detection problem. The American reaction wa geared toward eliminating the advantage that close terrain gave the infiltrating enemy. Treeclearing equipment, defoliants, and burn-offs created fm zones that made infiltration more difficult. Armor and infantry provided mutual support within fmbases; no tanker liked being stuck outside the perimeter without some security against infiItrators.’6 infiItrators.’6 Early in its history, the Israeli Army was an infantry-ba infant ry-based sed force with virtually no armor or heavy weapons. During the Israeli War for Independence, the army compensated for this disadvanta disad vantage ge y using infiltration infiltrat ion techniques in limited visibility to close close with with the enemy. The infantry would then destroy an defending with antiarmor weapon^.'^ These antiarmor weapons were of weapons weapons stolen stolen from from the British, Brit ish, bought bought from from foreign sources sou rces,, and taken from captur captured ed enemy stocks.’* Our recent experience in Panama to avoid tank losses from infantry tacks. Initially, tanks were tasked to reinforce the infantry. During this peoften used used in engage riod, tanks were often ments with Panamanian forces at ranges under five hundred meters. After a long period of urban and jungle fighting, the tanks were used to patrol as a “show of force” operation.” The close relationship relations hip betwee between n infantry and helped protect the armor throughout the operation. One illustrativ illus trative e observation of of the commanders on on the the scene sce ne was was that, “dismounted “dismounted security securi ty extremely important.” We relearned that 360-degree dismounted security is necessary for armored units uni ts in close close terrain?’ terrain?’ Historically, many many infantry forces have tried to take advantage of limited visibility, visibility, stealth, and surprise to close with with armor and maximize the effect effe ct of light antitank weapons. weapons. Typically, Ty pically, 13
armor as reacted by using dismounted security secu rity and by by avoiding av oiding close close temi as much as possible. Brigadier Simpkin put it best when he said combatants will, “...concentrate all available effort, whatever its nature, in time and space against th opposing element which is critical at that point poin t in time and space space.”’ .”’’’ We have seen the truth of this in the past when as the critical element.
Current and Future Antiamo Equipmen Equipmentt and Tactics Tact ics Regional threats will require th Army to be ready to deploy worldwideF2 Regardless of where Army goes, it must be prepared to face infantry attacks against armor units. A representative sample of of weapons currently available for antiarmor operations is described in in Figur 1. All of of the weapons systems in Figure ar available to a light force for killing tanks. They are light enough and have enough range and lethality to make a light infantry infantry soldier tankkilling system. Properly employed against the flanks, rear, and underbelly of a tank, all ca destroy or disable. An observation from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) indicates that “seventy-five percent of units that maintain security, win. Ninety-three percent of of those that don’t, lo~e.[sic]~~ he advantages in intelligence and disruption of the th e defensive scheme that accrue to units that successfully penetrate security measures are very important in setting the conditions for successful attack. Given this observation, th role of dismounted infantry in in denying den ying security to defending forces becomes very significant. According to these observations, dismounted mounted infantry inf antry should “stealth, darkne darkness ss,, and and restri restrictiv ctive et ” to in fdt nte enemy lines, lines, recon recon obstacle lo cations and enemy positions, and conduct supporting suppo rting attacks attacks.” .” These infiltration tactics ar meant to bypass and
Light Antiarmor Antiarmor Weapo ns MINES:
Carry ModellName
BE!!?
Weight
Effect
M15 Mine M19 Mine M21 Mine
Pressure Pressure Pressure Tilt Pressure cMCmd
30 Ibs
Breaks track Breaks track Kills or Breaks track
M24 Mine INDIRECT
28 Ibs
18 Ibs
24 Ibs
Kills
FIRE W E A P O N S :
Model/Name
Type of Round
Penetration
M20 3 Grenade Launcher
High Explosive
50-mm armor
DIRECT
FIRE WEAPONS:
ModellName
Type of Round
AT-4 M72A4 LAW RPG-7V RPG-22 Panzerfaus Panzerfaustt 3
Shaped Charge-HEAT Shaped Charge -HEA Shaped Charge-HEAT Shaped Shaped Charge-HEAT Shaped Charge -HEA
Carry Weight Weight
15 Ibs Ibs 22 Ibs 11 Ibs 26 Ibs
Penetration
350-mm armor 350-mm armor 330-mm armor 390-mm armor armor 700-mm armor
Range
300
220 M 50 250 500
Antitank) HEAT (High Explosive Antitank)
Figure
eliminate th defending armored force’s security system. One recommended infantry attack technique is to force th out of position and into the killing zone of supporting supporting antiarmor systems, The targeted vehicle must choose between flank and rn hots from attacking infantry or direct engagement with supporting armored systems. The observations further recommend electronic warfare support to jam fire control nets and protect the light force from indirect fires?’ Additionally, indirect fire support, particularly particularly smoke and illumination, is important for creating successful conditions for the infiltrators. Many Many nations n ations and forces force s adhere to th light infantry doctrine. The Antiannor Handbook for the 82d Airborne Division describes tattics, techniques, and procedures for operations against armored forces. The handbook wa developed because
th need for airborne forces to deal with armored adversariesF6 basic tenet of the 82d Th Airborne’s approach is to use stealth and periods of limited visibility to close with with defending defend ing tanks. The infanmaneuvers to gain th advantages of flank and rear sh0ts.2~Their stated intent is to minimize casualties while maximizing weapons effects?* Using these these tactics, tactic s, the airborne air borne infantryma ites, can attack important rear ambush supporting units, and attack to disru disrupt pt the the defens defensiv ive e ~ ys te m. 2~ The United States Marines also tecognize the need to train infantry units threat?’ The MaMato fight an armored threat?’ rine Infantry Officer’s Basic Course teaches its officers to draw tanks into ambush, use smoke and suppressive fires to force the to button up, disable them by flank and shots, and destroy them them using satche charges, Molotov cocktails, thermite grenades, and antitank weapons. 31 ~~
14
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November-December 1992
An article articl e in the M a r i n e Corps Ga zette describes infiltration as the offensive fensi ve form form of maneuver for light infantry. According to this article, one of the objectives is to create crea te a breakthrough by disrupting or destroying key defensive positions. The author also points out that current technology allows allow s relatively small bands of of infantrymen to call in highly accurate accur ate and lethal indirect fire on on identified ident ified enemy locations?2 Other Marine articles recommend training techniques for preparing infantry to attack tanks close combat. Familiarization Familiarizatio n with with tank vision restrictions, the noise of of tank tank gunnery and operation, operatio n, an an appreciation of with tanks are listed as training techn i q u e ~ . ~ll~of these thes e techniques prepare Marine infantrymen to take on armored forces and win. Other nations have developed organizations and tactics geared toward defeating armored forces. Chinese principles of combat include inclu de secrecy, infiltration, and night operations operatio ns to maximize the effectiveness of of their largely infantry infan try force.% Soviet platoon leaders and company commanders personally take their units through rigorous training on tank vulnerabilities, emphasizing how how to take tak e advantage of such weak spots?s One regional threat particularly well suited to infiltration tactics is the North Korean People's Army (NkPA). Specific organizations and tactical tac tical doctrine have been developed develo ped b th NkPA to support dismounted assaults on South Korean and American defenses.36 Aside from their combat infantry line units, the NkPA has over 100,OOO unconventional warfare and special commando troops whose primary mission is to create breakthroughs of defensive lines?7 These infiltrating forces have major objectives of of securing the approach routes, raiding and fixing enemy strongholds, securing and controlling key temin, and other disruptive missions?* missions?* They They will use
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stealth and limited visibility to penetrate defenses and close with with defenddef ending forces. NkPA combat infantry units have five basic forms of of maneuver: m aneuver: pene tration, trati on, Pocho (an (an infiltration infil tration maneuver by small sm all units through gaps in th enemy lines), Cheon Ib (another form of infiltration infilt ration maneuver), envelopment, and bypass. Infiltration, deception and surprise are integral parts of ea each ch te ~h ni qu e? ~ dditio dditional nally, ly, th night attack a preferred method of conducting offensive operations, while one of the th e types of of nighttime formations is the dispersed formation. This formation is used to allow infantry units to find gaps in in enemy defenses defen ses and close with enemy positions:' All of the forces discussed are highly formidable, for midable, with with tactics well suited to disrupting and defeating armored defensive positions. positions. In general, g eneral, their infantry infantr y will use use stealth, stea lth, cover, concealment, and limited visibility to close with tanks and engage engag e them them from the flanks and rear. American units must be prepared to deal with this threat.
Future Equipment and Tactics In the future, armies will will continue to develop lighter, cheaper, recoilless, smokeless antitank antitank weapons to exploit tank weak : Therefor Ther efore, e, the next generation of antitank weapons is likely to attack the top of armored veh i c l e ~ ~ ~at least have improved ability to penetrate reactive or composite armor. Although effective ranges rang es may may increase, weapo weapon n weight will be kept low enough to allow a dismounted soldier to carry it. Additionally, laser technology currently allows small groups or teams of light infantry to locate armor defenses and designate individual tanks for indirect fire targeting. This, in in turn, allows these infiltrating teams to strike repeatedly without being detected un less active detection measures ar taken. As laser technology becomes more widespread, this technique will
November-December 1992
order to be adopted by many forces maximize lethality while minimizing cost. The basic tactic using stealth, limited visibility, and close terrain to facilitate infiltration will remain the same. Although technological reaction and counter-reaction may protect against again st many many weapons, doctrine doctrin e and organization must adequately protect against again st the threat of infiltration infil tration attack. The key, now and in the future, is deny the enemy access to your defensive positions.
Tank Company Security Cap abllitles abllitles Does the tank company have the capability to secure itself against the threat? The organic organi c assets th tank company commander as available to conduct security operations are prescribed in the Table Tabl e of of Organization Organizatio n and Equipment (TO&E). By task organizing organ izing,, the battalion commander can provide th company commander with more personnel and equipment to secure his unit. Th need for task organization is determined for fo r each mission mission by considering th situation in terms of mission, enemy, troops, terrain, and time (METT-T). Since task organized asdifferent as each battalsets can be ion commander's commander 's assessment o MEIT-T, I will only discuss personnel and equipment equipmen t organic to the tank company.
Personnel Figure lists the personnel available to th tank company commander. These personnel organized three line platoons of of four tanks each, and a headquarters platoon with one armored personnel carrier, two l f i ton trucks truc ks (I-IMMW (I-IMMWV), V), one five-ton f ive-ton truck, and two tanks. Each line platoon is authorized one officer, one platoon sergeant, and fourteen soldiers, while the headquarters platoon ha th remaining two officers, the 15
Personnel Inventory or Tank Company Captain . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lieutenants . . . . . . . . . . . First Sergeant . . . . . . . . . Supply Personnel . . . . . . . . NBC Personnel . . . . . . . . . Platoon Sergeants . . . . . . . Tank Commanders . . . . . . . Tankcrewmembers . . . . .
................
6P3
Figure
fmt sergeant, and eleven soldiers. With With this number of of personnel, perso nnel, the company has no more than complete crew for each vehicle. comparison, the mechanized infantry company has 54 dismounted personnel not committed to crewing crew ing vehicles.& partial list of authorized tank company equipment is at Figure The list is limited to equipment with direct applicability to security operations.
Tank Company Defensive Security Security Doctrine Company Company defensive tasks are outlined in mission mining plans ( M T P ) , field manuals nd unit standard operating procedures (SOP). Within the defensive defen sive regimen, many tasks ar either directly related to providing security for the force or direct assets away from that requirement. short summary of defensive tasks is included below. simple simp le list of of tank company compan y tasks for the establishment of the defense is contained in the company-level compa ny-level and platoon-level MTP: .Occupy .Occupy per platoon plat oon MT .Establish unit security .Empl .Emplac ace e observation observatio n posts post s (OPs) and air guards .Patrol areas that cannot be observed .Empla .Emplace ce Platoon Early Warning System (PEWS) .Posit .Position ion weapons systems syste ms and establish fields of fire 16
camouflage positions .All infantry fighting positions and in two hours OPs with overhead cover in .Conduct rehmals .Improve defense .Rec .Recon on and establish alternate alter nate and supplemen supplementary tarypsiti ps iti on .Empla .Emplace ce minefields and obstacles obst acles .Stock .Stockpil pile e and protect ammunition and supplies4 The establishment f unit security secu rity is intended to protect th rest of th company during during prepantion prepan tion of th defense. Many of these security securit y tasks require more effort ef fort and and assets than than others. Combat forces and observation posts (OPs) are established established to provide early warning and gain gain time for the defenders in case ca se of of attack. attack. The emphcement of OPs is critical to securing th defens def ense e against again st a 1 manner of threats. thre ats. Standards for the establishment of are:
.Platoon leader or phtoon sergeant site the OP .Mus .Mustt have good observat obse rvation ion and provide early warning .Selec .Selectt multiple positions if if needed to cover platoon’s platoon’s sector
.Hav .Have e good cover and concealment, with overlapping over lapping fields fiel ds of of view whe possible .Cover .Covered ed and concealed mutes mute s back to the position .Hav .Have e individu indi vidual al weapons rifles, telephone, MOPP suits/mask, binoculars, night vision goggles or sights, map/compass, load bearing equipment .At least soldiers pe OP 47 OPs may conduct air guard guard duties, but typically this duty is picked up by vehicle vehi cle wit with h some defensive defen sive countercoun ter-air air capability. In a tank tank company, this requires individual scan air avenu a venues es of approach from from the tank commander’s position of a tank. Patrols of dead space in in sector s ector must be conducted con ducted at random, but with well coordinated and planned routes. Pa trols are best employed during th day, while other passive measures ar more effective at night, Patrols must have communication, rifles rifl es or submachine guns, and appropriate supervision by trained tra ined noncommissioned offi cers. Emplacement the Platoon Early Warning System System (PEWS) requires two
Tank Tank Com pany Equipment Equipment
uth
..................
M l A l T an an k M113A2 Armored Personnel Carrier . . . . . . M8A1 Chemical Alarms . . . . . . . . . . . . . Binoculars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Commo wire rolls, rolls, .5 each . . . . . . . . . 16 Camouflage screen systems systems . . . . . . . . . Remo te control landmine syste ........ 40-mm grenade launche . . . . . . . . . . . . Cat MG , heavy fixed turret turret type . . . . . . 14 Cal .50 MG heavy barrel, flexible . . . . . . . . Ring mou nt, Cat .50 MG . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ground mount, mount, trip tripod, od, Ca l.5 0 M ....... Night Visi Vision on Goggles, AN PV S 7 ...... 9-m m Pistol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Radio Sets, vehicle mounted . . . . . . . . . M16A2 Rifles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Phone Sets, TA-1 TA-312 . . . . . . . . . . M-4 Carbine, 5.56-mm . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Remarks per platoon, in HQs Headq uarters platoo per platoon 1 pertank 8,000-m eter capaci capacity ty Mounted on M16A 2 rifles rifles 1 pertank Mounted on truck M113 Truck mount Carried in M113A 2 per tank Personal weapon Personal weapon per platoon 2 per tank45
Figure
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November-December 1992
soldiers and three to five minutes pe sensor for installation. With five sensors per system, total installation time is approximately thirty minutes. Monitoring he system can be done by OPs, but recovery is best accomplished by the same team that emplaced th sensors!’ Obstacles emplaced under the supervision of platoon sergeant. Crews m ust emplace obstacles withi six hours. Security must be provided initially for the obstacle teams, and then for the obstacles once established. That security can dismounted mounted, depending on the situation!’
Conducting the Company Defense From he incredibly busy activity of establishing the defense, the company must shift into maintaining and conducting the defense against all attackers. Although he list of tasks is smaller, the commitment of assets is still intense. Tasks associated with this phase are: .Conti .Continue nue to improve the defense on du ct count counter erre recon con .Prepa .Prepare re for tactical operati ons .Defe .Defend nd against dismoun ted attack .Defend .Defend against aga inst mounted moun ted attack” Even after the defense is established, the company continues to im prove its positions, camouflaging vehicles and equipment, clearing fields of fire, burying wire, improving firing positions, digging comm unication unication trenches between positions, and other improvements the leadership deems necessary?’ Preparation for tactical operations requires that many actions be sustained for th duration of the defense. Th first priority is securing the position by maintaining OPs, patrols, air guards, and PEWS. Equipment and weapons’ maintenance is also absolutely essential. Resupply operations, particularly food, fuel, and ammunition, must also be conducted daily. Train Trainin ingg and and s continu continue, e, an sleep plan is executed to maintain continuous continuous operations?2
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The standuds for successful defense against dismounted attack prohibit losing more than on e vehicle per platoon?3 The subtasks of this re quirement recognize th importance of detection and warning to defeating the dismounted threat. Even with successfu detection and reaction, the stand a r d s allow the platoon leader to withdraw if necessary to conserve the com bat strength o hi platoon. Defense against mounted attack requires th concentration of company fifepower against the enemy. Key players in accomplishing this ar the OPs established earlier. OP provide early warning, calls for indirect fires, and assistance in identifying the location of the enemy attack.% Before any attack, countemconnaissance is conducted to force withdrawal or destruction of enemy reconnaissance units. The entire company is involved in making th counterreconnaissance fight a success, as depicted in Figures and 5.5’ Figure illustrates security plan for fairly clear terrain, where mounted OP are able to establish fields of surveillance that can truly interlock and reach out a long distance. Th commander is expected to “spread his platoons and vehicles as far apart necessay without losing the ability to concentrate firepower against the enemy.”56 Given that platoon’s de-
fensive sector is typically from 40 to 800 meters wide, the layout depicted would have to be used in very open terrain in order to deny dismounted routes into sector. In fact, the platoon in mounted OP positions would be covering th company’s frontage of 1,OOO to 1,600 meters. This dispersion leaves mom for infantry infiltration routes if enough cover or concealment is available. Figure also envisages fairly open terrain for employm ent of the defense. This is a more realistic approach to securing position, with mix of mounted and dismounted security that, if properly employed and maintained, should be able to detect and react to both mounted and dismounted attack In close terrain, number of dismounted OPs would have to be increased. In addition to th defensive tasks discussed earlier, other tasks, requirements, and duties will naturally pull at th company’s already limited assets. Sickness, injury, special duties (details, etc.), and maintenance-related jobs will also require the commitment of company personnel.
Assembly Area Operations Another type of operation requiring dissecurity operations against mounted attack is occupation of an asDouble-Layer Technique platoon puts vehicle 1. Each platoon forward. 2. Platoons keep all weapon sights on rews rotate
//-----
em
sentries.
FIgure
November-December 1992
ight Sunfelllance Plan (Part II 17
sembly
Assembly areas resemble
porary and typically oriented 360-degrees for security purposes. In assemasks are bly mas, many of the required as defense. Security operations operations during during the occupation of an assembly area eared toward avoiding detection, since defensive arrangements are usually hasty. This includes increase in dismounted patrols cover dead space and heightened alert status for vehicle crews?’ Personnel
E q u i p m e n t Issues
Within the framework of assembly and defensive tasks is the need to maintain security. 71-1, The
TanWMechanized Infantry Company Team, describes security measures as
those actions taken to “protect the team team from being found or attacke d by surprise.”58Figure surprise.”58Figure is matrix from the manual listing some active and passive security m easures very As described earlier, important for th company’s defensive security. To minimize effect on th total force and heighten the teamwork of the OP team, two members of the same tank crew ar used as OPs. required, the remaining two crew members move their tank. Th problem is they can only fire in slow, de-
Passive and Active Se curity M easures Passive
Active
*Disperse vehicles and platoons. *Use camouflage, concealment, and cover. *Impos e radio-listeni radio-listening ng silence. *Turn engines off and keep them cold. *Reduce noise. *Do not move around in positions. positions. *Use no lights. *Keep antennas tied down. positions. *Use hide or defilade positions. *Do not position position in likely likely artille artillery ry target a rea s.
Figure graded mode. If each platoon is forced by terrain to establish an OP. the company commander’s immediately available firepower is cut by onefourth. Since wo the 16 personnel assigned to a tank platoon are the platoon leader and platoon sergeant, there me actually 14 men at best to maintain wo-man OP on 24- hour basis. If teams are rotated to maintain effectiveness, th platoon leader will cycle through his entire platoon in short order. At the same time, the platoon must have someone on air guard and monitoring the radios. Further, dismounted patrols will require at least three soldiers under a noncom-
Techni niqu qu Systems Ov rl rp Tech 1. Platoon 100% alert other platoons rest. 2. Platoon conducts local security with only NVGs. 3. Dismounted patrol links the two platoons and uses NVGs. 4. GSR reinforces the forward screen (if available). 5. Company HQ and trains conduct local security security an radio watch. 6. Company commander locates with company HQ
Figure
*Establish OPs. *Perform mounted and dismounted dismounted patrols. *Emplace platoon warning devices. *Deploy M8 chemical alarm nets. *Position GSR posts.
ight Surveillance P i a n ( P a r t 1)
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missioned officer’s control (typically a tank crew) to periodically check their sector. ll of the tasks listed above, dong with with maintenance jobs, sustainment requirements, and sleep planning add to the platoon leader’s personnel personnel load. He must accept considerable risk in some areas to accomplish all of these important tasks. accidents As casualties, illness, occur, the platoon leader’s ability to conduct security operations is further degraded. There is no redundancy in the organic tank platoon or company organization that com pensates for personnel shortages. One obvious equipment shortfall is the lack of PEWS. Despite the recognition in d octrine that this sensor sysem is needed at the platoon level effectively implement security opentions. th PEWS is absent from th tank com pany’s authorized equipment. This is particularly serious since the system would help compensate for personnel shortages in the organimtion by covering dead space that might requ ire a Th e heaviest weapon weapon available to the dismounted platoon member is the 5.56-mm carbine. OPs need more effective weapon to engage and suppress infiltrating infantry. The tank company has 7.62-mm machine guns mounted at the loader’s position on each of its tanks. tanks. These could be used ovember-December 1992
by the if a ground-mount was provided?’ An observation from Op eration JUST CAUSE was that ground mount system of some sort was needed for the coaxial machine gu on the Sheridans. One crewman went so fa as to actually use asbestos mittens to hold and fire the dismounted coaxial machine gu to suppress attacking infantry!’ Another equipment problem is the shortage of binoculars. There are just enough for set on each of th tanks and two sets with th commander and execu tive officer respectively. When When set of binoculars goes forward with the OP one of the tanks does without. This reduces one tank commander’s ability to observe his sector during daylight hours. The lack of a manportable radio is also a problem. Doctrine recomm ends the use of patrols to cover dead space, but the TOE does not provide th tank company any communication for those patrols to report contacts. The additional radios would also provide back-up for wire communications to to OPs. OPs are expected to establish their positions as standard fighting positions with at least 18 inches of overhead cover. There ar no provisions in the TOE or on the M1 tank load plan for materials to accomplish this requirement, with the exception of shovel, axe, and pick. found that airfield paneling provided an excellent overhead base. With the addition of sandbags to the load plan, the unit would would have adequ ate resou rces to protect their OPs in any terrain. One advantage for the company is its tank Thermal Imaging Systems (TIS). These ballistic sights allow night and ay target acquisition and engagement capability for the main gu and coaxial machine gun. Thermal sights allow identification of vehicles at 2,000 et ed 1 and and detec detecti tion on of dismounted personnel at 4,000 meters, reg ardless o light conditions.6* There ar some limitations to th thermal system. Thermal sights
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powered by the tank’s batteries, and cannot be dismounted from the vehicle. Th e power drain from running the sights requires the periodic recharging of the batteries by running the tank’s engine. Aside from the intermittent noise running engines, the sights themselves emit a loud clicking noise easily discernible up to 100 meters from the k1nk.6~ These unavoidable real handicap to noise producers noise reduction as passive security measure. Also, thermal sight capabilities are degraded by rain, snow, dust, infrared smoke, and heavy foliage.64 Unfortunately, Unfortunately, these conditions occur with great regul regular arit ityy in in many many p s of the world. Additionally, since the TIS is a line-of-sight system, system, terrain masking also blocks thermal sight detection. Future tank designs iv going to worsen som e of of these problem s by reducing the number of available personnel. The tanks of the future will, most likely, have reduced crew size due to adoption of an automatic loader.6’ These two- or three-man crews will still have to handle th tasks listed above. The current tank company can bxely accomplish these tasks as organized. The reduction in personnel will force some sort of augmentation by personnel and equipment to successfully secure future tank company.
Compahson of Capabirity
Threat
he tank company commander must not only is forces to detect infiltration attacks, but must also be ar rayed to defend against what is probably his primary threat, th mounted attack. The difficulty in resolving this dilemma most serious consequence of gaps between capability and doctrine. the tank company n op n commander’s night vision sights and weaponry allow him the flexibility to set up effective mounted OPs which can be supplemented by minimal dis-
November-December 7992
mounted OPs to compensate for dead space. This is th ideal situation that doctrinal security operations ar best suited to address. Unfortunately, flat, clear terrain is not prevalent in many parts of the world where tanks might be expected to fight. Close tenain, such as heavily forested areas or hilly, rugged ground is not as simply defended. Mounted OPs in close termin are themselves vulnerable to infiltration attack due to their noise and physical signature. Many of the advantages of m ounted sights and weaponry will be negated by interventhat an in terrain and vegetation. attacking infantry unit requires is one unwatched lane to successfully overcome a defender’s counterrecon effort. Heavy of dismounted OPs to compensate for limited fields of observation will quickly degrade th company’s ability to fight its tanks. OP equipment inadequate; moonless or cloudy nights limit th capability of the authorized passive night vision goggles significantly. Tank company OPs do not have sufficient weaponry to defeat or suppress attackin infantr y units Clearly, these deficiencies indicate the TOE does not provide adequate personnel for executing executing security operations as required by current doctrine. On paper, there ar enough soldiers in the company to handle security requirements. However, due to lack of depth in the organization, any circumstances that detract from the number of available soldiers will impact rectly on the company’s capability to sustain d efensive operations. Equipment shortages and inadequacies are also debilitati debilitating. ng. The lack of ground movement sensors like the PEWS handicaps the company’s detection effort. Infiltrating forces will take advantage of of dense foliage areas and dead space to move into sector. Easily emplaced and recovered sensors would allow the company to cover infiltration infiltration avenu es of approach 19
while minimizing requirements. Unfortunately, even th PEWS only thirty percent chance of detectin craw ling A Sensor Sensor system with better detection capability is needed to cover densely vegetated avenues of approach. The passive night goggles currently authorized rue easily degraded by lack of natunl illumination or washout from artificial illumination. Since infantry units ar going to attack on clouded, moonless nights or indirect fire illumination to blind passive night surveillance systems, passive goggles have some definite disadvantages. Additionally, doctrine fails to adequately address the threat. The company commander is instructed to cover enemy avenues of approach into his position, but diaand emphasis all imply that security is only used forward of the defensive position. Lack of all-around security is dangerous, considering infantry's doctrine of infiltrating to attack the flank and rear of tank positions. Doctrinal manuals discuss the process of bringing enemy mounted units under fire, but do little instruct th company commander on on what process he should follow to defend against attacking infiltrators. Company counterreconnaissance and security doctrine does not provide th commander with an adeq adequa uate te m k for for plan planni ning ng and preparing.
Concluslon and Recommendations Tank compan ies have miuginal pability to secure themselves against infilmtion and attack by dismounted infantry. Important gaps in equipment authorizations and doctrinal expectations exist. Additionally, lack of of d epth in personnel strength assures that casualties and injuries will degrade that capability from marginal to inadequate. This problem is not insurmountable, if some changes in in T O&E and doctrine are implemented.
First, the tank company commander needs a more complete doctrinal answer to th question of how secure his force an infiltration attack. One recommendation that doctrine on company security security operations adopt a DECIDE DETECT DESTROY technique for planning and conducting this critic al element of defense. The commander must decide which dismounted avenues of approach to monitor, as well as the techniqu is going to use to conduct the monitoring. The monitoring effort must be as far from is main positions as his as sets will allow, and oriented in all directions. rections. The key to achieve "firstdetection advantage" by detecting the attacking infantry prior to their discovering main defensive positions: He must is detection effort in at least hvo belts to initially detect and then finally determine the direction and intent of the enemy attack. The commander can achieve this by mixing sensors, mounted and dismounted OPs, and roving patrols in coordinated and rehearsed security plan in depth. Lastly, he must have plan to destroy the infiltrators. His OPs must have both direct and indirect fire engagement criteria for attacking small forces, while a reaction force is ready in main defense to move out, intercept, and destroy larger attacks. Reg adle ss of improvements in doctrine, the company needs more personnel to defend and secure itself. While adding personnel, such as an infantry platoon or extra tankers, on permanen t basis might appear to be an easy answer, manning constraints will probably not allow this. The next best answer to ensure that each tank company an infantry platoon attached for security operations. operations. In 1986, a study at Fort Hood, Texas, examine examinedd the effect of m at in combined infantry and armor units at the battalion level. There was little appreciable difference between the com-
bined attalions with permanently assigned tank and infantry teams and a normal task organized unit with habitual task organization rela relati tions onship hips! s!'' Th e key change cha nge is tha the decision to task organize no longer situationally dependent. The decision to not task organize now creates a signific ant risk. risk. Som e equipment shoul be added to the company organization. One exmple is the PEWS. It is needed in th current organization as an interim to the lack of sensors. In the long run, the company needs a more advanced sensor system that can reliably detect a wider m e of of threats, threats, suc as crawling men, and can relay that data over a greater distance than PEWS. Hand-held thermal viewers, such as the ANPAS-7, also needed by company security forces. These devices can detect infantry out to 40 meters, as well as identify vehicles at approximately 1,OOO meters. Infantry companies rue currently authorized six of these devices for their security efsame f0rt.6~Tank companies have security requirements, but no handheld thermals are authorized. noted earlier, the tank company also needs portab le radios, ground ground mounts for the loader's machine guns, and additional binoculars to more effectively protect itself from infiltrators.
Endnotes Bellamy. Future cfhnd Wadare, Martin's Pmr. Inc., Ne York, 1987, p. 159. 'Bn'grdier R.E. Simpkin, 'Men Againat Mechanized Battlcfeld, TactiTanks" cal Aimlysis, ed. LT J. A. English, MAJ J. Addicott. and MA P. J. h e r s , PegamonBrassey's International Defense Publishen, Washington. 1985. p. 139. 'John Tanks, Agaimt Weeks, Men MasonlCharter Publishers, IN., Ne Yorlc. 1975. p. 26. 41bid.. p. 31 'lbid.. pp 3 9 4 0 . Tbid.. pp. 68-69. 'lbid., p. 100. *Guy Sajer, Forgotten Soldkr, Sphere Books Ltd.. London, 1977, p. 206. 'Weeks. p. 185. 'Chris
SL
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20
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November-December
7992
"Ministry Infamation. By Air to Battle the British First an rh Oficiol Account Sixth Airborne Divisions, His Majesty's Statione ry Offic e, London , 1945. p. 134. "J.O. "J.O. Rod rigue z. "David and Goliath Can Airborne Infantry Defend Against Armor in Cen tral Europe. Europe."" MM AS The sis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1986, pp. 22-24. "Captain Richard Faulkner, "Lecvning th Hard Way," ARMOR. VoL 99 July-August 199 0, p. 25. I3Jim Mesko. Armor in Korea. SquadrwJSigna Publications, Inc.. Camllton. Texas. 1984. p. 21. the 14Jamer R. Arnold. Illurrmred History Vietnam War, Armor, Bantam Books, Inc, New Yo&, 1987. pp 60-61. "bid .. pp. 69-71. I6lbid. "Karl Farris. "Grow~h nd Change in the Is raeli raeli Defense Defense F ra s Through Through Wan." Thesis. U.S. S. A rmy Wa r Col lege , Carl isle Barracks, Pa, 1987. p. 22. the Deseort, "David Eshel. Chariots Brassey's Brassey's D efence Publishen. London, 1989. pp 1-10. 19Cap tain Kevin J. Hammond and Captain Frank Sherman, "Sheridans in Panama," ARMOR. Vol. 99, MatCh-April 1990. pp. 8-13. 201bid.. p. 14. "Brigadier Richard E. Sirnpkin, Antifank, Brassey's Pu blis hen Limited. Oxford, 1982. pp. 228-229. 2tWhite House. National Security Strategy the United Srcrres. Government Printing Office. Wash ingto n, DC. D C.. 199 1. p. 30. =Center for Army Lessons Learne Learned. d. "Year Training Compendium. Volume 1: Heavy Fom s," Combined Arms Training Training Activi Activity. ty. Fort Leaven worth . Kan. Kan... 1988. p. 6. %]bid.. p. 10. 2Slbid. m82d Airborne Division, Antiarmor HandN.C... Hea dqu arten . 82d Airbook, Fort Bragg. N.C. borne Division, 1984. t71bid.. pp. 22-12 through 22-13. ?bid.. p. 22-9. 22 -9. ZPlbid..p. ZPlbid..p. 2 2-1 1. 9ergeant . rp . Antia Antiarm rmor or Training. Marim Corps Gazette 74. October 1990. p. 3'Captain Timo thy J. Jackson. "Light Infantry Techniques," Marine Corps Gazette 74. June 1990, pp. 54-55. Lid. "Light Infantry Tactics." 32William Marine Corps Gazette 74. June 1990, p. 33Captain David W. S zelo wsk i, "Training Grunts to Tackle Tanks,"Marine Corps Gazette 74. October 1990, p. 49. "Bellamy. p. 162. "Robert Kuth, "Soviet Airborne Antiarmor Tactics in the Defense," U.S. Army Russian Institut e. Gar misc h, Germany. 1981. p. 15. %.S. Army Combined Arms Combat Develoanents hctivitv. FC 100-2-99. North Korean
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People's Army Opemtions, H e a d q u m n . US. Army Combined Arms Center. Fort h a v e n worth. wo rth. Kan.. Kan.. 198 7. p. 3-4. "Ibid.. p. 3-5 "Ibid., p. 4-8. ?bid.. p. 4-2 *Olbid.. p. 4-20. 4'Weeks. p. 186. '2Randall Steeb. Keith Bmdley. Dan Norton. John Bondanella, Richard Salter. and Temll Covington, An Exploration Integratd Ground Weapons Concepts for ArmorlAntiarmor Missions, RAND, Santa Monica. Cali., 1991.p.24. %.s. A ~ Y .abl le of Organization Equipm ent. W17377L00 W17377L000, 0, Tank Com pany, Tank Battalion," Battalion," Printout received received from F m D evelw e n t Office. Fort Leavenworth, Kan.. 31 October 1991. p. 6-7. @U.S. Amiy Tactical Canmanden Develop ment Course. Battle Book, BrigadelBattalion Task Force. U.S. U.S. A rmy Comman d and General Staff College. Fort Leavenworth. Kan., 1991, pp. M-1 M-5. U.S. Army. Arm y. "TO E U1737 U17377LD 7LDOO. OO." p. 8-9 Army. ARTEP 71-1-MTP. Mission %.S. Tmining P l a n for the Tank Mechanized Infantry Company Company Team. HQ. De partment of the Army. Washing ton, D.C. D.C.,, 1988. pp. 101-103. 47U.S. Army. ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP. Mu sion Training Plan for the Tank Tank Platoo n, HQ. Department of the Army, Washington. D.C., 1988. pp. 119 -120. 48P. Antson, A. Burkard. Jacobs, McLaughlin. McPhenon. and B. Rapapt. Tacricnl Sensors for Dispersed Tactical Nuclear Force Units. Phase 11 Defense Nuclear ency. Mc Lea n, Va. Va. 1984, pp. 108-109. f9U.S. Army. ART EP 71-1-M TP. p. p. 5-142 5oU.S. Army. ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP. pp. 510, 5-99. Also U.S. U.S. A rmy, ARTEP 71-1-MTP. p. 5-103. "U.S. Army, ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP. p. 599. Also U.S. U.S. A rmy, ARTEP 71-1-M TP, pp. 510 5-103. U.S. Army. A RTEP 17-237-10 -MTP. p. 50.
531bid., p. 5-99. 5- 99. %.S. Army. FM 71-1. TankandMechanizd Iqantry CompnylTeam. Government Printing Office . Was hing ton, D.C. D.C.,, 198 8, pp 4-9 4-1 1. See ala0 FM 71-123. Tactics an Techniques for Combined Arms Heovy Forces: Armored ComBrigade, BattaliodTask Force, panylTeam, Final Draft. Unedited. U.S. Army Armor School. Fort KIIOX. Ky.. Ky.. 199 1, p. 4-1 79. "U.S. Army, ARTEP 71-1-MT P. p. p. 5-103. %FM 71-1. p. 4-9. "ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP. pp. 5-31 5-32. %.S. Army. FM 7l-1. p. 4-10. ll s idea first first surfac surfaced ed i convenation had with Captain Curt Hoover. Maneuver Division, Center for Army Lessons Lecvned. 60Hamrnond. p. 15.
November-December 1992
6'US. Army T a a i d Commander's Dcwlop ment Coune. Battle B m k , BrigadkIBattalion Task Force. p. 1-7. "Howar "Howardd Tate, engineer for Geaed Dynamics Tank Division, telephonic interview by thor, Leavenwo rth. Kan.. Kan.. 18 Novem ber 1991. 63~cnonal xperience with furdig tank uly at Fort Hood, Texas. taught me that the distinctive clicking of thermal sightn was tme indicator of the Ml's presence. Bank Book,p. Book, p. 1-8. %DC. aR. Steeb. et al, Integrated Ground Weapons Concepts,pp. v-vi. NP security study. @P. Antsen. 120. 671bid.. p. aU.S. Army Training Doctrine Command. Indepen&nr Evaluorion Report fa he Combined Arms Maneuver Battalion, US. Army TRADOC, Fort havenworth, 198 8, p. 1. TCDC, ~ t t l e p. 1-7.
Major Ma jor Patrick A. A. Stallings graduated in 1980 with a BA from McNeese State University in Lake Charles, La. After AOB, he served as a tank platoon leader, S1, and tank company executive officer in 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry at Fort Hood, Texas. He attended AOAC in 1985 after being a senior class advisor to an AOB class. After reassignment to Fort Polk, Major Stallings sewed as the S4 company commander and S3 in 3d Battalion, 77th 77 th Armor, participating participating in NTC rotations while the S4 and S3. He was assigned to PERSCOM as the Joint Speciatty Officer manager from from 198 8 to to 198 9, folfollowed by a year as the Future Readiness Officer for Armor Branch. He attended CGSC and SAMs, and is currently assigned as the deputy G3, Plans, 1st ArKreuznach, Germany.
21
Captain Captain Kenn eth L. Deal Jr. The rising sun is welcome sight to the scout platoon leader. fought long, lon g, hard battle battle during during the night, night , and three of his vehicles were destroyed. can account only three BRDMs destro des troyed, yed, and he heard B M P s penetrate his screen but has no idea where they are now. The battalion commander gave him two tank platoons, each from different company. has not had contact with one of them all night and suspects they did not as ordered. Enemy electronic link warfare was effective, and and made it i t impossible to us the radio ef/ectively. Of the other platoon, tw of the four fo ur tanks went maintenance down, and he has no idea when they will be recovered, and the remaining tw working tanks went back back to the parent unit un it hours before daybreak to prepare defensive positions. Even if he knew where the enemy was, he couldn’t fight them now. Of his three destroyed vehicles, five scouts died of wounds because the closest company medics 22
were 10 kilometers away and couldn’t find the scout locations on time. To top it off, he battalion commander wants to see him to learn why the fight was such failure. he could only get hours sleep maybe, he could could start to prepare r the next battle; not chance, the battalion de fensive order is to be issued midmorning, and the scout platoon leader expected to be there. Unfortunately, this picture is all too frequent. scout platoon platoon leader eager to be successful is unable unable to, because he is given given neither n either the assets nor the structure structu re to accomplish the the mission. It is ironic that what may be the most important task in the the battalion defens is given the least attention. attention . And And it raises more questions quest ions about who should be responsible for the counterreconnaismce fight, or more accurately, the “security zone” battle. Given that the counterreconmissance battle is the responsibility of of the defending task force, one of the most successful techniques for the TF commander to allocate a company-
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size element to fight the battle. question question then then becomes, becomes, how how does do es the company compa ny commander array hi limited forces to ensure success throughout his sector? What should he know? What should he look for? for? What is considered successful for such mission? And how how does he organize orga nize for the fight? The battalion commander should as sign the counterreconnaissancebattle, counterreconnaissancebattle, or the battalion “security “securit y zone, zone,” ” to his most competent commander his most most effective company. f at all a ll possible, it should be habitual assignment so he unit has time to train (a result of the unit METL). because he nature of this security secu rity mission mission requires well trained unit with platoons and crews that can operate with little littl e or no guidance. The battalion commander must must give the security zone commander very specific guidance, ance, which which at a minimum must give the commander’s commander’s intent intent for that specific mission, what battalion commander wants accomplished, and where he wants it done. The security
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Organization of the C ounterreconnaissance Force zone commander must determine
how. Once assignment is given. the company commander is fully responsible sponsible for everything that happens in the sector. This may include any passage lanes or any forward obstacles. ensure unity of effort, the company commander must control all assets in the security zone, including the scouts, mortars, and any assets forward. The S2 is always a critical part of the information cycle and will give the countemconnaissance commander PIRs. He will continue to monitor the company net to better template enemy forces and follow the recon battle. In he same vein, the counterrecon counterrecon commander should supply the task force with (information requirements) that can help win his fight. Th S2 hould no have operational control of any forward elements in the main battle area. When the commander conducts his leader’s recon, he must do a complete intellige nce prepamtion of the battlefield, paying special attention to key terrain, avenues of of approach (mounted and dismounted), engagement areas, and withdrawal routes. Much of this will come from the battalion but he needs to look at the terrain and assess what will be critical for him, especially since the battle is usually fought at night or under limited visibility. If at all possible, the leader’s recon should be done with the battalthe FSO, the ion commander, the security zone commander and th scout platoon leader. This will begin the synchronization process and the battalion commander will know exactly what to expect from his company forward. Additionally, the S2 can then brief the counterrecon plan as part of the and plan in the battalion talion operations order, and the subordinate comm anders in in the defense ca prepare and adjust their own patrol plans accordingly. This will accomplish several things: decrease the risk of fratricide, alleviate the possibility of inac curate spo t reports, provide se-
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Figure curity in depth, and facilitate reinforcreinforcing or reconstituting the security zone The task force TOC must be an integral part of fight, and the s t a f f understand that w hile the team is must understand forward in security zone, co un te on battle battle is is the the main main effort effort Of all the doctrinal defense techniques, the defense in sector will best accommodate the countemonnaissance force. It not only allows the most flexibility, but it is the most effective defense when fighting over a wide area, with multiple avenues of approach. The counterrecon force should consist of a company team with the commander being th security zone commander. Counterreconnaissance should be the primary focus of the company. Since night is most critical in security operations, leaders should minimize daytime distractors to the counterreconnaissance team. team. Detailed defens ive prepamtion and lengthy task force-level rehearsals will draw away combat power. Distractors place additional strain on the team command structure, and can eventually lead to degraded command and control in the
November-December 7992
security zone. th task force knows this, and makes allowances fo the unique counterreconnaissance kam, many of synchronization issues can be solved informal manner. Having the s t a f f come forward to th security zone is an option. Additionally, he team team commander must have thorough understanding of th MBA, since the team will join th main defense once the security fight is won. Under m ost circumstances, the counterrecon force should be company team, complete with its organic su port to be located forward of he main battle area (see Figure 1) The battalion should consider allocating additional assets assist in the mission. Once the mission is assigned, th commander w ill assum e responsibilit responsibilit fo all support to th forward elements, regardless their parent unit. Only in this manner will the task force achieve depth throughout se curity zone. zone. Additionally, this w ill reduce duce the amou amount nt of of c forwa forwa d. Also, it will enable the commander keep tight control of all activities in his sector. This becomes critical once th direct fight is joined and
Expected Direction of Enemy Attack
The The C omp anymeam Cou nterreconnaissance Force
TANKS
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\w/’
/’
RADLEYS COUT SECT OP
enemy recon elements can take advantage of the potential confusion Scouts are pivotal element in this defense, acting as early warning and tracking the enemy forces throughout the zone. zone. I is critical that the scouts do not fight, for once they they join the rect fight, fight, they they lose their value as a surveillance element. There will be plenty of of killing killing systems availa available ble for enemy enemy destruction. destruction. The scouts sco uts must
Primary Engagement Area
be m y e d in depth, and should not be considered static observation posts. With With his section, the senior scout can conduct roving patrols in the sector, sect or, (mounted and dismounted) dismounted) not not only to ai security, but also als o to ensure that enemy recon does not have the advantage of going to ground and selecting the time and method it will move. The able to follow the scouts need to enemy forces until they ar destroyed. Obviously, this is high risk mission,
Secondary Engagement Area
and the risk of fratricide fratr icide is uncomfortuncomfortably high; however, the security zone cannot afford to let elements slip or just assume that the battle handove is completed. In morning, the security zone commander must be able to account for all enemy vehicles by counting their burning hulks (proper identification vehicle type will indicate what recon element ha been scouts are positioned engaged). If correctly, there should be no friendly ~~
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movement. If the scouts are required to move, routes will be fully briefed and understood, with well rehearsed recognition signals to avoid fratricide. In the case cas e of of the security zone th benefit of a roving patrol far outweighs the danger of of fratricide. Th tank platoons are the killers. The platoon should organize into killer sections so they can spread throughout th sector and provide coverage on on all avenues. To ease th difficulty in battle handover, the killer sections can habitually align with the same scout. Plan Plan for f or the tanks to tight al night. They have the greatest armor protection, and will be the mos flexible during limited visibility. visibility. The Bradley platoon should be re serve all night and plan to engage the single recon vehicles that slip s lip throug th tank platoon sectors. The four Bradleys will be augmented aug mented with with the HQ section, creating powerful reserve. Keeping the mech platoon at REDCON (ready to move within 30 min.), min.), while whil e maintaining only 25 percent security, will provide the counterrecon force with with a well rested rested force f orce assume the screen, screen , if needed, and and to provide countersurveillance at first light. At th same time, th tank platoons will "go "go to ground" gro und" and rest until night, thus allowing allow ing the tea team m to conduct continuous contin uous operations withou degrading the effectiveness of th counterrecon counterrecon force fo rce over long periods The S4 should anticipate problems and emplace th assets to correct them. All maintenance-down mainten ance-down vehicles must be recovered from the security zone and fixed as far forward as possible. Supplying the team with an additional ditio nal M88 in addition to maintenance personnel, will augment the normal section and assist the team. Another consideration considerati on might be to attach additional addition al ambulances ambulances to the company and perhaps to locate forward aid station closer to th FLOT ha normal. In th defense, the team team will use more ammo than fuel, but will still only consume fraction
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of each vehicle basic load; however, the S4 should consider keeping a FAQ (fuel, ammo, quick) uploaded and available to the team first sergeant. The FAQ must have, at minimum, one fueler and HEMlTs loaded with resupply of ea type of ammo in in the t he team. Since the security securi ty zone is the task force main main effort ef fort,, it must also receive priority for support in all aspects with with the exception except ion o engineer effort. Engineer support is always welcome asset, but the t he commander command er must be fully prepared to fight without the aid of obstacles or prepared positions. FASCAM is available to the task force, it can easily be integrated into the security s ecurity zone. Th security zone commander must be given priority of fires fir es throughout the security zone battle. The company import ant part in the FIST plays an important defensive prep, ensuring all targets observed 'and 'and registered during dur ing daylight hours, and illumination targets should cover all possible avenues of approach. Fires should be planned all the way through the sector and the FSO should be prepared to fue them, based on the events on on the th e battlefield. Give special consideration to no-fire areas (NFA) to support the scout positions, to include random "safe areas" that the roving patrols can go to for safety. The mortar platoon will be fully integrated into the force and under the control of the company commander. The battalion FSO should allocate specific number of rounds that will be used in th counterrecon fight so th commander can can keep track of exactly how much he has fued fu ed and an d how how much he ha left, without wonying about his own internal fire support being being taken away. Additionally, the ca pre-stock ammo to continue the fight. counterrecon fight is often the most most important imp ortant phase of the defense, since th defeat of enemy recon elements may may well determine determi ne the out-
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come of of the battle. the task force treats the counterrecon fight as the initial main main effort, and devotes well trained, technically competent, and disciplined team to th battle, then th task force chance for success increases dramatically. dramatically.
the sun blinks over the horizon the company commander calls his situation report to the task for ce TO C. It was a long night but he knows he won th battle. he ten destroyed vehicles, only one was his, and the crew was evacuated quickly and will survive. The scout platoon leader has organized a patrol to identih) the remains the enemy vehicles, and the infantry platoon that was not committed during the night will begin to patrol the high ground ground to look fo r enemy enemy observation posts. The first sergeant is bringing up the LOGPAC for the company team, as well as the scouts and m ortars. The executive officer has returned from a route reco n, back back to the unit's subsequent positions, and will brief the platoon leaders and crews while the commander, FSO, scout and mortar platoon leaders attend battalion operations order at 0730 hours. will be a very good day.
Captain Kenneth L. Deal Jr. was commissioned as a Distinguished tinguished Mili M ilitary tary Graduate Gradu ate of the University U niversity of Idaho. Idaho . He is a graduate of AOBC, JOMC, SPLC, and AOAC. He served as a tank platoon leader with 2-72 Armor, Camp Casey, Korea, and as a tank platoon leader and the scout platoon leader for 1-63 Armor, as well as the assistant for the 177th Armored Brigade at Fort Irwin, Calif. Upon completion of the Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course, he will be assigned to 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment.
25
From Behind the Dragon’s Teeth:
Hitler’s Folly? Hitler’s lunge into the Ardennes, so often criticized criticized a strategic mistake, might might have b een his best chan ce at stalemate and survival survival by Captain Kevin
Austra
In December 1944,B German divisions, sion s, nine of of them armored, slammed into the U.S. First and Ninth Armies. For ten days, the German panzers zigzagged through the hills, valleys, forests, and fields fie lds of of the Ardennes until stopped short of the Meuse River in Belgiu Belgium. m. The German salient, 80 miles wide and 60 miles deep, was then pounded by U.S. and British forces. The Force but eliminated German German logistics. logistics. By February back to its 1945, he U.S. Army drove back former December positions and the German German Wehrmacht Wehrma cht had had no forces for ces left to keep the Allies from the Rhine. Hitler’s Ardennes offensive proved supreme folly was it? Since that last bitter winter of of the Second World War, much been written written about abou t the Battle of the Bulge. It provides a certain fascination for military historians and served as inspiration for five major motion pictures. Most Most student stu dentss of the battl b attle e have com to the same conclusion: Hitler forced secu rity of of the is army to leave the security Westwall (often called the Siegfried Line) fortifications fortifica tions and and exhaust ex haust themselves in the hopeless involuntary death throes thr oes of a dying man. majority of the judgments leveled at the last great German offensive in th West ar based on 1944 Allied expectations pectatio ns of a repeated 1918 pecifically, the overthrow of failed regime, gime, surrender s urrender before the nation’s borders were critically violated, and 26
preservation of the surviving surviv ing economic base. The Battle Batt le of the Bulg dashed Allied hope hopes s the war would be over by by Christmas Ch ristmas -just like 1918. General Genera l Dwight . Eisenh Eis enhowe ower, r, among among others, was furious. Estimates Est imates described the German Army on the brink of of collapse. collapse. Didn’t Didn’t the Germans Germ ans know the war was finished? Unfortunately. the conditions were not similar similar t 1918. At the end of the Great War, an intact German Army bowed bowed to the wishes of of a revolut rev olutionionar government in Berlin and demobilized itself under the worst possible armistice conditions. The unconditional tional surrender surrende r terms terms scaring scaring at Germany in 1944 compelled the Germans to fight on? Note too that in midstil l controlled 1944 the Germans still most of of Europe, Europe, though D-Day was a result, Hitler’s refar away. gime survived the halfhearted July 20th assassination attempt, armor an aircraft production peaked in summer and autumn 1944, an Germany’s armed forces numbered million men in 32 divisions and brigades? Despite Despite terrific losses at the front and at home, the German Army wa losing slowly and exhausting its opponents.
Leaving the Dragon’s Teeth While planning the Ardennes offensive, Hitler remark remarked ed that “the “th e side that lasts longer will do so only if it
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stands to lose everything.“4 German industry failing. Constant raids, essential mw material shortages, and lack of fuel ensured industry indus try could never keep pace with the war. More More critic cr itical, al, Germany Germany was sapped o almost all its adult a dult manpowe manpower. r. InfanI nfantry training, once regimented and several months in length, was reduced a scant six weeks. weeks. Luftwaffe Luftw affe pilots found found themselves committed commit ted to combat on their first operational flights. The German German armed forces force s were were fas losing their ability to wage offensive Warfare.
It is too simple to declare that Adolf Hitler in 1944 was was insane, ins ane, sick, or drugged by by his incompete in competent nt private physician, Morrell, that he was in capable of ntion nti onal al thought. thought. True, th of the last las t two years of war lef stress the German German leade le aderr an exhaus exh austed ted ma who yearned for and still believed in repeat of the the glories earlier experienced in 1940. Indeed, until late 1941, the German General Staff still controlled trolled operat op erations ions of the particularly on on the Eastern Eastern Front. The resulting failure to subdue the Soviet Union in 1941 could well be attrib-
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uted to the General Staffs delay in following up successes, as well as withholding urgently needed forces for an unwanted drive drive on Moscow. Moscow. The mounting emotional pressure was compounded compounded by by the unsuccessful unsucc essful attempt on Hitler’s life. Hitler’s subsequent distrust of of his own military commanders and purge of the army left him in absolute control control of the war effort, effor t, and and with with it the insomnia ins omnia an stress associated with with supreme command. Though thoroughly exhausted and aware of of Germany’s Germany’s plight, Hitler’s decision to attack in the west was a logical decision decision made by by a tyrant. Only the unlikely event that, Hitler would would have have been been overthr overthrown own could have prevented the attack in its it s final manifestation. In retrospect, the German people probably would have agreed with the final offensive gambl in keeping with a German saying, “Better an end in in horror horror than a horror without end.”’ In autumn 1944, Germany was not as close to defeat as some would believe. The German Army, whose back was broken in August in Normandy, was able to delay and withdraw to th
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1939 German frontier. After a few
tense weeks where much of the German border was defended solely sole ly by overgrown pillboxes and empty foxholes, the Germans were able to fill the gaps and halt the Allies. The base of the G m a n frontier defense was was a series f ffortif ortificatio ications ns know as the Westwall. These fortifications he length of the the German border from Holland to the southwestem tip of of Germany opposite Switzer land. Originally, series of small forts along the Saar River opposite the French border, the defenses were extend tended ed!! Today Today one can driv drivee along along the western German frontier and cross belts of concrete antitank dragon’s teeth stretching stretching belo below w sli s lits ts of grey crumbling bunkers. For their impotence in 194445, they remain formidable obstacles. The dragon’s teeth and shattered pillboxes zigzag through forest and farmers’ fields, forcing new roads to skirt skirt and and bridge them and housing to be built around them. Constructed between 1936 an 1939, the Westwall was Germany’s answer to the much-touted French Maginot Line. The once gleaming white
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dragon’s teeth shielded the remilitmized Rhineland while German forces massed in the east, eas t, The Westwall was was mixture of designs and wa never more than 15 percent complete at th start f the war. Unlike its it s French French counterpart, Westwall was not single, nonstop fortifrcation in depth. It relied on scattered scatter ed prefabricated pillboxes emplaced to provide interlocking fire. In front fr ont of of the pillboxes were concrete dragon’s teeth antitank obstacles, barbed wire, and minefields. Pillboxes and dragon’s teeth were anayed in belts several miles thick. In ma f rugged rugged terrain, terr ain, such as the High High Eifel opposite op posite Belgium, fortifica fort ifications tions were were less les s extensive. In this terrain, the dragon’s teeth were reduced to the size of small parking lot pylons. However, around Aachen, Sxubrucken, and high mobility areas such as the Losheim Gap, antitank obstacles stacl es too monstrous proportions. The Westwall was never designed to be a permanent barrier. The concept was for attacking attacking armies to be delayed by the defenses, defen ses, rugged terrain, an waterways until a German counterattack could drive drive them them out. In 1939,
SITUATION
EUROPE
Europe in January, 1945 This map of Europe in Janu1945. after the Ardennes battle, indicates how much of the continent was still under German control only four months before the end of th war. crumbling crumbling Naz pire extended over Norway, Denma rk, and m ajor portions portions of Italy. Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, slovakia, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Latvia, and the Netherlands.
they proved their worth when th French Army move into the Saar and occupied few kilometers of German territory during the abortive offensive." Although a formidable obstacle against weapons and tactics of of the 1930s. there was little the fortifications could do to halt the American Army in 1944. early as 1940, th Germans themselves used pmtroops to drop onto Belgian and Dutch strongpoints and directed panzers m u n d th Maginot Line, demonstrating the futility of of fixed fortifications. After the June 6, 1944, Alli Allied ed in sion of France, the Westwall was hurriedly reinforced and exten ded, particularly along the border with th Netherlands. There wa no time to improve already emplaced concrete the pillboxes and and antitank dragon's teeth since there as no concrete to spare while German industry built underground or reinforced factories . Nearl all of Westwall's armament and communication systems were dismantled and reinstalled along th English Channel 1943. Although the overgrown concrete bunkers and pillboxes were better naturally camouflaged than they were in 1939, their fields of fire were reduced by th same wild growth. In many cases, local caretakers did not have maps, plans, or keys to th fortifications in their districts. districts.
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During war, military technology advances by by leaps and bounds. Not only does m ilitary ilitary necessity accoun t for increased resourcing. battlefield experience provides a never-ending proving ground. Unfortunately for th Germans, pillboxes, pillboxes, designed fo r weapons of 1936. had no provisions for machine guns and antitank weapons of 1944. Weapo ns were not the only limitations. Initially, it was difficult to man th fortifications with the required number of soldiers. The best that could be accomplished in a few short months wa newly dug fighting positions, fresh minefields, hundreds of miles of barbed wire, and ineffective iron ga tes across secondary roads. On September 10. soldiers from the U.S. th Infantry Division Division c rossed the Our River near Schoenberg? Four days later, American soldiers from the 5th Armored Division crossed the
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Sauer River at Wallendorf. Without much effort, he Americans penetrated the first belt of concrete fortification and advanced to within few m iles o Bitburg. There was little to stop the Americans from occupying the whole Eifel region. The Germans raced troops from Trier to check th advance and destroyed the Sauer bridgehead week later! River incursion, opposite St Vith in Belgium, could not be dislodged. once pro proud ud German German A y was unable to stem th tide, confming the military military adag e that obstac les alone ar useless unless covered by fire and, more significantly, restored by counterattacks. Fortunately for the Germans, th United S tates Army slowed and halted the rugged terrain and thick thick forests of th Ei el. el. The combined with stiffened German reTh
November-December 7992
sistance anchored mound th Westwall, stopped Allied advance. For the Germans, an immediate counterattack to restore the border was out of the question. There were no forces yet available. In the beginning of September 1944, the Germans had only 100 serviceable tanks available on th Western Front? Allied operations in in the Netherlands and incursions around Aachen and in front of the Rur (as spelled in Germany, becomes Roer River in the Netherlands and is often sp elled Roer in military accounts) Dams siphoned off off divisions desperately needed elsewhere. However, Allied penetrations along the Siegfried Line in the southern region of of the S chnee Eifel drew th attention of the Germans. It was only natural then that Westwall's original purpose could be exercised. An attack against the deepest penetration the line would not only expel the Americans from the Eifel, but also threaten to envelop A achen, as well as capture Antwerp, thereby severing he Allies' line of communications. Th seeds of the Ardennes offensive were sown.
Miracle Miracle In the West There would never have been German offensive in the Ardennes if it had not been for Allied delays. After two months of slogging through hedgerow country in Normandy and clearing Brittany, the Allies broke out their small comer of France while at the same time landing an army in the south. On August 25, Paris was liberated. In September, the Allies pushed into Belgium and penetrated the Siegfried Line into Germany and mched a position which, when planning the invasion, they had not expected to gain until ay 1945.' 1945.'' Then the advance ran ou t of steam. By advancing along a broad front the Allies rapidly liberated most of France, Belgium, and Luxembourg at the cost of exhausting their supplies. Not that supplies were short here ARMOR
was just no way get them to th ever more distant front line. Unlike the superhighways of today, there were no autobahns across France in the 1940s. 1940s. The French railroad system was still wrecked from preinvasion bombing and resistance sabotage. Few of the ports were usable. They were either critically damaged or occupied by surrounded German divisions. German garrisons denied port f acilities at Lorient, Nmire, La Rochelle, Calais, and Dunkirk and would continue to do so until May, 1945. Additionally, the German 15th Army controlled the outlet to recently captured Antwerp. For the moment, al supplies had to be trucked to the various poin ts of th front. The trip was frought with ards. In the space between departure and arrival, the convo ys faced confusing routes, traffic j a m s , hijacking by roving bands of black marketeering American deserters and former French resistance, and diversions by competing armies. Complicating supply distribution was British Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery's less than successfu Netherlands offensive. a daring airborne and mechanized strike north onto H olland. olland. The attack, code named MARKET GARDEN, was to seize seven Dutch bridges along 70-mile route with three airborne divisions. Once British armor punched through the German line and crossed all seven bridges, the way would be clear to turn east, unimpeded by terrain, to slice through the German Ruhr industrial basin and then to Berlin. Though the opention captured five of seven bridges, the last bridge at Amhem on the Lower Rhine remained mained f y in German German hands hands (and (and would be until demolished in February, 1945). The soggy sogg y "island" between Arnhem and Nijmegen bridges was largely abandoned by th British who turned their eyes east toward what would eventually be th costly Reichswald operation. In total, th
November-December 1992
MARKET GARDEN operation provided a basis for best-selling book
and movie, but not much else. It denied other armies. particularly General George Patton's Third, the fuel required to exploit penetrations in Germany. Indeed, almost Allied activity that autumn was directed around Aachen. For reasons still debated today, the U.S. U.S. Army turned into th thick Hurtgen Forest. gained a few ilometers of ground while th better part of three U.S. U.S. d ivisions ivisi ons were mauled in fruitless three-month campaign. To the south, the Ardennes, deemed an unlikely site of future German operations, was used by the U.S. Army as place to send battle-weary divisions and trai fresh units. During the delay. the Germans were not idle. Barely able to field an equipped force, th Germans mounted several modest counterattacks with scratch forces to restore large portions of th e line in th hilly hilly E ifel region. By November, units all along the front were standing to fight, and when threatened. they they did so in good order. The Germans called the resurgence of their army "the Miracle of the West. West."" "" With the exceptio n of Aachen, the first major German city captured by the Allies, the western 1937 borders of German remained more or less intact. The apparent threat in th West, combined with the local German successes, acted as magnet for Hitler's military attention. Against advice of his generals, Hitler drained his carefully hoarded resources preparation fo major attack. Hitler knew that the Ardennes was th last card to be played. Whether the forces were successful or not, the machines and war materiel could never be replaced.
Why the W est? Desperate as he situation seemed, the German Reich still controlled greater portion of Europe in late 1944 29
To make up for personnel losses, au-
The Tiger II or ’Kin ’King g Tiger,”was the best protecte protected, d, best armed tank tank in W and far superior Allied Allied rivals. This one, part of Kampfgtuppe Pe iper, threw track and was abandoned in the early stages of the Ardennes offensive.
than it had after the conquest of Po land in in 1939. Thou gh the enem ies of the Reich had multiplied number and strength since 1941, th invading forces simply offensive out steam. The Soviets drove into Poland and the eastern tip East Prussia, but at great cost. The Red Army found itself at the end of supply line stretched across eastern eastern Europe. Continuous operations against stiff German opposition across a scorched countryside forced Soviets to temporarily halt. Though Soviets crossed the prewar Polish frontier in August, they paused east of Warsaw, where they remained almost five months. Stalin concerned himself with driving Germany’s allies out of the war and occupying the Balkans and Baltic countries. th Red Army gathered its breat for the final drive on G ermany, Hitler Hitler concluded the Russians were offensively exhausted. Horrendous Soviet losses and a slim logistics chain made it “clear“ that the Russians had reached their high water mark. Hitler believed that administration of the conquered territories alone would stall the Ru ssians indefinitely. indefinitely. For the time being, the Russians were not a threat. In northern Italy, Luftwaffe Field Marshal Albert Kesselring skillfully managed an economy of force mission in rugged temin and grudgingly
30
gave ground. In Hitler’s opinion, the defensive battle battle in Italy was good fo at least mother year. To the north, Norway and Denmark were secure for the moment. In fact, Germans maintained military supremacy in Scandinavia, where the navy secured the waters waters d Norway while while th Luftwaffe ruled th Arctic. In G ermany, the Luftw affe managed to rebuild from its staggering piecemeal losses that summer into a force capable of several hundred sorties per day against Allied targets.” targets.” German industry industry,, f y under control control of of M inister of of Armaments Albert Speer, had before D-Day. peak production The production surge, in pat due to th Allied air forces momentary attention to French targets, provided much needed war material for a skeletal German Army. D ecentralized production, round the clock manufacturing. and reinforced and underground factories made up for shortfalls due to bombing. To quickly reequip units, the German Army called upon its. as yet ly touc touche hed, d, vast stock of captured weapons stored at various depots from Czechoslovakia to Grafenwohr, Germany. Foreign artillery pieces of almost every caliber, originally planned planned to commemoas roadside monuments to nte German victories, were assembled to fulfill a m ilitary role. role.
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tomatic weapons were increased throughout the give units more fyepower, especially when fighting in wooded m. he 7.92mm MP-44 assault rifle, the forerunner of the U.S. Army’s M-16 rifle of the 1960s. ssued in great quantities and was th most common Gerinfantry weapon in the Arma denne~.’~ The Reichsbahn, Germany’s efficient, though antiquated, s t a t e nilroad, was able to keep supplies movand massive in despite hom fic losse s and nids on facilities. Despite rumors the contrary, was the Wehrmacht’s primary mode of tmsportation. Over the first two weeks of cember, some 1,500 trains bearing troops. tanks, and guns unloaded in marshaling yards east of the Ardennes.14 With five years experience, th Germans were technologically supeto the Allies. Though they would never have the atomic bomb, and the “V” weapons were only a nuisance, the Germans made remarkable strides in military technolog y. The Luftwaffe, Luftwaffe, though driven from th skies of uonly operational jet rope, had fighter, bomber, and reconnaissance t of the wa . Indeed, Indeed, the the dual dual jet engined Amdo 234 routinely photographed Allied supply beaches and battlefie lds in France.” Throughout the war in the West, German armor was consistently consistently supeto that of the Allies. Though the French fielded superb tanks in 1940, they were not employed properly and were quickly rounded up by th invading Germans. With the German defeat in Fmnce, not only were many tanks lost in battle or du to air attack, damaged panzers could not be recovered from the battlefield before they were captured. The relative stabilization of front allowed th German armor. Army to rebuild its supply Hitler ordered that the entire production tion of th e 68-ton Tiger I1 tank be sent
ovember-December 1992
to the west and al medium armor to the Eastern Eastern Front.1 Front.16 6 On On the evening evening befo before re the the p t batt battle le 717 tanks assault guns sat camouflaged opposite the American American positions.” positions.” Leading the refitting effort th often maligned Panzerkampfwagen V Ausf B, better known as the King Tige Tigerr 1 . Lik it predecessor, the Tiger I, the King Tiger was was superior superi or in armor an armament to an Allied tank. In battles in Normandy, the Tiger eliminated its opponents with ease. So feared were these 68-ton giants that Americans often called every German German tank a “Tiger.”’* “Tiger.”’* Apart from production shortages and the tank’s vulnerability to air attack, 136 King King Tigers Tige rs (remarkable considering only 47 were were manufactured during the war) were ready for the Ardennes offensive.’’ Regardless of of Hitler’s disdain for the armies of of Soviet Russia, the west, from from a cartographer’s c artographer’s point of view, was was the threat. threat. Historians Historians studying the Ardennes offensive usually do so with Hitler, as 1937 maps of Germany. well as to the German people, Germany many was larger. Kesselring’s Kesselrin g’s deter mined defense in Italy was due not so much much to Italy’s Italy’s surrender surrender as it was that the Germans shared a commo
Soldiers of the U.S. 99th Infantry Division marched into captivity captivity by Germ an paramopafter the initial surprise of the Ardennes attack.
national border (the former Austrian frontier). An Allied Allied offensive offe nsive into Austria wa attack attack on Germany Germany itself. Fo the time being, that possibility was months away In the east, east, German Germany y swallowe half of Czechoslovakia Czechoslovak ia and was close close to Germanizing the country. The border known n as the Sudentenland, Sudentenland, area, know already part of the Reich. The “Protectorate” Czechoslovakia Czechoslovak ia was was in no danger of of imminent invasion. In Poland, Poland, German in the process of of repossessing repossessi ng areas owned by Germany before 1918. With the exception ception of a few towns in in East Prus-
sia, these lands were safely in German hands. Red Army An attack against would undoubtedly bring tactical success, cess, but reach reach no strategic strateg ic objective. In order to be Victorious, the Red Army would have to be driven hund r e d s of miles, at least out of Belorussia and and the Ukraine. Hitler’s Hitler’s carefully hoarded pmzer pmzer force f orce would would easily be swallowed in the %pet Marshes and vast expanse expa nse of Russia. An offensive in the Balkans to be avoided entirely. The German forces force s there were having enough problems protecting their lines of
At a farm yard in Belgium on th second day of the offensive, offensive, German paratroo er look over antitank guns, trucks, trucks, and jeeps left behind by U.S. units. At upper right, the Germ an Panther tank. At lower right, the Tiger II on of 13 that were scrounged together for thrust into th Ardennes.
ARMOR
November-December
1992
31
The Ardennes Gamble Adrennes battle map shows limits of German objectives and actual progress, army boundaries, and Allied front line day th battle
began.
September, only a sliver of th country along the and Sau er Rivers reremained German.
Why the Ardennes? Historians in the 1950s an 1960s contend the G ermans attacked attacked through th Ardennes because of earlier victories through the wooded area in 1914 and 1940. However 1914, the German border extended farther th west than it did in 1937. True, German Panzer Gen enl Heinz Guderian's Guderian's thrust through the Ardennes in 1940 was a masterstroke, but it also was rected southwest against weakened French, Belgian, and British positions. Th 1944 drive would be northwest toward Antwerp, against grain of the country and in an area of very few
comm unications again st partisans, and fi s against the the Soviets and turncoat turncoat allies. Italy offered opportunities, but not for heavy panzer force. The very mountainous terrain which formed Kesselring's successful defense would be turned against Germans. Additionally, there were no ra materials to be gained, no thankful population to liberate, and no relief on fronts closer to Germany. If there was an attack, t would have to on th Western Front. The situation situation in the West by far the most dangerous. The Allies had already liberated the Belgian easternmost province of Eupen et Mal-
medy?' which was annexed by the Reich in 1940 (they were lost by by Germany after the First World War in 1919). Th American capture of Axhen and incursion toward Ru Dm posed a threat to the industrial Ruhr. This congested area, encompassing seved major cites along the Rhine, had already taken taken a beating from from continuous Allied air attacks. Its capture would virtually eliminate German war production. Luxembourg, described as German by tradition. Ftench by politics?' wa close to annexation by the time of the June Allied invasion of France. In
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From the Ardennes, it was only 110 miles to Antwerp reasonably tainable, though not necessarily retainable. strategic objective. Not only would the attack relieve pressure on the German border, but would cut off the bulk of the British Army in the north and deny the Allies their northernmost port. fate would have it, geography favored a German buildup. The Eifel region opposite the Ardennes offered cover and concealment, particularly for an y t r they had in 1914 and 1940. spurs of th Reichsbahn railroad ight into th Eifel from Trier and Koblenz. The German population of the region was unquestionably loyal, thus he chance of betrayal was slight. Additionally, Novembef-December 1992
most of families immediately across the front lines had at least one father or son still in the German Army and the locals could considered sympathetic. For the limited resources available, compared to the forces allotted in 1940, the Ardennes was deemed ideal. Though German generals like Field Marshal Walther Model advocated an attack to regain the historic Holy Roman capital, Aachen, Hitler would not hear anything of it. In his estimate, Aachen could be retaken, but the cost would be too great. Throughout the war, Hitler rarely supported plans that involved direct assaults on major cities. City fighting easily swallowed divisions and tied them down for weeks at a time. Hitler remembered Stalingrad all too clearly, where panzer army was committed to a city that could have been outflanked. Seizi Seizing ng n would would have have n stmtegic signifi significance. cance. Moreover, was too close to the British and Canadian forces in the Netherlands. Axhen's capture would no doubt evoke a swift counterattack. counterattack. Despite feeble attempts to dissuade him, Hitler was se on attacking through th Ardennes, cutting off British and Canadian annies, and inflicting defeat on the Americans sim ilar to that of their 1943 disaster at Kasserine Kasserine Pass in Tunisia at the hands of Panzer Armee Afrika. Paralysis of the enemy, not necessarily hi physica destruction, was the aim?3 Hitler was convinced that th Allied link with th Russians was fragile and defeat in th West would serve rupture the alliance.% Though he knew he could not win the war. he might be able to sue for se pm te peace peace withwithout surrender and then deal militarily with the Russians. In hindsight, the goal seems unrealistic. To th German military, and particularly to Hitler, it was the only logical course of action. Germany could not survive by fighting a defensive war, unconditional surrender would would b ring term s worse than than th ose of 1918, and the dictatorship would have
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been doomed. The only mu te left through th Ardennes.
Notes 'Cooper, Uatthcw, The German Army 1933Scarborough House, Chelsea. Michigan. 1978. p. 518. 2Crookenden. Napier, Bank of rh Bulge 1944. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 1980. p. 6. 31bid.. p. 7. 'Irving, David. Hifler's War. Avon Books. New Yorlc, 1990, p. 722. 'Elstob, Peter, Basrogne, fh Road Block, Ballantine Books. New York. 1972, p. 8. 'Flaherty. T h o m a s H.. Editor, The Reach Empire. Time-Life Books Alexandria, Virginia, 1989, p. 36. 7Nosbuesch. Johannes, Bis Zum Bitterern Ende, Paulinur-Drucker Paulinur-Druckerei. ei. GmbH , Trier, Bundesrepublik Dcutschland. Dcutschland. 1978, p. 113. ?bid.. p. 93. 515. 'cooper. "Ibid.. p. 516. "Goolrick, Willian and Ogden Tanner, The Baffle fh Bulge, Time-Life Books. Alexandria, Virginia, 1979, p. 32. '*Criers, T h o m a s Editor, The Second World War, the Wert Point Military Histor Series, Avery Publishing Group, Wayne, New Jerre 1984. p. 370. 'Parker, Danny S. Battle rh Bulge, Combined Books. Conrhohocken, Pennsylvania. 1991. p. 54. 141bid.. 25. .''Irving. David, Gorring, Avon Books. New York, 1989, p. 441. 16 Cooper. 517. "Parker, p. 26. '*Ibid., p. 234. ''lbid. mMacDondd. Charles B., Time Trumpers, William Morrow and Company, New York, 985, p. 28. "Flaherty. T h o m a s H.. Editor. The Heel of the Conqueror. Time Life Books. Alexandria. Vi inia, 1991, p. 11. 'Perret, BVM. Knights the Black Cross, Maltin's Pnsr, New York, 1986. p. 237. % m p e r . p 520. "Lucas, James, Reich, Gnfion Boob. London, 1989.
1945.
Sources Blumenson, Martin, The Patron Papers 19401945. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1974. Doyle, EnChamberlain. Chamberlain. P eter and Hilary ar cyclopeda German Tanks World Two, Publishing Company, New York, 1978. Coopcr. Matthew. The German Army 19331945. Scarborough House, Chelsea, Michigan, 1978.
ovember-December
1992
Cm ken den. Napier Napier Battle o f f h eBulge 1914, ew Yok, 1980. Elstob. Peter. Basrogne, rhe Ruud Block, Ballantine Ballantine Bo ob , New York, 1972. Flahetty. Thomas H.. Editor. H e e l ofthe Conqueror. Time Life Books. Alexandria, Virginia, 1991. Flahetty, Thomu H., Editor, The Reach for Empire, Time-Life Book s, Alexandria, Virginia, 1989. Ogden Tanner. The Godrick. Willian fh Bulge, Time-Life Books. A l m Battle dria. Virginia, 1979. Griers. T h m r Editor. The Second World War. the West Point Military History Series, Avery Publishing Group, Wayne, New Jersey, 1984. Irving, David, Goring, Books, New York, 1989. Irving, David, Hifler'r War. Avon Books, New York. 1990. Kleine, Egon and Volkmrv Kuehn, Tiger, Die 194245, Geschichre einer Legendaeren Motorbuch Verlag. Swagart, Bundesnpublik Deutrchland. 199 1. Lucas, James, Reich, Gnfton Books. London, 1989. Time Trumpets, MacDondd. Chader B. William William M w and Company Company.. New Yorlc, 1985. NighrNewton. John. Editor, Descent in fo Nighrmare, Time-Life Books, Alexandria, Virginia, 1992. Zum Bifferem Nosboesch, Johanncs, Ende, Paulinus-Druckerri, GmbH, Trier, Bundarep ublik Deutsch Deutschlan land. d. 1978. Bulge, ComParker. Danny S., Battle of bined Books. Conshohocken. Pennsylvania, 1991. he Black Cross, St. Pc mt , Bryan. Bryan. Knights Mm~in'rPm r. Ne York, 1986. Rhine, Stein Whiting, Charles. Bounce and Day. New York, 1986. Charles Scribner's
Captain Kevin R. Austra is currently the S3 training officer, 103d Military Intelligence Battalion, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), Wunburg, Germany. He graduated from Seton Hall University in 1982 and received his masters degree from Central Michigan University in 1989. In 1991, he was awarded the Bronze Star Medal for his service during Operation DESERT STORM. He has published several articles on the Battle of the Bulge and is a frequent visitor to the Ardennes battle site.
50th A nniversar
14th Amored Dlvision
14th in Seven Months of Combat, Liberated Thousands Thousands i Nazi Empire
Once again, the 14th turned its attention to training. Each soldier went through an infantry assault course, an urban assault course, an infilmtion course, and a close com bat course. During ropefree time, the “LibenGeneral Orders, Headquarters, Armored Force, tors” took part in an extensive program of comactivated the 14th Armored petitive athletics. Division on on 15 November In September 1943, the 1942, at Camp Chaffee, . .14th reorganized accordArkansas. As early as Seping to the new light divitember 1942, initial sion table of organizacadre fo th new division Tanks and infantry of the 14th AD move down forest bail in Germany. team from th tion. had smed to arrive. At Armored Force inspected the division messhall. Later, Later , they began the new new that time, the 6t Armored Division in October 1943. The 14th exceeded was moving out. As soon as the 6th year with a road march and bivouac. all expectations. General Gillam, the vacated a building th 14th occupied For nearly , g wo Armored C ommand’s commander, exexit December 1942, more t h a n be th sole activity of the 14th. pressed his sincere congratulations to Mobilization Training Program pre13,000 men joined th cadre to bring the “Liberators” on a job well done. scribed the conduct of dl mining. Ofthe 14th up to full strength. Most of ficers attended th Division Officers In November 1944, as the 14th these new men were draftees or enlistTraining School. The training plan moved to the Tennessee manuever ee fresh ivilian life. The “Libwas progressive, and the “Liberators” he 12th Armored Division erators” included men from every steadily grew com bat ready. moved moved fro from m the trai training ning a o Camp Camp E. Richstate in the Union. MG town In May 1943, 1 943, the nearb Chaffee. The “Liberators” cleaned ard, ard, the the 1 4t h’ ommander, forcefully Camp Smith suffered the worst flood their their vehic vehicles les and b s and turne turne stressed that the job of the division in its history. Fields, highways, and them over to the 12th. and the diviwas to prepare for combat. Training began immediately. On houses disappeared under the rising sion moved by battalion to the trainwater. Flooding destroyed power ing m , drawing vehicle vehicless fro from m th Christmas Christmas Eve 1942 MG Prichard addressed the entire division for first lines, water mains. and reservoirs. 12th. The division participated in time. He explained the necessity to Prichard ordered the division to eight consecutive mining problems, living tactically in the field. work hard and prepare for combat, assist local authorities in a massive rescue and relief effort. The 14th used “Liberators” spent Thmksgivand he gave the season’s greetings. all wheeled and water-going vehicles ing, Christmas, and New Year’s n the Then, “Liberators” celebrated Christmas Day with a dismounted to rescue and evacuate stranded famifield, and in Jmuvy 1944, moved to Cam p Camp bell, Kentucky, just as the road march and dinner in th lies. Soldiers sandbagged bridges, highways. and railroads. Mechanics enerators. Medics established ai World War ii Campaigns stations. Engineers set up water purifiWorld War II Commanders cation points and repaired bridges. Rhineland Th 8t and 11th Armored Divisions Vernon Pritchard sent additional men men and equipment to November 1942 July 1944 Atdennes-Alsace Atdennes-Alsace help. Finally, the waters subsided, and the grateful people of Fort Smith ofAlbert Smith Central Europe fered their thanks. thanks. July 1944 Deactivation The 14th Armored Division will celebrate its 50th anniversary this November. The “Liberators” were an active unit for only three years, but played a major role the liberation Eu
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34
ARMOR
ovember-December 1992
stubborn German resistance, th “Liberators” penetrated to the Alsatian plain, linked up with the 3rd Infantry Division, and cut off the retreat retre at of the deback up to streng th, and soon, th unit back fending Germans. 14th began preparation for overseas By the morning of movement. 16 December 1944, Throughout September 1944, it combat commands men of the d ivision carefully packed had crossed the Lauequipment and sent personal belongter River into Gerings home. Units loaded on trains for An enemy antitan k gun put two shots through this Sherman’s transmission. many. New York. early October 1944, In late December, the 14th had closed on Camp Shanks. 1944, th 14th was ordered to defend For about two weeks, the division fight, the 14th liberated he prisoner an expan ded sector, allowing other diprocessed for deployment. The “Libof war camp at Hammelburg. Resisvisions to move nonh to halt the Gererators” enjoyed classes on boat drill tance became uncoordinated and spoman offensive into Belgium. On and passes to New Y ork City. radic as the “Liberators” drove even January 1945, the Germans launched Finally, the 14th loaded onto the deeper into Germany. The division savage, eight-division eight-division attack again st U.S.S. Santa Rosa, the U.S.S. Le crossed the Danube River on 28 April th thinly spread “Libera “Liberator tors. s.”” Jeune, the U.S.S. eneral James Par1945. Next, the 14th seized Landshut port personnel served as infantry, supker, and the U.SA.T. Sea Robin. An and liberated the prisoner of of war ported by anti-aircraft guns. Isolated additional 14 freighters and Liberty camp at Moosburg. Finally, the divioutposts held ke road junctions ships carried carried their equipment. On 14 sion reached the Inn River near against overwhelming odds. After October 1944, th ships set sail fo r an chau when hostilities ended. much vicious fighting in harsh unknown destination. Although the Th “Liberators” remained near weather, the 14th gave ground but ships were crowded and uncomfortWasserburg and processed German held the line. Then , the division counable, the voyage was uneventful. prisoners and displaced persons. The terattacked to relieve the hard pressed On 30 October 1944, th “Libera“point system’’ slowly changed the 79th Infantry Division and push th tors**arrived tors**arrived at the southern French th 14th. Veterans rotated face Germans back. back. port Marseilles, and wo weeks home, and new men from other units In February 1945, th 14th assumed later entered the line at Frencharrived. In In August 1945, the the entire didefensive posture for rehabilitation. Italian border. In November 1944, th vision moved to Marseilles and sailed Much-needed replacements and new 14th attacked into the Vosges Mounfo the United States. The 14th arrived equipment arrived. arrived. On 15 March tains as part of the U.S. U.S. Seventh Seve nth at Hampton Roads, Virginia on 16 1945, the 14th attacked across th Army. Despite th rugged rugged temin , and September 1945, and deactivated at Rothbach and Moder Camp Patrick Henry the same day. Rivers. Quickly, th During th drive across Europe, th tankers exploited break14th liberated 200,000 Allied pnsonthroughs and reached the ers and over 250,000 displaced pervaunted “Westwall.” sons. The “Liberators played key The “Libentors” role in the fighting to defeat German y, fought through deterand captured 64,000 risoners. Today, mined resistance and the “Liberators” maintain an active captured the German citveteran s association. association. ies of Germersheim and Schaidt on 1945. Then, the 14th Captain John Buckheit precrossed the Rhine River pared this unit history while on April 1945 and conon temporary assignment to tinue tinuedd e . It rapidly rapidly ARMOR. seized seized Lohr* Gem unden, An M 10 tank destroyer destroyer attached the 14th AD moves past
26th Infantry Division moved out for maneuvers. Quickly, he division settled into their new camp and resumed training. American casualties in Europe mounted, and th 14th had to provide individual trained replace-
shell-pocked shell-pocked church church in Rohrwiller Rohrwiller,, G ermany, in February, 1 945.
ARMOR
November-December 7992
35
The Two-Man Tank Its Fightabil Fightab ilit ity y and Endurance End urance by Robln Fletcher
Captain Mike Newell, in hi article in March-April 1992 issue of ARMOR, ets ou to demonstrate “the advantages and th feasibility of fu ture MBT concept with two-man crew.” crew.” He conside rs that “any future place a reMBT design is likely duced crew in the tank hull, mount an external gun, have an automatic loader and, because of the prolifemtion of blinding battlefield lasers, depend on indirect optics for viewing This is basic FMBT design used throughout [his] discussion.” He says that “a two-man tank is potentially more su rvivab le than than a three-man tank. Survivability is the critical issue But] can two men effectively fight the tank in sustained combat operations?” Captain Newell’s contention that survivability will be increased simply by reducing the number of crewmen and reducing the vehicle’s armored volume should surely be accompanied by an acknow ledgem ent that increased survivability will, in fact, be attributable as much to the adoption of the new turretless configuration as to straightforward volume reduction. T he proposed turretless configuration will give a significant reduction in the MBT’s frontal area, which will then be able to be more heavily armored, with the vehicle’s components, such as crew stations, ammunition stowage and and power power plant plant,, m in series behind it. If a front-engined hull layout is preferred, preferred, as it almost certainl certainl will be, these components will be ar ranged in a different order, with the ammunition magazine at the rear of the hull for crew safety and easy replenishmen There ar other factors which will affect survivability, apart from config-
36
uration and volume, and these will be addressed later, but for the moment, let us address the key question: “Can a two-man tank crew maneuver th targets, and tank, acquire and engage targets, exercise command and control of th tank (and tank unit for leaders)? And can a two-man tank crew remain combat effective during sustained combat operations?” Maneuvering and and Fighting the Tank
In th case of three-man, automatimlly-loaded, turreted tank (e.g. Russian T-72), wo men can handle the vehicle when it road marching and maneuvering out of contact with the enemy, with one ma driving from his position in the front of the hull and the other exercising all-around observation from the top of the turret. It will be even easier to march and matank specifically designed neuver for two-man operation with both men seated together in the hull and having “360-degree vision as well as duplicate driving, viewing, and weapon controls,” as was found necessary in the German VT 2x2 rials quoted by Captain Newell. For instance, the crewman driving a two-man tank will able to reverse without having to be supervised by th other crewman, which is not the case at present in a turreted tank where the turret blocks rearward vision. But things will become more complicated when two-man tank enters combat and the three sepmte crew tasks of all-around observation, target engagement, and driving have to be handled by only two crewmen. These three tasks can be shared between them in three di fere ferent nt m
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ments and, due to the duplication of their crew stations, can be exchanged from one to th other almost instrmt instrmtaaneously. In practice, it will be difficult for one to combine driving with all-around observation and command of th vehicle, and it is doubtful if if the other crewman can be allowed to re main unoccupied until he undertakes target engagement. Therefore, the ve hicle comm ander might make himsel responsible for all-around observation in the normal manner and then go on to engage targets himself while his ju nior crewman would look after the driving and only assum e responsibil responsibility ity for all-around watch while his commander was actually firing. Or the commander might confine himself to all-around observation and the command of his vehicle and hand off acquired targets to his drive r who would have the assistance of an automatic target tracking and engagement system. An ad vanta ge of the latter ar rangement would be that with both driving and gunnery being handled by th same crewman. he would be able to maneuver th tank rapidly when engaging from behind crestline and reposition it immediately if an ob structio n were to block his view of of the target. There are, however, a number of problems that should be acknowledged, of which the first that the tank tank commander*s ll-around ll-around ob se tion will have to continue to be exercised from the highest point of the ve hicle. If this is not done, the enemy may spot the external gu on its raised mounting as the tank moves cross-country before our crewmen are in position to se th enemy. The enemy will then simply wait and open fue when ready and probably destroy our vehicle. No doubt, Captain Newell has appreciated appreciated this potential hmard and has avoided it by specifying that the all-around observation sensors
ovember-December 1992
to be located on top of the external gun mounting. A second problem will be that, although it will be easy to display both driving and sighting vision on flat screens in front of each crewman, it will be far more difficult to make allaround remote vision available to th crewman commanding the vehicle who will need to be given widest possible field of view observe battlefield. Indeed, as already mentioned, the 2x2 tests found that “360-degree [remote] vision [was] required [not only for one but] for both crewmen.” The commander of present da conventional tank will fight “head out,” if that is at all possible, order to continue to use his natural 150-degree w ide angle vision. vision. Th all-around vision cupola, with its array of vision blocks or episcopes, gives him more or less the same ability while also giving him protection. If th introduction of battlefield lasers makes the of indirect vision from remote sensors essential, he will only be able to watch part of the battlefield on a f lat screen at any one time, and enemy movement and gu flash in other sectors will be likely to go un noticed. No doubt, an automatic detection system would be able to draw is attention to enemy vehicles appearing outside his observed sector nd even identify them for him and then go on to track them ut how will he become aware of enemy bunkers and infanhy tank hunters outside his restricted field vision? Will this result in crewmen having to be surrounded by an array of screens giving full 360-degree coverag (a is believed to be the case, initially at least, in th German VT trials vehicle), as in that case the volume occupied by their crew statio ns is likely to become excessive. Might crewmen not have to be given Helmet Mounted Display (HMD) and helmet position-sensing systems so that they can quickly and naturally turn their restricted fields of view to observe in any direction? are
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-,,ay of
TV
screens needed for 360-degree viewing viewing in Germ an VT 2x2 test vehicle.
A third problem will be that of the gun itself. Its raised external gun mounting will m ake it very prominent and is bound to attract enemy attention. No doubt, it will able to be camouflaged, screened against therm al emission, and covered with radar absorbent materials, but an external gun mounting is not th most suitab le conconfiguration with which to start before applying low observable technology (see ARMOR, March-April 1992, p. fourth problem will be that of protecting an external gun raised permanently above the hull of the vehicle. Although the barrel itself may be able to accept a great deal of punishment, protection will be needed for the breech and for the recoil system. Also, reloading gu in such a position will not be easy, although the probable adoption of a front-engined hull layout with a sealed and vented ammunition magazine at the rear of the vehicle will certainly make it easier. Continuo us Combat an E x t e n d e d P e r i o d If the above-m entioned series of problems ar acknowledged and can then overcome, our two-man tank can certainly be fought for 24 hours continuously given night vision devices which are now available or
November-December 7992
which ar in development. But can the tw o crewmen carry on beyond that period when they will become exhausted, or will they have to removed from the vehicle and two fresh crewm en substituted? substituted? Captain Newel1 sets out to support his two crewmen with manner of new technology .and states that “with basic near-term technology improvement, we [can] give the crewmen of two-man tank over eight hours of free time day.” Frankly, I don’t believe believe it, This might be so in some outmoded 24-hour combat cycle in which tanks are expected to maneuver and fight by day and to us the night for rest and replenishment. But this will certainly not be the case in the immediate fu ture, when full sets of night vision devices ar made available and and tanks afe able to maneuver and fight almost almost as well by night as they can in daylight. In this new environment, maneuver and comb at wil be almost continuous, apart from pauses of minimum length for maintenance and replenishment that crewmen will be on duty constantly and get no rest to speak of. Should the tanks of formation held in reserve, and be dispersed and stationary, the most that can be hoped for will that proportion the formation erhaps every other vehicle ill be allowed to switch off and for crewmen to sleep their crew stations. An infallible alerting 37
driving, viewing, and weapon system will then have to be procontrols” and are given the assisvided so that resting tanks can be tance of “an automated acquisicontacted and again become availtion and engagement system.“ able. With on ly two crewmen handling operating under this pressure, th three crew tasks of all-around two-man crew will last for 24 observation, target engagement hours 48 hours at th utmost and driving between them, it is before fresh crewmen will possible that the reactions of have to be introduced into th Although Although Sweden’s ‘S-Tank‘ is designed to operate with two-man tank will be more rapid operational. tw tank to keep only two crewmembers. third travels at the rear of the hull compartment provide added endurance. to than those of vehicle which two-man crews ar available to needs team three to operate man each two-man tank alterit. However, while there will be little if he w ere able to occupy space withi nately, the offduty crew will have difficulty in presenting driving and the vehicle which had been provided light ar be carried in some form target engagement images on fixed for another purpose. For instance, if mored vehicle which will then have to screens in front of each crewman, givhe were able to rest and sleep in a meet up with the tank for crew ing them wide-angle 360-degree vipassageway running between the change to be effected. advantage sion from raised remote sensors will fighting compartment of front-enwill be that all four crewmen will then remain a problem. gined tank and an entrance in the rear be available to work on their vehicle Can only two crewmen “remain of the vehicle, he would only be maktogether, doing maintenance or re combat effective during sustained full ing use of armored volume which plenishment, but will th socalled combat operations?” No, that will not was already available. available. “fresh” crewmen have been adebe possible because night vision deIt is of interest to note that in the quately rested and will they be able to vices will make 24-hour operation encase of th Swedish “S tank, which reach th designated rendezvous? and AirLand Opem tions tirely feasible and is the only tank in service currently Captain Newell says that “extra crews demand continuous war of mawill operated by only two crewmen, a and maintenance crew chiefs may not neuver. Either fresh two-man crew third crewman is, in fact, accommobe necessary” but it is d ifficult to see must replace exhausted crewmen or dated in the rn f the hull to extend how they will not be needed given th third man must be carried within the the vehicle’s endurance. availability of night vision devices vehicle to join in crew rotation rotation sysand the increased tempo of maneuver tem, which will make two crewmen Conclusions demanded by AirLand Operations. available to operate the vehicle 24 However, an alternative system of hours a day for long mtinuous periods. crewing might see third crewman Surely, the increase in survivability canied within the vehicle, not to take sought by Captain Newell as been part in its operation but to change achieved as much by adoption of places with the other two crewmen the proposed turretless crew-in-hull Robin Fletcher was commiswhen they become exhausted. If all configuration as by reduction in the sioned in the Westminster three crewmen are similarly trained in number of crewmen, leading to a reDragoons in 1941 and later the op eration eration their vehicle; they can duction in the vehicle’s volume? served in the Special Operachange places every four, six, or eight It is doubtful whether the term “extions Executive and 2d Speor n accord accordin ingg to fixed sched ule o ternal gun” should be taken to mean cial Air Service Regiment. rotation and each man will then have only one that is permanently raised After the war, he attended the the “eight hours of free time a day” above the hull of the vehicle because, technical staff officer‘s course for resting and sleeping mentioned mentioned by in that case, it will be prominent and at Shrivenham, spent tw Captain Newell. vulnerable and reloading will be diffiyears on tank design at Such an alternative crewing system cult. Several other external gun Chobham, and returned to can, of course, be rejected rejected out of of h md mounting systems ar now the subject Shrivenham Shriven ham to to lecture lecture on tank on the grounds of reduced survivabilof proposals, and these should be exarmament. After leaving the ity. The tank would have to be enamined and considered as possible id service, he raised crops in larged to accommodate th resting ternat ives. Kenya and cattle in Ireland. crewman and would be bound to presCan only two crewmen fight such Hi articles on armor have en larger target, and three men vehicle? Yes, certainly that will be been published in Internawould be put at risk in larger crew possible, particularly if the are seated tional Defense Review, Soldat compartment. But th inclusion of in duplicate, fixed hull crew stations und Technik, Technik, Military Technolthird man would not be so contentious with “360-degree vision and duplicate ogy, and other journals.
ARMOR
November-December 1992
PHOTO B Y L T C DIANA O B E N A U E R
Armor’s Ow by Major James Brewer When When Idaho Idah o National Guardsman Guardsman CSM Larry Steele’s great-grandfather came by covered covered wagon to Idaho Idaho in 1896, elements elements of of the U.S. Cavalry were gatekeepers gatekeep ers of the Oregon Trail Charged with protecting settlers from hostile Indians and and their t heir own unpreparedness, the cavalry inspected each wagon train to make sure the pioneers had had enough provisions provisio ns to last through the journey furth f urther er west. west. Today, U.S. Army forces, forces, in in the form of the Idaho National Guard, still serving as gatekeepers nly now at Gowen Gowen Field, Field, an Air National National Guard Base turned Armor Training Center, they are evaluating tankers to see they’r they’re e ready to head into in to the 21st century. Triggered by by the failure failure of of numerous numero us Guard tankers to pass the Tank Crew Gunner Gunnery y Skills Skil ls Test, the gateway to the Master Gunner’s Course, Cour se, the National tional Guard Bureau began began a Reserv Component Tank Commanders Course (RCTCC) (RCTCC) at Gowe Gowen n Field, just ju st outside Boise, Idaho, in in 1984. 1984. Since that time, the facilit fac ility y has has grown to be one of of the premier premier armor training sites
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Private Idaho in the country. Expanding over the past eight years, the program now now in cludes cludes a Basic NCO NCO Course, Advanced vanced NCO Course, Course , Battle Battl e Staff Course, New New Equipment Trainin Teams, Teams, and a state-of-t state- of-the-ar he-artt Multipurpose Range Complex. Complex. The instruc in struc tors at Gowen Field like to refer to themselves “Fort Knox West,” and have have requested the new new offical title titl e of National Guard B u m u , Armor Training Center. The continued drawdown drawdown of active act ive duty forces, the deactivation deactiv ation of some units, and the conversion of others othe rs to the Reserve Component Comp onent makes makes the mission of these National Guard Guard train ers more more importan than ever. Current projections call for some 53 percent percent of the heavy armor force to housed housed in the Reserve Component b 1996, thus the quality of of instr instructi uction on and and the th e cumculum at this thi s remote Idaho site become become critical critical to the fu ture effectiven effect iveness ess f the combat arm of decision. But the confidence confidenc e and pride prid e of of the trainers here here leaves little doubt that they ar prepared for the mission. “Over eight years,” says say s LTC LTC Richard L. Brown, commandant commandant of the
November-December 7992
school, “when you se over 5,000 soldiers, you you really r eally get a feel fo what they learn, how how they operate, operate, their capabilities.” Brown Brown describ describes es the soldie sol diers rs who come to Gowen Field as mature, motivated and well educated, averaging some 13 years of education. ut insists that Reserve Component trainers and leaders must continue to shoulder the lion’s lion’s share s hare of of the training burden burden for fo r traditional traditio nal Reserve Component soldiers. “We know where their motivation motivati on is, an who hasn’t served served in National Guard or Reserve unit doesn’t really understand how how a civilian makes that transition to a soldier and back again.”
Res ewe Componen Componen Tank Tank Commanders Course The Tank Commanders Course, the h e a t of the Idaho program, is some 156 hours of training, Written by Guardsmen Guardsmen for Guardsmen: Guardsmen: but the t he umbilical cord of doctrine do ctrine with Fort Knox remains strong as the prof instruction (POI) is inspired by, and certified certifi ed by, Armor Armor Center Center staff.
“We’ve had great working relationship with Fort Knox since 1984,” Brown says, indicating that they mirro the Armor Center’s 19K program of instruction instructio n and adapt it to the 19Es they train. Initia Initiall lly, y, the the G d had had plan planne ned d to export its TCC, but later decided to centralize the training at Gowen Field. The present focus is individual/crew training up to platoon level apitalizing on th DESERT STORM lesson that maintaining training at platoon level is critical to successfully integrating Reserve Component forces. Using modest, yet effective, classroom faciliti fac ilities, es, together toget her wit with h the 138,OOO-acre Orchard Training Area, some 26 miles south of Boise, students undergoing NCOES training at the TCC “actually spread out to cover ground and or maneuver a section see for themselves th expanse of of terrain they must be prepared to control,” according to LTC Brown. Of the 17 instructo inst ructors rs in the TCC, TCC, 14 are master gunners, trained at Fort Knox, most mo st of whom began on M60A3s and transitioned to M1 Abrams. Approximately 38 states send soldiers to the Tank Commanders Course, including the Kentucky National Guard. When asked the latter latte r would would not n ot use the Fort Knox course, the school Sergeant Major, Larry Steele, explained that most National Guard soldiers cannot break fo r the six free of their civilian jobs for weeks required of the Knox program.
About
the Photo on
Page 39
LTC Diana Obenauer captured the spiri spiritt of mobile warfare, old an d new , in this this phot of an M1A1 a nd a h orse cavalryman taken taken at the Gowe n Field Multipurpose Multipurpose Range Complex. The trooper portraying “Old Bill’ is SFC Tom till of the 107th ACR. Ohio Army National tional G uard. He’s astride “Winsome,” LTC Obenauer’s 20-year-old registered registered quarter horse. Th e trooper‘s trooper‘s uniform was borrowed from from the a 6 Cav Regiment, Twin Twin Falls, Idaho. It too five or six tries at full gallop o get the angle right, LTC Oben auer said.
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The Gowen Field Course takes only two weeks so a Guardsman Guards man can either attend during an annual mining (AT) period, or in a school status. With With the TCC compressed into two weeks, students have little free time; but they also discover a challenging highly functional course. Some active duty units, unable to spare a soldier for six weeks, have sent students to the National Guard course.
Course Organization -Diagnostic Test *Maintenance
hrs
*Armament *Armament Controls/ Controls/ Equipnent
hrs
A one-to-four ratio of master master gunners to students ensures that this portion of the t he curriculum, what LTC Brown calls call s “the meat meat of th program,” gram,” is solid. “They look at every bit of that turret,” Brown Brown declares, d eclares, “and that’s what the National Guard soldier needsconfidence in in his trigger-pulling trigger- pulling skills.” Conduct of Fire
hrs
-Training Devioes
hrs
*Auxiluary Fire Controls *Crew Drills *Prepare-to-Fire *Prepare-to-Fire Check *Firing Engagements
*Course Review
hrs hrs
hrs
-Hands-on Performance Evaluation (A modified TCGST
that
hrs
the crewman gets
three chances to pass)
*Written Final Exam
hr
Like most other soldiers, s oldiers, the cadre a Gowen Field are concerned about the effects effe cts of of the th e drawdown and subsequent budget cuts. According to to the information contained in the Armor Functional Area Assessment Briefing, to field an armor force today equivalent to that of DESERT STORM, says LTC Brown, six battalions battalio ns would would have to come from the reserve components. With the majority o off futur f uture e Reserve Component NCOES and tank crew sustainment sustainmen t of training being done d one at Gowen Field, the real challenge ch allenge is “how to best utilize our assets. Qual-
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ity must remain. Content Co ntent and quantity, based on need, is the task hand. One thing is certain, constrained resources will mean limited number of limi ted number of of courses. slots in a limited A 20-percent 20-percen t cut in in staff would just about abou t close the doors,” Brown argues. Combat Vehicle Transltion
Training Team
more of the Reserve Componen moves from th series to the M1 , wen wen Fiel Fiel also supports that training requirement. Th Combat Vehicle Transition Training Team (CV‘ITT) is National Guard Bureau/ Department of Army-sponsored program that transitions tankers from the M48A5 and M60-series to the M1. But, rather than an individual ind ividual training effort, th CVTlT is more akin to the National Training Center’s approach, in that whole units come to Gowen Field. unit training activity. We “We’re train battalions,” explains LTC Rick Hoverson, Hoverso n, commandant of CV’IlT. When a battalion arrives at Gowen Field for Hoverson’s course, it can be garrisoned and begin training within four hours, an important point since time is critical to Reserve Component soldiers. Th battalion training cycle consists of 63 days, with 21 days per company, including some overlap in instruction time. There are no days off. Every minute is filled. Tank com manders and gunners must test-out in all four crew positions, positions , and there is pmllel maintenance instruction program as well. “We to show them that t hat what an M1 can do in an ambush, or at night, because of its it s speed and agility, it’s th difference between night and day [over an M601,” says Hoverson. Seeking crew integrity, th course tries to avoid av oid what Hoverson call “schoolhouse syndrome” of just cooperate and graduate. Each soldier maintains a job book that allows the unit unit to retrain or retest, as required. With video vide o cameras mounted in the turret, transmitting images to the tower and
November-December 1992
spotless maintenance faality supports the students in Gowen Fields Tank Commander Course.
recording both both actions and voice commands, the CVTIT can offer both specific, timely critiques during the after-action review, and ensure safety on range. The
116th Cavalry Brigade
Headquartered Headquart ered in Boise, and with units throughout Idaho and Oregon, the 116th Cavalry Brigade (HSB) is part of the activities activiti es at an integral part Gowen Field. a RoundOut brigade to the 4th Infantry Division Division (Mech) at Fort Carson, Colorado, the “Snake River Brigade” (s called as it historically included units along the Snake River in Idaho and Oregon) relies heavily upon staff and facilities at Gowen Field to maintain its training edge. Brigadier General Kane, commander of of the brigade, is proud of th progress of the Idaho National Guard training center. “Mobilization “Mobilization of Reserve R eserve Component forces for ces during DESERT STORM was better for having been a part of Gowen Field’s program,” Kane suggests. “They’re proud of the title tit le ‘Fort Knox West,’ and they they work w ork to keep close ties with the Armor Center. Nothing is trained here that Fort Knox isn’t aware of, or doesn’t monitor for standards.” Kane ties the growth his own brigade training program to the expansion of Gowen Field. Wit he th NCO eduRCTC RCTC , the the cation courses, and th multimilliondollar Multipurpose Range Complex nearby, the 116th Cavalry Brigade is
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reaching beyond traditional levels of preparedness for National Guard units. “In the past, it wasn’t the mission of a National Guard unit to prog-
soldiers, all the while stewarding the environmentally sensitive Orchard Training Area well enough to receive accolades from environmental groups and government officals dike
capability,” Kane explains, “but [with these facilities] th mission is evolutionary. It’s get as much much training train ing as you can and go as far as you can.” When When asked as ked where he he sees s ees his brigade two years from now, Kane sugges su ggests ts continuing relationship with the 4th Infantry Division (Mech), companylevel training using the MPRC to its maximum maximum potential, compwy-t comp wy-team eam CALFEXs, and and progress progres s up to Tank Table XII. In describing describ ing the program at Gowen Field, Field , BG BG Kane says, “It’s th first time ever that National Guard units were able to train without running ranges themselves. They simply make sure their soldiers arrive on on time for training and they function as the leaders of their the ir own own soldiers. They finall get to be leaders at their own AT.” Kane is referring to not only the user-friendly setup at Gowen Field, but the BOLD SHIFT mining philosophy and intiatives that sent some 1OOO active duty Fort Carson soldiers to support training training this past summer at Gowen Field. While remaining doctrinally tied to Fort Knox, Gowen Field is beginning to roll up some impressive statistics its own. The base goes through more gu tubes and tank track than any one post in the Army. Last year alone, Gowen Field trained over 3,500 m o r ‘
want to promote more of a “leveling” attitude about part-time and full-time soldiering, but they recognize that old notions ar hard change. Since Sinc e vol-
November-December 1992
Th staff
the regulars at First Manassas in in 1862, some have believed that Guard and Reserve training is a step down from active duty training. But the efforts ongoing in Idaho Idah o will make an observer think twice about such notion. “It doesn’t matter what status we’re in,” says CSM Steele. “Whether you’re active duty, AGR [active [act ive Guard Reserve], traditional Guard, we’re all soldiers.” There is local legend that the word “Idaho” is taken from Shoshone In dian term, “Eeda-How,” which means “sun shining on th mountain.“ But visit to this growing training cente this natural tank country where the high desert meets the mountains will convince you that the sun is shining on th Idaho National Guard and orce as well. th total
Major James Brewer was recently assigned as editorin-chief of ARMOR.
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and Dragon Employment Employment in the Armor Team Defense by Captain Sande J. Schlesinger
The armor armo r team team commander commander controls contro ls three three of the world's most lethal armor-kil armor-killing ling weapons. weapons. When When employed together, the TOW, th tank, and the Dragon can satisfy the demands of of any armor battlefield. battlefi eld. But to maximize the potential of these thes e weapons systems, syste ms, we we should position and employ each to take advantage of it strengths while protecting its vulnerabilities. The commander comman der who who thinks thinks that range range is the only differe di fference nce betwee these three weapons makes a grave error. Although the TO has one of the longest direct ranges on the battlefield, its disadvantages are long time of flight, flig ht, large signature, and a slow reload time. time. Th tank, with its outstanding fire control system and superior protection, can be restricted by terrain. Finally, the Dragon, with its relatively relative ly short range, range, is an extremely portable direct fire an surveillance system. Keeping these ideas how that armor in mind, let's examine how commander can can use the TO and the Dragon Dragon to augment a ugment his tank defense.
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Th TO The m r te m comm comman ande derr wil have four TOWs mounted on Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles. By followin seven basic principl prin ciples es of TO employment, he will multiply the effectivene fecti veness ss of his TO fms, increase Bradley survivability, and complement the killing effort effor t of his tanks.
Provide for mutual support Never allow one TO to cover a sector by itself its elf.. One One good good reason reason is is that volley fire by TOWs gainst tanks has proven more effective than single TO shots. shots. Furthermore, wh when en two or more TOWs engage the same sector, one can displace to an alternate position while whi le the the other maintains sector coverage. Employing TOWs in two sections of two is the easiest way to apply this principle. some point, the two sectors should interlock, thus creating mutually supporting sections, but mutual support shouldn't overshadow the need for dispersion. rule of thumb is to position TOWs so
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that fires he enemy enemy on one vehi cle do not suppress another. another. 2. Provide for security Bradley on a flank, flank, employing its TOW, is highly vulnerable to dismounted infantry. If it's it' s not feasible to position friendly friendly dismounts near the vehicle, provide provide the materials material s necessar necessar so that the crew can construct and emplace hasty protective obstacles and early warning devices along dismounted avenues enues leading to to the weapon. weapon. 3. Strive for flank shots anks ar bigger, weaker, and blinder on their flanks. The shape and composition tion of of ' t frontal frontal armor armor make make frontal TO shots ineffective. The TOW'S HEAT warhead is more lethal engaging the tank's ''softe ''softer" r" sides sid es and TOWs Position area were an rear. the advancing enemy will expose his flank. 4. Use Your Standoff Advantage
imply stated, engage with TOWs before the enemy tanks can engage them. With range of 3,750 meters, a ngage a T-80 1,350 meters beyond beyond the maximu maximum m effective effective range
ovember-December 1992
of the T-80’s main gun. Position your TOWs where they can get those long
shots, but keep in mind that the farther the shot, th longer it will take for the missile to travel (up to 12 seconds), and hence, th longer th enemy vehicle must be exposed. 5. Use cover, concealment, and dispersion he large signature means that the Bradley has to make itself survivable. Make maximum use of natural cover, such as reverse slopes, hollows, and ravines. Don’t position vehicles so that they must skyline themselves to acquire and engage. Above all, dis perse vehicles laterally and in depth. A distance of 300 meters is not unreasonable between TOWs, as long as you maintain the balance with mutual support. Don’t feel as though you must place four Bradleys Bradleys in in a 4W ete r platoon platoon battle battle position. Employ TOWs depth planning positioning of your TOWs, consider their need to displace to alternate positions after firing. Position TOWs so they can engage targets in depth: for exam ple, plac e one where it ca engage th lead elemen ts of a colum while another engages the middle of that same column. 7. Fight combined eam An enemy formation will have harder time reacting to that TO ignature if, at the same time, it’s also being engaged by tank, artillery, and mortar fires. Figure demonstrates one method of employment that achieves depth, mutual support, standoff, dispersion, and flank shots. The infantry platoon leader who owns those TOWs hould know these principles and put them into practice. Commanders, however,
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Figure TOWs engaging engaging from Bradleys in an Armor Team engagement area.
must also consider them when arraying their forces. The Dragon
Dragons are often employed to support the main engagement in role of close-in antiarmor weapons targeted at enemy vehicles threatening to penetrate ba ttle positions. Although this is a legitimate employment technique, one exists which makes better use of the Dragon’s ability to go where tanks and TOWs may not be able to go, or may not be able to engage. Few, if any, engagement areas are perfectly flat; many have wadis, dr creek beds, or eroded irrigation ditches running through them. Enemy reconnaissance eleme nts can can use these features as mounted avenues of approach. In some cases, a vehicle in one of these avenues can remain conceded throughout th depth of the engagement area and enter a battle position undetected.
November-December 1992
PIacing TO or tank into on of these avenues would take valuable combat power away from the main engagement ma. urthermore, tank or a Bradley may have trouble turning, getting out, or maneuvering in close fight if ditch very deep and narrow. narrow. By employing the Dragon in such terrain, the armor commander can place effective antiarmor fire on an advancing enemy along an otherwise concealed approach, and hopefully deny its continued use. Consider the following factors when planning for and preparing th antiarmor ambush, to improve its chances of success. Mass your Dragons ndividual Dragons lack the killing power of tanks and TOWs: olley fires at single target will increase the lethality of your ambush. Employ all three Dngons at one ambush site, either simulta neously r in quick succession. succession. Make them survivable ince this ambush could prove to be close-
“Also, don’t don’t forget the possible use of the ambush team as reconnaissance and surveillance asset. If positioned far enough forward in the concealed avenue, Dragon gunner can detach the six-power IR night tracker and observe for enemy movement into the company sector from well concealed position. position.
in fight, strong survivability positions must. Allocate assets to help prepare and reinforce reinf orce these positions. .Reinfo .Reinforce rce the ambush site with with obstacles the avenue is narrow enough, plan an obstacle obsta cle which which ties in with the higher ternin on th sides. This obstacle will help slow th enemy as he enters the kill zone and may disrupt hi when when the ambush is executed. Any obstacle will undoubtedly be reinforced by th burning hull of the destroyed destro yed vehicle caught in th ambush. Position subsequent ambush ambush sites sit es in depth the enemy feels that this avenue is valuable enough, ma try again, sending additional vehicles, even if one is caught in an am bush. To prevent prev ent him from from breaching breach ing and clearing the obstacles obst acles of an initial init ial ambush, plan plan additional ambush sites sit es in depth along the length of the avenue. nue. Ensure each position is prepared, with rounds cached at each location, and always monitor the current location of the ambush team if they have displaced from original positions. Figure illustrates how how to apply these principles. The task force S2, among others, ma be very interested your antiarmor ambush. Tie your ambush planning into the current IPB process to determine whether whether this avenue of approach is likely one for division and regimental reconnaissance units or even the CRP. By By doing doi ng so, you can give specific guidance to the infantry platoon platoon leader about the probable mission and intent that ambush. Also, don’t forget the possible use of the ambush team as a reconnaissance reconnaissance and 44
surveillance asset. If positioned far enough forward in the concealed avenue, a Dragon gunner can detach the six-power IR night tracker and observe for enemy movement into the company sector from a well concealed position. Fo armor team, an an ideal id eal situation would be for the ambush to block the avenue and force trailing vehicles out of the low ground up into th engagement area. Chances hat vehicles coming out of deep deep mi e woul woul have mobility diffiFigure culties, would exDragon antiarmor ambushes in depth. pose flanks and un dersides, and would be misoriented. Vehicles would with with weapon weapon systems syst ems mutually emerge and find themselves in th enporting one another in depth. gagement area, where tank and TOW fires fire s would would destroy them. Few would would argue ar gue that the most efCaptain Sande J. Schlesinfective killer of a tank another tank. ger, an infantry officer, However, terrain and engagement served as rifle platoon considerations consideratio ns may may preclude pr eclude a tank leader, an antitank platoon from engaging targets. Effective posileader, and a rifle company tioning and employment the executive officer with 2-23 InDragon and TOW ca cover those fantry and 3-47 Infantry at Ft. areas where the tank may have trouLewis, Washington. He is ble. Each weapon would then engage 1992 graduate of the Armor in a situation best suited for its capaOfficer Advanced Course. bilities, resulting in a solid defense
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ovember-December 1992
Lea ders hb Challenae Challenae For The Future:
Women
Armor and Cavalry
by Captaln Kelly John Ward The recent recent success success of wome women n in the armed forces, as part of Operations JUST CAUSE, DESERT SHIELD, and DESERT STORM, causing heated debate over the future role f women in the services. The Presidential Commission on the Assignment signment of of Women Women in th wa present a report in November, 1992, that could recommen women be allowed to serve in the combat arms branches. There is growing support in Congress to change the Army’s Army’s combat combat exclusion policy, and Presidential candidate Bill Clinstated his intention to allow women women to serve serve i all branches branch es of the military if he is elected electe d in NovemNovember.’ ber.’ Public opinion polls show that the American people ar divided over the issue women serving in combat, but the percentage of Americans Ame ricans supporting th idea has has steadily steadily increased in the past few years? The relevance f all this to the young Armor leader that we must be prepared for the very real possibil pos sibility ity o integratin integrating g wome women n into the force, probably Armor sooner than than anyone thinks
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of ARMOR Magmine. Bring the issue up at a Friday beer beer call and yo are liable liable to be thrown thrown out of the club by your peers. My purpose here, however, is not to discuss d iscuss whether to allow wome wome in Armor force. in-
stead want to focus on th issues that will be relevant to us as leaders, if and when th decision is made made by our political representatives that women will serve serve in in combat arms branches. branches. It will be the NCOs’ NCOs’ and junior jun ior officers’ officers’
November-December 1992
leadership challenge, as it always is to maintain the discipline, cohesiveness, and combat readiness for which th U.S.Army Armor force known. The first issue that comes to mind in any discuss dis cussion ion of women women in combat arms is the obvious physical strength differences between men and women. tank loader, loader, a woman woman must be pable of quickly maneuver ing a 53.4-pound. 53.4-pound. 120-m HEAT round, possibly while rough rough terrain. The combustible casing of th 120-mm ammunition creates a severe safety hazard for the crew if rounds are mishandled during firing. For this reason alone, it would be imperative that an woman wishing Armor force fo rce to serve in the Armor must pass some kind of upper-bod upper-body y strength strength test. Keep in mind, however, that the next generation could well have an autoloadautoloader, (and the XMS AGS will have a h e - m a n crew with autoloader) negating this ar gument against female tank crewmen? Vehicle maintenance and recovery, especially track and roadwheel maintenance, also requires certain certa in amount of physical strength that not all wome women n (or-men) (or-me n) possess. cavalry scout will be re quire conduct dismounted patrols over long distances with radios an 60 machine guns. For possibly poss ibly women women to serve in r d
units, they would have to be physically able to perform all of the duties required by that MO be fully accepted in th unit. To ensure that individualsnre physically capable capab le of of performing as crewmen, the Army would have to set and enforce new physical standard for for women. women. This This may may be as simple as requiring women women who serve ser ve in in combat combat arms to meet the same APFI’ s t a n it may dards as men may involve invo lve develdeve ldl oping a whole new new tes for combat a r m s soldiers. The Royal Canadian allowed d women women in Army, which has allowe the Armor Armor force forc e sinc 1989. has a combat efficiency efficie ncy test with an equal stand standard ard for for both men men and soldier soldier must must be able to run miles hours, with weapon and gear in thirty minutes, and then run another miles with weapon weapon and gea next day in wo hours, forty-f fo rty-five ive minminutes. They must also be able to jump six-foot ditch, scale a six-foot wall, and carry a petson of equal equa l weight weight 100 meters. Regardless of the scale that is set, it will be the responsibility of junior leaders le aders to se that the test is administered administered fairly and and to standard. Bias in testing, perceived b by y either or women, woul would d be be a volatile vola tile issue issue that would would quickly destroy unit cohesion and effectiveness. There wil be many unique problems caused by co-ed crews that I will address add ress here. here. Vehicle commandcommanders and small unit leaders will have th of maintaining professionalprofessiona lism ism and controlling controlling sexual sexual hm daily basis, something that leaders lead ers don’t normally normally contend conte nd with. The privacy of individual crew meman will be bers living on e difficult to control. Major Russell, the Canadian Army LNO to the Armor School at Fort Knox, states that it is only a matter of respecting the human dignity of the individual. in dividual. There have been no incidents of sexual hmssment or prejudice towards the three enlisted members the Canadian mored Corps to date. During DES-
46
ERT SHIELD/STORM, female soldiers die rs of of the the American Army simply
covered themselves with a blanket if cat-hole in the open desert ternin did not provide them with privacy. If leaders enforce standards f conduct, the problems of of privacy privacy can can be overovercome. so w i l y overcome, however, will be th traditional societal values that we and our soldiers sol diers share toward women. In joint hearings before ConMen ill gress in late July, General Menill M c M , Air Force chief f shf s hff, f, stated, “I have a very very traditional t raditional attitude attitude about wives and mothers mothers and daughters being ordered to kill people. ple.”’ ”’ Put more bluntly, General Genera l Robert B m w , former former Commandant o the Marine Marine Corps, stated, stated , “If you want to destroy des troy the combat combat effectiveness effectiv eness o a unit, unit, put a woman in in it.”6 The typityp id attitud at titude e of men men that wome wome ar th “weaker sex,” both mentally and physical phys ically, ly, is the crux crux of of the entire ent ire emotionally charged debate over women in combat The leadership challenge chall enge presented presented to the leader will be overcoming these strong societal prejudices to create a battle-ready team that includes both men and women. On of the most important tasks for leaders will be maintaining morale. This can only only be accomplished accomplis hed if high standards set and maintained. ganizations with the highest standards attract attra ct the the highest quality quality people, be cause caus e individuals want to be part of team that is greater than themselves? When and if women rue allowed to join the Armor force, there is a potential for fo r the esprit de corps of of individal units to suffer. suffer . Your Your soldiers soldi ers and subordinate leaders could feel that Armor has lost something intangible that made them join it in th fmt place. Men join the Army and choose to fight in Infantry and Armor because they want to be challenged, pushed to their limits limits in the traditiontraditi onally male male discipline d iscipline o wufighting. women serving alongside them,
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they will n n m l l y question ho chdlenging their service servi ce is. is. Once again, the importance import ance of maintaining high standard standards, s, both both physically physically and mentally, is th key to overcoming loss of morale. Standards mus be challenging to all, and enforced fairly, to ensure that that m e does not not suffer. Equally as important to maintaining standards will be the principle of of leadleading by exmple. FM 22-100 states that “no aspect aspect of of leadership leadership is more more powpersonal example affects erful your your soldiers sol diers more more than than any mo nt of instruction form of discipline.” I personally feel that this will be the biggest challenge cha llenge for us as armor leaders leaders should women women be allowed to serve serve in Armor and Cavalry. Cavalry. AcceptAccepting and integra integrating ting wom women en into into comba nits will be successful only if leaders, at a levels. professional enough to overcome their own feelings and prejudices about the issue. This is tall order. Many Many people people have compared compared thi Ecent debate de bate over allowing wome women n into combat o that of th integration of blacks into white units in the late 1940s and early 1950s. On the surface at least, the tw debates ar similar. The senior Army leadership in 1949 argued that an end to segregation woul would d seriously impair combat efficiency: much as the leaders leaders of today argue argue against against placing women women in comba The Secretary Secretary of of the Army 1949 argued that the Army was not of social change, and an instrument of that ncial integration would dangerously weaken weaken the force, forc e, an idea that is ludicrous to us only forty ater. At the time, th President ordered th integrat integration ion f the the m d forces forces for political reasons, much as the recent study study of women women in combat been been undertaken undertake n due to political sure. The Navy’s Navy’s Tailhook incident an recent Army Times rcport de scribing sexual assault allegations by women who served in DESERT STORM has heightened the political climate for change?
ovember-December 1992
The difference between the two
blacks and women, is that leadearly 1950s had only to ers in th overcome racial prejudice, an inational belief that black men were inferior because of their skin color. If women ar allowed in combat arms, we as armor leaders will face a much harder challenge. Overcoming sexism and gender prejudice is more difficult because there differences tween men and women, gender differences that you cannot refute. Charles Moskos, Northwestem University sociologist, argues, 'The idea that fighting is masculine trait runs deep. As a cultural trait, it predates any written history. It may even be genetic tmit."'O Add to this the fact of human sexuality, and the relative immaturity and youth found in Army, and we will be asked to proalvide leadership in situation most unimaginable turmoil. The leadership challenge will be to take unit under these circumstances d create disciplined, cohesive fighting force capable of winning on the modem battlefield. cases,
we up for the challenge? Only time will tell. But it is obvious from
discussion that the possibility exists that in the very near f u t u r e political representatives could us as leaders to integrate women women into Armor force. What also obvious is that it is not something to be taken lightly. The mission of the armed forces involves national security. political leade rs must do cost-benefit analysis. They will weigh the importance of equality and equal opportunity as the basis for ou democratic government against the potential cost to th nation if combat readiness is not maintained. They will expect us as military leaders to carry out ou mission of providing the nation with combat ready force, whether we agree or disagree with the restraints under which we must operate. We must begin to think about and plan for this contingency, as we would any other. It is our duty as leaders, both to the nation we sewe and th men (and women) we will lead. this
Notes S till Defense," ' M a , ., "Bush O f f ~ ~ eStill Army Times, August 31. 1992, p. 6. Women Combat 'Maze. R., 'Drawbaclca Jobs Preoccupy Hill." Air Times, July 1, 1992. p. 16.
%erpans Department, US. Anny Annor School, Ft. h. Rurwll, Royal b a d i r n 'Interview with Anny LNO, Knox, Ky.. August 1992. %villi*. a. 'Women's R ~ U : IH ~ e b t s Rages," Army Times, t 1 0 1 9 2 , p. 8. nstiJust Say Nol" 'Downing, tute, Proceedings, February 1992, pp 4 5 4 . 'bid.. p. 45. 'Foner. Jack D., Black an the M i l i t q in American History, Pmcger Publishen. New Yo&, 1974, p. 186. 9 ~ i l l i s , 3. ' O ~ a t t h e w ~ , u ~ i t r r yUI B u i c r ink Sex." Army Times, July 27,1992, p. 16.
Captain Kelly John Ward is 1988 graduate of th United States M ilitary AcadAcademy. He has served as a tank platoon leader, scout platoon leader, assistant regimental an XO of HHT Regiment in the 11th ACR. A graduate of Airborne, Air Assault, Ranger, SPLC, and JMOC, he is currently attending the Armor Officer Advanced Course at Knox.
"Old Bill?" Since 1904, the symbol of the Armor Association was a drawing of a frontier cavalryman by the noted Western artist Frederick Rem ington. ington. Remington, a famous magazine illustrator, loved the Cavalry and spent a lot of time visiting cavalry posts. And when the cavalry cavalry prepared to go to to Cuba for the Spanish-American Spanish-American War, Remington was sent by the publishing mogul, William Randolph Hearst, to cover the war an d the buildup. The d rawing of the cavalryman cavalryman was apparently made by Remington at staging camp in Tampa, Florida in 1898. he cavalryman who posed for the sketch was Sergeant John
ARMOR
Lannen, a snowy-haired veteran on his last enlistment. Lannen would later die of yellow fever, as did so many of the veterans of the Cu ba fighting. in 1904, the archives of the Cavalry Association note that Remington, an honorary member, had agreed to let the Association use the drawing as its symbol. The sketch of Sergeant Lannen on horsebac k appeared on the cover of the old Cavalry Journal for years. Th Journal, evolving with the missions of the men it served, later became the Amored Cevalry Journal and, still later, ARMOR, which became a Department of the Army Army publication in 1974. Today, ARMOR'S office at Fort
ovember-December
1992
Knox is Building 4401, called Lannen House, and the drawing still appears in the magazine from time to time. But over the years, the sketch has been ca lle d "Old B ; not no t "Old John." John ." We at ARMOR were wondering why. why. What do we know about this cavalryman, and why was he renamed "Bill"? Could 'Old Bill' have been SG Lannen's horse? If you have any information at all about the origin of Old Bill, the facts of th matter, matter, persona theories, or just interesting Nmors, we'd like to hear about them. We've begun investigating the question and will p ublish the results in a forthcoming forthcoming issue.
Armor Center Tank Design Contest The post Cold War Army demands a new and revolutionary change in tank design and development philosophy. Given the changing global situation and a constantly decreasing defense budget, it is important for us to draw new ideas to th e forefront. Do not misunderstand the intent of the contest. The Army materiel development community has and continues to provide the American soldiers with the best and most advanced equipment and weapon systems in the world. This contest was conceived to generate thoughts about Armor and Armored Cavalry and to gain access to your, ideas and concepts on the future tank systems needed to equip future tank and arm ored cavalry organizations. To establish a starting point, relative to al entries, entries, you will find below definition of the "tank "tank," ," and the objective s of the contest. Goo d luck.
Deflnltlon
a la la n
The tank is an all-weather, daylnight, multipurpose weapon system incorporating a high degree of tactical mobilky, and protected firepower, capable of condu cting sustained combat operations against a determined, sophisticated threat. The tank accurately fires a variety variety of lethal munitions (while stationary and on the move), can rapidly move across the battlefield (on roads or cross-country), and with its armor protection (to include electronic warfare sensors and countermeasures), can survive most threats encountered in the close battle area. area. The tank's inherent lethality, mobility, and survivabilit abilityy provide commande rs a h igh degree of tactical flexibility and enable rapid concentration concentration of of combat po wer at decisive points on the battlefield.
The principle role role of the tank is to lea ground forces i n offensive operations. operations.
the judges in u nderstanding your design.
Contest ObJectlve
Rules
The role of the main battle tank to lead ground forces in offensive operations will continue for the foreseeable future. There are new and worthwhile ideas to how this role can best be fulfilled. Consequently, the purpose of this contest is to develop ideas for an advanced land combat vehicle, or components thereof, which will substantially increase the shock effect, effect, lethality, and survivability of tank and armored cavalry cavalry organizations in operations over all types of terrain, in all weather conditions. While its configuration and the time at which it might be fielded are not overriding factors, you should attempt to aim your effort at a successor for today's tank. The current Armor community prio rities for a future tank are .Lethality .Survivability -Mobility/Agility -Protection Deployability .Sustainability The future tank must be transportable by current U. . transpo rtation assets. The tank must also weigh no more than 55 tons combat loaded.
General Design Parameters Include in your entry general design information such as: vehicle weight, crew size, type of weapon systems and caliber size, engine type, and tracked or wheeled, etc. You are not limited to the above. This will assist
ARMOR
1. Wth the exception of the Rules
Committee, judges, the contest officialsMorkers and their family members, the contest is open to all who desire to enter United States Government employees may not submit work produced in their officia l capacity. Ideas or designs submitted will no include classified military information or previously published information. Ideas or designs may be simple in format and, where used, only rudimentary sketches are necessary. However, the more detailed the drawings, the easier it is for the judges to understand the concept. Judging will be based on how well your concept matches the priorities listed in the contest objective paragraph above. All of the priorities must be addressed in your entry. Ideas or designs must be for a comp lete vehlcle. vehlcle. 6. Idealdesign entries will be no more than five 8x10 pages, one sided, sided, single spaced; that includes drawingddiagrams. Only one entry per contestant allowed and only one prize will be awarded to to a ny one individual, 8. Each idea or design will be companied by signed official entry form. You may reproduce the entry form in this magazine, magazine, if needed. However, your signature must be an o riginal Receipt an d evaluation of designs 9. Receipt and ideas does not imply a prom ise to pay, a recognition of novelty or origi-
ovember-December 1992
nality, or contractual relationship such as would ren der the U.S. U.S. Armor Association or the United States Government liable to pay for any use of the information contained In entries. 10 Entries must be received by 15 January 1993 to be considered for an
award. You must Include self-addressed, dressed, s tampe d envelope In order for you r entries to be acknowledged acknowledged as received! Please do not call the Armor Association or Armor Magazine to verify receipt of your entry. Allow 4weeks to receive your verification in
Official Tank Design Contest En try Form Attach this form to your entry for the U.S. Army Armor CenterN.S. Armor Amodadon Tank Design Contest. understand and consent that after the receipt and evaluation of my design des ign or idea the United States Government may use my design or idea without the Armor Association or the United States Government incurring any obligation or liability to me, my heirs, or assigns. also waive any proprietary rights that may have in this design or idea.
Se nd entlre entry entry to:
(Tan (Tank k Deslg n Contes t)
Knox,
40121-5210
DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974
Authority: 10 US 3013 Principal Purpose: (a) Address and phone number are required 80 that winners may be informed and (b) Employment category Is required to ensure conformance with applicable laws. Routine Uses: Address and phone number to inform winners. winners. Employmen category to ensure compliance with applicable laws. Mandatory or Voluntary Disclosure and Effect on Individual Not Providing Information: Disclosure of information voluntary. However, failure to provide any of the infomation ma result in delayed notification of a winning entry.
(Signature)
(Date)
(Print or type name, rank If military or title If civilian) Home address address and phone: phone:
Ieaw Cheek One: (Who do you work for)
ARMOR
(Dept.
Work address and phone: phone:
DOD Defmre)
Government Contractor
November-December 1992
Judges Entries will be judged by panel of combat and materiel developers from the U.S. U.S. Army Armor Cen ter and varlvarlous research and development centers. Their selections will be final and binding.
Prltes
Armor, ATTN: ATSB-AM Fort
the mall. There wlll be no notlflcatio n for elimin ated entrl entrles. es. 11. All entries must be In English and must be legible. legible. 12. At the conclusion the contest, all entries and forms will be kept by the United States Government. Entries will not be returned1 returned1 13. All rules must be followed to preclude elimination from the contest.
Other
First prize $500 Second prize $300 Third prize $200 Fourth prize $1 00 In addition, the fifth through the tenth place contestants will receive an appropriate certificate and a two-year honorary membership in the U.S. Armor Association. 3. Winners will be announced at the 1993. Armor Conference in Ma Prizes Prizes will will be do nated by the U.S. Armor Association to the winners. winners. Awards will be presented by appropriate representatives of the Armor Association. You need not be present at the Armor Conference to win. We are hopeful that many good Ideas will b e forthcoming. Let your imagination run wild wild.. Sketches mailed with the entry forms need not be professionally prepared long th idea is adequa tely presented. presented. Remember, all entries must reach the Armor Magazine office not later than 15 January 1993 to be considered. The timetab le of the contest calls for a preliminary judging In January 1993 with the final judging p rior to the Armor Conference in May. Winners will be announced at the Armor Conference and in the following issue of ARMOR magazine.
RIVE
SEAT
.Len .Lengt gthh of time remaining rem aining in unit Will the soldier extend to complete em tour following graduation? .Does .Does the soldier meet al th pre110? Tank nquisites? GT 105? commander commander for for two y ? Qualifi Qualified ed his in the past t least si months' experience on MlFIlAl? Can he pass the TCGST in FM 17-12l? Does he have a SECRET security clemce? Be volunteer, ps c o n f m e d d u ing batttalion/squadron commander interview. As first sergeant, l m e d that, in addition to the mentioned prerequisites, th TABE A test administered an local education center by excellent indicator of students who may have reading and comprehension problems. Although he TABE A test is not foolproof, gives good indication of soldiers who may have po Master Gunner tential problems. Course requires great deal of reading and comprehension of complex subjects. An NCO who had sco~ewhen he was m d ma not have th eading and comyears later. Give prehension level the master gunner candidate every portunity to be successful. We, the senior NCO leadership, must give those high quality NCOs th tools needed to complete the course and work in these demanding positions. To further prepare the master gunner candidate for school, an opportunity to work il an Instructor/Opentor (VO) in the UCOFI' helps. Working as an I/O serves a two-fold mission. First, t is prerequisite for the follow-on Senior course taught after the Master Gunner Course. Th three-week. Senior VO course makes talented NCO more valuable and a greater asset to an I/O the unit. Second, working expands an NCO's knowledge and grasp of th tank's fire control system and its employment. An NCO who is successful at training his crew as well as other crews is a valuable miner. In
50
(Contlnued from Page 5)
the Master Gunner Newsletter dated October 1992, discussed the problem rueas that result in the highest failure nt in th Master Gunner Course. student attending the Master Gunner Course needs to meet all the prerequisites. Although one or more waiverable, the the waiver is an exception to policy and is intended for extenuating circumstances. If you have an NCO you are considering for the ut er G unner Course who falls short short on a prerequisite, you can get confirmation for approval of his waiver before sending him to the school. Send or fax his prerequisite data to the following address: Weapons Department, A'ITN: ATTN-WPG-G (MSG Preston), U.S. Army Armor School, Fort Knox, KY 401214212, (FAX number to t h e b m c h i s DS
464-5708 or commercial (502)6245708).
An NCO attending school needs to have foundation of knowledge and experience from from which to draw. Meeting the prerequisites and passing the TCGST the essentials that establish this foundation. This wh we test the TCGST to standard. TCGST is tested, step by step, from 17-12-1 the checklists in App C, w/Ch The instructors of the master gunner course and myself want all students attending the course to be successful. It is our belief that the best NCOs ar selected for attendance. Th intent of this article is to spark idem and help in the process of selecting the right NCO.
The Armor Hotline: Your Armor Center Connection The Office Office of the Chief of Armor, Readiness Assessment Division, mainArmor Hotline as medium for armor and cavalry units worldtains wide to communicate with Armor Center, Armor School, and Fort Knox. The Armor Hotline ca provide you with the answer to almost any question pertaining to armor nd cavalry cavalry issue s. It ca also answer questions or provide you information concerning Fort Knox. recent analy sis the Armor Armor Hotl Hotline ine show ed that the majority of callen were requesting reque sting informat information ion on th e availabili availability ty or sta tu of current doctrinal manuals, with question s o FM 71-123 and FM 17-12-1 (Change 3) heading the list. Requests for assistance with main tenance related topics were second, and information on Safety-of-Use messages ran a close third. We have also answered questions concerning developments in longrange gunnery, recent changes to the divisional cavalry squadron organization, training devices and training ammunition, and correct boresighting procedu res for for the M1A1 just While this sampling of th questions answered through Armor Hotline, the continued success of this initiative lies wRh the armor cavalry soldiers deployed around the world. Your use of this service will continue to make the Armor Hotline an easy and viable way to communicate with the Armor Armor Cen ter, Armo Armorr S chool, and Fort Knox. The Armor Hotline accessible 24 hours day, 7 days week Our charter to respond to your question within 72 hours. you have question or concern or simply want to comment on any issue facing Armor with tough Cavalry community, or if you just want to challenge question, you can contact at: commercial (502) 624-TANK, 464ANK, ANK, or toll-free 1-800-5 25-68 48.
ARMOR
ovember-December
1992
LETTERS (Conttnued From Page 2) and Companies Companies A and in the first cycle followed by B and C. The admlnhg support packages were duplicated in each cycle and, where possible, add itional funding was obtained to help in maintaining the support levels. The plan (Steel on Target II) was briefed to the brigade commander, who endorsed it, and the division commander, who not only supported it but briefed the Adjutant General on the 'concept of the operation.' The entire senior leadership was c omm itted to the success of this operation. might add that during this time period, the 50th AD NJARNG was going to be at BCPT for "War Fighter." During IDTs, in-progress reviews were conducted conducted to track progress, an to identity and correct problem areas. These IPRs kept the .senio r lead ership informed. informed. The battalion conducted tw leader recons to the AT site, Fort Drum, New York. These TEWTS sewed as coordination visits and allowed us to walk the ground we would occupy occupy during AT. Once we arrived fo AT, all of our prior planning paid off. The battalion's first cycle moved to field locations and established bases operation. order to maintain the focus, the battalion lived In a tent city as dose to the ranges as possible. Field motor pools were established and tanks parked administratively. The battalion MCOFT (mobile conduct of fire trainer) was also in the field within walking distance of the motor park and tent city. An RB (Recruiting and Retention) tent was also in close proximity, where a soldier could get a cold soda or hot dog at a reasonable price. The RB tent was equipped with a and VCR. Keep in mind, our focus is on tank gunnery and crew qualification on Range 44, a comp uter range our crews had never fired on before. e concentrated on the basics: basics: good p recombat checks repare to fire checks screening by the book CPC (Tank Crew Proficiency Course) Day Night VI1 Table ABB AB B a nd the n o nto Table T able Throughout the process, battle rosters were annotated by the leadership. These were the basis for the commander's assessment as to how well crews were progressing. Battle rosters had started with TCGST (Tank Crew Gunnery Skills Test) and kept for all events, to include MCOFT time. These These rosters became more and more important as the process crew qualification continued, They were analyzed by commanders and became consistent predictors and indicators of of crew performance. Du ring the process of the commander's assessment, certain tools were available to correct crew deficiencies. For example, if the analysis indicated poor fire commands or lack
ARMOR
of crew coordination, the crow could go back to TCPC or sit and go over engagement cards. the problem dealt with switchology, switchology, retid dgu n lay, control manipu lation or acquisition, the crew was scheduled fo the MCOFT. Tank crews knew help was available if they needed It and time would be provided to administer that help. We emphasized command control at the company level and strongly enforced strict accountabil accountability ity for men a nd m achines, maintaining company integrity wherever possible. While time was flexible, we could not waste it on finding crews or fixing equipment that had not been iden tified and reported through the proper channels. We demanded that the standards be maintained and met. Th leadership chain was exercised and functioned from to and from CSM to E4. We did experience logistical problems. agree with SSG Schneider that our Class IX system in the National Guard is broke, and we must do something to fix it. During our first cycle, Class IX was neither "forward nor supporting." In most cases, parts were nonexistent. could not get a good answer as to "why "why.. there wa s a problem We give "Tommy Tanker a million dollar machine and tell him to "be al he can be,' and when it breaks, we tell him to sit around until it's fixed. That's a lot of bull, and becomes a serious training detractor that affects our retention efforts. During the second cycle, with a great deal of help from our 1st Cav assistorslevalua tors, this situation changed; we rec eived parts and fixed our machines. Regarding our "First Team Evaluators," it was a pleasure to have such a qualified group of highly motivated professionals work with our soldiers. It was obvious that these Armor and Cavalry soldiers are highly skilled and very familiar with the gunnery process. Our battalion master gunner took the time to familiarize the Cav soldiers with the M60A3 system. feel that this gesture paid dividends as our assistors were able to identify with some systemic problems that occurred. We thank them and their leaders for their fair evaluation and qualified assessment of the battalion and our soldiers. a102 Armor (The Essex Troop) qualified 98.2 percent (54 of 55 crews) on a tough range. feel our success is because of "focusing on the basics,' basics,' allowing leaders the flexibility to lead, providing resources to meet the requirement, and lastly, listening to our soldiers. If a range or a system can't meet the standard, how can we, as leaders, require our soldiers to meet the stan-
November-December 1992
dard? It is our charter charter to provide for thow placed in our charge, and we must do ev erything in our power to meet that condition. This Annual Training Period 'Swa n Song' as a ba ttalion commander an could not think of a m ore fitting fitting finale. "Armored Knights trike with Steel" WILLIAM MARSHALL 111 LTC, Armor NJ Army N ational Guard
On Command Style, lndlrect Flre, and Duds Dear Sir: Lieutenant Bohannon'r article, "Dragon's Roar: 1-37 Armor in the Battle of Easting," in the May-June 1992 issue, was both refreshing and stimulating, while disappointing in a few aspects as well The battlefield achievements of the ACR at 73 Easting are now balanced by other participants not previous ly published. published. Lieutenant Bohannon's 'ground-eye view" as a tank platoon leader carries important lessons for us all. However, some of the comments were distuhing. For example a comm and-directed communications communications ne which a ccelerates ccelerates the the deasion-action process of command and control remind me of a bad lesson from from Vietnam days, that of overcontrol by senior commanders. Th command-directed method may best be employed in preplanned ambushes or to initiate a kill-zone or fire traps, but, as soon as the first roun d is fired, fired, control must pass to the junior leader knowledgeable of his 'commander's intent' at the point of battle. agree that long-range tank gunnery training is necessary and suggest this be the unit m aster gunner's gunner's responsibility. The Armor School once taught extended range gunnery for the main battle tank, in the indirect fire role, out to eight kilometers with observed fire. We should reiook and update those classes, aiming at a range somewhat beyond the tanks effective direct fire ranges lways as obse rved fire or else we a re just wasting precious ammo In the same sense, "maximum effective range' ought to be reexamined based on the 120-mm's demonstrated (Gulf War) capability along with current thinking on "friendly fire" fire" doctrine for direct fire engagement. Regarding munttions, or rather unexploded ordnance fired by coalition forces, it is tragic that the tactical scheme of man euver may be dictated by: ?he ?he usa
51
of DPlCM and CBU use (and) must be ddressed in the op erations order. Due to the large number of unexploded bomblets, area attacked with DPICM or CBUs should be considered minefield capable of killing dismounted troops and disabling disabling wheeled wheeled vehicles." This is a starUlng announcement abdication of doctrine to technology, technology, rathe than requiring that technology dramatically reduce the dud rates. Th US. Army munitions developer has long ignored an Implied need to mitigate against this danger. Ask any Infantry soldier who experienced booby-trapp ed artillery rounds in Vietnam if he saw a need to lessen chances of injury from our own duds. Three yeam ago, Germany fielded a DPlCM round with a self-destruct mechanism on each bomblet to deal with the dud problem. Why haven't we ad dressed the same issue yet? People in TRADOC are beginning to ask the same of new munitions, tha t is, is, a se lf-des truct feature. However, confess that the "green eyeshade" bean counters and 'not 'not invented here" here" mentalities still abound in the Army development community. 'It costs too much' is heard more often than not. A t what price is this capab ility 'cost c ost effective"? At what point does human suffering outweigh the price to develop and tieid become 'effective'? tive'? We and our allies are now collectively spending an estimated billion dollars to clean up Kuwait, not to mention the human costs from killed or wounded in the clean up or during the Gulf War. hink it's time the Army accelerated the fielding of self-destruct artillery munitions by joining with Germany and adopting their DPlCM round until we ca invent it here.' Again, co ngratulations to Lieutenant Lieutenant Bohannon for a most tho ughtful articl article. e. ROBERT F. F. WIU DET Springfield, Va. Questions SelectIan For New AG
Dear Editor have just read your article on XM-8 "Armored Gun System' in the July-August have tried to keep up on this 1992 ssue. '808. The acsubject since it began in tual selection of a winner has made me curious. Could ask some questions? The FMC model was one of four different competitors. The only one not mentioned was the 'Commando-Stingray" by CadillacGage. Could you do a story on the compe. tition and the different contestants? have
52
not found a really really good article on all four, yet. would like to compare the different features of each contestant to see which one is best From reading your story, think the best feature of the FMC entrant was its ability to be Low Velocity Air Air Dropped (LVAD), and the automatic gun loader. Did the other contestants have these, or did just the FMC? looked at the pictures and drawings, then read an article on the XM-8 in the September Amy. Several things bother about the FMC. These are: *Overall design. Th engine deck is to high. It should be longer, flatter. flatter. The turret front must be higher to fit over the engine during LVAD. Maybe it would have been better to have a longer LVAD LVAD pallet, *The turret has a prominent shot trap. Th armor should deflect fire away from the tank, no t into it. *The turret opens when the main gun is depressed and tired. This breaks the NBC seal. Spent shell cases are to be ejected through a trap door. also break ing the the seal. main gun *The ammo IS arried arried inth
but may be oo heavy or a ligh t tank. tank. *The Armored Gun System has a mquirement to fight for long periods with a minimum of e xternal support. support. The FMC has main gun rounds in the magazine, magazine, plus nine more stored. The max imum fire rate is don't think this 12 shots per minute. meets the requirement. requirement. M-240. In *The coax machine gun all the battle stories from Kuw ait-Iraq, the M-240 oax was not working. working. Surely, ther is a better coax machine gun that works in the desert. In any competition, there is usually some some controversy. There looks like some potential here for a lulu. Maybe there are too many co nflicting requirements for the AGS. The Army might be better off using the U V - 1 0 5 for its LVAD requirement and something heavier, less complex for air transport. The normal infantry divisions would be better sewed by the M6 with re active armor added. RICHARD B. PRUITT Sulphur, La
vehicle vehicle.. A i ther blast panels in the roof to channel an explosion, as in the 'M tank? *The automatic gun loader is patterned on naval designs. Navy FMC turrets have no en in turret.
about. In cases of autoloader malfunction, the commander had better be left-handed, have the agility of an acrobat. and the strength of a weightliftor to load. Also, the commander ev8n reach all the shells in the magazine? W h e n t h e r e ar only two men to fight th tank, will the commander be able to tire the main gun? What happens in a two-man crew when the autoloader fails? .The turret driw is
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ovember-December 1992
Guidebook to the New National Strategy Reconstituti Reconstituting ng America'a America'a D fense: The New U.S. National Security Strategy edited by James J. Tritten and Paul N. Stockton. Praeger Publishing Co., Ne York, 1992. 17 pages, bibliography, notes, $42.95. This is an important i mportant book. Most of today's soldiers have served only during a time of defense build-up, especially over the past 12 years. But the buildup is over. over. Hard times, times, they are acomin' and every every soldier is painfully aware of it. In an August 2, 1990, speech at the Aspen Institute, President Bush laid out the outline for new national strategy that reflected the end of of the Cold War. as well as plunging defense budgets. These concepts will guide our defense posture well into the next century (and thereby impact the career of every person on active duty!). duty!). Every soldier who who has been wondering where the Army is going and how we're going to get there (and even whether we we can c an get there!) better understanding of the directions directio ns we're we're following. The new strategy has four major principles: deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution. The first three are familiar, familiar, but will be accomplished accomplis hed with important changes in light li ght of the military mili tary force drawdown. drawdown. The fourth, fourth, reconstitution, is a wholly new concept. I t would occur when the nation is faced with a major threat beyond the scope of existing forces and involves creating new forces entirely from scratch. scratch. Reconstitution is defi ned as ?he ability to restore global warfighting capabili capab ili y.. It includes mobilizing manpower; forming, training, and fielding combat units; and reactivating the defense industrial base." The whole concept of reconstitution is based on two premises: first, that our intelligence community will give us about two years' warning of major threat; and second, that once the threat is identified, we will have the political will to recognize it and move promptly to reconstitute our
ARMOR
forces. These two assumptions may be the most crucial weaknesses in the whole security strategy, strategy, especially especi ally we go back and look at our own history. Many times, the signs of the threats have been there to be seen, but we either chose to ignore them until it was too late, or we looked for less aggressive (and cheaper) alternate courses of action. This book is made up of eight short monographs, each looking at a different aspect of the new strategy. The editors, both from the faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School and included among the authors, have pulled the issues together together with a succinct introduction and conclusion. The papers address the Base Force, ntelligence. the Influence Influe nce of War on Strategy, Strat egy, Congressional Response, Response, Maritime Forces, Forces, Nuclear Policy, Strategy for Asia, and Strategy for Europe. They are all excellently written and, while you may question some of the discussions, you will find them uniformly lucid, readable, and thought-provoking. The price pretty steep, even as good as the work is, so you might want to check your post library first. But the analyses are important. And you are left with a much clearer understanding of what's what's driving all the changes, as well as a bit of trepidation on whether we're expos ing our flanks again. JOHN R. BYERS COL, Ret. Alexandria, Va.
Collapse of East German Comm unism: The Year the Wall Came Down, 1989 by David M. Keithly. Praeger Publishers, Westport, Connecticut, 256 pages, $47.95. The
Certainly overpriced and probably overstated, The Collapse East German Communism has the potential to be rousing good history, but it falls far short of that. David M. Keithly's book is so dry and wordy that it squeezes all vitality out of an exciting event. event. Despite Despit e this significant
November-December 7992
shortcoming, shortcoming, however, the book boo k does focus on the two major reasons for communism's downfall in East Germany in 1989 ational identity and economics. As a separate sepa rate communist state, state, East E ast Germany was doomed doome d to fail because it was never able to establish its own national identity. 'Germa 'German' n' identity crossed crosse d both borders, East and West, and the East German nation-builders erred in thinking that communism would supplant the centuriesold feeling of German unity. This is perhaps best described as "two states, no nation." tion." The communists have never fully understood that no country can free itself from its geography, its history or its culture. Economics, more than nationalism, however, played a greater role in the collapse of East Ea st German communism. Outwardly, East Germany appeared to be an industrialized, relatively modem police state. Inwardly, wardly, though, though, it was economically economi cally feeble and diseased. Ambiguous planning planning and diluted leadership, technology lag and remarkable inefficiency, and raw material wastage combined to aggravate the economic disparities between East and West. Rejection of glasnost and perestroika coupled with widespread corruption among party officials only heightened the national economic dissatisfaction. The communists failed to see that economic performance is the key to political stability. Most remarkable is that the collapse occurred almost without violence. violence. Unlike similar circumstances in Romania, the East German officials refused to use force on their own people. The Soviets, of course, refused to intervene because they quickly saw that East Germany was a strategic st rategic luxury they could no longer afford. afford. The author is university professor with two previous published books to his credit. With this book, he provides no maps photographs, but plenty of footnotes, mostly from European newspapers. This book is best-suited for the European cialist, not the general reader. W.D. BUSHNELL COL. USMC Shawnee Mission, Kan.