Aristotle - Rhetoric II (Ed. Grimaldi with Commentary).pdf

COMMBNTARY

39

which, as Kassel remarks, is found in De part. an. 6sob 28, 6sIb 10, De gen. an. :nob 3. The metaphor vividly captures the way in which the feelings in each instance (sickness, poverty, etc.) prepare the way for anger; see S4& 8. a 22.-2S l-<, &' &!tv .•• a lloUl.E'tIl' I would agree with Spengel that this refers back to ']9a Io-II and is a further explanation (i.e., 79a 22.-2S with ']9a II-IS) for the statement there (and see ']9a 6). "Further, if a man happened to expect the opposite"; "the expectation of something else" would seem to be a mark that in the man's MEa there is also present an affective element of desiring something else. This appears to be the point of the following clause (. See 81a 6Jf. a 23-24 d "oAu "lIpci &6~lIv what one expected.

i.e., what is sub.tantially contrary to

a 2S-26 "'PII' ... ~A'X[II'. Cpo A 7, 6sa 20-21; 9, 68a 12.-13. , a query provokes a dispute: sore spots are never disturbed without grumbling." is the reading of foor edd., Spengel. Kassel, Cope a 27 : J XIII k. read "al OTI IITS. The evidence for both readings is good.

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

2 ~ov... lI-ii>.J.ov

",d

79a 33

probably understand TO;; dio .....o, with

dIe first !',UAov: "when they are more caught up in these conditions than is needful they are even more easily moved to anger." J lv '
a 28

a 29-31 6pyll;ov.... , ... yelp The first persons mentioned are those ...bose actions are acts of ~Pe'.; cf. 78b 23-26. The three verbs are more or less synonymous in their general significance: to laugh scornfully at, mock, deride, jeer at another. The sense of superiority which they convey can be seen in Plato, Euthyphro 3c ("aT..,.e"ci')' The.ga I2se (<1"OO=e ..), Demosthenes, On the False Embassy 23 (xAevdCe ..). Apart from the statement at Top. 144" 6-8 that xAeva<1ta is a species of IJPe'" and the indication at .EN I128a 4-30 that <1"OO=e.. can be used in a good and bad sense, and in the bad sense causes pain and is a "o,dOe'1!,d n, A. does not discriminate among the meanings. Cope, p. 28, makes an effort to do so. From his comment on the charges of Meletus (Apol. 260) Socrates saw them as acts of hybris.

Ross alone includes this in parentheses and a 3I : 1 6j!p(~oucr, yelp. punctuates with a comma after it. The other edd., Spengel, Cope omit the parentheses and punctuate with a period. They also end the next sentence with a period after <1'1!,e'a (Ross, a colon). I consider the punctuation of the edd. more Correct and the reason is given in 79a 32 : 2. 2 ..o;:~ ... j!AcI"..oucr,v "at th",e who commit the kind of injuries as are, each and everyone [U<1a], the signs of wiI1fu1 insult"; this is another class at whom anger is directed. I '"111-£;:" C£ 57b I : 2; "E'1!"'''''' 390. 2 TO'CIlk...tv.. , To,aVTa would appear to refer to a 31-32 ("al TO'••.• <1'1!,B,a), and to explain (''1lut it is necessary that sncb acts be th",e which .. .'1 when sncb actions constitute {JPe'" i.e., when they have no purpose save the gratification of the doer. See, e.g., 78b 23-25. J a sc. I<1Tt: "which are neither retaliatory nor useful to those who do them [ToE, notovaw]."

a 32 :

a 33 i\6'1 ... Gj!p'v This is commonly taken to mean: "for only then will they be felt to be due to insolence" (Roberts translation) or "for when this is the case ... , then (and not till then) are they thought to be due to a wanton ... intention to offend" (Cope, p. 25). I believe that it would be more correct to interpret: "For, in fact, actions of this sort are held to be done [do"•• elva.] from hybris." A. has just told us that the actions he

COMMENTARY

41

has put forward must have the qualities which are identified with hybris in his defmition (eE 7')a 32 : a), and in OUI sentence he draws the conclusion: for such are held to be hybristic acts; on ild'l, see 541> 7. a 34 nit; ... XClTtUppOVOUaL se. oeylCov-r:a, (79a 29)i another class of people with whom men grow angry. On "aTa'l'eoPBiv, see 7sb IS-I6, 78& I4-1S : I. Air." is to speak ill of, to revile. The understood object (TaVTa) of the verbs is the antecedent of the following relative clause, nse1 0011•.••

"a,,';;,

a 3S : 1 crn""6ci~auc,,v as osed at A II, 7ra 3; see also Soa 2S-27. It indicates, as does the following 'l'IloTl,..ov,.. ..ol (eager for honor), the serious concern of the individuals for the objects mentioned as things of major importance to them. 2 t ..l .o""'l'I~ 'l'Ilon,...iu6al int = to take glory in, pride oneself for. 3 ickv ... .O""'l'I..v The condition is present general, e.g., ea. TI, '"',,,,,;;, Ail'T/, ""Ta9'e6"l1); el" "with reference to, with respect to, in regard to"; LS, .1" N; eE also 7')a 36; 81, ... Idea•. a 36 160'1' In A. the word commonly means form, shape, figure. It is not unusual to interpret it as beauty; see, e.g., Plato, Protag. 3Ise. Thus Dufout, Tovar translate Out passage; in the English translations it becomes "their appearance." a37: 1 inl....." 4, 64b 16-17. 2

of ,..71

il....

....

"in the case of"; eE LS, b,t, A.i.2; cpo A 9, 6Sa IS-I9;

refen to the qualities just mentioned ana is the subject

1lnciex...· 3

..o)J.ij> p.iiAlov·

sc. OertCOVTal of a 29-30.

the reading of the codd., three edd., Spenge!, Cope. a 3S : 1 "U"D~ Ross and Kasse! read atlToi,; on the interchange of the personal and reflexive pronouns, cf. 60a I : 1. 2 i\ 6Aw~ ... SOX.LV i.e., if they suspect that the qualities are not in their possession: "either in general, or in any effective way, or do not appear (to others) to be present." 79h I : 1

D
whenever men "are of the very firm

conviction. n 2 un.pix.'v is the reading of the edd. with Roemer whose conjecture makes sense. Spenge!, Cope have the reading of all the codd., 1lnciex'''' which has created difficulty; see, e.g., Cope, p. 26.

& 2 "DL~
AllISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

01""7 to fare wdl at the hands of friends. A friend is clearly of the class TOV ol',,"'e8i. "'", neOm/"O.TO" 78a 33. A. puts the idea in another way at Pol. 1327b 40 - 1328a 16 in a reference to Plato's TO Ov",oB.Mr;, the part of the soul that is the seat of indignation, resentment, and anger, among other feelings. There he suggests the possibility that Ov",o, is the faculty of the soul by which we love because it is aroused more readily against those who are loved, i.e., friends, than against those we do not know: "when one thinks himsdf slighted his 8v",o, is more aroused against acquaintances and friends than against strangers"; see also Pl.to, Laws 717d. The word, as we saw it atA II, 7Da 6--9, indicates b 4 ""oil; EI8".fLEv0'~ that which is an habitual way of .cting on the part of an individual, his typical. characteristic way. Change in such a manner of acting toward another is sufficient in itsdf to raise questions as to the reasons why. and A. says as much at 79b 5--6: unless there was a reason such. person would presumably act as always: l'aVTa &11 no,er" (oio"Tat), b 6. 6Ib 2;

II.

T,,,,ii..

Ii
b 4-5 ""'fLiiv

to. pay .ttention to. b 5 i«v ... 0fLw;,; explanatory "fie: for otherwise ; see Denmston. p. 62.. b 7 : 1 cl.""",,,,o....ua,,, a; Le., confer benefits in return. We saw the verb at 78b 25. W "01S'" "&"X'" has been seen a number of times in the fust book. e.g.• atA 7. 65b 2-5; 14. 75a 14-15. etc. In fact, in the last passage, speaking of injustice (d6",.a) A. says that not to return a good to a benefactor is a form of injustice; see also 79a 6-8 (In ... dpovlf}o,,). In the Gorgias 5200 7-10 Soctates says that certain good deeds inspire a desire on the part of the beneficiary to make a return (a'T' tV ,.olSi.) so that it is fairly sure that if one does such • good deed he will in tum receive back • good deed. On this topic. see 79b 30.

79b 14

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43

T'l)v ('"I" Cope, p. 1.7, suggests that poieav is understood and gives evidence for his reason. Granted that A. uses the neuter when he uses the word alone, e.g., at 84" I1., I do not see why the foIUl here cannot stand alone to signify equality; see, e.g., Demosthenes, On the Peace 17: ow. tixe' ri'j, 1'"1" The kind of equality would come from the sentence, e.g., "those who do not repay \vith a comparable benefit." If the word is used adjectivally it would seem that x~" (79b 30), W"(!y""tav, rather than p0ieav, would be understood. 2

If this passage is to be interpreted as it generally is, and as was first mentioned by the scholiast, then the punctuation must be watched. The scholiast's interpretation makes sense since a reason for the anger experienced has been given in each instance from 79a 30 on; our sentence gives a reason for the anger fdt in the two instances at 79b 6-JJ (xal TO" ... dVTanod,do;;"..) and 79b 7-8 (xul TO', .•• Therefore a colon after both w",v, b 8, and dVTtmod.do;;".., b 7, makes more sense if we are to extend the reason -at 79b 8-IO to both sentences, as everyone does. oC TO.OWO. (79b 9) refers then to those who do not return benefits, or who do so inadequately, as well as to those who, though inferiors, oppose one. The form their xaTa
w"..).

,.".Te,

p"" -

rpeopel" rpal1l0'PTa&. 2 AOy", "of no account"; LS, lOyo" 1.4sc. deytCO.Ta,; c£ 79b '-7. e.g., 78a 31-33; "for the anger caused by slight is, in our assumption, directed against those who do not properly have the right to slight." 3 OA'Y"'pU.~ an objective genitive: "anger caused by slight"; c£ S. 1331..

b

II : 1

p.iiAAov

• 6,,01,,£......

1 p.-li "pocnj"ov..~ sc. &l'YWeB'v; c£ 78a 32.-33. • n:poa'lj"., ... 6A'Y"'pe'iv. There should b. a period after &l,"wee,v (see Spengel, Cope, Kassd), not a colon as read by the edd. It should be clear from the explanation of dl.yweta at 7sb 10-13 that, naturally speaking, one is not entitled to demean someone better endowed than oneself in the very thing which is attacked.

b

I1. :

b 14 "f1ivllvd..

sc.

Ail'''''''' ij no"ii" ...

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTOR1C' II

44

b IS c.......p ... Mu.....yp'l' The story to which A. probably refers is told by Diodorus Siculus 4.34.1-6 and Ovid in Metam. 8.420-444, and given more briefly by the schoJiast: Plexippus, the maternal uncle of Meleager, remonstrated with the young mao for giving his trophy, the skin of the Calydonian boar which he had killed, to Atalanta with whom he was in love. Meleager, insensible, apparendy, to what his uncle considered his rightful claims, aroused the anger of Plexippus (llAoioumo, [cleylCsTa,] T.p MeA.dYe'!'). On Meleager, a subject in both epic and drama, see OeD, PW. The identity of the playwright, Antiphon, is another matter. Athenaeus, Deipnosophist.. I S.673e-f speaks of Antiphon, 0 Teay,!,d,ono,." and of a character in his play called Plexippus. This is identified by Nauck & Snell, p. 79Z, as the play Meleager, and they refer both to our passage and to a later reference in the Rhetoric, B 99b 2S-28 as instances from the play. Meineke, I ]I S- r6, in his discussion of the comic poet Antiphanes (see OCD) to whom Pollux, IO.73 acribes a play Mele.ger, also considers both the Aristode and the Athenaeus citations to refer to the tragic poet Antiphon. It is most likely this poet who lived at the court of Dionysius the Elder (ca. 43<>-367 B.C.) and was put to death by the tyrant (Plutarch, De Stoic. repugn. IOSld; Philostratus, Lives of the Sophists, 499-S00; PW, "Antiphon" 12 and "Meleagros" 4SS.63). At 8sa 9-13 there is a mention of the death of an Antiphon; see 8sa 9 : z. b 16 6)',Y"'p{~", '"I....iov If a friend is defined as "one who for the sake of the other brings about that good which he considers to be good for the other," A s, 61b 36-37 (and see 80b 3S - 81a I, and 6Ib 37 : I), it is clear that such neglect (T~ p;, al..M.B..Ba,) is in itself an indication of ciA.y.,. ela. 10 fact, in the very next clause, A. underlines this sign character of such neglect by saying that "the needs of those for whom we have regard [i.e., even those who are not necessarily our' friends] do not escape our notice." I interpret an understood Ta a.oplrlla TOVTO,. as the subject of o~ Aav9d••• at b 17 since this seems to be clearly the thought A. is developing in b 14-17. 6A .., (0£ A 6, 62b 34; 7, 63b 2S; 9, b 18 "IIEl ilAw~ E68up.oup.E"o~ 68a 26; cpo 79R 16 : 1) sums up this whole class as any and all who remain cheerfu at another's misfOrtunes.

.Ii"

b 20 )'umj""'Ir'V The unconcern in this regard (which is an active disposition, e.g., p;, 'Peo.TlCov ....) on the part of those who cause the pain is an affront, and an indication of their. dA.ymeia. The illustration of this which follows (a.d ... cleyiCo.Ta.) would be true only where the bringer of bad news manifests the same disposition. 10 other words, if the anger is to be justifiable, there must be an element of dA.yweia in the action, as the analysis of each class with whom men become angry indicates; see, e.g.,

COMMENTARY

4S

79a 3Ion. Thus I believe that the illustration is memt to say that men spontaneously assume such disregard when anyone causes them plrin. For the individual consciously or otherwise associates the pm with deliberate intent to fruslr.lte, and so an attitude of o).'YOJela on the other person's part; c£ 79a la-IS (aVToi ... deyiCeTa.). Thus anything, even the conveyance of bad news (which in the best of circumstances is usually TO "o).,} naea MEa., 79a 23-24), triggers anger. On the idea in a•• ... deylCona., c£ Sophocles, Antig. 277 (tn'eye. yae otldel~ ayyeAov "a"Oi. mOi.), Aeschylus, Perr. 2S3, Demosthenes, 01. 3.21.

b 21 aXOUOUGL • . • OECi) ....iv(u'it i.e., lito listen toU; lito look at as at a spectacle." The implication in the context (e.g., b 22: o).,y"'eo;;u" II '%8eoi~; and b 23-24, see note) is that both are done maliciously and with pleasure. That which is 'Pavlov is generally in A. anything opposed to what is good, reputable, worthy of attention, signUicant. Here it seems best taken as "weaknesses, faults, wrongs"; see, for example, 8Ib 29. The object of both verb. is Ta tpavla; nee;' aVTow = "concerning them.JI h 22-23 ot yl&p ... CNvllAyoiio,v is the explanation of why they are like A:c8eoi; see, for example, 8Ib 7-<).

a.

b 23-24 8..:.",",,0' &l ... c!
79b 31

.ARISTOTLE, IRHB'I'ORIC ' II

b 26 : J otl~ "lCJ)(Uvouv'r'" LS, alax••"" B.IL3: "to feel shame in the presence of a person," ie., U to stand in awe of, to reverence, the person." We see this use at Soa 32, Sob I (and in the noun at sob 3" where it carries the meaning of al~w" reverence, awe, respect). See Euripides, Ion 1074I07S, 934. Sophocles, philoctetes I3S", and Cope, p. 30, for further instances. This is not a meaning we find in the word when we meet it in the first book or, for the most part, in B 6 whete he discusses alaxUv.j; but cf. S43 27. 2 ij Ev 'ro;:~ "tCJ)(UV0l'EYO'~ The constroction is suddenly changed; the relative clause is put aside for a prepositional phrase; see 79b "4 : 2 for the translation. If anything is to be undetstood with this phrase, it is what Cope suggests: i.e., " (... dl,,,we06a. av....;;., b "4) tv ... "d.

0.,

b "7 6pyl~ov'r'" I'iU.Aov from b "4-26.

0.,

The reason for the greater anget is obvious

The use of eI, here parallels that of "'eo' at b 2S : J .~ 'rit 'ro,,,il..,, b "4, and it means "with reference to," a common meaning; LS (dl'l''''e~w) and Kassd (appar. crit. 7Sa 33) take it in close connection with dl."we~w; more instances of such usage (dl',,"'ee" el,) would be helpful. On the use of ...o.aiiTa, which points forward here, see 6xa 5; for its more common usage to refer to what has preceded and to instances similar to them, see 66b "7 : 2, and Beare. This is an instance of who the • .;;. cnJ...06 at 7S, 3" are. 2 "tCJ)(polv sc. ia.... ; on the sense of alaXeo, cf. A 3, sSb 2S, "S; 9, 660 "4.

b "9 yov.;:~ b 30 XUp'Y I'ij 4",o516ou""y lu Spengel, p. "IS, notes, this is substantially a repetition of 79b 7. It is, save that a different and more natural and commonly a=pted explanation is given for the anger, e.g., "'aea ... "wela: it is contrary to all that is naturally fitting (cf. 67b IS : 2, or A I, 55a zz); cf. Xenophon, An.b. 7.7.46: "I think that all men consider it an obligation to show good will to the one from whom they have received gifts." Spengel finds similar repetitions at SIa 9 (presumably 01 aVTo" ex8eot) and a T6, and also at SIa 31 (plj .ll.",. ...."ol ...Iii. 6.,..ae . .a.opSv",), SIb 2.

"l.-

"'0"

b 3I

'roi~ d"..."EUO"",,O'~ ",po~ cmou5cii;0V'r"~

See Plato, Crolyl. 3S43,

sle.,'''...a. "eo, ,..e: "he speaks ironicalIy to me," with the idea of dissembling,

i.e., purposefully affecting ignorance. This is the way we find its cognates used at 8"b 21, osb "0, I9b S-IO, 20a "; cf. EN IIoSa 19-23, II24b 29-3T, EE 12343 I. At EN II27a 18 A. begins .. division of the trnthful, the boastful, and the ironical man, in the course of which (at II27b 22-32.) he sets down the characteristics of the sie.,pe,. Working, as he does, from the idea 01 d~ ,......e'.,' zew,....o. Tfi slew'.'9, he gives a generally favorable and somewhat benign meaning to .Iew.eta; the mention of Socrates as being

COMMENTARY

47

ironic is similar. Compare Cicero, Bru/IIS 292, De orat. 2.67.269-270. In irony, however, there are dements of ridicule in the affectation, pretense, evasiveness, which (though the ridicule may be partly of oneself, cf. r 18, 19b 8-10) reveal a certain disregard or disdain for the other person, as A. notes here at 79b 31-32: "aTa'l'eOPT/T,,,dp "de. Socratic irony has been much discwsed, and there is dispute about the meaning of the word when used of Socrates. See, e.g., Friedlander I, chap. 7; Gulley, pp. 62ff.; Guthrie, Socrates, pp. 126ff.; and Boder, pp. 14-36. Though Socrates i. not the ironic man as seen in Theophrastus' Characters: Irony, aspectS of mockery or disdain are not always absent £Om his remarks. On cmovdclCoVTa" cf. 798 35 : 1.

b 32 : 1 £U_l1J"'""'Di~ C£ A 9, 66b 16; II, 7Tb 3; for the force of the ending, see 5gb 32 : 1, 81a 20. 2 Uv ... eN";;'" sc. lap JA~ (dia. e~"o''1T.''ol) "al ~o;P. b 33-34 ..10 fl.iI ... cN..Ov The articular infinitive with its relative clause is in apposition with and explanatory of ,O';TO: "al "de ,o6T& (laTl) "aTa~ .roalZ "for example, forgetting names, though it has to do with such a trivial matter." b 36 "'Ifl.oiov C£ "1:1I1'8'OP," 391; Spengd, pp. 215£, has a long note to the eJfcct that ;1>16'1 i. an example (in the threefold division at 78. 24-25, or here at 79b 36£), not of the persons with whom one is angered (inl -ria..), but of one of the reasons why (i"l "oio.,). But, as he righdy corrects hirnsdf, A. could just as readily have said: "and men are angered with those who are forgetful." The point of calling attention to this comment is to note something already indicated in the outline to this chapter: narndy, that the threefold division is not stricdy followed in the analysis of the emotions, i.e., divison by division. See, for example. the very next emotion in B 3, where the third divison (inl "oio.,) appears intermingled with the second division (inl Tia.) and the first (,,0;, n lxopn,), 80a 30-31; see also the concluding statement at 80b 30-33 which mentions ouly the first two divisions. In B 4 the major subject of consideration is the second division (inl Tia..), and the first ("o;,lxop..,) and third (inl ,,"oio.,) are practically dismissed. This analytical procedure, occasioned quite clearly by the close interaction of the concepts in each division, is stated by A. .t 79b 3?£: 01, ••. IJ.JAa el"e'1Ta.; see also 87b 3S - 88. 6. C£ Boa 6 : 2.

AlUSTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' II

80a 4

See A II, 700 IS where the idea behind forgetfulnessb 37 4"0..,,,,,, here, namdy, indiff"erence (dl dpJ.l...a •... l'i""eTa., 79h 36-37) is brought out clearly as it is set in contrast to l""pi.l.e,a; c£ 708. 14 : 2. Boa " : 1 6£o, iiy x ....'.."'''''cil;.'y is the reading of three edd., Spengd, Cope. Tovar, Kassd read Q~T6. before "QTQ""""dC... from a good tradition. Spengd, pointing to 83a 8-9, 8sa 3<>-31 (where a~.6., a.lToo" or 1Jpii., is omitted) decided against it here and was followed by Roemer. I :un reading without it (cp. our passage, for example, with 77b 22-"4, 19b 17-18), but can see no reason against it. On "aTa"".vdC... c£ S9b 142 ..cjI 1.0Yf!J See S6a I : 2 and in particular the use of the word in s6a 4-19 (d,d pw ..• .l.iy",p.,,). a 3 : 1 0[0' ••• lxoucrty "to make the auditors such that they are ~~tua}ly irate." Fo~, the adver~. with exOJ, ~; 1438. The adverb can mean inclined to anger, but also to be angry ; see, e.g., Demosthenes, Ag. ~iJi", 21S. 2 €V""'..!OU~ ..o6'ro,~ lvDxou~ boxo, in its technical meaning is found atA 13, 74a 36; TOOTO., would represent the d.d ,"oia, the reasons why we become angered with people: "(to establish) their opponents as subject to those things."

a 4 "D'oU"OU~ i.e., Toll, bavTlov" the opponents who are to be presented as "the kind of pCISon with whom men are angry."

CHAPTER 3

definition of mildness (almness, gen-

I . Introduction: 80a S-8

tleness, patience, good temper) II . Development: 80. 8 - 80b 29 I.

80a 8 - 80b

2.

80b

1

the penons toward whom men experience mildness, calmness (80a 30-31 :ilso refers in passing to the division d,1I Tl"",v, 80a 7); the objective aspect of the emotion

2-29

the disposition, attitode, of those who are aim, and under what conditions they are so (80a 7); the subjective

aspect III . Conclusion: 80b 30-33

80a S : J -njI 6pyl!;Ecr8clL ••• 1:/0 n:p..GvEcrllclL is the reading of four edel., Spenge!. Cope and Ross read Td derlCeaOa, •.• TIP neailv.aOa,. We have a parallel to our construction at 88b 3. In general A.'s srudy of the emotions by contrasting them is an eJfort to see them more fully by viewing them from diffetent perspectives, e.g., 77b 31 -78a 6. The same is done with characters, e.g., young, old, prime of life. From his explanation of mildness there can be litde question that it is the contrary to anger. Further, its opposition is of the same character as the opposition found between pity and indignation, fear and confid=, shame and shanrelessness, kindness and unkindness. There would be no reason to question this save that SI. Thomas Aquinas in his extended study of the emotions (in which he indicates his awareness of A.) remarks, Summa Theologiae Ia II.., q. 23, art. 3, q. 46, art. I, that anger alone of the emotions b.s no contrary. The opposition A. speaks about in all the .bove is contrary opposition, i.e., two positive terms denoting extremes of difference within the same genus, each excluding the other from the same subject. If the form (to use A.'s terms) which constitutes anger, shame, pity, etc. is changed so that the new form constitotes the opposite of the original emotion, the entity which results is the contrary of the original; and SO we have: mildness, indignation, confidence, etc. There is, however, a possible diffetence between anger and other emotions, and Thomas is correct in saying that anger as an emotion b.s no contrary. In

50

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' II

80a 6

the other emotions the contrary is usually a possibility toward which a person can move. Por an individual subject to fear (pain caused by the image of impending and destructive evil), confidence (hope accompanied by the image of safety and the absence or remoteness of the terrifYing) is a possible alternative. But this is not true of anger. In anger the move toward the contrary is dfectively blocked since the evil which causes the anger is actually present in the individual, i.e., he is experiencing or has experienced rhe act of disdain. The only alternatives open to him are to .ccept this evil and so experience the concomitant pain and distress, or to reject the evil and so become angry. 2 npczGv£G8'lL is the process of growing or becoming milder, appeased, becoming tractable. All was mentioned earlier, at 78a 22, this emotion a 6: 1 "pexO'n)T' together with xOe" is peculiar to the Rhetoric Uust as xaed i. found only in EN, 0"",0' in EE, noOo, only in EN and MM, '",O"",ia only in EN and EE). Cope, pp. 35, 42, does not accept it a. a true emotion. It is, however, included among the "dO~ in De an. 403a r6-18 (along with 0"",0" 'Popo" IlBo" Odeao" xoea, 'P.lia, and ",iao" which, with the exception of 0"", ••, are also found in the Rhetoric and EN). Hicks, s. 403a 16, views these "d~ of De an. 403a r6-lS in the wider sense of "attributes" of the soul conjoined with the body, rather than as emotions. Hamlyn, s. 403a 16, leans toward "affi:ctions" (which is not excluded by Hicks) with the further possibility of "emotions"; certainly emotions are used by way of illustration at 403' 17f[ There can be no question that A. understands "eaoT1J' in the Rloetoric as an emotion, as he does also in part in EE 1231b 5-2.6 and EN II03b 17-25, 112Sb 26 - 1126b 9 (on this last, see also IIogb 14-26). It is in the l.tter works, however, that he speaks of "eao,,}, as E~." and l~., is not a "elOo,. Por example, studying in EN the nature of c!esnj and using his doctrine of the mean (noSa 3-9), he speaks of neaoT1J' as a l~., (see, e.g., 1I03b 21-2S, II09b r8-26, ru6b 4-9), and specifically as one of the virtues, which it would be as the mean state between the extremes oel',MT1J' and d.all'~aia as they are named .t EE II20b 3S. It is this understanding of neaoT1J' which is found in On the Virtues and the Vices 1250a 4-6, 39-44; see also Top. 12sb 2(>-2.7. AtA 9, 66b 2. it is spoken of as a virtue (see 6Cib2), although in the same chapter, at 67a 3 S, the idea of an emotion is present. However, even though an ijOo. (69a IS : 3) is determined by its dominant habits (Us.,), it should be clear that there is no conflict or contradiction in A.'s mind between a habit and an emotion since in discussing the different kinds of ij90. in B la-17 he speaks freely of the emotions (for example, cowardice, courage, anger, etc.). From what A. tells us, a person's ijOo. emerges in part as he establishes a formed pattern of response to the feelings or emotions frequently experienced. This set way of responding is called.

U',

80a 8

COMMBNTAlI.Y

51

(see 62h 13 : 2, 69& 8 : 2), and while it is true that the "&6,, are not i!E.. ~, it is also true that in the moral (>j6."'1) sphere the i!Ee.~ are concerned with the ,,&67]; see EN II06b 16-17, Physics 245b 3 - 247a 19, especially 247a 3-9. In the case before us, a person by responding to or encouraging feelings or emotions of mildness, good temper, placidity ("eaoT7J')' or by countering anger with such affective responses, can fonn the 6t;.~ also called "eaoT7J~, just as a certain kind of response to del'>1 can develop the iE.~ deyWiT7J~. In the Topics passage cited above (I2sb 24-26), A. admits the possibility that a MJfJa,..~ accompanies the ll;.~ which is "ea6T7J~ such that if a .person experiences the ernotion of anger he is in control of it. See 80h 30 : 1. c£ Chantraine. A recent discussion of the word can be found in Nikolaidis; see also de Romilly, pp. 37""43. Gauthier &: JoliE, II 301, translate "ea&T7J~ as "Ia placidite," admitting that "Ia douceur" is "une praotes, mais c'est la praotes biblique, . . . une vertu essentiellement religiouse, tout afait dilferente de Ia placidit" aristotCIicienne." But cf. de Romilly, pp. 19sns, 97-196, who presents the concept as she understands its development in the fourth century. 2 ""'~ .XOV'
&..;

See 60h 14:

2.

a 8 : 1 ",pcillval~ We have here in a 7-8 A.'s understanding of this word. Why he uses it instead of "eaoT7J~, which is the emotion under consideration, is a question. It may be, as Cope urges, that he is thinking of "eaOT7]~ as a 61;., (cf. Boa 6 : 1) of which he has said (Top. I2Sb 23, 26-27) that "eiio~ 6 clna61\~ Ul'BTa.. But if this is so, his language at 80a 6 is careless in correlating it as an emotion to oer>i which is an emotion. The word itself is rare, and I find no evidence for its use in A., Plato, or other writers of the fourth century. It appears to be an Aristotelian construct to 'ignify the modification itself. the movement within the self experienced by those who undergo a change away from anger. 2 _'
80a 10

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' II

51·

down from disturbance"). Plato, Definitions 4ud, also conveys this meaning: "I!aoT7J' "aTtl"Ta"., Tii' ,m' deYii" We also meet ~ei"'1J"" in ,he Physics where the rneming "coming to rest" or, on occasion, "being at rest" best fits the sense of the text; see, e.g., 22.6a 7, 230a 4-5 ("movement toward that in which a subject is stable is rather coming to rest"), 238a 18, 25Ia 26-27 ("coming to rest is the privation of motion'). In our definition, then, A. is saying that is an emotion which consists in the experience of feelings within the self of a settling down and a coming to rest of anger, Le., feelings of calmness, gentleness, good temper, feelings opposite to angry feelings.

,,,.,j,,e..,,

"etliJ'''"'

a 9 : 1 ...oiS 6A'yc.>poGcr.1I We begin at a 8 the discussion hd TI"w. We have already seen the place of dA.y"'ela in anger (c£ 78b 32.£), and its meaning for A. (c£ 78b IOff.). It is worth our notice that the concept is used frequently in this chapter as a critical principle to assist in determining the nature of "I!aOT'I'; see, e.g., 80a 13, 20, 23, 27 ("aTIl'l'e••eiu8a.), 29, 35, 36. z 6' Qc..u,nOll is the reading of four edd., Spengel. Cope and Kassel read ai lUT.. il
."OV""O.

"O.OV"w

."oV,,"O.

a

10 : 1

"'C'oU"fWV

cbcouau..s etc.; c£ EN 3.1-3. Z

i.e., the various kinds of dAIy"'e'a; see, e.g., 7sb I3ff. if, for example, done under constraint or deception,

a Io-II CP"'"Op..IO'~ ...o,oG...o,~ "those who appear to be that sort of person"; on TO.OVTO, referring to what precedes, c£ 66b 27 : Z; see also 79b 28 : 1. TOIOVTO.,: i.e., "'1J~l• ... 11 cl"o."I." ".IoVa ...

80a IS

COMM]!NT AllY

53

a II : 1 x,d TOi~ ,..,..t sc. "eliot .10"" both here and in the like instances of the datives which follow. z j30uJ.0p.6vo,~ The verb appears at 63a 25 in a passage on the neoalqeTa of men as generally draM. and it clearly means "wish" or "will" in the sense of "intend"; on the meaning in the text there. see 63a 25 : 1; see also 7fJa 8. 2.5. So. too. here, the meaning indicates the intention of the agent: ..they are "eli•• [they experience neadT11~l toward those who intended actions contnry to what they did." ie.. actiOIlS or words ("ecinew "al .ti"•••• 7sb 23) were acadentally the occasion of slight. The only difference discernible between this class and the a...vatw~ ".,oJa.~ of Soa 10 is that those now uruler discussion intended what they did. but did not intend them as slighting actions. The results of such action are what A.• at A 13. 74b 6. has called clwX'l/laT.. (ODe of the three kinds of (JU{Ja. me!> do. EN II35b IIfE). on which see 74b 6 : z.

!"'eir

This is another topic. and I would a 12-13 x,xI 31J0,. , . 6",ywp£iv. punctuate with • period after o.h"wq.i. as Cope. Spengel. Ross. and Kassel do. not with a colon. The main idea is in OA."wqerv. ie.• this group can be presumed not to slight others for the reasons given: no one is thought to slight himself, and this class treats others as they treat themselves. Since T.'O;;T., must have a point of reference. it should come from the sentence itself, ie.. "al (T.VTO'~) 6ao, (el~ 4Uov~) "al ... TO'O;;TO': "and with all those who indeed with respect to others are such as they are with respect to themselves," Since the action of OA'''Wela is the issue. we can translate: "and with all those who indeed act toward others as they do toward themselves." a 13

SaHeL

as at 7fJa 33: "is thought to."

This forms one idea with '/lOAO"o;;a.: they a 13-14 1'-E'\"1I1'-"'0l'-ivo,~ confess and repent. As can be seen at EN IIIOb 18-2.4. repentance is considered to be a sign of an involuntary act: "everything done through ignorance is not voluntary. and that action accompanied by pain and repentance is involuntary"; see also IIlIa 19-21. This class. then. is comparable to 80a 10 d"ovalw~ "olO;;a... A .• however. gives a diffi:rent reason for the presence of "qadT11~ toward them: namely. that the pain experienced by the agent removes any desire for retaliation (lIeeE'~ T'/lOJqta,). a 14 c:.~ yckp lxov...£~ , • • "For considering that they have (their) recompense in the pain experienced at what has been done. they cease to be angry." On tb, see S. 2OS6; at..'1v i. in explanatory apposition to Td AVneiafJar..

a IS '"II'-£iov . i.e.. what follows at Soa 16-1S (TOU, /lA • ••• 8V/lOV/lBVO.) is a confumation of the correctness of Soa 13-15 (.oa! TOr, •.. oeJrii')' C£ ..E'1/1sro.... 3S3ff.

80a 24

ARIStOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

54 a 16 xoAci...... ~

Sec 6l1b IZ : 1, 2.

a 17: 1 0l'oAOyoilv<...;

Cope, p. 34., cites Schrader's illustration 60m

Terence, Andria 621-624. 2 l'iiA).ov xo).cil;0I'EV

Sec, for example, the action taken by

Theseus against Hippolytus whom he assumed to be contradicting and d.... nying the charge made in Phaedra's note, in Euripides, Hipp. 992.-1089. a 18

8ul'oUI'EVO'

As a synonym of Oel"7, see 6911 4 :

2.

a 19 ckv.llUXW"'l.. predicate noun to an understood brrt whose su1!ject is the articular infinitive (TO ••• ae,oia6a.). As we saw at 78a 32, shamelessn..s is an indifIerence to any evil which brings dishonor (see 68b 23 and note). The effrontery shown in such baldfaced lying reveals complete disregard of the other person and disdain for any honor or respect owing to him. It is, as A. says, oA',,"'eta Hal HaTa'l'eri'P71a.~ (see also 83b 15-16). A clear idea of what A. has in mind in the word is seen in 79b 26 (and see note) in the use of a!a;t6Yoa6a.. As an example of the general idea in cl.a.axwda ... cle.o'a6a~ sec Aristophan.., Knights 296-298. C£ 8sa 14-'5. a 20 6).'ywplCl x ..l x .....a
oA',,"'eia

a 21 : 1 tllax,UVOPOE84

SC. TOVTOtl" antecedent to cL)' (a 20): CCwe feel no shame before those we deeply d..pise." • 'tCl7tE'VOUI'OvO'~ 7tpO~ ..lhoU~ The middle force of the verb is pr..ent: e.g., "humble themselv.... ; cWT06, refers, of course, to those who are "I!lio. (8oa II). Cope, p. 34, wish.. to take a 21-25 as a development of the preceding topic, specifically a 17-r8. I do not sec this as possible and certainly not for the reason he gives: "the mitigation of the penalty consequent upon the admission of the offender." There is no question here of any offense admitted or penalty remitted. It is another and separate special topic in the analysis of "eariT~'.

with the meaning found at 78b 35 :

1,

but sec 7Sa 33.


Cpo 80a 35-36: 0';6ol, ... oAc,,"'eor. A. bas already sugg..ted this at 78b 20-21 wbere he giv.. the reason for such fear: the possibility of being hurt by the one whom you slight. • 3"<1 "and the fact that. . .... The clause is governed by ~Ao;;" "LV (a 24) and is a substantive object clause in indirect statement; sec KUhner, BIas., & Gerth, II 355. . a 23 : 1

a 24-25 xCll 01 ..• XCl8[l;ov....~ The "at is intensive; "a611;0VTa~ means simply "sitting." Whether there is in the word itself without some further specification (e.g., Thucyd. 1.126.IO, Soph., Oed. T. 2-3, Lysias, Ag. Agora/us

80a 29

COMMENTARY

ss

24. Oem.. On the Crown LI7) the idea of humble supplication is questionable.

Animals were not infrequently used as examples of natural behavior; see. e.g. Plato. Laws 690b. Arisrophanes. C/o,"ls 1427-1429. The point here is that even angry dogs do not attack: those who appear T""••••,..."o •• since their posture signifies no threat. This is the kind of action to which Odysseus resorts (ad. 14-29-38) when threatened by Eumaeus' dogs. an action which. as Homer's text makes clear. helped for just a moment. a 25

.....ou&ci~ouc"

See

7')a

35 :

1.

a 26 : 1 ...pO~ ToU~ c".oulci~aYT~ is the reading of the codd.. three of the edd.. Spengel. Cope. Ross. Kassel bracket ti,e T06, (cp. 79b 31) with Bonitz, whiclt is more usual Greek (S. LI30). There is no reason. however. why the particular article is not possible here (S. II20b). referring to the individuals who are nelio. and who have been the subject of discussion from 80a 8. i.e.• "and men are good-tempered with those who treat seriously with them when they are serious." Z IOKe' This appears to be impersonal. and a~Tol, to be understood with it. dll' ot! = "and not rather" (S. 278Ib): "it seeUlS to them that they are receiving serious attention and not rather utter disregard." a 27 p.d~", Kex"p'Gp.EvO'~ The perfect middle is used actively here: "with those who have shown greater favors" - "greater" (i.e.. ,...ICw. cognate accusative. S. I 572). presumably. than those who experience the neaOT'7' have shown. This is generaUy true. but not as absolute as Cope would make it. the most obvious exception being found among those who are the recipients of extensive largesse and generosity. It is in fact the sense of debt and obligation of which Cope speaks (p. 35) whiclt often embitters. a point A. discusses at EN II67b 17 - II68. 18. What is a more likely understanding of this p..sage is that this is the positive side of what was seen negatively at 79b 6-7: "al Toi, ,..i1 ...
,..a.

'7'.

a 29 :

1

6f3P'GT..i~

2

XA£UClGT..i~

See 78b 23-26. 78b 14-15 : ,. C£ 79a 30. 7')a 29 - 31.

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' 11

Soa 30

3 a).Lycl>pOL~ See 7Sb 10-13, 78a 3Z; the word appears again at S3a 2 together with vPe"nal. It is probably righdy interpreted: "with those who act disparagingly." i.e., those who are morally good. In this moral a 30 : 1 XP'lcncN~ sense Vablen (Beitriige, pp. 266-6S) discusses the similarity, if not the idenxeijaTo" a"ovdaio, to denote the morally tity, in the Poetics of h.... good, and citeS a number of instances as proof, concluding that in the larger sense anovaaio. is a paronym for deSToj, as are 1""••,,4, and x:e;;UTO. although less frequendy used. And see my comment at 6ra 25 : z; also ?Sa X3 : z. sc. .ia.. There should be a colon, as Ross punctuateS, z mol' not a period, after aVToi. The other edd., Spengd, Cope read a period. With the colon the following sentence (oAw, ... "eal1.o.Ta) read by all, but bracketed (as Aristotelian, however) by Kassd with Buhle, is part of this particular topic. such a close connection is quite correct as Vater also saw (p. S3), particularly because Aristotle in this topic specifically refers to prominendy critical causes of anger mentioned in chap. 2 (VPe'UTai" aA."rheo,,), and he has told us at Soa 5 that Tcp aeriC.aUa. i.avTlo. TO "ea11vsu8a•. Consequently, in a form of shorthand he draws the general conclusion that the topics which produce the feeling of good temper must be sought from among the oppositeS, namdy, those which produce anger.

,,*,

"eal1.ona is the reading of four edd., a 30-3 I /I).w~... n:p ..Gv.."..... Spengel. Cope, Kassd read neaVvn"d. The neuter plural in our reading is used to refer to the general idea of persons (Tiu ..) and things (inl "oio.,) which evoke good temper, mildness. On "ea!1vovTa covering the division in! "oio., C£ 79b 36, Spengd, p. 21S, and cpo 82b 22-27. This clause has caused commentators since Buhle a number of problems (e.g., Spengd, Cope). Buhle looked upon it as an interpolation because it interrupts the Sow of the topical analysis. This criticism can be questioned for we have been receiving a series of specific topics by means of which one can devdop in the auditor the emotion of good temper. The statement here is simply another topic which by way of general summation says that from the very nature of "eaoT'1,' anything (person or thing) which is the opposite of anger is likdy to stir within one a feeling of good temper. It should also be noted that the topics presented are not, as Cope bdieves (p. 36), "going over very nearly the same growld as the topics of the last chapter." This should be clear by now from the present chapter itsel£ The 8Aw, clause is not a digression better placed dsewhere (see, e.g., Spengel, p. 2IS), but a summary conclusion to the topic at 80. 2S-30 ("al Tol, ... aVTol) by way of a generally valid principle. As such it is quite similar to that at Sob 4 and those found at A 9, 6S. 26; II, 70b 9.

80a 36

COMMENTARY

57

a 3 I XIX' oiI~ The antecedent of the relative is in an understood TOVTO', with otl" aeytCoyra, (a 33).

a 32 : 1 "lcrxUvCN'I"" ,..,~

C£ 79b 26: 1.

av ... Ox",a,,,.

the reading of cod. A and four of the edd., Spengel. Cope, Kassel read 2w, yae dy with a good MS tradition. r can see no reason to change, particularly since a reason is given in the next sentence, daV.aTOY rQq. On the mood of 'xwaw, see S. 2423 b. 2

a 33 ciw"IX"'." "d. The reasons for this statement must be derived from the analysis of anger in chap. 2 and the understanding of fear in chap. 5. Briefly: if fear is the distress experienced at impending painful, destructive h2rm from someone, it cannot coexist (/J.p.a) with a desire to take revenge upon that person, revenge which one sees as possible ot the moment of QIIger (78b 2-9). The very feeling of fear indicates that the fearful person is in the presence of someone in whose regard there is simply no posSibility for anger as it was defined. a 34 ..oi~ &,' opy/r.l 1I:ol1ja"a,,, As a commentary on 80a 34 - b I, one should read A 10, 68b 37 - 69a 19 and 13, 73b 25 -74b 22 and the notes thereto in COMMENTARY I, where the dift'erence between the deliberately intended voluntary act and rhe act which is voluntary but not deliberately intended (as an act done in anger can be) is discussed; see 73b 35 : J, 73b 36 : 1. The statement is clear if aA,ywela is action deliberately intended (see, e.g., 80a 9 and Boa 9 : z) and if the influence of anger and other emotions (73b 36 : 1) diminishes or removes in our actions the element of neoate"'" (deliberate intent in the action); see EN IlIlb 18--19 - "i"'aTa rae Ta aid 8vp.d. "aTa neoatesc", oZ.a, do"•• - and Il35b 19-27·

a 35 06 yo!.p • . • "'pi!;",

Cpo 80a 23. In the first place, such action a 36 opy,~op.E\lo~ o}.'Y"'pei would be a contradiction. Anger by its definition desires an act of retaliation, not any other act. If the angry person acts, the act is ordinarily an act of anger, an act seeking retaliatioll. Furthermore, the reason for the statement comes in the following clause: an act of oA'rweta is free of pain for the agent; an act of anger is not. The angry person experiences pain caused by the one with whom he is angry and who i. frustrating his realization of what he desires (79a II). The whole dlAolwa" in the angry person has its cause in the act of another person. An act of aA,yweta i. a voluntary act deliberately intended and realized, the cause of which resides in the person acting. His desire is in no way frustrated and so no pain is experienced in the act. Unless we are to demand the presence or co-presence of opposed modifications in one and the sasne person at the sasne moment, A's statement stands. On

58

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

Soh 5

the other hand, when the angry person places the act of retaliation (and his anger ceases; c£ 7Sa 31 : .3). his retaliatory act may assume any form including o.l,,,we1a. Sob I CZ'crxUVOp.£-.oOU; C£ 79b 26 : , for the meaning. such respect is a recognition of worth. value. in the person. the denial of which is the very thing which causes anger; c£ 7Ila 32. b 2 ""I Ixov'
cr..

b 4 xcz"'"pe....... ~'1p.. The first word is seen at 63a 33. 36 in the meaning found here (see 68a 14). The idea in ".l~e.,O"~ - namdy, a satisfaction, gratification. of the person (usually of the senses. e.g.• Plato. Philebus. 3Ie. 35a-
80b 8

CO,MMBNTAlty

S9

n.

b 6 "ClU"' ... 0 Xp6vo~ e.g., Eustathius on 24.139: "and consider ... how the intervention of time softens the harshness in those who are angry so that the one who said 'time is a god who makes gentle' [i.e., Sophocles, Blear. 179] spoke the truth" (ed. Stallbaum, p. 1342).

b 7 : 1 6. XCI! See 6sa 16 : I. What begins here and continues to 80b 13 (8C11'aTo.) is a discussion of d,d Tl.w. (8oa 7), the means which produce neaoT7/~ in a person. 2 E'1'EpOU ... aAl.ou C£ LS, 1-r:6(!O~, 1.2, "one . .. the other," i.e., "vengeance taken first on one person diminishes a stronger anger against another." The reason which explains such a reaction on the part of an angry person is actually given by Aristotle in his definition of anger at 78a 31-33, and in particular in T£pwela~
tially diminished. 3 opyiJv ,.d~...

-11 js the reading of the codd., four edd., Spenge!, Cope. With our text we interpret as in the preceding note. Kassd reads with Madvig: OIlY!} p.ICw. TJ.

b8:

1

6,0...

Kassd alone secludes (but as Aristotdian) b 8-ro

[d,•... d",p.pl1/pbo.] as interrupting the close cohesion between b 6-8 (,,!We, ... "eOTBea.) and b IO-I3 (nelia, . . . 8a.aTa.). While b 10-13 may seem a more pointed illustration of b 6-8 than is b 8-ro, I am not sure that it is meant to explain b 6-8 at all. The sequence of ideas is: b 6-8, the topic proper; b 8-ro, an exemplification of b 6-8; b 10-13, the e.'
60

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC'

[1

80b I3

3 .t,,6v..a~. opy.1;OP.o!vDU two genitive absolutes in which the first expresses the occasion ("on the occasion of someone's asking'), the second, the time ("when the people .. .'). b 9 "..I aUx cb.al.ayEl" The quotation marks are correctly read by Tovar, Ross, Kassel, Cope. Roemer, Dufour omit them here; Spengel uses none in the whole passage. b 10 : 1 &'I1~.~).'1P.o!v"" c£ 54& I6 : 2. Isocrates, Antido.is I8-I9, is a good example of what is meant by the kind of calumniation which philocrates has in mind as well as the rash, harsh, and all too soon regretted action which it called forth from the Athenians. philocrates' hope was to benefit when the anger of the people had been expended on someone else brought to trial first. Indeed, Demosthenes, Ep. 2.I4-IS, says that his condemnation in the Harpalus afWr was due to the fact that he was tried first. See also Lysias, On the Monies of Aristophanes 6: "those brought to trial last are acquitted because you, your anger at an end, give tliem a hearing and willingly admit their refutations." The explanation of such inconsistency in action on the part of those who are angry was suggested at 80b 4-8. See Sob 8 : 1. The important point here is th2t 2 yIYV"""II' having satisfied their anger against one person they beco... good-tempered tow.,d another Of others with whom they were angry. See PW. An Athenian general active in the Helb II 'EpyocplAou lespont in the years 363/362, he took part in Athens' campaigns in the area (e.g., the Propontis, Hellespont, Chersonese) prior to the revolt of Millocythcs against Cotys in 36I. Removed from command (Dem., Against Amloeralts 104), he was tried at Athens and apparently, from what A. says here, fined; see Dem., On Ihe False Embassy 180. C£ 98b 26 : 1.

b 13-14 xIIl o!civ nc..c"v sc. "'eliol
80b 18

61

COMMENTARY

person should be that he no longer is angry, not that he experiences good feelings toward the convicted penon. Can we press the definition .t 80. 7-8 this far? There is another reading which I consider preferable, a correction of ilsova.. in cod. A., i.e., Us,"aw. It is read by Spengd, Cope, and, I note, Freese. Taken in conjunction with what follows ("ai Am. ''',,"al', "ai ia• ... ldeaaa.· &lanse . .. • ,pOJe1ao), it makes, for me, eminent sense of 80b 13-16 (keeping the second "alla. where Spengd would drop "at or U.). A. then sa}s: "And men are good-tempered if they pity the offendexs, especially if they (the offendexs) have suffered a greater misfortune than they, the angty persons, would bave infficted. For they think that they bave, as it were, received their vengeance." This makes sense in itsdf, in the light of the comment on the angry man at 82a 14 ("a! ... 1lJ."'a....), and of that on pity at 8Sb 13-14 (laTa> .•. "'l'Xd....). Pity means that the other person has suffered serious and unmerited harm, and so harm greater than any T'!'"'eta desired. As a consequence one will well fed "I11io, toward such a person.

b 14 il 01 opy.!;6P.6V0' is the reading of three edd., Spengd, Cope. Ross reads 11 8; Kassd reads without 01 from a good tradition. b 16

XIII icky • • . 1I:ci"l(E'V

se. neaol .!law.

b 17 eN y'yve:"L"'IL ••• Six.."", "anger does not arise with regard to justice." This phrase is secluded by four of the edd. Ross reads it (secluding '"Ii, as do Spengd and Cope; Cope and Tovar read o~ Those who seclude the phrase follow Vahlen ("Kritik arist. Schriften," 1I2). I cannot be as certain as Vahlen that b 17-18 are twO coequal reasons and that our phrase is that of an interpolator. The conclusion to b 16 is an undexstood "'eliot ela ... We must first know why they are so disposed. We are told this in the sentence before us: anger and justice cannot coexist since (as we are assumed to know) justice is the only virtue that is considered to be "another's good" insofar as it "does what is advantageous for the other" (EN 1130a 3-S). We are then (b 17-18) given the reason why men in this instance are "'elio&: the presence of justice makes it impossible for them to consider themsdves treated improperly (see .,sa 32-33).

rae.

See 63a 9 : b 18 ~ .d "'e0afj"o. aspect.

1.

The point of the de6nition is to emphasize the

b 18-20 S.D ••. SoiI),o. This is an observation which is really directed by the intent of the analysis of the ",dB'I in this book, an intent which can be lost .long the way. A.'s objective in the extensive analysis of the particular topics of Myo" "dBo" ijBo, inA and B is to make these constitutive elements of the TiM understandable so that they can be used correctly;

62

ARlSTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

80b 23

on this particular emotion, c£ 80b 30--3]. Their correct use is quite simply to enable the person to whom the spoken or wrirten word is addressed to make a judgment (see COMMENTARY I 349-50). In the present passage A. calls our artention to such a practical application of a special topic - namdy, that at 80b 16-18 - for eJfecting "I!aOT11'. The idea bdrind "chastising befordrand in word" is to make the other aware of the claims of justice against him with the expectation that when the claims are recognized any anger will be removed or lessened (I\"TTO. dy""""Tova..). On ".laa., c£ 80a 16-18. The ordinary interpretation of this stateb 2Q--21 x.d ic10v • • • 11<..8011 ment and quite possibly the correct one if we are to avoid unnecessary complications is: "And people are good-tempered if they think that those who offend will not perceive that they suffer at their bands in return for what they themse1ves suffered nom them." There are three difficulties: the subject of h
C£ 78a 33-35.

b 22-29 6.0... I'£VE"!VCoIV In this passage we have a further explanation and some consequences of this topic (80b 2Q--21). At the end of it he draws the conclusion to the chapter.

n.""[1)·....

"Wherefore the poet has rightly written 'Say that b2.2 Odysseus, sacker of cities,' on the assumption that [Odysseus) has not been avenged if [the Cyclops) did not perceive both by whom and for what reason (he was blinded)."

OJ 9.504; the rdevance of the paob 23 'P«a8...... ",,<>A.nope.OII sage becomes clear by starting at line 500.

80b 30

COMMBNTARY

b 25 : 1 &.au. e.cr... The semicolon, used, I notice, by Ross, seems the ooly reasonable punctuation since the following lines are closely linked to the preceding idea. All the other edd., Spengd, Cope punctuate with • period. dl
b 26 oG..c ... for, sc. deyiC.""a. (b 25): "nor are they angered besides"; this is the second alternative. nB••waw is explained by "" ... alaB"l1.p""" in which the ideas are c10sdy connected by the coordination: they have ,utfered the ultimate misfortune and are not about to fed pain or to perceive anything. b 27 GiS ••• bplov...., Anger, at 78a 31, is defined as Se'." npwela, ",a,•• piP'!,. The participles cUy>!aova.., ala~a.pb.., contain what is in fact the antecedent idea to which oJ refers, and express this !JeBE', of the angry man insofar as cUY>la.~a.. i, the T,p"ela, the pain aspect, and alaB"a.p •••• , is the ",a",p.'1/ dement.

b 28 "O''1...q~ sc. .:tty... b 29 : I ..c8vcW"o~ an objective genitive modifying oeYii" 2 """PiJv, .. p.EVE.. I""", II. 24-504; they are the final words of Apollo in hi, appeal to the gods to permit burial of Hector', body. The key word in the citation as an example of the topic is " ..~, "dumb," i.e., without senses. After the above quotation Roemer, Dufour assume a lacuna in the text; Tovar, Ross, Kassd, Spengd, Cope do not, and I agree. Roemer's reason for the lacuna is that there is no consideration of d,d Ti• .,. "I!ailP.PTa, (8oa 7). In the first place this is not, strictly speaking, correct; see Boa 30-31, 80b 6-7. Further, see the comments at 7!lb 36 and at 80a 6: 2.

b 30 : I x ......"p"OV.'v i.e., to soften, appease; Isocrates, Panegyricus 13, expresles the idea intended here: "aTanea6....a, T'~' d"e.aTll,. A moment'l reflection on the use of this verb form and its cognates in this chapter ("eail••a8a~ 80a S, 7, 3I; "ea6Pa", 80a 8) should make it clear that A. is talking about "eaoT'7" not as a virtue here, but as an emotion; see, for example, Boa 6 : I with Cope's reservations (pp. 35, 42). The actionreaction projected by the verb is tranlitory and passing - see, e.g., Euripides' oeY!j. "eailPovaa (Nauck & Snell, frag. 822) - and as A. use. it, further

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

80b 31

supposes an action between agent and patient. Both these ideas ate in direct contradiction to everything A. says about a virtue in the EN and BE. Certainly it is quite incorrect once again (see 66a 36 : 2, 60b 14 : z) to say, as Cope does, that the view of nea/5T"1~ as an emotion "is adopted in the Rhetoric merdy for convenience, philosophical accuracy not being required" (p. 42); see, however, his subsequent comment (p. 42) on the de6nition of ""l/a. It would seem that the most telling observation against Cope's criticism on the matter is A.'s statement in the EN, a work to which Cope (e.g., I 159-00) usually refers on occasions such as this: namely, 1094b II-I3, 19-25. z b:... """,dov These are the .r6"1, special topics, and the methodology is exacdy the same as that in A; see COMMBNTAIlY 1354-55, 58a 17 : 1, 7tia 32 : 1, and cpo A 2, 58. 31-32, B I, 77b 16-20,78. 16-19, 27-30.

b 31 ll.nw~!Ltv namdy, the auditors; cf. 77b 24 (Tdv Hem)V HaTa-"HBvaC...). Set in contrast to b 31, cnJTO~~ ,•.tv, are those with whom they are angry, or~ d'.... We s.w naea"H.vaC, .. at 60b II, on which see the note. Ross reads aVToV,. o~ Ii' 6pyl~ov...... sc. (lH.tvov~) oC, 6' oerICo....a' (naea
b 31-33

CHAPTER 4

I . Introduction: Sob 34 - SIa S

definition of friendship

II . Development: Sra S - S2a Ij I. Bra B - BIb 34 2.

8Ib 35-37

the persons toward whom men experience friendship: objective aspect the things which cawe the emotion of friendship: objective aspect

3. 80a I-IS

the opposite of friendship: enmity and hatred

III . Conclusion: S2a 16-I9

Sob 34 .r[,,1O<; 8E • . • 8.....r[ followed by a comma and no lacuna is the reading of Tovar, Ross, Ka.!sd, Spengd, Cope, and is correct; Roemer, Dufour indicate a lacuna because of the absence of the third division: "W~ TB lxov..,. This problem has already been discussed; see Sob 29 : 2, and references there. b 35 : I ""," '1"l.{.." " ..l ..II
Uyo,...,. 2 I","" On the quality of the definitions in the Rhetoric, see 6Gb 14 : 2. The definition given here (Sob 35 - SIa 2) is essentially that given at 6Ib 35-37, and can be found in substance at EN II56b <)-17, or, again. at IIssb 31-34 and in the discussion on friendship throughout Books Sand 9. Friendly feeIing rather than friendship is perhaps a more accurate interpretatinn of '1'01.1" since as an emotinn it is a transitory, psycho-physical experience rather than what is implied 'in English by friendship, i.e., a more permanent disposition or state. As such an experience it is both a liking for and a wishing well to another for his own sake, a feeling engendered in parI by the bdief that the other person is so disposed toward you; see 8ra 1-2. We must remember that emotion is an integral dement in virtue as we have already seen and as A. indicates with respect to friendship itself at EN II26b 22-28 (d''''I'ie.' .. . ).""•••), IIssb <)-10 (6"" ... "d8'l). In fact, Grant, II, VIILS.S, discussing IIS7b 2S-31 ('1'01.1" as U,~), refers to 1I26b 22--28 and remarks: "the present passage does not in the least contradict this, as U'~, or a settled disposition of mind, is merely the result of regulated emotions

66

ARISTOTlE, 'RHETORIC' II

80b 36

and the tendency to produce them." Consequently, it would seem. that in the effort to determine the meaning of 'P,Ua as emotion a careful use of what is said about 'P,Ua as the virtue of friendship in the ethical works is legitimate. In a recent study on the use of the emotions in Greek tragedy, stanford cites most of the emotions found in the Rhetoric, including 'PIlla. h 36 :, ,<,0 pOllA£..8." This is a critical dement in this emotion, and it points to the intdlectual aspect of the emotions as A. understood them. We have seen this often-overlooked aspect in the emotions already studied. In fact, it is disappointing to fu,d that the commentaries on B (apparendy conditioned by the view that the "dO'I are not a proper part of A.'s theory of rhetoric; cf. 54& IS : , and .) treat the ,,~ in a casual and cursory manner. We have seen povl'luI~ in A where we futd it as rational desire for the good (64b 32 : 4, 6l)a 2-3), an act which intplies that what is willed is under the control of reason. Or, as A. says in the Top. u6a 12-t3: sllj 'P'lla h TOP hrdlv,..."n"op, o~" a. ehJ povA'Iul~ n, . "ijua rae POVA'IU" l. Top AOYlun"op. The idea in our definition here is seen at EN IIS6a 9-10; that it is rational desire would seem clear from the clause in our own definition (80b· 36), Ii o,eTal ayaO&, as well as from the starernent at EN on the three kinds of friendship (ns6a 7'-19) whicll reveal purposefulness in 'PIAla. Cope's stress (p. 43) on the purely appetitive aspect of 'PlAia is misplaced, and his description of ,'Ala as an "emotion" is strange: "the desire . . . which is naturally, or has become by habit, instinctive, and therefore a "dOo~." Once again the transitory cb.racter of emotion is lost, as is the difference between "dOfJ and U.,'; see, e.g., EN nosb 2S-26: 6(;.It; ~. "aO' a, "eot; Ta ,,010'1 Ixo,.... eJ ~ "a>
81a 4

COMMENTAlIY

ology of the particular topics the kinds of people (this is his primary concern in the chapter) who evoke the emotion oflove (friendship). Further, he has told us in A why this is necessary and has done so once again at the beginning of this book, B I, 77b 21 - 78a 5. At the very end of the preceding chapter, he states once more the purpose of this study of the "dB" (Sob 30-34), and at the end of the present chapter, S2a 16-19, docs so again. The purpose is to enable the speaker (writer) to make an intelligent use of the emotions in his effort to communicate the truth to another as far as it can be known in the generally contingent siruation in which rhetoric works (ssa 23). WhUe the purpose is practical, the theoretical analysis of the "dB" is soundly grounded in what he says in other works about the "aB". But to lose sight of the • .ua. of the analysis is to misunderstand it.

Sla I :

1 Io'ij ."h·w e.g., EN u67" 17'-lS, and Cicero, De nat. dear. 1.44.122, and particularly: "Prata et arva et pecudum greges diligunrur isto modo, quod fructus ex iis capiunrur, hominum caritas et amicitia grntuita est. ..." 2 ..0 x",.. 1l ... dy"" On "ea ...".6v C£ 6Ih 37 : 2, 6zb 4 (and MM II97a 3ff.); Had dwllp
Kassel alone secludes this (but as arisa 1-2
used as it is at 69b 33, 79b II: "with mese principles

Briefly, me argument in a 3-S is: if me princirles are a 4 CI!Y"yx1) valid, it follows of necessity mat the friend rejoices in me omer's good and grieves at his evU because me friend is one who fJovl ..al ..., a aZ..a, draBa (Sob 36), and pleasure is a mark that good has happened to one, as pain is

68

AllISTOTLE, 'RBBTODJC J II

8Ia 10

that evil has happened. I would take this section to be an integral part of what precedes as a further explanation of the definition. And so. contrary to Cope. pp. 43-44. I consider the topical analysis to begin at 8Ia 8 where we find the first mention of those toward whom (TI.a,. a 34) men experience friendship. a 5~ !'-II &0& ••• mc.'vov In other words. a friend is another self; see. e.g.• EN n66a 31-]:'. II70b 6-7. There exists berween the rwo the "I'0.ola attributed to ",IUa in Plato. Dejiflitions. 413a-b. or as Zeno in reply to the question Ti, 'UTI ",iAo,; answered: ci.l.Io, lya. (Diog. Laertius. Lives of the Philosophers: Zeno 23). This ide> will be exemplified in the very first topic 8ra 8-II.

a 7:

1 Z

(3ouAi) .....,S See Bob 36 : 1. '"I!,€lov See 57b I : Z; and ..1:'11'....... 391.

a 8-9. ....lois &-11 ..• ex8pol sc. "al (",D.OI ./,,1. TOVTOI,) or,: "And (they are friends to those) to whom in fact the same things are good and bad and (who) are the friends and enemies of the same people (as they)." The logic of what is being explained. e.g.• Tl.a, \l'IAOV", (a 34). calls for but does not absolutely demand the rdative pronoun (who). The lines describe a single class toward whom men experience the emotion of friendliness. i.e.• those who have the same id... as they of what is good and bad and so like and dislike the same people as they. This seOInS to follow from the reason given at a 9-"0: TaVTa ..• dvdy"'!. Spengd (p. :0:01) is not happy with the norninztive case since he believes that all the accusatives (presumably betWeen 81a 14 and 8Ib 34) depend upon the construction at 8ra 4 (dvdy",! ",i).o. Bl.a.) but he =pts our text on a parallel with A 9. 66b 25-:06 eventually followal by 67a 16Jf. (his reference to A 5 is uncleor). But there are some problems with Spengel's position: first of all. the accusatives from 8la "4 on ("al Toll,) make more sense in e>ch instance as the objects of a ",lAov"" understood from a IZ (and cf. ",lAoVa.. at 8lb :02.. :06. 28) than they do as part of the 8la 4 construction; secondly. the cases at 8ra 34-35 ("al o! b"M.. ~101). 8Ib 23 ("al 01,). b 24 ("al TO.,) must also be explained by Spengd. Cope's problem (p. 44) with dlj (he would read IId'l) seems to be answered by 61 b 37 (q; d>j) and see Bucken. De Aristotelis diandi ,alio... p. 43.

a 9 x,d 01 ... q>IAo, ... ex8pol read by four edd.• Cope; Kassel alone secludes it. but as Aristotelian. Spengd reads the rdative o! for the articles. "for of necessity they [TOVTO.,] wish the same things." a 10 : 1 """·.ens TOOT..,. indirect object with d.d)''''!. refers to those just described, i.e.. those who fed friendly toward and those who are the objeclll of their friendliness_ For. as they are presented, they must enjoy the unity of mind and wish proper to friends (d"'Ddo~ta "Bel "I!DQ'I!A"B"". Plato. Definitions 4I3a).

8Ia IS

COMMBNTAIIY

i.e., wan po.lD,..."o~ "al cY,u

a.nq;

a

Coer......

(lcn>A6p.£vo~

(po~).BTa,) TO~T
II-12

",d "oU~ •.• cplAoUer,v

Cpo 79b 2-4, 13-17.

a 12 : 1 ij cn."oU~ •.. ,,1j&ov.... , Cpo A 12, 72a 9, 73" 3. a,jTo~~ and the understood antecedent of dip are the object of "",o''1''OTa~ sJ. 2 ,,1j&ov.... ,· ij . . . A colon is the punctuation of four edd., Spengd, Cope; Ross reads " comma. The verb understood with this and the fullowing 3 eI P.&yci>... procases is sJ ,..,.o.ljxaa,; ,..."dJ.a is a cognate accusative: "if they have done thern substantial benefit•. " a 13 : 1 ..o,..u..o,~ " ..,poi~ On "a'eo" see 6sa 20: 1; considering the use of TO'OV"v "'..... The a.n.;;. refers to the subject of 'P" )..va.., a 12. The phrase is to be taken with each of the procases. Four cdd. punctuate with a comma after Iv ...a; Kassel, Cope with a colon, which appears more reason.ble.

1 de; ...

1I:OLCLV ~

$C. (fPM.O;;ct,,, '£'OU1;'Ol1') ofJ, . .. oM Cpo 79" ~. 3 " .. I "oU~ ..;;", cpo.wv For the accusative see 8Ia 8-9. TWv 'PI),,,,. = "their friends" (S. II:I.I), "their" referring to those who are the subject of 'P,).ova .., a IS: "they are friendly to tho.e who are friends of their friends."

a

14 :

3

0"""....' •.•

"al here introduces another group: namely, "and a IS " ..I cplAOUV....~ those who like the people whom they themsdves like." It is not explanatory "al (as Cope, p. 45, takes it) explaining what is meant by TOll~ ••• 'Pl)'o.~ inunediatdy preceding. A moment's reJlection will indicate that this is so. There is no reason to think from 8Ia 14-20 that mutuality ('P').';;' - d....· 'P,).o~,...o~, 81a 2-3) is present in each of the topics mentioned. It is assumed, all things being equal, to be present - e.g., SIa 19: 'Pal'.Ta, sI.a, - and thus it is ground for the emotional response ('P&Ao6vT'~) they experience (see EN IIS90 "7 - b I).

81a 20

ARISTOTLB. IRHBTORIC' 11

For a fuller discussion of the a 15-16 '
16

'
sc. oC,
they are enemies." a 17-18 xlll 'll'aTa: "with regard to money"; on this use of see Bonitz, Index, :O:02.5Sf[ Cope, p. 46. speaks here of "the utilitatian view of virtue, ... already prominendy brought forward in 1.9." First of all ""Ala as a virtue is not the issue, but ""Ala as a "dBo,. Secondly, on this "utilitatian view" of virtue, see 66b 4. and EN II56a I#. where the utilitatian view of IIS6a lo-U is put aside.

.1"

8ra 24

COMMENTARY

71

1 ToU~ D..EU9€ptou~ See A 9, 66b 16-17, and 66b 7 : 1. From 66b I6-r7 it becomes clear that they feel friendly toward "the generous" because they are evmwrrr:ueo£ el, Xe7}IICTQ (a 20); see EN Il20a 21-23. 2 ToU~ olv6p€lou~ See A 9,66b II-I3 and 661> 12: 1, from which the same inference a. that of the preceding note must be drawn with respect to the avb(!£io, who are £v";0£77,£,'''0£ el, uW"CTJ(liap. 3 T.""",,,, xcd ToU~ 6.x .. lou~· Apart from the colon (Roemer, Dufour, Tovar use a period), this is the way the text is read by four edd., Spengel, Cope. I accept it but punctuate with a colon after ~,,,alov, as do Ross, Spengel. It is preferable to the period since we have in 8ra 20-24 one topic naming three lrinds of people who are d,e objects of 'P"Ua. Kassel collocates di1ferendy and not unattractively by using a period after T"PW"" and thus beginning a new topic with "al TO~' ~I"alov, ... pcUI"Ta - in which case al"alov, would be the object of 'PIlov" .. undmtood (a 12). On amalov, see A 9, 66b 9-II.

a 21 :

a 22 : 1 TO'oU-rOU~ From what A. says in what follows and from his statement in A 9, 66b 9- II, this would refer to Toll, ~I"alov,. With v"olappa,ov,," undmtand el.ao: "they assume such to he those who ..."; cf. 7!lb 28 : 1. 2 ToU~ ••• ~';;VTCl~ As we saw at A 9, 66b 9-10 (66b 10), justice is the virtue whereby men possess what is their own and as the law commands. The just man, then, is one who respects the rights of another, or as we read in EN II30a 3-5: 'Justice alone of the virtUes is thought to be the . good of the other since it looks to d,e other" (see also II34b 5-6). In these termS the just man is correcdy assumed to be one who does not use others (d'P' 'TieOJ' CW'Ta,) but to belong, on the contrary, to the class of 8Ia 18-20 ("iia ... .. 'Pao.).

Ii""

1 01 Toil .pyci~Ecr9... sc. 01 COl .... , ';"0 ... : "those who live by their own labor." eeraCeaOal refers particularly to agricultural work (e.g., see Thucyd. 2.72.3) which seems to be its primary meaning here. However, we saw it at A 9, 67a 31 where it refers to manual labor. 2 ~cni'fWV •.• yECdpylCl~ TOVTWV is a partitive genitive; the phrase refers to those who live by their own labor. Farming and agriculture (e.g., husbandry in general) are also given high praise in the Oeamomica 1343a 25 - 1343b 6, a work, if not by A. (? Theophrastus), is considered to be (in its first two books) by very early Peripatetics with a base in A.'s Politics and Xenophon's O.tonomit"s. Xenophon, of COUIse, holds farming in high esteem in the State; Barker, p. 263112, speaks of the "agrarian trend in Aristotle's thought" seen in Pol. I.9-II. Cp., however, Freese, p. 194a.

a 23 :

Tcdv oiAAb>v 01 "~TOUPYO( clAAOJ. (for its meaning, see S. 1273) is • partitive genitive with pcJ..!'aTa: "and beyond all the rest (of those

a 24

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

8ra 32

who live by their own labor)." We saw aUTOVerol at 73a 8 : 2; they are, as defined by Hesychius: oE d,' eavTcii. ~eraCop.••o, and so they are not the workers of 67a 31. a 25 : I "'DU~ G':'CPPDV~ .•. ci6",o! The reason for feelings of rprJ.la toward this class is dependent upon what is said about the just in a 22, and cf. 8Ia 22 : 2. On ao>rpeoaVVT/, see 66b 13. 2 ciftpciyl'ov,,~ i.e., those who mind their own business; the reason here is the same as in the preceding note, preswnably on the ground that these, too, exercise self-restraint regarding others. There is an interesting conjunction of the aUTOVerol and the d3tedrp.o••~ who constitute the demos in Socrates' discussion of the democratic State in Rep. 565a. a 26 : I "Cll ot~ ,e. "al (T06rOV~ rprJ.oiialV; cf. 8Ia 8--9) ol~. However, note that in the relative clause A. clranges from the generic plural which he has been using (at, e.g., 8Ia 14, 15, etc.) to the first person plural. a 'P"Lv"",,,,,,. i.e., "are manifestly (clearly) willing"; cf. 78a 31 : 3. a'7 ciYCl8ol"..",' cip.~ i.e., morally good; as he says in EN 10960 23-29, the good has many meanings; moral goodness, clem) >10,,,>1, is set out for us at n05b IS - no6a 12. a .8 :

1

See A 5, 6ra 25-27, together with 6zb 20 : a;

£660"'1'0'

and cf. A 12, 72b 21. i.e., "or among those who 2 8C1.UI'''~o""ivo.~ ... 9"u ....cil;ou.rLV are admired by us, or among those who admire us"; the verb has the meaning found' at 79b 25 where it is also used to denote the subject's admiration for another, or the admiration of another with respect to the subject. The TO'~ in TO'~ 8avp.dCovalV is a conjecture of Victorius' read by the edd. for the ol~ of the codd., and I would accept it. If ol~ is read, a different meaning emerges and it was indicated by the ancient commentator Anonymus: "and those who are hdd in honor in all things, or in the best things, or in those things which they admire, or in which othm admire them."

".d

a 30 CJUVll",yuy.iv CJUVll.'IJ .....pEiiG... The infinitives define the meaning of >id.'~' In EN Il57b 19-24 A. says that there is nothing more clraracteristic of mends than being together, that even those supremely happy desire to spend the day with each other. Cope, pp. 47-48, has a long note on the verb forms. a 31 c!t ......p"'ClVOp.&vc..v the verb is seen at 74b 7.

"of them when they are at fault"; the idea in

a 32 'PLAOv.XD. the reading of Dufour, Ross, Kassel rather than rprJ.6••• (read by Roemer, Tovar, Spengd, Cope); on the form, see LS, rp'A6v",o~: 2, and 63b I, 6sb 21, ?Db 3].

,,0.

Sra 34

COMMENTARY

73

a ]>-33 1tclV'<.~ ... ~ouA.,,8 .. , Ross alone encloses this in parentheses. On l'amTl>
with. ent. 2 xcii. 'Ra)8ciaa.l XIXl UX0I'-ELVClL This is a confl1sed passage in the codd. The reading given is that of two codd., Kassel (cf. Der Text, pp. 133-34), Cope (c£. pp. 49-50), Freese; Ross reads )Gal -rep 'f(lJOdaat xal 'rrp vnoperval. Other codd. suggest the possibility of TOJ9&".. ,. Cod. A, Roemer, Dufour, Tovar, Spenge! and possibly (but not certainly) the Anonymus Commentator read Na, rq; naiaa, )Gal 't"qi vnope'i'JIQt, Those who read with. cod. A find no difficulty in the dative of the articular infinitive with l",a.~,o~. Whereas A. rarely uscs TOJOdCs .. (it is more common ill Plato), " ...6Ia, " ..iC... is quite frequent in passages similar to ours; see, e.g., EN II27b 33 lusb 4, Rhetoric 70a IS, b 3S, 7" 4, b 34, Sob 3. Furthermore, the tenor of the passage, which must be kept in mind, seems at first view to imply the kind of witty repartee and pleasantries more identified with "aIC ..., .s does the use of o~ as a synonym for .VT~dnelo~ at EN IuBa 33. For this reason • .,8d".. , Ueer, taunt, mock, scolf at) might seem too strong and, in the light of 79a 29-30, more likely to cause feelings of anger not friendliness. On the other hand, the use of {mOl"""', and of at a 3S-3 6, suggests that A. has in mind temperaments able to handle something stronger than mere good-natured joking. 3 U'KOf'ELV(lL sc. nalCeaBal., i.e., as explained at 81a 35-36, those who are skilled, dextrous, in the give and take ofbanter.

.".a•••

",,,h,,nw

cmwden' ml = press on toward. a 34-36 E1'tl 'l:'w"to ... aXW'M'OV"l:'E~ strive eagerly for: "for both have the same objective in mind [i.e., a pleasant

74

ARISTOTLB, IRHBTORIC' II

8rb

2

time] as the other ~iterally: their neighbor] since they are able to take a jest, and to return it gracefully"; but see 8ra 3S : 1. 1 a.!'-'Po...po. is the reading of the codd., of three edd., Spengel, Cope. Ross, Kassel read d"''PoTie'''~, a conjecture of Roemer's. There may be a point in Roemer's conjecture, or Thurot's df'fPtiTef!ov ("0bservations critiques [I]," 304-305) - namely, to take "a! 01 h,,6ie,0 • ... "no""'.a, as a single class: those able to make and take a joke. On the other hand, our d"''PoTseo, indicates that there are two classes: (a) those able to make a joke, (b) those able to take one. This distinction must be kept in mind at du.d,..e.01 ... O'"cimTov,,~. In this sense a!-"PoTBeO' makes a totally acceptable reading in accord with EE 1234" 4-23, where we learn that wit is of two kinds - (a) a delight in the truly comic even if it is directed against oneself, and (b) a gift for producing the comic - and that tbe two are different (a 14-18). C£ dfJ'Poneo" 8Ib J. z ' w.>\a.OII dependent upon TavTo; see 62a 9.

a 35 :

is the reading of Ross, Kassel, Cope a 37 : 1 K,d ..aU","", !,-a,a.... Ii from a good tradition; d,e other edd., Spenge! read "a! TOVT"'P a,..dJ.'aTa. In our reading TOUT"" is clearly a partitive genitive with ,..dl'O'Ta referring back to Tel .•. dyaM. These aya6d, in the light of the praise given to them, are probably their virtues; cf. 63a 10, 67a 29 : " 67b 27-33. z !'-iI ~"cipX"v Ricllards, p. 107, calls attention to the unusual (and it is) infinitive construction in place of the ordinary relative clause. Once again, however, we seem to have a constructio ad sensum since tpo{1oiJ-II'ra" "which they fear" carries the idea: "which they clearly think [oloPTa,] they do not possess." 8Ib I _e ..polO\)~ i.e., "those who are respectable in appearance, dress, and their whole manner of living." Our reading is that of Tovar, Ross, Kassel with cod. F and other codd. The odler edd.• Spenge!. Cope read "a6a.eiou~. On the various uses of the word. see Cope. p. 51. It is nnderstandable that such people migbt easily inspire feelings of 'PLAia in others. b 2 !'-iI OVE'&"'''ci~ See 8Ib 3. AA we know from 74a 22 (and see 74" 22 : I). ""do~ is the opposite of praise. Insofar as these persons do not resort to such 8...60~. either because of faults committed against them or because of their own (unacknowledged) kindnesses. they reveal a good will which possesses all the marks of one who is a friend, e.g.• 80b 3S - 8ra 1. and particularly of one who treats them well. 81a nf. These people are in = y ways like those described at 8ra 31. b 2-3 ck!'-..p..'1!'-ci.....". ~EpyE..'1!'-ci....", For the meaning of the first see 74b 7; of the second. 67a 6 : 1. Since both nouns signify action toward another, the first. the action of the 'PLAOii"B~. the second. the action of the

SIb 9

75

COMMBNTARY

'P,lov",."o" this elliptical expression has to be filled out: "they experience feelings of friendliness toward those who do not reproach them because of their [the 'P'Ao;;"TE~l failings in their regard or because of their own [the 'P,lov"".o,] kindnesses toward them [the 'P';'06'TE~]."

b 3 a.fUponpoL It is clear that A. has in mind two different classes in fJ~ o...o,..~d~, either one of which is a likely object of 'P'lla: (a) those who do not censure others for faults committed against themselves, and (b) those who do not reproach others with the kindnesses they have done them; c£ 8Ia35 : 1. 1'-"'IaL"""";;"'<"~ Aeschines, Again.!l Ctesiphon 20S (see also On the Embassy 176), says that if the Athenians who helped restore the democracy (4<>4/403 B.C.) had been like Demosthenes, there would have been no restoration. However, they were men "who gave voice to the finest words of a coltiv.ted mind, 'forget and forgive.''' This sentiment is repeated by

b4: 1

Cicero, Phil. I.I.I. 2 rpU).IIX'
On 'Pvl"'m"ov~ c£ 60b 17; in the light of the context, i.e., those who remember past injuries, the adjective here would mean: "those inclined to cherish [LS, 'Pvlti ....co: B.3], nurse, grievancrs." The technical meaning of i""J..7Jpa was seen at A 12, 72a 22, and 7Jb 33.

b 5 eU_,
b 5-6

... ot......... ,

The idea in the word was seen at A 9, 67a 19-20, On "ai, see Sra 19 :

1.

The subject of the

main verb (oiona,) is those who experience the emotion of 'P'lla, and we are given the reason why they so react to this particular class: "for of such disposition as they accept these persons to be to the rest of men, so

they think they will be to themselves." Understood with oiovTa, is ~o'ov­ TDU"

elval.. Cope, p. 51, is confusing.

b 7 : 1 " .."o).oyou~

See 79a 34, S4b S. "nor even .cquaint themselves with either the evil in their neighbor or the evil in them," as Socrates, Thea.retus 173 d, says of the philosopher: no more does he know evil of anyone than he knows the number of pints in the ocean. This topic should be compared with 79b 20-24. 2

1'-'1&. et&O,<..~ .....6.........

b 8-9 (I ya.p ... 5p~ As he says at EN 1099a 17-18: the good man finds his delight in noble actions; or at n66a 15-16: the good man is the one who struggles to do the good. b 9 a"ou&ci~ouaL" Cf. 79& 35 :

1.

ARISTOTLE. 'RHBTORIC' II

b 10 :

J

"'''XYJ''''XO(

2

",po~ cN"'oU~

8Ib 19

as e."Plained at 80a 32-33. i.e.. those who experience ""Ata.

b II : J ,",ou6 .. u..~ ""'~ IxOYT"~ "those who are somewhat seriously disposed toward them"; c£ S. 1709b. 2 811N",cil;""",~ On the meaning c£ 81a 28 : 2; it modifies and speci£es -I7. Boa 30 : J. b 12 X,dp""",..~ cN",oi~

"find pleasure in them."

Il"'.....

b 12-13 "'.. (3""""""'''' "and in particular have had these feelings about qualities for which they particularly wish ..." TriTa is an internal accusative with nm0v8dTa, (S. 1573); cpo 7Ib 19. b "4 60x.iv

as used.t 80a "3. 79' 33: "to be thought to be."

C£ Sla 17-18; cpo A II. 7Ib 12-23 on the pleasure b 15 : J bfLO(OU~ found in likeness to another; see also EN II59b 2-3. & A. qualifies the general principle here (lav pi! ... (iio,). so he qualifies it in the earlier passage. e.g.••t 7Ib 14 (.. , ... ,..lu'). 2 TeN"'cIt ...,"'1J6.uov ..... ~ "and engage in the same pursuits." 3 ....pEVOXAcdcr' Cpo 79' 14; the verb in composition would indicate here th.t some annoyance is toler.ble. but not an excess. J ,; (3(o~' ie.. livdihood; there should be • colon after it. 2 oil........o x.p .. ",.u~ x'p .. ",.i is the reading of a good tradition and is accepted by Dufour. Ross. IUssd. and Cope. The other edd. and Spengd read with cod. A: oiIT., Hal "Bf!apB1l, HB~"I'B'. thus giving the phrase as • direct citation from Hesiod as it is found in the codd. at 88. 16. For the citation (Works and Days 25-26). see 71b 14; see also Pol. I3I2b 5. EE 1235" 18; on Hesiod (fJ.. 700 B.C.?) c£ OeD.

b 16 :

Ellii "''' for the us.ge see LS. e!: B.VIL3.b. TeNW •.• era",(3"!"" "the same thing simply takes place": namdy. that which Hesiod said (potter grumbles at potter. etc.) which. of course. expresses feelings of dislike not ""lla.

b 18 :

J 2

b 18-19 x ..1..po~ . . .

sc. "al (""lo;;O'w ToVToo,) ~., 00,. ...

b I!r20 ",cit ..po~ 561;1111 This is ordinarily and attractivdy interpreted to mean "the unconventional": "so that they are not ashamed of their unconventional actions." This is possibly done under the influence of 84b 22-26. There. however. the corresponding phrase is not Ta n~o, dd~av but Ta ..... vopov do"oma. On the meaning of MEa as "what one expects" and so

"'e.'

81b 24

COMMENTARY

77

"what is established and likdy" in the interpretation above, see 79a 23-2S (In ... (Jo1l).ua.) and 7l)a 23-2S. However. because of the contrast between Ta "eo~ doEa. and Ta "eo~ d).-.jge,a., it seems that we have the distinction operativeherewhichappearedatA 7, 6sb 1-8 (see6sb I : z; see aha EN II2.8b 23-24): namely, that between that which is thought to be and the truly real; cpo Top. losb 30-]4. Since both phrases are the object of a form of al..xV.opa., their meaning in part should be specified by the action denoted in the verb. We know ttom 83b 13-IS thauhame is occasioned by evil or bad things which appear to bring the person dishonor, or, as A. states it more simply at EN II28b 22, "shame is consequent upon bad actions." Therefore. Ta "ecl~ MEa. would be actions or things which are thought to be, i.e., are apparently, wrong (cf. SIb 31-32); Ta "'ecl~ cU-.j9 ••a., those truly wrong. And so I would interpret b 18-20: "And (they like those) toward whom their attitude is such that, provided there is no contempt, they are not ashamed of their own apparently wrong actions." In other words, the actions are not truly bad (though open to such an interpretation) and are seen as not bad and thus are tolerated by the other person; further, the actions in no way imply disregard (d).'YOJeta, 1Sa 32.) for the other person. Many of the liberties taken among those who are ttiends presume their understanding, and fall into this category. 84b 22-2.6 should be compared with the present passage; we find there an interesting collocation of d)'~9.", and do"••• : Tli "eo, cU-.jge.a. dO"oV.Ta. b

20 : J

p.iJ

X ....ll
"aTllIPed"" ..,~ cf. 18b 14-IS :

On the force of p-.j cf. s. 213 I; on

J.

Z XCII ..po<; 06<; This is another topic designating another class toward whom men experience 'PMta. such persons, with respect to whom they are ashamed of their really bad actions (Tli neo~ d).-.j9.....), can be found at 843 2S1£

We have seen the word at 79b 24- See 79b 24 : z. b 2.2 : J 1;7JAO;;"OCl' rpOov£'''O.. , On Cjj).o, see chap. II; on 'P90.." chap. 10. The nature of the emotions explains the choice made here. z ..011..",,<; either their rivals or those they desire to have emulate them. b 23 ClUP...p........... 'v We saw the word at 7l)a 14; on the mood, see S. 2S4SC. Here, governing the dative and the accusative, it means: "those whom they assist in procuring good." Such cooperation is more substantial than e1'h>ola (EN u67a 1-2) which is like li:iendlincss, but is not 'PM1a, as we see at EN u66b 301£ b 24 : J p.Elln The apodesis to this protasis (cf. S. 23351£) is the onderstood 'PMoii ... (see 8u 11-9), Le., "al (aIlTotl, 'PM06 ..,) of, a.....

AlIISTOTLB, 'amrrORIC' II

2 "cd Ta;:~ is the reading of all the codd., the edd. (save Ross, Kassel), Spenge! (but with doubt), Cope. It is explained by introducing

the words 'PIAO' slul suggested by 81b 23 ('PIAoI eloa,) and on a parallel with 81a 8-9, and 81a 34. on which see notes. Bonitz (Studi"', pp. 8889) objects strongly to this as contrary to A.'s usual style. He finds the dative even more unusual in that A. continues with accusatives which have appeared since 81a '4 (all of which I have taken as the object of an understood 'PIAO;;u b.to'TaTQI 'PlAeio 'PI.:tov" see Edmonds, III a, 194.19. We find it translated by Terence in Phormio 562: "solus est homo amica amicus," Terence mentions an EpidiCllZomenon in his prologue, and Donatus on Phormio 48 tells us that Terence is following Apollodorus. b 28 : 1 .......
"to this class

La>! "AaTTo/J,oov~l also belong

81b 33

COMMBNTARY

79

In the light of the argument which follows at 81b 30--32 and the statement at 81b 19-20 this must be interpreted as "their own faults, mistakes," i.e., things relatively petty; trivial, thoughdess wrongs. Taken as a substantial and real wrong it renders the statement at 81b 30--32 2 TO.
meaningless; see, e.g., BIb 31. 3 icz",""" Tovar alone reads a1lT1lW with cod. A. b 30--31 dpl)TCZ' yo.p ..• czl"ltw6l'c8cz e.g., 8Ib 19-20. A. once again (see 8Ia 26, pouM,..JJa) changes from the third person plural to the first person. The argument in b 28-]2 is: those who are honest with others are the recipients of
b 31 6

b 32
i.e., in the active sense: those who cause fear.

ofI~ 8CZppoGI'EV oU&E~...


"of whom we have no fear." as should be clear from the de6nition of


b 33-34 d&l) U ... TOl";;"CZ If anything, A.'s objective in this statement SeemJl to be to poirit to the ground of all iv, IIs6a 12), the friendship of

80

AllISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' II

81b 3S

men good and alike in virtue (-ruBta 'Pula, IIS6b 7). When A. comes to analyze these three types in some deWl together with other aspects of 'P,Ata in the rest of Books 8 and 9 he mentions the Bfcl7j of the Rhetoric in different contexts, contexts which imply that they may submit to one or the other of the three types he presents in the EN. Finally, in this whole . matter we must not forget that in the Rhetoric we are con=ed with "dlhJ not U .." emotions not virtues, and that A.'s intention here as it is in the rest of this chapter (as also in all of B :>-II) is to analyze the disposition of those who experience feelings of 'Pula, the kind of persons who cause such feelings in them, and the reason for such feelings, e.g., 78a 2.3-2S. See Gauthier & JaM, Ib, 6SS-S9 for a good introduction on mendship; the chzrt on p. 688 indicates the kind of problem which can be met in seeking correspondences between the three kinds of mendship in the Rhetoric and the doctrine of the EN. b 34 : 1 l .....pEI.. In general the word ka'eo, as used by Homer of Achilles and Patroclus would describe this rdationship. At first glance there seems to be an ascending order of more intimate rdationship in ka'eela, ol"..6~7J~, ""1'"lo..a, and superficially such may be intended. Schrader's distinction, p. 2.340 is quite appealing, e.g., sodalitas, necmitudo, cognatio. But statements in the EN make one hesitate to assert this. For example, EN !Is8a 18-20 would seem to describe .~a'e.la as one would naturally understand it. There is a further description of it at n6ra 2.S-2.7; but here it is used of a mendship more properly called .."""io..a. At EN IIS9b 3S II60a 8 the order of importance would appear to be oZ,...6~~, ka
2 OlXEL6'r'l~ This would be some general kind of kinship of association which is what A. seenu to have in mind at EN n61b 1:>-16 when he sets it off from what he calls njo 'P,liao ..v""ev-lv Hal njo iTa
b 3S : 1 "oLlJ'rLXci "things which tend to produce" (6200 27 : .) the emotion, the feelings, of 'P,lia (see comment toward end of 8Ib 33-34). Cope, p. 56, points out that the plural fonn is meant to include xde" and

8:!.a 2

COMMENTARY

81

the two specifications. We see this again at 82a a. In this short passage we are given the l,,1 "oto,~ of the triple division (78a 23-2S). There has been no formal discussion of nw, T8 du".ai",...o.. z Xcip.~ The meaning in this word as well as in the two qualifications of it is to be found in B 7 where the ",'8o~ is defined; see the commena at 8sa IS, 8sa 17. J ",d "';, . . . " ..I "';, . . . ''both doing a favor though not asked and doing it without advertising it." 4 fL-li 5'7Jatv",o~ For this form of the genitive absolute, see S. :ul72; it is concessive here. b 36 ..6-.oii i.e., the person who, as the object of the action, experiences as a consequence the feelings and emotion of ,!>
See 8Ib 35 : 1. There is a point of some importance, a 2 : 1 ",o'7J""Xci it appears, to be kept in mind here and in what follows: here, that both l"'1e.aa",o~ and ~,afJoA.q cause Oel'7/; and in what follows, 82a 3-19, that any attention given them would be that of their rdation to oel'.q, which is the primary concept A. uses to define and delimit ",;;ao, - llf,8ea as an emotion. Z opy/I See chap. 2, and 78a 31-33 through 78a 33. J m7JP"'''fL6~ See 78b 14-15 : z. 4 8 ...~ol.i) See S~ 16: z. Anaximenes treW the idea at much length, at I436b 38 - 1437b 33 and again at IWa aI - I442b a8. The kind

82

ARISTOTLE, 'rumrOnIC' II

82a 8

of hatred occasioned by this sort of action is frighteningly exemplified in its consequences for Socrates; see Plato, Apology. lsocrates. Amidosis 30, speaks of the same kind of slander directed against himsel£ "arises from conduct directed against oneself," " 3 : 1 Ilx ... @TOV i.e.. personal offenses against one; e.g.. 78. 32.. Cope. K.ssd read eaVTO. here and in ti,e phrase inlmedi.tdy following, and "dv (for "-". in a 4); each is from a good tradition. 2 S. ",d "but enmity even without the personal aspect." n,e "al is intensive: "even"; c£ 85" 34. There is no need for any personal offense for one to experience hate (e.g.• 82a 7); robbery victims are not the only people who can hate thieves. Further, because personal offense is not in question, Plutarch's observation at 82a 8 : 1 is valid. "of a certain sort." i.e., rnerdy a certain type of charhas or has not offended one. Beginning here we are given the differences between anger and hatred, e.g., hatred is not necessarily personal (a 3-S), is directed against a dass as well as an individual (a S-?). is not healed with time (a 7-8). ainu at (desires) positive harm (a 8), is not accompanied by personal pain (a 12r-13), is without compassion (a 14). All this brings out rather dearly the rational and calculating character of hatred mentioned at Pol. 13I2b 32-34 (,LlAd "ii.Uo...d.). a4

To,0,,5£

acter, whether he

a 5 TOt " ..8' bo""TIl "with particulars." and specifically, as he goes on to say. with individuals; see 78a 33-35. In this and the following sentences the verb understood is AUTI. a 6 KCIllillv;j l:c.>xpci'n)V is the reading of the edd., except Kassel. Spengd. Cope reads the dative, on which see his note. p. s6; Kassd reads without 11 and gives the ordinary accusative form E"'''I!UT'1/ (our form is a common variant in Plato, Xenophon); from the codd., as I understand them, there may be a point in omitting the 11. We have the same conjunction of these two men at A 2, s6b 3I and CalIias is most Iikdy the Athenian nobleIlWl (ca. 4S0-370 B.C.) whom we meet in Plato's Protagoras and Xenophon's

Symposium. a 7 CNxCKpciv'n)V Together with the thief he exemplifies the statement at a 6 ("",'1/); on syncophants, see Bonner & Smith. 1139-'74; Harrison, 116o-62. 219-20.

a 8 : 1 dvlllTOII But, as the seboliasc says. death or something dse may well cure it. and Plutarch, On Envy and Hate 538c. says that men give up enmity or hate when convinced that they have not been unjustly treated, on taking the position that those hated as evil are good, or when they are benefited by those they hate. Pericles (Thueyd. 2.64.S) also argued that hatred does noC last long.

82a

COMMENTARY

II

:2 BpEaLt; lithe aiming at, desire for," as we see it at EN I I 14b 6. Cope, p. 56112, has a brief comment on dIe word in which he also mentions its legal meaning (appeal); for this meaning see Bonner & Smith, 1160, 104, 166; Harrison, II I90ff. The ).""'11 ().""1I' I'P""') would be the TlpOJe1a (mentioned at 78a 3I; see ,sa 3 I : 3) inflicted on the person who causes the anger, as is said at 82. IS. Anger and hatred here, in contrast to 82a 12-13 (Hal T~ ••• p,ati,. oil.), are being analyzed in terms of their specifying differences. 3 x"xoU i... , positive harm, or, as Plutarch (On Envy and Hal< S38e) expresses it: the deliberate intent of the one who hates is to do harm ("aHa;, no'iiaa,). & 'P,).[a was defined at 80b 36 we could, although A. never does so, define ",'lao, as: TO {JovA,sa(Jal rwl. a oina, Ha"ci.

a 8-9 ,derO.erO .. , ... 6py,~.".vos "for dIe angry man wishes the object ofhis anger to be. aware ofhis revenge"; see, e.g., T'p"'Q!a, 'Pawoph"" at 78a 3I, with which cpo 80b 20-29 and the notes thereto. a 9 '«j\ 5·

i.e.,

"00

the other" - namely, the hater.

a 9-I2 I .... , ... xCllxl ..S I would be inclined to agree with Vater (pp. 87-88) that this passage is parenthetical and intended to make a distinction between Ta ).tm1lea. the effects proper to anger, and Ta "a"Il, the effects proper 00 hatred. The desire of the angry person is to inflict retaliation experienced as pain upon the one who has slighted, to strike back and cause pain for the pain caused. The specifying diffete1ltia of anger is Tlp"'e!a which carries with it )."""1/. The specifying differentia of hatred is "ax!.. (e.g., piao, is an oeBE" "a,,/a,). A "a,,/a can be a Ha,,/a for another without causing pain. Hatred desires evil for the one hated, but this evil does not have to be recognized by the one hated and so be a source of pain to him in order for the emotion of hate to ""Press itsel£ The one hating is llot concerned whether or not the evil desired is experienced as evil by the one hated, but simply that evil be done to the person. Furthermore, A.'s argamont is not undermined if we say that the angry persoll can actually place an act of T'pOJe/a, which is in fact an injustice and so an evil, because the primary intent of the angry person as angry is to retaliate by giving pain; it is not his intent to do evil qua

tale. a 10 AU"'IP« .•• nciv..... Pain, like pleasure, by its very notion, is something which is sensed (De an. 413 b 23: ihr:ov ptv rae aia811a", "al ).""'1 TB Hal 7j60v>1); as a "sensation" it convey> meaning to the mind only as something that can be experienced (ala8'f/TIf, 10). a II ci6L>
ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTOIUC' II

8"" 17

believe, simply as examples of evils that are not all1lh}Td and so are different from .l0m). a II-I2 oU&£v .•• XIlX[Il~ Here we have the reason for the preceding statement: namely, that the presence of evil does not at all (of necessity) cause pain, and since it does not, it is not an alaSl1To11.

"'0' "'"

a 12-13 xIII '1:'10 ••• In contrast to a 8, anger and hatred are being analyzed with respect to their genus: both are 0lli..." but one is ~e
civ-rL1tCl8ci'V

SC. T01STOJI.

78a 31-332 "iJ .Ivll. i.e.,

antecedent to the rdative clause; on

the idea see

the complete destruction of the hated person.

Tovar, Ross, Kassel, Spenge!, Cope read correctly a 16 : 1 'PIlVEP6v by not indicating any lacuna before this word (Roemer, Dufour mark a lacuna). To argue for a lacuna because a discussion of l"'1e.al1~o, d.a/1o.l>i (82a 2) is absent would be to miss the point made at 82a 2 : 1; see also Sob 34We begin a concluding section here which can readily be misinterpreted if we lose sight of what A. is doing in this analysis. And so I would refer to my com:ments at 7sa 22 : 2 (see also 7Sb 11 : 2) and call to mind that the purpose of this topical analysis of the emotions is to enable one to make an intelligent use of them in forwarding the objective of the TiX""I: namely, to get at truth as far as it is possible (see 55a 22 : I, 55a 29-38), the truth which is so easily obscured by the wrong emotional reactions, as A. says at A I, 54b 8-II. z tx 'l:'oU......v i.e., the preceding special topics; see COMMBNTAlty I 354-55.

xcii h'C'cxC; ci.1tO&ELKWVCl.L •. • &LCIAUIL'V anods"cMa, is a synonym for d..l
a 17-18

82a 20

COMMENTARY

85

following "Ill p~ o.TIl, and to coordinate the verbs: "it is possible both to point out those who are friends or enemies and to make friends or enemies of those who are not, and to refute those who assert that they are frieuds or

enenries." a 17 'R'OIELV This is often taken to mean "to represent them as" - e.g., by Richards, p. 108, Cope, p. 58, etc. This reliects the kind of interpretation about which the caution was given in 82a 16: 1. I believe that the verb means quite simply "to make, render" (eE LS, A.III), i.e., to make those who are not friends, friends, or those who are not enemies, enemies.

a 18 : 1 """".....,,~ &1e&AUEIV

"to refute those who assert that they are friends, or enemies." The verb dial';... is used with the force of lAirx." here (see Bonitz, Ina.", 5••• ), as it is at A IS, 77a 2 (on which see na 2 : 1). Richards, p. 108, notes (correctly I believe for its ordinary use) that "dlllA1S... refute cannot take an accusative of the person but only of the statement or argument refuted." • "Ill... ciI"l'Lcr~'1..oGV"II~ The verb is to be interpreted as it is at 76a Z4 (see also 77" r): "to bring those who because of anger or hatred are our opponents to."

a 19 ~'6n6...p' av is the reading of four edd., Spenge\, Cope. Ross reads ."oTie"" 11. with Roberts (Oxford translation. note ad locum). I understand the reading of the codd. to mean: "to whichever attitude one chooses," i.e. if anger, to anger or its opposite; if hatred, to hatred or its opposite. On our reading see Jebb's remark Oebb & Sandys, p. 80nz). a"... is used as it is at A 9, 67b II. a

20-21

'Koiu ... 'PClVEPOv

See next chapter.

CHAPTERS

I . Discussion of fear: 82a

20 -

83a

12.

I.

Baa 20-27

transition with division; definition of fear

2..

8.22. 27 - 83a 12

development of fear things which cawe fear: objective aspeet

(a) 830>1- 8.b 4 (b) 82b 4-22 (e) 8.b 22-'7 (d) bb.8 - 8l' 12

people who cawe fear: objective aspeer brief summary on the really fcadUl, be they penona or things the disposition, attitude, of fearful people: subjective aspect

II . Discussion of confidence: 83a 13 - 83 b 10 I. 83a I3-I9

transIlton to, with division and definition of, confidence

2. 83a 19 - 83 b IO

development of confidence thlng. aod persons whichin general occuion

(a) 8l' I9-'S (b) 8la.s - Slb

10

confidence: objective aspect the .mpesition, attitudco~ ocmlidcnt people: subjective aspect

III . Conclusion: 83b IO-II

82a 20 : J 1
a 21 :

1

ifcr'no)

2


C£ 78a 31 : I. At EN IlIsa sif. in speaking of courage as the mean between fear and confidence (see also II07" 33), A. considers fear in passing as he does also in EE 1228b 4If. He remarks th.t some define it as "!!ouao,,tav """oG, as Plato in fact did in ProliJgora, 3S8d; .nd then mentions some of these evils: disgrace, poverty, sickness, lack of friends, death. Some, but not all, evils, he continues, .re correctly feared (the man of courage, for ex-

88

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

ample, fears correctly, EE l229a 4-6). Elsewhere in the EN in passing observations, A. takes note of fear as an emotion and part of the definition of shame (II28b nff.), of the relation of fear to human action, e.g., voluntary action (I IIoa 41f.), or again to action objectively good but placed under the constraint of fear (uI6a 3IJf., II21b 28ff., II3Sb ~, II79b uff.). In passages closely connected to EN IIIsa sf£. and EE 1228b ~, A. discusses the meaning of th2t which is feared, TO 'P0P-ed•. The meaning of this term obviously will be determined by the definition of fear itself and so we will look at those passages when we meet 'P0Psed at 82a 28. 3 >.0..... i\ ....p..X>\ Kassel alone reads "at for II with some justification; C£ 823 28 s.f. The same two classifying nouns are found again at 86b 23-24. They express, not two separate possibilities, but two closely connected specifications of fear as "a painful disturbance," as A. says at EE 12293 33-34: 'fJOPSea Aiy ....a' Ta "o''Im,a
"'s

a 22 I'ro""...S ••• AU1nJpoii "impending (coming) destructive or painful evil." Though the evil is in the future, still its character is such that it appears imminent; see, e.g., 82a 24-2S. The adjectives qualifying evil are also important. It is not simply the proximity of the evil but its substantial threat to the person (e.g., 823 23-24: /Jaa . •• d.n.aTa,) which causes the fear. This is made rather clear at EE 1229b 10-12: "for as a matter of fact danger is spoken of only in such instances of fear when th2t which is capable of causing such destruction is near." The word
COMMENTARY

something painful; nor does even the unusual person of necessity experience his injustice to another as painful or destructive to hUnsel£ Pead';~ here is used of the mind and is opposed to dl'xl.o,a, on which see 62b 24 : 4 (misprinted as 24 : 2) and Plato, PhaeJr. 2390. a 23-24 .n;\.' ... SUv......., On the interpretation of dwaTa, see 68a 5 : 2, and Cope, p. 59, for further examples. Again we come back to the kind of evil which is the object of fear. To be noted here is the addition of ,..&l'dla~ to l';",a~ (see also 82a 30) which draws "axov 1v,.."eov closer in its connotation to "a"o;; 'POaeT'''o;;. Not every "axo. l""''1eo, is an object of fear. It is the evil described here which constitutes the 'PopB(!a of which he will shordy speak, e.g., 82a 28/f. In the attempt to make the nature of the emotion clear and distinct, A. seems to bear in mind. although it is not his immediate concern. his comment at EE IUla 17-19 (see also EN lIISb 34 - III6a 9): "the confident man is the one who does not fear what he ought. nor when he ought. nor as he ought to fear; the coward is the one who fears what he ought not and when he ought not and as he ought not to fear" (see also I229b 23-25). Intelligent fear is a valuable emotion and its teleology is clear: the protection of the individual; cpo EE 12290 39-40.

iI....

"and that too" (S. 947). In other words. even the a 24 x ..l .... evils just described become objects of fear only when "so near [aV.ey".~] as to be likely [WUTe ,..,<11...]." a 26 cpoj3oGv....., The force of the middle is present in the word. "fear for themselves"; Roemer's text misprints u'P0dea. a 27 :

1

3..,... lyyO~

sc. AUT! OavaTo>. the elause is causal.

o~d ••

q>eo.Tl{ov,,,. is used in a different construction at A 3. S8b 37. z d &>\ We begin here a brief analysis of the things which cause

fear. his first division; see outline to chapter. a 28
ARISTOTLE, ·RHETORIC· II

82a 34

analysis here in the Rhetoric. In the EN (IlIsa Io-n) some fearful things are mentioned. The nature of their fearfulness and of all truly fearful things is made clearer at EE (1229a 32 - 1230a 33) where we learn (as we do in the Rhetoric) that they can be called fearful only if they cause disturbance and pain (and so c£ 82a 21 : 3. Kassel's reading of "ai). and then only when they are near at hand and of such a magnitude (whether real or apparent) that the majority of men respond to them with fear. 56val'-ov ••• fl-£YcV.'JV C£ 82a 28; "substantial capacity. power"; on the word in general see 60b 16 : 2. a 29

EI~ ... 1NV,<,ovoUall~

a 30

12 :

2

and cpo A

s.

C£ 82a 23-2<\; on t1VVT.iv.... see

?lib

60b 9.

a'lp.dll ... 'PO~EPOv This should be expected from the way A. has analyzed sign. As he says in the following clause. the sign denotes the closeness of TO 'P.P8(}ov. which is the signate; see 57b I : 2. ..1:1/"....... 384. 39D-93. 39S-97. The enraged dog set to leap is a sign of an attack coming momentarily; the sign is fearful as the signate (the attack itself) is. a 30-32

a 32 : I ",oil",o .•• 1
(b 2-3). a B : 1 lJt8pII... opy>\ &uv1lP.OVO>V For the omission of the article, see S. II]2: "the hostility and wrath of those able to...... 2 . . . OElV '<0' is the punctuation of four edd.. Spenge!. Cope. Ross omits the colon and includes a 33-34. diiAov ... "'.IBiv. in parentheses. punctuating with a comma and not a period at the end of the parenthesis. The TI here is euphemistic, and it denotes something harmful. bad; c£ LS. A.II·3· is the reading of four edd.. Spenge!. Cope. a 34 ~oUl.ov"'"0. c,a... Ross reads povA.VTa, TB [sic) "al dVva.
8:>.h 4

91

COMMENTARY

a 3S : 1 qouaox' 111e colon of Tovar, Ross, Kassel, Cope is, in the context, clearly more reasonable than the period used by Roemer, Dufour, Spengel. A. states here that the power to do harm is present but he must show, as he does in the next clause, that the will to do so is on hand. 2 ...ijI ... a&lXO~ The articular infinitive (Uby his own choosing") states the idea of willing. Since the power (a.s.al'w lxovlla) is also on hand, the two conditions (the power and the will) are present, and so their consequence, the actualization, is near at hand; cf. Iba 34. What makes the tmjust man unjust is the deliberate will to act unjustly; see, e.g., A 13, 74" II-I:>': brae Tfi neoa'eellet 1/ I'0X9TJe1a "al TO ad",.,. (see also 7"" II : 2). Speaking of injustice at AID, 68b 6--14, A 13, 73 b :>'1-36, A. emphasizes the idea that it is action which is deliberately willed; cpo EN TI36a I: a. d' ~" neoar.eell8(,), {JAav>n, dd", ••. Ibb 1 : 1 4PE-ri! {,~p.I;Ol'Ev"IJ As we saw at 78b 14 - IS : 3, Pol. 13I2b 29-32, J{Je" is a powerful stimulant of anger, and the reason is explained in part atA 13, 74a II-IS. Obviously if anger is present, the will to .etaliate is present (cf. 82a 34), and A. states this in the next clause (dijAo • ••. vii', b 1-2), where we have the obsetvation that deliberate intent (to punish) is always present when one is subjected to lJ{Je'" Added to this deliberate intent we now have the capability to act: atl.aTa. vii.. A 9, 67a 19-22 is the basic principle of natural ethics on which this statement rests. 2 &ijAov... Wv Ross alone includes this in parenthes.., omitting any punctuation before the parenthesis and placing a comma after it (see 82a 33 : 2). The parenthesis is acceptable; the comma is not. His punctuation of 82a 33 - 82b 4 is not as helpful as that of the edd., Spongel, Cope.

a.

The genitive;" subjective. The rpo{Jee&' b 2-3
rae

We now take up the persons who cause fear; see outline. b 4 : 1 ;;"JrE; &' Spengel, p. 226, remarks that the transition to this next division is marked by this phrase. He returns to the idea in more detail at p. 240; see 8?a 16 : 1.

92

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

a Xdpou~ xed i\'M'OU~ "are quite bad and slaves to ["'aa.,., LS, II] their own advantage." For the general idea Victorius suggests Aristophanes, Plutus 362-363; see also Lysias, On the Murder of Eratosthenes 44-4S.

cb,... "oAv C£

b S-6
S'7ll

II.

b 6 "'0 ... dve.. "for one to be in the power of another"; the articular infinitive is subject of the understood 6""t. On "to be in the power of," see s.ca 33, LS, B.I.g.

.,,1,

6-JT ....cru •.• ly"",...CIIA,,,€iv This is a result to b 4-6 (.,.£1 6' ••• sl.a,) given as an example: "so that the accomplices [LS, aV.oc6a, II] of one who has done wrong are regarded (by him) with fear as likely [LS,
b

eo',

1 .... aT~ sc. elva,. a "E"0'"IIx6..., &.'VDv is the reading of a good cod., three edd., Spengd. Ross, Kassd, Cope read: """0'71"0'" rc also from a good cod. and possibly more correct usage.

b6:

6.,...

b 7 lyx.....CIIA"••iy See 8Ib 27, and Plato, Symp. I79a; for a further explanation of the word, Cope refers to his comments on pp. 47-48. This infinitive along with "anme" is dependent upon cpoPseoL

b 8-9 x ..l ot ... &Uvt.>vT..,

Cpo A I2, 72b 27 - 73a 4-

By itsdf and unqualified this is a strange statement. It is Plautus' "lupu, est homo hornini, non homo, quam qualis sit non novit" (AJinaria 49S), .. well .. a more pejorative repetition of 82b 4-5. It is somewhat similar to the realistic acceptance of man found at EN I095b 19-22. & a general statement its intent is unciear, and its pessimism is not typical of A.'s thinking in the first book, particularly A 9-14, where such a view of human nature could more readily sUIface, or in the EN, BE. In the early pages of the EN (I09sa 111--20, 1098b 20-22), he tells us that the common view of both ordinary men and cultivated men (with which he agrees) is that happiness is the goal of man and that it consists in ro .J ,,,.. "al ro eJ "ean .... What we seem to have here is a rather blunt and also somewhat overstated acceptance of the fact of moral weakness in men.

b 9 cililXoucr,y .•• &Uvt.>vT..,

b 10 T"/IpoUcr. X"'pDv

i.e., "they watch CllTefully for the opportunity"; at

Pol. 1337b 41 we find "a'eOcpoM"••• which, from its usage (cp. "ace0rqet.,), appears to be a less vivid expression. On "ace" see 6Sa 20 : 1.

b II
as at I12b

6-JT.

b 12 &E5,6"'E~ •.•
COMMENTARY

93

see at 8.za 34-35 ("a! d61"ia ..• lxovaa) and 82b 2-3 ("al ipo(Jo, • •• nodi"al), such people are among the ipo(Jeed which A. presented at 8.za 27 - b 4The fact that sud, belong among the ipo(Jeed is the reason for his statement of explanation, b r2: .In'''.ITO [on meaning: 69b 33 : 1] . . . rpo(Jeeo.: "for such was assumed to be what constitutes the fearful." Furthennore, it is a truism that men hate those whom they have injured (see, e.g., Tacitus, Agricol. 42.4: "proprium humani ingenii est odis,e quem laeseris"); and so in the light of 82a 32-33 (Tola6Ta ..• "0 ..i7 TI) such wrongdoers are also regarded with fear (ipo(Jseof). b r3 'riiiv IIV.."", ... 3a.. "rivals [c£ 83a 22] for all those things which ... "; the critical element is contained in lipa, aprpoi7. b r4 m>A£!'wa, i.e., men always treat such a rival as an enemy, one for whom they intend painful harm (82a 22), and therefore these men are tpa(Jseoi• b 15-16 x ..l ot ... xpd....ou~ "aL .. rpo(Jseot: "who are asouree of fear in the context is practito men more powerful than they." piUA07 cally the equivalent of ITl !,cillo>! "all the more could they harm them." el Ha! ••• , sc. 61l.a...ro (J).th.....; the "at is adverbial and intensive.

rae

b 16-17 x ..l cril~ ........:...6 As commonly noted, this topic does not differ significandy from the preceding b r 5-r6. In one respect there is no difference since in both instances those who are an object of fear to those' more powerful than we are are fearful to us. A distinction which possibly could be made between the two is that the first class is objectively fearful as A. takes care to point out, i.e., they have the power to do serious harm; the second dass is subjectively fearful, i.e., they are actually feared and so they are !po(J'eo~ but whether the fear is right or wrong either on the part of the "eBiTTOV, (oil, !po(Jov.Tal 01 "esITTov,) or their own part is not stated. For " similar repetition cpo A 7, 63b 35-]7, and c£ 63b 36-37b 18 : 1 .r..nplIx6...~ tial in 82b I5-r6. 2 lft,.. ,Si!,EVO'

C£ A IS, 76a 6. This dass realizes what is potenThe middle voice gives the verb its particular

meaning here (tS, B.IILz): "to attack."

b 19

~ ..v~lISMC~

so. la07Ta, !po(J'eot; see, for example, Demosthe-

nos in 01. 3-"5-28. b 19-20 x ..l """" ... ,,:CIPPlIa, ..a .. ,xo( tives are partitive; see S. 1306, 1312.

so. tpa(Joeol .Ial.

The geni-

b 20 6~u9u!,o, C£ 68b 20 : 2; cpo 79" 17: sVnaeOep1lTOI. Euripides, Med•• 319-320, illustrates A.'s point here, rtmj .'1l6v!,0, 1
rae

94

AlUSTOTLB, 'RRBl'ORIC' II

82b 25

quick-tempered woman, just as a man of the same sort, is easier to guard against than a quiet, clever person."

b 21 :

I "'pCiOL See 80a 6 : 1. Here we are speaking, it would seem, of those with the lE'" "eadT1j'. Their general disposition is one of mildness, meekness, but if they are ~ured or become an enemy or rival, they may pose a threat of serious harm. Z dp"",€~ C£ 79b 31; the meaning here, however, is more specifically that found in Theophrastus' Ch.,aders: I,ony: one who dissembles.

b 21-22 ii&~OL ••• "oPP'" Ordinarily interpreted somewhat freely as "since we never know whether they
acting)." b 21r-27 "u~........ iI.... l~ This appears to be a return to 82a 27ff., the things which cause fear. However, it is more correctly taken as a gen,,!"a1 statement on' what, be it a thing or a person, makes anything more fCarful. Certainly the statements can and must apply to persons or things. There is a clearer e"ample of this intermingling of persons and things at 84b 17-22 where A. is speaking formally of the person before whom shame is fdt; but c£ also Boa 3<>-31 sf. Schrader, p. 253, makes a useful distinction between i"a.rieOo"", (correction of an evil done) and po7/8..a (help for an impending evil); cpo 83a 20. b 23 11_ oi:.....p...a~O\IcrLv This is the reading of cod. A, the edd., Spengd; Cope reads with cod. F ,iv tipaeTo>a... The corrdative pronoun is object of rnapoe8waaa8a. (on verb, see 7Ib 3), while the participle (c!I'aeTdvova ..) is an indirect object to the main verb in the clause: "all fCared things which men have bungled and cannot correct are more fearfuL" b 24 t,,' ... twi C£ 8zb 6. The repeated dU is peculiar: "at least either totally impossible to correct, or not in their power but in that of their enctnies." b 25 Wv ••• /It&LaI .... is an objective genitive; on what A. means by ecjd",., see 63a 21r-24-

82b 30

b 26

c:.~

COMMENTAlIY

... d"dv

See

ssa

95

7: ,.

b 26-27 cpOliEplt ........'v Cpo 860 28-29. A. will di.russ pity in B 8. However, as he does here, he brings fear and pity together in Poetics I453a 2-7; cf. 8Sb 13 : 1. There it becomes somewhat clear why this statement in the ruetori, is true: namely, that the things we pity in others are fearful. For we learn that we experience fear "eel Td7 6,.0000: for someone like ourselves. Therefore, we see his misfortune, the Td .a.....w, as possible for ourselves, and so fearful. On .'11' hie..v (in the case of others, with regard to), see LS, "'1, A.I.2; see also 86a 28-29; 7')a 37 : I. SC.

ytyvea8ah

b 28 : I ..It flEv oW . . . II cpolioilv.... ' A transitional sentence to the next division: "cii~ do"".;,..voo. Although A. has covered in the precediug section both "oi"a and T;va~ rpo(JoVvTao (820 20), he seemingly refers here in Til rpo(Jeed and cI only to noi"a. This is quite possible, and Spenge!, p. 227, would argue that it is the fact. He bases his argument on the next statement of summation at 83a 13-16 (i".1 ••• Blatv) and its omission of Tlva~ rpo(Jov.Tao, and on the fact that in the section on confidence (83a IS - 83b 10) there is no formal presentation of the persons in whom men e.""perience confidence, i.e., Tl.a, 8aeeovao. However, in taking up the things which cause confidence A. does in fact consider in passing the persons in whom men are confident: Tiva~ 8aeeovl1o; see 82b 4-22. What happens in the passage Oll confidence is the vety same thing which Spengel admitted as possible in B 2; see 79b 36. Furthermore, since it would seem clear that "aVTa dA ...11 rpO(JBed (82b 22) refers to both persons and things, I do not see why both neuters rpofJ.ea, iI. (b 28) cannot refer to the general thought in the antecedent passage '82a 27 - 82b 27, i.e., things and persons feared, particularly in view of the fact that persons, pace Sponge!, are mentioned in the section on confidence; see 83a 21. 2 "XES"" "more or less," "approximately." Tlm use by way of summation is fairly common. See, e.g., A 2, 560 35 and 5, 60b 17; see also Slia 13. b 30 .. 'v,;~ Read by all the edd. it is not found in Spongel, Cope: "accompanied by a certain expectation." On "eol1do"ta cf. 82a 21 : 2. b 30-3 I ..oil •.. mlOO~ An articular infinitive, governed by >
"'0'

ARISTOTLE, 'RHllTORIC' II

b 31-)2. 'tiiW olo!J.Ev"'~ Partitive genitive with 0,)d81" it governs the following in£nitive with Ii. stating a future possibility (S. 1824 with c). b 32 : 1 ....0..... along with TOUTOV, (b 33) the object of rpop.iTa. (b 31); tIris verb is understnod with TOTS (b 33). • or~"II' _8Ei~ is the reading of three edd., Cope. Spengd reads naB..i. but questions its presence; Dufour secludes it as does Bywater ("Aristntdia II," 42), and Ross conjectures 11.. before it. Richards (p. I08) would delete naB.i. or read 11.. with it. However, Bonitz notes (Index, 41 b 4f£) that Ii. i. occasionally missing with the potential optative, citing 9837 (where Roemer and the edd. read II.v with cod. F); of the omitted Ii. at 983 7 Roemer says, and tIris is to the point of our text: "fort. ferri potest ex superioribu••ubaudita particula ii•." Certainly it is tn be understnod in our text. b 33 ...... The rpoPse&., as we have seen at 82a 31-32, 820 24-2S, must pose a proximate, serious threat, which is not the case here. b 34-35 livciyx'IJ .....6... 31 -33.

This is simply a positive statement of 82b

b 35 ...n.~ 6 ..1. ....u..c.r. A brachylogy for TOO, Vrp' W. oio'Ta, naB.,. as we find the clause at 82b 33, 83a II: "fear both those at whose hands they think that they would suJfer as weIIa. that whiclt they would suJfer, and at the time when they think it Iikdy." Although Spengd, p. 227, does not comment on tIris phrase, he speaks tn the difIicuIty at 83a 12: "Aegre desiderarnus quod post Hal TaiiTa hie deest: 4 00" tjlO'TO, velll "alOn." 83a I : 1 E6'NXIIl'~ See 6Ib 39 - 620 12, 6Ib 39 : 1. This, tngether with the qualities at 83a 3 (nAoiiTo" laz.$" noAvrplAla, and possibly dv.al"')' are all parts of ."da'l'ovla (60b 19-23) whose explanation substantiates the present observation. 3 &OXoUV"'E~ sc. awoi,: "who think. they are. n 3 6ui The explanation of what constitutes the confident person (83a I6H:), as well as the explanation that the characteristic of the insolent and the contemptuous is a senSe of superiority tn the common run of men (78b 27-3 I), justify the inference that the people just mentioned are insolent, contemptuous, rash. For such men are among the dO"OV.TS, . . etln,xla., l'.,.ciAa". a 1-3 6,0 .•. &Uvlll"~ Ross alone encloses tIris in parentheses; the other edd. and Cope enclose a 2.-3 (no ••, .•. dv.al"'); Spengd does not use parentheses.

a

2: 1

613p .......1

2 &Alywpo.

See 78b 23-3 I, 78b 14 - IS : 3. See 78b 10-IS, tngether with 78b IS - 79b ,370 7Sa 32.

COMMBNTAIIY J

8pClCJ.i~

$C.

o~" olo ....a.

97

"aBB'. liv from 82b 35; on Beat1B;;,

(rash, audacious, overbold) cf. 90ll 3I. a 3 : 1 nAoU"'O~ See A S, 6Ia 12..--24 and notes, and 62b IB : z, 90b 32 - 9ra 19; as well as 8sa I : 1, on which see 60b 20-29. z taxu~ See 6Ib Is-rB. J ,.O>'"",,).(Cl See 61 b 3S-3 B. 4 IiUvClP.L~ This may simply be physical strength and power, one of the goods of the body which is called more specifically at 60b 22 dv.a,,,. c!yw"uTooIv, or it may refer to the power of position in society as we find the word used at, e.g., 60b 27. How such accidental things as ".OiiTO" etc. enter into the formation of character is discussed at B IS-I7. a 3-4 olin ... S.Lvli "nor those who consider that they have already experienced every kind of disaster."

a 4 m.,:aJ!UYP.EvOL "have grown cold and indifferent to." This is the inertia of despair as the simile (&lanse . .., a S) would indicate. A. uses the same root word to Mute fear in its physical aspect; see, e.g., B 13, B9b 3], De part. an. 6920 23. a S c!,.owp.,,"vL~6p."'OL liS,! "like those actually being done to death"; on 116" see S4b 7. As for c!nonJptavLC..., we meet it again at Bsa 10. We find it in Demosthenes, phil. 3.61, On the Embassy 137 where it has been interpreted as "to cudgel to death," and id,ntified with the Romm military punishment fostuarium which does mean fuste 1Iecare, but the word can also mean a form of punishment. In LS the word is said to mean "crucify on a plank." Cope, pp. 6S-66, says that it means "beating, sometimes to death, with cudgels." The explanation from the scholiast on a; TVl"'a.a in Aristophanes' Plutus 476 is of litde help: "the wood on which ""pto.••Co• ... or the cudgels with which those being punished were struck." Cope suggests that the TVl"'avO. was a block on which the person was stretched and then beaten. Bonner & Smith, II 279-B3, call it a form of capital punishment. In the light of the evidence at their disposal· they describe it as a method in which the victim was &Stened to a plank and gradually strangled by the tightening of a collar fixed around his neck; cf. Cope, p. 66, on the force of c!nd in composition with certain verbs. From this simile and the metaphor (c!nBVNl'l'bo.), A. is apparendy speaking of the passive response of inactivity in those who despair, not the active response of which Schrader, p. 2S4, speaks: namdy, a frenzied activity doomed to failure which despair can also cause. In either case, however, since rhetoric is directed to rational action and the intdligent use of emotional response (see 83a B-9: &laTe ... "aB.;;.; COMMENTAIIY I 3S0), the objective of the speaker (or writer) would be to

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

98

introduce when possible. in such instances. the grounds for hope and so for intelligent fear and deliberation. a 5-a.v On the meaning of the verb here ("anxiously contend"). cpo 6"]0. IS. The comment of Seneca. Epp. Moral. 5.7. while in a different context, is to the point: "Desines timere. si sperate de-

sieris." a 6

a'lfJ.£iov 5t

a7:1 3

See ..:£1/p.'o.... 393.

POUAEII"'ucoU~

POUA.ueru.

See S!lb 32 : I; i.e.• "men inclined to ddiberate." See 57& 2 : 1.

a 8 : 1 beA"{"""'" See EN II390 I3ff.: "no one ddiberates about that which cannot be other than it is." z "IIPllcncEllci~E'V See 60b II and 80b 31. a 9 : 1 ...11 ..• lI1koU~ articular infinitive subject of 11 liiAno. ("is better. preferable"). z 3....... "..e.iv IIT< = "namely that ... " (5. 2577); on oEo, with the infinitive ('Just the sort able to suffer") c£ LS. olo,. III a 9-10 "lit yckp ••• &1I8ov Ross alone includes this within parentheses without any punctuation before and a comma afte!. a 10 "'oU~ o""lou~ 5.uc""«' The infinitive is governed by de, understood from 83a 8. Our reading ("men like them") is that of cod. F and opparendy the reading which the scholiast and the author of the Vetus Translatio had before them. It is also the reading of Cope and Kasse!. Spenge! and the other edd. read with cod. A: TOU, TO'OVTOV, d..HvVva,. In the light of the Poetics '453a s. d e•• 'Polio,] ,.eel TO.lIpO .... the reading ofF appears preferable; see 82b 26-27. 83a 32. In the Poetics. Else. pp. 373. 461. understands 8po,0, as: a fellow-man. one like us. an ordinary and representative

d. r,.

human being. a II "lit 6,,11 ...0.0<......,. 6op' .rov "(and that they are sulfering or have sulfered) at the hands of men such as they did not expect to suffer from.»

6....

a 12 "lit ...IIU...II "al ... This is the reading of four edd.• Cope. Spenge! reads it but suggests: xa& Tavt'a Ii Hai 8T8; Ross reads: HaL TavTa Hai TOTt. With our reading and with the interpretation suggested at 82b 35 in mind. I would construe a II- 12: " ••• and have suffered at the hands of those from whom they did not expect it. and have suffered the sort of things they did not expect and at a time they did not expect it." Bottin. pp. 28-30. interprets differendy.

83a 18

COMMliNTARY

99

a 13 : 1 'PII"'POv sc. e<17:••. We begin here the section on confidence. The construction 'Pa.eed. ('CrT..) ..I e<17:•• is repeated at a 14-15. 2 ..c;;." 'P0Il'pCiw sc. "'.et; on meaning cf. Ibb 28 : 1.

a 14 :

1 " ..1 ... 8.61..0-1 "and the disposition of each and everyone who experiences fear." 2 'P""'POv sc. ea..... Cpo EE 1228. 28£ 3 ..06""" i.e., the three subjects just mentioned: the nature of the emotion; the things which cawe it; how it is experienced. These are paraIle!ed in what follows, e.g., 'Popov by TO 8aee."; 'POP.eii"w by ",o.a; cb, ... 6edlaa, by ncO, ... ei.alv.

a 15 7
.u.,.

a 16 : 1 a"pp .."001 do-I,,· ..6... Ross, Kassel, Spenge!, Cope read correctly, I bdieve, without the lacuna which is marked after .lalv by the other edd. on the grounds that Tl.a~ 8aee06a. is not discussed; but see 83a 21, Ibb 28 : 1. 2 -nj> <'Poll'!' ,...1 ..I> a..pp..>.oov -nj» is the reading of the edd., Spenge!, with the following difference: Spenge! encloses the supplement which comes from 1536 Venetian edition ofTrincavelus within parentheses. Kasse! encloses the first and excludes the last T.p. While I accept the supplement I am inclined to agree with Spengel, pp. 227-28: "apte quidem sed non necessario sunt addita; auctori enim nostro si Me.... opponitur TO 'PoP-eo, sofficit."

a 17-19 !£E-ni: .......oppm IN""" This definition of confidence closely parallels that of fear (820 21-22): "(confidence is) hope accompanied by the image of that which brings freedom from danger as being near, and of that which cawes fear as being non-existent or remote." Just as fear is a certain kind of 1,)"'1 11 TaeaX'!, so confidence is a certain kind of hoping. As A. tells us at A II, 70a 29-35, a 'Panaata n~ always accompanies hope and hope looks to the future. Plato, in the Lathes I99b, puts it even more snecincdy: "the things which inspire fear and those which inspire confidence are admitted to be future goods and future evils." a 17 'P..".... o-I~

See 78b 8-9.

Ross alone of the edd. conjectnres 'PoPseii>. < .. ~> a 18 'P0ll'pc;;." l\ with Richards; it does not appear necessary.

if

100

ARISTOTLE, 'RHJ!l'ORIC' II

a 19 8Clppcz).iCl

i.e., "that which inspires confidence."

a 1~2O 7tOpp... IlvTCl x ..l U eClppcz).ialyyd~ is the reading of most of the codd., of two edd., Spengd, Cope. Spengel was slightly disturbed t1lat the matter to be explained was in the explanation. Thus Dufour adopl5 a reading from the margin of cod. C: e.g., fur "al Ta 8aeeaAla he reads ij Ta uarnie.a lyyV~. Ross retains the "at but reads Ta uw.-.je.a; see also Richards, p. ro8. Kassd reads 8aeeaUa a. .uspect. I see no reason = the proximnot to read with the codd.; "dee'" = the remoteness of; ity: "that which inspires confidence is the remoteness of what i. dreadful and the proximity of what gives courage."

s""v.

a 20 l7t""op8':'cr..~ ... j3o>'l8€LCI' See 82b a2-a5, Ibb 22-a7, 83a 15. The apodosis to the protases of the general condition (av ibu., a 20; ibuw, a 22; lx"'uw, ibu., a 23) is an understood 8aeeeAlo. slul, as it i. also in the following sentence, a 24-25: ij .

a 2I -IJS,x'lp.ivo, Cpo 82b 10-12. These are the people who have not done them harm. They together with those who are not their rivals (a 22), or are rivals without power, or who have power but are friends (a 23), as well as tho.e who have treated them well, and those to whom they llave shown kindness (a 24), and those whose interesl5 are the same as their own (a 24-5) - all represent the presumably missing TlP,,~ 8aeeoiiu. (see Ibb 28 : 1; 83a I6 : 1). Cpo 82b I3-14.

a a3 :

1

2

p.iJ lxwcr,,, Suvap.'" Cpo 8ab 15-19, and 8ab 8-ro. ",0.0' They fed confident with such fur the reasons given at

80b lSi£. 24-25 M€(OU~ ••• xp£(TTOU~ i.e., those whose interesl5 agree with theirs are more numerous or more powerful or both than those who can block or interfere with their good.

a

On TO O"1J/MPieop see 62a I7-aI and A 6. II.......... eNTol Dufuur alone assumes a lacuna here after i1p'POJ for the same reason as that given at 838 16 : 1. 3 cril.....~ lxOVT€~ "those are confident who are so disposed," i.e., as he will set forth in 83a 26 - 83 b 10. a 25 :

1

au .......P€,

2

a 26 XClTOp8wxiv ..,

See 68a 14.

a 27 7t£7tov8iva, if their arritude is (Or_Ta,) "that they Iiave not experienced many reverses."

101

COMMENTARY

a 28 : 1 x ..1 &'''''ECp£uy6...~ Aeneas. Am. 1.198-207. attempts to rekindle the confidence in his men (rf1lOcate .flimos) with a quick survey of the serious dangers from which they had escaped. 2 .m..eEi~ "free from fear"; literally: "free from emotion." However. A. is speaking about the disposition of men who are a;>nfident, and to be confident is to be without fear. since confidence is the opposite of fear (83a 16). While on this point. it is worth noting that A. is talking about being without fear. which is a quality he attributes to those who are 8aeeaUo, (83' 26). But 8deuo~. while it may be an aspect of dJo~e.la (c£ 8sb 30). is not dJobeBla (EN 1I07" 33 - II07b 4. EE 1220b 39). and consequently the texts concerned with dJode.ta introduced by the commentators in support or criticism of A.·s statement at 83a 28-32 (d'%-194, 196-199. As Nicias says (197b): ol"a, ..d lbpo(Jo. "al ..d d.de.... 0'; ..avTo.lun•.

a 29" T<£'J<"piicre..., lxc." The arti~r "infinitives are causal. (JOr,8B
a 31>-31 ot ...... XIII 01

"both - and."

and so see 8]a

10.

a 33 XIII.r.... sc. "al ...otSTO" m.. The difference between this group and the one immediately preceding is that the preceding group are actually our inferiors while this group are considered to be such. The grounds for sueh bdief are given in the following sentence. a 33-34: ol'o.Tal di ["e.l..... ...ou~ sl.a, To,)......1dip ..•

·.,,01....

a 34 ij 116........ . . • 61'0"",,, am
".1_.

a 3S : 1 td..Lc.J XIII ",lr,;",

the "resources" in both quantity and qual-

ity specified at b 1-3.

2 oi~ UT
102.

ARISTOTLE, 'aHBTORIC ' II

is simply oJfering some general instances (as at 83a 2.-3) which make men con£dent. They are broad categories and could be undetstood as either personal possessions or properties of the society in which the individual lives. as TW. ned, ",;;'B"O. "'aeaaH_ would suggest.

b 2 Kcll t"Xu~ .....""....... This is the reading of the codd.. the edd. (except Kassel). Cope. Spengel. I would take ,.;.,,9o, "al lavl' as an hendiadys (cp. Thucyd. 3.74). governing all the genitives: "a powerful abundance of wealth. and supporters. and friends. and property. and the annaments, either all of them or the most important for war." Thorot ("Observations critiques [I]." 30S) suggested lax,), Hal ",MiBo,. taking laxv, alone, and together with ,dfi90, governing the genitives. His reason was that lavl' by itself means bodily strength (and from the use of the .word in the Rhetoric he would be correct). Kassel. Det Text. p. 134. secludes lavl,. calling it an interpolation introduced by a misundetstanding of a",,,aT"" in a militaty sense. b 4-5 -/j&'K'IKO".~ ..• ~ liv '1:" "pO~ 8.o!l~ . . . Aoylwv readings. practically, for this phrase as there are edd. What I have accepted is the reading of cod. F (using Kassel's apparatus), of Spenge!, Cope. Kassel (but see below). Roemer, Dufour read with cod. A: d. "eo' TO'\, eBOV,. Tovar reads Ii. "eo' geov,. Ross reads with corrected cod. A: 4. Td "eck Tov,9..,v,. Kassel secludes b 5~ ("al ... ).oyl.,.) as an Aristotelian addition and conjectures < "al 8Ta. dd"'WVTa.> immediately before it. With our reading the interpretation would be: "And on the whole men are confident [sc. 9aeealio, slal., b 26] if their relations with the gods are good, their relations in general but particularly those dependent on signs and oracles"; on cflla see S. I2.73. This arguntent for inspiring confidence is rather prominent in Demosthenes' Olynthiacs and First Philippic - see 01. :0.2.2and Phil. 1.42, and Jaeger, Demosthe..es. pp. 130/£ and passim; Xenophon, CyropaeJeia 3.3.34; and Thucyd. 7.77-1-4: Nicias' attempt to give conJidence to his men at Syracuse. b 6 '"l"dwv KIll AOY[wV See Xenophon, CyropaeJeia I.6.2.; on "'1",l",. see "E'IJ""'o,," 383-84. 395-98; on ;'oyl.,., Euripides. Chiltlren of Hetacles 405·

COMMENTARY

103

b 7 8uppcU.o\ov ycip Some of the difficulties experienced here might be removed if rde is taken. not as causal (as it frequently is here), which of course makes no sense, but a, adverbial and explanatory (S. 2.808; see 66a 2.S : 1), e.g., "anger, for example. inspires confidence." So I would interpret: "Anger, in filct, inspires confidence, and to be wronged without doing wrong causes anger; moreover the gods are assumed to hdp those who are wronged." The devdopment would seem to be that b 7-8 is a part of the topic introduced at b j-
b 10

xCl'top8cbcrElV

See 8]a 26.

CHAPTER 6

I . Introduction. 83b 12-17

division and definition of shame and shamdessness

II . Devdopment: 83b 17 - 8sa 13 I.

83b 17 - 84a

23

things which cause emotion of sIwne, i.e., nor. (83b I2.): shame viewed objectively, as also in II.. people who cause the feeling of sIwne, i.e., >q!opl...< (83 b I2.) the disposition, attitude, of those who ".;;< l;con« (83b 13): shame viewed subjectively in genenl in particular

feel shame, i.e., (0) B4b 27 - Bs", (6) BS' I - BS' IJ

III . Conclusion: 8sa 14-15

with passing mention ofshamdessness

83b 12-13 "DU. ... S~"" the general division (cp. 78a :>3-:>5); each division is formally developed in this chapter; cpo 79b 36. b 13 If""",, Sir ,d"ltUv-rJ On the definition see 78a 3I : 1; see also 843 :>4. An understanding of alaxVV7I and c!..aU7xv.....1a in A. must come primarily from the chapter before us. Before taking up alaxVV71 we should form some idea of its rdation, if any, to al6rb, in A.'. ethical writings, particularly since there is generally no discernible diJference between his use of aldrb, - al..xVV71 in the ethical works and in the detailed .bternent on al..xVv'l and its meaning which we meet here in the Rhe1oric. Although there appears to be no sharp and clear distinction between aldrb, and al"xtl.'I in the ethical works, Gauthier & JoIif say that EN n:>8b 10-35 "nous livre sur I' aid8s I.e dernier mot de Ia pensCc technique d' Aristore: I'aid8s y est avant tout pOut lui la honte et Ie repentir d'une £aute d' ortS et deja commise" (II.I 3:>1). If this is so, it is not precisdy the view of al..xVV71 met in the Rheto,ic where in a larger and more adequate manner al..xV." is described as: the distress experienced in regard to present, past, future evils which appear to bring dishonor. Let us glance at .devant passages iD the EN, EE, MM, but before doing so let us see what A. says about alhrb, as an "emotion"

106

AllISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC 7 II

since al
COMMBNTAllY

107

Gauthier & Jolif, II.1 320-22. By the fifth century aM." in Euripides, accordiug to Gauthier & Jolif, II.1 320, can be found in its tnditional sense, and also as shame for a present dishonor (Helen 417) and regret for a past fault ([phigenia in Tauris 713). In one play, the HippolrulS, it would seem to me that we can find its traditional social sense, e.g., at 78, 335, 1258-1259. On the other hand at 244, 772r-775, its denotation is the same as that which we find for aiaxVv'1 in our present chapter, whereas at 385-386 it may be the feeling of shame concerning oneself and so more directly alax~.'1, or it may well be Barrett's "sbamefastness" (p. 230) and thus the more traditional sense. While A. retains the technical term ala." and very possibly with a definite purpose in mind, I am not certain that the distinctions Cope, pp. 71-'12, mentions are clearly discernible, e.g., ala.", vere"lndia, a subjective feeling of honor which precedes and prevents the shameful act; alaxVv'1, plldor, an objective aspect which reflects upon the consequences of the act and the shame it brings with it. I am more inclincd to think: that the judgment of Gauthier & Joli£; Il.l 320, is correct: the concept ala." will become alaxVv'1 in Aristotle. And so speaking of the Rhetoric they can say (p. 321): "Dans la RMtorique Aristote d6fin.it I' aischun~ qu'il ne distingue pas de I' aida,'; and of EN 1128b 11-13 they say (p. 322): "On rernarquera qu'Aristote cite cornme une definition de l'aid8s ce qui etait en reaJite une definition de I'aisch."e• ... Ies deux concepts sont en effi:t pour lui identiques."

Cpo 823 21.

"a,,';;.

b 14-15 "'EP< ••• xaKiilv Ta TWv = "that class of evils which seem ...";
108

41USTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

the reason given for each is that they are either a v:iolation of a v:irtue or the exercise of a v:iee. In fact, he introduces the section by saying that the ~axd of which he is speaking are 8aa dnd ~axia, ill!'Ya ini. (83b 19-20); see also 84"- 7-9. Even when action is not involved - e.g., at 84"- 9-13 - it is still the sense of not possessing what is proper to the good man that causes shame. This is rather interesting to me. For in this sense the a~oEia spoken about (83 b 14) in connection with this emotion of shame caD readily refer to the MEa a person has ofhimself; his v:iew of his own honor, his self-respect. His violation of this causes him to experience shame. On the other hand, a. we see at 84a 24-26, the Mea in question is mainly the opinion, the view, of others which causes a person to experience sbame. From the fint perspective one caD seen the survival of the traditional meaning of aiM., in alaxV"'1. One caD also understand, perhaps, Alexander of Aphrodisw' problem (mentioned by Cope, p. 72) with calling shame a ",clOo, (Qllaestiones naturales et moral.. fed. SpengelJ, pp. 270-73). His specific concern is with as seen in EN n08a 31-32 and II28b 10-35, and his argument is that, if aiM>, is a rp&{Jo, MoE/a" this is something all good persons of any age experience. Therefore aiM>, would appear to be an d,uOTe.OT71' "ed, Ta alalecl in such a person, and thus not so much a "dOo, as a liE., ~al 6.cl· O.a". This is in many ways quite reasonable, but it reduces itself to the prob' lem seen earlier with respect to neaOT71'; see 80a 6 : 1.

aM"',

1 oiv.....xuv..I.. Cpo A la, 68b 23 and note, Theophrastus, Characters: Shamelessness 9 is essentially correct in its generic definition, e.g., ~aTatpeOv.ja.' Me1f" but far more limited are its specific differences which

b 16 :

reduce shamelessn... to a fOrm of alaxeoxied..a; see #30. In fact many types among the varied characters share in what A. would qualify in this chapter as ..sharnelesm...... z 6).'Y"'pl.. See 7Sa 32; from the ways (78b 14-IS) in which .;hY"'eia expresses itself, its affinity to sbamelesmes. is rather close; c£ Demosthenes, On the Palst Legotion 206; cpo A 10, 68b 23. 3 4....eE'.. a total lack of feeling with regard to the shameful; c£ 83a 28 : z. Where d).'Y"'eta would designate an intellectual attitude (78b IO) toward the shameful, d"clO.,a designates the complete insensitivity to it which would follow upon such an aItitude. b I7 6p".8oia.. b 19 il>v 'Pp......II;EL

Cpo 84a 24, 84a, 24-26. sc. TOVTO', tn.; cpo 79b 16-17.

b 19-20 _I~ Ipy.. On xa,,/a see 68b I4 : 1. leya is being used as it is at 66b 27-34, and I would interpret d",d "ax/a, leya in a way similar to the interpretation given to a,..aOo6 leya at 66b 28, i.e., "all those acts which proceed from vice"; c£ 66b 28 : z, 66b 29.

COMMBNTARY

109

b 20 : 1 olDY ••• cpuY£iv Cpo Archilochus, Erg. 6 (Diehl &: Beuder); Alcaeus, Erg. Z.I05 (Lobel &: Page); Huod. 5.95; Anacreon, Irg. 38Ib (page); and Horace, Odes 2.7.10. • &.lAl ..~ cf. 66b II-I3. 68b 18 : z.

b 21 :

1 '"' ,broc....pij...., ",..pu""",..8>\,.'I" The particular topics in this section through 84b 16 arc introduced by the articular infinitive. On the verb see 63b 32; as Cope (p. 73) remarks, it is frequendy used of "the meaner vices of cheating and de&auding," as well as defaulting, refusing payment of a debt. To refuse to return money or propCIty entrusted to one's care, which Cicero, speaking of a similar situation, calls injustice ("qui propter avaritiam clam depositum non reddidit, quod est iniustitiae," Tusc. 3.8.17) was. considered among the G<1J "aem
b 22 : I •

48,,.1~

ol~

See A 9, 66b Io-II. Ross alone reads aC,.

ol~ ••• I'oi) &Ei On the exchange of ool - ,..fI, see ?lib 18 : z. It does seem that no real difference is intended here any more than at 78b 10-20; in some instances -:- at ?lib IZ : 3, for example - a distinction may be at work.

b 22-Z3

b 23

cl"oAU.. lu~

Cf. 68b 17, 66b IS :

1.

b Z4 I'o"'pWv ••• 4&uv1i....." "to make a profit of mean and triJling things, or things base and vile, or from the helpless" (Cope, p. 73). Io general, the activity here described with respect to things or persons is set down at EN II2Ib 31 - IIZ2a 16 as that of ai<1xeo"ie~"a, and it marks the oWdoOeBeO, (b 26), one who spends his time in pimping, usury, pCIty gambling, clothes robbing, thievery. Greedy for gain. and even that wretchedly small, he and his attitude are described somewhat vividly by Suetonius: The Lives

of Ihe Caesars: Vespasian 23.3. Cope, p. 74, mentions logography, a derogatory term in the fourth century, among such occupations; ef. 88b 22 : 1.

b 25 ",a b:a ... £P"v Apart Irom the obvious implications, the proverb could also refer to such pracrices as forcing people to redeem the slain

no

AlUSTOTLB, IllHBTORlC'

I[

at a price (see, e.g., Homer, Iliad 24, in particular II7ff., and Vergil, Aeneid 9.213-215) or demanding money from parents for the burial of their children (Cicero, Verrine Orations II 1.3.7), etc. Cope, Kassd alone read: T& an6.

,.a.

b 26 dvu.""e'plIlS See 66b 16 : a; for the meaning in ala"eo,.ie~a,a see EN II22a 2-13, Theophrastus, Charaders ]0. b 27

'Is

i.e., "in regard to" money; c£ LS, IV; EN II6sb 19.

b 28 ~,.o....... i.e., wealthy, well off, persons of substance, e.g., Dcmosthenes, 01. 1.28. The idea of the topic from the viewpoint of the >lTTO. s{inoeo, is well exemplified in Terence, phormio 41-46. b 28-31 >c.d 6uvell;.aell' ..• ~'<'Co'lTTO. see LS, i/aaow: III. b 31 :

dvdeue.pUas See 83b 26. See "X7JI'e,ov," 39~I. These 07Jl's,a would refer certainly to the actions described at b 28-31 (aa••/CaaBa, .. .); Spengd, p. 229, appears to extend them to include b 2~28. 1

2

01J1'.'"

COMMBNTARY

III

b 32 "'06' .",...v.Lv " ..ptlv.....~ xo)...xd..~ is the reading of the codd., fuur of the edd., Spengd. Cope reads "Oo/!ovTa rHoAaHBia,]; Kassel secludes the whole phrase as an Aristotelian addition. "oAaHBla, (sc. 111I,.."ov) was a source of concern to Vahlen ("Kritik d, Rhetorik," 561-<52) as already present at 83b 35, and to Kayser, II-I2, as not bdonging to the idea of beal"sip. In one sense Kayser is correct; however, the addition of nae&'IITa~ as object of the verb suggests that the praise meant is praise which is excessive, nAel", TWV "eOI11l"OvT"'O, MM II93a 21-22; e.g., Terence, Adelph. 26\)-2'70: "ah vereor coram in os te laudare amplius, ne id adsentandi magis quam quo habeam gratum facere existumes." See 71a 22 : 3. masculine, singular, accusative agreeing with underb 34 " ..ptlv..... stood subject of the articular infinitive. b 35 "'It'd..

See 83b

]I : •.

b 35 - 84a 2 x ..l...a ... Cl'lJt'd.. C£ EN lI50a 9 - II50b 28; the soft man is one easily overcome by pain, one who is deficient "with respect to those pains against which most people fight successfully" (II50b 1-2), or (as A. says more specifically in our passage) the difficulties tolerated by those who are neeu{JUTBeO' "d.

84a I

:1 ...purp....,..
a 2 ~axl..~ a 3 ..... "o>.>.,D,,~

See 68b 18 :

1

(where 83b 5 should be: 83b 35).

sc. s.J "aUXe..; i.e., "and frequendy do so."

a 4 : 1 ov •• 6(~.LV sc. (TO) av."'i~... (TOUTO) 8 ... • t'.xp"""'X("~ 66b 19: 1. 3 ....." ••v6'<'1...o~ here in the moral sense: a vileness, low-mindedoess, meanness. A" the Virtues and Vi"" 1251b 14-16 calls it one of the consequents of aosA.v9eela.

a S n:ci....,"rCZ AirEL" X(l1 E:n:a:yyo.1Ea8C1.1 practically the same as navTa no's;;" "ai .Aiye",: "to stop at nothing [as TdlloTe,a aVTo6 tpaa"B'" suggests1 in making every kind of st.tement and proclamation about onesdE" Richards, p. ro8, looks upon naPTa as a repetition from a 4. a 6 : 1 ...:. ....u sc. • loa,; for the case, see S. 1303: "to assert the achievements of others as one's own. n • cU.C&~ov.(..~ See S6a 29 :', EN II270- 13 - II27b ]2; in On the Virtues and Vices I251b 2 it is a consequent of aa."ia.

II2

ARISTOTLB,

I

RHETORIC' II

&. Ked C£ 79a 20--2I. riftO 'niw . . . KCOC{wV sc. and ... heaaTf" Tru" dllcov xtw. TOJ'ieOV" "from each of the rest of the vices of characrer."

a7:

J

8~ I I

op.ol",~

2

TWP

xa-

a 8 : J .... lpyll Kill .... en)p."-LCI See A 9, 66b 27-34. In 83b I98.1'1 7 A. has given us examples of both, and specified them as actions or signs of particular vices. He now extends the principle to all the vices of character. 2 Kill .... 3p.o'lI· IIlcrxp" y"p xlll IIlaxw.. ucci This is the punctuation of Ross, Kassel, Spenge!, Cope. Since is read in all the codd., this appears to be reasonable punctuation. The rae clause gives the explanation of the general statement made. Roemer, Dufour, Tovar punctuate and read: xal Ta 6,.0,a aluxea "al clvaluX.,.Ta. I am inclined to accept aluX"VTC"d (provocative of shame) of cod. F since the chapter in this present section i. concerned with what causes shame. d.aluXVVTa (shameless) is possible, but there is no reason why these actions are to be called such any more than the others mentioned in this section, for all proceed from moral badness; see 83b IS. Ta 8,.0,a would be derived generally in the same way as th~ varied activities that are virtuous are derived at A 9, 66b 23-34-

rae

a9:

J

2

b,l "oU..o.~ LS, Inl: B.I, i.e., "in addition to."1 ....... 1'1) p.ttEx£.v Cpo A 7, 6sa 4-5; on Ta c£ end of 83b

21 : 1.

a

10

31'0L01 • . .

MElmoL

an axiom used previously, e.g., at A 6,

63a 32; 7, 64b II-I3·

'a Io--I2 p....lx£Lv, (op.olou~ ... laou)' IIlcrxpclv Here the edd., Spengel, Cope read the same but punctuate differently. I would punctuate in this way and use parentheses as Tovar does. Roemer, Dufour, Ross print: ,....X.... - 6,..tov, .•. 1'<70v - aluxea., (but Ross omits the comma and colon); Kassel, Spengel, Cope (and Freese): "'".X.... 6,.010v~ •.. luov' aluXe"" The punctuation of Roemer, Dufour is acceptable, but I do not understand the period of Kas,el, Sponge!, Cope since the whole statement, a 9-I3 ("allnl ... 6,.0IOJ~), is a single unit of thought, e.g., statement (a 9-I2), and the reason for it after the colon (a I2-I3). a descending order which grows more a I I op.o£Ov£i~ ... CJUyy.vd~ restricted with each example. The summation, 8J.w~ TM>~ .~ rerov r'in short, one's equals"), gives the validating criterion for each class: namely, full parity with those in each group whose pO'Session of the honors he is without is the thing which causes him shame. Without such equality, and consequently the opportunity for the person to be as the other is, there would be no ground for him to experience shame at honors possessed by anyone in

II3

COMMBNTAlty

any of the groups mentioned. He might experience envy or other emotions. ~.,), l~ ru.v means persons of equal station in life; c£ Plato, Laws 777d, 919d. a 12 i\6"'1 See also 84"- 15; "for in this situation [i.e., being equal with others] it is a cause of shame not to share.... " On the word see 69& 27, S4b 7, 79& 9· a 13 : 1 en:l ...oGcru....", the neuter of the demonstrative used substantivally: "to the same extent as they do." 2 x,d... Of'O""~ coordinate with :n;aultolae.". a 14 : 1 7tsv..... 6£ .....G..... l'iiAAOV sc. Ian alaxed. The ~av~a refers minimally to the deficiencies mentioned at a 6-13. 3 ..u...... ... !'iiAAav sc. 'Pal....at: "for in this case they now appear to be more the effect of his moral badness." "whenever (if ever) he himself is a 15-16 ;tv ..u...b~ .•. !'dAciv'
o,..

a 17 ....... G_ the object of the preceding participles; it is specified by the relative clause /Jua ••• &vsld,!: "men are ashamed of .11 such present, past, or future personal experiences which lead. ... " a 18 R,I'/Clv ... " .. I civoi61J i.e., disgrace and censure, as we find it in Herodotus 9.71 tAe,~oa,!"" ... u.,8.!, .1X. 1I•• "a! d~c,.I'1'), or Plato, ]Up. 590c (pa.avula ... a,d TI, orec,II••• 'Pie.c). Therefore d~c,.la is used here in a manner similar to its use in 78b 29 and A 7, 6sa 5 (and see noteS thereto), and not in the legal sense, despite the explanation of T.caVTa .. . lJaa (a 17) at a 18-19 (Tma .•• v{JeICea8ac) which might suggest the penalty, 6m,.la, which did exist for such actions; see e.g., Harrison, I 37£, and on dT.,.la in general, II 169-"76.

d.,

a 18-19 ..."G........ "Urxpii>v brackets it, but olfers no reason.

,a.,

read by four odd., Spengd, Cope. Kassel

"and these are acts of prostituting one's body a 18 .... d~ iI""PE-njGE'~ or submitting to degrading actions." On the construction see S. IIS3. "among which is to be physically outraged." a 19 ilJv ••• iI(jpll;£a8 ..,. eli., partitive genitive; v{JeIC.a8at: to be physically outraged. A period is the punctuation accepted by four of the edd., Spengd, Cope. Kassel omits the period and makes this together with what precedes (apart from his seclusion at a 18-19) one statement down to a 20, cf.co.Ta, where he punctuates with a colon as do the edd., Spengd, Cope.

These lines are interpreted in a I~I : 1 " ..l....... (jl..v ihcav..... different ways by the translators, and the Roberts translation reflects the

II4

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' II

84a 20

general tenor of these interpretations: "And acts of yielding to the lust of others are shameful whether willing or unwilling (yielding to force being an instance of unwillingness)." It seems more correct to interpret the lines as follows (the reasons are given in the subsequent notes): "And on the one hand acts of licentiousness both voluntary and involuntary are shameful; however, the acts done under compulsion are involuntary." 2 XIII "Ill "." ott; ... xlllbov"... "Ill 6' EI~ ... lixov".. · This is the punctuation of Ross, Spengel, and I find it the most reasonable. Roemer, Dufour, Tovar punctuate: ... "at WcOVT4' (rQ /J' sl, ptav d"ona) '; Kassd includes the whole in parentheses ("al Ta ",S' • •. (iia. Il"ona) .; Cope omits the clause rei d' Bi, . . • &"0'111'0. J "Ill "EV .l~ m..o>'llcrl..v This should be interpreted as was Ta d~ V"1J~.nj(J"~ (84& 18), or as 84a 34f: Ta .. o'P8a).por~ [acts done in the sight

a 20 :

of all], Ta .. 'Pa••~q,. For example, I find it difficult to understand how Cope, p. 78, finds no problem in interpreting a 18, Ta e!~ 1ln1J~'Tlj(J"~, as "acts of service or subservience," but insists, p. 78, on interpreting our phrase here as: UTa ai, d"OAQalav sc. tp6eO'llTQ, uv'JITsivovra; quae spedatlt ad incontinentiam." which he then translates: "And of these, all that have a tendency or reference to (all that subserve) licentiousness are disgraceful." If 'P~~o'Ta, (JIIVTEi.ona are to be understood here on an analogy with (?) 84a 1.,£ (8ua e!~ QT,,,,ICrP cpi~,,) or 83b 14, then they should also be understood.t 84a 20, Ta 6' el~ (ila. axOVTa. But Cope, p. 78, does not so understand them, and translates the phrase: "the involuntary being such as are done under compulsion." This is the same as his interpretation of Ta el~ V"1J~ETljU.'~. Furtb=ore, if we understand tpB{!Ol1TO, auvTslvovra and translate in terms of acts, we have: "acts that 'have a tendency to or reference to' compulsion." While this can be defended as having some meaning, still such acts cannot be called unqualifiedly Il"ona if all that A. says about such action in EN u09b 30 uub 3 i.! correct. I would interpret our phrase (c£ Bl~, LS, IV) to mean: "things which have to do with lust, licentiousness," which comes to mean "acts oflicentiousness" since in the context these things have to be actionsif ."ona - Il"o.m carry any meaning. On dxoAaula see A 9, 66b 13-15 and EN Iu8b 15 - IIl9b 18. 2 Exmll XIII cbcOV'<'Il On voluntary-involuntary action, see A 10, 68b 26 - 69b 27, and in particular 68b 32 - 6,.. 2, 68b 10-11, 69b 21, 73b 34 : 2 and EN Il09b 30 - IIub 3. a 20-21 "Ill 6' .t~ ~lllv axov".. as A. says at A I5,77b 5, "d 6. (iiq "al dnaTl1 d"o~u,a, which is a fairly concise statement of what he says about (iia in EN u09b 30ff. In his discussion of the voluntary-involuntary in that first chapter of Book 3, A. opens with the statement that the involuntary action appears to be the one made under constraint or ill igno.rance. He

COMMENTARY

IIS

then spends the rest of the chapter in determining what is meant by "under constraint" and "in ignorance. OUI concern is with the first, which we are told means that the initiative for the action is external to the agent and is such that the agent contributes nothing to the act (IIIoa 2-3). After reviewing other actions in which the initiative might be considered external and which he calls mixed (voluntary-involuntary), he a.ks (IIrob 1-3) whether "under constraint" should still mean what it was said to mean .t IIIOa 2-3. He answers his question in the affirmative at lIIOb IS-16, and sums up his position at the end of the chapter at HIla 22-24: an action done under compulsion (Le., the initiative is outside the agent) is involuntary. Thus, while acts of licentiousness which are, or could be considered, involWltary in a broader sense, are a source of shame, those done Wlder compulsion are truly involuntary. But even as such they are a caose of shame to the person since yidding to the force (a 21, Wr0l'olnj) seems to come from personal cowardice. It should be noted, however, that these truly involuntary acts are not the kind of actions A. has been describing from 83b 13 to here; C£, for example, 83b 19 (TowTa ...). II

a 21 IivCIV&p (.. ~ - &'LA(a~ See A 9, 66b II- 13 where de,}./a is defined in terms of a.deela, for which reason I would take d.a.dela, as a synonym of ae&J.l",,; see also 68b 18 : 2.

a 23 a ... "! (83b 13-15), but with a concentration on the specifying difference, d60fla: the loss of reputation, the disgrace incurred in the minds of others. Since we are concerned here with neo, Ti.a" this. limitation of the definition is quite reasonable.

a 24-26 "".pi "&o~(a~ ... &o~"~ov"<,,~

A. determines here what was partly assumed in the definition at 83b 13-15: namely, that shame as an em0tion is "a vivid inrpression" of disgrace personally incurred. This disgracenamely, "a loss of respect in the esteem of others" - is the sole caose of the shame, not any of the consequents of such a loss. However, the loss of the esteem of others which constitutes the disgrace does not in itself cause shame (e.g., 84b 22-24). Shame depends upon whose esteem is lost, i.e., dip M840 27, a phrase A. specifies at 840 27-29.

,.0. "X",

a 24 "&o~!~ the loss of one's reputation, esteem (Mfa), in the minds of others; and so: "dishonor," "disgrace." a 25

....tN'"I~ ... Xcipov

"foI its own sake"; i.e., the dishonor itsel£

a 25-26 cN&El~ ... cill' ij aLii "and since [b,ei] no one attends to another's opinion of himself except in the case of who they are who enter-

u6

ARISTOTLE.

C

RHETORI C I II

tain it." ml6.t,: we have the singular here and in what immediately follows. At 843- 29 there is a shift to the plural. In instances like this one can ask with Spenge! on 86a 28: "cur ttansitus in singularem?" In this division there is • Ti.a, to ".ia (c£ 83b 12-13) at 843- 34-36, 84b similar shift £rom I'T-20; cpo SSh 28-29. .

neo,

See LS, My., L4. This particular topic is developed _ 27 AOYOV €XC. down to 843- 34, after which A. turns to the more general category of d.a" people (whether they are held in particular regard or not) whose opinion matters sufliciendy to cawe others to experience shame.

"eo'

_ 27-28 81l.. p.1l~av-n..v .•• 8.... p.ci~c..81l, See 79b 25-26, 81. 28-29 fur the use of the same norm in a related situation; see also A 6, 63a 34-35. a 28 : 1 qnl.o-rLI'ELTClL

a XClTCUPPOVEi

See 79b 24-25; see .150 81b 21. For the idea in the word, see 78b 15-16,

78h

14-15:1. _ 29-30 81lUP.ci~...81l' .•• 8.... p.cit;ou.., pm. oJ> is retrospective and transitional (Denniston, p. 470). We are given here the development of two of the five classes set forth at 843- 27-29. We should note that while the analysis concerns the kind of people held in esteem (84' 27: dl. My •• lx.'), its u1tim.te purpose is to set forth the people before whom shame is felt.

(any good) "£rom among those which bring _ 31 : 1 Tidv -np.""" honor"; at A 5, 61a 27 - b 2, we are told the things which are Tip,a, the things which. cawe men to be held in esteem. z &eDp.£IIO. "'Ppo&" ..."o~ i.e., "desperately want something."

_ 32-33 'PtAo..,p.oGv........ 'Ppovlp.wv 28-29: "ed, .~, ... ddc7J'. _ 33 :,

a brief development of 84a

6p.oiou~

i.e., "equals," as arA 6, 63a 32-33, 83' 32-33. See 6]_ 17; the word, modified by cr., cU1/9••••n". ("as speakers of the trudr"), is the object of 'PIl0n/Cov",.

z rppovip.wv

_ 34-35 " .. t ....... P.iiAAOV sc. al"xVvovTw, on • parallel widr palAo. al"xVvovTa, (a 37) in a sentence which illustrates this p.rticuIar topic. On Td Iv &p9aJ..po" sec 84a 20 : 1. On the shift in subject matter, c£ S.... 25-26. _ 35-36 38ev ..• Ill&... theses.

w.,. ...

Ross alone of the edd. encloses this in paren-

_ 36 Ill&.;; If there is • sequence of ideas here in what is presumably intended to be • unified statement, we must determine the

COMMENTARY

II7

meaning of (I) Ta l. d'l'6aA,..oi~, (2) Td b dtp8a).,..o'~ .l.al aldOl, (3) dla TO i. d'l'6aA,..0'~ d"''I'dT.ea. Since it seems clear that the public character (Ta b d'l'6a).,..0'~) of the act causes the greater shame (,..a.!).o., a 35, 37) - and this idea is restated in the example given as an explanation of the proverb (dla TOVTO ... d"''I'dnea) - it would appear that the proverb (TO b . .. aldOl: shame is in the eyes) most mean here that shame resides in a person's act being seen by others, in conspectu aliorum as Vater, p. 90, says; see also Schrader, p. 281. This idea is hinted at by Suidas (ed. Adler, s. aidcb~) in one of the explanations given for the proverb, e.g., II {In 1"01l~ naedoTa~ &eOl>T.~ aidoMal,..Woo 01 iI>6eomol 1J TOtl~ dnd>Ta~. This idea would find confumation in 84b 32-36, 8sa 8--13. It also seems reasonable that in this division of the chapter devoted to those people before whom one experiences shame A. should speak about a greater shame experienced for an act seen by others, by those likely to be close associates (nae."o,..bov~) who give close attention to one (neoaixona, aVi'oi,). If this is so, the citations given as explanation for the proverb - e.g., Sappho 137 (Lobd & Page), Hymn to Demeter 214, Theognis 85-86, Aristophanes, Wasps 446-447, Euripides, Cresphontes &g. 457 (Nauck & Snell), HippolyluS 246, Iphigenia in Aulis 993-994, Xenophon, Memorabilia 2.1.22 (see, further, Cope, pp. 8Tal! "La manifestation de la pudeur, ce sont en effet les yeux baisses, soit parce qu'i1s n'osent pas se lever sur I'objet qu'i1s respectent, soit parce qu'i1s n'osent pas affronter Ie regard d'autrui OU iIs pourraient lire un bl~." The only part of this comment which would be consonant with the interpretation olfered here is the second reason - seeing one's shame in the eyes of tho.. who have viewed one's shameful actions: in conspectu aliorum, b dtp8aA,..o'~ dva, alae».

84b I

Suit 'to ... '!"Po't'p"

sc. • loa" "because both instances [naesao,...the eyes of others." diJ'l'dnea is the accosative of the neuter pronoun referring to statements in the preceding part of the sentence; see Riddell, nos. I7, 42, and Plato, Ph.edo 68c. oo.~, neoa.X"Ta~l constitute being in

b 2 't";;'tli The specification of the word must come from boX""" "those not liable to the same imputations, charges," namdy, that their actions are shameful. The fact that they are ,..~ boxol (i.e., ,..~ b.X0,....ol) indicates that their usual way of acting is different, and so the reason: Mi)."" "ae . .. TOUTO'C'.

I18

AIlSTOTLB, 'RIrETOllIC' II

b 2-3 " ..1 '
II9

COMMENTARY

b 7 iJ&'K'I"'tvO' ... ,,,.p ....'1P£.v See 82b 10. The verb (naeaT1leB1.) emphasizes the danger from th.s. people who lie in wait for an opportllDity to speak out; cpo Top. 16ra 23. b 8 K..KO>'oyo, See 81b 7 from which the impression is drawn that "oHoMyo. are keenly aware of the faults of others and speak viciously about "al them. an impression borne out by the reason given here: .r,,'e ("""oA."o;;.,..) T.,), "TA. However. the subject of """.Aoy.6c1l is 1id"'"'!,..t.•• and "a"oAOyo,. the two specifications of Ual'l'BAT"•• t.

yae

.r,

b 9 : 1 Kill ot~ sc. "al (T.6T.0, olav......o.) (ian). 2· &'II"P'~~ i. •.• those whose way of life. whose business. is with the faults of their fellow-men. From the example given - e.g.• XAeoocr-rol, (7\111 2~31. 80a 29). "w,..rpdo"••ol,. and the classification of these people as "o".Uy... i~OyyeAT.".1 - 6.0Te'P>! implies more than idle amusement or innocent pastime.

For the general idea in the word. see 741> 7 and I14b :1.-3. b II-I2 "Ill tv o~ ... &'''''.'''''11' "And they experience shame io the pr.sence .of those among whom they have never failed sioce (among such) they are io the position of those admired." 60.,..01;&,..""•• as p....ive and subject of d.rb....TO. must refer to those who experience the shame. not those before whom they experience it. Knowing that their past successes ....ure them of a good M~o among such people (843 27: My •• lX.' TW. 600,..01;&oT<01I). they are more readily susceptible to olaV"'7 io their presenc•. There are other ioterpretations of the statement which change the meaning and neglect the middle. 60.,..01;0,..••••• b 13-14 &,a ... .n...ol~ "And as persons who are not yet held io disrepute they are ashamed In the presence of those who ask a favor for the first tim.e." This statement curies on the idea of the iotegrity of the person's 6O~0. and so. ordinarily. a freedom from a sense of shame. However. it implies that the inability or refusal to respond to the request will result io the loss of one's M~o with these people (e.g.• new friends. old acquaintances) whose opinion one respects. and so a consequent sense of shame. A 12. 72b 21-22. 76a 30 : J. This refers to those mentioned io 84b 13. i.e.• those whose esteem they still possess. They consist ofrwo groups: those who have just recendy wanted to be their friends (b 14-1S). and old acquaintances aware of no failures on their part (b 16-17).

b 14

: 1 2

iJ&ol;'1Ko...;

..o,oil... ,

b IS-16 &,1> ••• EupCIKocr(...~ The problem with these Iioes is that we have no evidence of any event to which we can asaibe it; nor are we Wtaio of what was said. or who said it. The evidence for the speaker and

120

ARISTOTL~ cllHBTOBIC' II

the statement comes from the scholiast (Anonymus) who assumes that the speaker is Euripides, the tragic poet, as an ambass.dor from Athens to Syracuse on • mission of peace and fiiendship. This presumably would have occurred prior to the Sicilian Expedition of 4-15. Certainly the words which the scholiast cites are an apt illustr.tion of the topic. In the account of the scholiast, the Athenians newly desirous to "be friends of the Syracusans make • request for peace which is rejected by the Syr.cusans; in reply Euripides comments: "'f for no other reason, at least, gentlemen of Syracuse, you should respect us, your admirers, for this present [the first, explains the scholiast] request made of you." As Spengd (pp. 23C>-3I) aod Cope (p. 83) remark, there is no firm reason, apart from the absence of any confirmatory evidence, which permits us to say that this is not the tragic poet or that the scholiast has invented the story. Other conjectures have been made but they are equally unsatisfying. On the positive side in some favor of the scholiast is the fact that we know Euripides was deeply regarded in Syracuse and that many Athenian captives owed their lives to him following the Sicilian disaster (plutarch, Lives of the Philosophers: Nidas 29), and that A. from his many citations of Euripides (he racks third after Homer, Isocrates) apparently knew his work intimatdy. See commClit at

84a 25-26.

b 18 : t .... P'I9,....... certainly the shameful actions indirectly mentioned in this division (842 24- - 84-b 17) by way of illustrating "'e~' d.a" but .lso those mentioned in the first division (83b 17 - 842 23). 3 0"1)p.E111 Sec l'E'1}PBiov/' 391. b 19 itppo&LC..ci;l;ov..~ ... Moil al"xVv0VTa& must be understood with d'l'eoa&,,&a'ovre,: "those who engage in acts of sexual intercourse are ashamed of the acts and also of the sign. of such actions." The underlined phrase must be understood since A. is talking about actions even though he makes the construction personal both here and in 84-b 20: ".&oiivre" Ul'DVTB'. The context from 84-b 17 wil1110t tolerate any other meaoing. A. has already indicated what he has in mind by this topic at 842 16-20. b 20 "'o.oil.....~ •.. ).eyov...~ See preceding note. For the general idea, see Sophocles, philoct.ru 86-87, Oed. Tyr. 14-09; Isocrates, To Demonicus IS. b 21 ....... ~ elP"IJp.£vCl\l~ Cpo 84-b 18, Tel. tPI8bTa; the persons mentioned are those ("eo, dv~) of this division, 84-' 24- - b 26. b 22 cN"O~ i.e., the people before whom men experience shame, i.e., the -leTJPivov, (b 21). Now their servants and fiiends are put i.n this class.

COMMENTARY

b 22-26 1IAc.>~ ••• voP.ov 84a 24 - 84b 22.

I21

a general summation of the whole division

b 2.3-24 oil8' WV ...lou

... cU.'18WE'v so. 060' (TOVTOV,) &iv: eli. is a possessive genitive with M~'1' which is governed by the verb. This is the positive expression' of what was previowly stated negativdy at 84" 28-29 (Hal eli. pT, "aTa'Pe.'" Tij, Mf'l'). The validity of the statement rests on 84" 25-27: shame is occasioned not by the Mfa but by the quality of the person holding the 66~a. On "OTO'PeO"'v, see 78b 'S-I6, 78b 14 - IS : 1.

b 23 56;1)~ ",oil cU.1)8WE'V "whose views (judgments) on speaking the truth they deeply despise." On aA'IO.v... see 84" 33, A. II, 7" ro, 14. The more wual interpretation found is: "whose opinions we quite look down on as untrustworthy" (Roberts); "for the validity of whose opinion we have a great contempt" (Cooper); "for whose opinion in respect of perceiving the truth ..... (Cope). Cpo A II, 7" 13-17. I would interpret O'leio b 24 "",,5i.. x",l 81)p('" here as there; see pa IS. In fact this present passage would confirm that interpretation, for it is somewhat diflicult to comprehend how A., given his definition of shame., could possibly speak of being ashamed in the presence of animals. b 25 oiln ",ar6d an accwative of respect: "nor are they ashamed with respect to the same things before those well known to them. ..."

. . . 50xoiiv..", . . . ",ck "po~ ... vop.ov The TO "eo' phrases are also acowatives of respect: "with respect to those things righdy evaluated ... with respect to those conventionally evaluated." Cope on this passage, p. 84, refers to 8Ib 19-21 for the meaning of the. expression. However, this does not seem to be correct, and the reasons are set down at 8Ib 19. Spengel, p. 23', interprets our passage as a statement of what men are wont to do and cites EN r 128b 23-25 as a contrasting statement of what men should do. But there really is no connection between the two. In our p .... sage we are talking, not abollt the actions men perform, but about their emotional response to the actions they perform which are judged by others as wrong. Actions which are TO "ed, ,U"O••av d."criivro are those which are rightly viewed as wrong, i.e., in accord with what they really are. Those which are TO "ed, vo,..ov are those viewed as wrong in accord with established law, wage, or convention; see e.g., SE 173a 29-30. As was seen at 8Ib 19, sf, these last are not necessarily the cause of shame to one if they are done in the presence of close friends. In the discwsion on law and equity in A 13, and in particular 74" 25 - 74b 22, there is a difference between legal and real wrongness in an action.

b 26 ",ck .. po~

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

122.

b 27: 1 .r,&e "(disposed) as follows"; c£ 82a 20 : 3. We begin here the last division of the chapter. "W~ IXo .....~ of 83 b 13; it is analyzed (84b 27 - 85a I) first from a genexaI perspective. z np"'TOY po... This is :mswered at b 2.9 (-liera. 6') - if it is answered at all; cpo 87" 6. The usual correlation can be seen at A I. 54" 34-

b

I.

1 d ,:,...cipXO'EV •.• ixoy.".~ oil...., '''''.~ OIiT"'~ is read by Roemer. Dufour. Ross. "If certain people are related to there in the manner described." 3 oiou~ ... ,doxwOYT.., "people such as tho.!e we said are the kind in who.!e presence they feel shame." .'Pa,.... i.e.. at 84" 26/[ (d.ay,,'1

b 28 :

TOVTOV," • •• ).

ij."." ...

b 29-3 I IWT"; Kassel alone of the edd. enclo.!es this in parentheses without :my break with what precedes; the other edd.. Spenge!. Cope begin a new sentence with "iera. and omit parentheses. punctuating with a comma after /J'Te~. Kassel gives his reason for the change in DeT Text. p. 134. I do not see his reason. At 84b 29-36: >Jera•... alerO"ljer.erOa. (b 36-38: 6••... C7lA"'Tai is simply a further addition occasioned by the statement) A. specifies what he means by 84b 27-29 (neWTO' ... alerx.s.o.Ta.). and he does so by naming again the group mentioned earlier at 84a 27-32. In 84b 29-31 (>Jera•.•. /J'TB~) he mentions the four major groups in who.!e presence men experience shame. At 84b 32-36 ("al OIiTO' ••• alcrO>1er.erOa.) he determines the OIiTO' o( b 2.9 more specifically: "these especially [see S. 1246) whether they are onlookers ["al oIiTo. ~ (11. eli.,.",) de Oav,.aCo,...o••

See 84" 27-28. At b 29

ij cr.v &.loy..,", ..,v..... IW ...~ See 84" 31-32. Ross alone conjecsecond w" e.g.• T",a xe.la> 7j~ (as does Richards. p. 109). However. leola> as a collective singular denotes a class (c£ S. 2502b): "or those from whom they have some need which they will not.... " Kassel conjectures <"aTd>.",a citing the scholiast. Twa xe.la. is a cognate accusative.

b 31

tures >J~ for the

b 32-35 (C, ....Ep ••. lJnicp("""'....,) Only Ross and Kassel enclose this within parentheses. as does Freese. Doing so is reasonable. for the remark is parenthetical. and a better use of the punctuation than that of Cope who encloses b 33-35 (~'lov . .. 'P'1'Pler"'>Ta.).

85a I

COMMENTARY

123

b 32 : 1 Ku&I,,~ A. is our primary source (see, e.g., PW) fur this Athenian orator who argued, probably in 365 B. c., against the establishment of cleruchies in Samos, an action which, while legitimate since Sames was not a member, was clearly contrary to the intent and spirit of the Second Athenian League (on this last see OCD; CAH, VI; D. Siculus, Ip8.3-4, gives a brief report of the formation of the League under the year 377/376 B.C.). • Eci"ou In the year 365 Timotheus after a se.ige of ten months captured the island, and the Athenians moved cleruchs into it; see CAH, VI I05f£, 209/f. See OCD, PW, for thi, process begun at the end 3 x>.1JpouXI..~ of the sixth century B. c. whereby Athens settled her own citizens (who retained their citi2enship) in conquered territory. Its unpopularity in the fourth century B.C. is reflected in the constitution of the Second Athenian League, and in Isoerates, Panegyricus I05-Iog.

b 33 :

1 E&1JI'-1JYOP'I"'" See A 3, 58b 8-10, and the whole chapter for comments on deliberative rhetoric. • .n.ol.
"as if they were eyewitnesses [dew ..a,] b 34-35 ':'~ .....xauao .....ou~ and not merely people who will eventually hear about." b 36-37 bpii"e", .......Xoiiv..E~ ••• (3..uAav..", See the statements of Hecuba in Euripides' play of that name, 968-974. or of Ci=o on Murena in the peroration of the Pro Murena (41.89): "Ibit igitur in exilium mioer? Quo? ad orientisne partis, in qnibus annos multos legatus fnit ... res maximas gessit? At habet magnum dolorem, unde cum honote decesseris, eadem cum ignominia reverti" (Victorius). Emulation, as a distressful feeling experienced by b 37 ~'1AoUv'fWV noTE good people at the absence in themselves of good things which they esteem and which are possessed by their equals, is studied in chap. II. It i, a constructive, not a destructive, emotion, and as we see at SIb 21-23 the relationship between both persons is actually or potentially one of friendship. Thus A. is able to bring (b 3?f) the C'l/AOlTai within the general elass of 8aviJacnal.

8sa I it x"""'axUvou",v We begin here a consideration of particular aspects which are determinants of the disposition of those who experience shame. Our reading is that of four edd., Spenge!. "aTa,,,xtIVO';,,.. read by

I34

ARISTOTLE,

I

R.HETORIC' II

8sa 5

Cope, Kassel has a sounder textual foundation and is read by the scholiast. However, while the future may possibly be explained, it is difficult to understand how the context can tolerate it. A. says, for example: "men are ashamed whenever they have deeds or achievements upon which they bring dishonor - whether their own or their ancestors or certain others with whom they have some kinship." If we accept the future - "upon which they will bring dishonnr" - they must, in order to experience shame, already be engaged in a course of action which will dishonor these achievements. Some, e.g., Spenge1, Cope, Freese (Loeb), interpret II "aTalaxV>oVa&7 diJferendy, taking 11 as the subject of the verb: "deeds or achievements which bring dishonor;" see also the Vetus Translatio and Victorius, who cites an apposite example from Euripides, Hipp. 424-42S. a 3 ciYX"...~!1I Technically all blood relations up to second cousins; what is a realistic understanding here would be: some close and special blood relationship.

a 3-4 XIII 3Aw, ... oN",O! "and in general (men experience shame) in the case of all those on whose account they themsdves fed shame." In the previous topic men experience shame when they theuudves bring dishonnr upon the achievements of theuuelves or those closely rdared to them by blood. Here men experience shame when these same people, or others closdy relared to them (e.g., those who look up to them as modds or as their students, advisees, or rivals), do something sham.efu1 themselves. The sentence has been given different. interpretations: "Generally we fed shame before those for whose own misconduct we should also fed it" (Roberts); "To speak generally we fed shame before those persons whose own disgrace would affect us" (Cooper); "And universally, we feel shame on be""!! of those whom we ourselves respect" Oebb Ill: Sandys); "In a word, men feel shame fnr those whom they themsdves respect" (Freese).

a 4 : 1 slp'!""'o, presumably those mentioned at 8sa 2-3, as wdl as those, it is likdy, from 84b :>.sif. 2 01 ••. clvCUPEpofLWo, "those who refer (themselves) to them," Le., "tho.e who defer to them as standards" (Cooper). This group (including as it apparendy does 8sa S'"'l [see following note]: those taught or cOWlSeled, and rivals) could also refer to 84h 30, 8avpd'....,.,. a S il Jw .•. yoyo"ua,v, il eli•••• ,..,,&.aa&7. "ai M•... ; Cope reads without the first ~ (which is omitted by cod. F, anaong others). I follow the reading of the edd. Kassel's oE.. is attractive hut I find it difIicuIt to confine the reason at Ssa 6-7 (noUu,.ae ..• "olo;;aw) to Ssa s~ ("al Au> ••• 'P1A0T1po;;.Tal); I :uso find a problem in the fact that with Kassel's reading the ~ngivenat

8sa 14

us

COMMBNTARY

8sa 6-7 (noAAd ,,~ ...) is so confined, it would seem. Yet this reason is meant to apply to 8S' 3-<1 since it is because of the shame fdt on account of such people (1.e., a 3: ~"'e w. alaxVvovTa,) that men (alaxwopBVo., a 6) do or do not do many things. a 6 IIfIo0
See 84a II-I2; and cpo 8~ 32-33 (rpMoT'pomll' ... opolov,).

a 6-7 ..!lIJtuvop.£Vo.........OU"fO\I~ by people such as these."

"out of a sense of sbJune occasioned

a 8-9 " ..I p.m..,...~ . . . et.,ly These lines should be compared with 8~ 34 - b I; c£ 84a 36. a 8 lv
,.laxuv'nJMI ~OY

i.e., "are more ashamed" - a meaning

called for by the context and derived from the meaning of the word as it is ordinarily used: sensitive to, su~ect to, shame, and so: modest, bashful; see the word at 72b 30. z •AY.....u.....op.lvou~· as a sign of their shame; see, e.g., Plato, PhaeJrus 2.43 b, PhaeJo II7C, Acscbines, Against TimorchlU, 26. a 12-13 ....I .......u-...",.. possible example of aiM".

See 83b 13 where the words are cited as a

a 13 ij flo" sc. ij ly"aA,;,.na6. Pit . .. The alternative ii, here introducing a second question, is the equivalent of the Latin The second question usually (as here) anticipates and rejects the answer that would be given to the first. See Plato, Apology 2.6b (11 MjA.. "'i ...) and Adam's note on it (PI.tonu Apologia Suer.tis), or Crit. S3C (11 oJanee ...). Cope, p. 87, offers another explanation.

.n.

the conclusion to the chapter.•" a I4-IS ",.pl flo£'" ••• o(,"'OP"aofloEY To;,. hani.,>, i.e., the opposite of the particular topics on shame presented in the chapter. Apart from this nothing is offered on the emotion opposed to shame; however, c£ Boa 19. ,~oefjaop.., cpo A 8, 66a 20.

CHAPTER 7

(Sec 85' IS)

I . Introduction: 8s, IS-2.S I.

2.

introduction to, and triple division of,

8S' IS-I?

kindliness definition

8S' '7-19

expIanztion of definition when kindliness is gIOZt what 4••pb", in the cIe6nition

3. 8sa 1!)-2S (oj 8sa '!)-"

(6J 85' 21-25

IT • Development: 8S' 2.S-2.9

melD'

those who can be said to have kindliness. This is presented not so much by showing how men are disposed .s by considcrlng what kind of act they perfOrm in terms of the definition:

.movey'a as.pIN,!, of kindlincss: a restatement of the triple division as now clear, and then - most unusual- how one ;. to develop kindliness in others

III . Conclusion: 8S' 2.9-33

IV . Unkindlincss: 8S' 34 ~ 8Sb

10

development of unkindliness by Way of showing how to remove xde" in others. Again thiJ ;. done in the bare terms of the definition, that is, by showing that the person, or the act, ;. not commensurate with the definition

·.tenv ••. _1 .....; ... ix"""o; the usual division (cf. 78a 2.3-2S). The reading;' th.t of four edd. Tovar along with Spengd, Cope reads with the codd. iJ

lisa IS-I6

,.Iii,.

There are two things to be said of thiJ chapter on xde'" the emotion ofkindlincss, good feeling toward another. In the Drst place, in organization it is, despite the brevity, the most loosdy constructed of all the chapterS which have been met thus far in the second book. It;' also different

a IS XoiplV

u8

AlUSTOTLE, 'RHETOR[C' II

85' 17

from the preceding chapters and those which follow in the nature of its analysis. It makes a token effort by way of simple statement to follow the triple division, but does not do so. The analysis is concerned more with what constitutes xde." and thereby what constitutes ar.ae",...la in the second half of the chapter, than in determining in any detail the disposition of those who experience xde." or the people toward whom, or the conditions under which, it is experienced. It defines xde., in terms of the actions of the person experiencing the emotion; this is unique among all the definitions of the emotions. Then, unlike the other chapters, it analyzes these actions in terms of those who would be the recipients of the emotion. Even in this last analysis, which might seem to be a development of the division "ed, -.:l.a, (those toward whom men fed kindliness), A. occupies himsdf only with recipients who exemplify certain specific kinds of need which illustrate the de6nition. He does not assume the definition and present US with general classes which exemplify the kind of people toward whom the emotion is felt. The best way to grasp what is meant by this criticism is to take an emotion closely related to xde." namely, ",.lla, and compare the division ned, d.a, (8la 8 - 8Ib 34) with what is said in our chapter in 8sa 21-2\1; this, in fact, is the entire statement on xde" in all its divisions. The second point to be made is that xde., as we find it analyzed in the chapter does not include the feeling of gratitude, as not only Cope, pp. 87, 89, suggests, but Cooper, Freese, and before them Schrader, p. 299, and presumably Vater, pp. 93-94 (reading, a. Cope does, .t a 17-18 xde" unove,,'" for xde .. lX"')' In. itself xde" means: (a) kindliness, benevolence. (b) gr.titude, (e) a favor cOnferred. But the intent of the dc6nition (a 17-19) of xde" as an emotion and its explanation in the chapter is an analysis of the emotion as kindliness, benevolence: helping someone in need and doing so without any expectation of a retum. Cope'. effort, p. 89, to defend (b) gratitude, does not really stand up. Gratitude as a feding, or emotion, is pleasure at and thankfulness for aJavor received. No matter how else the feeling or emotion is described, gratitude is a response to kindliness shown to one. But A. excludes this in the definition of xae'" e.g., 85a IS-n, and repeats it at 8sb 4; nor does he say anything itt the chapter which negates his definition. Further, 8Ib 35-37 makes it clear that xde', is kindliness shown to another. On pp. 94-95 of his commentary Cope speaks more correctly of xde" when he says that it is "confined to doing a service to a friend in need." a 17 l ....... ail XclPL~ On the definition, c£ ,sa 31 : 1. As was said in 78a 22, xde., (the feeling of kindness toward another) is, as a ..d90" exclusive to the Rhetoric. The "d90, met in the EN (where it is only mentioned, nosb 22), is xaed, and it would seem tomeanjoy, as it apparently does in the De an. 403a 18 where again it is simply mentioned. In the, Top. Iub

Ss. 19

129

COMMBNTARY

21-26 it again appears to mean joy, as also in the Rhetoric to Alexander, i.e., Anaximenes 14221 17. When x
"B'

Ix"'" is intransitive (!.S, B): with which the one • 17 xd' ilvo lxwho is in conformity is ,aid ... , i.e., "in confonnity with which one is said." • IS 6"oupylCl literally: ,ervice rendered; here probably: being helpful to, doing a favor for. And so: "Let kinclline.s (benevolence) be defined as being he!pful to (doing a favor for)." Cicero, De inv. 2.3S.IIZ on beneficium (Cope) helps toward an understanding of the idea here. This statement would rule out a IS-I9: 1 ",iI liwl .. :"<. oIxElvcp the idea of gratitude as an interpretation of x.'1 &i sc. laTa,. Since x
130

AllISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

favors typical of friendship based on utility, the comments are at most marginal to our word, which is well specified in our text.

a 1!}-20 CRpcl&pCl &.ov-tv'l' Cpo 8"" 3 I. Ross alone of the edd. reads d.op""o~ with Bywater and Richards; see Richards, p. 109.

a 20 : 1 ".ym).1dV XCll xcxAmWv These genitives are best taken with a.op"''!': "to one in need of something quite important and difIicult to obtain." Cope (p. 88) apparendy takes the words with v"ov~yla. This is attractive (see also Spengel, p. 232) since it would extend the scope of ;cd~,~ in what seems a legitimate way; e.g., ;C~I~ is present if (u"oveyla) the doing of the favor is: (a) for one in great need, or (b) of something important and difficult, or (e) at a critical moment. For example, the explanation of %~,~ (not necessarily the emotion) found in Plato, Definitions 413e is of larger extension: %~I~ ';'.~y.,,[a J"oV"'o, . .meldo"o, dyaBov . u"ov~yla I. "a~
a 21 : 1 l\ "Ovos ... "ciA"""CI The idea intended seems clear: the kindness shown is very special. Since we apparendy revert to the personal construction here and this creates confusion, we can resolve the problem by understanding the a. of a. " at a 19 (with which Richards had difficulties; see 85a 1!}-20) together with UnoveJlii: ., (a.) po.o, (u"oveyfi) - "or if a 'person is alone in being helpful, or the first to be helpful, or is most helpful of aII." z c1pil;..~ See 78a 31 : z, 69a I : Z. a

22 : 1

't"ou-r-

a partitive genitive: "and of these those appetites espe-

ciaUy...."

Z CIt ".."ck M"'IS See the definition of deY>1 as 6e.~I' pB't"a )'V"'1~, 78a 31, and the comment at 79a II : 1. 3 ",oil,,~ y,yvo"c!vou "for something not possessed." a 23 : 1 W,.,.;;.".., .•. in,au"ICl' For the relation of 1".Bvp[a to o~e<", see 68b 32 - 69a 2, 69a I : z, ?Oa 17-18. To,avTao, i.e., oes.", peTa )'V"'1'. z i!p... ~ Cpo 8"" 32.

a 24 X"",:,,,.,,," ... X,"su"o,~ Cpo 86a 8 ("a"cba•• ,), 82a 32 ("I.a..o,). Both words, together with " ..I~ (a 2S), ",."ai" piye6o, Tij, d.>jaBw, (a 26), and the statement at a 28-29: made at 8sa 20 : 1.

avtly"" ... petew, bear out the comment

131

COMMENTARY

a Z4-zS c\ KLV&""el..... l"'LUuI'Ei ••• AUttoUl'EVOS If ..t.d""., is the approach of what is fearful (see 8za 3Z), then fear, or the emotion occasioned by a vivid sense of impending and harmful evil (82a ZI-ZZ), is present. The natural response to fear is the hope for safety (83a s-6) which is a desire (.,nBv,...r). Furthermore, the fact that fear makes one deliberate (83a 7) means that the appetitive faculty is present; see S7a Z : 1. The same natural e.g., 79>- II: response (l,..8v,...t) occurs in the case of one who is l,lBTal "de n1o'0C' d AV,",OVI-'670" on which see 79a II.

.:1"".6,....."

a ZS "'EVI,!, Cpo 79a IS-19 where those who are poor are characterized as among those who are bnB",..oWro,. "C1fI't1Ta,.....' = "those who help." exile as at 72b 6. Plutarch (Parallel Lives) in his Thea 26 : 1 cpuylliS mistoeles Z4-2S speaks of the assistance given to Themistocles in exile by his friends; see also Thucyd. 1.137.3. z I'LKPci 67nJP.-nj....,crLV The verb here tolerates the meaning found in vnovl!l'ta (a 18); further, the presence of vn01Jl!ytap at a 29 suggests that this is the operative ide, in a 2S-29 (d,•... ,...tC.,), and so I would translate: "even if their helpfulness is insignificant." In, way this lends confinnation to the interpretation at 8sa 20 : 1.

a 26-1-7 &Lci"';' l'iYE8oS .•• KIlLPav to nplq., as Ha'l!6" does to qN')'ai'".

,..froB., T;j, 6mjl1• ." refers back

a 27 K€)CIlPLal'ivoL sc. • Ia<: "have exp.....od fedings of kindness." Cpo the use of the verb here with its use at A 12, 73' 16 (to gratify others). a z7-28 orav ... &oUS No one. apart from the scholiast who receives small credence here. has any idea of what the reference is. a 28 ElS ....116...... is the reading of three odd., Spengd (although he questions it, p. 233). Cope. It is not the reading of any of the codd. Dufour, Kassel read Taiha with cod. A; cod. F reads TO'aVTa, which would be my preference, i.e., "with respect to the sort of instances mentioned." Cpo

a 3Z, 33. a Z8-29 ness."

l)(ELV

'
6n:oupylllV

C£ 8sa 18: "to show this helpful-

a 29 : 1 £IS 1,,11 ij 1'011;.... This is the reading accepted by all; the punctuation, however, is that of Dufour. Tovar, Kassel, Cope. Ross punctuates with a colon; Roemer, Spenge!, with a comma. z C.......E with dijU. (dan), a 30. a 29-30 oI",.l
ARISTOTLE. 'RHETORIC I

[[

85b 2

watched. "And so since it is manifest to whom and for what reasons kindliness is ,hown and how those are disposed who are kindly, it is clear that their presentation must be made ready from these sources by those etc. [cE RS31 : Z]." A.'s assurance that all is now eminendy clear is somewhat starding. It is true that he has covered each point, if very skctcbily, but "de'~ as a does not emerge clearly. To interpret it as a "feeling of kindliness toward another in need" is more a deduction from the fact that he calls it a and defines it as .",verla d••pAP", PT! d.d ...... " and from the explanations briefly given in the chapter, as well as a statement such as that at 8Ib 35-37.

"dB., "dB.,

_ 31 : J me <"oU"""" i.e., from the particular (.I'd'l) topics presented for this emotion; cpo 82a 16. The methodology is set forth in general outline in COMMBNTAlI.Y I 354-55, and in some detail at Sgb 25-]2•. A.'s expectation that the method is to be used can be seen at A 7, 65b Ig; g, 66a 27, 68a 33. 19, 19b 17-28 where we are told that the Further, see the comment at analysis of the emotions was a presentation of particular topics au each. z ''''PCl
r

a 33 II 6mjp.TDilv<"Cl~ is the reading of four edd.• Spenge!, Cope. Kassd reads it as < f}> Vn1}e ....OVVTa'. a 34 Iii; x.d "on the other hand it is also clear." I would take this as , the use of "al with M to supplement the adversative sense with the idea of a further addition (Denniston. p. 305). Here we are given another conclusion (cE a 29) considered to be obvious (tpa••eo.). But A. now introduces a new emotion: d"ae, ..Tla. a 35 - RSb I 4q>.llp.i.,S.Il •.. 4xClpIGTOU~ The verb carries the meaning found at A 4, 59b 29, 60a 10. From what follows at 85b 1-5 we remove the presence of kindliness and acts of kindliness in others by showing that the definition of "de" (85 a 17-21), in whole or in part, is not present.

Rsb 1 II yap 3... , sc. ~ rae (6 .....va..., from 85a 31) lin. The structure in the subordinate clause to b 4 is a series of doublets: three sets of verbs, one of participles. b

2 : 1

iiy

,b,o

C£ 63> 9 :

1.

z ..ux"ll~ ClUllhcE.,W The verb whose subject is an understood .,..verla reinforces the prepositional phrase (on which cpo 59" 35). On C£ 6ga 32.

wm.

133

COMMENTAllY

b 3 : 1 """1I"ClyxoicrS'IcrCIV "were COnstrained, forced"; see Pol. I256b 7, Demosthenes, Ag. Aristogeitr>ll B. 10. z li",iI&.,xCIV "or tbat tbey returned a favor, but did not do one"; for tbe idea, sec 79b 7, 29- 30 (Mal ~o'~ •.. an06160ver..), and 79b 30; on the form of the VCIb, see S. 755a. b 4 : 1 or..e oI6':'~ cI-re p.it oI6':'~ is the reading of four edd. Ross reads, as do Spengd and Cope: .rn el6dT8~ .rn 1I'i; but Spengel prefers the reading accepted above. Strictly speaking, A.'s statement is correct. If an action, objectively considered, is in fact tbe return of a favor (and is not a favor freely given without any expectation of a return), it cannot be called xde.~ as dc./incd. For it is, as A. says (85h 4), an action that is in fact TO T"O~. The fact that tbe person placing the act does not know that bis act is such does not change its objective character. Subjettively speaking, however, as far as the intent, the good will, and tbe attitude of the agent are concerned, I think Cope, p. 91, is quite correct in saying that such an action on the part of one who is pi! el6cb~ is an act that may have its source in xde.~ - provided, I would add, tbat the otber conditions for xde.~ are present. "for in botb instances '[i.e., sldcb~, pi! z liP.'PonEp"'~ ..• T'''O~ .ldcb~l there is a return for something."

a""t

b 5 : 1 066' oiI..... ~ "not even in this respect." The statement is certainly correct witb regard to el6cb~; it is questionably correct (sec BSb 4 : 1) in the instance of pi! .l6cb~. • XIITYJYop(~ i.e., the ten categories, or predicates (witb the understood reservation about substance as a predicate) that can be assigned to any being and arc studied in tbe work by that name, Cattgories. We have five of them here (b 6-7) ~ tbe other five are: relation, position, condition, action, passion. As indicated here, tbey are uscful for any kind of analysis and have been used in the presentation of tbe particolar topics in the first and second books. Here A.'s concern with tbe caregorics is to give one the tool for developing ..zap.erda: look to the person acting, or the act, under different categories and sec whether or not they arc witbout the constituents of xde". And he in fact exemplifics what he means: e.g. IAaTTo. pi! VmJeiT1laav, TO'~ "z6eoi~ belong to tbe category of relation; to quantity.

rail,

b 6 ST...0&1 ••• "oil Cpo 64b 15; sec 64b 15-16. ST. introduces a causal clause, 8n (lern1: "for kindliness is kindliness because it is this particolar tbing, or of some magnitude, or quality, or done at .orne time, or place." b 7 "'Ip.eiov i.e., of dxae.~ta which was introduced at 85a 34- On tbe use of '"IP.'o, here, .ec "I~p.'o.," 393: namely, the facts adduced (e.g., not doing a smaller favor, or doing tbe same, equal, or greater favor

134 to

the person's enemies) are given as sign evidence of the presence of elxa-

e"1Tta in

those who do such things. The intrinsic connection between the acts and the absence of xde" reside. in the fact the acts are not unselfish, e.g., b 8-9 they are not done solely for the recipient, and so do not fulfill the definition of xde" at 8sa 111-19. llano., TavTd, etc. are cognate accu-

satives. b 9 tplliiACI dli':'~ sc. v"'leBT1J". A. has wed 'I'aiiAa a number of tinu:s in these early chapters - e.g., at 79b 2.2, ~3, 81b ~, 83b 33; see 79b ~I. Here it means "favor of no value." As A. goes on to say in so many words (""601, .....A.): need signifies the want of something seen as good and so of value, for it signifies, as he said earlier, a natural appetite (6"'i"'" ai £law al deBe.." a ~I).

CHAPTER 8

I . Introduction: SSh II-I6 I.

8sh II-[3

transition

2.

8sh [3-[6

definition of pity

II . Devdopment: sSh 16 - S& 8 I.

8sh 16 - 86a 3

(.) 8sh 16->4 (b) Bsh >4 - 860 l 3. 860 4- 860 I7

3.860 I8-86h8

attitude of those who experience pity: subjective aspeet what is necessary for one to fccl pity those who feel pity

the things which excite pity: objective aspeet those for whom pity is felt: objective aspect

Four edd. hegin the chapter here; Kassel, Spengd 8Sh II xIXI ".pl begin at 8sh I3 (1m",), as does Cope in his comments. I would prefer to . include 8sh II as the conclusion of chap. 7. b u-13 "ou. ... >,oyw",... the usual division first mentioned at 78a 2.3-2.S. In the devdopment the order is changed to "oia, Ti....,.

,.Iii"

b 13 : 1 ........ &>\ Cope, p. 93, once again speaks of a "popular definition which is all that Rhetoric requires." On this matter see 60b 14 : " or the comments on any of the definitions thus far seen. For example, in the case of the present definition, one is at a loss to determine how it can he called "popular" as opposed to scientific, since it is the only extended treatment which we have of the concept in A. In his other works we find it simply mentioned in a catalogue of emotions, e.g., EN IIosb 23, MM 1I86a 12-13, De an. 403a 17. Similar to these citations are those found in the Rhetoric at A I, S4a 17, 2.S; 78a 22; r '9, 19b 2.4-28. It is not mentioned in EE. In the EN at lI09b 32, UII a I-2, we learn that one who acts involuntarily can be the object of pity Uust as we saw at Soa 10 that such a one is the object of "eao"'1'); and at III40 2S-27 we have a statement on pity which makes sense only in terms of the definition given in the Rheroric. The other references to 1160, in the Rheroric at 87a 3-S and 88a 26-30 are understandable in terms of the explanation given in the present chapter. In fact, pity plays a prominent

13 6

ARISTOTLE. 'RHBTORIC' II

85b 13

part in the discussions of indignation in B 9 and of envy in B 10 (c£ 88a 2.3 : .). Tvrice Anaximenes mentions pity as one of the emotions: I440b I, 1443 b 17. At I439b 2.5-37 we are given the conditions necessary to arouse pity in the auditor; the conditions echo in some respects the definition given here in the Rhttoric. When we turn to the Poetics we find pity mentioned in conjunction with fear, a relationship found in the Rhetoric, e.g., 8zb 26-27; 8, 86a 2.7-2.9. The Rhetoric, however, also notes that the pitiful is different from the fearful and that the fearful often produces the opposite of pity (860 22-24). While the Poetics speaks of pity, fear, the pitiful, the fearful (I449b 27, I452a 2-3, I452b 32 - I453a I, I453a 3-4, I453b 1,9, 12, 17, I456b 1-2), it has nothing to say formally about the specific meaning of these terms. In fact to understaDd On tnt, see LS, B.IlLI. . p. 93. on Victorius' interpretation of tpa ...,.btp are quite sound. On the other hand his observation, p. 94 (and note Il - see also pp. 99-100 - that all mention of mental as opposed to physical suffering is absent in the text can be misleading; cpo 86a 5. It is true that the evils specified in the chapter are physical. This, in itself, would not exclude mental pain and suffering from the word "a"••. InOeed at 82a IOo-II the word is used of non-physical evil. Obviously in" terms. of the definition (
85b X4 is that the:

COMMENTARY

"a"rI.

be perceptible -

a1uO'lTri•• as A. says at 82.a IO:

X37

Ta ,...

l""'7ea aIUO'lTa ",i.Ta.

h 13-14 cpS ..pT1XCji ;j l.u,,'lPCji C£ 82a ,,2.. ru at 8:>a 21 : 3 these are two closely related ideas. and so: "painfully destructive." h 14 &v ..~lou TUyxcivE1V c£ Poetics 1453a 4-6. The importance of this phrase in the deftnition becomes clear as the chapter develops. The adjective also enters into the: definition of indignation; c£ 86b 9-x6.

_,.LV

While Cope's ohservation (pp. 94-95) is h 14-Ij 3 xiv ... correct ("the conception of general benevolence and love and duty to our fellow creature is of modern and Christian origins and finds no place in Aristotle's Ethicol System. . . . the limitation of pity to those sufferings to which we ourselves or our friends are exposed ascribes a selfishness to the emotion which seems not necessarily to belong to' it"; see also Schadewalt. 13If[, and Gomme. on Thucyd. 3.40.3). I am not certain that s~hness can be drawn from the text here. It seems more reasonable to see at work here an idea found in the Poetks whicll became popular in the fourth century; see. e.g .• Snell. pp. 246-52. and Dover. pp. 201-203. We read ill the Poetics 1452b 38 - 1453' I that the plot snitable to tragedy should be one which responds to man', sense of kindly sentiment for his fellow-man. sense of pity. and fear: 9"la.0eamo•• fl ....... rpo{J.erl.. This philantbropia ("ordinary sympathy." as Else, p. 364, calls it; c£ Stanford, pp. 26-27) is the compassion for oth"" aroused in man because of his sense of common humanity and fellowship with men. I tltink that there is a fine expression of what I mean in Cyrus' rellection. in Herod. I.86.6, or again in the words of Theseus to Oedipus, in Sophocles, Oedipus at C%nnus 566-568: "For I koow full well that I am a man and that my portion of tomorrow is no larger than yours." In general, just as tltis idea of common fellowship is at work in goa 20 where A. speaks of pity as experienced by the young. so, also, I believe it to be present here when A. says that we pity that Wldeserved suffering in others which we think that we ourselves or our friends could suffer. Unless we are able to see such suffering as sometlting which we, too, can suffer by reason of our cornman humanity shared with others. it is diflicult to comprehend how we can understand or appreciate suffering in another and so be able to "","tend pity to one in the throes of it. There must be this element of selfregard in pity (as there is in fear) in order that the emotion may be what it is primarily (as opposed to fear): other-regarding. On I",U.Oewno. in the Poetics, cf. Else, pp. 368-'7I; Lucas, p. 142; or Poblenz, 53/[ Pohlenz' description of philanthropy, p. 59, is somewhat to my point: "It is simply the feeling of intimate unity with our fellow man. It is more comprehensive than eleos since tltis has to do with our fellow man as suffering; and yet it is indeed a

138

ARISTOTLE, 'RBBToruc' 11

natural instinct out of which comes the fellow-feeling with our fellow man."

""'1"

il"
b IS.

8sb 21

the distress of the exchange

1 ").'1"(OV'P..1"'Y'''' Cpo 82a2.S; another instance (cf. 8Sb 13 : z) of the relationship between pity and fear. The clause is an important addition, namely, that the other person's destructive evil is seen as an evil proximately threatening the one who is to experience pity. Its importance becomes clear at 86a 27 - 86b 1, and cf. 86a 24-25. z liij).ov ytltp . . • tiv"y>C'I sc. AnI. We begin here the analysis of the division lXO.TB, with an explanation (to b 24) of conditions which must be realized in the person who experiences pity.

b 16 :

,,,ii,

"'O"N"''''' at.... The verb (cp. A 4, S9b 34-35; 6, 62b 22; 7, 6sb 12; 13, 74a 8; IS, 76b I) states more finnly the necessity that one actually b. (e.g., its use at b 22) this kind of person. On 010, with the infinitive, see S. 2497. The phrase TO.oVTO, 010, occurs again at b 18, b 24.

b 17 6,."pxE'V

""'1"

1 il ..6...ilv il "
b 18 :

b I!}-20 01 ... ti,.O)"")'cI....~ the second perfect with middle force: "those totally ruined"; cpo 83a 3-S; another instance of the relation between pity and fear. b 20

o6liev... a!.......... '

"for they believe that further suJfering is beyond

them." b 21 6,..p."Ii..,I'-""cLV A glance at A S on eudaemonia, or the oudine of that chapter (COMMBNTARY I 103), readily explains why those who d,ink theD1Selves to be enjoying an excess of it would easily become hybristic or, as A. specifies their attitude (ssb 22-24), completely secure and self-confident. On hybris as met in B 2, see 7Sb 14 - IS : 3. There it was seen primarily as an aa, but we cannot forget that as part of tl.t.r.,~la it denotes an attiIIlJ.. In our present passage A. appears to have in mind the attitude and feelings which are at the root of the act (e.g., 8sb 31: b v(i~.C1Tm1j a.aOla••) aud which make it possible to speak of an aa of hybris, as is constandy done. Lattimore, pp. 2.3-24, points to the various meanings of hybris as an aa, but questions the claim "that the Grew knew and described such punishable pride in its pattern by the master-name hybris." Yet Solon 3.8 (in Diehl & Beuder) speaking of the hybris of the Athenians. as leading

85b 26

COMMBNTARY

139

to injustice is speaking of an attitude, not an act. So, too, it would seem, is Theognis 151-152 saying that god gives hybris to the man about to be destroyed, or Aeschylus describing it at Persae 821 as something "which when it has flowered bears a fruit" (and cpo Eumenides 533-534, Agamem.wn 763-'766, Petsae '708-831). It is the attitude and spirit of going to excess, of excessive pride, arrogance, insolence, recognized in Agamemnon (see Robertson), in Creon of Sophocles' Antigone, and Ajax (e.g., 758-777) in his Ajax. This attitude is recognizable enough to fonn the substance of the brief note on the concept in PW, S. IX (1897).

b 22-23 El ymp ••. "IIXDv A glance at A 5 with its sum of external and internal goods which constitute .iida'/J""ta makes it obvious that those who believe themselves abundantly favored with it (.mse ...da'/Jo••r.) do not think themselves capable of meeting misfortune. On the contrary, they view their life as da'PaU<1TaTO~ & Plo~ (60b 28£), a life in which TO /J~ bM.. XBa8a. "a8.r. (8sb 23) is assured. Eudaemonia is atlTae"Bla C{JJij~ (60b I4£). But aUTae"..a makes life desirable and wanting in nothing (EN I097b I4- IS), a life, in the words of 60b 15, & /JBTa da'PalBla~ f/~'f1TO~. The attitude of mind subsequent upon such a view is well described at 8sb 21: 1JPeICoIJf1W. b 22 &ij>.av 3.., ",d sc. dijlo. lin "al (ofo.Ta• .maeXB..): "it is clear that they also believe suffering any evil an impossibility."

b 23-24 ~ ..a ..wv ckyll8&iv TOUTO refers back to (b 23) TO /J~' .. "aH.' and governs the partitive genitive. It should be clear from the explan.tion of dra8•• in A 6 that freedom from experiencing evil is a good. b 24 .t..l &£

We begin here an enumeration of those who feel pity.

This is, as the TS" "at indicates, a b 24-25 at u ... &......... ouya...~ single experience of both' Wldergoing a painful event and coming through it successfully, an experience which makes one sensitive to the =merited suffering of .nother. What Cope, p. 96, has in mind in relating this to B 5, 83' 27-28 is unclear, particularly in view of the fact that il'1Av8.TB~ BI~ Ta dBwa does not signify that the individuals have suffered in the experience as they do here (e.g., "",,o.8.TB~). Furthermore, the action at 83a 27-28 is • repeated ("oUd",~) .ction, and if suffering .t any time were part of the experience, it is difficult to understand how 8aeao~ would be the response to it since 8deao~ is the expectation of the .bsence or remoteness of the fearful (83a I7-I9). 'Pea.... in the sense of the adjective b 26 cppav.iv . • • ~"".LpIIlV at 63a 17, 64b 12; on 'Peo''1a,~ c£ definition at A 9, 66b 2~22. The importance of experience in the development of this kind of practical wisdom is explained at EN II42' II-I8. Both the practical wisdom and the experience make one aware of the possibility of undeserved misfortune in one's life.

8sb

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

'40

]I

b 27 : 1 &EoAO..EpO' fLii>.Aov i.e., "overly timid"; on the use of ,UI;AAOV with the comparative see 64b 1-2, or Kiihner, Blass, & Gerth, I1.1.349b 6c, Cope, pp. 96-97, meaning (2). The person who is excessivdy fearful is deficient in confidence and is called a coward; c£ EN IlIsa 34 - IlI6a 3, 68b 18 : l. 2 e}My .....o. In the context, a. Bonitz, ltu/ex, notes, it is the one who is .v Aoy,C6,.."0,, one good at calculating, and, so, prudent, circumspect. This reason certainly applies to the "'."'aw.v,....', of whom it is characteristic that they are good in making judgments (EN I094b 23 - 109sa 2), questionably to da6 ....i', dBlA6ueo,. Cpo dAOyurra at b 30, 32.

b 28-29 a.6'ro\j ... "'''Oft "for these are one's own and are able ..."; see, e.g., 8sb IS, 18: ~OW aVTo;; T"a, which explains, I believe, A.'s use of the singular (av..oii) here; i.e., yo..., etc. fall into the category TOW aVTO;; Tl.a. The singular is questioned by Spengd, p. 234 (aV~oii); on the matter in general, see II4a 2S-26, 8Cia 1.7 : 2. b 29 dp1JfL.....

sc.

'P'l,.6,...a """d 'l'6a~,..a II

A""'1ea, 8sb

13-14-

b 2Sf-30 ."... 1Iv..~ "those who are not experiencing fedings of courage"; see Bl,.;, LS, C.rv.3. These fedings are immediately specified as anger (see B 2) and confidence (B s, 83' 13 - 83b 10). Aspects of courage as an absence of fear can be found in both: direcdy in confidence as the opposite of fear; in anger, in the desire for retaliation. See also 83b 7: 6aeeaAiov yae tj6ey7j· b 30 (liMy..............ii....) The parentheses are read by the edd. and ,Cope, but not by Spengd. The neuter represeats an understood Ta na87j, i.e., Ta;;Ta (Ta nd67j), referring back to anger and confidence. lliY'aTa = not heeding, thoughdess ot; apparendy in the sense of o~ Aoy,C6,...0,; C£ 8Sb 27 : 2. Spengd, p. 234, questions the use of dAOy'aTa TOG lao,.bov for these nd67j. I find the doubt a reasonable one for confidence; see, for example, 83a 17-19. On anger, however, we have the statement at A 10, 6ga 4- I believe the point that A. is making is that reason plays a more active role in pity as defmed (e.g., the one who pities "must be such a one as to think that he him.!elf would suffer some evil," 8sb IiS-I7) than it does in anger or confidence, where the reaction of the sense perceptions is more dominant; he says of anger (EN II49b I) that "it follows reason to some extent." b 31 6(3p,....."ij &,CI8taE' C£ 8sb ,u; on d,a8l1as, C£ 7Da 2 : 1. This attitude, which is described at 8sb 21-24, obviously excludes all thought of experiencing any serious harm. b 31-32 (x..l .....,) The parentheses followed by a comma or no punctuation are read by the edd. and Cope, but not by Sponge!. ,

800 2

COMMBNTARY

141

b 32 •.. "da.aOed T.). Q>.).' 01 p..T"~U ToU","", See asb 34. This is the reading of all the codd. at this place. It is also the reading of Dufour, Tovar, Ross, Sponge!, Cope, who punctuate with a comma, colon, or period after TO~TOW. The phrase dll' 01 pna." T.VTOW read here makes sense in itscl£ Moreover, taken as an integral part of the whole sentence8sb 29-34: "ai .1 ... ndO•• , it permits the sentence to read intelIigendy. On the other hand, put at the end of the next classification 8sb 32-34: pf}T' cnJ ••• 01>0.1'1' ndO•• , where Roemer and Kassel locate it, it makes for far more sense, I believe, although I can give no reason, nor does anyone else, for the dislocation (if indeed there is one) in the codd. The contrast in this single sentence, 8Sb 29-34, is between two emotions, inrmoderate courage (e.g., anger, selfconJidence, hybris which is excessive and irrational self-confidence) and excessive fear. It is possible to see midpoint between them: the experiencing of reasonable courage and fear which permits the person to see the possibility of suJfering misfortune and so being capable of pity. This, in fact, is said for fear at 800 27-29. On the other hand, if we read our phrase where it is found in the codd., it refers only to immoderate courage, specifically its examples: anger self-confidence, hybris. b 33-34 oU Y"'p ... " ..0.. Kassel alone includes this within paren-

a

theses without any punctuation before it. On the idea in the sentence, cpo 800 22-24: Tel ;e~a.pov.

rae ...

b 33 : 1 clX"E1fA.''lYp.£vO' strongly enforces the 'PoPODP"" u'P0dea, i.e., they are driven out of their senses by the fear; see Euripides, Medea 8. orO ••• " .. "becawe of their:. preoccupation with their own emotion"; see LS, slpl, C.N.6. Cope, pp. 97-98, analyzes the expression in terms of neo,. b 34 otxcI", " ..0••• ti)J;' 01 p.ET,,~u '\"eN","", I would read eLll' ... TOOT"'" here with Roemer, Kassel; for the reasons see Bsh 32. TQ,n"JV would then refer to the two major emotions mentioned: courage and fear.

,. 5....

e..

b 3S : 1 'tcdv cln•• b«.w On the word, see 7& I3 : 2; recognizing that there are good men, one acknowledges thzt there are men unworthy of their suJfering and so one can experience pity. The genitive is partitive. 2 p.'15lv.. Otop.EVO~ sc. .lva. b."""i; see Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 4.1I.2S on Timon of Athens: "ut odium ... in hominum universum genus, quod accepimus de Timone, qui p.advOem"., appellatur." Ixll oIl....,~ C£ LS, l;em B. 2: "and generally speaking indeed (men feel pity) whenever one is so disposed that ..."

8Cia 1

a 2 : 1 ...olcoin.. i.e., "axel ¢aeT",el 'ill~"'1ed (8sb 13). dvap...,aOij.a. T••a;;Ta is the side of the coin set forth in Bsh 14-IS, see Sophocles, DC

s60-S68.

ARISTOTLB, 'RHBTORIC' II

86a 6

z il cN...p il ....." is the reading of three edd., Spengd, Cope. Tovar reads aVT TOO.. On the expression see 78& 32-33. a 3 : 1 o."[,,," y",,01..8... "or to expect that they would happen." Richards, p. "09, wants either av or y6Vlj17Ba8a,; but c£ S. 1868 and cpo 1991. Cope, p. 99, discusses the meaning of .]",1, and at I 65 the construction here. z cN...p il ....." ..6 ..oii the reading of three edd., Spengd. Kassd reads c!aVTq;; Cope: aVTrp; Ross: I} TOO•.

a 4 : 1 Il>~... dplI..... "well, then, the disposition of those who pity has been set forth." z cl 8' We begin here the second division: nola iA....d (8sb I2). a S.J? CI....... q6v........ We have here a division of those things which men pity, and from what A. says it is based on the definition: namely, "a"d cpa ..&,..va cp9ae..."a I} Av""!ed, 8sb I3-14- Despite the disagreement about the statement here - e.g., Spengd, p. 235 - it seems to be fairly straightforward: (I) 8aa ..... •• iA ....d is nothing but a statement of the definition of the kind of evil that arouses pity; (2) "al Gaa ava'eBTIHd i. one specification of the evil; (3) "al 817"" ... l;COvT"" is a second specification. Thus we have two kinds of evil: (a) evils which are ruinous; (b) those which are substantial and due to chance. "For all destructive evils which are painful and distressing arowe pity, both those that are ruinous, and those, provided they are substantial, for which chance is the cause." In what follows A. goes on to exemplify the destructive at 86a 7-9 and those caused by chance at 86a 9-12. From Victorius' comment on dva'e"""d compared with cp6ae""'Xrl, he would agree in part with the interpretation offered here - e.g., ",9"11"'"d ... "tantum ilia [mala] esse, quae interitum alferrent"; dva
as

AUn1JpOw x.zl6&uv1Jpo.v Victorius and Schrader (pp. 3II-12) refer the first to mental, the second to bodily, pain. But Cope, pp. 99£, shows that each word can denote both. Certainly in the definition of fear (ltlm] ...., I} Taeax~ l" cpa.Taala" 82:1 21), Atlm] cannot be confined to the body alone. Nor do I agree with Cope, p. 100, that the evils mentioned here are "evils affecting the body alone" (Cope refers to Bipontine #8; he may mean #9). There are no grounds, however, for excluding """'7ew. "al &a""'1ew. from ##9, 10, II (86a 7-16). Moreover, the evils mentioned therein can be

both physical and mental; cpo BSh 13 : 3. Kassd alone secludes; in this he would agree with a 6 q>8C1p""'" Vahlen ("Kritik arist. Schriften," II6).

86a 13

143

COMMBNTARY

-rox1J

C£ A 5, 61b 39 - 62a 12, 69a 32. 68w1)pc\!,tv ",d
Z

a 8;

I

,dxlll'

Cpo A X2, '72a 22, 73a X3. Kassd alone reads "al a/".ia,

Ha, uOJpd:r:OJv.

z _xcdcr••~ C£ 85' 24; along with al"la this is usually in prose a term used in l.w for physical assault upon a person. a 9 ; I yijPIl~ IClll V';crOl Cpo A 7, 65a 33-34; 5, 6xb x3-X4, 27-34There is no reason to think that A. has tr.gedy in mind in the instances meotioned in a 9-X3 but they can be found there. z C£ 86a 7 ; 1.

-rox1J

a 10 C\i ..rfJpaTo~, 6xb x5-26 (opposites of daBAvsuz, d'=7Ie1a, 86a II). How chance may be the cause of these misfortunes is explained in part at 6x b 39ff. where we are told that good fortune iudf (61lTVxla) is owed simply to the causality of chance which, as presented, is indefinite, arbitrary, and beyond human control; c£ 6.3a 3 ; z. While chance may be the cause of these misfortunes, A. is aware that they may also be the effect of voluntary human action and so not ,u....d; see, e.g., EN IIx4a 21-30 where he considers a..BAv..a, ~ela, and by inxplication al"xo~.

C£ 7Xa

II with which cpo EN XI26b 25-28.

"a...w

IClll..o •.• CN!,j3ijvlll sc. "al TO T. avp(#i.a, 8Bw "'eo";;"..... (leTTl IlA....".). leTTl AA.... is to be understood with the following two sentences. The experience, as Victorius notes, was th.t of Ariadne in Catullus 64.132ff. On the force of "'eo";;"" c£ 78a 33. z .n.ckpJ;lll is the reading accepted by the edd. from a suggestion by Vahlen (''Kritik arist. Schriften," II7) who refers to 860 "7 (,,6) and 86b 3". All the codd. read "'e~a, as do Spengd (but he considers Vahlen correct), and Cope, who interprets with "e~a" "when an ill results from what might naturally have been expected to lead to good."

a 12 ; I

.w

a X3 ,.....ov8.....~ genitive absolute; on the construction, see S. 2073'; for a contrary view c£ Richards, p. x09. Cope, pp. 101£, discusses it. Ordinarily with the statement in the articular infinitive (TO .•• draB ••) one would expect the dative.

144

ARISTO'ILE, 'ltHBTORJC' II

86a

20

a 14 : 1 4,o",d8E' There is no assurance as to which Diopeithes this is. A likely candidate is the general who led a contingent of cleruchs to the 'I'hracian Chersonese (a military colony in fact which brought the Athenians into conflict in the area with Philip), probably in the years 343/342. and is spoken of in two speeches of Demosthenes', On the Chersonese, Phil. 3; see PW, Diopeithes (9), CAB, VI 2SI-54. z T1!t "'IIPU ~"O'u.o1",S If Diopeithes is correctly identified above, the king would be Artaxerxes III (3S8-338 B.C.), and the gifts possibly were sent during or after the successful resistance of Perinthus and BY2antium to Philip, 340-339 B.C. a IS : 61....).

J

xed TO ...

Z

YEVop.oivow

sc.

(".,,8"i,,8a.,

dyaDw•.

C£ CiIa 17 : .; cpo 61b 9, 72b 2S.

a 16 ILmll.llUO"v a 17 .... ' oIS

The article serves both infinitives

On hrl c£ BSb 13 : 3.

a 18 : 1 ....uS ... yvwplp.OI>S We begin here the fino! division: those who are pitied. The use of ~. here is a prohlem. A more detailed explanation is given at 86a 24-2S. HoweveI, ifwe read as all the edd. do at 86024,<0~ "de> In lA60v"w, then the .... is a connective with "at ~otl, opolov, at 860 2S. If at 860 24 we read with all the codd., h. lA80ww, the n is connective with h. lAov",.. To argue that it stand alone makes sense only if we assume that the second idea present in A.'s mind is ""expressed; c£ Kiihner, Blass, & Gerth, II.2.S20.4). On ","eipov, (acquaintances) c£ 84b 17; it is not used as at A IS, 760 8. Spongel, pp. 235£, points to !socrates, The Team of Horses 48 for examples of other persons who receive pity. z obceLOnj'r' On the dative, see S. 1516. i.e., those closely related to them. sc. T' """."Da.. That is to say that they fear for them; c£ 82a 2I-2S. Ross alone encloses 86a 19-25 ("eel . .. •'TO') in parentheses. In a way this makes for a closeI articulation between 860 17, 1).80v", ~i ~o,;, n, and 86a 25, "at ~01l, .polov,
J

...n."O\IS

Z "'Ept ..noUS p.U.).OV'rIlS

a 20 vAf/oII.rtS The story of Psammetichus III (?S26-S2S), son of Arnasis (S69-?S26) and king of Egypt, is told in Herodotus 3.14, who calis him Psammenitus. The point of the story is indicated at both 86a 18-19 (a. p~ . . . lxov"..) and 860 22-:'3 (~o~o pe. . .. "iov): P,ammetichus expeIienced fear and dread for his ,on on his way to death, compassion and pity for his dear friend reduced to begging. The first pnnis~ent, death,

86a 24

COMMBNTARY

145

for one very closely rdated to him was -rd de..d., a thing that expelled pity, something, as he told Cambyses, the Persian king (529-522 B.C.), beyond tears: ",'C", ,,,,,,,I iJ dlne d.a"lat... (3.I,PO). His noble friend is not a close rdation, and while Psamrnetichus sees his disaster as possible for himself and so to be feared, his emotional response is pity not fear. A. in giving us the father (Amasis) for the son has made a mistake, and Spengel, p. 236, cites similar ones. a

2.1

n:POO'ClL't'oUv't'l

"beggiog," as the story told by Herodotus demands.

a 22 5E.~Ov a synonym for TO
In the light of the use of this word at A I, 55a 21; 7, a 24 XP>\"'fLOV 65b 8; 9, 66b 4-7, I think that A. ha, in mind the way in which the dreadful can just as readily evoke fear as pity, and can be so used. For ......lip Radt, "Rberorik," on good grounds suggests "the opponent." is the reading of all the codd. All the a 24-25 k. a..oG"." ... lIv",o~ edd., however, read Vahlen's conjecture: <0'; yae> in eleovaw . . . 8no,. Cope, Freese do not read it; nor does Spengel, who nonetheless, agrees with it. See 86a 18 : 1. With Vablen's conjecture our clause is rdated to the Psarnmetichus example at a 20-22. For example, A. at a 22-24 gives an explanation for the example, and our clause is a further statement which gives the ground for the explanation. This, therefore, means that the clause at 86a "'5 ("a! TO,), ",..otov, l ••ova..) is joined with 860 18 (U.oval dll TOV, ..s). Vablen (uKritik arist. Schriften," II7E) gives his reasons. (I) To read without unites our clause to 86a 18 (sABoDa, 88 TOo6, Te): since our clause is not

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' II

86a 24

a new idea this is not acceptable. (2) To interpret the codd. as Victorius does (so, too, Cope, p. 1"4) gives only half the definition of pity, e.g., "further men pity when the evil is near themsdves." (3) To translate "men experience pity when the dreadful is near themsdves" encounters two difficulties: the question is not when but whom men pity; moreover, this statement is at odds with 8sb 32-33, 86a 28--29, 82b 26-27, 900 21-22, and especially with 86a 22--23. Vahlen's point is that the whole passage (86a 18-29) has to do with those whom men pity and that our clause as found in the codd. does not contribute to this idea. His conjecture (a substantial one as he admits) and his explanation are quite attractive and tie in very well with the Psammetichus statement. However, a few comments are called for. If we read with the codd. the statement is not as meaningless as suggested - even granting that the purpose of the whole passage is: those whom men pity. For it gives us the second part of the definition of pity presented at 8sb 13-19: narndy, the need to see the destructive evil as possible for onesdf (and so fearful) if one is to be able to pity anyone. Without this dement there i. no pity, as A. says in dfect at 8Sb 19-24. Thus it is possible to join 86a 16 (~A.o;;a. d~ ToV~ TO) with 86a 24 (iT' lA_oVa••), and the new idea (if such is indeed necessary) is: for men to pity anyone they must see the evil as do.e to themselves. Vahlen's reading diminishes an idea necessary to the experience of pity for A. Whether this idea correcdy represents the nature of pity (ef. 85b 14-IS) A. does insist dIat the person who experiences the emotion must consider that he can suffer the same evil and that it is near to him. Furthermore, as the fearfuI i. explained at 82a 21-2S, that evil must be a potential
'''''e01Jn,,,''

.""rnA""',..••••.

86a 32

147

COMMBNTAlIY

certain. Td 6...6. is interpreted as a synonym for Td "",(Jee6. in chap. 14 of the Poetics and could be so taken when it appears in the chapter on f= in the Rhetoric. But the g=1 interpretacion of the passages is "horror" at 8334, 19 and "danger" at a 27; see 86& 22. a 25 '
ru

a 27 : 1 p.iD.lov tpcdv."CI' "it appears more likely." subject of ~""e~a" understand Ta 6...<£ or Ta (c£ 86a 34). On the statement

"a""

hex., see 84ia 24-25: in such instances the probability that the one pitying may experience the same is far stronger, and so the pity for the othex, e.g., 86a 29-30 (."",l, ... BA....d). Z Kul cttJ'tc{l "at is intensive and adverbial; the shift in person has frequendy been seen, e.g., trom third person plural to first plural (at 81a 14, IS, 26, 8lb 30) and from plural to singular as hexe (see 84a 25-26).

a 28 : 1 iv"ClG8C1 C£ Cila 20. C£ bb 2(j...27. 2 &cp' eN"..." a 29-30 .,,01 ...•,,"'v as seen in Poetics 1453b t8,

C£ 8e1a 27 : " 8e1a 24-25. "d8'1 = sufferings, 1454& 13.

20,

a 30-32 ,
148

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' 11

86b I

contribute to the effect by their bearing, voice, dress [reading luSiiu,; see 86a 33), and by and large by their dramatic manner are more pitied." Then the reason given at 86a 34-3S for this statement relates the protasis and apodosis of the sentence at 86a 29-34 (.",1 ... • lva,) in a logical and reasoned way, and the statement at 860 29-3S is consistent with what follows to the end of the chapter. See 86a 34. a 33 t"eij,,' is the reading of three edd., Spengd; cod. F reads Au8ijT. as does Tovar; cod. A, alu8tju•• ; Cope, iuB1ju•• ; Kassd, aluBtju•• (which I would translate "by a display of feeling"). For a discussion of. 32-33, see Vahlen, Beitrag., pp. 27007I. a 34 - 86b 8 iyyU~... 1t..eou~ In the reading and punctuation of these lines, Roemer, Dufour, Tovar are in agreement. Changes in both will be found in Ross, Kassd, Spengd, Cope. They will be indicated when they occur. ycip 1to,oii", 'Pcd"."e .., ..0 XIIXen. 1tpO ..• ~,."" ij .:.~ "For they make the misfortune appear near, setting it before our eyes as something about to happen or as just past." All the codd. read TO "a,,0., as do Ross, Kassel, Spengd, Cope. The other edd. seclude it. I do not agree with Roemer's reason for the seclusion. Consequendy, I accept the reading of /Jillo. - y.yov6~ with Kassel, Spengd, Cope, not the plural fonns read by Roemer, Dufour, Tovar, Ross. The punctuation found in all the edd. (save Kassd), Spengd, Cope is intdligent and obviates the need for Kassd's parentheses, e.g., (Syytl~ ... Y"'ovcl~). Ross encloses a 34 - b I in parentheses, 'e.g., (Syy1l~ ...•" .... 6nea).

a 34-35

tyyU~

YOT""cI~.

a 34 1tpO 6"j.lIi....", 1to,oiiv...~ Por the idea, see r II, ub 22 - 12a 9; and cpo r 2, oSb 12.; 10, lob 33-36. See also Poetics I455a 2.2-34 (cp. I453b 1-6), passages which may have contributed to the common interpretation of our 860 32-34 (.way",! ... ,Iva.) but which are entirdy coDSonant with the interpretation offered at 86a 32.. Cope, pp. 105-106, cites Cicero, Quintilian on the idea.

a 35 x ..1 ...ci YOT"".;.,... is the reading of Ross, Kassd, Cope; Spengd, p. 2.38, accepts it in a note to the passage. The other edd. read without the article. In the sentence at 86a 35 - b 4, as he further illustrates his subject, A. shifts from the subject of this division (people who are pitied) to things which arouse pity (i.e., 860 4-16).

8tlb I : I

6,ci "'cxxt..n. a common periphrasis for Taxi"". 6tci ...oii'l"O preceded by a colon or period is the reading of four edd., Spengd. Ross uses a comma followed by <> dId TOVTO. Cope reads with cod. F d.d TO «vT6 and makes it part of the preceding sentence. 2

COMMENTARY

149

b 2 ""l ..ci crij",i.. " .. I ..ci~ "pci~'4; is the reading of all the codd., SP!'llgel, Cope, and none of the edd. Roemer, Dufour, Tovar, Ross transpose "al Td, "I1dE.. , to b 3 before ,,"l Myov, with Thurot. Kassel simply secludes the phrase. The reason given by Thurot ("Observations critiques [I)," 307) is that BaOijTa, refers to ""J,."a not to "~cl<.,, which would be more appropriately linked with Myov" an idea closer to "ecl<.". This is re:lsonable, but ,,"i iJua TO''''Ta, even though coordinated with saOijTa" can refer to more than clothing and could include actions; at A 9, 67b 32, 66b 27-29, 8428, we find leYa joined with ""J,..'a (on the passages, see "Ef/,..iov," 391-92). b 3 /lOll ..DuN.... " ..I ).oyou~ See preceding note; this is the reading of the codd. which I would accept with Spengel, Cope. /Jaa TO''''Ta would appear to mean "all other such things like ""J,..'a and "ed'."," and li"a
",d

"ci).,.........

b 4-S "Ill D.,.""", sc. I"T" "and most pitiable is it when those caught up in such crises act nobly." b 6 : 1 Ii,."",.... ycip '~ ••• /Iv....~ ••. " ..l'l'Il'''o"w.... On the use of ." with the genitive absolute expressing cause, see S. 2086d. The two clauses give the reason for a,d TO lyyV, ",,,/••<18a•.

CHAPTER 9

I . General Introduction: 86b 9 - 87 a S 1.

86b 9-12

2.

86b 12-16

a definition of indiguation w.tion between pity and indignation

3. 86b 16-25

relations among envy, pity, indignation, fear

4. 86b 25-33

indignation, pity viewed in their effects

5. 86b 33 - 8,. 3

wation between envy and malice

6. 8,. 3-5

summary

II . Development: 87a 6 - 87h 15 T.

87.6-13

division, together with a restatement

of tbe dc6mtion" given at 86b 1D-12 those at wbom men become indignant in the course of wbich discussion some things which cause: indignation are mentioned; cf. 87b 3: "al dui ~l

or,

the attitude of those who experience the emotion (a) 87b ]-4 (b) 87b 4-'5

summation and ttaDsitiOll those who experience the emotion

III· General Summary and Conclusion: 87h IS-20

: 1 fUiA ....... p.lv answered by 86h 16: ME ... d': "On the one hand, what is called indignation is ahove all the antithesis of pity.... on the other hand, envy would also appear to he opposed ..." Indignation, not envy, is the real,opposite to pity. However, as is seen in chaps. 9-10, hath indignation and envy are considered as emotions which exclude pity. See following note. • v£l'-£criiv Por the infinitive see S. 1987. Tws chapter i. quite different in its structure from those seen thus far. As the ourline indicates, the subject of the chapter and the threefold division is not formally approached until 87a 61£ Instead, a good third of the chapter is spent upon a quasi-definition of indignation together with a discussion on the relation of pity, indignation, envy. At 87a 61£, assuming more or less the presence of a definition

86b 9

AllISTOTLE. 'RHEl'ORIC' 11

s6b

II

in what has preceded, A. devdops the rest of the chapter in the fonn to which we have become accustomed. Whether this structure rellects the uncertainty about this concept which is present in the ethical works (see, e.g., Cope, pp. Il2-13) is another matter. It is true, however, that for any (both words, as here· studied, detailed information on ..,..."a.~ express the same idea) one must tum to the Rhetoric. The brief comments in the ethical works do not diH"er in any substantial way from the explanation of VB".""a.v as we find it in the Rhetoric. It is called .i".."", and is mentioned at EN nosb 1-6, EE 1221a 3, 1233 b IS-26, MM II92b IS-29. From these passages the following common statement can be drawn: indignation is pain felt at the undeserved good fortune of one's neighbor. However, EE (1233 b ISf[) extends the meaning when it identifies indign2tion also as pain for undeserved misfortune (which we know as pity) or as pleasure for deserved good fortune or deserved misfortune (which we learn from Rho/Qric s6b »-31 is the response of the man who is just). In these passages it is further described as a mean state between envy (pain at all good fortune whether deserved or undeserved) and malice (pleasure at all misfortune whether deserved or undeserved). However, in EE the extreme called malice is not mentioned, and the extreme is called more precisdy d7ti)ov,..... There has always been a problem about these two extremes of indignation (envy, malice), and it surfaces in the commentaries on the EN: e.g., Grant, on EN IL7.1S (II08b If[), Gauthier & Jolif, IL1.160-61. In the way he analyzes the two extremes: envy ('1'860.,) - malice (h"xa1e"I
- vi,.."",

vi,..."."

b 10 ...;:. yckp . . • XIIXD",p..yl"L~ The articular infmitive is indirect object to the verb (see S. 1961) whose subject is the articular infinitive , • .\11""aBa •. .• B1l"lIaylal!:. Our phrase is a condensation of 8sb 13-16, such as is found at Top. Iloa 2-3. On h.t, cf. BSb 13 : J. b n Tp6nav ••• i\8DU~ "in a certain sense and arising from the same motal disposition." In other words there ;. a kinship between pity and indignation in which one emotion is complementary to the other in a person, as A. also says in the MM passage. Such a rdation is not presco! between

86b '4

153

COMMBNTARY

pity and envy, or malice. On TqO".O, adverbial, LS II.2, and see 86b 17; on >16.~ see 69a 18 : 3, ssb 30-31. b 12--13 ci"""" ... XP'IGTOU Both pity and indignation are emotions experienced by the good man, as >16.~ Xfl7/lno. would indicate; on xe71aT&~ cf. 80a 30 : 1. See below Sllb 14 : 3.

b 13 : 1 &EL

would seem to imply a .ense of moral obligation, which i. the force Cope finds in the word (cf. 78a 33) and which is strengthened by 86b 14-16: 000"" l'~ •.• ",.Baa.. !u Barrett, p. r65, notes, began to replace Xq~ in denoting need, necessity (although in the fifth century xe~ to some extent was still reserved for moral obligation) until it became dominant and was used to denote various kinds of need. These needs could be, as we find the word used in the New Testament, physical, moral, legal, etc.; cf. Robinson or Bauer, or Gooddl. 3 4yCl~""~ "p.wrOUG' X"xcd~ On nqdTTS" "a"';;,, oJ cf. LS, "edTT.", II; doa';tQJ~ modifies the expression as it does in the next line: "those who undeservedly fare badly ... fare well."

a.,

b 14 : 1 GUV
w

6.

b 14-15 c1I&.xov ycip sc. eaTL If we consider the unjust to be what is unlawful (TO "oed.o,.o.) and unfair (TO a..ao.), EN II29b I, then what is violated here is the law of nature and man which is understood to command that right be done (EN If30b 33-24, "the law commands life in accord with every virtue and forbids life in accord with any vice"). Part of the right is that one receive in accord with one's merits ("aT' dElao): "in matters ofjustice the equal is prim2ri1y that which is proportionate to merit" (ENII58b 30-31; cpo II31a 24-27). when such a law is violated the response of both men and the gods (e.g., 86b IS-III) is indignation. Speaking of the personification ofNerncsis and Aides in Greek mythology, Grant (on EN I1.7.14-15: lI08a 30Jf.) says that they "seem to represent the natural and almost indestructible ideas of justice in the human mind," an instinct in man of what is right. in Homer, Hesiod, Gruber, pp. 65--'72, brie1ly reviews the idea of •• Herodotus; cf. also on justice Gauther & Jolif, II.I 325-28.

,..a,,;

ARISTOTLE. 'RHETORIC' II

154

e...i~

b 15

86b 20

Cpo EE I233b 26.

b 16 SoIl;.,. s' av x,d correlative to 86b 9. The Hat is adverbial: "also"; i.e., as indignation, so too envy, might be considered an opposite to pity, opposite, in &ct, in the same way (TO. aVTO. T~&"O') since it is very close to (cnl•.""v,), even the same as (Hal TatlT"'), indignaQon. b 18 M"'I'" K,d ....P"X.:.S'I~ As we see at MM II92b 25-26, the envious man experiences pain at all good fortune, deserved or not. The fact that .lV"'1 is present in envy also (Hal 6 'P8&.0,) and that its object is good fortune makes it seem like indignation; c£ 86b 18-19, b II-12 (-ro .lvx••a8a•

.. .•~aylal'). 1 cpe6vo~ See B 10; Soaates (in the Memorabili. 3.9.8 of Xenophon) defines envy as we find it here and also in B 10. Z bel ":;"p ..yl'f is the reading of four edd. with cod. A; Kassel, Spengel, Cope read with an equally good tradition and the support of the sclroliast BI, .~aytao. If Roemer, Kassel are correct, the cod. A reading of the edd. ntay be suspect. Both readings give the same meaning. C£ Top. noa

b 19 :

'-4.

b 19-20 ci1.).' ••• av..I;Iou ... 0",,1.... This is what differentiates envy from indignation. The genitives are dependent upon .tl"ea"Iq:. In the very first instance (otl d.a~lov), the diiference of envy trom indignation is clear: the envious man is pained at any good fortune experienced by someone like himselfwhether deserved or undeserved. On TO;; laov "al .,..olov see 87b 22-27, 860 25-26; LS, fao, lb. It is frequendy joined with 8,..010, to denote equality. b 20-22 ..0 U ... ~"cipX.'\I The TO 6A ,...q . .. :nI.l'lato. clause is the subject of the main verb 6••: "The attitude that 110t because something untoward will happen to oneself, but rather because of what happens to one's neighbor must be equally present in caclr and every instance (of indignation and envy)." On the use of ro, see S. II53g, or Gildersleeve, II 579. A. himself gives the meaning to n 'neo. (bad, untoward) at 86b 24: TI 'PaVAo.. I interpret ibraa.. to mean: "any and all the instances" in whiclr one ean speak of the presence of envy (and also indignation). Taking it as Cope, p. no, and others do, "common to all men who have the feeling," does not seem likely; A. is analyzing here the necessary constituents of the two emotions in order to distinguish them trom fear which can easily enter into consideration, as we see at 86b 23-25 (iel•..• e1l"ea~t~), if the other person's good fortune (and also bad fortune) is seen as an imminent personal threat. If it is good fortune, it could be seen as placing the person enjoying it in the class of those at 82b 2-22.

86b 32

COMMBNTAlIY

ISS

b 20 I'i! S·... CI.mji Cpo 87b 22-24: d "86.,,, ... 6,' ......OVl;. Cp.,.7J On with o~x aT' at 88a 34. b 22 ..0 I'tv indignation."

... ..0 li.

,.71 iva T' aVTq;,

cLUd

"in the one instance envy ..., in the other,

the antecedent to its clause of explanation at 86b 24:

b23 'nN.... 6T' amq; ...

b 2.3-24 )'U'"I

0

'
••

C£ 82a 2.1 : J.

On the meaning, see 6za 29 : 2; cpo 78b 7.

....u.....~ "And it is evident that opposite feelings refers to indignation and envy attend indeed upon these emotions." (just mentioned) and quite likely pity, and, from what follows, malice. From 86b 12 to 87" S, in the eIfort to discriminate pity, A. tries to show its difference from indignation, envy, fear, and malice in that order. Here he states that indignation and envy are each accompanied by its own emotional response (i.anla nalhJ) which is diJfereut from the other and from that of pity, and also (s6b 34ff:) from that of malice. b 2S-2.6 ",d '
b 2.7 tv..,,'<""~ b 28 ........ ~.

T.uTo.,

e.g.,

M'."

which is the way opposite to d.~I.".

I"Cllq>OVOU~

As Cicero says (Tuse. Disp. 4.8.18) in the continuation of the citation at 8sb 13 : 2: "nemo eninr parracidae aut proditoris supplicio misericordia comrnovetur." The accusative with the passive verb, A""7J8.i7J, is noted by Cope, p. III; see S. 1S9S. 0

b 29 :

J

•

'<'l""pICl~

as seen at A 6, 63a 26; ro, 68b 2.1. C£ 74b 3 I. C£ Boa 30 : J.

z XP1JcmI~

liEi yd!p ••• '
b 2.9-30

This is a r ....tatement of 86b 27-28

b 31 : J cil"f'Cd libel"CI ill"., refers to: the punishment of wrongdoers, deserved good fortune. At 86b lS-16 we were told that undeserved good fortune is unjust (since justice demands that one receive in accord with one's merit; ,ee 86b I4-IS), and so we can assume that what happens (punishment, good fortune) to someone because he merits it is just. z The good man, the Xe7JaT6, (86b 2.9), of whom A. is speaking in this section; cf. also 80a 30 : I. 0

••

m'."'ij

JAn.,....

J UvelY"1J a,.u;••v 'c. (Td. m••• xi/) z Welp!;CI•.•. au'"i> This statement in indirect discourse is governed by and expresses a future possibility (e.g., I1Y with the aorist (Ta;;Ta), infinitive); cin'e is the subject of the verb VniieEB, Leo, cinse (tlnijeEs) Tq; 0,..1
b 32. :

0

IAn.,...

•

0

iAn.,...

156

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

87" 6

pen.d to one like him could happen to him also." Th. general grounds for such an attitude arc set down at 86a >4-27. namdy. the doseness and affinity: cpo also 8
1

i\O~

3

..aRk..

C£ 86b II. i.... the feelings. emotions. just mentioned from 86b 2.6/f.. i.•.• pity. indignation: sec 86b 25-2.6. 3 ..ei 6' w....... I.. Thes. arc the emotion. which arc described in the following clause: 0 "de ... qllJo>se&,.

b 34 - 87'l 1 6 yeip ... cp8av.p6~ Here. and in what follows to 87" 3 (.•. Xale ...). we have A.'s correction of his statements in EN. MM (the statement in EE is left open by the use of .ww.v/,ov): sec 86b 9 : 3. In stating here that the malicions man and the envious man arc the sarne A. recognizes that the two emotions arc mordy different aspects of the same state of mind. As he goes on to say (87" 1-3). if on. is pained by the presence of something in another (envy). he will necessarily be pleased by its loss (malice). ''The envions man." say. plato (Phileb. 48b). "will b. dearly found rejoicing at the misfortones of his neighbors." b 34 m.x...pt......~ Th. passages concerned with malice have been mentioned in 86b 9 : 3; 'l'6&.0, is taken up in the next chapter. y.yvo~ ....1 ~mtpxOV"<. Since I think that A. wishes to make a distinction at 87" 2. between o-r.eoj".. and qllJoe~ which correspond to· "."vo/'t.rp and .dndexon.. I would interpret our phras.: "for that at whose acquiring and actual possession someone is pained he must necessarily take pleasure in its loss and complete destruction." qllJoea. then. is the ruin of som.thing actually in one's possession (dndexo,), whereas UTie,,"', is the privation of something whidr is still in the process (",,,,&/,"0') of becoming fully possessed and established.

87'l 1

• 2 : 1 ......p>!aE •••• cpOoP'

3

-...u......

a 3 1Ud1....' ..1i

• 5 xp>!a,p.cI a 6 np.......... '"" ~': cpo II4b 27 : z.

See preceding note.

refers hack to "'l"4> (a 1). Cpo 6:Ia 29 : 1•

C£ 86a >4.

If this is answered by anything. it is at a 8: 'l'a••e6v

a 6-"'1 -ric.." ... qav...~ ••hol Again the threefold division whidr we have seen in each chapter. In this chapter. however. as in chap. 2. the people with whom men become indignant and the things which cause the emotion arc combined. A glance. in fact. at the outlines of th~ preceding

COMMENTAlIY

157

chapters reveals that the threefold division is formally followed in only three

instmces. a 8 : 1 cD.Ac.w the other emotions, presumably chaps. Io- II, since envy, spite are not given further notice in this chapter. z elp,! .."""" i.e., 86b 9 - 87a 5.

a 9 01..1 -ni> ..• 06"'PCly.LV "at someone manifestly enjoying undeserved good fortune"; on rpo..,o,..b'P, see 78a 31 : J. a 10 : 1 ..p......ov p.o!v auswered by 1,,01 6i, 87a I6. Z ",iier, "
06 yAp ... v".......crc, The reason for this is given at a 1:>-13 . .. • Ial,), and is groWlded in the fact that ,i,..sa., is the opposite of 11,0, (86b 9-12). On that ground the argument is: if we are indignant with a person for deliberately [virtue is the result of deliberate choice] being good, then we should pity him for being deliberately evil. a 12 0..0' "pity"; on the plural see S. 1004. a

II-I2

(o~di

a 13 :

l ..o6-n.>v i.e., justice, courage, virtue. sc. ",...rrlJa.~ z 4>.lil J .u.o6'«!' ... liwil..., .....o,o6-ro~ C£ A S, 61a 12-24 on wealth; 6Gb 27 on d'VtldpBt as meaning either "power" or flposition·'; 1'ot06is specified by what follows at a 14-16. C£ 87a r5.

TO.'

a 14 .:,~ cbu.....~ £I..dy

C£ 74& 34 : z. ixOVT~ 4ycz8il

is the reading of the codd., the edd. (except Dufour), Spengel, Cope; Dufour reads a conjecture of Roemer's ("Zur Krltik," 504): 0~6' .1 .d 'l'VCIB< 0%0"" ciy08c1. In the phrase Tel rp
a I4-I5 XCII 01 ... qroer..

a 15 06yw. _ _ I xcVJ.o~ C£ A 5, 60b 30-37, and 6Ib 7-14- At 87a I3-16 A. says: ''but a person will become indigoant at wealth and power, and, generally speaking, at all such things of which men of virtue, a. well as those who are endowed with the gifts of nature such as good birth, beauty, and other such gifts, are worthy." This statement of the Greek accepted by the edd. (except Dufour), Spengel, Cope, is clear: men experience indignation at those who fare well because of goods which they do not deserve. Among such goods they include things like wealth, position, and all other such advantages which in their minds only the morally good, as well as those endowed with natural goods, deserve. Why those endowed with natutal gifts should deserve other c!ya6cl is questionable and is questioned. Thus

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC'

I[

Cope (pp. II3£) rejects the above and accepts with qualification the interpretation of Victorius. Victorius understands our statement to mean that men are not indignant at those who possess natural goods and fare well because of them. In such instances envy might be possible, but not indignation. This is an interpretation which is quite reasonable and understandable. Ostensibly, however, it is accepted only by Dufuur among the edd. who reads a conjecture of Roemer's: 01 dya601 o~a' (sc. ••,...mlas. TOOTO~ from a 12) el Ta qnla.. lxova.. dra6a. If we ore to accept Victorius and Cope, the text, as far as I can see, must be altered in a way similar to that of Roemer. On the other hand, it is possible that A. may very well mean what is obviously said in the Greek: namely, that men accept the fact that those who possess natural goods are worthy, as the morally good are, of such dya6d which bring with them success, i.e., .w.eayia, and so do not experience indignation with such men as they do not with the morally good. There may be a hint at such an attitude among men as A. knew them in the statement on .~Tvx[a at A S, 6rb 39 - 62a 12 and the observation at 88b 27-28 together with 88b 3.-'7. From A S we know that the ,~vXoVvrs, are those who possess natural goods, e.g., 62a 3: Haw. (sc. dra6...) 1j qnla.,. From 88b 27-28 we learn that men despise the .tlTvxo;;ne, for not having the other draM which are held in honor and which A. specifies together with their possessors (good men) at 88b 3-'7. If men despise these people for not having these other dya6d, it would appear that men in general expect them to have them and so would not be indignant if they do possess them. This brings us back to the disputed statement: it is not totally unreasonable to think that A. could mean that those endowed with natural goods are deserving Qike the morally good) of 'other dyaM. a 16 : J md S' is the reading of four edd., Spengel, Cope. Kassel reads l"..alj ae. In a note to the passage, Sponge!, p. 240, speaks of our phrase as one used in transition to a new division and refers to instances in chaps. s (82b 4), 6 (843 24), 8 (860 29), 2 (78b 10, mistakenly called I), 10 (88a 13). The following do not appear to me to be correct: 8, 2, 10. The instance in 2 is change to a new idea, not a new division. 2 .... clpxlliov .yyU~ .., "the long established appears to be s0mething aIrin to the natural." lyyo, governs TO;; 'Poas. in which the article (5. IIS3g) specifies the word: "the 'natural,'" i.e., long-established possession appears the same as possession by nature. A. used a similar type of orgument with regard to habit and nature, at, e.g., A II, 703 6-9: 8,..0.0. yde Tt TO 160,

Tii qnla..; c£

70Il 6 : J, 70Il 7.

a 17 'ToiC; ... qouaLv The dative is governed by vepsuiiv. TQV1'O, i.e., an identical good, no matter what it is. From what follows. these goods are not natural. goods.

COMMBNTARY

159

a 19 'ni'w ",cUe.. ICed 6,elI ytvo~ sc. mowom",.: "those of established and inherited wealth"; c£ B 16, 9Ia 15-19. a 20-21 c\I'0u..~ .....o,eN.....,.

sc. Avno6a••, and so cause indignation.

i.e., government officials (of whom one a 20 c!pXov.....~ xed 6wci(l.EVO' group was called "archous") and those with power or position of any sort. a 21 : I noAucpW>L Kul oiIu""o, C£ A 5, 6Ib 35-38 and 60b 38 6Ia II. "al dno6. ,...A: "and anything whatsoever of the same sort." The principle at work in this section is the newness of the possessed good (cp. 8')a 17-20: Ad•.•. ywo, with B')a 23-25: Hal ... cUl",.) as the cawe of the indignation, i.e., civic office, power, abundance of friends, a good 6unily. It is possible to see the principle realized in the first three, with di1IicuIty in the

last.

z xed .au..O' apxOVTE~

a 23 : I Z

recendy acquired riches they have wed the money (d.a ~~. ,.loW..) to acquire political office in the State. It illustrates 87a 21£

a 25 01 pkI .•. 01 6'

"the latter" (those in long possession of the good) ... "the former"; c£ 62a 36-37-

a 26-27 ..0 yellp ••• ixE'"

See the comment at 87a 16 : z on this explanation of the rea.on given at a 25: "Por that which appears to have been always as it is now seems to be the reality, with the result that recent possessors do not seem to possess what is their own." One should compare with this statement that atA 7, 6Sb 14-16 ("al il ... do"•••). On cU'18c!, as "the real," seeA 4, 59b 4; 7, 64b 9; 13. 74b I; Bxb 19-20. WithcllcnBunderstand do"o6a •• the indicative stating the actual result. Cope. p. II5. has a note on the difference between cpal••aBa. and do"••••

a 28: I

..oii 'NJtmo~

"any chance person"; c£ LS. A.2.b.

z ei"uMylca... ..o elIpl'o....ov i.e.. there must be some rdation between the good and the possessor so that a proportion is preserved. and drw an appropriateness and fitness in the possession of the particular good; on depO~TO' see 6]a 2B. Ross alone reads n ae/JOTIo. with Richards. p. 109.

a 29 liPI'o....E'

Cpo the we at A 15. 76b 140 17.

160

ARISTOTLB, 'RHBTORIC' II

a 30 : 1 &"''P.pOVT~ "distinguished," as used at A S, 61a 13, 'S; on the idea cf. r II, I2b z'7-z8, or Alcibiades speaking of the marriage ofhis father, Isccratcs, The Team of Horses 3I. 2 .u.ouCJIo.~ The reading of four edd., Spenge!. Kassel, Cope read nhtn-oiiuw; cf. 87" 19. a 31-32 WyWECJLV iiv oW •.. VEIUCJ"IITOV "it follows that [ow] it is a cause of indignation if a man, through he be morally good, obtains a good not appropriate to him." With a few minor differences the edd. agree on the reading and punctuation, e.g., Ross, Kassd, Spengd punctuate with • oJ. begins the apodosis to colon after BVy••iuw. This is acceptable since 87" z7ff., Hal br.1 (and .ince) ... ; cpo Vahlen, ''Kritik arist. Schriften," II9. I do not understand Cope's period after eiJySViUIV, but see his note, p. 116; Kassd, Cope read leW oJ..

a.

a 32 K,d <...0> To" ij......... a conjecture of Ross's read also by Kassel. An articu1ar infinitive •.• d.p",cufJ"'ITB" as the subject of an understood BUTI """<1"'ITO' seems more reasonable than the accusative and infinitive as object.

a 33: I cil'.q"CJ~"lJTEiv C£ Iba 18 : z. 2 !£cu'_II p.tv oW "particularly '0," answered by 87b I: .1 ~. ,..i!. Cope's note, pp. II6-18, on oJ. should be compared with Denniston, pp. 47<>-79· 3 "oU~ Ov • • • "particu1arly so when they are engaged in one and the same matter." The phrase is in explanatory apposition with Td. 1ITTOJ ... a,.",IUfJ"'ITB'V, i.e., inferiors contending with their superiors in the very thing

,..A.

which defines their inferiority. Kassel alone encloses this in parentheses, punctuating with a comma at the end, not a period.. The text is (in part) from Iliad U.S42; the second line is not found there, but it is found in the Life ofHomer 132, attributed to PlulaIch, as well .. in his How to Study Poetry 360.

a 33-3 S &8w .•. p.ciXo....

871>

I-Z

d IIi ... II.KIlI",

b I : 1 el liE p."I\ not the sam.e."

Cf.

87a 33 : 2; i.e., "but if the subject of challenge is

2 Kiv ••. KPEt....OVL so. d.p",IufJ"'ITfi: "even if an inferior contends with a .uperior in any way whatever." b k-3 ~a...ov •.. P.OUCJ'Kij~ For the nzture of A 7, in particular, 63b 3S - 64a z, 64a 31 - 64b z3·

I> 3-4

ol~

... cdI..ollii ...

the basic argument cf.

C£ outline; see 86a 6-7.

COMMBNTARY

161

b 3 &ij>.... Cope. p. II9. considers the impersonal construction here inaccurate. preferring mjMI or d~Ao,; however. cf. 79b 37£. 88. S£. 88b 14-

v.".""..."a! On the force of the ending. cf. S!lb 32 : 1. There is an actual order from the particular to the general in the presentation of those who experience indignation: e.g.• 87b 4-7. the particular class; 87b 7-9. a less particular class; 87b 9-II. a more general class; 87b II-IS. the most general class.

b4

rae

b 6 ",d ....G..c& x61C'<",""a.

In the light of the reason given (b 6: Td ..• dlHauw) for the statement at b S..s: lao IIE,o, .. • '""T1J,uvo •• actual possession of the goods. as stated here. would seem to be necessary for this group to experience indignation. For ouly by possessing these "greatest goods" can a person decide whether or not another is unworthy of them. As A. says at 80ra IO-IZ. one cannot become indignant at another·, possession of =tain forms of good. e.g.• justice. bravery. virtue, which are surely among Ta ""r'rlTa draOd. One might well be envious. but indignant only if the decision can be made that the person is unworthy of the good.

b 6-7 ,,0 ... "ij OfLOL....~ TIiW Gpol.,.. sc. dyaOIiW.

b 7-9 SEll...p......

articular infinitive subject of ot! dl"a,o. (~rIT').

"."oG".

This second type of per,on who experiences indignation i, the more general class: good people capable of making an intelligent judgment on what is right or wrong.

b 7 ily..8al _1 ""au&..ia. Tbese words are practically synonyms; cf. Boa 30 : 1. Tbe good man is the man of moral virtue and like the anovdaro, (e.g.• 67b 21 : 2) "he judge, correctly in each matter and in each case the truth is manifest to him" (EN III3" 29-32). or as we read here. b 8: "et.o~", .J. As a man ot moral virtue he will not tolerate the ~ust. and we have been told (86b 14-16) that undeserved success is something unjust. On ""o~daro, see 6Ia 25 : Z.

b 9-II " ..lib ... ""YXciv""'''v

sc. ,.pB<1f/T,,,ol.I,,,•.

CPU.o...fLO' The object of these "ambitious" men is honor. in general. A 6. 63b 2. C£ 68b 20 : 1; cpo also 7fJ8. 35 : 1. 2 ...V""'" "'p ..y"......." In the light of the previous note. the objects of their desire will be anything which bring, honor; at 79a 35 it was philosophy; at A 5. 613 38-39 it was honor-conferring rewards. Cope alone reads

b9:

1

ne4E8OW. b 10 : 1 jIociA.....1I ",.pl . . .

Ross alone conjectures <4.> with Richards. p. I09. z .. cT>v TafjTa would be anything which brings honor with it and is the anteeedent of di.: "and above all if they are ambitious for

aN.......

ARISTOTLlI, 'RBBTORIC' II

those honors which others, who are unworthy of them, have received"; or, "of which others happen to be unworthy," as Cope, Freese, Radt, "Rhelorik," interpret.

I>

II

",11 a:Aco>~

I> 12 cr.v

governed by the verb, as its antecedent, would be governed by

a'.o;;.n,.

TOVT.,., if present,

1 """'""V apparendy governed by the ,.pBt17JTCxot on an analogy with the verb which can take a dative of the person (TO"TO.,) and genitive of the thing. The word refers to those goods undeservedly possessed in their view by others. 2 ci.v8pcmo8':'8E~ Such persons (whose opposites are the AJ.B.J6ie'0,) are characterized at EN 109Sb 19-2.0 as choosing a life suitable to cawe. In 87b 13-1S we are given a general cl... of those who do HoI experience indignation as a contrast to the general group (87b II-I3) who experience the emotion; see 87b 4. sf

I> 13 :

1....u....... I would say that this refers to the contents of the whole chapter, immediately to 87b 3-1S. mediately to 873 6 - 87b IS together with 86b 9 - 87a S. The sentence ('I'avseo, ... M) canilot be understood without knowing the definition of indignation, at whom and for what reasons men become indignant, and how the indignant feel. It cannot be understood because it actually sets forth persons and feelings opposite to the emotion, indignation. 2 ",,101, Although ",oio" is used here, not Tlaw (i.e., persons). :md ",oio, has been used quite consistendy for the things which cause an emotion (e.g., 78. 2S is the first instance). I do not see how it can be so interpreted here, e.g., "the cases of misfortune, disaster ... ' (Cooper; Jebb & Sandys similarly). The participles modifying the word are verbs which apply more readily to persons, not things. I would interpret, as do others, "at what kind of men they are at whose misfortunes, troubles, or failures one should rejoice, or not experience pain." If men rejoice or remain neutral in such instances, the misfortunes are deserved; c£ 871> 17 : 1. On the possibility of ",oiol, referring to things which cause the emotion, c£ 87a IS where such (e.g., '~l'iv,"a. "dllo,) are mentioned in a section which has to do (c£ chapter oucline II.2) with the people at whom men become indigoant.

I> IS :

~ cU.U"",~ qEIV Cpo 86b 26-28. In EE I:>33 b 20-21 the feeling of pleasure at the misfortune of another is said to be without a name.

I> 16 X,dpELV I> 17 :

1 obc yci.p ••• ci.V"L"IXEI/LEVU See 861> 9 : " 2, 88a 28 : 2. The reason is now given that £rom what has been said in the chapter the opposites are clear. In fact he has just set down some opposites to in.tion in bd

COMMENTAlIY

".[.,~ ... ~.~ The consequ=, as he goes on to say (dlUT' ...), i. that "if our discourse develops in the judges (auditors) a corresponding attitude of mind (i.e., to feel joy or nothing at all [b 16] at the failures of the undeserving) and further demonstrates that those who think it is their right to be pitied happen to be unworthy, in fact worthy not to receive pity, and so, too, the grounds on which they expect to receive pity, it will be impossible to pity." This concluding paragraph is somewhat strange in its argument. After presenting the threefold analysis of indignation, A. in this concluding statement reverts to the argument of the opening statement of the chapter: namely, that indignatinn is the contrary of pity but that there is a kinship between them. As he says at 86b 12-14:, orin MM II92b 22-23: the man who feels pain at undeserved good fortune (indignation) is the sarne man who feels pain at undeserved misfortune (pity). The argument here (seemingly somewhat unnecessarily involved) is that if we put forward persons, causes, reasons opposite to those which arouse indignation (pain at undeserved good fortune), we will in fact make it impo.sible for others to experience both indignation and also pity. For the opposite of pain at undeserved good fortune (indignation) would be joy at deserved bad fortune. But to arouse such a response in others is to remove any grounds for their feeling pity (pain at undeserved bad fortune). 2 c,G..' governs d~~.aT6. (eUT') lA••i" "with the result that pity is impossible if our discourse develops in the hearers a corresponding attitude of mind and further deroonsttates ..."

b 18 : J "oU~ ... " ..p..GlCoucicrn Cpo 77b Z4, 80b 3I, 83a 8, 8sa 3I; on the verb, see 6Gb II. 2 lCp,..ci~ C£ 77b 21 : J. 3 Myo~ Le. discourse; see 55a 26; 5gb 16 : I; A 13, 74b 12; 77b 23 : 2.

CHAPTER 10

I· Introduction: 87b ZI-34

with division and de6nition of envy

II . Development: 87b 34 - 88a :>5 I.

87b 34-35

3. 88a S-zS

the attitude of those who experience envy: the subjective aspect of the emotion the things which cause the emotion: the objective aspect of the emotion the persoDS who are envied: the objective aspect

III . Conclusion: 88a ZS-30

87b 21-:0:0 &.JAW.. Ixov".~ The usual division for the study of the emotions £irst mentioned at 78a Z3-2S; here it serves as the apodosis to the statement at h n-:>4The definition of envy is stated. It is b n-34 6 'Pe6vo~ ••• ixeLVDU~ essentially the same as that given at 86b 18-:0:0. The,.,q r.a ... phrase simply reiterates, hut with a different emphasis, what is said at 86h 20-:0:0: namely, that the major cause of envy is ohjective, not subjective; .ee 861> :00-:0:0. Men are moved by envy hecause of what happens to another; the self enters in as a secondarY, not a primary, cause. It is an emotion, as we are told at EN IlO?> 8-27, which is bad in se (see also 88a 36), and there is no way in which it CUI he made, in itself, into something good. This is an idea found again at EE 1Z34> 30 where we are told that it contrihutes to injustice. As we find envy in the ethical writings (c£ 861> 9 : z for the full passages), it is defined as the pain experienced at all good fortune; see, e.g., EN Il08h 4, EE I:O:OIa 38-40 (adding the qualification "even at those who deserve their good fortune"), MM Il9>h :05-:>6. However, EE IZ33 h 19-:>0 defines it as pain at deserved good fortune. This idea is repeated in the defiDition found in the Topics (which in its terminology is quite similar to that of our Rktom de6nition) at l09h 36-]7, IIoa 1-4: pain experienced at the manifest good fortune of good people. The de6nition given here in the Rktoric hovers hetween these two ideas. It is pain at good fortune, hut not at .11 good fortune, or again deserved good fortune, hut simply: at .11 good fortune of those who are one's e'l""l.r; c£ 86b 19-:00. As"equals" is explained

lo"'.ov,

166

ARISTOTLlI, 'RHBTORIC' II

at 87b 25-27 there is no necessary reason to confine them to "good men" (as the Topics passage does, and EE I233b 1\r20), or to "friends," as we find envy defined by Socrates in Xenophon, Mem. 3.9.8, and in the Definitions 416, which bear Plato's name. However, "equals" is more specific than the generic term given in the definition of Diogenes Laertius, Zeno 7.IIl: pain at another's goods, or of Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 4.7.16: "invidentiam esse mcunt aegritudinem susceptam propter alterius res secundas, quae nihil noceant invidenti." The discussion of 'P80•• , in Plato, phileb. 47b - 50e is not relevant; e.g., is it envy or malice which is at issue? And the comments of Anaximenes I#DO 34-39 on how to stir up envy in others are based partly on an understanding of it in direct opposition to A.'s statement at 86b 19 (dAA' .,; "06 d.aElov), e.g., 06, MO'PaJ..JU1' d.aEt." eil nmeaxo..a,•.. . Plutarch also has a small treatise On Envy and Hate; c£ II2a I : 1.

b 22 ...el w-n:pllyl~
b 23-24 I'it tVII .•• 1It.-nji

We begin here the explanation of b 24-25 ..OLOU.... ' .••
'x.,.....,.

b 26-27 y.vo~ ... t.-n:cipX......1I Y"o, is birth, lineage, as at A 6, 63a 29; for """"....a> c£ 8Ib 34 : 3; ~A."la" IE", (attitude, disposition), c£ 8Cia 25; MEa., C£ 62b 20 : 2; .melexo.
COMMENTARY

167

p. 124, says in part "ro (P~) if LUs"'" is impersonal, as it usually is, is redundant as far as the sense is concerned; if not, ro ,.~ ,j"
h :.8-29 6ncipx£'Y (liLl> ••• £law)· n
h 30 : 1 ... ,p.c:.I'£YO' C£ A S, 6ra 27 - 61b 2. a ILI.cp.pciy.....,~ in the meaning of 8?a 30 : 1; "exceptioually" honored. C£A S, from which it can be seen why one so fortunate h 31 £66cz'l'ovl,!, might well be conditioned to feel distress at another's good fortune. "pretenders to wisdom," a somewhat unique word h 32 lol;oaocpo, in A.; cpo Plato, Pha,tItus 27Sb. In this word and the following, note that two dilfcrent ideas of the root word (60".") are present: here, "seem, pretend"; in the second, "to be thought to be, to be reputed." h 33 cpu.cl60l;oL

"those who love a reputation, fame."

h 34 1"lCpoljluxo, A suitable comment on this class is found at EN 112sa 17"-24 where it is said that "the small-minded man, though he is worthy, deprives himself of the goods he deserves ... owing to the fact that he does not consider himself worthy of good things." At II07b 21 - n08a r this type along with the ambitious and unambitious (c£ 87b 3D-F) is defined with rdation to From the detailed description of the small-minded man in On lhe Virlues and Vices I2srb 16-24, he is clearly not a happy person in the best of circumstauces.

n,.".

From here to 88a S we have the second division of the h 3S : 1 icp' oI~ cbapter on the things whicb cause envy. In a very cursory way we learn

168

ARISTOTLB, 4RHETORIC' II

88a 9

that they are in pan the aya6& mentioned; see 87b 23 : 1. Other things that cawe envy are indicated at 88a 1-5. 2 .... p.lv 4y..&ci pb is solitarium. 8Sa 1-3 lcp' aI~ ........, "For those achievements or possessions which arouse in men the love of fame and for which they are ambitious and for which they desire renown, as well as all the things which are the gifts of good fortune - virtually all these are subject to envy." tpw,6oUw, tpuoTOpaii,.a~ if they differ, would dn so in that the former indicates the desire for fame in the eyes of others which is won by one's achievements, etc.; the latter, the desire for the honor in itsd£ oe8YfWTa, expresses the whole appetitive drive in man toward what is seen as good; c£ 69" I : 2, 68b 32 - 69a 2. For the idea in stl",x1j,.aTa See 62a 5-12. t....EflExOUC..V For the idea in the word, see 78b 28 : 1. ~ p..xpc'ji m.lKOUG.V What is meant by this phrase is clearly: "or those thing. because of whose possession they fall off excellence but slighdy." In other words, goods whose possession while not conferring distinction still confer substantial honor. This is not always clear in the interpretations. ] CPClVCpav... the beginning of the final division of the chapter.

as:

1

2

a 6 &1'''

'Just now," i.e., in the preceding two divisions, e.g., 87b 23-27, a passage he refers to in what immediatdy follows at a 6-7.

a 6-7 XP6"'1' XCII "0,"" . . . 56lin The point behind the fint phrase is made at a 9-II; C£ 88a 9-10. 8Sa II-12 picks up MEn. , a 7 : 1 66lin cp8avaUG'v The reading of Ross, Kassd, Spenge!, Cope. Two edd. read with Roemer his conjecture: MEn <"a/yb•• > '1'6011060""; c£ 87b 26-27. 2 saw ... In:IO"'O....... read by the edd. (save Kassel), Spengd, Cope. Kassd double brackets as an addition (or possibly such) of A.'s. The saying is identified by Nauck as Aeschylus' (frg. 305, Nauck & Snell).

a 8 "Cll ...pc\~

p.aGv.....

alI~ cpll..... sc. tp6o..vaw TOtlTO'~. It is important in this topic (a 7-17) which is concerned with rivals that we understand that the main subject is: those whom nlen envy. On tp,10·...,.••.-6a. "e&~ c£ 7lIb 14 : 2.

a 9 dp'lp.lvou~

presumably those mentioned in a 6-7 (e.g., see following two notes), as well as those referred to at a j-
a 9-10 ",pc\~ 6~ ..• oN&d~ sc. tpUOT',. ........ Cpo 86a 29-31. Obviously TOtl~ ,."e'o....O-' ho~ w.a~ . .. "'o,.bov~ ... 1'B6••ciiTa~ refers 10 a 6: TO'~ . . . ."ytl~ ... xedvq>. Four of the edd., Spengd, Cope agree on t;he reading

88a I4

COMMBNTARY

of a 9--10. Kassel, however (0£ Der Text, p. 134, for his reasons), secludes and II n8.BwTflI;.

:ned~ ToV~ before laopbov~,

a 10 "oU~ .'P' ......TIj"CI~ refers to a 7: TO'~ ••. lyl'~~ ... TO"fjl. Cope, p. 127, illustrates the use of the phrase from Pindar to denote the outermost limits of the known world. I I-I~ wI' irw ... 6'REpQIELV, sc. oil'" (ned~ TOVTO!', fP,AOTI.uoiWra,) WP ••. : "nor are they rivals of those to whom in their own eyes, or the eyes of others, they consider themselves to be far inferior or far superior." After .moe';xo.. all save Tovar, Kassd read a comma, making the WotWTOJ~ clause a part of what precedes; o£ following note.

a

a 12-13 ':' ..cahw~ XCII ..po~ "oU~ ...pl ..a. ..O•..u-.CI The reading is that of cod. A, three of the edd., Spengd. Ross, Kassd, Cope, the Anonymus Commentator read with cod. F: wua6Tw~ "al "oel TDVTDV~ "al "eel Ta TDI.w...a. Usually the passage is interpreted as though there were a complete break before this clause, e.g., "So, too, we compete with those who follow the same ends as ourselves" (Roberts translation). However, the edd. (save Tovar, Kassd), Spengd, Cope punctuate with a comma before the clause. Of equal importance with the punctuation i. the verb to be understood with the clause. If one follow> the common punctuation, then the verb which introduces the whole clause should be understood, e.g., a II: D~a' (II"MJTIpD6PTa. "ed, To6TOV~) WP "DAV• ••• For this reason Spengd, p. 243, would transpose the clause to a 9: :ned~ TDU, 8Ie'lpbov, Q)"a6T.., "al ... TD,a6Ta. Certainly with the common punctuation I do not see the possibility of dismissing 006' (9'MOT'po6vTa.). Therefore I would have to interpret our statement to mean: "nor are they rivals of those to whom in their own eyes or the eyes of others they consider themsdves to be far inferior or far superior; so, too, they are not rivals of others in like instances." This offers the following sequence of statements in 88a 8-17: men are envious of their rivals, and their rivals are (I) the aforementioned (11-9), (2) not those far removed in time or place or to whom they are clearly superior or inferior or those of similar status (9--13); but they are rivals to those who are their competitors in general, or in love, or who seek what they seek - of such they are necessarily envious (13-17). The statement is eyclic: men are envious of their rivals. .. they are particularly envious of certain kinds of rivals. On the other hand, if we punctuate with a complete break (Le., a period) before our clause, then it would be corrdated with 88a 11-9: "al "ed~ o6~ 9"ADnpD6'Ta, ..• Sle'lpBIIOV, ... r.6aaV't'Q), ("&1oT,,,,oo,.Ta&) ned, TOO, neel Ta TO&a6Ta: "Men are envious of their rivals, for they are rivals of those already mentioned. . .. In the same way they are rivals of those engaged in similar pursuits." a 14 4"..ClY""' ..... Ii~ rivals, competitors in general (as at 8..b 13, 83a 22), e.g., in law, in politics, in sports, etc.

AIUSTOTLB, 'RHBl'ORlC' II

a 17 xIXl XEP"!L£US •.•

88a 24

c£ 8Ib 16: 2.

a IS xul Wv ... XCX'Top9oUv'nIN SC. tpB01IOVd& 't'oV'ro&" as at 88a 8; "those whose past acquisitions or present successes." On H,"OeBoVvT<'" C£ 83a 26. Immediately preceding our sentence Cope, Preese (Loeb ed.) read: "al Tol, TaxV 01 " !'oA., TVxd,re, " !'~ T~XdOTB' ",Booo6"... This is read by the edd., Spenge! at 88a 24 where we find it in cod. A. a 18-19 01....1" •.. <0;> £nus ... 3P.OLO. Ross alone encloses this in parentheses. Dufour, Tovar, Ross, Kassel read with Vater (p. 99) OilTO. <01> with which Spengel would agree. The 6~ Hai (Denniston, p. 30S) strengthens the adversative sense, "but especially those near and like them." In these two instances, as the reason given (a 19-21) says, men are aware that the failure to win the good is their own. a 19-20 ",,,p' IX6-rWS "becawe of themselves"; c£ LS, naed C.III.7. Jebb &: Sandys intexpret: "in comparison with these."

a 20 ",..i;"o l."",oiiy i.e., the failure to obtain the good won by the other (-r06ro) is a cawe of pain (Atmo;;') resulting iu envy: "so that the failure which is painful cawes envy." 21 ",o~ .•. XEK..... p.Evo.S governed by an understood ",80006"" "those who either have now, or have ocquired." Cope, p. 128, interprets: "who either have now in their possession or have once possessed."

a

a zz :

1

3u" "')",oiS "POaijXEV

"all that naturally belongs to them";

cf. 78a 33. ,

2

Spenge!,

bebe....."..'; "OTe is the reading of Ross, Kassel. Three edd., Cope read: "bclT}nd "OTB.

a 2Z-23 &.0 "'p""I1~"'po, " ....... po.S. is the reading and punctuation of Kassel, Cope with cod. F. The other edd. and Spengd read d.a "es"P.sreeo, TB ""'Tieo", "al "d.; whether Y' or rB i. the reading of cod. A is 110t at all clear. In any event the reading of cod. P followed by a full stop makes sense whereas tying this in (rB - "at) with the next clause does not. It makes more sense to have a 23-25 ("a! 01 "olid ... TVXOVT', ",Bo,06"w) introduce two other instances of persons who are envied. a 23

'
6).(y"

sc. 6ant1l11faa"•.

a 24 ",oiS ","Xu 01 1'000.S 'N)tOv..ES "And those who either have acquired something with difIiculty or have not ocquired it at all are enviow of those who got it quickly." Sc. Tal, raxV (TVx06".). . .. The cod. P reading seems the most reasonable in the context. It is accepted by Kassel (C£. Der Text, pp. 134-35). Roemer, Dufour, Tovar read ror, TaxV 01 "lj"OJ; Ross, Cope (on Cope, C£ 88a 18): roo, TaxV 01 "

"dA.,.

88a 26 a 2S :

1

171

COMMENTAllY

U x ..[

The "al is adverbial.

• €
is the reading of the edd., Spengel. Cope reads or~ but accepts in his note, p. 129, 1'1" or~. His difficulty basically is whether 1'1" or, or ",.I Tial stands for the persons in whom men take pleasure. He opts for hi Tial, and, in the light of what has gone before, this is co=t; cf. the use of Tl, at 78a 2S, 79a 10, 80a 7, 80b 34, 82a 20, etc., and the use of 1'1" or, at 860 17, 87b 19, lS. However, cpo I17b IS : z. 3 01 TOtoiiftL i.e' those who are envious. l

a 26-27 c:.s ylzp Z x _ )"unoiiv....... .nm..S Ex"""'~ bel .....S lv...,.(OlS ilcr8>\cr.",..... This is the reading accepted by the edd and Spengel, and I consider it co=t. Cope reads: ." rde oil" l"oOTe, with which Vater (PI! ."0.....'), pp. 99-100, would agree. If we look at the whole passage from 88a as, we can see the development: "It is al.o clear at what things and with what persons men who are envious fmd delight and what their attitude of mind is. For just as men with this attitude of mind [envyl experience pain, so with this attitude they will rejoice at opposite in.tances; consequendy, if men, on the one hand, are made to feel envious [oth-.., ,,,."1, whereas those who deem themselves worthy of pity or of receiving some good are .uch as those mentioned [i.e., in the class of those enviedl, it is clear that the.e latter will not obtain pity from those with the power to grant it." The statement in the entry, despite the discussion it has aroused - e.g., Cope, pp. ~3O-3 I - is simply a repetition of the clarification made in the Rhetoric between '1'8.00' and l"""a'l!",a,,la in the preceding chapter. See, for example, 86b 9 : z where it was said in part that the confusion between the CWO appear. to have been corrected in the Rhetoric when A. points out that envy-malice are not two extremes of excess and defect whose mean i. indignation. Rather, as h~ says at 86b 34 - 87> 3, they are simply diiferent aspects of the same attitude of mind or general disposition. In saying that the envious man and the malicious man are the same, A. recognizes that envy-malice are only diiferent movements experienced by one and the same general attitude of mind They are not opposites as indignation and pity are, as he states at 86b 9-14 and argues at 87a II-I3 (oil rde . .. Blalo). Just as there is no contradiction in a man who experiences indignation and so pain at undeserved misfortune finding joy and so pleasure in deserved misfortune (or deserved good fortune), 86b 26-3 I, '0 there is none in a man, who experiences envy and so pain at another's possession and enjoyment of good, experiencing joy and so pleasure at the other's loss of those goods. See also I17b 17 : 1.

.''0"".'

a 26 c:.s ZxOIl'
AllISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

a 27 lv.."..lo,~ joyed by another.

88a 29

i.e., instances of the loss or destruction of the goods en-

a 28 : 1 "CIfIllcncWllriii'l",,, C£ 8sa 3I : 2. 2 "'••irill' See 86b 9 : I, z; 87b I7 : 1. Once again the emotion pity appears in an atgUDIent on what happens if a person is made to experience the opposite of the emotion under discussiop. It would be interesting to know whether this emphasis on pity is owed indirectly to the pervasive inHuence of forensic rhetoric.

a 29 41;106,,0"'"

Ross alone reads dE'.iin.~ with Bonitz (StuJien, p. 94).

CHAPTER II

I . Transition: 88a 3I-3S

definition of emulation

II . Development: 88a 3S - 88b 28 I.

88. 35-38

2.

88. 38 - 88b

definition explained by contrast with envy the attitude, disposition of those who experience the emotion: the subjective aspect

10

3. 88b II-I4

the things which cause the emotion: the objective aspect

4. 88b 14-22

the persons towmI whom the emotion is direCted: the objective aspect contempt: the emotion opposite to

5. 88b 22-28

emulation to the section on the emotions

III . General conclusion: 88b 29-30

88a 31-32 .....~ ... &ijAov

the usual tripartite division.

a 32 :, I:ij).o~ Apart from what is said here on this emotion, there is nothing of any substance on CilAo, in A. It is merely mentioned in the ethical works as one of the emotions; sec, e.g., EN IIoSb 23 and MM II86a 13. At EE I229a 38 in a discussion of fear it is identified in a passing way with the experience of A~"'1 (as we find it in our definition). There is nothing at all in Anaximcncs on the emotion. When we turn elsewhere, we find that emulation is generally linked with envy (as we find it at 8Ih 21-22, 88a 3S-38, and BID, II) but that it has also 2Cquired a pejorative meaning, e.g., Diogcnes Laertius, Zeno 7.II1: ",B.... all A~",," in' illOTelo" draB ••" CijA•• all AUmjv inl TCP 4.lltp "ae.'va, di. mlTo, in,Bu,.••,; Stobaeus, Ethica 2.178:

",Bo.o, all A~"'7 in' d,uOTelo" draBo'" CijAo, fl. AUmj .,,1 TIji IT6flO' in... nrxd•• ,. div ""'TO, h"Bu,. ••, ""'To. ,.'Ij' Ai"aa8a, dll ,.al hJew, CijAo., I'QXQ(!U1poJ baB,av 1I-ro, cillov I'lp'Ia"" 01, 4" H(!BiTTO'VO' j Cicero, Tusc.

a.

Disp. 4.8.17: "Invidentiam esse dicunt [ei. 87b 22-24] .... Aemulatio aUtem dupliciter ilia quidem elicitur, ut et in laude et in vitia nomen hoc sit; Dam et imitatio wtutis aemulatio elicitur ... et est aemulatio aegritudo, si eo, quod cupierit, alius potiatur. ip.e careat." In A. emulation i•• good emotion and an emotion which belong. to good men (88a 3S-36); its object is the good

88a 38

ARISTOTIB, 'RHBTORIC' II

174

seen in others who are one's p=s and seen as possible of attainment for the one who desires it. It is an emotion which is self-directed but with an element of altruism in it (88b II-14), and it is intimately connected with nfA~ which is itself a sign that one has a reputation for doing good (c£ A 5, 61a 28 - 61b 2). Further, it is the prize of virtue, that which is given to goodmen (EN II23b 35). • AU"') ... ,~ The presence of pain indicates in this instance the clear awareness of the absence of something seen as a good together with the desire to achieve it; c£ 79& II. This is also true in the case of anger, fear, envy. C£ 7& 31 : 3· J rp",~o"''''l1 not simply dyaOd, but those which are a 33 ."...(..."'" x ..l ."&
c£ 88b 2.

"BfI'

a 34 : 1 ".pl "'oU~ ... "
a 35-38 (&,0 •.. rpOavov) The parentheses are used by the edd., and ,are followed by a comma; Spengel and Cope do not use them. This paBSage is a brief explanation of emulation by contrasting it with envy.

a 35

bi:,.,x";~

a 36

01",."""" ... rp..w..;;~

i.e., morally good;

C£ 80a 30 : 1; cpo

S6a 6.

for the case, S. 1304.

a 37 : 1 ....p ..crxEUci~., C£ 88. 28; here it governs the accusative and the infinitive: "the man e."Perieneing emulation prepares himself to obtain; ... the man who is envious sees to it that his neighbor is deprived.... " Strictly speaking, as envy is presented in the Rhetoric and the ethical works, this is not correct. It may be an added effect of envy, but it is not the direct effect. Neither envy nor malice directly seeks to deprive the other of the goods possessed. The closest envy comes to such an idea would be in the competition with rivals of whom one is also envious (88a 8--18). 2 a.yaOidv sc. 6PT'fA"., a 33: "highly valued." a 38 ~ciy>
88b 6

COMMBNTAlIY

88b I : 1 ~'1_A"'cN~ fLEv tic (S. 2897). S. 2522.

175

the ".b is solitarium and somewhat empha-

z.rw

cN&ol~ yUt> 4;lOi .... ", ...volfL"'" cl&6vcx.... This is the reading and punctuation of Tovar, Spengd, Cope. Roemer, under the influence of Victorius, Muret, indicates a lacuna after lxova.. • . .. This lacuna is replaced in Dufour, Ros.s by the conjectured words suggested by Victorius, Muret: 1.~.xo".A• .,. a~To" lap.,.. This replacement is considered necessary by Vater (p. 100) and schrader (p. 342) because of the "de clause, and Cope, p. 133, incorporates it into his interpretation. Kassel doublebrackets ~~.k ... cI~"'aTa with no punctuation before, and a colon after, the secluded passage. As was said at 88a 33, the possibility of obtllining the good things is part of the definition of emulation. Therefore, it should not be necessary to repeat it when speaking of emulous persons. According to the definition, men can be emulous only of good things which they can secure for themsdves. It may well be, as Spongel, p. 244. says, that "if the [conjectured] words are added, the whole passage has better coherence," but I am not certain that its coherence as it stands is not quite adequate, i.e., "it follows of necessity that those inclined to emulation are persons who deem themsdves worthy of the good things which they do not possess, for no one deems himself worthy of good things manifestly impossible for him." The "de clause, as an explanation of the statement immediatdy preceding (cI.a,,"'1 dlj ... T~' dE.oiivra" i.e., the tksi,e fo, certain good things, a desire denoted by d<.oiin"a, atlT~'), is a logical clarification of that statement, which itself demands a knowledge of the definition. C£ 78b 3-4.

b 2 fLiI lxoua.v·

b 3 : 1 &.0 ........oiho... Ross alone encloses this in parentheses. All punctuate with a period at the end; the punctuation before varies but in all instances is sensible. On the .it" see B 12; on ".."aM.,.,xo., z veo••.• p.eycxAclcJn>xo. 6Cib 17. 3 xcd.r.; sc. "al (TOIO;;TO.) or, ... b 4-5 h-<. lit is the reading of the edd.; c£ Thurot, "Observations critiques [IJ," 307-308. In Spenge!, Cope we have the reading of the codd. (I".... "de) where "de ("nanIdy") would be explanatory. C£ Denniston, p. 58, and Cope, p. 134"1. b 5 1
b 6--"'7

c:.~

y"p "pocrijl
lxouaL ••. clyall&iv.

1']6

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBI'ORIC' II

88b 8

gd. It would be interpreted: "for assuming that it is their duty to be good men they aspire to such good things because such goods belong by nature to those who are good." The major problem in the reading ofthe text occurs for the commentators (and here the reading of our edd. is influenced by them) in the clause OTI ne0aij". Toi~ araB';;, lxova,. It might first be noted that Stephanus indicates that he read: II... neoaij". Toi~ dra8.;;, exova.. Anonymus gives an interpretation but I would find it difficult to determine what h. was reading; e.g., his comment on the whole clause ,;,•... lxova, is: C7lAova• ..• dId Td olea8a. mlTO,)' araBo,). elva• aut ToUTO IX." ..0; dyaM, Ii neom!" •• Ix ... TO,)~ dyaBov~. With a slight correction (the same is required in Stephanus) to the first part, which is not the Greek of the text, this is effectively the interpretation offered above of the Greek of the codd. Muret initiated the problems by translating: "bonos enim vires esse se par esse arbittantur, quia tales esse par est eos qui talibus bonis aiIluunt." This demands: 0... ne0m!"., (-fi".) Toi.ixova, TO; TOuWTa T';;V dyaB';;v (c£ Vablen, "Kritik d. Rhetarik," 566; Vater, p. 101; Spengel, p. 204). Vater, pp. 100-101, argued that A wrote only: "';', neoaij"o. dra6oi~ elva. Toi~ dya6. Por 8T' neoaij'" Ross reads ola "eo,",,,... After all this effort a return to the reading of the codd. might seem presumptuous. However, we should attend to what A. has ,said and is saying about C'ii40, and C7IAmT,,,ot. Emulation is an emotion of those who are morally good (88a 35-36), and so one would expect that those who experience it would consider themselves worthy of good (as they do, 88b I) because they are good. Thus when he speaks in our passage (88b 3-7) of C7IAm ..."o/ who already possess good things and describes their attitude (88b 6-7), it is natural for him to interpret the attitude as the attitude of people who believe it their duty to be good and so aspire to the good things which belong naturally to the morally good. c£ 87a IS.

..a,

b 7 Ily«8w.; /!xoue.. Though araB.;;. may be used rarely by A. - we have this instance, and that at Top. 136b 27-32 - it is surely correct here, i.e., "those who are morally good." The moral goodness is made mote obvious with dyaB.;;, than it would be with ro. b 8 : 1 xed cril~ sc. "al (C'14WT,,,ot £/",..) oU,; i.e., aware of the es= in which they are held by others because of their draBd m.,.a, they strive fot further distinction. 2 cr.v Its antecedent is TaVTa (b 10).

88b 16

3 auYY£"~'~ b 9:

b 10 :

c£ 8Ib 34 : 3·

ob...o, lv,<,I'-'"

J

2

177

COMMBNTAl!Y

J

OIXE'"

2

~LO'

"intimate friends of the family"; cpo 8Ib 34 : "held in honor."

2.

The term is de6ned at A S. 61a 21-22; c£ 76b 6 : •. Ross alone conjectures: lIE",. following

,<0<.","",

Richards. p. 109. II : J d S· t ....I" ... iy..t« the beginning of the second division. Among the highly valued goods would be not only those that follow. but certainly some from among those mentioned at 88a I-S andA S. 6. 2 cip ...~ Virtue and virtues are discussed inA 9 as moral excellence and constitute the burden of EN. For an idea of what A. has in mind by a

b

virtue see 62.b 13 : "all the virtuous."

2.

Cope, p. 13S. gives an odd interpretation to de....~:

On the idea in the word sec A S. 61a 28-32. At A b 12 ":'EPYft"'ci 9. 660 36 - b I A. speaks of virtue as a d.wap., eU'eyeT'~ "ollwv "al I'By.uwv; c£ 66a 36 : z.

,<,,,,,,a, ...

b 13 : J oiy..80<.~ Ross alone encloses this in parentheses with no punctuation before and a comma after. z _I 3""", ... oi,,6Mua~ "and all the goods which yidd pIcasure to their neighbors"; on d"&lav,,., c£ 6Ib 9. Kassd. Spcngd. Cope begin a new topic with "al 6""",. b 14 ")'crii,
b IS

like them, a few more of which are mentioned at 88b 16--18. Isocrates. ISO-lSI mentions snch wrtl'a dy~a in connection with his own life which is characterized (141) as worthy of emulation.

AntiJom.

_.,111

b 16 oivSpeI.. On the variant spelling of &.dee/a. c£ 6Ia 3 : •. Courage is called an excellence of the soul at A S. 610 3. and one of the parts of de.n1 atA 9. 66b I (c£ 6Gb 20-29. with which cpo 62.b 12.-28). It is de6ned

AllISTOTL~ 'RHEl'ORIC' II

88b 22

atA 9. 66b II-13 (c£ 66b II); atA 6. 62.b 33 we are told that it is something whose possession is advantageous. and at A 9. 66b 4-7 most advantageous to othets. which is. of course. to the point he is developing here. "o",ta. as we saw at 87b 3D-31. is something for which men are held in honor; it, too. is mentioned as one of the parts of ap8ni (66b 3). but it was:not considered in the analysis which followed there (c£ 66b 1 : 3) although we were told at A II. 71b 28 that it is "the knowledge of many admitable things" (c£ 7Ib 27 : 1).

b 17 :

1 clpx>l as seen at 88b 5; it is explained in the following clause. b 17-18. where Ross alone punctuates differently and not successfully.

3 E6 ""'Ei" picks up JJ",il'pa Hal 81lBl'l'BT""'. 81l,pYBToii.~", of b 12-13. On the idea c£ 7'Jl1 7 and cpo 8Ia 14. 8Ja 20 : 2 •.

b 18

P>l""p.~

It is obvious from what is said here that A. regards

snch men with esteem. In this respect the comment rellects the same kind of jndgment on rhetoric as was met atA I. 5sb 17-21 where he notes that while there is a name for the man who misuses the art of dialectic (he is called a sophist). there is none for the man who misuses the art of rhetoric. the kind ofmisuse described. for example. by !socrates. Anlidosis 147-149; c£ ssb 17-21. b 1!}-20 ot<; "aUol ... "allot There are two ways in which this sentence is taken. The first is that which the scholiast. Anonymus. and others take: "Those men are objects of emulation to whom many wish to be like. or of whom many wish to be their acquaintances. or their friends." The second is that found in the Vetus Translatio and elsewhere: "Those men (etc.) ... to whom many wish to be like. or those who have many acquaintances. or ,those with many friends." b 20 8I1ufJA!;ou'"'' Cpo 79b 25. 8ra 28-29. At 84> 27-3 I admiration is used as a criterion pointing to those whom the admirer respects and holds in esteem. b 21 mll'vo, x"llyxcl>I'-'" At A 9. 67b 27-35 there is a definition of praise and its difference from encomium. c£ 67b 27-33. 67b 28 : 2. b 22 : 1 "0'"1)........ II ).oyoypcicp_ Ros. alone of the edd. reads" ,j"d 10yoyea",ow. The words Aoyoyea",o,. loyono.a, (most likely Ionian constructions as !~oe,oyecl'l'"') acquired a different meaning in the fourth century at Athens. "Logographer" has a mixed history. however (c£ Bux in PW). which permits us to say that Cope'. three interpretation. (pp. 136-37) are true. but not as formally secure as he assumes. e.g,. (a) early prose writers. mythographers. geographers. historians; (b) those who wrote ,peeches at a price for others to deliver. particularly in the law courts; (e) writers of eulogies. panegyric. epideictic literature. For example. none of the early historians is formally called a logographer. and when the word was used in t!>e fourth

88b

22

COMMBNTAllY

179

century for speech writer it was a tenn of opprobrium. The range ofmeaning found in the word in its later use, however, appears to rdlect its earlier meaning. Bux, for example, argues that like AO"""O'.~ it was originally used in a serious way to denote prose writers including historians, mythographers, geographers. There is a difference in the three groups, and this is reflected in the change the word underwent when it was employed to denote serious prose like history (e.g., Thucydides I.2I.I) as well as prose not seriously concerned with the truth, "unreliable writers of stories," as Gomme, I 138-39, puts it. It is this last meaning (see, e.g., Plutarch, De Iside et Onride 3s8f, De deftctu o,,,,,,lornm 4171O-f) which appears to be reflected in the use of the word for speech writers, and for the writers of epideictic literature, i.e., those concerned more with giving pleasure than with presenting the truth. At the same time the word retains its denotation for ..nous prose, as Plato Phaedrus 2s8b-c would imply. There is little question that when it was used of speech writers (a practice called d"'oyea'l'ia by !socrates, Antid. 2) it was a derogatory term; see, e.g., Plato, Phaedrus 2S7C, Aeschines, Ag. Timarchus 94 (applying it to Demosthenes), or Aristotle, Rktoric r 7, 08a 34 (so Bux; Cope would disagree). The insulting character of the word resided in the fact that such writers were not concerned with the truth, were unreliable. It is this quality of unreliability which one senses in the use of the word to designate writers of eulogistic literature. This appears to be its meaning in our passage: namely, those concerned more with pleasing the auditor or reader than with the strict truth. Cicero, De orat. 2.84.341 describes the genre well: "Ipsi enim Graeci magis legendi et delectationis aut hominis a1icuius ornandi quam utilitatis huius forensis causa laudationes scriptitaverunt; quorum sunt libri, quibus Themistocles, Aristides, Agesilaus, Epaminondas, Philippus, Alexander a1iique laudantur." When Aoyoyeaq,O, or AO,..,,.,., is used with "'0' 1"''1" as it is in our passage, it may carry thismeaning. Compare, e.g., Thucydides 1.:U; Dionysius ofHalicarnassus, On the Composition ojWo,ds 93; Plato, Rep. 392a; Isocrates, To Philip 109, with which compare his Evago,as 40, To Philip I#3 "",,,,,,,,,,,,,u.,,, i.e., those who are opposite to 01 C'I1OJTol (b 15-22). b 22-24 lv.."..!ov"•.. x ....."'PPDVEiv Contempt, disdain, is considering persons and things as worthy of nothing at all (78b 15-16); emulation, in essence, is considering persons and things as worthy of very much. In contempt there is the pleasure which comes with self-satisfaction; in emulation there is the pain attendant upon the dissatisfaction owing to the sense of want. Herein lies their basic opposition. More fully, as we have seen at 88a 32-35, emulation is defined as feeling that the highly honored good things possessed by an equal but also available to the one experiencing the emotion are personally desirable.

180

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

88b 29

b 23 xed " .. ~'I)Aoilv "'" x""llfI>povEiv is the reading of the codd. and four edd., Spengd. It is parallded at 80a 5-6. Ross, Cope read: Tq;

err

lot;" TO HaT
b 24 oG"",~ lxov""~ as he explains in what immediatdy follows: those who are C7]AaJTI"ol (b 1-10) as wdl as the C7]A"'Tol (b 15-22). Granted the opposition stated at b 22-23, such people, when shown persons who possess, not Tel bT.,.a cl,.a06, but their oppositu (which is the point here, as it is at 88a 26Jf.; see 8sb 29 : Z), will turn away from them in disdain, as is said at 78b 16-17: TOW 6~ "7]6 ...O~ del",. JA.,."'e06a ••• b 25 : 1 ....u.....v i.e., those with Tel lva.Tla "«I
b 27-.28

&,......

fI..ux'l)

TOW lnl,.",. dyaOai..

(d6",ov ... ,..,..eI,.evo.). b 29 : 1 &,' clJv .•. &'uAU"""', t~ clJv Kassd alone reads >eai IE ,;,. and Conley ("IId01}," pp. 306£) argues for it as necessary for the sense. It may hdp but it is not necessary; see, for example ]ebb's note, p. 98112 in ]ebb & Sandys. In each instance w. refers to the special topics; cf. 77h 16 : 1. They constitute the necessary material whereby (6,' ,;,.) one devdops in discourse anyone of the emotions studied, and from which (1< w.) one devdops the ,.taT" b ..." .., called "dOo" emotional proof This proof is incorporated with the logical and ethical into deductive and inductive forlOS of argument thus constituting the unified logos so critically necessary in the dfurt to communicate cffectivdy with another person.

"laT",

88b 30

COMMBNTARY

181

2 5...ME'tCO. i.e., are dissolved, dissipated, destroyed. This was done formally in B 3 for anger, and, indirectly becallSe of the rdation between anger and mildness, for mildness in B 2; it was done for friendship at 82a II[ and for fear at 83a 13f£ For shame it was simply stated at 8sa 14-15; at 8sa 34f£ there is a somewhat similar presentation for kindliness. 86b 91[ enters into some detail on the opposite of pity. The eH"ort at 87b 161[ (in the chapter on indignation) and at 88a 261[ 1m the chapter on envy) to set forth ways to dissipate the emotions are less direct and explicit; see 87b 17 : I, SBa 26-27, and 86b 9 : I, 2.

b 30 ... t"",,E'~ very probably (as at A 8, 660 18, or 7, 6sb 20) in its third meaning (c£ 55- 4) as source material from which to· devdop propositions about each emotion for enthymematic or paradeigmatic argumentation; in the Rhetoric, see Studies, pp. S~6. on the meanings of

"t,rn,

CHAPTER 12

I . Introduction: 88b 30 - 890' 2

to chaps. 12-17: a study of the kinds of ~Oo, as specified by emotions, habits, age groups, the gifts of fortune; each kind is explained briefly

II . Development: 890' 3 - 89b 12

of the first age group: the young and their character traits (the study of age groups continues through chap.

8g. 3-9

desires of the young: .trong, bodily in character, .fickle, violent but not

14, I.

gob 14)

_permanent

3· 8g"7-34

4. 890' 34- 8gb 12

their emotions: hot-tempered, easily angered, eager to win their attitudes: see the good rather than the bad, are hopeful, confident, courageous, bigh-minded their actions: live in accord more with wbat is morally right than with what is advantageous, overact and re-act. are ready to show pity, to enjoy themselves

III . Conclusion: 89b 13

i.e., Tel ,.~. • • • ~Oo,;

cf. 89h

13

88b 30-31 TO. Stile'! ... ..uxCl~ We have seen the problem ofthemeaning of ~Oo, and the problems occasioned by identifying it as ..I,m, ln0V"" solely with the speaker's ~Oo, (77b 24). Despite this common interpretation, even a casual reading of the RNloric makes us aware that A. has more than the speaker's if00, in mind when he talks of the probative power of cbaracter. Any doubt would be removed by 90a 25-28: "such then are the f/0'1/ of the young and old. Consequendy, since men give a favorable hearing to discourse whicb is addressed to and in accord with their own ~Oo" it i. quite clear how the speakers by the language they employ will reflect such cbaracter both in themselves and in their discourse." In an eff'ort to understand whether A. intends the speaker's ijOo, to be the only entecbnic pistis, let us review briefiy some of the problems whicb .rise if this is so, and then look at A.'. use of the word in our treatise. The most obvious difficulty is in the area of

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

ssb 30

the structure and the logical development of the work. We arrive at B

12-17

after an extended analysis of two of the three entechnic pisteis: lcIyo~ (A 4-15). "d90, (B 2-II). The only extended statemcot on ~9o, is found in the fourteen lines at 7Sa 7-20. In the light of the logical organization of the two books this is a substantial defect. and, of course, it leaves B 12-17 inexplicable. The purpose they serve is not known. Realizing this, some =lte the ~90, of 12-17 a form of the entechnic pistis "d90" e.g., Siiss, p. 163. A., however. says that ~90~ is not "d90~ (EN IIooa II-U) and from his explanation of iJ90~, it could not be. The one merit to be found in making chaps. 12-17 an extension of "d90~ as found in chaps. 2-II is the recognition by those who do so that theiJ90~ of 12-17 is in A.'s view as much an entechnic pistis as "d9o~. But this is precisely the problem: the conBict between what A. is obviously saying in 12-17 and the position of those who confine iJ90' as entemnic pistis to the ~9o, of the speaker. It is clear from A.'s statements in 12-17 that the auditors' iJ90~ in the speaking situation is presented as something whic:h must be known because of the way it affects the mauner in which auditors respond. Such an argument on A.'s part is an indication of the probative force of the auditors' iJ90,. How, then, can we limit the meaning of ~80~ as "tcrn~ l .....X"o~ to the speaker? Indeed can we do so when it makes nlmy of the 59 uses of the term in our Rhetoric meaningless? For example, at 76. 23-29 A. clearly speaks of the two enteclmic pisteis Myo~, ~90~; but the iJ90~ he speaks of is the character of either the speaker or others. Again at 69a 28-3 I in discussing the motive forces behind human action he speaks of the role played by ii80~: "And in general all the circumstances which cause men's characters to differ must be considered; for example, ,if a man views himself as rich or poor ... this will =lte a difference in him. However, we will discuss these matters later." Strangely all who subscribe to the view that the speaker's ~80' is the only enteclmic pistis still interpret this forward reference to be B 12-17. When we tum to the use of iJ9o, in the text in all it!. 59 appearances (I except I3b 3<>-31), it refers to what we ordinarily understand by "the character of a person." Furthermore it carries this basic meaning throughout the text. Thus Cope's view (Introd., pp. IOS-I3) that it submits to three meanings is not correct, e.g., (a) iJ80, of speaker; (b) i190~ of forms of government in A S and iJ90~ of B 12-17; (c) 7180' of style in r 16. The meaning found in (a) is the base for that in (b) and (c). A study of the sS instances as they arc read in the text and context establishes the following meanings: (I) 7 clear instances in which it refers to the speaker's >l90, as enteclrnic pistis: 56a 2, 5, 13; 66, 26; 95' 23, 26-27; Isb 23; (2) 4 where it can only be the 7190' of others as entechnic pistis: 66a 13, 14-15; 90a 26-27; 9Ib 2D-31;

88b 30

COMMENTARY

185

(3) I where it denotes the ;>j8., of both the speaker and another as entechnic pistis: 760 28; (4) 43 where it signifies either the speaker's or another's (e.g., the auditor's) '18.,: to cite a few: s6a 23, 59b 10, 76a 25, 86b 12-13; and (S) 3 where "character" is a possible interpretation; but quite possible is: ". trait, quality of character," "characteristic": gob 29, gIa 20-21, 91b 2. This rather large range of referents along with the problems already mentioned makes the decision to limit ;>jB., as entechnic pistis to the first category rather temerarious. It should also be noted that Anaximenes, a contensporary, distributes his uses of ;>j8., in a comparable manner between speaker (2 instances: 1430a 28-29; 14460 14; possibly 1445b 17) and auditors or others (7: 1429a II; 1430a 35; 1434b 28-31; 144lb 19-20,22; 144Sb 3, 12), and his meaning for the word is fundamentally the same as A:s, i.e., the way a person habirually acts (1428b u) prinlllrily in the area of moral activity (c£ the actions he mentions). This leaves us with the problem of Bland the interpretation of 78a 7-20. There are a few dUngs to note about the chapter. It is certainly not devoted to the speaker's >J8., as entechnic pistis. In content it is actually a chapter of transition from logical pistis (77b 16-23), a general introduction to the psychological pisteis ;>jB." (77b 24 - 78a 6), followed by a comment on ;>j8., (78a 7-20) and (78a 20-28). The comment on ;>j8." however, is directed to that of the speaker and enumerates three traits which make one credible (as a speaker) to others: sound judgment, moral integrity, good will. Oddly enough, these are the qualities which appear in the analyses of the typical responses associated with a character type in 12-17. To exemplify from the fir.t charaCler (12), that of the young: we learn that sound judgment i. limited (89a 17-26, b 5-1), moral integrity mixed (89a 3-16, 35-37), good will.trong in certain areas (89a 37- b 2, b 8-n). Theargwnent which underlies chaps. 12-17 is that by observing these traits and their presence or absence in his auditon the speaker ensures the effectiveness of his own ;>j8., as entechnic proo£ The argument is stated blundy at 90a 2S-28 and earlier at A 8, 66a 8-14 (hrsl ... siva,). Should the speaker overlook the.e qllalities in his audience or dismiss them as insignificant or irrelevant, he effectively weakens or negates the power of his own ;>jB., as entechnic proo£ As Demosthenes remarks: "while other artistic or technical attainments are fairly autonomous, the speaker's art is ruined should the auditors prove recalcitrant" (On the Embassy 340). In such a relationship the auditors' ;>j8., is obviously seen as an entechnic pistis for it must be understood and addressed by the speaker to ensure the credibility of his own >J0o, with the auditors. Thus Spengel has no hesitation in speaking of chaps. 1:>-17 (the "indolem auditorwn") as the last of the three artistic proofs of 56a 1-4 (Specimen c.mmenlari.rum, pp. 3435). Finally, we must recognize the fact that A. has made the auditor the

",,8., ",,8.,

186

ARISTOTI.E, 'RHBTORIC'

[J

88b 30

telos of rhetorical di!course (A 3, 58b 1-2; 9, 67b 7-II) and judgment ("el,"~) on the part of the auditor essential to the whole process (77b 21 : 1). In itself this is an argument for the auditors' ~90~ as part of the enteehnic pistis ~90~. In such a perception of rhetoric, to be effective, the speaker must always recognize and utilize the fact that he is speaking to a certain kind of audience with a particular set of established attitudes, interests, intellectual convictions, emotional responses, desires, needs (i.e., a certain kind of ~90~), all of which flow into the judgments and decisions made by them. & we learn at A 10, 69a 7-3', it is this ~90~ which affects a person's decisions and judgments. So it is that the actual purpose of chaps. 12-17 with its study of the major character types is to show the speaker how his il90~ must attend and adjust to the il90~ of varied types of auditor if he is to address them successfully. The chapters di!elose th.t in A.'s mind the speaker', ~90~ cannot function autonomously as entechnic pistis nor con the auditors' ~90~ be viewed as neutral or passive as a source of proo£ The more realistic assessment of the speaker-auditor relation is that the auditor's ~90~ influences not only the speaker's il90~ but also the emotional resonance he lends his argument (,,&90') and its intellectual temper (Mro~). On this tnatter I would have to conclude that if any di!tinction on ~90~ as entechnic proof were to be made, I would say that A. thinks of ij90' primarily as that of the speaker (e.g.,.4 9, 66a 26-27), and secondarily but equally as that of the auditors (e.g., 90a 2S-28; A 8, 660 9-14). In the Rhetoric A. does not explain the meaning of il9o" but it is safe to say that it carries for the most part the ordinary meaning found in the ethical worle., i.e., moral character. We can come to some understanding of its "'lJ1eanmg in the Rhetoric from what A. calls its root idea, 890~ (c£ A 10, 69b 6-7, 70" 6 : 1; EN TI03a 17-18; EE 1220a 39 - b r). This is the name given to an action repeatedly placed by a person, an action done over and over. Thus at 700 6 Ta l/hi refer to specifically diffi:rent actions repeatedly performed by an individual. This manner of acting, as we are also told there (70a 6-9), is like but not the same as that which flows from our nature; in fact, .90, is said to be like a second nature (EN nS2a 31>-32). Thus i!90~ is the ground for what A. colis €E'~, which, in turn, plays an important role in determining A.'s notion of il90,. A lE~, it seems, is a disposition already present in a person (see below) which can receive the effect of the repeated action and thus become further disposed for the doing of that action (EN IIo3b 7-25, c£ b 21; 1II40 9-10). A. speaks of this very notion of .E'~ at .4 I, S4a 7 in the introductory lines of our treatise: "because of the habitude ['''''''j9.,av] derived from a stable di!position [dno lE.w,]." According to A. (EN nosb 19-28, EE 1220b 7-20) there are three things found in that part of the soul called TO Oee"",,", the appetitive part: .<.,~ (stable di!positions), 611>&,.." (capacities), ,,&9'1 (transitory motion proceeding from the capac-

88b 30

187

COMMENTARY

ities). From the passages cited it would appear that the dvvdp." possess no specific determination from nature (EE 122.0b Hi) but may be influenced one way or another. That influence come. from the which shape the capacities to function in a certain way (EN IIoSb :>3-28, EE 12Wb 16-20). If a Mwap', is shaped pardy uuder the direction of reason by IE" as an dective habit, i.e., iE', "eoal{!BTt"'7, into an habitual way of acting in the area of moral activity, the tesult is a firm direction of the person toward or away from the good proper to man which iJ called virtue or vice. A. also calls it l}6o, which is a tendency toward (or away from) the standard of goodness proper to man (BE 1:>2Ib 3:>-34; Poetics 1448a 2.-4). Such an understanding of l}6o, as "moral character" is common in the Rhetoric. It is seen quite dearly atA 8, 66a 14-16; A 10, 69a 15-19, 28-:>9; 89> 35-37; 90a 16, 17-18; 95b 14-IS; r 13, 140 21-:>2; 16, 17a 17, IS, 19-20, 22, :>3-24; 17, ISa 16-17; 18b 23. It is also the meaning found inA 9. In B 12-17 and its presentation ofl}6o" there is constant reference to the virtues (and so good moral character) as they are found in EN nD7a 2S - IIosb 10; EE 122.0b 3S - I:>2Ia 12. A. speaks, for example, of courage, temperance, liberality, greatness of spirit, love of honor, etc., and their presence or ahsence in the varied character types. In analyzing the character types A. actually presents patterned ways of acting common to a type and indicative of good or bad moral character. Thus if we were to make specific the primary meaning of l}Oo, as A. uses it in the Rhetoric we arrive at this: l}6o, is a firm disposition within the person formed pardy under the direction of reason (BE 1220b 5-7), a finn disposition with respect to the appetitive part of the soul represented by the emotions which reflects the quality of the person's dominant habits in the sphere of moral activity. As Burnet, p. 66, remarks, it was the formation of this kind of l}Oo, that was the object of the first education in the Republic and Laws of Plato; cpo EN II04b 11-13. But ~6o, does not always denote this finn disposition deliberatdy formed in part under the guidance of reason. For example, at EN II44b 1-30 we read (4-6) that men are of the belief that each of the kinds of ~6o, (and he has in mind moral character) are somehow naturally present: men are just, temperate, and brave, and possess other kinds of character from the moment of birth (cp. n03a 24-26 and cf. Schiitrumpf, pp. 4/[). In other words, there are kinds of l}6o, with which people are variously endowed by nature; e.g., EN III70 3-6: "The courage arising from the spirited temper seems to be most natural and, when it adds choice and motive, to be courage." This natural endowment disposes the individual to a degree for the ddiberate formation of the kind ofl}6o, which iJ formally identified with moral character, whether it be good or bad. ~6o, as a natural endowment would appear to be a dominant meaning at 11790 33 - nSoa 24. In the expression l}Oo, .~".,.i, "a! OJ, ciA7jOw, ."uo"alov (II79b S-9) >lOo, signifies a natural predisposi-

Ie..,

188

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' 11

88b 30

tion for moral goodness, something that is .1",••• Pi~ de'Pi~ (II79b 30) and that can be made ready for virtue (OJ soil is made ready for the seed) by education in virtue Wlder proper laws. In itsdf, however, this fl9.~ does not signify moral eharacter. In the same way the states of feding discussed at EE I233b 16 - I234a 33 are closely roated to moral character but they are not fl90~ as moral eharacter since they too are d.w "e.a'eiC1'''~ (12340 25). The same may be said, it would seem, of the statement at EE I220b 7-10 in which A. speaks of kinds of character denominated by natural capacities for =tain kinds of emotiom, e.g., the irascible, the lustful. It is in this sense, however, that Kroll and Verdcnius enlarge the meaning of fl9.~. Kroll (p. 69) argues that fl9.~ can denote a "passing mood" which seems to mean an emotion typical ofone age group and not another. Verdenius (p. 243) includes within the meaning "emotional states." Such stable emotional responses or attitudes may be "praiseworthy or censurable states with respect to eharacter" (I233b 16-17), but they do not constitute moral cltaracter. As moral character fl90, signifies a stable and established attitude in the area of moral activity which is the result of some kind of reasoned action by the individual. We know that the emotions (nd9'l) are integral to fl90c;. We also know that diJferent age groups (ljl",/a.) respond almost Wlanimously to a spectrum of emotions peculiar to the age (and so the idea of the "ages of man"; cf. Horace, AP I56-I7S). In the same way we know that individuals because of the circumstances of life (TVXa.) can devdop =tain kinds of emotional respOIlSe. In the sen.e that such responses are somewhat stable and set they may be (and are) spoken of as fl90c;. When A. is using the word in its strict sense in the Rhetoric and when in ,the wider .ense would have to be determined from the context. But in either meaning it includes an aspect of the personality of tho.e addressed as of utmost importance to the speaker. If he overlooks or dismisses it, as has been said, he effcctivdy undoes his whole intention to communicate. In its strict sense a. moral character Aristotelian fl90~ does not appear to have been understood in the Latin tradition. As a matter of fact, it is a word for which according to Quintilian the Romans had no equivalent (6.2.S): "There are two kinds of emotions as we know from ancient tradition: one kind the Greeks called "d90" a word which we, interpreting it properly ond correctly, call adfectus; the other kind they call fl90" a term for which, as I helicve, Latin has no equivalent. MoTtS is the term used, and so that part of philosophy known .. >18'' 7/ is called moral philosophy." This is clear from Quintilian and Ci=o. Quintilian's failure in Wlderstanding may wdl be owing to O=o's failure (Roth, S58-59). In any event, an explicit reference by Quintilian (5.10.17) to B r:Jr-I7 cannot be reconciled with our text OJ we have it. In the Latin tradition 'lj"9.~ is interpreted as For example, at 6.2.2-20 Quintilian takes up the concept. Through 8-IS his comments are promising (~g., at s£

"dB.,.

88b 31

COMMENTARY

it is morts; at 131£ it denotes goodness in the speaker reflecting the morts dic...tis; at 18 it requires that the speaker be a vir bonfls). But in the last analysis ~Oo, is a calm, gentle, perduring emotion, and "dOo, is a more violent, momentary emotion. Quintilian attributes the distinction to the more careful writers on the subject (6.2.9). Thus ~Oo, is a "dOo, (c£ Martin, 97). Cicero's comments on this matter arc contained substantially in Or.t. 37.128. Everything dse met here and there in De or.t. :z.27.U5-2.S3.2Ia1f. could be seen as a rather loose deveIopment of this. First of all it should be said that Cicero recogniud the importance of the auditor, and therefore of hi. ~Oo" to the speaker. See, e.g., De inv. 1.16.22 (.b iuJicum person.); De or.t. 2.79.321 (ex eis opud quos . .•) and compare 2.44-186-187. However, despite encounging statements-e.g., Drat. 37-128 (cp. De or.t. 2.53.213, 2.43.182-184) where he explairu >10.,,0. in a way which would qualify it for the ~Oo, of speaker or auditor ("ad naturas et ad mores et ad omncm vitae consuetudincm accomodatum") - he does not appear to understand ~O", (a word he uses once; see De foto I) as we find it in the Rhetoric. At most where he is presumed to be speaking of Aristotdian ~Oo, as a form of "t,m, (c£ Drat. 37-128; De orat. 2.27.115,28.1211£,29.1281£, 43.18a1f., 79.322), if he is not actually speaking of what we know as "aOo, ("dOo, and iJOo, in Roman rhetoric are called ajf.ctus; c£ Martin, 158--60), Cicero is speaking only of the ~Oo, TO;; liro..o, and how it may exert an effect on the audience. But his statements are directed to arousing an emotional respome in the audience. In A. this would be done by the use of "dOo, (A 2, 56a 14-19, 78a 20-28). For A. any response of the auditors to the speakers' ~Oo, is fonnally a response to the ertckntial quality of the speaker (56a 5-8, 77b 25-28). It is a response that is more intellectual than emotional, or as Roth, 856, says: "the speaker's ~Oo, is the prominent quality in his personality and his style which respond. to the understanding of his hearers." For another view on Cicero and ~Oo" c£ Fantham. In conclusion we can say that in these chapters A. is speaking of the allditor's ijOo, and understands the word essentially in the same sense as ~Oo, when used of the speaker. Further, the auditors' 1jOo, is studied because it is apparently understood to be as much a "I....., hlTB""o, as is the speaker'. ~Oo,.

b 31 :, "aial .....~.~ sc. .lao: "Let us discus. next the characters of men, the kind ofmeo they arc (Le., their character] in rdation to their emotions...." On the meaning in "oio. c£ 77b 26-29. There is no formal hierarchy among the "t......, (66a 27: ,) and so the discussion of iJOo, (which has been called 6."...iea "t.....,) in the third and final place is not in any way unusual. In fact, methodologically the discussion is simplified by locating it in the final place since there is no need to explain the many referents to the "dO,! which constitute a critical part of the nature of ~60,.

"'TO""O.

190

88b 35

ARJSTOTlB, 'RIIEl'ORIC' II

governs each of the following four nouns, and .0 ifOo, can be considered under each aspect. The explanation offered in the text for each of the four words lend. confirmation to this interpretation as does the scholiast in a general way for ,,&0'1, U .." and 9Ib 5 for 7jA..o/a" TVXa,. A. does not discuss the first two forma1ly for the reasons given at 88b 33-37 in Roemer, 33-36 in Ross, Kas.e1: "Bel dip ... "ea"'''Ho~ The Vetus Translano and some of the older commentators, e.g., Vater, p. rolfE, understand "aTd only with the last two nouns, e.g., "we will treat next the ij67J, ,,&0'1, U .., with respect to various age groups, and the gifts of fortune." Cope, p. 140, agrees with the first interpretation but later (ibid.) in replying to Vater to accept the interpretation of the Vetus Translatio. However, A. appears to be saying that 110" can be considered from four general viewpoints: dominant emotions (we have an example of sueb at 79" 10-25), habits (specifically moral habits, dqBT~ Hal "ax/a" 88b 34), qualities determined by age, and those determined by fortune. Since the first two have been studied, he concentrates on the last two showing how different periods in man's life as well as differing fortunes bring about certain artitudes, dispositions, traits of personality (emotional, moral, intellectual) which can determine if00,. The point is made for >lA/x,a, in a passing comment in Euripides, Hipp. 986-987. At A 10, 69> 21-3 I we are told that youth, old age. wealth, good fortune can affect if0o, and that this will be discussed later. 2

" ...."

=

On "dO", see 78a 20 : 2, ,sa 22, 86b 12-13, and 84ib II. Anger was discussed in B 2. In&O"pla, as was. mentioned at ,sa 22, is not one of the emotions in the Rhetoric but is found in the EN, among the emotions.

b 32-33 Atyw .....o""G....

!E

b 33 dp~_I'EV ",po...pav i.e., B 2-I!. Ross following Spenge), p. 248, secludes the adverb; Spenge)'. reasons are not strong.

b 34·:

J lll.'~ ... " ..,,!..~ Oearly A. has the moral virtues in mind and is speaking of ojO,H'Ij dq.T1j; cf. 88b 30-3 I. On l~.", cf. 6zb 13 : 2, Ii9a 8: 2. Kassel alone of the edd. read. Hal with cod. F.

a.

b 34-35 Elp,)",,' "'po...,av e.g., inA 9 the virtues and the vices. However, in A S there was a discussion of ,roda,pa.1a and the goods which are a necessary part of it: goods of the sou!, of the body, extrinsic goods, rob 20-29. In A 6 after defining the nature of good he partially repeats and adds to these goods, 62b Iolf. and see 62b 12-28'- Since the goods of the soul are virtues, we can include A S, 6 also in nedneav. b 3S-36 ",oi..... "'p.." ..",o! In A S, 6, 9 A. mentions moral goods which individual men eboose ("oia "eoa'eomal ;"aa-ro,) and <;hoose to

89Q. 3

COMMBNTAllY

191

do ("oiw. "ea"",,00, concluding in part at A 6, 63a 19 that "in general

all things deliberately chosen are good." On "ea"r",oi, 6xb 37 : z, 6:lb 4. b 36 t»..xl... C£ A s, 61b 1-14; 7, 6sa 20. At A 10, 69Q. 7-8, B 8, 86a 2S-26 it is used together with I ..., and also with i/071 as indicative of a set of established characteristics. The three age groups are studied in chaps. 12-14: 1 Wx1JV This is one of the extrinsic goods, !Sob 20-29, among which are mentioned at 60b 26-29 ""'''.,a, xe>!para (our nAoiiro.), dO• ..,.". In our present passage these notions are made a part of WXf/, which tromA. S, 61b 28-31 and 10, 69Q. 32 - 6gb s (the explanation of WX7l), seems more reasonable; o£ 67b 24. That character can be inJluenced by the accident of chance (fortune) becomes clear at EN II78a 28 - b 7 where A., speaking of ,"fOo, in the strict sense as moral virtue, .ay. that even such ,"fOo, needs the chance gifts of fortune, e.g., the liberal man and the just man need wealth to exercise their virtue, and the courageous man needs strength and power. z ....yEv .......... M";;"O...... awll"",'; These are taken up in chaps. IS-17; on good birth, A s, 60b 3<>-37; wealth, 61a 12-24; on "power" see 60b 27 and 60b 27; this seems to be its meaning here and at B 17, 91a 2<>-29.

II9a I

a 2 ...."<11)(1(1\1 C£ A s, 61b 39 - 62a 12; 6xb 39 : 1. It is the acquisition or possession of all, or very many, or the most important goods whose cause is chance. A. uses it here together with a.envXia as his explanation of WXf/ (e.g., "al 8lto,). At 60b 22-23 it is a part of efJdaJ.po.la and one of the goods of the body. In his long discwsion of its meaning at EE 1246b 37 1248b 7 A. concludes (EE 124Bb 3-7) that there are two kinds of good fortune: one, divine, in which success is thought to be given by the gods (and so o£ 91b 1-4); the other, .narural. "inclined to desiring," i.e., with appetites dominant; a 3 : 1 m.Ouf'lI".xol "cupidus" as Horace says of them at AP 16S, i.e., inclined to follow their desires (0£ ....010v07l,,"oi, a s). On h"Ovpla which is one of the dements of the ap68b 32 - 6ga 2) see A II, 70a 11-27, 6ga I : Z, petitive £acuity (r& 6ga 2-3. In the words of 70a 11-19 hnOv,.la can be either rational or iIrationai desire. However, in the explanation of the De an. 433b 3-7 and 433a 23-26, when one is moved by rational desire for the good, it is called potl17l'1&, (0£ also Top. 126a 12-13) while desire in opposition to reason is called h"Ov,.1a. From what follows immediately in our Rhetoric passage (a 4-7) it is more likdy that irrational desire is intended The fact that their po.Ali".., (890 8) are so readily dismissed and that (a 9ff.), another irrational dement, is introduced would lend confirmation to this, as do EN 109sa 4-II and Top. II7a 27-33 which stress the fact that the young are ordinarily assumed "to live by their fedings (ndOBlr (EN lu8b 17). And there is the statement, of

de""""'''',

0.1''''

A1lISTOTLE, 'RHBTOIUC' II

COOOe, at A II, 70a I9if. which identifies desires for sensual pleasures (our 89'1 4-5) with irrational desire. 2

OIol

'Iare

capable."

a 4 Ii the reading of four edd., Spengd, Cope; Ross reads dlo from a good tradition. "inclined to pursue"; as he says at EN I095a 8: the young live their lives and pursue each and every thing following the dictates of their feelings ("dOo~). ""o.,,,,lwo is a partitive genitive, S. 1306.

a 4-5 ......... .. Uxo>.ou8YjTlXol

a 5 ".o, ... ~lxopo, C£ Horace, AP 160 ("ct mutatur in ho..."), 163 ("cereus in vitium fI.ecti"). Cope, p. 142, on dtp{"oeo~ ("fickle, quickly sated") gives the evidence for this word which is found with some frequency in Plutarch. VlCtorius suggests Horace, AP 165 ("amata Tdinquere pernix") as an apt illustration of the meaning.

a6:

a 8-9 6Iiei.., . ..

1M."..,

Ross alone encloses this within parentheses with no punctuation before the parenthesis and a comma following. The ordinary punctuation followed by the edd. is preferable: "avona,· 0.6ia' ... ".ioa~ Ross makes 89a 4 ("al TWO) down to a 10 (derfil one sentence, not three, as found in the other edd., Spengd, Cope. The fact is, however, that we have here three different topics relative to the ~O.~ of the young.

a 8 l3ou).>\cr£,~ •.• IN "cyci)... , As we have seen povl1}(II, thus far e.g. 6tb 32 : 4, 69a 2.-3, 78b 18, 8ra 7, and see Bob 36 : J - it means rational wish, desire. If it denotes that here, and there is no reason that it does not, it must mean rational desire, wish, which, while impulsive and quick (d.eia,; c£ also a 7: o-q>ddea ""0.,,,,0.0-'), is not substantial and lasting (ou ",aydlo,). Comparing them to the hunger and thirst of the sick (cf. 70" 21 : z) A. indicates their transient character. a 9 eu",xol _I 61i6eu .... , au O"",&~ as a synonym for del"i (e.g., dtn'fi at a 10), see 69a 4 : z, 69b II, A II, 70h II, 78b 5: on anger, see chap. 2; on o
J alal z~

c£ II9a 3 : z. "unable to resist," LS, II.

89a 17

COMMENTARY

193

a II : 1 rpv.o"...I.." As is clear from A 5, 6Ia 37 - b 2, 6, 63b 2, this can be a legitimate love for honor, but it can also become excessive (as can 'PMO""/a, a 13; C£ 68b 21 : 1) and a motive for wrongdoing (e.g., A la, 68b 1:>-"4),; c£ 68b 20. !t seems "bett~. to "interpret this in its immediate context as love of honor, not as ambillon; see 68b 20: 1. 2 OJ.'Y"'PWfLEVO. a supplementary participle, S. 2098. For the meaning see B 2, 78b 13 - 79a 8; for its rdation to an act of dishonoring and injustice (d6""'a8a., a 12) c£ 78a 32, 78b la, and see 78b 39-30. Ross alone includes this within parentheses a 13-14 (,,,,.poxij~ ........~ and punctuates the text in b 12-21 ("al 'P,).6T1./JO •..• dn:oTBnlm....a.) differendy; C£ 8!)a 8-9. The other edd., Spengd, Cope are in agreement save at 89a 18, q.v. On the idea in 1lnBpom, 68a 23, 63b 20 : 2. At 78b 28-29 we are told in effect that Ithe young consider themsdves superior (Horace's "sublimis," AP 165). Here we learn that their desire forpre-eminence (",..pois the reason for dIeir love ofvictory since victory (as he also said earlier, A II, 70b 32-34) signifies pre-eminence; see also A 9, 67" 22-23. Cicero, De fin. 5.22.61 speaks in a similar vein about the young.

xtM

a 14 &fLrpw " ..il"..

lit.: "they are [sc. slaw) both of dIese"; for neuter

C£ S. 994; cpo 90b 8.

ijx.......

a 15 rpv.oxp1\ ...."o. &£ Cpo Horace, AP 164- We find at 890 37 dIat the young cherish their friends and companions. This combined with their disregard for money recalls an earlier comment of A.'s at A 7, 64b 1-2 .that to be fond of comrades is far more honorable dian to be fond of money; C£ 64b 1-2. In contrast the old are concerned about money (89b 28-30 with which cpo EN I I20b II - 14), a contrast also found in Plato, Rep. 549b. a 16 D.ffmxail of Mytilene, who lived ca. 650-570 B.C. and was a contemporary of Solon of Athens. He was elected head of Mytilene (aisymnetes) for a period of ten years. We know him mosdy from the poetry of Alcaeus, a life by Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers: Pittacus I.74-8I. A. speaks ofhim in the Politics, e.g., I274b I8/[; see also OeD, PW, CAH, IV 98/[ We do not know the comment made about Amphiaraos (one of the early Greek heroes), and nothing in the sayings attributed to him in Diogenes Laertius is direcdy illustrative of the preceding clause: 'PMoxplj/JaTol .•. ""'B
a 17 KCllCo1\e.~ ... E61\e ••~ The first means cynical, inclined to put the worst construetion on dIings (89b 21-22); the second, guileless, accepting things at face value (cp. Thucydides 3.83-1, Demosthenes, Ag. Timocrates,

194

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

89ll 21

52). etl>i8'1' can also mean simple, silly, foolish (as A. uses it at r I, 04a 24; 12, 13 b 19), and Cope, p. 1#, following Victoriw believl'S that such a meaning may be possible here, i.e., "simple-minded." Victorius citing Plato, Rep. 4C9a says: "stl7j8.., is used by the Greeks of those who follow the old ways, who never fear deception and construe whatever they see or hear favorably." But this would seem more proper of the group mentioned next, .iin.a~o. (a 18-19), the credulous, those who believe readily. They do so says A., as does Plato, because they have not yet been much deceived. The etl>i8.." however, are such because as yet they are innocent of most wickedness ("o"'1~ta,).

a 18 "'DV'Ip~. Tovar, Kassel, Spengd, Cope place a period after this word, which is preferable; Roemer, Dufuur, a colon; for Ross see 8ga 13-14. a 19 e6"'",,6£~ This trait of hopefulness is what determines a number of the characteristics which follow down to 89ll 34a 19-20 C>crn£p ... rp6cr... ~ as we also read at Pr.b. 955a It[, and cpo ENU54b9-II. At 78a 2.0 : 2leferencewasmade to a few passages which indicate that A. is aware of the corporeal (as opposed to the psychic) aspect of the emotions. The present passage (e.g., the very nature of the young infuses them with warmth in the same way as those intoxicated with wine) is by way of confumation, as are 89b 30-33 and also ENII28b 14-15 (Cope, p. 139) where A. is speaking of "a87) (aiM", 'Pop.,). To illustrate this physiological view of A.'s, Cope, p. 145 (also p. 139), refers to Plutarch, On M.ral Virtue 4500-f, where we read: " ... our impulses which arise in and are moved toward the corporeal and become violent or relaxed with bodily changes. So it is that the young are quick to anger, reckless, fiery in their appetites, and raging because of the abundance and heat of their blood whereas in old men the source of the appetitive which lies about the liver i. being quenched." oi• .,,.....1 appears in this form as perfect participle in the codd. of A. although the augmented form r/>.,;,,....., is common in Attic (LS); Cope p. 1#, has a comment on it. a 20-21 011'''''' 1'1) ",oJJ.ci ci"' .... """lt'l"tv... a further reason is given as a more concrete and practical explanation of their hopefulness; d"o~.",.. is to fail, miss one's object. Kassd and Cope read from a good tradition,..~ at a 21 for,..oj; cpo ,..>i"" at a 18, 89b I; o~ •.. "., at 89ll30, 31-32.

za....

a 21 ~cr, ...ci 1
890. 31

COMMBNTARY

I9S

a 24 'Ojj ••• -li ...PI!' "in the early years"; o£ Euripides. Ion 720. and cpo 89b 34: TSMvTal", ijp4/",. a:>.s oto" .... sc. IUT'; this conjecture of Dobree (Kassel). not Bekker. is read by the edd. for OrOPTa, of the codd.; P'Pv>7""" in middle voice takes

an accusative. a 26 O'...(~I"rL... ~I!'8u..S Ross alone encloses this within parentheses. as he does with many of the following clauses in the chapter. e.g.• 89a :>'7-:>'9. a 30-31. a 31-34. 89b 4-S. b f>-J7. b 9-II. This cawes him to change the commonly accepted punctnation and so to join together topics which seem better separated. e.g.. 89b S; the edd. read: "m.Ta opo[.". "al Blaba, ...

.r.v..........

a 27 "the former of which" (6:>.a 36-37). Le.. the fierce, hot-tempered (BvprMB") disposition diminishes a sense of fear for it is impossible to fear if one is angry; e.g.• a 28. and o£ Boa 33. This absence of fear is complemented by the positive quality of confidence. the opposite of fear. as was seen at 83a 13f[ where we are told further. at 83a 17-19 (as we are here at 890. 29: "to hope for some good inspires confidence"). that confidence is a certain kind of hoping. The combination of spirited and sanguine temperament makes for the greater degree of courage in the young (rlvae"OTSeO'). Courage. defined arA 9. 66b II-13. is said to be (A S. 6ra 3-4) a virtue of the young and. together with pryaAotpvX1a (0£ 890. 31-33). is called at A 6. 62b 12-14 • virtue of the soul. It should be clear that in pointing to characteristics of this sort in this age group A. has moral virtue in mind (;;60,) in the ·strict sense; o£ 88b 30-31 .

"sensitive to shame" (0£ 8sa 9 : 1) which expresses • 29 ..lax......'!Aol the idea more sharply than "modes!," "shy." etc. Owing to their limited experience the young are immature in the matter of what is honorable, the Tilo, of all morally good things (660 33 : 1). "Educated only in the established rules and customs of their society [n.,.aMswra, Wed TOV v&pouj they have as yet not entertained the idea of other standards of the honorable [.. aAr! keea Wrolap/lr:lvovalV)." I understand vop., here as explained at 73b 5 : 3 (I) and (3) (i) i.e.• positive and customary law. Consequently. keen as they are to do the honorable (89' 34-35) they are more sensitive to what others think. i.e.. the MEa of others in their regard. This attitude exposes them more readily to the fear of clishonor which is shame (83 b 14-15. EN Iu8b II-I3). Their situation is described well at 84a 25 - 84b I (o~asl~ ... a,.'1'onea). a 31 : 1 "EYC&).6IJmxo. This is another indication of their concern for the honorable; o£ 66b 17. Z olin yrlp is the reading of the codd.• four odd .• Spengd. Cope. Ross conjectures 011.

196

A1USTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

89' 35

a 32 ..on. d,""Y",d",,, "the force of circumstances." Cope, p. 147, refers to Anax. 1422a 2D-21 which explains d'ay"",a as "those things which do not lie in our power to do but are such as they are as a result of divine or human constraint."' a 33 !'-EymA."'UXI.. The definition here is different from that at A 9, 66b 17. However, as can be seen from the discussion of the idea at EN Il23a 34 - Il2sa 16, both explanations of the word are contained in the concept. At II23b 1-12 we find our present definition: "A person is thought to be high-minded who being in fact worthy deems himself worthy of great things." At II24b 7-18 we read that he is the person who does good and repays good with greater good, i.e., 66b 17.

".A""

a 34 ..ail...... ":'EA7t.&.~ This meaning of does not emerge explicitly from 8ga 19-29 but a comparison of a 19-29 with a 31-34 indicates what A. has in mind: namely, their attitude of hope combined with their inexperience of life fosters a self-confidence and ,elf-assurance which in turn inspires the self-esteem of the high-minded person. a 34-35 x .., !'-iiAA." ... ""!'-'Popclv...,,, Cpo Horace, AP 164: "utilium tardus provisor." The distioction between ,d "aM. and ,d rlVI'rpiqa. at work here i, that the honorable is an ultimate good chosen (when chosen) for its own sake, whereas the advantageous is a relative good chosen with reference to a more ultimate good. Action whose object is the honorable is not self-regarding, whereas self is the object of action directed to the advantageous. A. says as much at 89b 38 - 90a 1 and earlier at A 8, 6sb 25: "All ,men are won over by the advantageous," because, ordinarily, as he remarks at A IS, tsb 19, "no one chooses the absolute good but the good relative to

himsel£"

a 35-37 ..oj> yclcp ... "mAail "For they live more by the rule of moral character than by that of calculation." With the exception of Cope (lOo.), all read 710 .. (an instrumental dative of manner, S. 1516). This appear. to be correct both from 90a 16-18, the compauion passage, and from the explanation of 1j0 •• by deoni (i.e., moral virtue) at 89a 36-37 (" 66 deonj ,au "aAav), which is what "lOa, signifies in the ",trict" sen.e as seen at 88b 3D-31. In A 9, 66a 33 - 67a 32 A. discus.e. the honorable, identifying it as good and connecting it with virtue (c£ 660 33 : " 660 34-35). a. he says at EN lI20a 23-24: "virtuous actions are honorable and done fur the .ake of honor." The honorable is that which exists for its· own sake and is the goal of all good action. In describing the activity of the young as he does here, A. is attributing to them either formal (deliberately acquired) or natural moral virtue (de'ni). The advantageous is also a good (A 6, 62. 20) and is studied as .uch inA 6. Its difference from the honorable was indicated in the.preceding

89a 36

COMMENT AllY

197

note. At 66b 36 - 67a I we have, I believe, the distinction A. wishes to make in our present passage on the actions of the young: e.g., "all the objects of human choice which a person does not for his own sake are honorable, as also are things which arc absolutely good such as the things one does for onc's country while neglecting one's personal interests, and those things which are naturally good, and those which are not goods for the person himself, for all such are not done for the sake of the seI£" In other words the unselfish choice of good is rd HaM., and (as he remarks at BB I~4ga IQ-II) for the truly good man the advantageous and the honorable coincide. Cope, p. 147, has a strange note in which he asserts a 36 Aoy..r"o~ that ''The intellect and its calculations are here distincdy excluded from any participation in virtue which is assigned soldy to the moral character." SchfitrumpC. p. 7113, in a reference to Cope, explains the passage by the 6."&""1' concept of EN II44a 23f[ In view of the fact that cleverness itself is a form of reason, I do not see how it responds to Cope. The first problem with Cope's observation is that virtue and moral character, as we have seen them, are a stable attitude formed pardy under the guidance of reason (88b 3Q-3I). There can be no moral character, good or bad, without some role for the intellect in the form of practical reason since moral character implicates "eoate.a." which is desire conjoined with reason. The second problem with his comment is that from the companion passage at goa 16-18 we would have to say that the old for the most part do not act with virtue and moral character. Yet all of chap. 14 on the old in detailing their deficiencies specifies deficiencies in moral virtue. Moral character and virtue are not possible without the exercise of the intellect and its calculations. Furthermore it is not possible to have good practical reason without good moral character since virtue is both that which is in accord with right reason and that which aims a person at the right objective and so enables practical reason to take the right means; C£ EN II78a 16-~I, II44a 6 - II4Sa II, MM II98a IQ-~I. In his analysis of moral virtue, A. does not exclude the possibility of incomplete or deficient virtue and therefore an incorrect use of reason in deliberating. From his statements on practical rcason, we find that it can be exercised wrongly. In the first place, as II~a 7-Iof[ implic:s, to grasp one', good is not always as simple as it might seem. Secondly, we learn at II~b I~ that the calculation can be quite correct and successful, but can in the case of a person not fully good result in what is an evil and not a good. Thus in our present passage, together with its companion, goa 16-18, the object of the criticism and the contrast in the way of acting would seem to be the exercise of the practical reason upon what is practically expedient for the individual in given situations; his personal good at a given moment which as a good rdative to himsdf i, not necessarily his rcal good as a person (e.g., to do an injustice

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' II

to another person rather than incur monetary loss). On the idea in practical wisdom see Hardie, pp. 212-39; Gauthier & Joli£; II 463~ (history of concept) and noteS to II39a 17 - b 3, II4Qa 24 - b 30, II41b 8 - II4sa II; and Sorabji. a 37
1

l

b 2 : 1 Xp(VE.V sc. d,a Td; an articular infinitive in a construction similar to 6.a Td Xa4!6W. In EN IIS6a 7-19 three kinds of friendship are mentioned, that of utility, of pleasUIe, of the good. The friendship of the young i. that of pleasUIe, the love of people for the pleasUIe they give. Cpo EN IIssb 17 - IIS7b S. 2

Glen«

sc. "~l,,e'71.

b 3 11_..... ck""'P""civou.n "They commit all their mistakes with excess and vehemence." The phrase A"I [in the direction of] Td I'dlAov "al a'l'o6eoneov is another instance of the article used with the adverb to fo= a noun (S. lIS3). On al'de"tTJl'a see 74b S, 74b 7. While potentially harmful, al'aen,l'aTa as such do not have their SOUlce in moral perversity; see, e.g., A 13, 74b 2-10. b 4 Xv..;,VE.OV Cbilon (fl. S60-SS6 B.C.), a Spartan prominendy influential in his country (as indicated in later references to him), served Sparta as an ephor and may have contributed significandy to that type of government found in Sparta; cf. PW, OCD. In Diogenes Laertius, Lives oJthe PI,iIo:lOphe,.: Chi/on 1.3.68--73 we learn that the bUIden of his teaching was self-restraint but find no mention of OUI proverb. In his Life oj Thaies 1.1.40-41, however, Diogenes remarks that the sayings of the Seven Sages of Greece receive varied attributions, with Chilon singled out as the author of the saying: nothing in excess (41). On the expression cpo Euripides, Hippo/rlus 26S, and Terence, Andria 61: "ut nequid nimis"; cf. 9sa 33-34b 6 &llGXUp(!;OV...... "confidendy allinn." This is a distinct step beyond thinking that they know all. It is this complete self-assuxance (cf. 8ga 34) which leads to their excess in all that they do, e.g., 89b 6-7. sc. "ednB" from 89b 4- Although 1''76i. &yav b 7 : 1 oroii ••• cir"Y can be considered a noun expression (cf. LS, 6, >1, TO, B.LS), the main thought in b 2--7 is the manner of acting. At 89b 4 (nd.Ta rde) unrestrained action

COMMBNTARY

199

is given as the reason for their excess in wrong action. At A 89b S-6 ("a! ... ~""%"eICovTa,) another characteristic trait of the young is introduced and it is now offered (To6ro rde) as the reason for their unrestrained action. • &&,x-IJp."'f" ••• €I; GI3P'v . C£ 74b 8, 73b 36: 1. aaooj"aTa are acts which proceed· from moral badness and are done with knowledge and so are considered voluntary. But they can be either the result of deliberation and moral choice (and so deliberately wrong actions) or the result of emotion (and so partially outside the control of deliberation). In our passage A. docs not say which they are, and so both meanings arc possible. As to the meaning of 01, IJllelV . . . "altOVerlav ("with wanton insolence in mind not small-minded malice"), the companion passage at 90a 18-'9 (sec also 9I~ ,8-,g) is of assistance in deriving this understanding of the words; c£ bdow. However, Po/. 129Sb 9-II says that the causes of d~'''''"a..a are twofold, vile" and "axoverla, and identifies the former (cp.73a '3 : 1) with great wrong acts, the latter with minor. This passage is in tum reinforced by B ,6, 9" ,8-1g which, together with our present passage (89b 7-8), points back to 78b 28-29 (~.d 01 viOl "al 01 "Aov,,"o" ...). There we learn that hyhristic action is typical of the yOWlg and the wealthy as the means taken to asscrt their superiority. In this sense the wrong action of the yOWlg is fully in accord with the general mode of behavior attributed to them ill 8gb 3-7: one of excess. Thus I am not sure that A. is diminishing the wrongdoing of the young as we find 8gb 7-ll interpreted in the translations: e.g., "If they do wrong to others, it is because they mean to insult them, not to do ·them actual harm" (Roberts). Sec gIa 18 : 2 a10ug with A.'s example at a Ig. The contrast between the wrongdoing of the young here and that of the old (goa 18-19), who are shown in general as mean and ignominious in their wrong action, not strong and violent, tends to confirm the interpretation oifcred, as do Cope's remarks, pp. 14;1, 16g. b 8-n D.E1J'fucol ..• "':''f..u; This becomes clear from chap. 8 where piry is defined and explained. Here, however, A. stresses the aspect of the manifest Wlmerited misfortWle of anodler which evokes pity and does not mention its other aspect: namdy, misfortune which the person who pities sees also as something possible for himsd£ As a matter of fact, from what A. has said of the young in general. they could well qualify for those who do not experience pity; see, e.g., 8sb 21-23 (oil... 01 . •. "'16m- """".). However, there are two statements which explain A.'s use of tAs'l"'''o/ of the yOWlg. The first, 8sb 34 - 800 1 ("clv ol.",ra•. .. """06) is directly connected with the reason given here for the young's being disposed to pity, 8gb 8-g (dod T• • • • w.o}.a"lIav ...). The second, 90a 20 (which attributes youth's capability for pity to their
200

AllISTOTLB,

I

RHETORIC ,

n

of fdlow-feding with man on the part of one who pities which makes him awal"C that he too can experience the misfortwle; cf. 85b 14-15.

b 9 Xp'l ....ou~ ><,11 ~u... iou~ The "al is alternative: "or." On the meaning of xe7lC1TOV~ and so of {J....{ov~ (its alternate) as "morally good," see Boa 30 : 1; it is also confirmed hy the criterion used, d"a,,{a, i.e., the absence of moral badness. There are two ways in which our phrase can be inte'OL Ross, Spengd alone read 'I',lsv'ed".lo, with cod. A. S~J1:ean.lla is analY2ed at EN II27b 33 - Iu8b 3, EE 1234a 4-23, MM II93a II-I9, and the general impression A. conveys is that it is a form of well-bred, tactful wit (as the word is ordinarily translated) and hwnor: e.g., ot de! E"".J.iiJ~ "a{l;o...~ sll'ed"slo, neoaayoe.Vo.Ta, (EN 1128. 9-10). In this sense it is not a trait which one would readily identify with the young for whom 'I'£loycll"T'~ (care-free enjoyment of life) seems more characteristic. The further specification of SVTean.Ua as "cultivated insolence" might be more to the point. In fact, eVTean...la originally had a pejorative sense (Gauthier & Jolif, II.I, 316-17) and that may be.t work here. Realistically the "wit" of the young by and large is more akin to what Cicero (Orat. 26.87, De or.t. 2.54.218) calls dicaeitas ("in iaciendo mittendoque ridiculo") than to foutiae.

b II

b 13 .... ,,"Cv ••• 7jeo~.

C£ chap. 13, init.

CHAPTER 13

I . Introduction: 89b 13 -IS

II . Development: 89b 15 - 90' 24 I.

89b 15 - 90a 6

2.

90a 6-11

3. goa 11-16

attitudes of the old: hesitant, positive about nothiug, cynical, distrustful, small-minded, ungeneIOUS, cowardly, fond of living, self-seeking and thus looking to the advantageous not the honorable, shamdc.ss, not hopeful their .ctions: live in the past their tlnotions and desires: anger, violent, but weak; desires non-existent or feeble their actions: live in accord with the advantageous, not the honorable; do wrong in a petty and malicious waYi are inclined to piry, are queruloll'

III . General conclusion: 90a 25-28

to chaps. 12-13

89b 13 TO ph ... ij8o~ Four odd., Spengd, Cope make thi. part of ch.p. 13. I would prefer to read it as l{assd does, i.e., as the cooclusion of 12, and to begin 13 .t 01 d~ 1Cf!WPVTBl!o.. . .. Thi. do•• not seem to be an unusual use of transitional ",6P oJ. followed by a sentence introduced by de; we h.ve it at 88b 2!r30, or 9Da 25-29, or Pol. I25Sb 39. with the participle: "p.st their prime more or less." i.e., "formed of character rypes opposite to those just presented." A study of ch'ps. 12, 13, 14, youth, old age, prime oflife, reveal. the following qualitie. considered in each (the numbers are given serially): b,,6v"'''In"oi (89' 3; 90a 13; 90b 2); 6v",,,,01 (89' 9; 90a II; 90b 2); ",.l&~.",o. (89' 12; ? 89b 26-27; -); ""loXI!7j",a~o. (89' IS; 89b 28-30; 90b I); WIl6 •• , (89' 17; 89b 20; -); oIm.aTo. (89' 18; 89b 22-23; 90a 32); etl.hr;,de, (89' 19; 9Da 4; -); a.dee'""l!o, (89' 26; 89b 30; 90' 31 .nd 90b 3); aluXV'~Aol (89' 29; 9Da 2; -), ",syaM'P"Xo, (89' 3I; 89b 26; -); "I!dn... ~d "aAd (89' 34; 89b 37; 90a 34); 1/6.. COOu. (89) 35; 90a 16; -); ",M6",.Ao, (89) ]7; 89b 36; -); ",Mo;;U, lira. (89b 4; 89b 23; -); sldba, a"av~a (89b 6; 89b 18; -) dd,,,06UIV (89b 7; 90" 18; -); 'A~",ol (89b 8; 90a 19; -); ",'AoyeAOI", (89b II;

b 14 :

1

"Xoliav

2

tv......."""

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' II

90a 23; -). Toward the end of 88b 30-3 I the significance of many of these qualities for .q8o, as moral virtue was noted. The following qualities are peculiar to the young: sVp«d/lolot (89a 6), "o"at povl>ia.., (890 8), .';.~a",l­ ",TO' (89a 25), r7tpOa@&r'eo> apQ@TavoVr7t (89b 3). Cpo on the old, Horace, AP 1<>9-174.

b IS .... 7dEi......... i\S'I

"for the most part possess characters." On

1j8'1 cf. 88b 30-31.

b 16 1<4£1... l!i'l" ..-rij ..S.., ... '!i'lll-"P~"o\v'"

nulw is a cognate ac-

cusarlve (S. 1573-1574) with both verbs. b 16-17 .... 1<4£u" ••• "p..y~'t'WV another articular infinitive with a,a TO (b IS) understood: "and because human affairs in general turn out badly."

This is the reading of all the codd., three edd., b 18 : 1 ~....6v« "Y"" Spengd, Cope. Ross reads in••
203

COMMENTARY

2 OiOV"C'tlL, iaacn i.e., '"suppose, suspect, believe," as opposed to "know for a fact, have knowledge of"; e.g., Plato, Apol. 2Id: oJTO~ ",h or... Tal TO .ldha, OVH .IMJ~ (this fellow supposes that he knows something though he knows not). Cpo 89b 6. Victorius suggests Ci=o', comment on the testimony of Indutiomarus "who omitted from hi. whole testimony that most cautious word 'I think' [a,biITo,] which we customarily use even when, under oath, we state those facts we have as=tained and have oursdves seen, and scated that he 'knew' [scire] all" (For Fonteius 13-29).

J

cill
2

...0 r"",~ K"[

C£ A 2, 56a 8. Cope reads d"''P,aP''lTO;;OTB~. The joining of the two adverb. is not un\JSUai for a stronger statement of the uncertainty. Cpo Horace, AP 171.

b 20 :

J

""Yu..~

ep. r

2 KClKO>\8.,~ IS, r6b 10-15.

b 19 :

"'''x''

"without any reservation." A. specifies his meaning of the word in what follows;

b 21 ...0 btl .•. "dv..." The articular in£nitive ("to put the worse constrUction on everything") is predicate; at 90a 5 we find ,,"eoo again.

.,,1 ...

Cpo 890 r8. We also find there b 22-23 K"Xu"6",,,o( ... l,.."..p[DlV in d,d TO ... 'O"l"aTija8a, the ""Planation of what is meant by the of the old who have frequently been deceived; see the comment at 89a 17.

'''''''l(!iav

b 24 : J ....,;;.,." This is specified most likely by the reason. given from 89b 15-23, e.g., b r5-17 (d,d,.Iie ... nea,.",tfraw), b 22-23 (cin,rrrlao ... la .). 2 ..-Ijv B[DlV""~ ~"o8>l"'I" "the counsd of Bi..... On vno801H'f/V, 68a 5 : J where it is used in the sarne sense. Bias of Priene is another of the Seven Sages whose· life we have in Diogenes Laertius. He is often referred to in the early literature and lived, as did most of these wise men, in the early part of the first half of the sixth century B. c. He is spoken of for his statesmanship and legal expertise; see PW.

' ' ' ' fI

b 24-25 ""l \aov....~ They both hate and love (xal- Hal). cl>~ ""aojaon.~: "as though they will one day hate," S. 2086. With our passage cpo 95a 26-33 (TO d. >f8o~ ... del 'PIAB"). The saying is fairly common in ancient literature: e.g., Sophocles, Ajax 677-683 (and ep. Oedipus Col. 614-615), Euripides, Hippo/ylUs 253-257- Demosthenes, Ag. Aristoerates 122 (660) accepts it as a sound principle in human affairs, whereas Scipio is cited in the De amicitia of Ci= (16.59) as considering the sententia most pernicious to the very idea of friendship and something which he could not accept as a saying of Bias'. In his Lives of the Philosophers: Bias 1.82-88, Diogenes Laertius notes as one of Bias' counsds to men: "to love friends as though they will one day hate them" (87). Aulus Gellius (Noet.. Attica.

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

17.14-4) cites as a seuteuna of Publilius Syrus' (who came as a slave [from? Antioch] to Rome in the first century B.C. and became quite popular ca. 43 B.C. as a writer of mimes): "Hold a friend in such wise that you consider him one who easily becomes an enemy." b 26 fI....p6
C£ 66b 19 : 1; cpo 89a 31-32.

C£ 63a 27 : 4. b 27 : 1 7t.p.noU z '""" ••. (jlov i.e., the necessities of daily living. b 28 : 1 clvu.we.po. C£ 6xa 7, 66b 7 : 1. EN II21b 13-I4 (oj d' d••lev6'1lla • •. nO&erv) is direcdy to the point. Cpo Horace, AP 170. z clvllYXllk.>v i.e., 89b 27: "ed, ... (Jlo•.

b 29-30 060'''' ..• 'CD "..-.jO'IIO'ell' .....0 cl7topoO.dv

These are all subjects (ACId understood) to which 8. n, xaleno., 64d.o. are predicates: "for money is one of these necessities, and at the same time they know from experience that acquiring it is difIicult and losing it easy." Plutarch, MoraUa 786b, notes that Simonides when charged with being avaricious (c£ Aristophanes, Pax 698-699) remarked that since old age had robbed him of all other pleasures, he was growing old with the only pleasure left, that of making money.

b 3O-]I lioiAol ... 7tPCKpoP1]...... 1 Cpo 89a 26-27 and Horace, AP 171-172 ("res omnis ... inen"). "eo
v..

v.....

b 3I lv.. I"lS yoip a.&x•• On the meaning in the verb, c£ 77b 27-28. The statement here is explained in what follows: "aT61pVY",ivo •• .. xaT4tpvEI, ian.. In 892 19-20 there is a physiological explanation for the sanguine temperament. Here, as in the definition of fear at 820 21-22,' the physiological aspect of the emotion receives attention. Fear is identified with a coldness in the physical system, 89b 33:
205

COMMENTAlIY

condition of old age with its accompanying coldness which prepares the way for timidity. In De part. anim. 650b "7-30, it is the condition of the cooled blood, and in Frob. 954b 10-13, the condition of the chilled bile which prepares the way ("eoQ)~O"O;'1Ta.; "eow6onrnol1J"') for fear. b 33 xczTci
ien."

Ross, Kassel, Cope read

"aTa.,v,I,

T"

from

b 34 : 1 "">.O~"'O' A5 Cicero says in De senectute 7.24: "No one is so old that he does not think that he can live another year," or Sophocles, "No one cherishes life like an old man" (frg. 63, ed. Nauck & Snell). 2 Tduxlcz Cpo 89b 25-:>.8 ("al ... .,,,I}vpooa.); cf. EN lI07b 21 - 1I08a I, lI25a 17-34. However, there is nothing in EN, EE, MM which would justify the use of the word here as a reason for self-love. The statement at 84" 3-5 ("al Td "'P' ..• ~p"a) and that found at I25Ib 16-25 of On the Virtues and Vices (speci:6cally the consequence of p"'eo1pvxia: namely, pettiness, faultfinding, pessimism, moral baseness) might indicate the selfseeking attitude A. appears to have in mind from what he says at 89b 37 - 900 [ ("a! "ed, ... "aAclv 1in.i0i,); cf. also I19b 36 : 1. This may explain the use of the word here; and so "a! aliT,!: "even this is a kind o£" Cope, pp. 15455, also offers an explanation.

n,

C£ 89& 34-3S. A5 we know b 37-38 xczl "po~ ... ",o.CZUTO. .t"cz. from A 6 the avp'Pieov is a good (62. 17-21) and as such is a legitimate object

206

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' 11

90a 6

of desire. As it is defined here at 90 a 1, it is a good rdative to the person. There is nothing intrinsically wrong wid, such goods since even absolute goods (i.e., goods desirable for their own sake) can be thought of as goods rdative to the person choosing. Anaximenes 1422. !}-16 gives a list of ""p'I'leovra which include many that are absolute goods although he is obviously thinking of them as goods rdative to the penon. However, as A. says at A 9, 66b 3tS-]8 absolute goods are Hald (and he gives his meaning of HaMW at 66a 33-34) but relative goods are not, the reason being that relative goods are sdf-directed (672 I: atlTov"de bBHa Tei To,a.Ta); and he extends this quality in a general way to those things whim are goods to • living person (672 2-3: TO "de aiTro;; bBHa pli).).•• l".. Tei 'olin,). In other words, rdative good has a sdf-directed quality, and the fact that the old moose the rdative good pli).)..v II is attributed to their love of seI£

a.,

!IDa 2 civ,dOXWTO'

C£ 8sa 9:

Shamdessness is defined at 83 b 16. On all1xwn7i.ol

J.

a 2-3 &LClt ••• ""1''Po!pOVTO~ "for, since they do not attend to the honorable in the same degree as they attend to the advantageous." a 3:

J

",d ""l"Po!pOVTO~

Ross, Kassd, Cope read with a good tradi-

tion: Ka&-r:oV avprpe(lO'llTo,. 2 TOG SOX£LV lIaf their reputation." i.e., TOG

dOH2i'P Blval n: of being thought to be something, LS, 11.5. Thinking only of themselves they disregard what othen think of them; c£ 84a 24-26.

Cpo 890 27; the reason (dcd d"",..eiav) is explained in a 4 &u..u.7tLl;~· JVhat follows, 89a 4-6 (Tei"de ... ".'e.v).

a 4-6 : J '"'" iP.11:E.pl.... (To. yo.p ... E..".V· ci11:O~ ..lvE' ••• XE"ipOV), ",d In ... &Eo,IOIV This is the punctuation of Ross, Kassd and it is more effective than that of the other edd., Spengd, Cope who in place of the parentheses punctuate with colons; c£ !IDa 6 : 2. Z (To. ••• yoUV To. mt>.AclL •••) "for most of the things whim happen in life are bad, at least many of them tum out for the worse." Kassel, Cope read from a good tradition for the "de read by the other edd., Spengd. The restrictive particle gives a more satisfying sense here; c£ S. 2830.

.u.."" ...

".u.

J xc"ipov Cpo 89b 12: ll1T•• •• "dna. Z &Co,IClV a second reason. Cowardice is a form of fear, and the fearful person is expectiug evil (82.21-25), not good. On the cowardice of the old, c£ 89b 30-33- However, granting the physiological explanation given there, emotion as we have seen has a cogoitive dement. It appears, therefore, more precise to join this reason for the cowardice of the old more

a6:

90a 19

207

COMMBNTAIIY

closely with the previous one (experience) keeping in mind Acschines' remark (cited by Cope, p. 156): "the lawgiver is quite aware, I believe, that older men are more advanced in good critical judgment, but that courage is now beginning to fail them because of their experience of human affairs" (Ag.

Tim.rehus 24).

...

a 6-7 x,d ~"'a, 0.,,(6. C£ 89a 21. A reading of A II, 700 27 70b 29 focuses A.'. comments on the role of the past and the future (9oa7-u) in the lives of the old. a 9-10 46o).."ltu.~ ... ~ov....~ Nestor in the Iliad is a good example. As Plato has the aged Cephalus say: "Know well that for me the desire for and pleasure in good talk increase as the pleasures of the body wither away" (Rep. 328d).

GulLO! c£ 89& 9. The language here (d••" pi> daB...,,) echoes that of 89a 8 (&••'m ... ou p.,.,uao).

a"II

a 12 : 1 XIII III i".GuIL!II' ""I b,,6upiao of cod. A is read by three edds., Spengd. Ross, Kassd, Cope read with cod. F ""I "I b"6upi,,o. Two lines bdow (o,IT' b"6up~TO,,ol olire "I1a"Tt"oi) all the edd. read with cod. F; cod. A transposes the two words. On b,,8uplao, see 89a 3 : 1. 2 lxAEl.o!"IIG'V ''have failed"; and so the consequence at a 13: oifr' b"6up~T",,,i: "they are not inclined toward desiring."

a 13 "plIX"'LXol ... xlp6o~ "nor do they act from motives of desire but rather from those of gain." On "II""To"oi C£ 61b 37 : 2, Ii2b 4a 14 _'Ppov,xol At A 9, 66b 13-15 we have the definition of ''''''Peomlv77; C£ 66b 13. Since the dderly are rdativdy free of desire, they "appear to be able to control themsdves." On the force of the termination, see S!lb 32: I. a IS 4vdx..o,

"have slackened"; for the metaphor c£ 60a 24.

a 16 .,.;;; xip6.. In what follows at a IIS-I8 A. continues this theme of the sdf-interest and odf-seeking of the old which he has mentioned a number of times: 89b 27-30 (T';;. "eo, TO. plo•.. .), 89b 36 - 900 I ("al 'PtJ."1>TO .... ), 900 14 ("aT,hd "Iedo,). a IIS-I8

x .. l fLUUov ..•

tOT'V

C£

a 18-19 XIII -..l6un\IL.......... llfip.v

89a 34-35,

a 35-37. a 36.

C£ 89b 7 : 2.

.1,

a 19 : 1 oUx GfiP'v Ross, Cope alone read: ou" ilPe .. from a good tradition. However that tradition also reads ddo"ia. not the ""Houeria. which Ross and Cope accept from cod. A. 2 o.CYjT'XO! C£ 89b 8-n.

208

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' 11

90a 27

3 'r@'r
a 20 : 1 al f'iv .. . qU.AClV9Pld7dClV "The latter," i.e., the young, are inclined to pity because of their feeIing of common fellowship with all men (e.g., 89a 3'7f£, "al 'I',M'I'I;"I ••. To1l, '1'1).0"'); on 'I'I;'a.8e.",la, see 8Sb '4-'5. 2 el"8Ev.,,,~ This is explained at a 21-22 ("dna ... UB'1Tt"d.), and the explanation is sinIply the second PaIt of the definition of pity: namely, pain at another's manifest and harmful misfortune which one could expect to suffer oneself particularly if it proximately threatens one (85b 14-27: 8 HCi•••• s1IAOYluToI yael· At 86a 27-29 he gives as a general principle for pity: what we fear as happening to ourselves is the thing that exciteS our pity when it happens to another.

naB.,.,

a 21 tWn>i~ ....8.i~ Kassel alone reads a~TO'~. The infinitive with its object "dna, is subject to lyyu, el,'at: "for they believe that all possible suffering is near to them"; cf. Goodwin, p. 745.

a 22 : I

D.E1]T'xOv e.g., 85b '3-'9; 7}.: S. 1903. "querulous"; cf. Horaoe, AP 173: "diflicilis, queruIus." On s1ITed,,';'ol cf. 8gb II. 2

'raU'rO ••• 6&UP'rlXO{

a 23 qUAOY£).O.O. Kassel alone reads 'I'tAOYBMp, a nominative plural for 'I'tAoyiA"TB~ (LS, s.v.). Spenge!, p. 256, suggests this since 'I'tAdyeA.,~ is the £orm A. has been using, e.g., at 89b II, 90a 24a 25 'rel ij8"1)

C£ SSb 30-31; "the kinds of character."

a 26 cl_&'xWT... ie., admit into d,e mind, and so "receive favorably, hear with favor," give credence to. "discourse addressed to and in accord a 26-27 'roU~ 'rcj> . • • bp.o{ou~ with (reflecting) their own character"; cf. Plato, Gorg. 5131>-c. This appears to be the more correct interpretation although Cope, p. 157 (wiili Freese), interprets: "since language, ... as well as persons similar to themselves, are acceptable to everyone." This interpretation may be occasioned by a 28 ("ai mhol "al 01 ).61''' both ilie speakers iliemselves and the discourse). However, if 7}80' as a form of proof is in question (which it is), its effect is achieved 6,,1 Myov; cf. 560 I, a 4~ (dtd pi•. .• Air••Ta), 66a 10 (dl'~61"06, sc. My.v), 66a 25-28 (uvppofJUtrral . .. deeTfJ.). a 27-28 7";'~ . . . AOYO' "how the speakers in the discourse they employ will reflect such characters both in themselves and in their words."

CHAPTER 14

general statement: cbaracrer of those in the prime of life lies midway between that of the young and that of the old

I . Introduction: 90a 29-30

II . Devdopment: 90a 30 - 90b

I2

I. 900 30 - 90b 6

not excessively confident or overly fearful not ex=sively trustful or d;strustful

(.) 900 30-3'

(b) 90a 3'-33 (e) goa 34 - 90b (d) 90b

I

1-'

(,) 90b >-3

(I) '90b 3-6 2.

of the introductory statement specific instances:

90b 6-g

not living only for honor or the advantageous

frugal similarly with respect to anger and desire temperate with courage and vice vena not extravagant or

general principle: those in the prime of life possess the valuable qualities of the young and the old the age period of those in the prime of life

III . General conclusion: 90b 13 -14

to chaps. 12-14

gOB 29 : 1 4"p.ci~ov..~ C£ 90b 9-12. 2 ..0 ij90~ accusative of respect, S. 1601. This is an instance (c£. 88b 30-31) of.the use of YJO.~ as the generic term which includes the domioaot aod typical traits of 0 specific type, e.g., the young, the old, etc. We find it at 89b 13, 90026, 90b 17, 9Ib 7. a 30 ix..dp........ 6KIEfI(30).>jV "removing the excess of each of the other two," i.e., both excess aod deficiency as we see at 90b iI-9 (i/aa ... dlkin.va ..). Since A. begins to exemplify the statement of 90a 29-30 in what immediatdy follows, 0 clearer punctUation break in English might be of hdp, e.g., ". .. of the other two - they will be neither excessivdy confident, etc." Cope, p. 158, on dq>a
210

ARISTOTLE, cRHBTORIC' II

lines there is a series of active participles each specifying a'l""eo'ihrrs, •.•

""se/loA>lv. a 31 8I1ppoGv...~ (8plI..u..YJ~ ••• ) Ordinarily there is no distinction made between Bd{1ao, and Beaao,; e.g.• at Pol. us8a Io-II we read that "the function of courage [d.6eeta,] is not to make money. but to produce daring [Bdeao,]." and at 1312a 19 that "courage possessing power is daring [Beaao,]." Bd{1ao, as "daring." "confidence" was discussed at 83a 16 - 83b 10. However. at 83a 2 Beaa", C'audacious." "over-bold',) appears to carry the meaning given here. i.e., Beaa6TrJ, = atpddea Baeew., as we also find it at EN II07b 2-3: 6 d' b Tq; Baees,v ,j"se/ldU.,. 6eaatl,. On the other hand. at A 9. 6-]b 2 (c£ 67b I : J). 8eaatlv Iiluld mean confidence. daring and not necessarily rashness. audaciousness. although this second meaning is possible. See. for example, the shifts in its meaning at oob 19-20. "they are well disposed." At I19b 14 : z the a 32 ...w;;~ ... 1x0V"ni~ points of correspondence among the three age groups are noted. a 33 I<1I..elI ..G ck}.YJ8~ Cpo 74b I; i.e.• they make their judgments in accord with what is really the case. C£ 6Sb 1 : 1. I14b 26. 9Gb I : 1 clllell "PG~ olI(IofPCd There is no contradiction in this. as was seen at I19b 37-38. z 1<111 oil... "PG~ 'P.'8ci> sc. ,"
b 2:

explained at b 4-6; on the meaning in b 3 cnlxppov.~ p..... elIv6plII~ each word see the references at 908 14 and 8!)a 27. b 4 vta,~ •.. ytpOUG' The evidence for the separation (6'rie'7Ta.) of the.e two virrues in the young and the old is obvious from the preceding chapters. A specific statement on the absence of temperance and the presence of courage in the young is found at 89a 4-6 and 890 26-29. The same is true for the cowardice of the old (89b 30-33) •. but not for the presence of temperance a. an active vinuc; at the most 908 12-IS indicates its presence by a kind of default. C£ S5- 7 : b 6 .:.~ &I! ....80>."" ot_iv meaning similar to "a60AOU here; 74" 30.

1

where dnl
90b 13

COMMBNTARY

211

b 7 8'lIP'I....' This is a perfect middle (in eontrast to its use as a passive at b 4-S): "all the useful qualities which youth and old age divide between themsdves are each [TatiTa cJp'l'..] possessed by those in the prime of life." On the singular form with the two eollective nouns, see S. 966; Ross alone reads 6'rie'lOTa, with Richards (p. 110).

b 8-9 &..... U

\m:Ep~cUAou ...,y .•. upp.6....crv i.e., 6aa (TWO tb'l'sJ..tfJOJ». TO ",fre'o. here is clearly A.'s oj fA"f16nj,; see, for example, Pol. 129Sb 3-5; cpo Euripides, Hippolytus 253. At BNrlO6a 13 -1IQ7a24A.sbows man's excellence or virtue to be that which makes him a good man, makes him perform his fimction as man well. This virtue i, moral virtue, which is concerned with man's emotions and actions. It eonsists in finding the mean between excess and deficiency in emotions and in actions and in deliberatdy cultivating that mean as a habit; e.g., lI06b 36ff.: "virtue is a habit grounded in choice, and it lies in a mean rdative to oundves, a mean defined by a rational principle in the way that the man of practical reason would define it." Men in the prime of life in choosing the mean arc clearly choosing what is proper to them (TO /ie",onoo, 90b 2) as men..

b

II

~ci. lvo~ &e:iv TrEV~~XOVTCl

"fifty

save one," a use of the absolute

in£nitive in place of the more usual participle; cf. LS, ai.. (B) 2.. As the commentatorS note, A. here, as also at PoL 133 5b 32-35 and elsewhere, appears to acccpt the septenary principle of the stages of life which we find in Solon (£g. 2.7; West) although he questions the theory at Pol. 1336b 37 - 1337" 3 -reading either "aAw, (codd.) or "a".., (eoni.). As Solon enunciates the principle, man's life is divided into ten weeks of seven years for a life span of seventy years. For Solon man's bodily prime occurs in the fourth week of years (age 22-28). Plato, Rep. 46oe, places it at 30, as A. does here (e.g., 3D-H), both somewhat over the age given by Solon. A. sets man's intellectual prime at 49 as does Solon who places this prime in the seventh week (4349). Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 4.29.3, 4.3I.4, speaks indiscriminatdy of both ages 50 and 30 as man', physical and intellectual prime. Macrobius (II. ca. A.D. 400) in his commentary on Cicero's Somnium Scipionis 1.6.1ff: engages in an extended numerological analysis of human life based on the number seven. Kassel reads dB, (cf. Der Text, p. 136). b 13-14 _iwv iJ8iiiY "Let these remarks so/flee [Toaa;;"a s/eojaOwj with regard to youth •.. and the kinds of character bdonging to each."

CHAPTER IS

I . Introduction: 90b 14-16

tranSlt10n to the goods of fortWle which aft"ect character

II . Development: 9Gb 16-31

the character formed by e(,yw.,a (well-born, good birth): more ambitious disdainful

1.9Gb 16-19 9Gb 19-22 3. 90b 22-3 1

2.

!lOb 14-15 ".pt ... liy,dlc'".

diff'erence between "well-born" and "noble"

C£ 89a 1-2 and

II9a 1 :

1.

b 15-16 5,' 3"..... '
.uy.vd..~ C£ A 5, 60b 30-37 which makes it clear that good birth is not nobility of blood, which it can include, but ancestors marked by distinctions and honors. When the concept appears in Augustan, postAugustan Latin as genuosus, gmerosilas, it carries a similar meaning. But see also !lOb 22-23.

b 16

b 17
2I4

ARISTOTLB, IRHETORIC' 11

b 20 : 1 ,....."'PP""'II'rtxov On the meaning, c£ 78b IS-I7; as Cope, p. I62, indicates, the adjective agrees with an understood TO .""..11, which in fact replaces the preceding .""iv••a in the following sentence. These two character traits (ambitioumess, contempt) presumably belong to the wellborn as such, wbether or not they are also " ........ (true to their birth) as this last is described in the rest of this chapter, 90b 22-] I. The reason for both dispositions i. radicated in the i.T,pOT71' "!I.,,&...., a quality independent of, and thus unaffected by, anyone who falls from this birthright. This point is usually overlooked in the comment on this chapter. See !lOb 22-]I. 2 x,d ""'" . . . .ru..wv "even of those who are equal to their own ancestors," i.e., those of good birth show disdain toward their contemporaries who are as distinguished in their own right (i.e., have won the same or similar honors and distinctions) as the ancestors of those who are disdainful once were. Four edd. read cWTIii.; Spengei, Kassel, a~TIiiv. Cope reads with cod.

F.

TOr, amwv.

b 21-22. 6.0..•... w.o...~cIvEUT" "because the same distinctions [TmlTa] when they are further back in time rather than near at hand are held in greater honor and are easy to boast about." This explanation should be compared with the argoment at 87" II-]2.. The translations, Spengel, Cope, carry the comparative idea over to .~alaCo.8VTa, e.g., "easier to boast of," Kassel reads TriTa for TmlTd of the other edd., Spengei, Cope; Spengel, however, p. 2S8, finds Tama of cod. A acceptable; .cWTa appears to come from Victorius.

After discussing two ways in which good b 22.-] I I ........ ~xpa..au~ birth affects character, A. breaks off the development at b 22.-]I. The break is apparendy occasioned by his awareness of what he mentions at b 2S-]I (IP.ea . .. ). Thus the ooly point which emerges in the rest of the chapter as far as the specific intent of the chapter is concerned is that the chance acql1isition of good birth does not automatically ensure for one's the qualities attributed to .""i•••a. Something further is required. This is called '0 While TO " ...a.oo might in fact also be viewed as a form of wX"), yet as defined by A. it presumes action on the part of the individual endowed with good birth, some form of personal responsibility. This is the clear implication in the specifying phrase (b 2]) "not to degenerate from one's own nature." A certain kind of nature is received by the chance gift of good birth (.,)yiv ..a). Such a gift, if the individual preserves it by being true to his birth (TO " •••ai••), can .ffect >l8.,. Historically, however, the known facts (b 28-30) point to variance in families of good hirth: some continue, some falter. The passage is a rdlection of the nurture-nature discussion of the fifth and fourth centuries. Euripides mentions the problem in connection dying of Polyxena, He<. S9I-OO.z. But his choice with the noble (" ...

;jIJ.,

".".a'.'.

a'.')

90b 28

COMMBNT AllY

215

at Electra 367-372, Supplices 91I-9I7 is nurture, as it is that of A. here. A. would appear to have in mind what he has said elsewhere about virtue (e.g., at EN 1I03a 23-26): namcly, that nature gives us seminally the wherewithal for virtue but practice, exercise, education make virtue a reality for the person. The well-born have a good beginning but no assurance of a good end.

b 2.2-23 I ...., ...
"The tenn 'well-born' refers to [LS, HaTa, B.iV.2] excellence of stock whereas 'noble' means not to degenerate from one's nature." This idea is found in Hist. animo 488b 18-20. The verb UlaTaatla. in this construction carries the idea of a change to the worse; c£ 90b 28 (1lE1C1TQTQ •.•• d~), LS, B.II.4- The meaning of qnla" here is that found at P"I. 1252b 31-34: "qnla,~ is a completion, for the kind of thing each entity is when its becoming (generation) is completed is that which we call the qnla,~ of each, for example of a man, a horse, a household." In this sense nature is the same as the essence of .. thing, that which makes a thing to be what it i.. In our present instance nature, then, would be that which is given by good hirth.

a".p ........"!!..I,,., 8"'e refers to TO I'q ',lrnQa6a, Tfi~ qnlaBW,. Cpo Euripides, The Childr." q{ Hera,/es 324-328.

b 23-24

b 25-26 rpopek ... y'YV0p.£vOt; Cpo Pindar, Nem. 6.8-1I, 1I.37-42; Demosthenes, On the Crown 61 speaks of a opoeci. "'e066TW' Hal dweodQ"w., and Aeschines, Ag. Ctesiphon 234 of a opoeci e'1TOeW' "0"'le""

b 27 Eyyly"........, 5,ek . . •

"extraordinary men appear over a certain period of time." On 6.&, see LS, A.H.I; on 'yyl')lPOnQt., Plato, Gorgw 526a.

".v.,,,

c1v..5Ui..... ,,, The verb is better .taken intransitively: b 28 : I "and then again it falls oK." This is the way in which the Greek scholiast (Anon.) takes it, as do Bonitz, Index, the English translations, and Dufour and Tovar. Vietorius interprets the word also in its more ordinary meaning, and this meaning is adopted by Vater, pp. 108-109, Spengel, p. 259, and Cope, p. 164: "and then (after an interval of unproductiveness) they begin again to produce them." 2 ":'rpuii y ....'! "Clever .tock degenerates into more demented kinds of character." This is in contrast to C1Tda'I'Q (yiv1)) at b 30: "staid, .table stock" which deteriorates toward "fatuousness and dullness." Spongel, pp. 259£, calls attention to Plato, Statesman 31oc-o which attributes the same qualities to a decline in lineage owing to a certain self-seeking in marriage which fails to develop the line by an intelligent mix of family stocks. The close relation between cleverness and madness is mentioned at Poetics I455' 32 , Frobl. 954" 31-34.

u6

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC· II

b ~!r-30 'AAxl~"i6ou mA. A good illustration of what A. means by clever vs. staid can be found in plutarch's Jives of Alcibiades and eimon. In Plato's Alcibi.Jes I.u8e, the sons of pericles (Paralus and Xanthippus) are called foolish and stupid, and much the same is said of Socrates' sons in Plutarch', Life ofCato the Eltkr (chap. 20). We cae see this concern for the preservation of the excellence of their stock: in the quest of LysimadlUs and Me1esias (who accept themselves as ordinary men) for the right education for their own .ons, in Plato's dialogue Laches. Indeed Lys.irnachus (the son of Aristides) and Melesias (the son of Thucydides the elder) are mentioned in the Meno 93'-940 along with the sons of T'hemistocles and Perides as sons who did not achieve the excelIeoce of their father.. On Dionys.ius the Elder, cf. S7b 30 : " 68a 18 : I.

CHAPTER 16

I . Introductory statement: 90b 32

wealth affects character

II . Development: 90b 33 - 9ta 19 I.

90b 33 - 9" 14

(.l

90b 33 - 9" •

(6l 91 ......12

wealth makes men: insolent, arrogant

(el 9" 12-'3

iDdined to lllXllriousncos aod 05..... tation to think themselves lit for public

(d) 9" '3-'4

prwperous fool.

•• 91. 15-19

office

.

effects of old and new wealth on character

!lOb 32. ' ..• m"raA"~ On wealth, a constituent of S1lda,/,ovLa (A S, 60b 1!r-20), cf. 8]& 3 : 1; the meaning of '''OTa. i. mentioned at 62a 2.9 : 2, and that of brmol;;, at 76b 14. The relative clause with antecedent incorporated ( in the char.cter. This interpretation is .upported by 91a 14 (olOo, "lOUTOV) where it i. clear that A. is speaking in the chapter of the character peculiar to the rich; c£ 91a 23. 6~p,......l ... 61C.P";'PIIVO, "insolent and arrogant"; c£ 78b 23-3', 7Bb 14-15 :); Diodorus in the Mytilenian debate (Thuc. 3.4S.4) attributes the same qualities to wealth. Victorius cites Cicero (De lege ogr'Gria orGtio set;UntiG "mira Rullum 2.3S.9SIf.) on the character of the Campanian. as an apt illustration of A.'. observation.

b 33

1CciGJ(""""~""'" nA04...... "seeing that they are somewhat affected by the possession of wealth." The change in attitude, disposition, character brought about by wealth is actually explained in 90b 34 - 9ra 2: dla".~ ,,
b 33-34

Ross alone encloses this within parenb 34 - !lla 2 &,....p .....6..-oii theses followed by a comma, and without any punctuation before. All the

218

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC I II

edd., Spengd, Cope punctuate: TOV

".to"TO~ .

dl""'e . .. a~Tov.;

910 7 this is

clearly more acceptable.

liuixE'........ ' C£ 68b 4 : 1, 77b 27-28; the verb is indicative of an established and set attitude, whicb is what is sigoified when one speaks ordinarily of if8o" "for their general disposition is the same as if they possessed every kind of good."

lila I

a 1-2 I> lil ... lI1h'oG

is the reading of four edd., Spengd. Kassel, Cope read with a good tradition d vUe ... ; copulative di (S. 2836) can have the force of vae: "for wealth, as it were, is taken as a kind of criterion of the worth of all other things." On ",."" c£ LS, TI,.Io>, II.2; on ~ta, c£ 6sa 8 : 1; a~Toii (i.e., wealth) is a genitive of price; <:f., however, Bywater, "Aristotelia V," 1I7. "given to sdf-indulgence and pretena 3 'L'PU
a 4-'7 Ii,....o ...

ca....1 The subject of both articular infinitives is the wealthy and so "c!VTa~ means "all of them without exception." Some generalize the statement, e.g., Cope, p. 166 ("they [like others] are all"), Jebb & Sandys ("all the world is wont"). The first part of the clause (dId ... awwv) could be read as a general statement and in this respect the rim would be like all others. Bnt joined as it is to the following clause (C£ following note) it is more clearly restricted to the ricb as a dammant preoccupation of theirs. This is the point of the explanation at 97a 7-8 (ii,. ... .. 'X6OT""). a 6 o""...:mi>v, . The edd., Spengd, Cope place a comma after this; Ross alone punctnates with a period. . a7:

1

iii ...

2

'roU'fO

ca.... 1

sc. C'1AoVa ... Le.. what is stated at a 2-7: HaL -revtpeeo, ... aUTot.

a 7-11. noAADl ... IiLC...pl~ov..~

Ross alone enclose. in p,arentheses.

9Ia I6

a8:

COMMBNTAlIY

219

€)cOY"'"'" sc. TO' "AMov: "of those who have money." z ELfU"Yl&ou See OCD, PW, and cf. A 6, 63' IS, 67b I9-20. Hieron I moved from Gda, Sicily, in 478 B.C. to succeed his brother Gelon at Syracuse. Somewhat later (476?) Simonide. visited Syracuse (one among many distinguished poets to do so); he eventually died atAgrigentum in468. TO I,,,.,,,ldov ert!1/Ta, = "the remark of Simonides was made...." 1

a I I Mcmenov £in€Lv Ross alone punctuates: ud01JO"O'JI'," The infinitive in narrative as an indicative is dependent upon the idea of saying in ere1jTa,. a lI-I2 'l:oU~"••• &LCI'l:pl~av'«l~ I would read this without any quotation marks and Roemer's coD,jecture of 6<17:,. (se. scn,. oeli>) as do Spengd, Cope, Ross, Kassd. Roemer, Dufour, Tovar use the quotation marks and read (save Tovar) Roemer's conjecture. In the Republic 4891H: Plato refers to the saying and calls irs author (whom he does not mention) a liar. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers: Aristipp"s 69, attributes it to Aristippus (a friend of Socrates') and gives it a new twist: Aristippus, when asked by Dionysius (tyrant of Syracuse, 430-367 B.C.) why the philosophers frequent the doors of the rich willie the wealthy no longer go to the philosophers, replied: "The philosophen know what they need, the wealthy do not."

a 12-13 xctl'l:I. .•• iiPXELV another characteristic of the rich, as Vater, p. lIO, points out. And so the articular infinitive construction should be taken as the subject of a phrase like that at 90b 32: b.eTa, Tq; "Ao.hl!'. On IJex'" (hold public office) see A 8, 6sb 32-3S, 87' 23-24, 8sb I7-18. a I3 £X.LY ydp ... ii~lDY "for they think they have that which gives title to governing power." This is the usual interpretation with the scholiast (Anonymus) and later Victorius. Cope, p. 168, disagrees and mentions the Vetus Translatio as confirmation, but this can be questioned. 1 .:,~ .•. xE C£ 6Gb 6 : 1. z ciYoiJ...... dJ&ClI!£oyo~ ~eo~ nAoUTOU "the character produced by wealth is that of the fortunate fool." Our reading is that of Spenge!, four edd. Cope reads: ~80v~ " "AMo,; Ross, ~80, <~80'> "AO~TOV. The denotation of eMat"o.., is well explained by Victorius' reference to Cicero's uinsipiente fortunato," De amicit. 54-

a 14 :

a IS

&lCI
Cpo 87' 8-32.

311 instrumental dative (S. Is06f[): "in that the a I6 -njJ ••• ExELY newly rich have all the vices in a stronger and baser form." Cpo Aeschylus, Agam. l042-I04S. Some sense of the pejorative meaning of V.6n.lovTO, which we see in A. is found in Ps.-Demosthenes, On the Treaty with Alexander 23.

9Ia 19

a 17-18 c. ....ep ••.•1".., "to be newly rich is in fact like a lack of education with respect to wealth." Cpo A 5, 61a 12-24- Ross alone encloses this in parentheses. On Ml"7Ipa cf. 73b 36 : I, 74b 8. a 18 : 1 4Iiuc1\fL'l"'1I 2 x ....oupy".4 ••. obcpII'
CHAPTER 17

I . Introduction: 91a 20-22

to power

IT . Development: 91a Z2-29

how power affects t}"9o,

m . Introduction: 91a 30-32

to good fortune

rv . Development: 9Ia 32 - 91b 4

how good fortune affects t}"9o,

V . Conclwion: 91b 5-7

9Ia 20 : 1 6JU1""~ &.1 x.a! C£ 7lI8 20-21. "&uvci/L.... ~ "power"; for this meaning see its use atA 4, 60a 1-2, 60b 27, 63a 29, 'lOb 14; ']8b 35 : z, 82a 34. 83a 3 : 4, etc.

a 20-21 "X.&Ov •.• 1181J

"practieally speaking most of the kinds of

character are obvious."

a 21-Z2 Tc!< /LW- Tc!< &i "some kinds - others." A. does not specify which kinds are the same (Td a~Td) as wealth, which are better (Tel /loAd.,). Certainly among the former would be the type of wrong done (cp. 9Ia 29 with 9Ia 18-19) and probably, as well, the assumed right to govern (9la 13); among the latter would be tho.e mentioned at 91a 22-27. Spengel, Cope, Kassel read at a 21 fiom a good tradition: " which I would read for d.n.ap', of the edd., cp. Bywater, "Arlstotdia V," II7.

6.Wa,,,,

C£ 90b 17; 68b 20 : 1. "more manly," i.e., honorable (EN II25b 8-16), straightforward, virile, self-contained (EN II71b 6-10). a

Z2 : 1

'PIAOT•....sT.pO.

z 4,,&p ... &i.....po.

a 23 ij81J accusative of respect, S. 1601. The plural denotes the varied instances signified by the ahstract suhstanti"e. a 24 ip"Y"""" 86v"/L'" "all those deeds which they have abundant resources [AEovl7la sc. Jan] to accomplish because of their power." a 2S a.c!<... .t".11 "because of their diligent concem"; on the prepositional phrase with slpl, e£ LS, olpl, C.rv.3. C£ A II,7Da I2 on lsta; it is this concern which makes them "more earnest"; e£ 7lI8 35 : I.

""p.B-

a 2S-26 4"..Y"..I;0/LEYo•.•• 86v"/L'''' concerns their power." This explains the

"since they must look to all that preceding statement. Ross alone

222

ARISTOTLB J 'RHETORIC' II

91a 30

reads a comma. not the period. after fnJ."I'IV. A new aspect of character is introduced in what follows and therefore the need for a complete break.

a 2.6 ""1',,6"<£po, "and they are people who are more reserved rather than more overbearing." As we find at EE I2.2Ia 8. I2.33b 34-38 and MM II92b 30-38. (dignity) is a mean in personal relations between pride-arrogance and servility. As we see in Euripides. Hippo/rlUs. 93. 99. 103. 1364. its meaning is insecure enough to shift between correct self-respect and haughtiness. arrogance. In what follows at 9Ia 2']-29. A. implies that this reserve and dignity regulate for the most part a temperament which inherently inclines to arrogance. Plutarch. Nicias j24-2.C.4. stresses the good side of •• e.g.• "his reserve was neither severe nor annoying but combined with carefol discretion." A.'s descriptive definition ofit also moves in that direction; c£ lira 28.

u.,...OT7/'

u.,..••.,

a 27 ll''P....." ....tpOUi ..o liF;!w1'1l u.,...odeoVl; is the reading of four edd. and Spenge!. Kasse!. Cope. and Freese read from a good tradition ip.
i.e.. sernnotes is "a tempered and graceful

a 29 ci& ....;;..,,,... IHYcU.ci&,xo,

Cpo 9Ia 18-19; for the idea see

Bgb 7: 2•

'" 30 : 1 ..nux!1l is one of the parts of eudaimonia. A s. 60b 19-29. 60b 20-29. It is one of the goods of man and is explained in more detail at 61b 39 - 62a 12. Along with dVC1Wxia, good birth. wealth. position (890 1-2). it constitutes what A. means by 7jO'1 "a~" .vxa, (88b 32). The fortuitous nature of such gifts is underlined indirectly at 87a 8-32 where some of the very goods discussed in B rj-r7 (e.g.• good birth. wealth. position) are mentioned as things which are fi-equently the objects of indignation (i.e.. pain at the undeserved good fortune of another). There is. however. a larger view of good fortune (chance) which explains in part the brief comments here (9Ia 30 - 9Ib 4). and it is found at EE 1246b 37 - 1248b 7. The EE passage explains why A. is unsure at A j. 60b 19-29 whether he wants a"TVxia among the internal or the extemaI goods of man. 2 XII.... p.6pui .." "in its varied parts"; this is simply a specification of 89a 2: "al 8J.to, aVTVxla. "al dvCIT"XI.... and it refers .t1"'X..... 8vCITvxia. to stir........ "Aov.o•• dv.d,.. ..,. On the word ,..oe.a: 54'012 : 2; sec also A I. S4b 19; 2. j6a 30; j. 60b 6. The.a is continued by "al ... (a 32); c£ lira 32 : 1.

T"

T",

9Ib

223

COMMBNTARY

2

i .•.• in chaps. 15-17: good birth. wealth. power. 4 "contains the kinds of character of those just mentioned." i.e•• those mentioned in preceding note. 3

.lp1JiLc""", elI 1I81J

1x., ...

a 3 [-32 1I81J. el> yellp ... e6""X(",,' "for those kinds of good fortune thought to b. the most significant tend toward thes. effects." The lines in this passage arc variously punctuated. I would punctuate as indicated sine. sl, . .. sVTVx{at is an explanation of a 30-,3 I, whereas "al e-" .. . nAeOVSHTBE" gives further elfecES of good fortune; see gIa 32 : 1. The usual punctuation is a colon after ij6'1/ (save Kassd: a comma); a colon after eVT1JXiuo (sav. Tovar. Kassd: a comma); Ross includes .k ... •~Tvxiao in parenthe.es with no puntuation before and a comma after. .Ir; ... TelU,,", GUV"'C'eLVOUG'LV TaVT4, i.e., 1j8f} referring thing as e!1!'/1'1.• .,.. On awed••w
a 3I

to

the same

If T£ is read at a ]0 (as it is by all). it a 32 : 1 _ll.... d~ e6...£1C\I("" appears that iES coordinate statement is here at a ]2-33 ("aIiTO ... "AOO••* , n"); c£ 86a 24-25. Despite the use of which causes both the scholiast (Anonymus) and th. Vetus Translatio to take our phrase with what precedes. there is no discernible logical rcason in what is .aid at a 31-32 (01, "ae ... s';T1JX1a.) to add our phrase to it. However. it does make sense to understand "al I .. ... "Aso.s> 30-]2: " d' ... eVTvxia.) and the internal goods (our 9Ia 32-33: "aUn ... "Aoo.s"ni.) as good fortune affects them. eVn".iu (c£ A 5. 60b 38 - 6Ia II) is one of these goods of tbc body to which he refers in the phrase Ta "aTa Ta aiiJl'a a"aBd; on th. internal. external goods see 60b 20-29.

.1,.

a 33 : 1 "",.ovu....iv This can be interpreted as it was at 60a 3 : 1; Cope, p. 170. has a note on the word. 2 iLlY oW C£ Denniston. p. 473; "thus it is that ..... 3 ':'"eP1J'P""w..epo, •.. ciAoyLa.... po' Cpo gob 33; also 9Ja 14: d'O>1ToveVdail'o,o,. See Archytas on BllTvX1a in Stobaeus in the Gaisford (ISaz) edition, pp. 45ff. (i.e.• T.I.79. p. 16). 9Ib

b2

I

cixoAou8ei

a....

C£ 78b7:

1.

"namdy. that ...•" S. 2577; 7sa 9 : 2.

91b S

ARISTOTLE, ·RHBTORIC' II

b Z-l lxoua,v .•. ""'~ "stand in a certain relation to divinity"; the relalion is explained by TVX'1'; see 89a 2. The contrary view of Lucretius. 3.S3-S4. "multoque in rebus acerbis acrius advertunt animos ad religionem" (see also Lactantius [ca. A.D. 2S0-3'7] Divina. Institutiones 201.S). calls attention to what is the more common reaction (e.g.• Ssb 21-22). but by no neans what Cope (p. 171) calls "a truer account of this matter." A. himself at 83b s~ sets down the positive reaction of which he speaks in our passage. See me reference to BE at !lla 30 : 1.

",.,....Von., ...

o

b 3 Tok Y'YV0l'£vC> tion.

Kassd. Cope read draM with this from a good tradi-

b 5 ".pl 1'6'1 • • • Elp,,"'" This is a general summation for chaps. Iz.17. However that which immediately follows b 6Jr (Tli rae . .. cloIvvdTOV) refen only to chaps. IS-17. In his discussion of the age groups A. gave us the special topics proper to the /j6o, of the YOWlg. the old. the mature. In presenGing these three groups. by way of contrast between each group. he actually gave the opposites (..Ii lvaVTta) of each group.. In this respect he follows the method he used to specify the opposites of many of the "d6'1. With -WX'1 in its varied aspects. however. he follows his procedure with alaxUv'l (Ssa 14-IS). CfjAo, (SSb 24-27). simply stating that by anaiy:>.ing the opposites of each (e.g.• poverty. lack of power. etc.) in terms of the topics presented in chaps. IS-17 the typical traits of these opposites will be discovered (the opposite of '~rlv..a is nO! mentioned).

CHAPTER 18

I . Tramition: 9Ib 8-23 I.

9Ib 8-9

from B

1-17

(cf. 9xb

8-23)

rhetoric is concerned with ~ta,,; cf. 77b 2.1 -78a 6

2. 9Ib 10-20

how this is so in each kind of rhetoric

3. 91b 20-23

TW. "ol ...:.t... was discussed in A 8; thus we have shown [presumably he has B "}'-17 in mind] how to make discourse reBeet moral character

II . Transition: 9Ib Z4 - 92a 4 I.

91b Z4-29

2. 9Ib 29- 92a I

the ij61/

from A

I

to B 17

each kind of rhetoric has its own Ti.ao~, and the ways for arguing in each have been discussed, as well as how to make the discourse reBcet moral character we must now discuss the elements common to each kind: namely, possible-impossible, past tact - futuIe fact, amplificition-mciosis

3· 92a 1-4

III . Conclusion: 92.4-'7

to complete OUI task we must consider the proofs (enthymeme, example) as formal modes of reasoning common to each kind of rhetoric a brief statement on the ""..
!lxb 8-2.3 l ..El 51! ..• "OL'ITI!OV The chapter begins at b 8 as all would agree although the paragraphing in a few editions may be unclear. But this is a minor matter in a chapter upon which, ever since Spengd C'Ueber die RhetorikU ) detected an absence of coherence in it, a good bit of ink has been spilled without any satisfying results. There can be little question that the chapter marks a transition and forms a writ with chaps. I!)-2.6, and this is not disputed. The natUIe of the tramition is another xnatter. If one accepts, a' I do (cf. Studies), that A. centers his stndy of rhetoric on enthymemeexample (dcduction-mduction) as DUldcs of inference, the transition at this point is natUral and integral to the structural wriry of the work. A 4 - B 17 is A.', study of the three entechnic proofs (.aoyo~, "d60~, ii6o~) wherein the

ARISTOTLE. 'RHETORIC' II

9Ib 8

analysis provides matter for statements which can be used for inference by enthymeme-example (or by itself) in the three branches of rhetoric (c£ COMMENTARY I 349-S6). With the conclusion of this section, A. at B 18 makes a transition to the general aspects common to all the kinds of rhetoric, or from a study of the particular topics which can provide material for use in each of the three kinds of rhetoric to a study of dements common to all. We should note here that one could object that the three entechnic pisrds (Ady." "d8." 118.,) are also common to rhetoric. In one respect they are. They are used in all discourse in varying ways. However, each of them does not enjoy the same universality as typifies the material of B 19-26. Each is limited by the discourse itself, narndy, its subject matter (Ady.,), its type of auditor ("d8." 118.,). With regard to the dements A. calls common ("...6.) this is not so. The " •••d (c£ 59& II-I3, 7sa 8 : :J and see 92a 4-7) which we meet in chap. I9 are necessary preconditions to any kind of discourse. Example and enthymeme of chaps. 20-22 are the common ways to argue an issue without regard to subject matter or audience. The general topics of enthymeme in chap. 23 are common ways in which to reason on any matter with any audience. Fioally, apparent syllogism, chap. 24, and refutation, chap. 2S, are dearly common methods to discern false argument and to refute an argument. This interpretation of the devdopment of A.'s first two books does not, however, remove some of the difficulties occasioned by chap. I8 as we shall see. But it is consonant with what A. sets down as his intention in the programmatic statement ofA 1-3 (0£ 9aB 3-4). Further, it is in complete accord with a statement like that at B 22, 96b 28 - 97a 6, which becomes rather meaningless with the change in the order of the chapters suggested by Spengd, Vahien, Marx (0£ Studies, p. 32). The problem with chap. 18 is primarily occasioned by the 10gicaI sequence of ideas in b 8-23 caused by the introduction of the idea of "el,,,,. From the time of the scholiast (Anonymus), most have agreed (e.g., Victorius, Spengd, Cope) that the paragraph consists of the protasi< b 8-22 (en.! . .. "'eOT8e.') and apodosis b 22-23 (0lf1T•... "."'ITS••). For examples of this construction, see Spengd, pp. 26H3; indeed, Else, p. "38, points out an unconscious irony in an example from Poetics I4sob 3
9Ib 8

CCYMMBNTAllY

an attractive solution for our text: namdy, join the last sentence of chap. 17 (9Ib 5-']: "eel pi, ... dcl1wdTou) to chap. I8 at91b 20 ("eel de . .. "o''1do~). Of the modem editors Kassel alone adopts this and double brackets the troublesome lines b 8-20. Cope, pp. 17I-,]5, looks upon b 8-20 as A.'s, but "most probably not written for this place." However, he accepts the text as we have it and suggests, but without confidence, that a sentence or more may have been lost. On p. 250 ofhis IntroJudion he supplies the sentence and his interpretation. Vater, pp. III-I6, would include everything in b 8-29 in the protasis and take b 30 (Aomdo .•. "o..ciio) as the apodosis. Thurot, "Observations critiques [II)," 4<>-41, also suspects a lacuna and offers a similar solution. Roemer agrees in general with Spenge! but would place b 8-23 back in B I (c£ preface to his critical edition, pp. xcvII-eI). Siiss, pp. 147if., discusses the chapter at some length, finding little difficulty with it as it is and in its relation to B I since he finds in it confirmation of his interpretation of >lOo~. Cope's note in his commentary and that of Sandys Oebb& Sandys, p. I05n4) set forth the various interpretations; see also Studies, pp. 38-42, for some other problems connected with chap. 18. None of the above interpretations really resolves the problem in the chapter, an admittedly transitional chapter, and .ome intrude rather boldly on the tradition of the text. Is there a solution within the te;"t as handed on to us? Possibly there is. But it, too, would I.bor under a difIiculty to which all the above are exposed, i.e., the absence of any mention of the "d0'1 (chaps. 2-II). In this chapter of transition, one would expect some mention of them, particularly at the point at which we find ,,0"'06, (b 23, 28). Some do maintain that "dOo, - >lOo~ are denoted by this word - Cope, p. '75, for example, Barwick, 1~20, and most recently Lossau, p. I65n7. I have reservations about the inclusion, and they are occasioned by A.'s use of in the Ri.etoric where it inevitably refers to >l00~ (i.e., the moral character revealed in discourse) and in a nwnber of instances is explicitly distinguished from naO'1T""',. One way in which one might possibly include the "dO,! in the word would rest on the fact that "O",o~ in the Rhetoric always does imply >lOo" and >lOo~ even in the RiletD,ic entails in the last analysis the "d67J. The solution is not overly satisfying, but c£ 77b 27-28. Turning to the chapter as it is written, it is clear that the immediate problem in the text is the unexpected appearance of the statement on Hela,~. Yet, though abruptly introduced and lengthy in detail, the statement is not necessarily out of place in a chapter of transition such as this in which A. is moving from one major division of the work to another, i.e., fromA 4-B 17 toB I~ 26, and more immediately nom his discussion of "dOo~ and >lOo~ in B 2-17. With respect to this particular transition from "dOo~ - >l0o~ we must recall that when he introduced them in B I (c£ outline to B I) he wished to show their importance (77b 21-39) along with Adyo, (A 4-14) for "eta.~ which

,,0.,,&,

ARISTOTLE,

f

RHETORIC t II

is the telos (c£ A. 3, 5ab 1-8) of rhetorical discourse. So a restatement at the end of the study of "dBa, - iJBo, of the importance of "e[a., is not strange (c£ !lIb u). Theacldition of the reference toA 8 is odd but not unacceptable. For with the completion of iJBo, in chap. 17 this concept would be uppermost in his mind. Some ,ense might be obtained from b 8-23 by a schematic statement of the lines: "Since the use of persuasive speech has "ela" (for which "dBo,- iJBo, is essential) as its telos and this is so in all the kinds of thetoric even if there is a 'ingle auditor for he, too, is a "e'nj,; and since iJBo, as it applies to the 1IB'1 of constitutions has been discussed under deliberative rhetoric - so it is that the ways by which persuasive speech must be made to rcBeet iJBo, may now be considered established"; see !lIb 12("opl ..• Aclyou) All the edd. use the parentheses. "pIa,,, Cpo 77b 2I-29 and the notes thereto; c£ also A 3, 58b 4-8. The reason for the role of "e'a., is also seen at A 2, 57" 22--26; c£ S7I' 23·

b 9 :

1

2

sc. xeta.,. We might, ask as Spenge! does, why not also "ed, "oAAo.k, but comparing this passage with 58a 36 - 58b 8 we find A. speaking in the same manner. In fact 91b 8-20 in its content repeats that of 58a 3658b 20; c£ comment in 9Ib 8-23. 3 "po-rpmn i.e., ddiherative oratory; c£ S8b 8-29. The general condition indicates that in each instance (deliberative, forensic, epideictic) there is always (1111:' d', b 8) a question of xeu",.

b 10 : 1 I...", Ii' 2

~ II-13

"pa~ Iv..

(06liw .•. "P'""'~)

All the edd. use the parentheses.

b II "oIeov....,~ always in the sense stated at A 3, SSb 8-14; c£ SSb 10 : 1. I would think that there is a contrast between this word and .0~B&­ ...ov....,. The scholia,t says that .ov8...0;;,..... , are those who give counsd (~,.{Jo~A.,;o.....,) or advise, which seems to me reasonable, and I find our contrast paralld to that at A 8, 6sh 23 (".IB.w ... ~,.{JooA";.,.). b 12 "P'""'~ predicate to an understood ia.... C'for one person is no less a judge"). The distinction made later at 91b 16-19 is in the nature of a technical distinction rather than one of actual fact. The auditor in all the branches of rhetoric is called upon to make a judgment which is the point A. wishes to make here as earlier; c£ 77b 21 : 1 with the references (to which add S'711 II, S8b 4 : 1). Further A.'s view of the role of "eta" in rhetoric and of what is important for its actuation is set down at 77b 21-29. There we learn that both reason and appetition play a part in "eta" and that he will now begin the study of the latter, i.e., "dBo, and iJBo,. So it is that in emphasizing "et,,,, once again here (as wa' remarked at !lIb 8-:-23, and

gIb 16

COMMBNTAllY

see COMMENTARY I 350) A. is referring rather directly to the presentation of ,,&80, - ~80, of chaps. 2-17 just completed; see gIb 16-23. Ro.. alone conjectures a masculine plural. Schrab 13 oll"!""!3"1)TOilv"" der, p. 374. wants the word to refer to judicial rhetoric, and so we have (a) deliberative, (b) judicial, (c) epideictic rhetoric named. But I believe that it signifies nothing more than the one who opposes, argues against, in a trial (S4A 27 : 1) or in any instance; see, for example, A 7, 73b 6, glb 13. At gIb Ig (Td dP.'P'U{J~TO~P.BVQ: the points in dispute) the reference could be to both deliberative and furensic oratory (e.g., Freese, p. 2-nnc), but see gIb 27. b 14 6"68... ,,, "against a proposed subject"; Spengel, p. 264, reasonably suggests the tetralogies of Antiphon. To this might be added many of the discourses of Isocrates of an instructive or deliberative character, or Gorgias'

Helm, Pala....J... b 14-16 &I'ol... ~ ('rii> ... "o ••iT..,), .:.....w....~ is the punctuation afRo.. and Kassel alone of the edd. All punctuate with a comma after "o.eiTa. except Roemer, Spenge!. Cope. The above punctuation is preferable, containing as it does the three brief explanatory clauses, b II-I3, b 14-16, and "".~~" in one sentence. later b 17-18 (dl"".~

...

..)

i.e., the opposing arguments. or theses, "against which, b IS 'Ollt lv""..I.. as though an actual opponent. one speaks"; cf. LS, " ••i .., A.ILS. C£ gIb 14-16. is the punctuation b 16-18 ....&• .,....,xo~ (C, .....p ... auvt......xov)· of Kasse! (cf. 9Ib 14-16) which I accept. Roemer, Tovar, Spengel, Cope read dl"".~ 'nml~"... So, too, Dufour but with a comma after """i~" Ross includes b 17-20 in parentheses: .,,,d•• I
.,,,a._.,,.i,·

(dl""'e ...

..;

...

,,TI-

b 16-23 .:...aN..... ~... "O''1flov "... similarly in epideictic discourse (for it is composed with a view to the spectator as though he were ajudge); in general, however, only that person is strictly speaking a judge who nukes a judgment on the points at issue in civil issues [i.e., judicial and deliberative discourse], for the matter of inquiry [C~T.iTai] is in one instance the status [m», lXB.] of the disputed issues and in the other [TS .•. of the matters under ddiberation; further, still, since [lnet, gIb 8] a statement was made earlier under ddiberative rhetoric about the 1J~ of the several forms of government, the consequence is that the ways and means to make discourse reflect moral character would noW have been established."

"aq

ARISTOTLB, 'RHBTORIC' II

23 0 b 17

e.... pav

b IS : 1 lIM>~ who conjectures

See sBb 2 or Cope, p. 176. is the reading of the codd. and all the edd. save Kassd

8,...,,; cf. Der Text, p. 136.

z xp,orlJ~ tv All read in this way. Kassd, following a good tradition, reads "1!'T-q,6 i., transposing the article from b 19 6 Tci ~rrr.';,.."a. b 19 "a).'T'KDi~ ct.y&\cnv Since our passage apparently has A 2, 5sb 2-S in mind, the words refer to deliberative and forensic rhetoric as the explanatory clause (Td TS ycil! ..• /I.u),.v••Ta,) would also indicate. b 20 llouAoUovTcu' I would place a colon after this word as Tovar does. Ross, Dufour use a comma; Roemer, Spengd, Cope, a period. Kassd (cf. 9Ib S-23) ends his double-bracketed passage here. b 22 np.....pov i.e. A S. The usual punctuation is a comma after the word; a colon might be preferable; Kassd uses a period. On the meaning of 1}B., in the Riletor;c, including these iJB17 Teil. ".),cnIOJ., see 88b 30-3 I, 77b 24. I take this to be the conclusion to the b 22-23 c. ........ no,'1..mv protasis at b 8-22 and offered a possible explanation for it at 9Ib 8-23. If "B,,,.';, here and at b .S does include 1}B., (c£ same note), then 6,ci Tl• .,. refer to the study of the particular topics in B 2-17; if not, then simply to 12-17. See, however, ~b 27-29.

,re."

"ci8., -

C£ A 3, 5Sb 20 - 59a 5, sBb 8-29. 1}. = "is," b 24 lupOll'" TtAO~ quite possibly the philosophical imperfect, 63' 9 : 1. The echoes of A 3 in B 18 are fairly obvious. In 3 A. spoke of the role of "I!/'''' and three kinds of rhetoric with their Til7J as he does in IS. He mentioned next the need for "I!OTa ..s" for each kind of rhetoric and in 18 (9Ib 25-27) he cdls us that we 110W have them. Then he turned to the three ".,.d necessary to each kind of rhetoric as he does here (9Ib 29 - 92a 1). In 3 after mentioning these ".,.eI he said we must also have "1!.Ta...., for them, and these (cf. also 92a 4-7) he will present in chap. 19. Taking our statement in chap. 18 with its back references to the opening chapterS of the first book (cp. also 92a 1-4 with A 2, 56. 34 - 56b 27) and recalling his statement in chap. I of Book 2 it seems clear that A. is marking the end of one major division and the beginning of another. C£ 77b 18: I. From the methodology b 25 6c1;Il' xlll "poTcicr..~ of B 2-17, paralld as it is to A 4-14 (and also IS), together with the statement at the end of B I, i.e., 78a 28-30, there would appear to be little question that A. views his effort ill the second book as one which provides further 8&Ea, "al "I!OTeI.."" for "dB., and 1}Bo,; cf. 78a 28-29. In fact "elBo,

9Ib 30

COMMBNTARY

:>31

and oJ80~ os "Icrr..~ lvr:0X"0o are dod TO;; l&yov (A 2. 56a 1-19) which must be by way of expressed opinions or statements. b:>6 "'{CJ'U'~ On the meaning of this word in the Rhetoric, c£ Studi... pp. 55-07. and 55a 4- The word here may signify the modes of inference (enthymeme. example) or the source material suitable to effect conviction (the particular topics); Smdies. pp. 60. 64. b 2.7-29 k •... 5..:.p........ Depending upon how one interprets "8",ov~ (c£ 9Ib 8-23. 9Ib 22-2.3) the words TOUTO,. here will refer either to the material of chaps. I2-I7. or 2-17. Because of the nature ofb 24-29 as a brief oudine of what was done in the first two books (as well as as a transition to a new division of the work). it is difficult (but not impossible) to believe that A. would intend to make reference here only to a part of the second book (I2-I7) and not to all that preceded (2-I7). This fact might encounge an extended meaning for "8o"ov~. e.g.• 9Ib 8-23. On the other hand. since there is no mention of the "aBot Spenge!. p. 264. is inclined to delete lTO ••• "0"'" (b 27-28). while Vahlon ("Kritik arist. Schriftc:n." 126-28) would drop ..., ... d"be,crrao.

di..

b 29 xo.ve;;" The logic of this passage to 92a I suggests that this should be interpreted as it was in A J. 59a II-I3 (and c£ 7Sa 8 : J): the elements common to the dA'7 of rhetorical discourse which he will discuss in chap. 19. The nature of possible-impossible. past-future fact. greatsmall as ".wa is that they are necessary preconditions which must be on hand befure one engages in the different kinds of rhetoric. At 92a I-4 A. follows this up with the general program for the remaining topics of this book. They cover material which is common to rhetorical discoune - e.g.• chaps. 20-2.1: the common proofS. exarnple-enthymeme; chaps. 22-23: the stoicheia or general topics for argument by enthymeme; chap. 24: the nature of fallacious reasoning; chap. 25: the ways in which to refute reasoning>; chap. 26: a few general refiections on points mentioned in chaps. I!)-25. b J 0 ...0 ",.p{ is the reading of cod. A and four edd.. Spengel. Ross reads Teji with Bywater (with whom at b 32 he reads "oel); in the light ofb 3I-32 (c£ 9Ib 3 : 1) this is a reasonable conjecture grammatically. Cope reads Ta from a good tradition. In our reading TO marks the articular infinitive: "in discoune the use also of the common principle of possibilityimpossibility is necessary for all speakers" ("also." i.e.• in addition to the kinds of argumentation already outlined in A 4 - B I7). As A. says. no one deliberates about that which is impossible. A 2. 57" 4--'7. At b 29 "oO'W' is commonly interpreted as "the common topics." Apart from the problems mentioned in 59" II-I3. it is difficult to see how past fact, future fact. can be called topics. Like possibility or gre.tness. they are aspects which the subject

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORICJ II

23 2

92.> 3

of discourse must have if you are to speak about it at all (possibility), or in forensic discourse (past fact), deliberative (future fact), or convincingly (greatness); c£ Studies, pp. 35-39.

e,..

b 3 [ : 1 x,d....u~ "." ... ",".pii.. Understand (doay"ai.. l
u"'u...........

b 32 xa ....Ov See comment at 9Ib 31 : 1. Of the "ow& greatness (and P9ssibility) are used in all three kinds of discourse. Past fact, future fact. while specific to foreesic, deliberative, may obviously al.o be used in

all three. b 34 x,d """j3ou~.uO\l",,'~ [ll Uno..-pmO\l"'~] x .. l m ......ailll....~ is the reading derived from cod. A according to Spengel, Kassel; "al ""/o'pov},."';" o.....~ "al inaL''';;VT.~ is the reading of four edd., Cope. Since the edd:. accept the tradition of cod. A., Kassel, Spenge! are a more correct reflection of the text, which i. also found in the Vetus Transl.tio. The reason for the seclusion as Spengel, p. 264, notes, is that A. does not use
...

",poem." This statement is interpreted in different a 3-4 a-~ ways depending upon how the commentator views the unity of the work; Spenge!, for example, assumes that it refers to "dOo, - lj80" ~aps. 2-I7,

COMMENTARY

92.a 5

which came after chaps. X8-26 (c£ 9Ib 8-23 and the references there). Most assume that A. is now talcing up the final part of his task: the elements common to all rhetoric. It seems reasonable to seek an understanding of Tel lomd and "ed8B"IV from the programmatic statement ofAx-3 (and cf. 9Ib 29). Are there any major points there which still need explanation? At 560 35 S6b 27 the discussion of enthymerne and example tells us that they are like syllogism (cp. also 5Sa ro-r4) and induction but does not instruct us in any detailed understanding of these criticol instruments. This we are told (s6b 2S-27) will be done later; and it is done at B 20-23. In the sarne passage (S6o 3S - s6b 27) enthymeme and apparent enthymeme are mentioned (as earlier. ssb X5-X7. persuasion and apparent persuasion were spoken of). It is only in B 24 that we have any analysis of apparent enthymeme and apparent persuasion. At 58. 2-3S. an obviously important statement to A .• two kinds of topicol sources for enthymemes are set out. A. notes that he will analyze first the particular topics. The only analysis in detail 'of the general topics appears atB 22-24. At S9a xx-26 weleam that we must have premisses both universal and particnlar for the three "0..,1. In B X9 this is done for the first time. In shorr the program set down at A x-3 receives its completion at B x9-26. There is no mention of u,'~. Td"~ in the programmatic statement and therefore it does not seem possible to refer Tel lo""d to Book 3 as some have done. a 4-5 1I....'v

... £ip'l.....,

e.g.• A 9. 68a 26-30; GSa .6.

a 5-'1 ..... at ... crup.(3ou"£u""xo(~

Cpo A 3. S8b 2-20; and c£ s8b X3.

CHAPTER 19

I . The "owd: 9.a 8 - 93a 18 I.

9'" 8 - 9.b 14

possible-impossible

3· 93a 1-8

past fact future filct

4· 93a !)-I8

greater-smaller

•. 9.b IS-13

II . Conclusion: 93a 19-21

As has been said, these "o ••d (not "owol .ono., essentially Wee in nwnber, not four (e.g., Cope, I, 55, and see S9& '3), a fact which Cope, pp. 178-'79 (and again p. 194) :u:knowledges in his introductory comment to this chapter. It is important to note A.'s method of proceeding in the chapter which is similar to that of chap. 23 and to parts of his analysis of particular topics (a. Studies, pp. 126-27). He offers us a series of general, axiomatic propositions on possibility-impossibility which can be brought into play in formulating particular statements in favor of or against the subject under discussion. His occasional exempli.6cations of the general propositions are illustrations of such particular statements. Remarks (b) (c) at 6]b 21-30 are helpful toward understanding the sentence structure in this chapter. 2 &WU'I:'oii The possibles mentioned in this section are discussed primarily as concepts. While they are not yet in the order of existence, it is rather clear that A. is speaking of clwa.d as things which can exist, or, as he says at Met. I046a 8: "we speak of things as possible or impossible because they are or are not in some way or other." We can see this further in the distinction between ~ ••a••• and l.6eX.,..tnlov (although he sometimes interchanges the words). Waitz, 1376 describes them in this way: a 6..a••• is that which is of itself in such a state of readiness that there is nothing in nature to prevent its "be-ing"; an ..6ezo,..evo. is that which possesses in itself no inner cOlltradiction and so can be readily asserted. The former he calls physical possibility; the latter, logical possibility (a. 27 : 3). In other words, 6..a••• would signify the presence of a positive power to be (capable of being), whereas ..6BXO,..tnlO. signifies that which in terms of its inner self could be. In the use of 6v.a••• in the first book at A 6, 63" 21 and 7, 65a 35 (there is • definition of sorts at 63' 21-23) I believe that the meaning just !)2a

8:

1

"'pii'nov ",4Y

a. Studies, pp. 36-39) are

s'"

ARISTOTLE. 'RHRTORIC' II

92a 9

given for the word is operative (eE 63a 2I, 63a 22 : 1, 2); so, too for has0. at A 2, 55b 26, 57a 24, 36. What is presented in chap. 19 assumes some understanding of A.'s theory of potency (""va,a',). Guthrie, Gre.k Philosophy, VI II9-29, may afford some hdp. Met. IOI9a 15 - I020a 6 Qater I045b 34f[) on eld.. mentioned by Cope, p. 179, is of no direct hdp. However, the idea in a•• of a positive capabiliry for being, a potency to be or to do, can be fuund with some frequency in the first book e.g., at 74b 28, 66a 38, 65a 21, 63b 29 with 63b 32-33. in the use of At A 3, 59a 31-33 A. mentions the importance of TO d..aTov for deliberative rhetoric, and Cicero and Quintilian, as Cope. p. 179, notes, do the same, e.g., Part. orat. 24.83, De oral. 2.82.336 (repeating A 3, 59- 32-34), and Cicero adds: "the man who taught us this, a truth unseen by others, had profuund understanding"; [mt. orat. 3.8.25-26.

%",...

Mwa,.."

a,.'a

aT".

Mw",.."

a 9-II av 6'/t ... vocrijcrelL Cope's note (pp. 179-80), which is _ summary statement of what is fuund in Cat. IIb 15 - 14a 25, is a good, brief synopsis of A.'s statement on the varieties of clOT".. In Met. IOI8a 20-35

C,...".

there is a short enumeration of the four kinds with a general description of what is meant by .."".t:la. Met. r055a 3 - I057b 34 enters into the question in much detail, and Top. Iub 27 - II4" 25 is again an extended statement on the four kinds of opposition, along with examples of how they can be used in argument. The four types as we find them in the Categories are (a) coudatives: terms reciprocal in their relation, e.g., doubk-half; (b) contraries (hania): extremes in the same genus not dependent upon but opposite to each other, e.g.; good-bad, and cpo A 6, 62b 30-35; (e) privatives-positives: ~e opposition found in the same subject in which the positive is something natural to the subject, the privative is its absence, e.g., sight (positive) is natural to the eye (the subject) for which blindness is the privative; (eI) alIirmatives-negatives (or contradictory opposition): a negation of what is affirmed, e.g., sitting us. not sitting. In Top. 47-49 these are the four which Cicero names, but his explanation of privatives is in a sense correct but can be misleading. A. in our chapter uses basically the opposition of contraries and correlatives. And with regard to contraries he has this to say at Cal. 13b 36 - 14" 25: if one contrary exists, it is not necessary that the other must; two contrary conditions cannot coexist in the same individual at the same time; the subjects of contrary qnalities must belong to same species or genus; and, finally, contraries belong to one genus or to contrary genera when they themselves are not genera. In the light of the above, the argument here from the possibility of a thing's existing or becoming to the likelihood (6c1~B'sv 4v) of the identical possibility for its contrary is grounded in the nature of contraries as extremes within a genus or species. As such they are potentially present, aI!d if one

930 16

237

COMMENTARY

Ii "de ... fi hmoTia; o£ EN I129a 13-14: "a dynamis of itself appears to deal with opposites"; and we were told in A I that rhetoric and dialectic which ate can argue opposites, 55a 2!r30. can be actualized, so can the other, e.g., a II-IZ:

a""a,..,.,

a II x,d vocrijer"'L

here and in the similar instances which follow: Hal (dvvaTov ea'n) 110crijaaL: "so, too, it is possible. .. ,"

a

fi

64h

14 : 1. Wv..Wv sc." ,l.al " " ...aBal (a 9) here and in the repeated instances of a""aT&' between a 12 and b 7. 3 x ..l TO a",OLOV sc. a~Ttii: "so also the one like to it." If two things are alike in every way as fat as the mind can determine, the possibility that one can come into existence offers firm assurance of the same possibility for the other. Such similarity is the ground upon which example often works, e.g., 8polo'''eo,8,..olo., A 2, 57b 27-36, 02b 15-17. The likeness suggests a class (or genus) and so equal possibility for actual or appatent members of the class. The following from Book I are some instances of A.'s use of the word: 56a 31, 59b II, 60a 5, 63a 32 (on the senses of "like," o£ Met. IOI8a 15-19, I054b 3-13). IZ : 1 3

x",1

01 •••

At A 6, 63a 24 the "difficult" is defined, and a 13 : 1 TD X.a..ml>TOPOV in terms of it the "easy" is explained (638 22 : 3), thereby establishing the two as correlatives, in the sense that any greater contains within itself the lesser. The principle is used immediately at a IS. Spenge!. p. 255, refers to Isocrates, To Philip 3!r57 (0£ 6]a 22 : 0) as an illustration and to Alcidamas, On the Sophists 6 (see Radennacher, B.XXII.15, p. 135) who atgues that those able to handle the difficult can rcadily manage the easier but not vice versa. o d TO crnouli",iov is the reading of cod. A and the edd., except Kassel, who reads .f n with Vahien. Reading TO (0£ next note): "if the good and beautiful thing can come into existence."

a 13-15 x ..l eI ... yevierS... "And if it is possible for a thing to come into existence as something good and beautiful, then it is possible for it to become in general." The axiom is m.de clear by the explanation at a IS, or at Top. I39b 8 ("it is easier to do something than to do it well"). In the real or the notional order of existence, a thing has first to be able to be before it can submit to further qualifications. It should first be noted that the suba 16-20 06 'II «px'll ... yIYV'T"'L stance of what is stated in this axiom is used implicitly by A. in the axioms which follow in a 20-28 (TO IICIT'eo, ... "'I'IAc,,). The meaning of this statement on possibility (somewhat befuddled as it is by the seeming in-

AllISTOTLE, 'RHETOllIC' II

92"

20

congruence of the explanation at a 16-19) is (with that e"'planation incorporated) as follows: any thing, not intrinsically self-contradictory (a 16-19), which can be or become can also end, and any thing which can end can begin. The explanation at a 16-19 simply extends the principle to anything capable of existence in the real or notional world. At 64a 10: J rdevant Aristotelian texts on dex~ axe cited together with references. Its meaning there as the starting point, beginning, originating principle of a thing is the meaning it carries here. i.e., that the diagonal of the square could be or actually is commensurate with its side. Spengd, p. 267, cites many passages where A. uses this example. It is an instance of something intrinsically incapable of an dex~ as far as existence (even notional) is concerned, e.g., a square circle.

a 17-19 otov ... y{yve-r.. ,

11"........ . ..

Y{YVR..' This in the order of physical reality as a 11)-20 A. knew it is secure as a universal proposition of basic significance to investigation in any case of becoming. Cope (as has been remarked dsewhexe, e.g., 6Gb 14 : .), with his emphasis on practical rhetoric for the practical orator, has a tendency to triviaIize statements such as this; see, e.g., his comment here on a 16-19 at p. IS2, or on the following principle, the priority of o1!ala, which is described as "utterly usdess in Rhetoric, from which all nice distinctions and subtleties of all kinds are alien" (p. IS4). C£ 920 16-20; this is but another form of the a 20 EI d GCJ'<8pOV principle enunciated at a r6-19 (and c£ a 2]: "al deX'l ...). Two statements on the principle are found at Cat. 140 26 - 14b 2], and Met. IOIsb 9 ·1019a 14 particularly 1019a 1-14- Met 102sb l3f[ discusses o~"ta at some length, and at 10]20 12 follows it with an analysis of yb18"". I believe that Cope, pp. IS2-S3 (c£ preceding note) and some of the translators misinterpret the explanation at a 21-2]; e.g., Cope: "if a man can be generated, then a child; for that (the child) is prior in generation ... and if a child, then a man; because this (the child ...) is a beginning or origin." But in reality as far as prior-posterior is concerned, this is saying the very same thing: child comes "'eOTBeov. But A.'s argument from the example given by way of illustration is that if something in the order of nature can exist, something whose substantial being or generation naturally demands an antecedent, then the antecedent can exist or come into being. For example, as A. says, if man can exist or become, then a child. The reason (a 22: neaTeeO> ... ytyvna.) is that man (i"e,vo) in substantial being (i> o~al~) is prior: the possible existence or becoming of the substantial being, man, is necessary for the existence or becoming of the child. On the other hand, if the existeoce or becoming of a child is possible, then, too, the man, since in the order of generation (iv yeveael) the child (dem . .. i".IV1j) in the order of nature is prior to ~e adult.

92a 28

COMMENTAllY

a 22-23 (TtpOTEpOV ••. yly.......,..) theses here and at a 23. AH."O, i.e.,

239

All (except Spengd) read the paren-

iI.de" 1'•••rl8 ..,.

'e'" -

a 23-25 ..C1l cl)y ••• '<0 Tto).u On the closeness in A.'s mind of hn8u,.!.. see 85a 23; on the nature of bn9v,.ia, A II, 7ll" 17-27. A. continues to speak in terms of the natural order and states that the objects of natural hwnan love or desire are able to exist or come into existence. The ground of the argument is that objects of natural desire represent things which bdong to the nature desiring because they complete, perfect, the nature. In fact, they are draBd proper to the nature (on the dra8••, A 6, 62a .21-29). Since they are such, the nature moves instinctivdy toward them, and since "nature makes nothing in vain" (Pol. I256b 20-21; cf. Bonitz, Index 836b 29-37 for numerous references to this principle), this instinctive natural desire marks the objeclS as bdonging to the nature and potentially existent and attainable. Thus the comment .t a 24: 0~6e1, ... hn8v,..t The added qualification (cb, .•. "OAV: "generally, for the most part") simply faces the fact that man's desiring does not always conform with his real nature.

a 25 ....l wv ......qV"L This is one of the opposites mentioned in the Categories and identified as corrdatives; cf. !)2a 9-II. The 6vvaTa here are those things contained in eLl', as he states at a 25-26 (dVV4-rOV ... Y£'IIea8at; see following note). The very nature of science and art (and on the latter see A I, 54a II) is that they are a science and art oj something, a fact upon which Socrates spends some time in the Charmides 1651>-171C. Granted the science and the art, their objects either exist or can exist. se. dVV4TO'V (eUTt); a 205-26 6uvu'C'ov 'C'caU"C'lI KelL e.IvclI. xexl YfNEria.a. this is the reading of a good tradition adopted by Spengel, Cope, Ross, Kassel; the other edd. read with cod. A. I would accept the above reading, consistent as it is with the usage in rhe whole paragraph.

a 26 iI cl:pxi) When the principle and starting l1"int of anything (whether the starting point be a thing or person; cf. a 28: T..vTa ••.
a 28-30: xC1l wv . .. TtO).u Again we have the opposition of correlatives, and as one implies the other in the real or notional order, the

ARISTOTLE. 'RHETORIC' II

92b 3

principle explains itsel£ The meaning of 8AOV here is: that which has parts; and such an explanation of it is found at Mel. 1023 b 12-36 where A. sets forth the meaning of part and whole. As the text here is commonly understood and punctuated, the phrase cb~ brl TO "oAV qualifies only the second member of the sentence ("al iJJv TO 8Ao• ••• I'Be'!). This is reasonable. For the meaning of "part" is that which belongs to a whole. Thus if the parts are possible, then the whole is. To speak of possible (or real) "parts" otherwise is without meaning. On the other hand, it does not always follow (and so cb, i"l TO "oAV) that if a whole is possible, the parts also are. Any failure of efficient or formal causality in the generation of an organic whole Qike a body) can on occasion give a whole in which a part is missing; or again in any substantial union of matter and form, the aWOAO. is possible but the parts (ilA'!, eldo~) are not possible as independent entities.

a 30-32 .1 yup ... KE
K.xl d This is the reading of four edd., Spengel. Ross, Cope read at a 12 with a good tradition "e'l'aAI~ Hai xmhv. The period is read by Kassel, Spengel, Ross, and Cope (after Xm6v). All four start a new sentence at Hal Bl. Roemer, Dufour, Tovar punctuate with a comma. The problem with interpretation is that we are not sure of the meaning of the words as applied to shoes; Cope, pp. I8S-86, outlines the difficulty and olfers as translation of the three words: the slit down the front of the shoe; the toe cap; the upper leather. Each of these is substantially the accepted dictionary meaning; c£ LS. Furthermore there is some foundation for some of them: e.g., Prob. 9S6b 4 mentions "eO"X"'l'a. in connection with shoes, and Xenophon in the same connection wes 0 "xIC.,v (one who suts out the shoes) and 0 6'; X'Twva~ I'0VOV """Til'v", (another who cuts out only the uppers) in Crrop. 8.2.5. In fact the passage from Xenophon indicates that the shoes were made in parts. The scholiast is not of much help in explaining neOt1x'''l'a, ''''I'a.tl~.

a 32 - 92b 3 K.xl d ...0 ... ttAOLOV "and if the whole genus belongs to those thing. which are able to be, then the species belongs...." d""aTw, is a partitive genitive with tUTI understood (S. I3 I9). This axiom is a form of correlative opposition in which each concept or reality entails the other, and so to grant the possibility of one is to grant that of the other. If the genus as a whole (TO 'Y••O,8AO.) is able to exist, obviously by that very fact any of its species is a possible existent. b 3-5 Kai d 8ci...pov . . . 6LttAci,",ov sc. d""aTd. 'Y ...afJa. as the main idea at a 9 (dIWaTo.1j .lva, 11 'Y••• ,,8a.) has been stated from a 14 on. Since .the dependence of one upon the other is grounded in their very nature, the fact that one can be or come into existence entails the other. The example is the one given in theCalegorles passage cited at 92a 9-II. Odneov (lreeo,) =

COMMENTARY

one of two; Td "'.'P.,,6, = to be that which a thing is by nature. C£ A 4. 60a 22; IS. 76b 22; 60a 5 : 1. 6Ib II : 1. 1Qa 6 : 2; and see 92b 16. Thus 8oneo. TW. . .. ",e'PV,,6T"" = "if one of two things naturally related to each other (can be or become)." b 5-7 Ked e! .•. 6uvCl..ov All the words indicate care. attention. effort. informed skill. e.g.• TBX"'''I (5.... II : 1). "'aeaC11i (6ob II). ~".",I.}...a (70) 12). Anything which can be realized without careful attention and skill can be done all the more with those qualities. b 7 •Aycie...v, On the case, see S. 1492. Agathon was an Athenian and after Aeschylus. Sophocles. Euripides the most eminent of the tragic poets. His birthdate is not known (perhaps in the 440S B.C.). His death in Macedonia is thought to be ca. 401; he went there possibly at the age of 40 in 407 a year after Euripides i••upposed to have gone to the same place. Plato's Symposium represents a party held at Agathon's house to celebrate his first victory in 416. and from the text he is apparently young (17Se. I98a). A.•peaks of his work a number of times in the Poetics (chaps. 9. IS. 18). C£ OCD. PW Agathon (13). and also (PW) S.9.I895 for more recent bibliography. All thing. considered I would follow b ~ KClI 1''1'' ... npocrylyv..... , the Greek text as printed by Snell (frg. 8. Nauck & Snell. p. 7(5). which is the text read by Cope and. among the edd.. by Kassel: "al ",~. Tei ",.. ,.. xeli T6X"1I "'eo"".... Td M fJ"," d.a,."17 "al -rum "'eoayt"l"Ta•. The major codd. and nwst other. read -rum for TBX"''lI in the first line. "18 Tfi -rum. as do the Vetus Translatio. and very probably the schoHast. TiX"1I first suggested by Grotius (i£ Snell; Kassel. Der Text. pp. 136-37) was also used by R. Porson. who conjectured xe~ TiX"'TI. dropping Tfi of the codd. From our te.'
ARISTOTLE, 'RHETOBIC' ]]

suggests as illustrative of the concept Cicero, Tusc. 2.17.39 ("And so will the military veteran be able to do this, the learned and wise man unable? Indeed he will be better and not by a little bit"), and Tacitus, Agricala 3 I ("Under a woman's command the Brigantes fired a colony ... and could have thrown off our yoke: let us, fresh and unconquered, ... show at once from the first assault what kind of men Caledonia has reserved for herself").

C£ 68a 20 :

2;

68a 21 :

1.

b 12-13 &••vo" .•• ~pEiv All the edd., Spengel, Cope, read Eil8,,.0,; Kassel with the two scholiasts (Anon., Stephanus) reads E~ov.ov, as the name appears in the speech mentioned below. The comment of Isocrates is not known to us from his works, and this may be the occasion for the variety in the spelling since the person is also called EII8v"a, in some codd., a name also mentioned by Stephanus whose gloss indicates that he knew the speech Against Euthynus. This speech appears in the corpus of Isocrates; it has been dated to ca. 403/402, but it is incomplete and its authenticity has been questioned. Cope's conjecture (p. 188) is possible.

b 13-14

."Ept &•••• "'I
i. the reading of four edd., Spenge!. Kassel, Cope add from. good tradition 11 "'" yiyo••• ; however, Kassel expresses reservations on the addition in his apparatus criticus. This ..a•• is generally spoken of in relation to judicial rhetoric (A 10-14). In judicial rhetoric the initial question calling for resolution is that of fact. It should be noted, however, that by a kind of shorthand (.een earlier and at much greater length in B 12-13) the whole passage from 92b IS to 93a 8 (concerning judicial and deliberative rhetoric) is in effect a unit. The priociples (with the exception of the fint two at b 15-19) proposed as source. for argument for past fact (judicial rhetoric) are repeated briefly for future fact (deliberative): compare 92b 19-20 ("d.TS' ... o~6") with 93a 1-2 (TO •• yde ... lOTa.); 92b 21-24 (In .1 ... •",8v,,0;;a ..) with 93a 2-3 ("at rd ... Bna); 92b 24-26 (..al .! ... "od/aa.) with 93" 3-5 (TaVTa ... "'" "BllaVIa); 92b 26-31 (.. ai ,I ... e:rs4!aa••) with 93a 5-8 (..al s! ... o!..ta). Further, the fint two (b 15-19) are in fact slight variations of those seen in what precedes: e.g., 92b 15-17 is another way of utilizing 92a 13 (el TO xaA,,,wTBeo• ... eq.o.) and 92b '7-19 is a form of the principle at 92a 20-21 (el TO 6areeo• •.• TO

b 15 01 &€ YEYOV""

o.

"eOTBqa.). b 16 : 1 TO ij....ov ... ".rpux"'~ YErov"" disposed to happen has occurred."

"that which is less naturally

COMMIlNTAR,Y

243

3 YoEy""O~ liv d'IJ ... I',z).)."" "then that which is more naturally disposed should also have happened." The optative signifies only the possibility of, not the actual occurrence, even though the stronger ""tural disposition to happen is present. This is one of the reasons for the comment at 92b 31-32: lIaTI aol •.. i%O'Ta.

b 17 "1:0 il,....pov £la6~ "that which ordinarily [usually, customarily] happens later"; cpo A 12, 7U 1.6: s/wBoTa (at 79b 4ff. the principle can be seen in use). In such cases it is safe to assume the antecedent (-fd neo....eo.). However, in the example used (ala •. .. T06TO), A present> us with a neces,ary relation between consequent and antecedent in which given the consequen the antecedent has to be. b 19 .MvIl"l:O Kill 01(300).£"1:0 This principle is used at 82a 27 - 82b 4, 82b 8-9 in the chapter on fear; cpo 83a 19-24; the argument applies to action which lies fully and unrestrictedly within the person's power, power joined to the will to act. As the explanation at b 19-20 indicates, the ability to act is complete (l,...odrb•... ovdi.) and in this respect it diJfers from the following principle at b 2I, sl S{JOVASTO ... ',,"'AvB>, where the power is contingent on certain conditions. If such capability to act conjoined with the deliberate intent to act can be shown, then, says A.., the action has been taken. Before considering (e.g., Cope, pp. 189-90) whether A. had an idea of "will" in s{JovASTo we should note two things: (a) that what is said about human action here and at 93a 1-4 re£lects the statement at A la, 68b 32 - 69b 32; and (b) that A. is apparently distinguishing here between the character of s{JovASTo and ' ..sBv,... (b 22), just as he did atA la, 68a 37 - 69a 7 where he says that {JovA"1Ja,~ is the rational wish for the good. c£ 69& 2-3 together with 6gB I : 3, Met. I072a 27-28; and then 64b 32 : 4 together with 68b 326gB 2. In our present palisage l{JovA8To would appear to signify a more deliberate and reasoned action; 1".Bv,. .. (b 22), amore habitual (C£ 69& 8 : 3) and unthinking act, as the example (b 23-24: 01 ,.••... I",Bv,.oiJaw) indicates. A look at some instances of {iovAsaBa, encourages one to interpret the word in the direction followed by Victorius ("cuncti enim, inquit, qui agendi facultatem habent, si volunt, quod volunt, efficiunt"), and Schrader, p. 381, even more emphatically ("voluit praevia deliberatione"); for Schrader l"smeans "concupivit ex affectu." For example, at 80b 35 - 8ra 1 (see Sob 36 : 1), {iovAsaBal in the context implies an act with reason behind it and one more firm than mere desiring (just as 69a 1-4 calls (Jov)."1Ja,~ a rational wish for the good, 69& 2-3). At 82a p - 82b 2 deliberate intent is the implication, and we find in the context that neoate.aBa, is used (on neoate.a,; ,ee 5.". 2 : 1, 63a 20 - 63b 4, 63a 20 : 1). At 84> 27-31, because of the ernotion analyzed (shame), there is more in the word than simple wishing, as there is also at 84b 14-15, 30, 37. {Jov;'.aBa" as a more deliberate act of

6V,..,

ARISTOTLE, I'RHETORIC' II

wishing, desiring the good or what is seen by the individual as good for himself, implies reasoned action (the AoY.U"ijJ "tfa 6v.a,..(J)~ of the parallel passage at 93a 3) in contradistinction to the spontaneous and natural desires, the ,!Aoyo. ae'Eo.~ of A 10, 6ga 4. fu reasoned action one would expect some calculation and therefore some choice in the action. b 19-20 "clv...~ .•. "pcl""OUcr,V

C£ PoL 13 ub 3.

b 20 lp."oSw" ymp "':'Siv fu noted at g2b 19, nothing wilhin the person is an obstacle to the act. This is by way of distinction from the next principle closely joined to it (iT') where there is no obstacle .xlernal to the person. Spengel, pp. 269-70, sees no difference in meaning between b 19-20 and b 21 (I... •. ",aU".,.) and would change the passage as cOIrllpt. Omitting his exclusions he would read b 21-22: In el TOO' IE", l".,A".. "al wwl{no,...A.

""a..

is the reading of a good tradition and accepted by Ross, Kassel, Cope. The other odd. read "al .1 d".aT&'.

b 21 K,d d .su".._

1 rl>py{~...o From the definition of anger (cf. B 2) it is clear that the possibility of an act of retaliation is essential to it. See A.'s comment at A II, 70b 13-14. 2 m.OUp.., After b 21-22 (In ... hroO."••) the verb "'''eax. of b 19 is understood. On the idea in lnoO."." see references above in g2b 19 and also A II, 70a 16-27 (with the notes thereto), II9a 3 : 1.

b 22 :

b 23 Wv bplyov.... , ... "o,OOcr", For the reason see 6ga ,should note that it is qualified here (w~ ... noAu').

I :..

One

b 23-24 01 p.tv .•. m,lh>p.OOcr,v

The opposition of these two classes has been met before: e.g., 7Iia .8 : 2, 83b 32-33, 88a 35-36. On In.o,,,i~ C£ 86b JI : 2, Boa 30 : 1,788 13 : " 6Ia "5 : 2. On the ide. in d"eau1a, 68b 14: 2.

b 25 : 1 Ip.""'. ylynoa.. " " ..t rn".iv is the punctuation of Tovar, Ross, Kassel; the reading ofRoerner, Tovar, Kassel. Ross bracketsy,,,••u6a,; Spengel, Cope, y'y.oaOa, "al, although the words are found in all the codd. Vahlen, Arisloleles De arte POttica, p. 183, reads as above and interprets "al .1 ."dA. "lyv."Oa. "al [sc. sl ii"s}.A.] no ••i• • • l>-91)

COMMBNTAllY

do. This interpretation is found in the Roberts translation, quite unclearly in Freese, and not at all in Jebb & Sandys, Cooper. 2 £lXD~ See S?a 34 : 2, 3, S7b 1 : 2; ..If/p.i.....

"Olij",,,

b 25-26 Elxo~ ... "for it is probable th.t a person on the very verge of doing something did it." lu seen above (9Zb 25 : I), A. explains The "al is intenonly the second part of the statement, sc. ellPMk

".,si..

sive. b 26-31 XCll .. yCyOl/€V •.. rnElpCl"€V "And if all those things which .re by nature antecedent to X or the means to X have happened (then X has happened); for example if it has lightened, then it has thundered and if one made the .ttempt to act, then he acted. And if all those things have happened whose nature it is to be consequent upon X or which are the cause of X, then the n.turaI antecedent X and the cause have happened; for example, if it thundered, then it lightened, and if he acted, then he made the attempt to act." This passage is a unit in which the statement ofb 26-28 is given conversely at b 28-31. The principle makes use of the idea of relation grounded in as well as antecedent-consenature seen at 92b 3-5 (c£ 9zb 3-5 on quent, 92. 20-23 (c£ 92b 17-19). Victorius interptets in.lea". in one of its possible meanings: make an attempt to seduce a woman.

".'1'"".')

"tfpux.

".".,

b 26 is the reading found here in all the codd., and at b 28 it is the reading of cod. A. The edd., Spenge!, Cope read it in both places. Ross and Kassel read "l'l'v". at b 26; Kassel (as would 1) te2ds it .also (with cod. F) at b 28. "s"v" .. is found in Plato and generally corrected to nl'!'v.... b 31 ... fL£v l~ .vci.YX'l~ This conclusion to the ways in which to establish the existence of past fu:t takes into account that in some instances the natural relation between the two events establishes the past fact with certainty; in other instances, particularly those involving human action, with strong probability. The phraseology here takes us hack to A 2, 57a 22 - 57b 10 and particularly so since much of the form ofargumentation used in 92b 15-3 I is based on sign and probability argument, as can be seen from the subsequent passage in A 2, i.e., 57b 10-25. On the question of necessary argumentation see S?a 22 : I, S?a 28, S7b 4, 57b 10-21. .iJno, lx.vTa qualifies both Ta pl. and Tel de: "some are so related...." This is the phrase used atA 2, 570 34 for b 31-32 ... 5' .:.~ ... ""AU probable argumentation from B!"oTa; c£ S?a 34 : 2, 3. However, it is also applicable to argumentation from <1fIpBia &Vrhvvpa (A 2., 57b 4), as some of the iustances in the argumentation at 92.b 15-31 clearly indicate: e.g., the statement that one did something because one was about to do it (a sign) (b 25-2.6), etc. For the reason why argumentation from <1fIpBia dvrhPvpa

ARISTOTLE. cRBETOlUC' II

is only probable. c£ 57b 10-:>1. and for the difference between the probable argumentation of el,,6, and a'1p.6t01l cf. uX'Y}pst01l.'" b 32-]3 ".pl . . . •lp"lJl'"livo.~

C£!)2b I3-I4.

b 33 v i.e.• the principles presented to argue that something has happened. 92b I5-3 I. a 1-2 ..6"t£ ... lIv ECM:Il. "since that will be for which there is both the power and the deliberate intent." On dv.ape.. povl7ja.. see !)2b 19.

/Iv......

a 2-3 xlll ..elt .•• "and those things will be for which there is the desire, or the anger. or the deliberate calculation. united with the power to act." On ",,,8vpia c£ Ala. 68b 37 - 69a 7; II. 70a 16-27. Because of the third sp~cation here (loy.ap
a 7:

COMMENTARY

93' 14

247

a !HI "'.pl .•. 'PI1VOPW The truth of this statement, which is explained in more detail at a II-16, is borne out by a re-reading of A 7 ((1I)"'P1eo, and ddiberative rhetoric), 9 ("aU. and epideictic), 14 (61"a.o. and judicial). Though Spengd, pp. 271J-'71, partially challenges the statement (i.e.,
a 9 ".pl ... "'P ..yfLci....,v At A 3, 59a 22-26 A. makes a similar statement. The remark here and at A 3 is seemingly challenged at 93a 16-17: "to examine greatness and superiority in the abstract is idle discussion." The criticism is correct not only for the reason given at 93a 17-18 but also because both tenns, great-small, in thernsdves are relative terms and determined only by reference to another, a fact which A. indicates both at 93a 9-10 and at 59a 23 by his use of the full phrase "sel 6~ I'srlBov, xal I'I"eOT7JTO, ... "ai "stCo.o, T8 "ai ';lehTo.o,. If we ask then if A. has spoken about "the greatness and smallness of things and of the greater and lesser and in general [HAW,] of great and small things ... and about the greater and lesser in itself[dnAw.j" (93a 9-13), the answer musr be yes. In determining the greater and lesser individual goods in A 7, for example, A. set down general principles on greatness and smallness (c£ 591l 24) whereby the greatness and Smalhless of individual things could be determined. Thus in his analysis he has followed his remark at 59a 24 ("al "aBoAov xai "eel '"elenov) and those here at 93a 13 (ww,) and at 93a 10 ("aIHAw,).

a 9-10 x .., fLd~ovo~ .• , D.ci.....ovo~ 21-35; 64a 12-23,

64a

]I -

64b

II,

ce.

specifically A 7, 63 b 7-12,

65a 8-J3.

a II "'PO ••P'lfLev.........

As already noted, A 7, 14, are clear instances and readily recognized. A 9, however, does not receive the attention it should. The discussion there is constantly of the greater (e.g., virtues, honorable, etc.) and the comparative degree is a common occurrence. At 68. Io-II, 22-27 the role of avE... is ina-oduced. a 12-13 ".pl"
c£ 93a 9-11. i.e., "in each of the kinds of discourse";

a '4 "<0 "'poxdp.evov •.. 4yo:8w C£ A 3, 58b 6Jf. and S8b 8-29. As Til" the UVI''P
ARISTOTLE., 'RHBTORIC' II

a IS bcol""",

93' 18

i.e., the advantageous, the honorable, the just, so, too,

TaVTa, a 16.

a 16-18 '1:11 lit . .. "p ..yp.«....." C£ 93a 9. &. an h"anjf.'1/ "e"'"<>ni concerned primarily with the elfort to enable men to make correct judgments on open problems, rhetoric will be mosdy concerned with the particular knowledge of experience. A range of experiential knowledge joined to the theoretical knowledge of the art (0£ Met. 981a 12 - b 3) makes the good rhetorician and is the objective of A.'s study.

a 18 "pll~ -djv Xpel..... •.. "PIIYp.«""""

" ... for ordinary needs individual f.cts (carry more weight) than large theoretical statements." On ..." HaO' haaTa see 5gb 2.

CHAPTER

the common proofs; specifically. example

I . Introduction: 93' 23 -27

II . Development: 93a 28

-!)4a

r. 93' 28 - 94' 2 (a) 9Ja 28-3' (b) 93a J' - 9lb 4 (C)9lb4-9lb 9 (d) 9lb 9-940'

2.

!)4a

2-16 (a) 940 >-8

(b)

940 9-16

III . Conclusion: 94a 16-19

20

16

the kinds and the use of =ple

the kinds three kinds of onmple: IWtoric:al. parable (parallel). fable historical (i.... citing put fact) illustrated parable (parallcl) iIlwtratcd fable iUusttat
the uses fables suit
(Roemer 16-19 = Ross 17-18. Kassel I6-r8)

93a 23 lCo,vtirJ m..... ...,y ci""CIlV C£ 9Ib 8-23 (with references) for the pl.ce of this chapter in the development. Clearly Schrader. Cope (p. I9S) by excluding chap. 19 as part of the discussion of the element> common to all rhetoric do not accept the division of the work as given in 9Ib 8-23. Spengel. p. 271, sees that drap. 19 is a part of all that follows to drap. 26 but considers the introductory sentence here (93a 23) poorly written. Victorius has no comment on • 23-2-7. These "t......., common to all (&naa ..) rhetorical discourse are called the "I......., anod""TO"al in A 2; C£ 5Sa I. Their dilference (as I view it) from the "t......., "'<6XVo. is given in COMMENTARY I 3SC>S4. On "t.......,•. see 5sa 4. On their common use in all demonstration: A 2, s6b 6-8. 56b 7, For a brief statement on them in A.. C£ lloyd. Aristotle pp. n6-2 7. a 24 : 1 t6""" sc. ,,1......{JJ1I. Primarily these are the three "tan., MBXVO. (Uyo,. "dBo" 7fBo,) of A 2. S6a IJf. but the dnxvo. as met in A IS would also be included. On the "'TOXVO.. C£ S6a I : 1. 2. ]; S6a 3 : 2; 55. 4. On the dnxvo •• SSb ]5: 2. 7sa 22 : z. 7sa 23.

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II Z yEv., i.e., there are two kinds (1'i1n7) - namely, induction and deduction - of the larger 1'&0' demonstration. These kinds have their own species (.r~~): e.g., for syllogism, c£ 56b 5 : 1; for example, c£ 93' 28-30.

a 25 : 1 "'lIpcili.,Y!'-1I

""I EvOU!,-,!!,-1I

Cpo A 2, 56, 35 - 56b 27; 57' 7-

33, 57b 21'>-36, and the notes thereto in COMMBNTARY l. On the role of

each in the Rhetoric, 578 I5-I6. 2 yvc:.!,-,! This concept is studied in B 21, as is its relation to enthymeroe.

a 21'>-27 3!'-OlDY ... "'''Y'''Yii

C£ A 2, 57b 21'>-36, 57b 27 : 2, S6b 5 : 2·

a 27 dPX1\ As was said, 57b 27: 2, it is clear with respect to example that one cannot use example. without explicidy or implicidy making a real induction to apprehend the general class under which the example faIls. In this sense induction is the "beginning" as far as example is concerned. However, from A.'s remarks elsewhere - e.g., at An. Post. roob 3-5, 8ra 38 - 8Ib 9, EN II39b 25-31 - it is also the with respect to syllogism. The reason for this is that while the mind cannot know the individual but only the universal the only way d,e intdlect can reacll the universal is through the particular, as A. tries to show in An. Post. 99b 15 - roob 17, De an. 43Da ro"17. On this problem see Owens, 167-68, or Harnlyn, pp. 140-41.

"em

i.e., two species or kinds of the genus example. We have a 28 &IS,! seen this use of the word at, e.g., A 4, 60a 21, 78b 14, 8Ib 33, and will see it again at 94b 7, ¢b 24. However, see s8a 36 : 1 and 68a 26.

Iv!,-Eo... Al(aU"ol One kind is basically f.lctual and historical, the citation of past events; the other is fictive in which one either invents a comparable instance or utilizes suitable paraIlds already at hand (Cicero, De part. orat. 11.40 mentions each kind). In all three instances of example, the point to be noted is that the ground for each must be likeness, or similitude. b c""'llp!e, a. A. explains it (An. Pro 2.24), we have two sta=ts of the same order (A 2, 57b 29-30) with one more familiar and accepted as true. The more familiar is used to establish the less familiar, or, as he says, the major term (A) is shown to be applicable to the middle term (B) by means of a term similar to the minor term (C). Thus if we wish to show that C is A, we can do so through the example D which is like C since both have the attribute B. But we also know that D has the attribute A. Therefore D is A, D is B, and so B is A (thus the m'!ior term bdongs to the middle which is shown by way of D). Then: B is A; C (as we already know) is B; so C is A. Ifin the example at 93a 32 - 93b 4 we identify the terms, the use of example becomes clear: A (cross over to Greece), B (take Egypt), C (Artaxerxes III Ochus), D" 2 (Darius, Xerxes). Arguments from example (or indeed parable, faple), based

'a 28-3 I

·93' 30

COMMENTARY

25I

as they are on analogy, will yidd only probability; they can move only from particular to particular in the same class and one particular must be better known and accepted. i.e., the speaker (writer). a 30 : 1 aN.."" again a fO[IIl of argument by analogy grounded in • '''''p<>/301.>'1 similitude. It involves comparison as the word and the examples (93 b 5-9) indicate. The word means: a juxtaposition for comparison, or as Cicero denotes it col/ationem; c£ Quintilian, Inst. orat. 5. I I .2.3; Cicero, Defin. 4.27.75, De o,al. 2.66.265. Ordinarily the comparison is invented by the speaker (writer), and its effectiveness depends upon his acuteness of mind in seeing analogies suitable to his argument (cp. Quintilian, Inst. o,at. S-II.I-6). In itsdf the parable in its stricter form is an extended metaphor or simile in brief narrative form usually for the purpose of teaching. An example of it can be found in the objection ofCebes in Phaedo 87b 4-88b 8 to Socrates' argument for the imm.ortaIity of the soul. In testameotalliterature where the parable is a more readily identifiable form, it is mostly instructional, employed to offer a clear illustrative example: ''The kingdom of heaven may be compared to a man who sowed good seed in his field ..." (Mt. 13 :241f.). a 3<>-31 l,Oya •... AL{3uxa( In contrast to the parable, the fable is not invented by the speaker (writer) but ddiberatdy sdected from material at his disposal which A. points to here as Aesopic or Libyan. Of the latter we know rdativdy little. There is a passing mention of Libya (Aeschylus, frag. 139, ed. Nauck & Snell) as well as Egypt and Sybaris as sources of fable; c£ Plato, Phaec/rus 275b, Aristoph., Wasps I2.59. But Hermogenes, Progymnaslllala "Be! ,",-600v, says that the place names were given by those who discovered the fables; c£ Spengd, Rhet. G,aea II, p. 3. The fable found in Classical literature is apparently independent of the other main stream of fable which is Oriental (India). Fabl... (Uyo~, Jabu/a: a thing said), parables, proverbs, gnomic sayings possess in common the quality of wisdom literature. This explain. in part both their suasive power and their use by speakers (writers). They rellect the fund of common sense of the race. The fable of Classical literature is identified with the name of Aesop (c£ Quintilian, Inst. o,al. 5.II.I9-21). The identification which was made by the Greeks in the fifth century B.C. is confumed by the later formal collections of fables by Phaedrus (ca. 15 B.C. - A.D. 50) and Babrius (latter half of first century A.D.). The sole exception to this identification is the fables of Aphtbonius (latter half of fourth century A.D.). However, we do have instanc... of fable prior to its identification with Aesop. We know, for example, of Hesiod (? 750 B.C.), Wo,ks and Days 202-212, Archilochus (? 68<>-640, or ca. 720 B.C.). Furthermore no collection of fables from the hand of Aesop has come down to us, and indeed our knowledge of the man is meager despite the fact that in Greece

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

from the fifth century onward fable and Aesop became one, e.g., Aristoph.,

Wasps 1446-1448, Plato, Phaedo 61b. What these Greeks meant most likely by Aesopic fable is that defined by Theon (second century A.D.) ". fictitious story pictoring • truth" (c£ Spengd, Rhet. Graeei II, p. 72-), such as we find in Herodotus I.141, Aesch., Agam. 717-'736, or even Soph., Ajax II42-II58. Aesop himsdf was most probably a Thracian from Messembria who was a slave in Samos and a contemporary of Sappho's (ca. 612 - ? 550 B.C.); c£ Herodotus 2.134-135. The first collection of fables under his name was made by Demetrius of Phalerum (b. ca. 350 B. c.). This work is known to us only through a copy made in the tenth century A.D., although it i. very probably the source for the work of phaedrus and Babrius. Collection. of these Greek fables in prose such as that of Demetrius (or later the sO
"the statement of facts is something such as a 31 I ....'v ..• "'0'''''&...., the following," Basically this is the only kind of example An2ximenes con,sider.. His discussion of ".edd•• apart from the question of similitude is not of much hdp in opening up A.'s statements. The rdevant passages are found at Anax. 1429a 21 - 14300 13, 1438b 39 - 1439a 7.-

"p.

".p ...

a 32 ...... >.iya' If there i. any real situation here, 1 would agree with Cope, p. 197, that it is the possibility of an attack on Greece. Given the situation of Persia and Greece in mid-fourth century B. C., an attack by Persia on Greece seems far from likdy even though Artaxerxes Ill, Ochus was engaged in subduing Egypt; c£ 93b 3. Aapoio~ eN "po",.pov . . • "plv "for in the past Darius did not cross over [to Greece] until"; on the use of the second nedneov, c£ S. 2440. Cambyses, king of Persia (529-522 B.C.) and son of Cyrus the Great (559-529 B.C.), conquered Egypt for the empire in 5261525 (c£ Herodotus 3.11£.). Darius who later became king (521-486 B.C.) was at the time a member of the king's bodyguard (Herodotus ].139). whether Egypt revolted from Persian rule in the general uprising. on the accession of Darius and whether, as Olmstead (pp. 1411£.) maintains, Darius "won baek his r~calcitrant

93b I "p6....pov

253

COMMBNTARY

subjects" in 519/518 before moving on Greece in the first Persim War of 490 B.C. is questioned. Eldest son of Dariw, he came to the throne in 486/ 93b 2 Sep~'1~ 485 B.C.; he did not move against Greece in the second Persim War (480/479 B.C.), as Herodottu 7.7-20 tells us, until he himself had settled a revolt in Egypt in 485 B.C. He ruled until 465. b 3 cN"'o~ This would be Artaxerxes III, Ochus (358-338 a.c.). In 357/ 356 he followed up a previous attempt made as crown prince in 359 B.C. to return Egypt to its tributary position. He failed again but in 343/342 he returned to the task and was successful. In 357 and again in 343 both Persia and Egypt were employing Greek: mercenaries and in 343 prior to his attack on Egypt Ochus sent an embassy to the major Greek: city-states to seek an alliance against Egypt. Thebes alone responded. C£ CAR, VI 14!rI54. 24!r51; !socrates, Pa.ath. 159. For the structure of the argument c£ 93a 2831. b 4 ...
87a 20.

b 5~ IljLOLOV ... ':'.",op Iv C£ S.fa 25; S. 2478-2480; our 11.. represents the suppressed apodosis ("as it would be"). is the reading of Spenge! accepted by the edd., i.e., b 6 l'iJ 01 6Uv .........' "should appoint by lot as atblctes not those who are able to contend fur the prize but whosoever win the lot." b 7-8 i\... xA'IP.....'ov "or if one should assign by lot some one or other of the sailors as the one who must be hebnsman."

aS4

ARISTOTLE, 61lHBTOIUC' II

b 8 .. ~ lit... ..0... AciXav.... ciAUt l"iJ ..0... E"''''''ciI''EVOV This is the reading of Cope, Ross, Kassel; the other edd. read with Spengel, Vahlell (eli, oV d~.o TOO '", d.ud TOO .
b9 :

IV S03-S04. 2 .mAciPllio~ tyrant of Acragas (Agrigento) in Sicily ca. S70-SS4 One of the more notorious of the cruel tyrants who seized power with the aid of a mercenary force, he removed all opposition through the use of t=or tactics; o£ Pindar, Pythians 1.94-98. His use of a brazen bull to roast his enemies alive is thought to be historically correct. On the other hand, the Letters of Phalans (148 in number) are forgeries of a second century A.D. sophist, as Bendey showed. As far as the time period for Stesichorus and pha!aris is concerned, A.'s story is historically possible. But the place is not terrain. We have the same story told of Gelon (0£ 73a n : z) of Syracuse; sec, e.g., CAH, IV 37001. As can be seen at 57b 30 : z dlC relation between a bodyguard and tyranny is fairly common. On Phalaris see PW, OGD, CAB, B. c.

IV 3S4-SS. b 10 Alac:.",ou •.. 1i'l1""Y"'yau Ross alone reads <6> before the name. The fable is given at 93b 1.3 - 940 2.

b 13-23 "~ ... ofoe&Acip'&' This is 2690 in the collection of Aesop's fables in the Perry corpus, Aesopica I; C£ Horace, Epp. 1.10.34-38.

"::""'p>\......O.., probably throughout here in the meaning of punish ; C£ Ci9b 12 : 1, 2. b 15 ..,~ .. civOp..."ov Cope and Kassel read Tdv from a good tradition.

~ 14.

the reading of all the cadd. and four of the b 17 CNVOl"oAOy>j ..~..o~ edd. Ross reads O'V'O,..oAoy'ljera, with Richards, p. 178, who says that "two participial genitives, referring to different unexpressed subjects, ;u-e very

94'l

COMMENTARY

I

255

clumsy." Spengd, p. 274. was also unhappy with the double genitive. However, the unexpressed noun which goes with each participle i. quite clear from the context: (lnnov) allVopoADl"ia""To• ••• (d.6ea",ov) a.apO'.To••••• b 19-23 .. 06..... 8E ••. + demagogue on trial for his life." This is the reading of a good tradition accepted by Cope, Kassd. Spengd and the other edd. read dT/P71"OeW. "ewop';"ov d71pa"OYyo;; which is a reading based in part on cod. A and the Vecas Translatio. Kassel, Der Text, pp. 137-38, discusses it.

b 24 - 94& I .n.:,"'''''CI... xAt",."OV"'~ This is fable 427 in Perry's collection, AesopiaJ 1. It is also found in brief form in Plutarch, Morali. 79oc-iA71T8, of Roemer, Tovar, Ross, is suggested by Bywater, ..Aristotelia Ill," 72, for the d'P.A71Ta. of cod. A; Dufour reads d'P.A1I as does Freese. The given reading found in some later codd. is more acceptable.

"p

b 32 "ci.. oW XCll6I'i~," irp'l, ".r. av8p.~ ••. " The problem of deciding here between codd. A and F (neither differs in meaning) is found in the critical editions. Kassd, the latest, reads basically with F, and it is the reading I have accepted. Spengd, Roemer, Dufour, Ross read with A omitting oJ., .'P71 eli; so, too, Tovar (but he reads l
94& I .." xa.vei "your [llp,.j public funds." This is the reading of all the codd., and it is found in Spengd, Cope, Kassd. The other edd. read 10"'0. with Roemer for the Latin reliqua found in the translation of de Moer-

beke.

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

94a 5

a:z : 1 S'IfL'IYOP'Xo[ "suitable to speeches in the assembly"; c£ 59b J2. : 1. Apart from their more general and fictive character, which relates them somewhat loosely to the subject under discussion, there seems to be no intrinsic reason why fable as fable should be more fitted to one kind of speech than to another. For A.'s thoughts on the pre-eminence of deliberative rhetoric, seeA I, 54b 2Z--29. 2 ci.y ..8.~ oG..o Cpo S6b 19-20 where dra8.. ("advantage" here) is in one interpretation used substantivally as it is here.

.

a 4 : 1 >'oyou~ Sl p/j.j .... , This repeats wkt was said of fables at 93a 29-30. But there is an olmous diiference between the "making" of a fable and that of a comparison or parable. From the evidence of A: s words, it is cleal that fables exist as independent entities ready to be used elfectively by a discerning speaker (writer). On the other hand, the speaker must "make" the comparison; c£ 93a 30 : 2. In each instance the "making" is different. With fable it is a matter ordinarily of "finding" the relevant similitude, likeness, in the material already at one's disposal; in parable one "invents" the relevant comparison. This would be the point of his adding with respect to fable "if one is able to see the likeness, an ability which comes from skill in philosophy." a 5:

1

pqw

.read by the cadd., edd., Spengel,

Cope; Kassel secludes it.

;rho text of the codd. makes sense, and there seems no need for any change although Thuror, "Obserntions critiques [II] ," 4Z would rearrange the line for wkt he considers a more logical statement. z 'X cp"'ocrol" rprJ.ofJorpLa, and refers to Pol. I34Ib 28. With his reading (c£ note above) I assume that he would interpret: "which is the task: of those engaged in philosophy." Some translators interpret the word as "literary training," " meaning more akin to the extended meaning !socrates gives to the word. Aside from the fact that it is not immediately clear how this ability to think: analogically would be formally developed by training in literature, I am not sure that A. uses the word for anything other than the different aspects of intellectual investigation or what he calls a[ "aTa rprJ.ol1orpLa. ""/T'ipa" the philosophic sciences (Top. lOla 27); cpo Pol. 1282b 14-23, Top. I63a 36 - I63b 12. Certainly the few times it appears in the Riletoric it means "philosophy" - e.g., at 79" 35-36, 06b II. At I2a 10-12 there is a comment relevant to the matter here on the sort of thing A. believes goes on in 'l'rJ.ol1o'l'La: "metaphors should be drawn from things proper to the object but not obvious, JUSt a~ in phi-

!j4aIl

COMMENTARY

257

losophy also it bdongs to the adept individual to see likeness even in objects that are far apart." a 6 p,p.. The reading of a good tradition and Dufour, Ross, Kassel, Cope; the others read liq:o•• It, like xe'1rJcpwnea, is predicate to an understood lCITt, whose subject is the substantival expressions Ta dea Tal. Uyw. (f.ble examples lpar.bles) and Ta dea Tal. "eaypriTw. (historical ...). a 8:

1

t"t ...10 "oAU

•

~........

,,~

C£ 82b 5-6. y.yevo,nv Cpo A 9, 68a 29-31. el,,08E,~.,,,v

(iJ yelp ... ..-oU'ftdV). lJ.ov..... 8£ This is the more satisfYing punctuation, and it is found in Tovar, Ross, Kassd, Cope, and with a minor change in Dufour. Roemer, Spengd place a colon after 63
... t"t ...o~

...

~8u">\"",,,V

a 10 : 1 el,,08o1~.,,,v C£ 7& 8 : J. • "(.....,~ C£ 55a 4 meaning (b), Studies, pp. 5!r6Q.

By way of illustrating !j4a 9-II Spengel, a II : J .:.~ ""p.... plo'~ pp. 275-'76, cites Problomata 916b 25f[ where we read: "Why are men more happy with examples and fables in speeches than with enthymemes? Is it because they rejoice both in learning and in learning quickly? People in fu:t do learn more quickly through examples and fables. For these are things which they know and which are particular. But enthymemes are demonstrations from universals which we know less than the particular. Furthermore we place more trust in that for which there are several witnesses, and examples and fables are like wimesses; again, proofs by means of witnesses are more easy to come by. Further, too, men perceive likeness with pleasure and examples and fables show forth likeness." Interestingly enough, this same principle of pri91Jac~ T"X"" plays a part in his urging the use of a condensed furm fur the enthymeme in the third book; o£ Studies, pp. 88-91. • tnt ...oi~ ~8u">\""",,, the reading of a good tradition. Ant also appears in corrected cod. A. but Kassd alone reads it and comments on it (Der Text, pp. 138£). Cope, p. 203, who does not read it implies it in M"p~parJe.. The translations interpret explaining the common reading: as Cope does and are essentially the same as the translation given in 94& srI! where the preposition is accepted.

TO',

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

94" 16

Tn "'CJf!a6.lypaTa is undera 12 : 1 "'pOTlO.!"""" .•• lO'XEV oln"ywyij stood with "'eo ..9Ip••a, as it is with b"lsyops.a (a 13). On lo.".. lnay"'l'ii see 93a 26-27. We have seen the nature of argument by example at 93a 28-3 I. Argument by induction goes from the less universal to the more universal. It do;" so (cf. An. Pr. 2.23) by establishing a relation between a major term (A, men) and a middle term (B, mortal) by means of a minor term (C, individuals): e.g., the individuals X, y, z are men; x, y, z are mortal; men are mortal. The diiference between induction and syllogism is that the C which is used to relate A to B is not a truly universal term but a collection of singulars. Z ToiS Si ~lIToP'xoiS i.e., "Rhetoric"; cpo 02a 3-9 where dialectic, eristic, rhetoric are compared, and 7sa 8 : 3. This is the interpretation commonly given to the word, and so nltj. b dliyo.~, 94" 13, is taken to

mean '·save rarely," "except in a few instances." If one reHects upon A:s concern for the audience and their ready apprehension of what is said which is round as early asA 2, S7" '-4, 7-21, and lateratB22, 9sb 22-9604, rIB, I9a I"l-I9, it is possible to see why induction is not 01><••0> to rhetoric. The comment ofProblemDla notwithstanding (see 94a II : ,), any strong inductive argument (as can be seen in many of the early Socratic dialogues) requires an extensive presentation (nolAd Mys .., 94a IS) and labors therefOre under the same problem as syllogism, S7" 7-17. AD this works against the pri9'1'J1' Taxs.a of the auditors which A. favors. There is, however, another interpretation offered by Victorius, p. 37], which is valid, attractive, and in accord with what A. says of rhetorical merhodology. Victorius interprets e'1Toe",oi, as "those skill~d in speaking." nltj. b dlLyo" he would accept, but hesitandy, as above. However, he believes that it is more righdy interpreted as "save - in the presence of a small audience" ("nisi cum verba fiunt ad pauces").

TO.,

a

I]

IKLAq6"."..

C£ 94a u : , init.

a 14 6 ... ""P-rUS .•• K'OUVOS To understand what A. intends by this statement and that at 943 Is-r6 (PrieTv, ... xe>l<"po,) in which he likens example to the evidence of a witness, it is helpful to read what he has to say atA IS, 7Sb 26-76_]2 about the clfectiveness of the testimony by witnesses. "for just one reliable witness serves the a 16 "'LOTOS xul .IS xp"l\o,,,os purpose." '''aTO, is the reading of cod. F and read by Kassel, Spengel, Cope, but xe'1aTO' of cod. A is read by four odd. xe-qa.po, is the reading of all the codd.; Kassel (cf. DeT Text, P.139), Spengel read instead dndxe'1 ("is sufficient''). In terms of the conte.'Ct it is quite attractive. I am not certain that in the light of the codd. I would want to change since xefja.po, (serviceable) also yields a meaning which satisfies the conteXt.

CHAPTER 21

I . Introduction: 943- 1!}-22

with threefold division: subject matter of maxims; when maxims are to be used; who are to use them

II· Development: 94" 22 - 9Sb 18 the subject matter of maxim: given by way of defining maxim, along with the kinds of maxim and how they are to be used

I. 94a2z-9sa2

2.

who arc: to use maxims

95a 2-7

when. how, and why maxims are to be

3· 95a 7-95b 18

used when and bow why

(a) 9sa 1-34 (h) 9sb 1-18

III . Conclusion: 9sb 18-20

19 Y""'p.o>'oyl..~ probably "the uses of maxims"; possibly "the theory of maxims," although in Plato, PhaeJr. 267c the word refers to what would apparently be a collection of maxims (if Ta Mou".ia My",. is the name of Polus' book) gathered from poet> such as Hesiod, Theognis. Apart from Anaximenes we have here, as far as can be known, the only effort up to this moment to define and specify It is more complete and (despite Spengel's preference for just two kinds of 1'• .,,...,, as we have in Anaximenes; c£ 94b 7) more specific than that found in Ana:ximenes. All future efforts made by later writers, in particular the rhetoricians in their Progymnasmata, are grounded in what A. says here. For Anaximenes the maxim is primarily an instrument for argument. In his mst mention of it (1<\28a 20-25) he includes it among his ,,1"TB'~. His formal discussion of the concept i. at 1430b 1-30. At 143Ia 25 - I431b 2 he speaks of its clliference from two of the proofs, enthymeme and sign. Oddly enough, however, in all other reference to (when he means by it "maxim") he coordinates it with what he calis enthymeme. This joining of the two because of their effectiveness preswnably with the auditors reflects a basic relation between the two which we find in part in A.'s discussion of yo",...". But Anaximenes, unlike A., appears to make maxim and enthymeme equal or at least mutually supportive in argument.

!)4a

yv""''''.

yv""''''

. ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

Thus we are told that in presenting one's argument both confer a certain degance and attractiveness (1431b 23-26; '434" 33-40); cpo r II, 12a 18-23. Further, they are of assistance in deliberative (I44oa 20-25) and epideictic (l44Ia 18-26, '44,a 39 - 1441b IO).discourse, and are to be used in thefonnal confirmation of one's argument (I439a 1-4, 19-24; '439" 32 - 1439b 2; 1442b 38 - '443" 6). In counter argwnent both are effective in handling opposition (I432b 25-32.) or interruptions (1433a 19-29) &om the floor, and in formal refutation one must refute the maxims and enthymemes used by the opponent (1443b 42 - 1#4" 2.). a 20-21 nolc.>v .....L'rlV The kind of subject and the times suitable for maxims, and the persons best fitted to use them, will become clear with the ddinition of maxim. The threefold division is renIiniscent of the analysis of the emotions at 78a 23-25; c£ 7Sa 23. The kind of subject is covered mainly between 94a 26 and 9.sa 2. Tbere we learn that in subject matter maxims are assertions about the moral character ofhuman living, assertions whose brief statements are either well-known and accepted or readily grasped when heard, or, on the other hand, are controversial or paradoxical and so in need of a short supplementary explanation. At 9.sa 1r-'7 A. gives us the persous, and at 9.1' 7-34 the occasions or times.

a 22 : 1 Aclyo,~ i.e., "in discourses"; c£ S9b 16 : 1. 2 lcs"" 5' 'Ii a' oj is the reading of cod. A and four edd. Kassel appropriates "'1 &om Spengd's conjecture ian" "'1 (c£ Spengd's note on .s.sb 25); Cope reads at with cod. F. On 001 plnoo oJ.... ("not, however" read by the edd. but not by Spengd, Cope, Freese, see .ssb 8 and Bonitz, In-

,dex 5460 2Off. :1 1l,,6cpllV"U;

C£ 6Sb 27 : 2.

a 23-24 x,d a(, ".pt """"""" olav is the reading of cod. A and three edd., Spengd, Cope. Ross, Dufour read 0;;.... "eel with cod. F, which is rejected by Kassd (Der Tex~ p. IU) .

....,.'v

This is A.'s ddinition of Y"wp7J. Without • 22-26 E""" •.. "p.. any significandy new contributions, it reappears together with dements of Anaximenes' explanation of maxim in the efforts of later rhetoricians to explain the concept: e.g., Hermogenes, Progymnasmata 4, Aphthoniw Frog. 4, Theon, Frog. .I (all in Spengd, Rhet. Grata II), and c£ 94b 7, sf. The definition of Anaximenes is not adequate. He explain. maxim as the setting forth of a personal view ("'1A.... darpaTo, 16(00). on gcneraI matters and leaves it at that. A. gives us a ddinition offering both genus and species: (a) a general statement on the objects of human actions, (h) specifically: objects to be chosen or avoided in these action.. Maxim, therefore, is for A. directed exclusivdy toward the human person and the quality of his actinn,. In this

o,

COMMENTARY

definition A. reHects the general nature of "'''1'71 as found in the antecedent literature. i.e.. a terse. pithy statement of a general truth on the moral character of human living. With two possible exceptions (94b 13. 95a 21; see below) all the examples in chap. 21 illustrate the definition; c£ Studies. pp. 141-44. The Audo, ad Heren,.ium 4-17-24 (ca. 86-82 B.C.) competendy describes A.'s idea: "A maxim is a statement drawo from life which sets forth in a few words what either occurs or should occur in human living." This idea is echoed for the most part in the comments on "'''1'71 found in Rhelo,es G,aed. among which the comment of Maximus Planudes (Rheta,.. G,aed. V 422) is a good example. Obviously. such ao explanation covers an area large enough to be transected by other popular modes of expression such as proverb (cp. A.'s remark at 95a 20). apothegm (c£ 9Ia II-I2. for example). chri.. epigram. In fact Quintilian. Ins/. o,at. 8.5.3. discussing senlenlia says: "The oldest forms which are most correcdy called senlentia are those which the Greeks named "'"'I'a< although the same name [St"l
a 23

'IcplXP,"",,~ 'sa 28. 67b 18-19. 9sa 25-26. xa.86l.ou in contrast to the individual instances "of a general character."

:

J

2

(c£ Sga 24):

a 25-26 "Epl S""'" ... "p
a 26-27 e.o,....... iO"
76a 32

On enthymeme c£ ssa 4-'7. ssa 8. S6a 36 : 2. Studies. pp. »-27. With the mention of enthy-

AltlSTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' 11

meme we have further confirmation that maxim fOr A. implicates the actions of men. Rhetorical discourse coucerns itself primarily with contingent reality and the probable. Its telos is to enable the auditor to maire, after deliberation, a judgment in this area (57" 2 : 1; S'Ja 1-7) which is to issue in action by the auditor (S'Ja 22-28). The argumentation of such discourse is directed primarily to the practical not the specul2tive intellect. The object of the practical intellect is reality insofar as it i. to be effected by human action, or, in our ca.e, with tho.e thing. which the auditor can do. As the instrument for deductive argumentation, the enthymeme for the mo.t part addresses itself to this intellect and so, as A. say., "eel TOloVrWV (94a 2.6). A glance at chap. 23 will frequently substantiate thi•.

a 27 l ....'v ax.aolv, The question of punctuation here i. of some importance. Victorius writes screw "xBdo. - he is fOllowed by Cope, Kassel, Freese. The other edd. and Spenge! writjO B"TI', <1x.do. whereby qualifies what follows. I am inclined to puncruate as Victorius does: i.e., "since the enthymeme generally speaking- is a syllogism about such matters." I do so because if this is correct, the statement (27-29: Tel ""p"
"".60.

a 2.8 mpx..1 i.e., the premisses of the syllogism, e.g., An. Pr. 43b 35-36. From what A. says, either the major or the minor premiss can be a maxim. Further this passage clearly indicates that he thinks of the enthymeme as an ordinary syllogism in form, i.e., two premisses and a conclusion; c£ 57" 16, Studies, pp. 87-91. Consequently I cannot accept Cope's statement, p. 2.09, that the enthymeme in form is "an assumed syllogism."

a 29-30 XpIJ··. 99a 13-16.

,,6'Po,,~

Euripides, Mede.294-295; c£ 94b 18, 30-31;

a 3I Clt... ICI~ " ..1 ,
" ..1 ..6

S. II53g.

94b IJ

COMMENTARY

b 2 06x ... E6811l1""'EL Frg. 66r in Naud: 8£ Snell from Euripides' lost Stheneboea. We find the four lines with a partial omission of the fourth spoken by Euripides in Aristophanes, Frogs 1217"-I2I9. As they stand in Euripides-Aristophanes they contain the reason and form an enthymeme: "There is no one fully happy for he is either well born and without a livelihood or base born and farming a rich estate." b 4 06x... D-E68EPO<; Euripides, Hecuba 864 where the codd. of Euripides read 6"'/T.... for A.'s ...de';;.. This and the preceding citation (01l..... .vda'po>e') from Euripides are maxims (e.g., ".tfnJ, 94b 5), but A. gives us the next verse (865) which gives the reason, and so, as he observes, it becomes an enthymcme. b 5 "pil~ ... ixo!,iv'l' and cpo 68b 2 : 2.

"along with the llext line." c£ LS,

'xw,

C.l.J.

b 7 ttT'<"PII Ana.'Cimenes divides maxim into two kinds: (a) l.doEo" which is a maxim in accord with current opinion and as such has no need for an appended explanation; (b) naeddoEo" which is not in accord with current opinion and so demands a reason. A. accepts this division without the terminology (e.g., 94b 8), but further refines each. MaJCims without an added reason (0) are dlOse which (I) are familiar to all (94b Il-14), or (2) are obvious upon hearing (94b 14-16). Those calling for the addition (c£ 94b 8-10) of a reason (b) are either (3) part of an endlymeme (94b 17"-r8) or (4) not part of an enthymeme bur possessing characteristics of the enthymeme. Gregory of Corinth (On Hmnogenes, Rheto"" Graeci, VII IIS4-IISS) gives a summary of the above which follows Anaximenes' division and ,orne of A.', examples. i.e., some kind of logical proof, or support, not necesb 8 cI:"o8d;..,~ sarily ,trict demonstration; .cpo 77b 2J : 2, ,sa 8 : 3, 54Il 27 : ;;. Cope, p. 207· As Victorius says, "Confirmatione a1iqua egent." b 9-IO "lIpci8oliov .•• cI:!''1"cr13,,''oulUVov On the fint c£ r II, I2a 25-27: contrary to COlllmon opinion and so to one's expectation; on the second, 91b 19: that on which there is strong diversity of opinion. b II "pOEy,,';-'crOClt known beforehand, and "": a maxim stating sonlething already accepted by a majority (c£ b 14). On the other hand, the second group of this class (b I4-r6) consists of maxims which. while not known before being pronounced, are accepted at once as intrinsically self-evident. This is the reading of the codd. and four edd., b IJ ..,,8pl ••. 80xEi Spengel, Cope; Kassel reads ipl. 60"e, with Meineke. The scholiasc Stephanus says the line is variously attributed to Epicltarmus (65a 16 : 2) and Simonides (63a IS). KaibcI, frg. 262, assigos it to Epicharmus (also Dids 8£

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

Kranz 23 B. I9); Olivieri, 233, is doubtful. Page places it with Simonides (frg.

I46) but questionably. Cope, pp. 207-208, discusses the matter further. Plato, GOOTgUzS we 3-5 cites the line in a fuller form as a song sung at banquetS: "w-ealth is bcs~ second is beauty, third is wealth honesdy come by"; see Dodds, Corgi"', pp. 200-201. The general acceptance of the maxim as we have it in our text might be inferred from A 7, 63b 30-3I and 65b 6-u. At EN 1099 a 27-28, BE I2I40 5-6 A. mentions an inscription at Delos where healrb again is ci1l:d as best but only to disagree with the sentiment and state that eudairnonia alone is best. b I5 E11: ..~AbjI""V "to those who attend to thenr with =e"; i.e. (as Victorius nores), tum the eye of the mind (mentisque adem) on them. The individuals are presumably hearing, not reading, the maxim.

b I6 GUIiEU; .. ''1"AEi Euripides, Trojan Women I05I; cited again at EE U35b 20-21. In Euripides the reading is: ov" laT' . ... Hecuba speaks the "Words to Menelaus in an eifort to discourage him from the folly of taking Helen hODl.e to Sparta for punishment rather than punishing her at once. Her word. fell on deaf ears, and their truth was revealed in the subsequent course at evenlS. b I7-I8 ......,. U ... ap'd
b I9 lv&uflo7Jf'CI~LX..1 Those maxims with the reason added which are part of an enthymerne are dearly enough presented to be understandable. Here we have those which are not part of the enthymerne but are still called enthymemanc, which is to say that they have the characteristics of the enthymeme, or

"'the esse~tial character of," "the nature of," an enthymerne, as the

word has been tnmlated. In other words, they possess the capability to be stated as an enthymeme (s9b 32 : 1). As "8u/J~/Ja.."'k has been used - e.g., at 54b 22. 55" II, 56b 2I-25 - it affirms some kind of capability for enthymeIne. The maxims whim A. gives by way of explanation are self-su£licient as maxims and are not a part of an enthymerne (ov" . .. /Jieo~). However. they have this dilference from an ordinary maxim such a. "there is no man who is altogether happy" that the reason fo< their truth is present within the maxim as stated. They stand independently but possess their validation within themselves. And so I see their "capability for enthymeme" in two ways: (r) they can readily become an enthymeme if one places the reason formally in a premiss; (2) as maxims they are statements on the moral ch":,,acter of

COMMENTARY

265

human action and this is the content frequently found (e.g., 94a 25-29) in the enthymeme, a fusion of the entechnic proofs (Ml'o~, ",d6o~, if80~). Cpo Studies, pp. 141-44. Cpo 73b 2r; d,e reason for their popularity might b 20 ..u&OX1I'oUalV be gathered from rIO, lob 2(}-27 (d.dl'''~ ... ~.6vp.w..dTW'). c£ Studies, pp. 88-91, on p.d6~,,,~ TaX"a. In this kind of maxim, as A. says at 94b 2(}-22 togetl1er with an example, what would oIllinarily be the added reason (afTIO., d,d T0 is implicit in the very enwlciation of the maxim: e.g., you who are man, and so mortal, are not to cherish immortal anger. The idea is seen again at 94b 25. b 22. 4.8livCI" •••
Cpo 79a 2(}-2I.

attributed to Epicharmus, e.g., Kaibel, frg. b 25 "BvCl": "Quid aeternisminorem I consillisanimumfatigas?"

"01,,,.

I am not at all certain that this refers exactly to b 27 : I "oLav at 94" 20 which indicates the "subjects" of maxim. Rather from what follow. it would mean "for what type of statement" each kind of ma...Qm is suitable. . z cltPI'O""'El here used intransitively as it is at b 34: "is suitable, appropriate." At 9sa 2 it is used with the infinitive, and with the accusative and infinitive as subject at 95a 8 as at 94b 29 and b 32-33 where with Cope, p. 210, I would keep it as the main verb; c£ 94b 29, 94b 32. What follows here to 9sa 2 is a further explanation of 94b 7-16.

1'"" . . .

t"v,oyou This is a specification of part of the b 27-28 ".pl content of "0'0'; c£ above. A further specification is found at 94b 32 - 9sa 2.

266

ARlSTOTLB., 'RHETORIC' U

b 29 xpija6.., sc. tiel' a....., e.g., b 29-32: "it is appropriate either to use the conclusion .. a maxim setting out the reason (epilogue) first ... or to append the reason after first presenting the maxim." See 94b 31, 94b 32.

b 30-]1

orav ... " .. ,6"'000,1<1 within parentheses.

b 31

TOU"'C'O

C£ 94> 29-34. Roo. alone encloses this

i.e., dre maxim: oil 'P'1P' ..• "a,de.ecrlJa•.

b 32 £'JtELK'EL'V sc. aepone". In Tel l,meoaOev we have the reason (i.e., b 30-3 I: 'nB.d~ ... ,l.a.). Kassel reads a colon after ll"'eoa9sv, not the comma of the edd., Spengel, Cope.

At"....

b 33 : I &.Ii-lj"""' ... "poa'r'04v'rCl sc. c1epOTT.. The difference between this kind of statement and that at b 27-28 is that the latter either contradicts or seriously challenges commonly accepted opinion - e.g., children should not be educated - or the paradox of Socrates in the Gorgias 469C: it is better to suffer wrong than to do it. Here the maxin! (95a 1-2) and others like it would be accepted but are not in themselves immediately self-evident in a given situation, e.g., one should not be insolent. 2 a'rpoyyuAc:lTCl'rCl .... tersely as possible"; cf. Plato, Phaedr. 234e: UTeO"",)}.a TW' .VOpaT.,V (terseness of language). See the references in Roberts, Dion}'sius ofHalicarnasst.is: On Literary Composition, p. 323. C£ also Grube, p. 10"9. Some (Roberts, Cope, p. 2n) find its meaning (compact, rounded, terse) in Latin rotundus, i.e., rounded off so that nothing is missing or unnecessary (e.g., Cicero, D. fin. 4-3.7, Horace, AP 323). But this meaning is questioned by Douglas at Bruoo 68.272. In later literary terminology the .Greek word was used of d", periodic style. i.e., when maxims which are controversial, parab 34 : I 'rO'aUTO'~ doxical, or unclear in their statement are used, Spartan apothegms or enigmatic sayings are also appropriate. For,like the preceding, they, too, are not always obvious and call for a brief word of explanation. 2 li",otpO.Yfl""'Cl Plutarch has a collection of those in Book III of his MornUa called Apophthegmata Laconica, 208bJ[ In his life of Lycurgus 19-20, he gives us further examples. Ftom Socrates' remark this manner of speaking was typical of the Spartans: "Indeed if anyone is willing to associate with the most ordinary Spartan he will find that he appears by and large undistinguished in conversation, and then somewhere in the cour.. of the discussion like a skilled marksman he throws in a notable remark - terse and compressed such that the one speaking with him seems to be no more than a child" (Protag. 342e). b 35 - 9sa 1 olav... or".... Kassel alone reads U,,", (for U,.... of the edd.) and gives it as the reading of all the codd. On Stesichorus 1'3b 9 : J.

COMMENTARY

The loenans are most likely the inhabitants of loen in southern Italy (c£ 9Sa I-Z), not those of mainland Gre=, i.e., East Locris running along the Euboean straits and West loeris which lies along the Corinthian Gul£ Cpo r II, IZa ZI-Z3. The fragment can be 95a l-Z 06 ... ~&"":JL" found in Page, 104 (b). Demetrius On Style cites the saying in less full form at 99, 100, Z43 and says that the comment was made to the locrians by Dienysius. If correct, it could be Dionysius II, who spent the ten years of his exile at Loen in Italy (356-347 B.C.) ruling rather cruelly; c£ CAR, VI z85. Demetrius giving the ordinary explanation of the saying (for a more confused interpretation, see Gregory of Corinth, Rhetores Graea, VII 1155) says: "If Dionysius had spoken directly and said that he would level the territory of the Locrians, he would have appeared quite angry and undignified. But he used allegory as a veil as it were for his meaning. Hidden meaning in all instances is more frightening ... " (100). a 2.-3 Y""'p.aA<>y£i,. ... "'pEa(3u«p"'" 948 ZO-ZI. c£ Quintilian, ['lSI. Drat. 8.5.8.

These are the Tl",. of 94a ZI; c£

a 3 ,r,,. lp." ••po~ "matters in which one is experienced." The comment seems obvious from the very nature of maxim (94a Z2r-z6) whose subject is the moral character of human living. In this area experiential knowledge is critieal enough for A. to say that while the young can be good mathematicians and geometricians and attain theoretical expertise in such matters, they do not, as far as can be seen, attain practical wisdom "because practieal wisdom is concerned with particulars as well as uuiversals, and particulars become known through experience; but the young are without experience since length of time produces experience" (EN lI4Za u-I6). The same reason prevails for <0 !'v80.tordv (a 5) which in its ordinary meaning signifies the telling of legends or tales such as the Homeric poems which convey some larger signi£cance for man, e.g., Plato, Rep. 39IC - 39ZC. a4 <0

.:.~ ... 4i",pE1
16; I4a Z5) among the literary critics signifies what is fittiug to man, i.e., as a moral person, as well as what is fitting to extemaI circumstances. Its use as a quality of language can be seen in Demetrius, On Language, or Dionysius of Halicarnassus (on the latter see Pritchett, pp. xxvi-xxvii). a 5 ".pt ... ri"'E'PO~ Not even the "eB,,{JinseO' should speak sententiously on these matters, a point not clear in some English translations. The reason for this precept is given at a 6-7 (01 rat.ovTa.) to exemplify the fact tl12t such action on the part of anyone is foolish and vulgarian. This is the tenor of dreo,xo, here (rusIict) in contrast to the cultivated understanding of its opposite, the aun;o, (urbani).

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' II

a 6 '"1",••011

9sa 8

8Sb7.

a 7 p,!,6u..~ ,b,a'P,z(vav'<,". This is the reading of the codd., two edd., Spenge!, Cope. Roemer Dufour, Tovar read Vablen's conjecrure: w.otpal.VO)lTa' , i.e., "they readily make general statements"; c£ "Kritik arist. Schriften," 68. I read with the codd. inter alia because a f>..J7 (C11/I'.'ov . •. c!notpalvovTa,) goes with what pr=des; another idea is introduced at a 7J£ ("a80Aov de! ••.) which has no connection at all with a f>..J7. On the overuse of maxims, e.g., YVOJI'OMO', e'J61OJ' dnotp. both the Auctor ad Herenn. 'P7.2S (use themrardy) andQointilian 8.S.7 (not many, not randomly used, not put in the mouth of anyone) oifer words of advice.

a 7-8 xu8Q).ou .•.•brE'v e.g., Catullus 70.4-S: "mulier cupido quod dicit amanti" in vento et rapida scrihere oportet aqua," or conversely 6+143: "nunc iam nulla viro iuranti femina credat, I nulla viri spcret sermones esse fideles." "in expressing bitter complaint and a 8-9 "ltE'<). ...o-l"i>... 6••v':'0-.. indignation." The first sigoifies passionate or indignant complaint .uch as we £nd in the two citations above from eatullus. It later designated a technical part of the speech devoted to winning sympathy by setting forth the wrongs, injustice, etc. suJfered by the speaker or the subject of the speech; c:£ CiG., De inv. I.SS.lo6fE (conquestio). The meaning of astvOJ''', is not quite clear. It occurs in three other places in the Rhetoric (alb 3, 173 13, 19b 26) and not at all in Anaximenes. Here I would take it to mean "indignation" (although "exaggeration"· is possible). At r 17a 13, 19b 24-.6 it is commonly taken to mean "indignation." In each instance it is joined to the word for pity, and in the second citation the corrdation of the emotions mentioned is suggestive (but no more than that): A. mention. seven emotions which (le" excepred) he discussed in Book 2 and does so in this order: lABO, "al 6BtOOJ"', recalling the sequence of chap•. 8-9 (pity-indignation), oeylj "al 1""0, which echoes chap•. 2 and 4, and then tp9&vo, "al C;jAo, of chaps. 10-1 I (envy-emulation). At B 24, alb 3 the word is again interpreted to mean "indignation, indignant language," but it can denote "exaggeration." Among the Greek literary aitics the more common word is iJswoT1J', 6e",&" and it signifies "vehement, vigorous, forceful." The one appearance of aBtOOJ"'" in Demetrius, On Style '30, is taken to mean "intensification." In Quintilian there appears to be a fusion of "indignation, exaggeration, vehemence," e.g., 8..].88: "dsll1OJU" in "",aggeranda indignitate ... altitudo quaedam"; 6.2.24: "6BtOOJ"', .•• language which imparts added force to things which are shameful, harsh, hate:fol." But Maaobius, Saturn, 402.1 brings us back again to the idea of indignation: "Opomt enim ut oratio pathetica aut ad indignationem aut ad misericordiam dingatur, quae a Graecis ol"To, "al dBt.OJ"', appellatur."

9sa 20

COMMBNTARY

r

as he says specifically at a 10 TE9puA'IP.Ev".~

19, 19b 19-28.

On the word, see Cope, p. 214.

a II : J S'" TO .....o.vei Ross alone of the edd. and Cope read with cod. P: ~"I rae Td ... " ...at (on the nominative see S. 1973a). C£ Roemer, "Zur Kritik," 506. 2 cd~ ... ncivTCaJv s. 2086d.

a 12 " ..p....CilAoiivT. More likdy here "exhorting, encouraging" rather than "summoning." I would explain the dative by an understood dePOTTB' which has been the verb carrying the main idea of this section &om 94b 26; see, however, Cope, p. 215. a 13 9ucr.. P.EvOU~ Victorius (not Schrader as Cope says, p. 215) suggests that our word means not simply to sacrifice to the gods but also to win their favor. Schrader by way ofinterptetation offers the Latin 1m which expresses both ideas. In its ordinary meaning our word in the active and middle voices denotes simply "to sacrifice" or "to consult the gods."

Iliad 12.243; the words are spoken by Hector a 14 et~... "ei..p'l~ to Polydamas prior to the attack on the defense wall of the Achaeans, an attack Polydamas wished to call olf because of the sign of the eagle and the snake; C£ 19S-229. Epaminondas the Theban general before the battle of Leuctra (371 D.C.; c£ CAH, VI 80-83) is said to have rallied his men with the same, appeal, Diodorus Siculus, IS.S2.4. See also Cic., De senea. 4.II.

.v...) lITTov, 6.Ta,:

a IS ml ....... 1Iv....~

sc. bd Td (" .. ~ ... the danger though outnumbered."

"to face

~uvo~ ·EwciA.o~ Iliad 18.309: "the god of war is impartial and he kills the killer." Again the words of Hector to Polydamas who had just counsded the Trojans to withdraw to the walls of Troy now that Achilles has returoed to the war. In his reply Hector just prior to our line says that he will stand fast and :find whether he or Achilles will win out. C£ also Archilochus (~d, "Ae'1')' &g. 38 in Diehl '" Beucler; Livy 28.19.11: Mars

a 16

communis. a 17 : a

19

reads

sc. "'aea"aAoVvT' (a 12). J '"l..o oiv..lpEl" intensive H:al: ~Ieven though they..•." • ....l... oiS"'oiiv.... viJ'K,o~... XCl"l'ddftEl

C£

760 7; c£ Livy

40.3.7. Kassd alone

Krs[.vOJv.

a 20 iv....... " ..po.p.u..v At A IS, ?6a 4-7 the maxim just cited is given as a proverh; C£ the comment made at 94'l22.-26. In the light of that

AlllSTOTLB, 'llHBTORIC' II

comment only those proverbs which touch on the moral character of human living qualify as maxims. a ::I(}-::n olav ",upo,fUu ... ",cipo'xo~ The mixed feelings of the Greeks toward Athens can be seen in Isocrates, Antit!. 299-300, Thucyd. 1.68-71. Since the tinre of the scholiasts this proverb has been interpreted in a negative manner to mean that with Athens as a neighbor one needs no enemies. Kassd brackets naeo'pia.

a 22 5e5'1l'o,",EUI'EvU "sayings which have become public property." They can well be other maxims (as here), proverbs, etc., as in the examples given. a 22-23 (AEyto> •.. ely..,,) The edd., Cope (but not Spengd) use the parentheses. I would read with Ross, Kassd, Spenge!, Cope without the quotation marks employed by the other edd. for ,,>..0, ,,,,,,...d>, 1'''16& cIya•. I would also punctuate 9sb 9-10 without the quotation marks used by Roenrer, Tovar, Dufour. On the two sayings and their assumed origin with the Seven Wise Men see Plato, Protag. 342d - 343b, CharmiJes 1641' - 16Sb, and the references at 63a 2 : Z, 66b 13. a 23 ij8o~ On the meaning of the word 6ga IS : 3. Here A. is talking of the speaker's >TOo, about which he spoke directly at 7Sa 7-20; c£ 78a 9 : 1. However, on the meaning of >TOo, in general as used in the Rhetoric cf. 77b 24, 88b 30-31. a 24 ",,,,8~,x&I~ etp'lI'iv'J. "or the maxim is likely to appear to be one stated with strong feeling." This is the reading of cod. A, Ross, Kassd, and Cf. Richards, p. 178: "na81J"'''''', .le1Jpi>1J 1i "''''1'''1, i.e. ,..tlln 'l'a ..."OaL" The other edd., Spengd, Cope read Bekker's conjecture: ele1Jpiv1J !}. a 25-.6 .,;s...o~ ... iJ~lc.>". Victorius quite perceptivdy refen OifTO, to Iphicrates mentioned at A 7, 65a 28 : I; 9, Ci']b 18-19. But Cope, p. 217, disagrees, and suggests a reference to "Cleon, Thne. IV.27 seq." As noted (650 28) we are not certain that this Iphicrates is the famed strategos of the fourth century. However, everything in the Rhetoric points in that direction. fle is mentioned many times as someone presumably well known to the readers (e.g., at 6sa 28; 67b IS; 94a 23; 97b '7; 98a 5, 7, 17; 99a 34; osa 19; IIa II; IIb I; 160 10), as well known in fact as the fourth-
271

COMMBNTAlIY

98a 3-8). See PW, OCD, CAR, VI passim. Cope's reasons for rejecting Iphicrates as the referent are not convincing. The comment could easily have been made by Iphicrates himsdf or an opponent in Victorius' instanee, or that mentioned at 97b 27 : J, or that at 98a 17-22 (his defense against Chare. and Aristophon, on which see r la, lIb IIf., CAB, VI 2II). a 26-34 -n. U ~eo~ ... I'oU'£lV" Io this passage A. discusses the relation between the ~Oo~ of the speaker and this special use of "vrh!'7J in a paradoxical way (the "oea M~a. idea of 79" 24) which was introduced at 9Sa 21. However, at 9sb 13-18 he will discuss the relation between ~Oo~ and ".rh!'7J in general. On the ~OO~-'l"'rh!,1/ connection see 9Sb IS-16. In both places ~Oo~, as should be expected, is contingent upon moral choice, 9sa 28-29 and 9Sb 14-18. a 26-27 TG U ~eo~ ... aU 5.i sc. TO d. ~Oo~ (
C£ 8gb 24-2S. a 29 : 1 ",pocdpc.,." cruv5Yjl.oil" "to make the moral choice completely clear." On the relation of ~Oo~ to "eoa/esa" c£ A 8, 660 14-16, 66a IS : I, 2; A 9, 67b 21-26, 67b 21 : I, Z; A 13, 74" II-I3, 74& II : 2; see also EN IIub 4If., II39"]I1f. The relation between ~Oo~ and U~,~ was announced .early on atA 2, S60 4-10; latel at 8, 66a 10-12, 9, 66a 2S-28; or again at 90a 27-28. 2 ..hI..... C£ 94b !rIO (a"od.t~• ." ,...l.). If one's moral choice is not fully clear in the statement of the maxim, one must make it so by giving one's reason, just as one must do with unclear maxims. The examples at a 30-34 fully illustrate the point. Thurot, however, notes, "Observations critiques [11]," 42 that the thzee examples illustrate the two precepts in a reverse order, e.g., the first example exemplifies nt. ai-riav 1",U,,6w, while examples two and three illustrate rfl U~•• ... avVd1/AOJ••

"''''ty.,,,

a 30

El",c\vor..

reason

subject of

.".lo/.w: "for

example, one must add the

by saying."

a 3I ",,~cNAou... 8ciTEPOV On the first c£ A 9, 67a 34; the second has been seen a number of times as a form of crasis: "for the other is the act of a traitor." a 33

9sb

Krd u cN8E . . . 1 : 1 2

l)(oua,

sc. H(d "ovde (deeax£1.

"'0/)

.c. a! " • .,!'a•• AOyOU~ i.e., discourse; c£ A 3, S8b 7.

7:0 I'Tld;'" . .. ""aBiv."

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC t II

b 2 cpo!""x0'n)'ra "because of the uncultivated minds." In general the word signifies a view of life which is confined 10 its obvious and superficial meanings. I would say that Victorius has captured it in part: "the kind of person captivated by the empty semblance of wisdom"; he also refers to BE 12I5a 29-30 which is somewhat to the idea. The estimate of the auditors seen here is similar to that expressed at A 2, 57a 1I-12. Cope, p. 218, looks upon the word (correctly so it seems) as a unique imtance.

b 3-4 xa80Aou... ixou,,,Y

"if someone speaking in universal terms hits upon ideas which they entertain about a particular instance." This is to say that their grasp of the general truth is limited, partial, and prejudiced owmg to their 'I'0e ..."oT71'. On "a9&).0v-"ieo, cpo S4b 5, S4b 6; on b"TV;m cpo 54>9: 2.

b 4-5 /iILII .•• 8lJP~E'Y sc. Ii"a de "al (Mj).o.'cn:a,) ,,0;,.... The metaphor in fi.qeB6 ... is found at AI,. Pr. 46a II-P2. b 5-6

c::.cr"op .•• tcr'r'Y

b 6 ).OYOIL£vou 3 11..

).."0",,,.,.

i.e., 94a 22-23.

sc. (TOtirO) )..,,0,,8'0" 6; C£ S. 2072. Kassel alone reads

b 7 & ••• 'rUYl(ciyoucr, "upon which with respect to a particular instance they happen to entertain an established opinion."

..ux0'

b 8 XEXP'lp.£vo~ i.e., "happens to have." The individual who is distressed by such particular instances will generally respond sympathetically to a statement which universalizes (even wrongly) the misfortune. This is even truer of those with a Iimiled and undiscriminating outlook; c£ 9sb 2. , b 9 : 1 eI"ltOY'rO~ aT' is the reading of Ross, Kassel, Cope. The other edd., Spenge! read (with cod. A) without an; but c£ 7J 6n immediately following. The same three along with Spengel read the text without the quotation marks; c£ 9sa 22-23. • 06&lv •.• XCIIA....:.... pOy Cpo Hesiod, Works and Days 346 ("a bad neighbor is a disaster''); Isocrates, Plalai",s 17-19 on the n,ebans as neighbors; Demosthenes, Ag. Callicles I ("there is nothing worse than having a bad and greedy neighbor"); also, Plato,Laws 843c, Thucyd. 3.1I3.6 (Cope). Kassel reads "etTOVBla!;; everyone else, "etTovla,. b 10 : 1 o6&lv •.. 'r"'YO"lto,la~ 418.

Cpo Menander 166 in Edmonds: or

b I I ""'~ . . . "ltoia .•. oIi..... ~ "at what kinds of preconceptions they happen to have and how ilis that they came upon them"; c£ 95b 7. Schrader suggests Cicero, De orat.2.44-186 as an illustration of the comment. Ross,

95b 19

273

COMMBNTARY

Kassel read noo" for "w~ and do not read "w~. which is omitted on a good tradition. oil..."'~ (read as o/lT'" by Tovar. Sponge!, Cope) refers to the manner of stating a maxim about such established views as he himself has just offered: "and then to speak in general terms on these opinions in the manner described." b 12 "..u,,'1Y'" xpija,Y is Bekker's reading adopted by all the odd., Spenge!, Cope. The statement refers back: to 9sb I and forward to what follows to xe;j"'" b u. b U-13

". Sij •.. " ..I

both - and; see Denniston, pp. 26~1.

b 13 ij8,,,oU~ This is a natural consequence of the definition of maxim at 94" 25-26 (aAAa ••• ned.........); c£ 94& 22-26. b 14-15 ~90~ ... "po.. lpe.. ,; See the references at 9sa 29 : I; cpo 17. ISa 17-1S; 16. 17a 16-33; Poetics 14sob S-II; Studies. p. 143.

r

b 15-16 ..I S~ ... """ n:po ..,p"";;'" "All maxims do this owing to the fact that the one who states a maxim makes a general declaration about his moral preferences." All the edd., Spenge! read neoa.'ei..e",. of cod. A. Cope, Kassel. and Freese read neoa.'I!e...w. from a good tradition. This is obviously the correct word here since this statement is nothing more than • summary of the definition of maxim given at the beginning of this chapter (b 22-26). See Kassel. Det' T....I. p. 139. for a further observation. At Poetics 14Soa 5-7. a.d•••a. b 5-u there is an indication of a close relation among ~Oo~ in A.'s mind. as exegesis ofthese passages tends to show; see. e.g.• Else pp. 23 S45; 263-73. Lucas. pp. 100, 108.

'Y''',.1/ -

b 18 XP'l""o>j9'1

C£ 86b 12-13. which r would take to be its meaning

here.

Ii....

b 111-20 ".pl p.~ ....... basically a summary of the divisions followed in the chapter - c£ 94& 2cr.21 - with two exceptions: the persons best suited to use maxims are dropped out and rep1tced by the advantages of maxim.

C£72a2:Z.

CHAPTER ••

I . Introduction: 9Sb

II . Devdopmcnt: 9Sb I.

ro discwsion of enthymemes as forms of argument

20-22

22 -

96b 21

enthyuwne as syllogism

9sb •• - 960 3

(0) 9sh 22-24 (6) 9sh 24-31 (e) 9sh 31 - 960 3

entbymcmc argues &om definite and acc:epted opinions and infen ttom premisses both necessary and probable

subject matter of these opinions and premisses material be specific to subject under dDamion this acmpli6cd for dclibcrative rheto-

•• 96• 4 - 960 34

to...

(0) 96a 4-'1

(6) 96a

entbymeme is • syllogism its dilICrona: &om dialectical syllogism

7-12

ric

this exemplificd for cpidcictic: rhetoric thi. only stated for juclidal rhetoric

(e) 960 12-22 (t!) 96a ....24 (e) 96. 24-34

3. 960

summation: on any .ubject the relevant

6cts are ncc:cssary sources of this rdCVllllt subject matter

34 - g6b 21

(0) 96a 34 - 911b ]

(6) 96h 4-II

(e) 96h II-19 (t!) 96h :1.0-21

demonstration of one"s subject comes only &om .he relevant &cIS so there must be a selection of pro~ sitions which .peak directly to the subject at hand (0) and (6) .bove arc exemplificd the mctbcd by which this selection is made is that of the particular topics (c£ 96b .8-34)

III . Transition and General Introduction: g6b I.

96b

21-2]

31 -

974 4

the Fecol sources of cnthymemes (i.e., chaps. '3-24)

to

96b .31, i.e.• Ta di: aTO,xsia ,",1.: there are two necessary prelim-

inaries to be noted

ARISTOTLB, 'RHBTORIC' II

(0) 96b 23-28

(6) 96b 28-34

95b 22

there are two kinds of en'hymeme the method of ,he particular topia for cnthymemes have been disalsscd.

(e.g.• A4- B (7) we will now study me memod of general topics for enthymemes IV· Conclusion: 97a 4-6

when the above is done. the method for the refutation of enthymemes will be discussed (i.e.• chap. 25)

In this chapter we have the final section of those transition.l chapterS (I8-22) which move us from the study of the particular topics (Bi'
b ,.}..2I x0t861.ou ......6"ou~ i.e.. h. will make some genernl observations on the proper way to look for enthymernes and their topics. From what follows at b 221f. (c£ chapter outlin.) this means (a) that h. will speak of the enthymerne as syllogism. of the particular topics as generating source material for its premisses which must b. specific and rdevant to the subject of discourse, of the two general kinds of enthymerne. and (b) that he will introduce the idea of the common topics. or the sources for forms of inference by enthymemo. H. mentions this last once again at the end of this chapter; c£ 9']ll2-4.

pau

This is the reading of a good tradition. of the scholiast b 22 €XIZ.... Anonymus, of Victorius. Cope. Freese. and ofKassd. who makes reference to EN II3Ib 24-2.7. The other edd.• Spengel read "'dneDl'. Our reading docs not change the meaning. for it is best translated: "for each of these is different in kind." If there is any question in the mind of anyone who has come this far in the work that the topical method is twofold in A.'s mind and that the object of the particular topics is not that of the general topics. the use of 4AAo .Mo,

COM.MENTAllY

'"aTieov should remove it. In a passing comment on this phrase. but with the opening (95b :ro1E) and closing (96b 20 - 97'l I) words of chap. 22 obviously in mind. Victorius says of A.: "and so he rightly mentions that he had to handle each kind separately." b 22-23 Mlu""1) .... CN>'>'QYLa!"i~ ."",,LV On the enthymeme as syllogism. 'ee Studies. pp. 53-I03. 55a 4--7. 55a 8. 56a 36 - 56b 4. 56b 5 : 1. Victorius. Cope. Freese, Kassel read ,",AAoy,,,,ucl~ T'~ from a good tradition; for an interpretation of that phrase as met in A r see 55- 8. b 23 .lp"l)...... '"'po....pov See references in previow note; for further references see notes following. The same references are valid for the phrase following: " ..I" 1E"~. b 24 ...1 Ii'Clcptp~. This is explained in what follows at b 24-3 I which is partly. brief resum6 of 56b 32 - 57'l2I. The difference such as it is does not (paa Cope, pp. 221-22. and passim) reside formally in the fact that an enthymeme is a shortened fonn of syllogism. Further. see comment at !J4& 28. I have discussed the question (Studies. pp. 87-9I; see also 571l r6 and the very end of 57b ID-2I). and the most that can be drawn from A.'s statements is that the enthymeme as syllogism favors a shortened. condensed statement. In fact. if enthymeme as syllogism is in itself a two-statement form. one might ask the meaning of r 18. 19a 19 where we are told to make them "as condensed (compressed. compact) as possible." Such a twO-statement form could not be rednced further and remain a syllogism. C£ 96a 3S - 96b 2. b 25 ,",opp...Oev ••• cruvciYE.V Cpo A 2. 571l 3-4 where the auditors are given as the reason for this injunction. At Top. 157'l 18-20 (cp. 164a 12-14) he indicates that the use of syllogism is for the more dialectically skilled. What he has in mind by this cOIIUllCllt is a line of reasoning movin~ though a series of arguments (our 1EoeewOev). This - namely. a,,1 ".AA ... '""'eli.is not easy for an untrained mind to grasp. as he remarks at 57'l 3-4; C£ 57a 7-17. The import of oiiTe "moTa ... .ta,u,8mo"Ta~ is the same as that of 57'l 17-21 (la•. .. "'l'ro~): namely. that the object of rhetorical inference is to convey to the auditor an immediate and ready understanding of the argument. Therefore the inference should not be burdened with facts possibly important but not directly necessary to the argument; a premiss or the conclusion may be omitted if it is already known. See the next note. On '""dy .... 571l 8 : 1. Here the faults of both procedures are noted. b 25-26 "'0 •.. AtYE'V and they make the same points offered in the preceding note. The Drst kind of inference leaves the hearer confused because ofits length; c£ 57" 7-12 (10611,,.Ta•... a".t.ii~). The second at the very least annoys him since he is told the obvious; cpo r 17. 18a 9-1:> ("al,u~ ... My.v" ..). On
ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

95b 31

90a 9, 06a 33-34. It should be clear that dialectical inference. concerned as it is with detemrining or challenging tenns as well as establishing or rejecting propositions used in reasoning (e.g., the eatly Socratic dialogues of Plato), toler.tes a more lengthy and involved reasoning; c£ Cope, p. 222. b 27 ."oGTO ymp .•• ",d The "de is e." 17, 59b '7. 24a 4-5, Bonit2, Index p. 399b 181[ Thurot ("Observations critiques [II)," 43) has an interesting comment on 95b 24 - 96a 3 in which he refers to An. Post. 72. 1-5. While I consider the interpretation of "oeewO.. (9sb 25) correct, his comment is relevant here. He argues from the An.lylies passage th.t "oee"'Osv (9sb 25) means that which is abstract, far removed from sellS. knowledge, which is specific and concrete. Thus he would interpret b 24-25 (OVTB rae ... <1vvciy.w): one must not infer from general and universal principles. b 3I TUyyU~. "(speak) on matters within their experience." Thurot (see previous note) interprets this as "concrete, very close to sense knowledge." I would punctuate with a period as do Tovar. Kassd. Cope. Freese. The other edd .• Spengd use a colon. The point of the observation on the manner of speaking by the educated - uneducated and the relative power of persuasion of each method is to alert the student of rhetoric that in making hi. argument he must .ttend to the questions. problems; difficulties present in the mind of his auditors concerning the subject. A. says this in the very next sentence. b 3I-32 eN" E~ .•• &0""""....." Cpo S6b 35 - 57a I ("ai ... ..",00T""). i.e.• not all opinions, views. judgments. At Top. Iosa 34 - ~ 37 princi-

96a 4

COMMBNTARY

pies for the selection of propositions are given which are valid for rhetorical discourse. Once again we are engaged with the selection of particular topics for argument; c£ 77b r6 : 1 with the references there, 77b 18 : 1.

b 32 :

1 ':'purp.£vc.w is the reading of the codd., the edd., Spengel Cope. Kassel conjectures a dative and refers to 56b 36£ and his reading there of d,o",i.o.~ ; on this see S6b 35 - S'Ja T. A. in our passage here is speaking of opinions, views which have been determined, established, set down for themselves by the auditors, or readily accepted by them on the authority of others. • l.ocuov The impersonal verbal adjective is practically equivalent to 6" with the accusative and infinitive. Since, therefore, the idea of necessity is operating throughout this passage (b 31 - 96a 4: cllUT' •.• :>
,I.a.

96a r : 1 xptvouc,"v

i.e. the auditors; c£ 77b 21 : 1. Three of the edd., Spengel use a comma after this word; Tovar, Kassel, Cope, Freese, a period. With either punctuation (as can be seen from Cope or Freese) the comment at 9Sb 32 : 2 (on etc.) is still necessary. 2

ci11:o8qOVTCI',

.I.a,

xed ~oU~O aij a.~L oG'RIJt; '9cdVE'fml, &ij:Aov E1vllL . . . This is the reading a"d punctuation of Roemer, Dufour, Tovar, Spenge!. Kassel, Cope, Freese mark off the aT' •.•
a 1-2

a

2.

anCXGLv ... 1tAe.lG'TOI.t;,

Kassel. Cope, Freese read ~ xaa", for /inat"'.,.

They also punctoate with a period for the comma of the edd. and Spenge!. A colon migbt be preferable to the period. a 3 : 1 """mYE'v

C£ 9Sb 32 : z for mood.

ciVClYX"""" ..• 11:0).>1 C£ COMMENTARY 2 (cllUT' ..••i'e~Ta,), S'Ja 7-17, S'Ja 15, S'Ja 22 : 2

58a S7b 4·

I 355, A 2, 57' T3I, S'Ja 28, S'Ja 34 : 3,

11:prdTOV A. draws a series of conclusions (96a 4 - 96b 21) on the subject matter of enthymernatic inference which follow upon his opening

a 4

2.80

96a 9

A1USTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

6., -

statement. The ~.,&'..,."a'oo stress the importance of the conclusions: "First of all, you must understand that on whatever subject you have to speak or reason, whether the subject of the reasoning be political or anything else, you must have the facts relevant to the subject, either all or some. For with nothing at hand you would have nothing from which to infer." On the idea in "oAm" The reading of all the codd. and the edd. except Kassel who conjectures "oAm"
a 5:

a 6 xlZL 'flk TO\i~ .•• 6Kci.pXOV~Cl The *rapxop-r:a represent the material present in the subject matter or topic of discourse which offers the ground for reasonable di"""sion about the subject. An. Pr. 46a 3-10 is a clear indication of what is meant by the term. See sSa 6-7, S9b 25-]2.; cpo !socrates, Ag. the Sophists 9 [292.], To Buriris 44 [229] where they are called Ta &vona. c£ 96b 4-II. In rhetoric by the very nature of its subject matter (i.e., questions open to deliberation, 57& 1-2) this matc:rial will be determined by the methodology of the particular topics working in three areas of entechnic proof: Ml'o~, "dBo~, !f90~ and working in these areas precisely because deliberation is involved (S7& 2.: 1). In one respect these ~"c!~xooTa are the ~xov­ Tit a of SSb rO-II; c£ ssb ro : 1. Ross alone reads (from a good tradition): HaTe! TOVTOV IXtt.'P Tel ~ndeXoVTa.

".9...

a 7-I2. hEye.> ••. TO'Clil..... A. moves directly into an explanation of ,what he means and does so first for deliberative rhetoric, repeating some of the particular topics mentioned at A 4, 59b 33 - 60a II; c£ S9b 2.5-32.. It should not be necessary to repeat that propositions on purely factual matterS such .. those proposed - material strength, 6nancial resources, etc. - can be and in fact mostly are formulated not simply in terms of the evidence but also with a view to the attitudes and disposition of the auditors (their !f9o~) and in a manner which reflects the speaker's concern and good will (his !f90,) and strikes an emotional response in the auditor ("dBo,). In short, as I have said in the commentary on the first book: and in Studies, argument by enthymeme and example first of all by the nature of its articulation in linguistic statements, secondly because of the material with which it work:s (matters for deliberation), and finally because of its objective (to facilitate a judgment on the part of others) necessarily incorporates the three entechnic See Demosthenes, On the Embassy r7-2.1 as he begins to set the background for the Peace of Philocrates.

"'crT••,.

a 9 : 1 li!'-iI "oh"!,-'1"'''''' These words, omitted in cod. A, are bracketed by three edd.; c£ Roemer, "Zur Kritik:," 507. Ross, Kassel, Spengel, Cope

COMMBNTAIlY

281

read them. As Spengel remarks: war or not war is the subject that must be resolved in the deliberation. 2 &Uv..p.,; Cpo A 4. 59b 33. 60a I.

"pooo5o, Cpo A 4. 59b 24; 5. 6.. 18. l .. , &~ ..Iv.. ; the reading of cod. F and a good tradition accepted by Kassel. Cope (Freese). and cpo A 4. s9b 36. Ross. Spengel read .ITa. The other edd. read simply the BTl of Susemihl for the ern of cod. A. a

II : 1 2

a 12 4".. ,vEiv a further illustration (c£ 900 7-U) for epideictic; for the infinitive c£ 900 8: dVllai,...Oa. a 13 : I Eotl...p.lv, the battle in 480 B.C. which was the beginning of the end of Persian naval power and the campaign against Greece. The Athenians played a major role in the victory which remained fresh in their memories ever afterward. even ISO years later; see. e.g.• Dernosthenes. On the Crown 208. 238; c£ CAR, N 304-16. 2 Map ..e",v, the lalld battle vs. the Persians in 490 B.C.; ct. Demosthenes in previous note; CAR. N 239-52. By way of exception from the codd. and edd. a 14 ..ei... "pciXO.".... Tovar omits TW.; Ross for ;;"~e conjectures .".. The .tory is told in part by Euripides ill the Children of Heracles. The traditional tale is the story of the courage of the Athenian. and their king Demophon (son of Theseus). They alone of all the Greeks faced down the Argives on behalf of Hyllus. son of Heracles. and his followers who had taken refuge in the Temple of Zeus at Marathon. The time would be shortly before the Trojan War. These three topics. which reSect praise .on Athen•• are cited often in the literature, and Cope. p. 226. has reference. to Lysias. Plato. Isocrates. Demosthenes. The formality within which epideictic works a 15-16 o!x ••• "civ-rE; is prai.e (or blame which is mentioned next, b 16-22). and its proximate TiAo~ is TO "aAel. - alaXed•• S8b 8-29. On the honorable see A 9. 66a 33-34. 66b 23 - 67a 32. [cannot accept the interpretation of dO"O ••TC•• as "imaginary deeds of honor." To attribute such to anyone i. a waste of breath since it is readily recognized for what it i. by the auditor. rThought to belong" is more correct here and at a 18. Such deeds would be accepted by an audience either as possible. or as a reasonable misjudgment on the part of the speaker. In fact. to interpret dO"oUnQ)' as "imaginary" would make a farce of deliberative and judicial rhetoric at a 26-32 where at a 28 we would be speaking of "imaginary evidence." a 17-18

GXO"oUYrE; .•. 6,,4px""

Cpo An. Pr. 43 b 1-38 for the process.

96a 25

ARISTOTLB, 'RHBTORIC' II

a 18 en •... _'rEiouAc:J,,,,,,'
20 : 1 2

a 21 : I " .. , ei ... .wTO~ Ross alone secludes ""l, on which c£ Spengel. p. 284, who says (referring to a 31: (Jaa • .• sf): "this is very obviously a duplication." and suggests the possibility of dropping the

""I

""I

second ;,at. 2

a

2Z

.:.~

Q.ILIlP'"!IL"

&·cdl.....~

a 23 CJX011:oUf1&VOL the facts on hand."

741> 7.

c£ 86b 30: "so, in this very same way." "after examination they prosecute or defend from

a 25 A"".8...1""'1wv 1I •A8'1""1wv is the reading of cod. A and the edd. except Ross, Kassel, Cope who read with a good tradition 'A6'1" 11 A ..".a. Since this same tradition reads the genitive singular (not the accusative plural of cod. A) in the following two nouns, it may be a better wit-

ness.

96a 34

COMMBNTARY

a :>5-26 TO ciuTI> ToijTO Spa... a~.d ToJTO is that which he has been insisting on from 96a 6f(: obtain the /lndeX""Ta. I find the construction awkward. I take the phrase as an articular infinitive: ''Doing this very thing differs in no way whether the subject be the Athenians or the Spartans, a man or a god." It also seems possible to take aeiiv as an imperative or with an understood as,: "It is immaterial whether the subject be the Athenians ..• one must do the very same thing." a 26 ""f'o~OU).";""TIl This together with the following accusatives (a 26-27) include all three kinds of rhetoric. In avpfJovAeilo>Ta (for the accusative subjects of ).""'."'" [a 28], S. 21520) we have the word denoting the kind of rhetoric. For epideictic and judicial he does not usc the words signifying the kind of rhetoric but those denoting the fonnaliry under which each operates; cf. schema, S8b 8-29. This usage continues through a 29-32, and the fonnality of deliberative rhetoric (neOTe"'''''''"'~ - dno ...e."o.....~) is omitted; c£ 91b 34. In a 29-32 (r.' ... fJAafJse6v) we learn that only by seeking the /lndexo ••a can we 1lI2ke intelligent statements about the proximate .....).'1/ of each kind of rhetoric, i.e., "ald." alaxed. ""'A. A moment's rellection on this should reveal why A. gave such an extended analysis (A 4 B 17) to the methodology of the particnlar topics. a 28 6".p cNToij Til 6"lipX"'TIl i.e., all the rdevant material on him (Ross alone puncruates in a way which would give a different meaning). This point is made a number of times, e.g., a 6 (Tli ... Vndexo ....a); a I5-16 (i" ... Vndex ...); a I7-18 (...1 . •. Vndex...); a 22 (Vndex.1 ~TO"); a 23 (il< ... tlnaex ......,.); a 29 (il< TOVT.,.); a 29-30 (81 ••. VndeX"); a 33 (I" ... Ilnaex ........ ... dya8q;); b 2 ('"'' . tlnaex6vT"'). At 96b 4-2I A. draws the conclusion from this: namely, the need to have on hand propositions directly rdevant to the subject if one is to present the subject effectivdy. See comment at end of preceding note.

a 29-30 d T. ,...>.0" ... 6"oipXE' sc. av...q;. Similarly vndex.. av...q; is understood at a 31-]2 with 8f ..., at"alo•. .. fJAafJ8e ••• a 32 6f'oO""~ •.. Kill "in the same way as the instances given"; cpo 79& 21)-21 where the phrase could be interpreted as here, i.e., the adverb and dative. a 33

II

f'o-IJ liYll801v

C£

96a 9 :

J.

I would read the words with Ross,

Kassel, Spengd, Cope. Understood with the clause sI ... pTj araB•• is VndeX", just as ).1)="" (a 28) is understood with what follows: II, ... araBq;. a 34 " ...... mE.S"; The consequence is at 96b 4f£: e.g., "Conscquendy since all indeed clearly demonstrate in this manner whether they reason stricdy or loosdy (for they do not t~e their premisses from any and every

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' 11

thing but from the fact'! relevant to the subject), and since it is clear that it is otherwise impossible to present anything by. way of discourse [or: it is clear from reason that it is otherwise impossible to explain anythlngJ, it is manifestly necessary ... "; C£ 96b 3. a 35 ,i7,oS.uaoUv'
C£ S6a 3 :

2,

"b 23 :

2,

82a I7-I8.

a lS - 96b 2 Uv .•. aul.l.oyl1;"",'
96b I-2 all that

(w ... ~",copxOv"""')

Cpo 95b 3 I-32 (d1aT' ... AB"T£O'). and

has been said from 960 6/f. I would understand the phrase

o~

rae

IE dnanow as olin ,,&'Ta was explained at 9Sb 25.

b3

>.Gyou C£ 960 34. This word has been understood in two ways here: (4) "speech," "discourse," by Cope and others: (b) "reason." by Vater (Animadversion .... pp. I24-25) and others. If by (b) is meant "logical exposi-

tion," c'rational explanation." "argument." ureasoned. discourse," or something similar. I can see the possibility for either interpretation and would accept either although I have given preference to (4) at 96a 34. From a study of 66 instances of the word (exclusive of the present passage) in the first two books. and in all the cases of the singular and plural (which I do not intend to list) the following emerges. Since in particular instances one can argue interpretations of a word, the meanings I offer are those interpretations of the word found in most instances in the commentaries or the translations. In 40 instances [m all word cases and in the singular and plural) it means "discourse" (e.g.• 55a 26, 58b 7. 80a 2). In 9 cases it clearly denotes "argument" (e.g.• 55' 33, "b 2, OIa 27); in 4 instances either "argument" or "discourse" (e.g.• 55a 28. 9Ib 9); and in 3 either "rational explanation" or "discourse" (e.g.• S604, 66a9, IO). In 2 instances in the genitive singular it means "reason" (e.g.• 70a I9.2S). In the remaining examples it signifies: (i) "words." four times (e.g" 80» I9. SSb

COMMBNTAlIY 3); (ii) "account," twice (e.g., OIa 23); (iii) either "word" or "reason," once (74b 19); (iv) "esteem," once (S4a 27). The two meanings olfered above for our passage can be seen at s6a I : z, S6a 3 : 2, s6a 19 : 2. Either of those meanings - "discourse," "reasoned discourse" - is strengthened, I believe, by what follows in b S-I9, particularly the comment at 96b 5r-II (8aq> ••• "0"&) where the use of d."",vva. in the clause points to what he means at 96b 3 by d.el TO;; UYOV .•• d.....v.a•. ...o".xoi~ Cpo s8a 2.9 (see s6b 13, ssa 9). The first book of the Topics, chaps. 4-IS, give the general method for seeking propositions on a subject. It does so by suggesting ways in which to look at any thing to discover its essential and non-essential aspects; it reviews the varied meanings of terms, kinds of possible propositions and ways they should be sdected, sum-

], 4

ming up the process in part at IOsb 12-1S (on which see 96b 6). ], 4-II "p......"" ..• xo.vci This is a specification of what was explained in a more gcneral manner at 96a 6; see note. b 5 : 1 ~.o).'Y,,"tvCl "sdeaed statements, premisses"; cpo 96b 30-31; o£ A 2, sSa '7-23 (rd.a ... sldw.), 58a 26-35. Mention of the sdection of one's material from what is olfered in the analysis of particular topics is common in A 4-IS (0£ COMMENTAlIY I 354 [s.£]- 355) and also in B I-17 (0£ 77b I6 : 1, 80b 30 : 2, 88], 29 : 1). 2 w8exo""""",,, i.e., possible points of discussion relevant to the subject; on the word 57" 27 : ]. b 6 b ..XCl.po...ci....", i.e., matters most suitable to the subject; on the word o£ 65a 20 : 1. At Top. IOsb I2f[ he says: "We should also sdect from written handbooks and compose for oursdves outlines on each kind of subject, setting them down in separate lists, for example, on good, on life, and on every kind of good beginning with the nature of good itsel£" ], 6 ~_YIIIGU C£ 54], 3 : 1. These are the unexpected aspects of a subject which suddenly arise, e.g., new problems, questions, uncertainties. As he will say (b 7fI:) they are to be handled with the same care for rdevant information as the subjects for which one is ptepared.

b.,..s '"oraAII"..,....Cl ..• A6yo~ "one must search out [''ITS''] premisses by looking not at indefinite gencralities but at the facts rdevant to the subject of discussion." On dOelUTa cpo 740 34: 1. b S-9 ".p.yp4
], 9-II 6"'1' p.tv ... xo.vci These two comparative clauses explain in tum first "l.iUTa, and then lyYVTaTa TO;; nedy",a..o~ ofb 9.

286

AllISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

b 10 Ix'l)..... ' is the reading of both cod. F and corrected A ("more of the rdevant facts are in hand") and of Cope, Kassel, and Freese. The edd. read 1%1/ from uncorrected A.

b Ie-II 0
sc. IV/Ta" "the more closdy they are

b II 6LX£'o...ep" The root idea in the word is given at A 5, 6Ia 201-2020. It is from this idea that we obtain the more common meanings: proper to, suitable to, conformable to, the nature o£ Here it modifies an understood TG\ ~"deX07ITa. With this passage at b !}-II one should compare A 20, 58. 410, :01-208; 4, 59b 2.-18 in which nothing is said that contradicts 96b!}-II and what follows. But in the earlier passages a cautionary word of advice is given concerning the llndexoVTa: narndy, the difiCrence between facts rdevant to the subject as a topic for ddiberation and those rdevant to the subject itsdf as a discipline. The first is the concern of rhetoric; the second, of the specific discipline itsd£ As he says at A I, 5sa 26: "Discourse grounded in specialized knowledge is proper to formal instruction."

b II-IS ij....ov XO'Vtl ••• 4,op.'lj6'1)v Tovar alone of the edd. and Freese punctuate with • period after Diomedes. A. makes quite clear in this passage what he intends by "common." The point to be kept in mind is that facts about a subject can be rdevant (~dexo>Ta) but so general (HO'Va) as to be of no particular hdp in presenting it. Diomedes plays a prominent role in the mad as warrior and man of counsd.

b 12.-13

a..,... 0.., ... k,

J) 13

ilp.,8twv

b

068~

14

These are causal clauses.

partitive genitive with an understood 'rn~ S. 1319.

p.iiUov

Sec SBa 14 :

2.

b IS-19 is,.......o,..u.... Each of the instances are truly ol,woTOea to Achilles. The story of Cycnus, the son of Poseidon, is known to us in some detail from Ovid, Metam. I2..64-168. Pindar, 01.2.81-83, in praising Achilles gives a passing mention to Cycnus (and also Hector as here); sec also Isthm. S.39-4I. Pausanias, 3.2.4.II tells us that Achilles came to Troy bound by no oaths but as a favor to the sons of Atreus. In Euripides, Iphig. Alii. 49-6S there is an account of the oath (Cope). There are a number of references in the AAeto,;, to praising Achilles: e.g., at S9a 3-S, 96a 206-320, 96b II-19, 16b 206-2.9, I8a 33-38. In discussing the last, Vablen, Schriften, I 32.4-207, questions the existence or influence of a Gorgian encomium on Achilles and bravery. b 20 d~ ......,..x6~ C£ 9Sh 21, 97a I on TeO"OV. This topical method of sdeering the pertinent evidence on the subject is the method of the particular topics. Correctly used, it yields material in the arca of the three "T'~VO' "la-

COMMBNTARY

n" for use in either enthymeme or example, and is the subject of study in A 4 - B 17. It is announeed at A 2, 58a 29-33, and apart from indirect references to the method in the two books (e.g., the many." TW. summaries: 60b 1-1, 5gb 25-32), we have passages such as 76a 29-32, 77h 16-20, 78a 2710, 91b 24-29 which directly refer to what A. believes to be the object of study in these books. Finally in our own chapter at 96b 28-34 we have what is really a conclusion to the proposal of 58a 32-33 to "speak first of the particular topics."

b 21 "TO'X_"'" .l.Eyto>I'OV

I would begin (c£ chapter outline) theJinal section of the chapter here. The statement here is picked up at 96b 34lE (IT. d~ ...) afrer an interruption (b 22-34) which serves a double purpose: it is an introduction to what follows in chaps. 23-26 (e.g., b 22-28) and a recapitulation (e.g., b 28-34) of what bas been done from A 4 to B 17. It i. a logical interruption since the analysis is about to turn to an entirely new matter: namely, a study nf the general ways of iDference and reasoning which apply to all three kinds of rhetoric and their subject matters. The meaning of aTo'XBia is given in the next sentence.

b 21-22. " ..o'Xdov ... oNTO C£ 01' 17-18, and 58a 35. It seems clear that in b 20-22. A. repeats the statement made at 58a 29-33. Since the particular topics are Jinished, the common topics alone remain (c£ 58a 10-26). The meaning of "common topic" is fiUrly well explained at 58a 12-17 (omo • . . . d.a"ses.), a ;U-22. ("",,s'.a ... ',..",eo.a); see Studies, pp. 129-35. The explanation of <71'o.x.'o.at 03' 17£ states: "I call stoicheion and topic the same thing, for stoicheion and topos is a class into which [.1, 8] many enthymemes fall"; C£ Studies, p. 132n76. A glance at the common topics in chaps. 23-24 shows them to be forms of inference which can be used on a wide variety of subject material in any area of discourse.

"''"'0,

From the first two books we know that the enthymeme is the syllogism of rhetorical discourse. Up to this point A. has not spoken of kinds of enthymeme, and what he puts before us here is relatively simple. As a syllogism enthymeme can function in rhetorical discourse in the same way as syllogism and refutation do in dialectics. It can be a syllogism proving that something is or is not (d .."",."dv), or a syllogism refutiog what is asserted or denied (LIsy"", ...dv). c£ O]a 25.

b 24-25 et5'1 &Qo.

On syllogism C£ 55' 8 with references. b 26 n"YX0~'" ""Uoy'''p.O~ A refutation as explained by A. is • syllogism (SE I7I. 2-3) which proves the contradictory of a given thesis, i.e., concludes to that which contradicts • given conclusion; C£ An. Pr. 66b II-I7, SE I65a 2-3, 17Gb 1-3, I75a 36if. Thus if one had reasoned to the conclusion: it is not most expedient to stop the Persians at Thermopylae, a syllogism which reasons to the conclusion

288

AllISTOTLE, tRHETOR.IC' 11

that it is most expedient to stop etc. is an iA."xo~; or in our case an ."B1Jp.,.. pa U."" ....,.,;.. At ooa 15-22 A. partly exemplifies the idea; at oob 27-34. 18b 2-5 he speaks in praise of the refutative enthymeme. The second TO is read by b 28 TO 6l D.Ey><...,,1nI ..0 ....... """"Y"v Ross. Kassd. Spengd. Cope. The other edd. omit it with cod. A. On 578 8 : 1, and cp. r 9, loa 2.2-23, "To infer -rei d'J'o,",oAoyovl't),Q" is to conclude to that which is not admitted by the opponent. or. strictly speaking. if it is refutation. the contradictory of what he admits.

avo""....

b 28-34 "Xclilnl •.. 01 ..0,,0. "well then to all intents and purposes the topics on each of the kinds of rhetoric which are useful and necessary are in our possession. For propositions concerning each kind have been sdected, with the result that the particular topics from which enthymemes must be drawn on good or evil. the honorable or dishonorable. the just or unjust are on hand, as are the particular topics on types of character. emotions. moral habits which were earlier sdected by us in the same way." We have here a summation of what has been done in the treatise from A 4 to B 17 (see 96b 20): namdy. the study of the particular topics. InA 4 -B 17 we were given ways to devdop statements ("e.T"aBl~) for M".~. ~8.~. ",,8•• (the l ..exv•• "ian••) in each of the kinds of rhetoric. This. was done by the methodology of the particular topics (the er~1J). Since A. is about to turn to the study of another methodology. that of the general topics (the TOn••). which. as we will see in chaps. 23-26. is primarily concerned with the forms of inference, not the content. he makes a summation here and thus brings to a conclusion the proposal atA 2. s8a 32-35: "eOTBe." •• "eoTaae.~.

".IV.1

lt29 1""a'rOY"ii>v El6ii>v C£ Studies. pp. 39-42, where the reasons arc presented for interpreting this phrase to mean "each of the kinds of rhetoric." i.e.. referring to deliberative, j~dicial. and epideictic. On A.'s use of .r~., C£ SBa 36: 1. Cope's interpretation. p. in which .rd1J means "specific topics" and TOn•• means "general heads or classes" I find difficult to understand in the light of A.'s treatment of topics in the text. Both the particular (.r~1J) and the general (".wol) topics can be and are called TO".' by A.• e.g., 96b 34 where we find TO".' for "particular topics." However. I know of no comparable instance in which he would speak of TOn•• TOO' Bldw. as Cope has him doing here. And I would say that Cope confuses one more with his interpretation (pp. 235-36) of b 34£ (e.... ••. lap"",,),

"33.

b 29-30 Xp'l.,(.......... civ"y",,""" C£ Studies. p. 411145. As A. says at A 3. 58a 37if.. when the constituent elements of discourse are taken into account. there are necessarily (d.d",,'1. b 2; ., d.6.r"'1" b 6) three kind, of discourse. The usefulness of rhetoric. and so the usefulness of the three ways in which it can be exercised. are mentioned at 55a zIfE. SSb 9.

96b 34

COMMBNTARY

b 30 tIl.ol.oy",£VIIl ... ",poTli,,£,~ 96b 30-34 should be compared with 9Ib Zo4-zB. At 7Ba 2B-30 A. declares unmistakably what he has done and will do. These "eo~dl1o" would be prim.arily the larger proposals on general subjects from which one would develop more specific propositions mevant to the particular subject of the discourse. We find them exemplified from the first chapter of the process (A 4) on to the end at B 17. For example, at A 4 A. mentions as relevant subject matter for premisses in argument: ways and means, war and peace, national defense, imports and exports, legislation. These larger proposals are frequendy added to and supplemented with specific propositions; these are well exemplified in the next chapter, A 5, e.g. "A friend is one who is able and inclined to do for the other whatever he thinks to be the other's good." On neo~dl1'" C£ 5Sa IB, 66. 23, 66a 31 : 4. b 31 "'IlJ90, in B I:Ir-17 and "d90, in B 2.-II. The use of "a9111"a.TaW for "dB_ is not unusual for A.; c£ Bonitz, Index, p. 554a 56/[ Cope, p. 234 and note, has some doubts; however, Lucas on Poetics 1449b 27 agrees with Bonitz. On Uo.w read by all the edd., Spengel, Cope (a good tradition has BE dl. which is quite reasonable), the explanation of Cope, p. Z35, is aeeeptable. See 88b 31 : Z, 88b 34 : 1. b 34 cl>"cN..... ~ I.e., for >JBo" "dBo, an analysis by particular topics was done in tho same way as it was done for lOYD, in the three genres. This is a confirmation on A.'s part of what has been said in both volumes of this commentary on A.'s methodology up to B 17, e.g., inter alia 77b 16 : 1. b 34 - 97ll 1 H, ... l.ul3"'",£v This statement is interpreted in varied ways by the commentators and trans1ators. In general all agree that A. is changing his perspective and is now about to approach the subject from a general viewpoint. However, some leave this "subject" undefined. Some call it "commonplaces for enthymemes"; some, "universal topics for enthymemes." Some also give no indication of any difference between "a90lov and "oel cind.~.,. in their interpretation. Certainly there is a sequence in this passage (the concluding section of the chapter), and it begins at 96b 21. The dominant idea in the passage is that of the topics of enthymemes, and specifically what he calls ~a l1~o,,,.ia TWv l.9vl"7Jd~.,. or ~&"o. lv9vl"f/l"d~_ (96b 21-2:0). The sequence ofideas is given in the chapter oudine at III (96b :01-

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

9?a 5

9?a 4). From there it is clear that A. intends to speak of topics here in a dilferent way. This would imply that the object of Up.,,...,, is TO".V, understood. What, then, is the denotation of "Be! ""d......,.? It must refer to what is mentioned in the previous sentences (b 23-34: irnw . .. T"".') or in the sentence immediately preceding (b 28-34: "X.607 ... TO".'). I would consider the reference to be to b 28-34 and so the reference in ""d7TW7 to be to the three kinds of rhetoric. Indeed, the function of the topical method (particular or general) is to facilitate rhetorical discourse. Therefore I would translate our clause: "But now let us consider topics in another way, that is, universally, as they are applicable to all three kinds of rhetoric." I note that Victorius makes a comment on the passage which I have not seen mentioned anywhere: ""a6cU.ov, i.e. comtnuniter atquc in universultl: cuncta scilicet simul genera complectentes: n.el ""d7TW7 ... pollicetur enim se communes omnium locos, et qui sine discrimine tribus dicendi generibus accommodentur, nunc traditurum"; see Spengel at 98a 3-4.

9'78 2 1tIlPIlCl'llU"VO""",,,o, Cope, p. 236, considers this word an odd choice for the discussion of chaps. 23-24 since it sipes a kind of marginal comment on the material. However, it also means to "counterseal. "put one's seal, stamp, upon." Thus we could say: "pointing out definitively." If

a 2-4 ..ou~ ..• wlloy".""",

TO~' sc. Tonov" and clearly the comnJon topics that may be used for all subject matter (e.g., A 2, 58. 10-17, 31-32). They are probative (""06 ......."'.,;,) and therefure useful for the d..........ci ill8v,..,,..aTa (96b 24), or refutative (1l.,."TO".6,) and useful for the i.u""T,,,d enthymemes (96b 25). Mosdy the probative are presented in chap 23. The 'topics of apparent enthymemes are given in chap 24.

a 4 066£ crulloy,CI""", "since they .re not even syllogisms"; Cope's interpretation, p. 236, is strange. C£ Studies, pp. 941£, on apparent enthymemes. a 5-6 _pI"';;" •.. rpEP€'V

discussed in chap 25.

CHAPTER

~3

The only reasonable ourline to which this wpter submits is to locate each of the 28 topics by the note in which each first appears in the following pages. I - rna7 II - rna ~o III - rna ~3 IV - !'7b I~ V - !'7b 27 VI-'}8a3 VII - 98a IS VIII - '}8a.8 IX - 98a30 X - 98&33 XI - '}8bw XII - 99&6 XIII - 99& 10 XIV - 99& 18

XV XVI XVII XVIII XIX

-

XXI XXII XXIII XXIV XXV XXVI XXVII XXVIII

-

xx -

99>:09 99& 33 99b S 99b '4-'S 99b I!r'O 99b 3'-3' ooa6-7 ooa IS ooa 23-27 00& 30-3 I ooa37-bI oob 4-S oob!rIO oob 17

!'7& 7 : I ..O"O~....... SEl,... l""'" We come now to the general or formal topics in contradistinction to the particular or material topics of A 4 - B 17. The subject has been prepared for since chzp. 2 of the first book, s8a 1-30; c£ Studies, pp. IIS-Jj. is correctly understood to refer to enthymemes which is the way it is used in the treatise (e.g., 96b 23-28, I8b 24). Kassel, p. 212, refers it to Ton••. The Greek text of this chzpter is, of all the chzpters in the first two books, the one most subjected to variant readings by the editors. In fact Roemer's comment appears to reflect their attitude: "there are many things which occasion uneasiness in this most diflicuit discussion of the ".lV.l TO""" (p. 148). The change from the particular to the general topics can be viewed in a way as a change from a static to a dynamic phase of topical analysis. It is a move from a collection of particulars produced by topical analysis (c£ Studks, pp. 126-27) to forms of inference which can employ the particular facts to demonstrate reasonably the validity or invalidity of the subject (c£ Studies, pp. II6-20). If, as many think, the topics found in A.'s T.pics are logical principles, or laws, upon which arguments can be built, then from the evidence on hand I would be constrained to say that the ".
a."...",".

ARISTOTLE, IRHETORIC' II

9.,.. 7

Rhetoric. In fact the ciosest we come to • statement of what a topic is can be found at Rhetoric 03' I7-I9: "1 call • topic and a stoicheion the same thing, for a stoicheion and a topic is • class into which many enthymemcs fall." 'Ihis describe.> well what we find in the common topics in the present chapter, and perhaps what Cicero had in mind.t De inv. 2.I5.48: "we call, then, those argwnents which can be shifted to many situations common topics." They are presented in a way which yields • form of inference that is a self-evident general principle, enthymematic in form, which can be used in an argument. For example, arguments such as the following can be devdoped from definition (topic 7): whatever is predicated of the definition can be predicated of the definitum. Another, using the antecedent-consequent form, would be: if something is removed from. definition, it is removed from the dejinitum; cf. !I8a IS. Admitting that our knowledge of wh.t A. meant by "topic" is not as sure as we might wish, we must still acknowledge that a study of the 28 general topics in the Rhetoric reveals for each of thern an explicit or implicit self-authenticating principle or rule often in the form of antecedent-<:onsequent - if A, then B - as in the topic of definition just given (cf. Studies, pp. I30-35). Interestingly enough, this hypothetical form is the way medieval logicians viewed the topics (eE Bird, Mullally, Stump, Green-Pederson, and Boehner, Gal, & Brown). From what Alexander of Aphrodisias says, Theaphrastus (a student of A.) also appears to subscribe to this understanding of topic (Studies, p. 132). So, too, could we assume did Themistius (ca. A.D. 320390) whose analysis of the topics (also 28 in number) is found in Book 2 of Boethius' De topicis diffemrtiis. In fact the list of Themistian and Ciceronian topics given by Boethius in Books 2-3 reflects in a somewhat striking manner the general topics as we find them in our present chapter. By way of example, here are A.'s first 10 topics in the order of their occurrence in our chapter but with their class identification as given by Boethius, which he calls their differentia: (i) contraries; (ii) conjugates; (iii) antecedent-<:onsequent; (iv) comparison; (v) adjuncts; (vi) similars; (vii) definition; (viii) conjugates; (ix) division; (x) enumeration of parts. A number of these classifications are fanUliar from A.'s Topics and Rhetaric and Cicero's Topics. They also appear in most subsequent works which study the topics and can commonly be found in books concerned with rhetoric; e.g., Maximus Planudes (Rhetores Graeci, V 4041f.) offers 21 topics, most of which are consonant with those of our chapter, while Apsines and Minucianus give us lists of common topics (Rheto,.. Gratei, IX 522--27, 604-13). These classifications, as we find thern in A.'s Rhetoric, are "sources to go to for arguments" (the accepted meaning of "topic"), and they contain in their very meaning a basic rule which can be formulated in dilferent ways. The rule possesses the advantage of being self-evident and therefore offers a potentialIy strOng argument for most people. At SE 170" 20 - I70b I I in speaking of refotation (and so, too, of demonstration) A. sI!ows the

COMMENTARY

293

nature of the topics. He insists on their importance as self-evident, general principles which apply to every art and faculty. This fact enables one to use them for a valid refutation or demonstration without the speciali2ed knowledge of the discipline required if one were to do the same within the structure of the particular disciplines. In brief the topics are seen by him as varied, selfevident, and general logical categories which enable one to refute or demonstrate effectivdy and to do so with strong probability. z c£ 93a 9-II on the four kinds of opposites. The reference there to the Topics is the passage in which A. exemplifies each kind; C£ also II9a 32-II9b 4. Here A. speaks of contraries, and the rule involved is: opposites have opposite qualities; e.g., if X (dissipation) is m (bad), then Y (moderation) is n (good). See Top. II4b 6-15. To this example (as far as opposites in general go) we could add: to assert one of two rdatives is to assert the other; e.g., ifx (parent), then Y (child): To asserr one contradictory as true is to assert the other as false; e.g., if X (John runs) is true, then Y (John does not run) is false. Contrary species have contrary genera; e.g., if X (dissipation) is a species of vice, then Y (moderation) is a species of virtue. See Socrates' refutation of Polus specifically at 475 (Plato, Gorgi/U). We can thus see how a topic (here contraries) by its very nature contains a principle which make. it a repository for discovering premisses useful for demonstration or refutation. See the argoment offered at 87a II-I3; C£ 87a II-I:>" The point i. illustrated time and again in A.'s Topics or by Cicero for various topics at De orat. :>.39.162-40.173 •

"'CIV.."""

.a 8 6vllv..I'I'... 6v""..lov Here two sets are in play, and they are illustrated at b 10 (olov ... (J).a{J.~&,): e.g., moderation-dissipation which are signified by ivanlrp, and good-bad by iva,•••,. Thus if one of the sets ("bad'1 belongs to (,0 l,anlo, ~",d~X") dissipation, then its opposite C'good") belongs to the opposite (.cp iva.drp ~~"••) of dissipation, namdy, moderation. In the example at a 10 "moderation" is the Tcpl,anlrp. a 9 li.VCltpo\ivo;a.... XClTClcnceuciJ;ov"E'CI SC. dBi ava&(?oiivTa tnlonai.." "TA. On xaTaaxsvdC... (prove), S9b 14; e.g., in refuting, if one finds that "bad" does not bdong to dissipation, then one denies that moderation is good.

a II

MccrcrlJV'"Kiii

C£ 73b 18 : 1.

a II-12 d ........VOpO.:.crllcrOCIt Quintilian 5.10.73 uses the same example. Cope, p. 238, cites Quintilian 5.IO.2Q-94 as a discussion of these common topics. Some of the topics therein are obviously common topics; others, less clearly so. Cicero, De part. orat. 2.7 does mention a number of ordinarily accepted common topics which are in accord with his explanation of the term at De in.. 2.14.47 and which he illustrates at De orat. 2.39.16240.173. Spengd (pp. 289-90) is not overly confident that Cicero's understand-

AllISTOTLl!, 'RHETORIC' II

ing of the topics comes from A. He sees a Stoic influence; see also p. 29:> on the second topic at 9']a 20. I'm not at all as certain of the difference in understanding and would take a stronger stand in favor of Cicero than I took in Studies, p. II6nI8. Lloyd, Polarity, pp. 15-171, considers the idea of opposition in Greek thought. Cpo Cicero, De inv. 1.30.46. The author of &: Snell, Adespoto 80, with olpal .s a conjecture for .lval. The infinitive is • problem, but dlis is an excerpt and so possibly part of a larger whole which influenced the construction; cpo cob 17 : 2. Radermacher, C.48, notes that some of the common topics were in use prior to A., as is clear from A.'. cieation at times of the authors of his examples. Arguments from contraries he sees as common in the fifth/fourth cennlrie., and he cites Aristophanes, Frogs 1443-1450, Andocides, On the Mysteries 24. To these can be added Dem., On the Emb....y 214, Thucyd. 6.92, both of which are forms of argument from contraries. Spenge!, pp. 29
a 13-16 d ...p .•. XciPlV

this passage is unknown. It is cited in Nauck

ing

II-I:>.

a 15-16 .,,:,6' ... XciPlV "Neither need one be grateful to anyone if under duress he does a good deed." The opposition (c£ 9']a 8) is between untruthful statements (which are believable) and truthful ones (which are not believable). a 17-19 iUA' ... ~pa",au; Attributed to the Thyestts of Euripides by the scholiast Anonymus; c£ Nauck &: Snell, frg. 396. For 'P.vd07yoe.rv (tell lies) K.,sel alone of the edd. reads a suggestion of Nauck's 'PsvM;, yieov; for the reasons, which make good sense, see Der Text, p. 139. a 20 o"",u"" ""'........v C£ 64b 34-37 where there is also mention of coordinates (atlaTolxa); 64b 35-37 also illustrates what he means by these inflections. The rule contained in this topic is: If X inrplies Y, then whatever inrplies X inrplies Y; e.g., if justice (X) inrplies virtue (Y), then just man, jusdy done, inrplies a man of virtue, an act of virtue. "for it is necessary that the inflecta 20-21 oILau..~ •.• ILiJ 6",ciPX.'V ed forms be present or not present in the same way (in the subject)"; c£ Top. 1240 10-14, nga 36 - II9b 9; Cicero, Top. 3.12 and cpo Quintilian 5.10.85, Cicero, D ...at. 2.40.167. A . .,sumes that the essential meaning of the inflected term remains unchanged (e.g., 6po[0)~) in its varied fonus; cpo Pol. 1309" 37-39. He exemplifies this at once in the example.

97" 23

COMMENTARY

a 21 a ....... liy,dlOv "to say that the just is not good in every respect," ie.• what "good" signifies cannot be predicated of all the in8.ected instances of 'just." Here A. demonstrates the general rule by ..."emplifying fJ~ tlndex.... i.e.. an instance in which "good" cannot be predicated of an inHection of 'Just." As Victorius says: those who argue that everything that is just is good can be refuted by stating that if this i. so. then whatever occurs ju.dy happens bene6cially and should always be desired. But it is far better (and so more desirable) to be put to death 1lI1iusdy for it shows that one is innocent since only criminals are put to death jusdy. a 22 : 1 xal ... &.xau..~ .c. • r"l TO ayaBo;,: "fur 'jusdy' would in fact be 'beneficially.·" On c!yaBcII, (used to convey the idea). see 88b 7. z Wv... Ii_Bav.iv " ... to be put to death jusdy i. not desirable." There are two points calling for comment here. The first is the way d",al." is being used. for which see 661> 29. second paragraph. and 97'l 29 - 97b I I bdow. The .econd i. that aleoTa. = that which is good (here: an act which is beneficial); on the rdation between draB&. and a/eSTOP cf. A 6. a 23 0. ... ~~a C£ Radermacher. C.5I. The te., "sA';;ua,; Kassel at 97b 2 reads d. aefJOTTT/. at b 3 'AAHfJi.,.,; he brackets b 7-II ["al oj ••• cbroBdvoVTa] while reading at b 7 "a! oCo. oj. The changes are occasioned in part (e.g.• Thurot, "Observations critique. [II]." 43£) by the fact that Dionysiu. of H.licam.as.u. in the first Lener to Ammaeus XII (747748) cites our text from 97a 23 to 97b 7 (,llAo, ... iJ"IfJouB. dl""l). Where relevant, the changes will be noted. Cope, pp. 245-46, views Diony.ius' alterations as W1fortunate, and Spengel, p. 297. questions the text he was using. a 23-24 E\ ••• ".",,,,,8lv,.. In this topic we are working with what A. call, corrdative terms, i.e., term. which are reciprocal in their relation: master/ servant, lessor/lessee, father/son, buy/sell, to act/to be acted upon. In corrdative terms one term necessarily includes (cf. previous examples) or excludes (e.g., vice-virrue) the other. A relative term e."presses a concept in which the rdation to the other is the dominant idea. as A. says in Cat. nb 24-31 (and cf. 92a \rIl). The rule for this topic can be: relative opposites demand each other; e.g., if X entails Y. to posit X is to posit Y. C£ 92a 32 -!/20b 3. !/2ob 3-5. Thus in the text here: if it is a fact that (1l"dex", IS, B.V) A (B~'­ etpl) does an honorable or just act to B, then B (B~ietp 2) experiences an honorable or just action from A. Expressed as it is in this translation. the statement is beyond cavil, as was remarked in 66b 29. At a 27 - b I I, however, A. goes on to make some valid distinctions on uses of the corrdatives (act/be acted upon) which are paralogism.. Plalludes (Rhetores Graeei, V 404) and Minucianus (IX. 611) give this topic.

A1USTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

9~

29

a 25 ",d .l ..........O.'I"tv,.. sc. '"'dex" which emerges in the English translations as: "if it is right to, if one had the right to," etc., and correctly conveys the idea behind the correlatives: the polver to command entails somer..ne's: obligation to execute the command (n:sn:o'1J",sva,). On RossJs conjecture, o£ ~ 23. Cicero, Drat. 4'.142 (as Schrader notes) exemplifies the topic in an argument for the study of good speaking ("cur aut discere torp. est quod scite honestum est aut quod nosse pulcherrimum est id non gloriosum est docere").

a,"

a 25-27 otov ... ':'v£i.. What is being compared here is the COIrelation between command/obey and seUJbuy. Cope remarks the pleonasm in olo. cr., (also 97h 27), but it is an expression that appears elsewhere in A. and in later Greek (e.g., Demetrius, On Style 94) and may simply indicate development in the language: "for example, as." Diomedon is unknown. Cicero citeS our example, mentioning in place of Diomedon the Rhodians and a Hermocreon (De inv. 1.30.47), and QuintiIian repeats it (Inst. orat. 5. 10.78).

"and if 'well' or 'justly' is predicable of a 27-28 " ..1 ct ... ,",O.ij ..ClV... the one acted upon, then it is predicable of the one acting." At this point A. takes note of the possibility of f.c.Ise reasoning in this topic; o£ 66b 29. The ground for the paralogism is an assumed (but mistaken) correlation between the temlS, e.g.• a 29-30 (el aov). The text at a 27-28 (..al ... "0'>1aa.....) is read in the same way by the edd. and Spongel. Cope and Freese read after no,fjaav'E'~ : :seai d 'E'q; no,fjaav'n, ~aL -rep "£110,.,80·".

rae ...

a 28-29

l ..... S' tv ..aU"", The reading of the edd.. Spongel, Cope. Radermacher (918 23) reads with Dionysiw Ka.... d'l. TO;;"; he also contends that this kind of f.c.Ise reasoning was common to Sophistic rhetoric. Certainly it is not an uncommon form of argument in drama, e.g., our instance of Alcmaeon (97b 3IE) from the play of that name by n,eodectes; this is paralleled by the argument in the Orestes ofTheodecte cited atola35- alb 2. The argument is also found in Euripides. Orestes 538-539 (0£ 546-547, SSI-563; and cpo Electra 1238-1"48. In Aeschylus, Eumeniaes 566-673 we have the issue set before us. Further evidence of the stock character of the argument is found at Ad Herenn. 1.10.17. 15.25. 16.26. and Cicero. De i,w. 1.13.18-19: "a very common example."

a 29-30 El ya.p .....oil In other words. in contrast to the statement above (0£ ~ 23-24). it is possible that a person.B, experienced justice (d",at,,",,0.8A.a.) at the hands of A. but it does not follow that A did a just deed (d ...al." nOLfjaa.). Other factors call for consideration, as is indicated in Ad Herenn. 1.16.26, De inv. I.I3.18-19 - specifically as we are told at 97b

co,

COMMENTARY

297

1 whether there is a true correlation in the terms. If there is not, as in the examples given from 97b 2 on, there can be no argument. The infinitive is clearly dependent on 97b 2 xpijaO .. , •.• iiv cl:PfLO"'"1aavT.) as Spengel thought ("Ueber die Rheto,ik," 498-501); Cope, pp. 244-45, in general agrees on the misplacement of 97b 7-II as does Thurot, "Observation. critiques [II]," 4344. The argument is !hzt 97b 7-II is quite in accord with 97a 23-28 but not with 97a 29 - 97b 6 (.1 ,.ae ... XTa••i.). Faced with .uch a consensus I hesitate to disagree. But the nature of this topic, as A. indicates, is that it lends itself to false reasoning and so, as he says, it is necessary to examine statements grounded in correlative terms. I am inclined to think that 97b 7- II belong where they are as further instances of statements based all correlatives which are open to question: e.g., was the judgment on Demosthenes and the others made correctly (a",at." 'xetO."aav ano"Teiva,). If not, what follows? Or

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC J II

298

97b

12

does it readily follow from the fact that the man at Thebes was ju,dy killed that tho,e who killed him did so jusdy? 2 A'Il.LC'cr8£vouS .•• N.xcivopcz This doe, not appear to be the orator Demosthenes, although Dionysius (c£ 9']3. 23) thought that it was and that the reference was to the defense of Ctesiphon against Aeschines in Demosthenes' Crown speech. Dionysius apparendy did not have in his text the words xal T.v• .mO"T...".T.,. "d. which would make ,uch a reference highly questionable since we know of no Nicanor with whom Demosthenes was or could have been so involved. Victorius suggests a' a remote possibility someone like the fifth-century general Demosthenes, but we know of no Nicanor at that time either.

b 9 ....pl ... &'...o8civOVTOS Xenophon, Hellenic. 7.3.I-I2 narrates the story of Euphron put to death at Thebes by Sicyonian exiles. This event occurring ca. 366 B.C. during the Theban hegemony is the one which A. pos,ibly has in mind. Cpo Helle;,;ca 7.1.44-46, 2. II-IS, Hammond, pp. 504-505.

b IO : J xu..ue •..• 4 ...o8czvEiv "(The accused man) bid that a judgment be made whether the man killed was righdy put to death." On ai"a.o~, ~', S. I982. 2


S. 2086d: "on the ground that it was not wrong."

b I2 : 1 oiU0S

This fori topic is read by the edd. with many variants from b r6 through the next five lines caused by what appear, to be a dittography. Con'equendy I print the text I am following, along with a translation. Roemer in his apparatus offers the readings found in the two main text

JIaditions. In the critical editions we find that Dufour reads exacdy as Roemer, as does Tovar in effect; with minor conjectures and variants Ross is in basic agreement. The major change from Roemer introduced by Kas,el is that Roemer secludes b IS-I7 [nm...••... de'
"e

IS Td 6' 8n .O~~ "~:'1"tov TV"T.. 8, "al Td. na'"ea, 16 l" TOV, .1 Td ~...o. ,j"cleZ'" "al Td plillo. ,j"cleX"' ["aB' I7 d"o....eo. d. dBrJ d,l tlndezo. p~ tl""ez'" .., rJi ~TTO' .1 tlnaez... <"aB'> 11' d"o....eo. <11.> dBrJ .,6' 0.... ,j"deXBI ..6' 8... oli. iT,

...m..B.

1',.

T.v,

a"
"Further the argument that the one who ,trikes his father ,trikes hi, neighbors, (which follows) from the principle that if the less likely is, then the more likely is; for men strike their fathers less than they strike their neighbors.

COMMENTARY

299

Or you may argue as follows: if that which would more naturally exist does not exist, (then the less likely does not); or, if that which less naturally would exi.t does exist, (then the more likely exists); (the argument proceeds) according to whichever of the two positions one must demonstrate: either that something is or is not." The secluded Greek is not translated. Z ",ii),),,,,, "Ill fj'<' ~TTOV. A. wed the argument at 92a I3-IS. C£ 92" 13 : 1 for other references to this kind of a fortiori argument. Our present topic forms the substance of A 7. On the topic in general c£ Top. II4b 37 - lI5a 24; see also Cicero, Top. 4.23, De orat. 2.40.172; Quintilian S.IO.S6--93. The argument afo,tiori (whether it be from greater or from lesser) works from the principle: every greater contains a lesser. We find the topic in one form or another in the Rhetores Gram: at I 225, for example, where Theon calls it comparison of the greater, lesser, equal (cp. Boethiw, De topids differentiis II90C - II9Ia); all three are also mentioned in Minucianw (IX 60S); Planudes talks of the more and the less (V 404) and Apsines mentions ouly the argument from the less (IX 522); the references are from Spenge!, p. 29S. "lC,o),ij "much less so"; c£ LS, S.U. B,2. Victoriw comments that as an argument this topic is a common one among the Athenians and cites Plato Phaetirus 6sb. In support of his observation we might note Deinarchw (ca. 360-292), Against Demosthenes 4I-4S; Demosthenes, Against Conon 23 (I264); Andocides (ca. 44D-390) Against Aldbiades IS (wrongly attributed to ADdoc.); Lysias, On the Murder of Eratosthenes 31; Isocrates, Antidosis 166, Plataicus S2. AU these are noted by Spengel.

b 13

b '3-14 ",oG1;o .•. '" fj ......"" ToVTO ••• lC1TW: "for this ... is to say that [cpo TOVTAC1T' in later usage] if something is not present where [literally: to whicll] it should more likely be present, then obviously it is not present where it should less likely be." From b I2 on, Ross alone of the edd. encloses statements such as this (el ... ~TTOV) in quotation marks. b 15-172 "'0 S' ... "oU~ nA'lcrlov C£ the text printed at lI7b 12 : 1 for comments on b 15-1'1'. Vater, p. I2S, calls the statement here fidse, stating that it is not an argument a minor; ad maius and so the other side of the coin seen at b 13-14- However, A. is saying (as Victorius, p. 406, remarked) that to strike one's father is a less likely action than to strike a neighbor; thw if one is guilty of such action, one is more likely to have struck one's neighbor. The argument runs from the evidence of the less likely to the strong possibility

300

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

of the more likely. Top. lIsa 6-8 expresses the topic as here: first, • maio,i, and then, • minori. b I'f - 174 ... &i1J , a conjecture of Spengel's (p. 300) read only by Kassel. Kassel also conjectures < ..aO'> ""oneo. < 4.> Mn at

I'fA. b 17 CI8 k-, el ..• ijnov At b 18 we return to the ordinaty lineation found with slight variation in Roemer, Tovar, Kassel. Introduced here and exemplified in b 1'J-27 is the • pari argument. b I'J-2O xcii "O~ . , . YOvov Cf. Nauck & Snell, AJespota 81. The author is unknown although some suggest that it is Antiphon (on whom see "b IS, Bsa 9 : 2). At 99b 25 we have a reference to the Meleager of Antiphon (c£ Naua & Snell, p. 792), and some (c£ Cope. p. 248, Nauck & Snell, p. 8SS) consider our citation and that at 97" 13ff. (.1 ..• xcletv) to collie &om the same play. In fact we know that an Oeneus was the father of Meleager and that Meleager killed Plexippus ("b IS), the brother of Althaea, who was the wife ofOeneus. So it is that the .choliast Stcphanus thinks "that our lines are those spoken by Oeneus to Althaea as she grieves for her father (Thestius) in his loss. Ocneus asks her •If your father i, to be pitied for his son, am I not to be much pitied for the los. of my son, Meleager?'" Stcphanus follows one account; A.'s citation follows another (e.g., "ai8a,) in which the two sons of Thestiu. are killed. Diodarns Siculus 4-34.1-6 tells the story. xed BT' •.. 'Al.';",,6po~ a pari arguments in defense of Paris and his abdllCtion of Helen and his killing of Achilles; cpo Top. II4b 25-36. 0n the grounds that among equals if one is guilty (or not guilty), all are, the innocence of Paris is argued &om the like instance of Theseus (lsoer., Helen 18-20) who carried off Helen as a youog girl (plutarch, Theseus 31), and also

b 21-23

Ariadne from Crete, and &om that of the Dioscuri, Castor and Pollux (brothers of Helen), who caxricd off Aethra, and also their cousins, daughters of Leucippus, Phoebe and HiIaera. Similarly, &om the instance of Hector, the killing of Achilles by Paris is defended, These examples may come &om an encomiam called the AlexanJros; cpo 98a 22, OIb 21, 36 and c£ Polycratcs in Baiter & Sauppe, II 223, Erg. 13. b "3-24 xed d . . . 'I'Ll-aoorpo, by Spenge!.

b 25

e..y .....oiiYT..'

Cpo !soer. Amidosis 2O'J-2I4 mentioned

"condemned to death"; Cope alone reads 7jTTOi....a.:

"are defeated." b ::16-"7 "d ... 'BU."""""," All . except Spengel, Tovar print the quotation marks. Most of the translations interpret 60<'1' as "rep~tation";

COMMENTARY

301

it could also mean "opinion." Either is possible since we have no idea of the context of the statement.

"xo",.'"

b 27 : 1 IilAO~ •.. The fifth topic is an argument from the adjunct of past time as an associated accident of an object or event. The argument has its force in an accepted inevitable relation between the accident of time and the object, e.g., ifx is true at t{I) in the past, then it is also true at t{z). In such an inst:mce, time is viewed as an integral part of a larger whole which includes the object (X) argued for. In fact, the object X when qualified by past time is taken as though possessing that which makes it trUe in itsd£ This can be .een in the examples offered by A. where a necessary conjunction Df time and the truth of the object X in the past is taken as the ground fDr the truth of X at the later time. The topic is a fairly common form of argument and i. found freqqently among the Greek.. For example in the peroration, found in the corpus ofLysias (0£ <)7a 13-16) as Or. xviii, it is argued (1']-19) that if the Athenians did nDt confiscate the property in 403 B.C. when they were angered at collaborators why .hould they dD so now? See also: Demosthenes, Ag. uplines 84-86 (this is mentioned by Apsines, Rhetores Graed, IX 525, who also identifi.s the topic as "past time"), 01. 1.8-9 (if we had acted in the past, W. wDuld nDt have this situation, therefor. act nDw), Ag. AnJrolion 6-7 (challenges the ...umed rdatiDn between past time and the obj.ct X); Lysias, On the Olive Stump 27; Isaeus, On the Estate of Astyphilus 14-15; Isocrates, On the Team of Horses 12-15; Thucydides 3.55.1-4. Spengd, p. 304. also mentions other instances .omewhat remDte to the topic as pr.sented her. by A. In fact, Top. IIlb 24-31 enlarges the topic time to past, present, future time, as does 1I5b II-35. Among other things, they make clear that.n event can b. qualified (and so time is an .ccident of the thing) or nDt qualified by time. Dionysius in hi. first Letter to Ammdeus XI (739-740) cites our p ....ge 97b 27 - 98. 2. with • few minor variants. Quintilian, 5010.42-44, briefly discusses time as • topic; most ofhis comment is more directly concerned with circumstances in their tempDrai rdation to an event. Spengd, p. 303, cites Hermogenes (Rhetores Gram, III 132-35), who uses an example quite the ""xBte'1P" by which he same as that of Iphicrates and calls it • means. "hypothetical argument." Apart from the similarity to an example used by A. and the fact th.t it is calI.d an "argument," there is no direct connectiDn with Dur ch.pter. On time as a topic, see Cope, p. 250, .nd Radermacher, C.49. 3 oIov':'~ C£ 9'78 25-27; o£ oob 17. 3 'I
"Aa......

302

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTOlllC' II

98a I

(found in the Moralia of Plutarch to whom the Lives are wrongly attributed), we are told that Lysias wrote two speeches for Iphicrates, one of which was against Harmodius. But Dionysius of Hali=nassus, in chap. I2 of his L ysi.., denies that the speech is by Lysias, while clearly indicating that there was a speech called "On the Statue." A. obviously considers the speech that of Iphicrates; cf. Baiter & Sauppe, II 178 (Or. xviii), 179, frg. 36. In 390 B.C. Iphicrates received the honor of a statue for his success at Lechaeum (CAB, VI 51£) against a Spartan hoplite force. After his retirement in 372/371, as Dionysius tells us, he brought up the question of his statue not yet received and presumably gave this speech. Pausanias, Altiea 1.24-7, mentions that he saw a statue of Iphicrates on the acropolis in Athens. h 29!P' Kassel alone secludes this, following the reading found in Dionysius; he gives his reasons in Der Text, pp. 92r94h 30 p.ro""....S··· ",,,06v"'OS when you receive it."

"When you expect something ... ;

h 3 I &"£0",,, The present infinitive, for which there is a good manuscript witness and which is also found in Dionysius, is read only by Ross, Kassel in place of the more common aorist: d,ei7al. The construction is an articular infinitive: "in respect ro the Thebans allowing Philip ro pass through into Attica they (philip's envoys) argued that ..."; cpo 8TI, b 28.

98a

I : J ' A......udjy For the history see next note. There are references ro this need for Theban cooperation in Demosthenes, On the Crown I46,2H213, and somewhat indirectly in Aeschines, 4f. Ctesiphon 151. • "'ply •.. ~"'x'is Ross alone of the edd. omits the quotation marks: ".i ... dl>111011',..." In 347 Thebes (an enemy of Athens) and Thessaly asked the help of Philip against the phocians in the Sacred War (356/355346). In 346 after the Peace of philocrates Philip decided ro give the help, move against Phocis, and end the war. He came inro Greece by way of the pass at Thermopylae and at the time the Thebans would not have stopped his march on Athens if he had asked pennission to pass through. However, Philip reduced Phocis and returned home; cf. CAB, VI 233-43. As the first direct help offered ro Thebes against Phocis, this is the event referred to in these words. In 339 Philip was back in Greece at the invitation of some Greek states to help in the Amphissean War. Establishing himself at Elateo, a town on the direct route to Thebes and Athens, he sent ambassadors to Thebes whose help or neutrality he wanted against the threat of Athens. Athens also sent an embassy, led by Demosthenes, who succeeded in winning the alliance of the Thebans; cf. CAB, VI 256-60. The argument of Philip's envoys as given ro us here is: Had Philip asked in 346, you would have allowed him to pass through into Attica even before he ever gave you any help; n?w that

98a 4

COMMBNTAllY

303

he has given you substantial help, and thrown away any advantage ("'100''''0) he had in that regard, and placed his trust in you, it would be unparalleled to deny him passage through. "another topic oomes from (turning) the a 3-4 a>J.o~ ... d"c\v'rez statements made against oneself upon the one who made them." aiTrov is read by the edd. with Bywater ("Aristotelia III," 72.-73); Spengel, Cope read atr... with the oodd. This topic 6 is one of those which Spenge! (pp. 28889) on the basis of 97a I argues does not belong among the topics since it is not oommon to all three kinds of rhetoric. For example, he sees topic 6 as applicable to judicial; 20, tojudicial and deliberative; 23, 25, and 27, to judicial. On examination, however, they do not appear so limited, and Cope, for example, accepts our present topic as usefuI in deliberative and judicial rhetoric. But Cope, p. 252, would restrict topic 6 to rhetoric, as does Brandis, p. 19; neither offers a reason. In fact, as A. explains the topic in a 3-4, it can be used in any kind of Idisoourse, and we find Euthyphro lIb 8 - lId 2 exemplifying the figure when Butbyphro gently turns back on Socrates a charge he had made against him. As a common topic it is quite straightforward, contingent as it is on what is said and the ingenuity of the respondent in turning the statement.

ov,

a 4 6,ezrpoipEt... 'rpo"o~ I would take "'eo"o~ as "this tum of speech." Spengel, p. 306, with the explanation (a 8-12) in mind interprets it as character ("the character of the speaker makes a difference"). 6,atpte.' tolerates two meanings and each has its adherents. It can mean: this turn of speech "is excdlent" or "differs." I do not know that either one can claim to be the only oorrect interpretation. I am inclined toward the seoond. In the first place there is nothing exceptional in the topic as presented by A. that it should be called an "excellent" topic - and this, though there are excellent examples of it like the well-known "If you were my husband, I'd poison your oolf.." with the reton: "If you were my wife, I'd drink it." Many instances are quite ordinary, as the reply of Alexander the Great to Parrnenio cited by Arrian (Anabasis 2.25), Diodorus Siculus (17.54), plutarch (Life of Alex.nder 29), e.g., on hearing Darius' peace terms Parmenio said: "Were I Alexander, I'd gladly accept." To which Alexander replied: "Were· I Parmenio I would too, but since I'm Alexander I shall send another answer." SeoondIy, we do not know the example (or examples) from the Teucer and whether it is different in character and tone from or the same as that of Iphicrates. And so we do not really know whether we are to understand the topic as it is given at a 3, which is the way retort is ordinarily understood, or in tbe limited way ill which A. explains it at a 8-14 (60' ... &.). The explanation would restrict the topic to use against one who accuses you of wrong and who is looked upon as morally inferior (as Victorius saw, p. 401) and as guilty.

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

a 4-5 orov ••. TEllxP'I" This is the reading and the punctuation ofthree edd., Spengel, Cope. Ross pl~ces olov . .• T";"erp. after el,,6vTa with Bywater. Kassel conjectures 01..... T";"erp <"al> rJ> which appeared in an early edition of the Rhetoric. I would accept this conjecture, which would explain some of my problems mentioned in the previous note. & I understand the conjecture A. indicates that there are varied kinds of retort, the kind found in the Teuc." the kind used by Iphicrates (with rJ> referring to TeO"O~). As was remarked, however, one can take the first meaning of d.atpiee., read without the conjecture, and have an acceptable, if restricted, understanding of retort. It is commonly thought that the Teuc., is the play of Sophocles, and Cope, p. 252, recoDSt:ruCts the possible retort in that play; see Pearson, II 215-16.

a 5 'I'I"xpci'"l~...' A.p ....0'Pc;;II.... On the first, 97b 27 : 3. This is a second speech of Iphicrates. It apparendy concerns a charge of betrayal. It, too, is mentioned by Dionysius as not being written by Lysias (c£ 97b 27 : 3). In fact, A. assumes here as at 97b 27 that the speech is that of Iphicrates as does Aristides, Or. 49.656-657 (Dindor£, Aristides, II 518-19), wbo makes reference to both the Hamwdius and Aristophon speeches; c£ also the comment ofQuintilian, P2.9-IO. The present speech was Dlost likely given when Chares (76& 10 : 2) supported by Aristophon wrongly attacked lphicrates for treachery as a fleet commander in the Social War, 357-355 B.C.; c£ CAR, VI 2II and Diodorus Siculus 16.21 who gives the story of the baede and the accusation. On Aristophon see PW. Bom before the Peloponnesian War (431-404) and.living well into the fourth century, he became a leading states,man in Athens in mid-fourth century after the fall of Callistratus in 361.

a 6 "et...."

Tovar, Kassel of the edd. use quotation marks, as does Cope.

a 7-8 "crQ ••• 'I
All the edd. save Roemer punctuate with

a 8 bcEillov i.e., the one who makes the original charge, e.g., Aristophon in the example: "it is necessary that the opponent be one who would be thought more likely to do wrong."

a 9 'Ap.u..d&'1" known to the Greeks and to history as "the Just." He lived ca. 520 - ca. 468 B. c., played a prominent part in the two Persian W m, and was a paramount factor in the formation of Athens' first Delian Confederacy shordy after the wars. plutarch has a life of him. C£ OCD, PW, CAlI, IV and V passim. a 10 ....uri ...t; av £i"••." .nAOt; ruo~ (for the codd. c!lld which is read by Spengel, Cope) is a conjecture of Bywater's ("Aristotelia III," 73) read by all the edd. Kassel also reads with Shilleto dv ..."".,.. for lJ....

r".,..;

98a IS

COMMENTARY

30S

Ross secludes 11•• The standard English versions translate the reading a.Ud of the codd., which is explained by Cope, p. 2S3. Our reading would be interpreted: "if someone should make this kind of statement to Aristide.la. a prosecutor with reference to his lack of credibility as a prosecutor." a I I (3cNA....., the verb.

C£ LS, s.". III "pretends to be." Cope, p. 2S4. discusses

12 : 1 "rOU"," i.e., a II-I2 (8Am, ... xa'tT/roeotJ): dlC accuser's pretension to moral superiority. z hi is read by all the odd. for the manwcript reading dsl found in cod. A and accepted by the ,choliast Anonymus, Spenge!, Cope.

a

I would agree with Victoriw, p. 402, and refer this to the a 13 a-.o"o~ person who follows: "for one is ridiculous when one criticizes...... Cope, pp. 2S4lf..: and others understand reM." "the lIS!' of this figure is ridiculow .•..

a IS 6pu,,,,oG A., Met. 10']8b 27-29, remarks that there were two significant contributions made by Socrates to philosophical thinking becawe of the way in which he used both. They were definition and inductive reasoning. Anyone acquainted with Socratic dialogues such as the Lathes, Lysis, Euehyphro etc., could readily agree. As a topic, definition is open to a number of formulations such as we saw in 9'7Il 7 : 1, all based on the fact that the definition and tle}initum are convertible. A. has argued many times from definition in the present book. Each of the emotions, for example, was fir.t defined and then conclwions were drawn from the definition. In the first book we have definitions and deductions therefrom for aya8&. (chap. 6, and C£ 6za 21 - 6zb 9) and "aM. (chap. 9) among others, and in chaps. 12-14 of our second book the analysis devdops a series of qualities usefuJ for a good descriptive definition ofthe characters of the young, old. and mature person. Spengd, p. 308, mentions as examples of definition [socrates, Antid. 27G-271, Lysias Ag. Simon 41-43. A. engages in an extended study of definition in Top. 6(139) 24 - ISSb 8). Cicero, T.p. S.26-7.32 explains definition, distinguishing it from enumeration of parts and analysis; cpo De part. orot. 12.41, De in". 2.17.S3-S6. Quintilian j.IO.S4-64 explains the topic together with a number of dements which can invalidate it if neglected. It is mentioned in R1retores Gram, V 4OS. a 1S-17 &11'","'''" ... eivll' This is repeated in more detail at r 18, I9a 8-12, and the question is identified as that of Socrates to Mdetus who bad accused him of atheism, e.g., Apol. 27b-e. As wed here and in the Apology, da,pO.,•• is apparendy the adjective and denotes either the result of divine activity (ler ••, "'edypcrra), or that which bdongs to a aa/pow and sperifically a god (806,). In general, one could say that this places the problem of tlaimon,

306

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC'

[I

98a 22

a.imon.. fairly accurately. Do they represent for the Greeks a kind of divine action, or a class of divine beings (e.g., Apol. 27d I: 8.wp "aida~) lower than the gods but cilled 8.ol? Cope, p. 2SS, gives .ome of the evidence for the latter view; Burkert discusses daimon (cf. pp. 179-81, 330-32) and remarks at p. 180: "Daimon does not designate a specific class of divine beings, but a peculiar mode of activity." Ro.s alone places this within quotation marks. a 16-17 Cip' ... EtV'" Cope reads a different text and punctuation at b IS-I6: olop 6..... . 1eYo,. a 17-22 K.d.:.~ ......el< ..
ana

The statement at 90b 22-31 is relevant; cf. 90b 22a 18 yEW ...cI........D~ 31. Cpo 60b 30 : 1; 90b 16. a 20 cruyyEV ......EpD~ On the idea see SIb 34 : 3. In terms of the argument as given in 98a 17-22: if actions define nobility of stock, my actions more than your. are like the actions of your noble ancestor and confer on me that same nobility of .tock (y...a.dT77~) as he won by his actions. Cpo 97b 21-23; cf. Baiter & Sauppe, II 223 frg. 13. This is an example based on the third a 22-23 K ..l .:.~ ... ""o)...u."v idea "defined": & "dap.o~. Altogether four "defmitions" are exemplified, da'pd••op, Y8.pa.oT77" iJPe". Victorius, p. 403, suggests that Paris, c11arged with licentiousness because of his actions concerning Helen, is defended on the ground that the definition of the well-behaved, non-licentious man, o "dap.o~ (Victorius interprets it as "temperate"), is: one satisfied. with the

98a 28

COMMBNT AllY

307

enjoyment of a single woman. This is found to be true ofPatis in his union with Helen (on anoAavu.., enjoyment, c£ 6Ia 17-19). a 24-26 x.d &,' .•• x"x"'~ Archelaus was king of Macedon (413399 D.C.) and brought a nwnber of Greek: artists - e.g., Agathon, Euripides - to his country; c£ OeD, CAR, V, passim, and Plato, Corgias 47OC-47Id. As we might gather from Plato, Archelaus was not a particularly attractive person and as presented in the Corgias would be even less so to Socrates; cpo Xenophon, Apol. of Socrales 16-17, D. Laertius, Socrales 2.25; Seneca, On Benefits 5.6.2-7. The definition ofhybtis on which Socrates makes his decision is somewhat unusual and has been questioned by some, e.g., Thurot, "Observations critiques [IIJ," 46. The fact that it is not in accord with the mealling given to it by A. at 78b 23-26, as Thurot remarks, does not necessarily signify anything since A. tells us that rills is Socrates' understanding of hybris. Furthermore, it is quite possible (see,sb '4-15 : 3) that the definition is legitimate for it is "an outrage upon, an insult to, one's person" to be placed in the demeaning position Socrates describes: namely, "to be unable to make an equal rerum when one fares well as to retaliate when one is hur~" Cope alone reads the singular form. a 27 : 1 op,aci!'ovo, ... cia", Cpo 98. IS. The TO .1 i"" is the essence of a thing or what makes the thing to be what it is, and, so, distinct and separate from anything else. The"definition" is the verbal expression of that .essence, e.g. Met. I042a 17. 2 DUlloyl!;....."", I iliv i.e., the persons mentioned, after defining and apprehending the essential meaning of a term, "draw inferences concerning the particular topics of their discussion." uvUoylC.uOa, may mean simply to use reasoning (S6a 22 : 2) or to reason by syllogism (s7& 8 : 1,2).

".p

a 28-29 iiJ.}.0~ ... "0;; 6p8",~ The text here is read by the edd., Spengel, Cope. Kassel alone reads dUo~ (for oe8cii~), a conjecture he attributes to Thurot, in support of which he refers to Top. I06a 13, 32, 107" 14, I07b '4, 23, Phys. 248b 7-IO. Difficulty with the passage is occasioned by de8cii~, a word not discussed as such in the Topics. On the other hand, there are two detailed discussions I06a 9 - I07b 39 and Iloa 23 - IlIa 7 on the ways to determine the right meaning of a term (leI. "oAlazcii~ liy'1Ta,) and its correct/incorrect use. There are a number of interpretations of this passage which can be found in Cope, p. 258. I can find no reason to refer the statement to a specific section of the Topics and consider Victorius correct in referring .. ,~ TO""'O'~ to the "topical system" (disdplinam lopicam) where this method of analysis is used, as can be seen from a glance at the Topics and Sophistici Elenchi. Therefore I would interpret our passage: "another topic is derived from the varied meanings of a word [lH TO;; "OC1azcli~l as has been mentioned ['c. l~l'H.a'l

30S

ARISTOTLE, "RHBTORIC' 11

9S, 33

in the topical discipline concerning the right use of. word [se. %efjaOa, mlTrp;

cf. Cope)." This topic, .s Brandis, 19, notes, is related to the two topics between which it stands: definition and division. In actual fact the present topic and the one which follows both are related to and are aspects of the topic definition. If the division into parts correctly exhausts a 30 &lAo~ ... &lCllpia_~ all the legitimate possibilities which apply in the given instance, this topic can be the source of a valid argument to prove or disprove (e.g., X is and only is a or b or c; but Y is c; therefOre Y is X). On the other hand, division may be easily used incorrectly, e.g., OIa 24 - oIb 3 with A's warning at OI. 33 on such misuse: ''The whole topic is fallacious." We can see A. himself using the kind of division he speaks of (9Sa 3<>-31), atA z, sSa 33-35 (accepting the division of rhetoric into three genera), A IS, na sff. (the different kinds of oaths), 7Sa 2.2.-30 (the three elements necessary to understand an emotion). !socrates, Antid. 217-:>:>0 uses a division similar to that in our text at 9Sa 3<>32; cf. also Radennacber, C.so. As a topic. division is variously named by Latin rhetoricians. The Auaar ad Hermll. '102940, using an example quite similar to A.'s, calls it e"Peclitia, i.e., the elimination of the irrelevant reasons offered for an action. Cicero in analyzing the nature of definition (Top. 502S and cpo :>:>.S3; De arat. 2.39.165) speaks of division as partitia and di.i.io. Quintilian, Insl. orat. 7.1.1, gives a reasonable explanation of each and remarks at 5.10.63 that it is Cicero's distinction: partitio i. the separation of a .ingle whole into its parts; divisio is the separation of a genus into its species. The reference sometimes made to An. Pr. 46a 3I - 46b 37 with its discussion of 9ivision is in fact a reference to A.'s criticism of trying to prove that something is necessarily what it is by using Plato's method of diairesis.

CiA 2, 56b 14-15 on the general similarity between a 33 : 1 ~"..ywyjjs argument by induction and argument by example. On the difference between the two see S6b 5 : 2, S7b 27 : 2, 931> 27, !/4lL U : 1, z. Our topic certainly speaks of induction [I.e., reasoning from particulars ro a universal, Top. Iosa 13) as the opening lines (9Sb 1-5) indic.te. They argue to the statement: women everywhere best determine the truth about their children. This topic, however, has been interpreted to include example (i.e., reasoning from part to part, like to like, 57b :>7-30), e.g., Rhetore. Graed, V 405. Thus Riccobonus cites 9sb 6-10 as concluding not to a universal but to a particular; e.g., do not entrust your safety to those who have failed to protect the safety of others. Cope, however (p. :>61), sees agmeralprindplein this. Ci=o (De in•. I.3I.5157, Top. 10.4:» seemingly makes no distinction between example and induction, calling both induction. Quintilian (PO.73, j.II.Iff.), speaking of the argument from similarities (i.e., from analogy), also makes no distinction, placing in the same category that "which the Greeks call epagoge, Cicero

COMMENTAllY

induction." Induction is regressive thinking working from the particular, which is far better known since it can be apprehended by the s"",es, through like particulars (from which in fact you can argue to a like particular, and SO argument by example) to the principle (or the universal) which underlies all the particulars. In his note on this passage (b I-S) I find Cope (p. 259) somewhat confusing. His first statement that a general truth is derived from a series of analogous cases is correct. His further explanation (''The meaning is ...") is unclear for there is no induction here to a geoerol truth from a single instance, i.e., that of the Peparethian woman. such an argument grounded in one such example would in fact carry small probability. z UE1tClp'l8[CI~ Peparethus is the largest of a group of small islands off the northeast tip ofEuboea; in the fifth century it was a member of Athens' Ddian Confederacy and in the fourth century (3408) was again an ally of Ath"",; Livy 3I.28.6 mentions its destruction in 200 B.C. Some - e.g., Eustathius citing our text in his comment on ad. I.:>IS - think the word refers to the place (a woman of Peparethus). Victorius suggests a piece of writing called the Peparethia; Cope proposes a trial, lawsuit (~IH7J). The context (a 33 - b S) strongly suggests I"woman" (peparethian woman), e.g., b 4: "Dodonis," or "the Dodonian woman," and b 3: "the mother." 98& 2-J M""",[, ... 1':/j'"lP Cpo Herodotus 6.68~. Mantias is most Iikdy the father mentioned in Demosthenes, Ag. Boeotus I; see also II. He is the father of Mantitheus duly recognized and registered as a citi2en of Athens. He also fathered (by another woman, Plangon) two SODS called Boeotus and Pamphilus; ultimatdy he was forced to acknowledge and register these as his own. This account is given in Or. XXXIX in which the son registered by Mantias as Mantitheus is a losing (c£ Or. XL) plaintiff against his halfbrother, Boeotus, who had registered himsdf apparently as a Mantitheus. Since it parallds in meaning TO;;TO at b 2 I take it together b 3 "'oU-ro with as the object of Wride.E••, functioning as a zeugma: "showed this in proclaiming her son to be the child of Ismenias."

,,16.

Ismenias and stilbon are probably the Thebans who were well known in Theban political life (IsmeDias was possibly boeotarch in J68; and both men represented Thebes at the Amphictyonic Council); see Xen., Hell. p.2S£[; CAR, VI 46, 64££; Buckler, pp. I35-37 and DU. 2S, 33. Ismenias was proclaimed the father. Dodona (the mother's birthplace?) is the site of a very ancient shrine of Zeus in the mountains of central Epirus.

& 3-4 'Icrp.'I"iou

On Theodectes c£ 97& 2-3. Prom the b 6 : 1 No....... -roil a.o&bc-rou statement here and at 99b I-4 it would seem that this "Law" was probably a speech of Theodectes and was possibly a statement concerning mercenaries employed by Athens, their serviceS, and the rdations between Athenian

310

AIUSTOTLB, 'ltHBTOIUC' II

citi7ens and mercenaries; cf. Baiter & Sauppe, II 247, frg. I. See 98a 33 : 1 for Riccobonl1s' interpretation of the argument here. Mercenaries, a common phenomenon in the fourth century B. c., when employed as a force integrated with citizen levies were valuable and responsible. As a mbstitute for citi2en troops they were a questionable factor, as might be expected ,ince apart !rom pay and possible booty their ties to the COllDtry which hired them were inexistent; Demosthenes, Phil. I 20-27 illustrates these points as does CAR, VI 57; and cpo Cope, pp. 2']6-77b 6-10 EI ........'"Ipl..v Ross alone encloses this in quotation marks as though it were a direct citation. He does the same with b II-I9 (Ode ••• ...

"oil.,). b H VrN~· i. the reading of the codd., Speugd, Cope, Tovar, Kassel; these edd. pllDctuate (as Thurnt, "Observations critiques [II]," 47) with a colon. Roemer reads the conjecture mggested by the scholiast as do Dufour, Ross; they PllDctu.te with a comma.

b 8-9 .ruxoUv ••• " .. I

"surely ifit is the same in all instances, then ... "

b 10 ·A:1.x,6ci(l."~ C£ 73b 18: I, PW; Radermacher, B.XXIl.I4, cites b 10-17 as that of Alcidamas. Baiter & Sal1ppe, II ISS, &g. 5, attributes it to a work of his which Stobaeus, Anth.logy (ed. Gaisford), III 459 (T.I20.3) call. Movu ••o•• a work whose title and contents are much argued. It is thought to be a collection, or golden trcasuty, of statements on varied topics; c£ Radermacher, B.XXII.I3, Cpo 000 I8/[ for a further comment on Alcidamas. I I : 1 ao
I>

b 12 •ApXv.oxov Born at Paws he probably lived ca. 75D-700 B.C. From his fragments it is clear that he was a prolific poet and also one known to antiquity for his bitter tougue, e.g., {Jildu'P"f/f-'OV (cp. Horace, AP 79), a quality he more or less acknowledges in !rg. 66 (Diehl & Beutler Ill). He is somewh.t notorious for the shield he tossed aside in battle to rl1D and fight another day, frg. 5B (cp. Horace, Odes 2.7.10) and for his ongoing conBict over Neobule with her father, Lyeambes; LTo PW, OCD.

98b 17

COMMENTARY

31I

b 13 : 1 1t.M'"!v Seven cities claimed Homer as their own, and the most favored is Chios, although A. here has Alcidamas denying that Chios is his home; see, however, Thucydides 3.104.5 where Homer remarks of himself: "blind the poet and he dwells in Chio., the rocky island." z Ellmpw C£ 67a 8. b 14 Xo...wll b 15 YEpciv......"

C£ 89b 4a partitive genitive: "one of their senators."

Kassel (Der Text, pp. 139£) alone of b 16 Du9I1YOPCLV ••• •AVCL!;CLYOPClV the edd. secludes Hal 'LTd.roTa. IIv6ayoeCD' following an observation of Thorot's ("Observations critiques [11]," 47). Kassd bases his reasons for seclusion on the structure of the sentence at b II-17 (II.Je ••• ... Hal m). The argument is reasonable and fOT me in the light of my regard fOT the articulation of A.' s sentences - see, for example 7tb 2 : Z - suasive. Pythagoras was born (ca. 570 B. c.) on the Aegean island of Samo., which he left ca. 531 for the Greek colony of Croton in South Italy. His life and wOTk are identified mosdy with Croton, from which he and his followers were banished most probably toward the end of the sixth century B. c. He went to Metapontum where he died. A remarkably original thinker who was both a theologian (e.g., his doctrine on the immortality of the soul) and "a founder of mathematical science and philosophical cosmology"; c£ OeD, PW, and Guthrie, Greek Philosophy, I 173-81. Anaxagoras (ca. 500 - ca. 428 B.C.), bom in Clazomenae, a city on the coast of Ionia, arrived ca. 480 in Athens, probably as a conscript of the invading Persian army. Here he taught philosophy and science and was both the teacher and close friend of Pericles. This friendship was partially the cause of his trial and exile (probably ca. 4]:'; there is the possibility of an earlier exile in the 4505) which brought him to Lampsacus. Socrates records (PhDedo 97b - 98e) his high hopes of and then disappointment with the Anangorean system. The edd., Spengd, Cope assume a lacuna befOTe BT.; b 17 : 1 ... aT' Ross reads, as does Victorius, "al in place of Bn from a good tradition; Kassd secludes b 17-20. In accepting the text the first thing to note is that we have here a new induction with three instances to prove something which is not stated at all and which was quite Iikdy: "wise men are the best political rulers." Secondly, I would also note that from the statement at b II (Bn ... n,..ro ....) the Bn at b 17 could well have been preceded and followed by a lacuna, e.g., "(and as X said) that (wise men are the best ruler.)." This statement was then proven by the three instances of Athens, etc. On the passage here see Vahlen, "Kritik d. Rheto.ik,n 557.

3I1.

ARISTOTLE, tRHBTORIC' II

• EO>.c.rJo~ C£ 7Sb 32 : z; as one of the earliest known specialists in the devdopment of Athens' constitution Solon made a major contribution to the wdfare of the state in his codification and publication of its laws. the legendary lawgiver of Sparta and the founder b 19 : 1 AUJ(..upyou of its constitution whose life Plutarch has given to us; C£ OCD, PW. He is well attested in ancient sources but his existence, whether we assign him to the traditional dates of the ninth or the seventh century B. c., i••tiII conteSted. 2 ciIL" ... ..o),~ "as soon as the leading men became philosophers the city then prospered." Victorius suggested, and in this he is followed by others, that the leaders were Epaminondas and Pdopidas. These men were the instruments and leaders of Thebes' moment of glory in 371-361 B.C. when she was the effective leader in Greece. The reference of Victorius is actually to Polybius 6.43 where, comparing the Roman Repnblic with the constitution. of some Greek stateS, P. remarks in part: "the fortunes of Thebes very obviously grew, reached their peak, and declined with the lives of Epaminondas and Pdopida.... The fact that A. may be referring to them is s1ighdy strengthened by his references in the topic which follows to others from the same fourth century B. C. On both men see OCD, PW. Theban history offers no other obvious candidate. apart from A:. mention (Pol. 1274" 31) of Philolaus of Corinth as the "lawgiver at Thebes." b 20 J(pID.... ~ This is the argument from authority, an argument for or against the point 1l1lder discussion based on the judgment of someone thought to be a secure soqrce for its truth or falseness. This topic is often called an extrinsic topic since it does not directly rdate to one's proposition; witnesses, laws, documents, exhibits are other examples of .uch. Intrinsic topics are those which are directly related (e.g., definition, parts, cause, etc.) since they are involved with an analysis of the terms and the cnherence of the propo.ition. An argument from authority is based on a witness (testis) who states/denies the truth of something (testimonium). What is stated may range from an acrual fact to a scientific or theoretical principle to a fact of religion, and the statement may be made on the witness' own knowledge (immediate) or on that derived from others (mediate). The witness' authority is determined by the fact that he knows and is truthful (scien, et verax). It is on this last point that our motive for giving consent rests. An argument from authority can be a source of certain knowledge. It should also be clear that this certitude can vary in accord with the capability and quality of the authority. Finally, a moment's reflection will reveal that there is no segment of human society from the most to the least learned which does not direct many of its actions on the acceptance of such authority. The topic can be found in Cic., D. inv. 1.30.48, Z.22.68; Auctor ad Herenn. 2.13.19, 2.30.48; QuinIili2n, 5.II.17-18, esp. 36-44; Apsines, Rhetores Gratci, IX 526; Minuclanus, Rhetor.. Graed, IX 6JI. In a

COMMENTARY

3I 3

more general form the topic is frequelldy wed by the orators when they call for wimesses, the reading of documents. For its we in argument ef. Demosthenes, On H.lonneSfIS 40. A.'s discussion of wi messes, A I5, 75b 26 -760 3:0, is generally to the point here. The judgment ("eta.,) is analyzed here b 20-25 ".pl ... &.&...."u>.o.~ fust in term, of what is judged: the "eta" employed as an argument may be about something that is the same as, or like to, or opposite to, the point we wish to establish. The analysis also considers those wha give the judgment: (x) all men always so judge (in the moral order this is practically the same as saying that the judgment is the sensus communis of man.lcind); understood here and with the nominatives to b 23 is the verb "eHQi"aa..; (2) most men; (3) all the learned; (4) most of the learned; (5) good men (ef. A 6, 63a 17-I9); (6) the judges themsdves, i.e., those about to give judgment on the point under discussion whose past judgments on the matter are favorable to it; (7) those whose judgment these judges accept; (8) those whose judgment cannot be overruled, e.g., those in authority; (9) those whose judgments it is unseemly to overrule, e.g., the gods, one's father, one's teachers. is the reading and punctuation of b 22--23 ij cmop ",,0 All the edd. read lv""da save Ross who conjectures the singular. All the codd. and most of the edd. read wanee TO. Bywater ("Aristotelia V'') suggested wa"ee iJ on a paralld with oxb I5 (010' 8 U,.e,),xoa I7-I8 ("al 8 ... eln••), and it is read by Ross, Kassd. I prefer the Bywater reading. Reading TO makes the whole phrase the object of the verb (ef. S. U53): '1ike the statement Autodes made to Mixidemides." b 26 : I M'~'&'1p.I&'1v ... Au""o""ij~ There is an Athenian, Meixidemides (as Kassd spells the name), who is known, at least by name, from a lost (and possibly not genuine) speech ofLysias dating ca. 393; see PW. Autokles is better known (ef. Cope, p. 265). Xenophon, Hellenica 6.3.2, 7--9 mentions him as one of the embassy to Sparta in 37X (before Leuctra) and gives us his words to those gathered at Sparta. In 368/367 in command of a squadron of 30 ships he was sent to the aid of Alexander of pherae (Diodoms Siculus 15.7I.3-4) and later in 362/36I took over from Ergophilus (see Bob II and Demosthenes, Ag. Aristocr.us I04). Autedes himsdf was later prosecuted as Demosthenes says (For Phormio 53); ef. PW. 2 et seduded by Ross alone. With the punctuation given by the ede!., Cope's suggestion (p. 264) is hdpful, i.e., understand 6...,", .lvat: " ... Autodes said that it is frightful that [sI: S. 22471 it was all right for the Dread Goddesses to stand trial before the Areopagus but not for Meixidemi-

314

AIUSTOTLB. IRHETORIC' II

98b

32.

des." The reference is to the Brinyes who willingly entrusted the just decision of their case against Orestes to the Court of the Areopagus in Athens, as the story is told by Aeschylus in his Oresteia presented in 458. Apparendy Meixidemides would not acknowledge the jurisdiction of the court in his own case even though the goddesses had judged its authoriry valid. b 28 E ..mp" C£ 98b 13 : 2; again the .rgoruent is from a judgment of the gods; o£ Lobel & Page, p. lOS, ttg. 20!. C£ Rhelores Gra«i. VII II53 where £Om this example Gregory of Corinth (on whom see the note to frg. 201 in Lobel & Page) exemplifies what he calls an epenthymesis. i.e., a confinning argument added to an enthymeme. ·Apl ....'1mO~ ... Ina.....".. On Aristippus c£ OCD. PW. Guthrie. Greek Philosophy. III 49D-99. He came £Om Cyrene to be a pupil of Socrates. Somewhat older than Plato. he taught as a Sophist with some success and is the likely founder of the Cyrenaic school of philosophy. From what we know ofhis own comments it is somewhat strange that he shollid rebuke Plato with speaking "rather professorially"; c£ Mannebach. frg. 104. Cope. p. 266. discusses the matter.

b 30

b 31-32 AUde •.. Ewxpa'"IY Cope, Tovar. Ross. Kassel punctuate with quotation marks around "cillO. ... ",,,,wv," "ovBb 't'olo6To,,"; Kassel reads o.d •• and with Ross the accusative in TJ for Socrates' name. If the quotation marks are read, a verb of "saying" is understood with the quotation. In this example the argument is on the authoriry of a teacher.

imJp......

b 32-33 •AY'lar"oA,•... Cope. Spengel. all the edd. except -Roemer read Agesipolis from a good tradition; the verb. also from a good tradition. is read by Cope. Kassel. There seems small doubt that this is Agesipolis of Sparta (son of King Pausanias) who later became king (ca. 394); c£ PW. Xenophon (Hel/enita 4.P) tells this story of his visit to both shrines before he invaded Argos ill 387 B.C. (0£ CAR. VI 52). As Xenophon notes. this was an effort to neutralize the Spartan rear prior to the planned campaign against Thebes and Athens in the Corinthian War (395/394-387/386). The rea.wn for the precautionary double visit according to Xenophon was the Argive habit of declaring a festival orod so a lime of In,a when threatened with an invasion from Sparta. Cope (p. 267) gives an account of the text problem as known at the time. Kassel (Der Text, pp. 141-42) presents us with a detailed corrected account of the history in which we discover that Agesipolis was a reading found in the tradition and that Hegesippus was probably the mistake of a Byzantine copyist. In his account Xenophon uses the form ""'TJeWTa. and Kassel offers evidence (p. 142nS8) in support of it as the term used to consult an oracle. In this example the argument is on the authoriry of a father.

99a 7

COMMBNTAllY

99a I c:.~ ...•bt.iv his father"; S. 2086.

3IS

"implying that it would be shameful to contradict

a 2 'IlJoxp«"t'l~ The passages referred to are Helen 18-22 for Helen; 41-48 for Alexander; Evagoras 51-52 for Evagoras. Cpo our lines with 63a 11-19·

a 3 Ov

Ross alone reads 6n.

a 5 KcIv_ a distinguished Athenian naval commander, ca. 444-392 B.C. He fought in the Peloponnesian War and was helpful in the rc:-establishment of Athens after her defeat; c£ PW, OCD, CAE, V-VI passim. On his flight to Evagoras in 404 see Xenophon, Hell. 2.1.29. Ross alone punctuates .. K67.,. ... illO.,."; I would not assume a citation though four of the words in a S-6 appear in Evogoras S2. a 6 ,.tp_ ... "to"'lCoi~ From the statement of thi. topic A. is speaking of "parts" in tenns of genus and species, and the kinds of inference made possible by this topic are seen at Top. lIla 33 - Iub I I (the likely reference in To,.,,,oi,; cpo T2.Ib 2.4 - I2.3a 19; I27a 20 - u8b 10). This topic is closely related to the triad at 98a 15-33, and the notes to those topics indicate some of the possible, varied lines of inference. In the example from Theodectes we see one line: if contempt for the divine (genus implied) can be predicated of Socrates, then the profanation of some house of the gods (or) failure to reverence the gods recognized by the State (species) can be said of him. Since the latter cannot be said ofhim neither can the former. For such an argoment to be valid you should know all the "parts," as Quintilian (5.10.67) notes. If one is omitted, the statement can be challenged and dismissed. For example (e.g., Cope, p. 268), the "parts" of ,,1"'1"" are four in the De anima and six in the Caregories. Quintilian, 5.10.63££, discusses "parts" as we find it here; Cicero does not, confining himself to the topic of definition (for the references see the end of 9Sa IS). a 7 "0(,. ..• ilS. Cpo Top. I27b 13-17. For A. the soul is the first actuality (ivnUx.,a) of the body, the form which actuates the body (matter); in the union a living being is constituted, whose formal cause is the soul. The problem of the soul and movement (Is it movement? If so, what kind? etc.) is reviewed in chap•. 2 and 3 of the first book of the De anima. Guthrie, Greek Philosophy, VI 277-330 olfers a survey of the psyche in A. a 7-8 tIC ••. eE06t.."tOu "Socrates" is apparently the title of an apologia by Theodectes (on whom see 97b 2-3, Guthrie, Greek Philosophy, IV 73). We have a number of ,uch defenses among which the Apology of plato and th~t ofXenophon are the most well-known.

31 6

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

99-0 13

a 8-9 ".t~ ... "o"U;.," Cope and the edd. punctuate with quotation marIa; cf. Baiter & Sauppe, II 247, frg. 3. Plato, Apol. 26b, Xenophon, Apol. II mention Meletus' ebarge against Socrates of disbelief in the gods of the city; c£ Memorabilia 1.1.2, 20; 98a 15-17; Cope, p. 255. See also r I9a 8-12 and Cope, III 212. a 10-13 au.o~ ..• ojIoIy.,,, This thirteenth topic on consequents is closely related to the fourteenth. Topic 13, in A.'s words, is valuable as a source of inference in all three kinds of rhetorical discourse (e.g., a 12--13, cpo S8b &-29). But he confines topic 14 to deliberative discourse (a 1&-19: 6Ta•.•. d~, and see d7lPJyoes" a 22, 24). Another dilference between the two is that 13 speaks of things whieb are simple and unqualified, anyone of whieb can usually be found to have opposed (good or bad) consequents, e.g., education, running, courage, justice, etc. In 14 we start with two opposed things, each of whieb has two consequents whieb are themselves opposed to caeb other: e.g.,

anteadenl: to speak justly

- consequents: loved by gods I hated by men

t

t

t

vs. anlecedent: to speak unjustly - consequents: loved by men I hated by gods.

Top. '1I3b IS, II4a 25, 1I73 5-15 describe the character of argllDlCnt from consequents well. At 62a 29 - 62b 9 A. uses the argument in establishing what things are "a good." Cicero in his treatment of the topic (Topics 12.5354) speaks of consequents (also antecedents, contradictories) where the relation of the consequent to its antecedent is a necessary one. This is not 50 in our present topic. Quintilian, 5-10.74-'77 speaks of two kinds: consequenlia t
10 : J

z

bl ... ftldu"Cwv "in most instances." ~'"'. C£ 201Ia, 2271; for other examples, see Cope, p. 271.

s.

a II h ...e..,... .bcoAoue........... ~ We have seen these two concepts at 62a 29 : 2, and cpo 63b 30 : z. Obviously Cope'. interpretation cited at 62a 29 : z would clearly have to be qualified in this topic where the cons&quent is nol seen as "invariable or necessary." From their use here (and at 62. 29, 63b 16, 28) the two words are in fact quite similar in meaning. a 12-13 npo,, a suggestion of Richards, p. 1I0. tion marIa; he also reads at. 14 This excerpt is from Euripides, Medea 294-297; C£ 9~ 29-30. In th~ example

"a"••

COM.MENTAllY

31 7

the two consequents, one good, one bad, arc expressed in the artirular infinitives. Gloon argues from consequents against pardon for the Mytilenians at Thucydides 3.39.1-8, as Diodotos does for their pardon at 3.46.1-4 (Spenge!, p. 316); cpo Demosthenes, Ag. Aristocrates 2. a 17

Ka1.Abmou

An Athenian from Lamptrai and a pupil of Isocrates

(AnIiJosis 93), he is mentioned again, ooa5. There is no reason to think that a work of his on rhetoric is not intended (cf. Radermacher, B.XXIX.I-5) which contained this topic together with (Tdlla, cb, .re'rr:a,), i.e., the elements common to all discourse set forth in B 19: pos.ible-impossible, pastfuture, more-less.

a 18 cllAo~, a...1lY ht Roemer the printed text of this topic leavessomething to be desired: slllrting back at a 15 the lineation is olf, a quotation is started at a U and not ended, and there i. a misprint ata25 (!"M>!eOV"'.). In this topic we start with antecedents which are opposed (Ta.a....ta, a 21) and so the consequents in tum arc opposed (d...."'"I'.......). So we £ind in A.'s example that a double opposition is found in the consequents: hate-love, gods-men. d...." ...l'wo .. = opposed, contrary, and not the more technical sense: contradictory; cpo 68a 8. On the kinds of oppnsition, 92& 1)-11, 97& 7 : 2. See Top. II3b 15 - II4& 25. a 19 6in, IC,d ...ij> "ahead by all the caddo is secluded by Spengel, Tovar, Ross, Kassel. Reading it we bave: Hal (Mn) ... xe;j,,6a.; see next note. a 20 : 1 ...pOmp ... ~1"fI0iv The reference is to the method described in the preceding topic at a 13-16. Kassel reads TO"'P with Radermacher (B.XXIX.3). al'!".'. = the two opposites: "and must use in the case ofboth the method just mentioned." 2 be.; $C. topic 13 (99a loll:).

This difference was explained at 99a 11>-13. a 2.1 ""XOv........ -MVIIV... I.. On TVXO.Ta cf. 66a 31 : I, 67b 6: "any two things." a 22-2.5 ."" ... tlv8p,"",o, Sponge!, Cope, Dufour, Kassd read without quotation marks. Ro.. uses them, Tovar uses them at a 22.-23 (la•. .. 6e.L) and, as noted (99& 18), Roemer's text is awry. On this example see Rlreto,es e,a.ci, VII IlS3, where it is cited as an example of." epenthymesis, i.e., the strengthening of an enthymerne by a corroborative argument (see 9IIb 28). There is a further illustration of what A. is saying in Euripides, The Phoenician Women 954-958, and in Auct. ad Here"". 2..24.38. a 2.6 'I"ij> ••• n..~ The "saying" is a proverb ("to buy the marsh along with the salt") whose provenance is unknown; cf. Leutsch & Schneidewin, I 409. Its meaning, I should say, is rather clear in itself (sometimes to have a

31 8

AllISTOTLB, 'RBETOIue t II

99a 30

good you must take the bad), and in the context, i.e., in the sitwttion as given, you are damned if you do and damned if you don't. In either sitwttion given at a 22r-25 (im. ... &.6e"".'), the good has an admixture of the bad. a 27 (nco,....... " Cope, pp. 273--"74, explains well the problem with this term as well as its possible meanings and the general lack of understanding

on the part of the commentators of its meaning here. The root idea in the word is: crooked, twisted, bent, curved. Its form here appears to be a unique instance in A. who explains it in the words which follow: a blaisosis occurs "when good and bad follow as comequents upon each of two opposites, each of the two consequents opposite respectively to each other." As I understand this, it means (cf. 99a 10-13): (I) two opposites: speak justly I unjustly (2) good/bad consequents of: speak justly: loved by gods I hated by men good/bad consequents of: speak 1lJljusdy: loved by men I hated by gods (3) each of the two consequents opposite respectively to each other: { loved by gods I hated by gods loved by men I hared by men. In fact in this sense the term seems to have the meaning found in LS: to retort a dilemma. Put in form, the dilemma would be: If I speak justly, I will be loved by the gods; if unjustly, I will be loved by men. So I will speak either justly or unjustly. Therefore I will be loved either by the gods or men. The retort: If you speak justly, you will be hated by men; if unjustly, you will be hared by the gods. So speak either justly or unjustly for in either case you will be hated eitheJ: by men or the gods. a 29 1iAM~ ••.
99a 3S

COMMBNTAlty

319

a 32 cruvoiyc'" O.....pov Le., from these opposing views (h< T06T.,.) try to establish one or the other. The Socratic dialogues of Plato frequendy illustrate this divided viewpoint in the persons questioned by Socrates. Go,gias 455-460 is as good an inStance as any. Gorgias' professed opinion is seen at 455 (rhetoric effects a persuasion which produces belief but not knowledge). At 460 we find his private view (rhetoric eH"ects a persuasion grounded in knowledge). "This is the mOlt effective topic for produca 32-33 TW. yollp .•• l .....v ing paradoxes"; see SE r73a 4-6. 99a 29; on "
!J8a 1']-22.

a 35 ).E.-.aupy.iv The liturgies were public duties performed by individuals for the State in Athens. Among the more commonly known were the trierarchy (the maintenance and repair and command for a year of a

32.0

AlllSTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

trireme for the Athenian Beet) and the Choregia (responsibility for the major costs of a production of a dramatic presentation. e.g.• tragic. comic. offered at the major festivals). These obligations were imposed by the State on the wealthier citizens and metics. and served as a fonn of taxation; c£ OCD. PW. Alh. Pol. 57.3-4.

a 35 - 99b I at ..oU~ .•. Ij>7J'P.oilv...... C£ Baiter III Sauppe. II 219. Erg. 5. Ross alone reads a comma for the period. The future may represent a simple future; more likdy it stands for a fonn of command (S. 1917): "they must resolve that...." C£ glib 6:

1.

b 2-4 k. ""oA("~ ... &"'''EnP''Yl'tvou~;''

The quotation marks are read by the edd. with the exception of Kassd. Spengd. Cope. On the statement. see Baiter III Sauppe. II "'47. frg. 2.. b 2-3 Eoopcip..x ..... X"p(&7J1'OV Charidemus is the centerpiece of Demosthenes. Ag. Aristocrates; c£ 23. 65. 89 (mention of the citizenship given). 145. 188 (golden crown bestowed on him). 185. the tide ..Bey• ...,' (hencfactor). c£ also Athenaeus 10.436b-c (ed. Kaibd). CAR. VI 2OOff. and p .... sim. OCD. PW (5). Dernosthenes. Ag. uplin.. 84 mentions Strabax. b 3 b",dxE'''V We bave seen the word at S6a II : 3. 73a 18. The likdy meaning here is: "because of their merits."

76a 28 : 2.

Ross alone conjectures ",o,7j"B"OB. Since 'P"Ya~a, indicates b 4 "O.'ij .....E here those sent into exile. it implies that they are citizens (cp. Pol. I2.7sa 19b). and so I would interpret: "will you not make exiles of those among the mercenaries (who bave been given citizenship and) who bave wrought irreparable damage." The statement of this topic 17 is elliptical. b 5-
!"e

COMMENTARY

32I

is understandable. However, I am not certain that the topic is fully grasped in the translations and interpretations given. In the first place, A.'s first example is different from the other three. Antecedents (as the topic proposes) are the same if the consequent is the same when there is a necessary relation between the antecedents and the consequent as there is in the Xeoophanes example. The antecedents (the gods come into existence; the gods die) are equal because they necessarily entail the consequeet, e.g., at some time the gods do not exist. But in the other three examples this is not so, and that would seem to be the reason why A. tells us in that odd commeot at b !r-IO "in general assume that the consequeet of each thing is always the same." So it is that in the other three examples in some instances but by no means in all the antecedeots may eotail the consequeot in each case, i.e. (a) a challeoge of the need for pbilosophy, (b) an acceptance of slavery, (e) a submission to the commands of another. The Isocrates example can serve to exemplify the other two. If one assumes that the constant consequeot (0£ b 9-IO) of an act ofmaking a judgment on Isocrates is to question the worth of philosophy, one could defend any attack on him (his method of teaching, his writings, his failure in civic duty) as an attack: on philosophy and therefore unjust. Thus one has the option (C£ b I3-I4) of presenting any attack on him as unjust or accepting some as such and others as not.

b 6 :;;:£vatpci"'1~ I 3601f.

b 7-9 8...,

al'-olw~.

a dative governed by

b9:

'/7& I9 : 2, PW, OCD, Guthrie, Greek Philosophy, ..

.,..t..,.

7<0....

Diels & Kranz, 21 A 12.

T." ... Ul'.vaw

1 "CIt ..• 50! 63&7: 1. z oixoi.....ou the .teading of all except Cope, Freese who read: v•

·",,"fie·

b!r-IO "CIt 3Mo1~ ••• lid This statement in the light of the instances given in this topic would appear· to mean that while an antecedent may have other consequents we are to assume in general (cU.., ... A",.Pd•••• ) that one given consequeet is the same in all cases. Thus we accept that passing judgment on the worth of philosophy is the regular consequent of judging Isocrates, or slavery as the regular consequent of offering tokens of earth and water, etc., just as in the first instance we necessarily acknowledged that deoying the existence of the gods is the consequent of asserting temporality of them.

Rad by all the edd., it represeots a conjecture of b 10 'I..o"pci......~ Speogd's (0£ pp. 320-22) for E."'eaT•• , of all the codd. While "Socrates" does make sease, a reading of !socrates' Antidruis I73-I75 as Speogd notes

322

AllISTOTI.E, 'RHETORIC' II

makes his conjecture more than reasonable. Spenge! also notes as comparable parallels to lsocrates' statement, Andocides, On the Mysteries 103-105 and Dernosthenes, On the False Embassy 229-233. b II-I:> XCll II...... i ....!v ~t1Tl. is read by Cope, Ross, Kassd, and bracketed by Spengd and the other edd.: "And to state that to give earth and water is to act the slave.... " On the idea of total submission in the act see Herodotus, 5.17.18; for other references see Cope, p. 278. b 13 dp~'l~ In late 338 B.C. (after Cbaeroneia) Philip formalizcd his re-c:stablished rdations with the Greek states by creating at Corinth the League of Greek States (CAR, VI 266ft:). All except Sparta participated. On Philip's death in 336 and the growing break-up of the League, Alexander moved quickly in late summer to re-establish the League under Macedonian control with himsdf replacing philip as general of the League. The commonly accepted date for this "common peace" is 336 B.C. If the remark: of the scholiast Anonyrnus, who refers to Philip, is accepted, then ca. 338/337 seems a probable date (c£ Cope, I.trod., pp. 36-49). Anonyrnus also notes, however, is Demosthenes'. This does not that the remark at b 12-13 (TO make 338/337 improbable, for it could be a remark: ofhis for which we have no evidence. There is, however, a speech attributed to Dernosthenes, O. the Treaty "itb Alexantler, which is dated ca. 335. This mentions explicitly "o•...j eleoi"'l (30, 17-18; and cpo la-II); and so the acceptance of the 336 date. The speech is an attack: on Alexander, and it is accepted as a work: not of Demosthenes but of Hypereides (389-332 B.C.) or of one of the party of Bernosthenes. The question of the actual date, I would say, remains a question.

pgr,,,......)

b 14 1m6...pov See 99b 5-6. In terms of the explanation there one could argue that the criticism of Isocrates' writings is equally unjust as a criticism of the man himsdf since in each case one is questioning the value of philosophy. Or the opposite can be argued: namdy, that such a criticism is not at all unjust because in no way does it implicate the value of philosophy. The example (b 16-19) illustrates b 14-15 : 1 cD.M>~ ••. civ""d.y well the way in which this topic can raise challenging questions and strikingly sharpen the issue when persons are questioning or are in doubt ahout a former decision they have taken. As instances of this topic Spengd mentions Deinarchus, Ag. Demosthenes 81-82, Thucydides 3.56.6-7 with 5702. a ... lx "gij 1'1) "...:.,,;, ciEl "(another topic is derived) from the fact that people do not always make the same choice." This is the reading of all the edd., Spengel. Cope, Freese read with a good tradition and the scholiast, Anonyrnus: en TO;; p~ TIZ1lTO ...o1l~ av...ov~ dB!.

COMMENTARY

323

b IS : 1 1\ the reading of the edd., Spengel, Cope. The meaning is "as"; cf. LS, B. Cope, p. 279, is not happy with this interpretation of the word, and Richards (p. III) rejects it for "al which Ross reads. 2 "'~"'1".. Victorius (p. 414) interprets this in the way in which we find it in Cicero and later rhetoricians. His comment is-that here A. calls the ent:hymemc not an inrperfect syllogism but an argument drawn from contraries (sententiam ex conlTariis conelusam), the way in which many rhetoricians C'magistri dicendi') usually understood the term. On this interpretation of the enthymeme see Cicero, Top. 13.55, 14.56. More reccndy, Conley, "Enthymeme in Perspective," 175ff., views this interpretation with some favor. Without dismissing the interpretations of later rhetoricians I fail to see how they, inJIucnced as they so obviously are by Anamenes (once thonght to be Anstode) and by each other, can help to specify the term in A., who clearly calls it the syllogism of rhetoric; c£ Studies, pp. 74-'75, 77-'78, 80-81, and cpo Cope, pp. 279-80, c£ cob 35-38.

b 16-17 "d ... "1lJ(..

,,.e....

Tovar, Ross, Kassel among the edd. along with Cope use the quotation marks. Quite possibly this is correct since it reads like an adaptation to the enthymeme form of a statement by Lysias in Against the S~bversion of the Ancestral Constitution of Alhens 11. Lysias' statement starts with the words "For it would be strange, men of Athens, if, when we. . .. These words arc understood in most interpretations of b 1617, e.g. (Roberts): "when we were exiles, we fought in order to return; now we have returned, it would be strange to choose exile in order not to have to fight." Dionysius of Halicarnassus in his critical essay Lynas at #33 preserves Lysias' speech for us (cf. 31). At 32 Dionysius gives us the occasion of this speech written as he says for a well-known statesman and probably not ddivcred. The year was 403 B,C., and dre occasion had to do with the return of the democrats to Athens from the Peiraeus. The return was arranged by the Spartan king, Pausanias, but only after an armed conllict with them (b 16: (~l'o,~s, i"a%o"s8a); cf. CAR, V 371-'75, esp. 373. On this matter Cope, pp. 280-8 I, is quite exercised at what he call, A.'s "haste and carelessness in writing." Unfortunately his reasons (p. 281) for the comment arc to me not convincing. There is no need for A. in exemplifying this topic to say anything more than he docs; sec following note. Planudes, Rheto,.s Gratci, V 406, cites b 16-17 as an illustration of topic 23 at oca 23-29 (Spengd, p. 323).

"t.

b 17-19 0... "'" ... "",,,tV AlI the edd., Spenge!, Cope agree on this reading given by all the codd. Spcngel (p. 324) has problems with A.' s Greek, which he explains at some length, as docs Cope (p. 280); Kassel in his apparatus gives some conjectured possibilities for the Greek. The Greek. of the codd. seems to be quite reasonable. In the first place A. at b 16-17 echoes (with the exception of the mention of the Lacedaemonians) the statement of

32 4

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

Lysias at 33.n; as for the omissiou of Lysia.' d....o. ycle Ii• • r'l, cf. 98b 26 (as Kas.el notes). Secondly, the explanation at b 17-19 corresponds exacdy with the example given, e.g., (I) b 16:.1 ep.vYOVT., . .• "aTi),Ow/J" is explained by aTi /Js, ... neO;;VTO (b 17-IS): "for at one time they chose their homeland (TO /Jiv ....) at the price of fighting"; (2) b 17: ""T••OO ....., ••• /J"x"'/J.Oa is explained by aT•.•• /J1I /Jiv ... (b 18-19): "but at another they chose not to fight at the price of leaving their homeland" (TO;; JJ1! /JI.••••). One possible discrepancy which i. of no significance in terms of what is meant would be that TO /Jiv ... •.. iieOVvTO (b 17-18) answers to "ad),Ow/JtnI (b 16). b 19-20 oi),AoS •.. yoy.,.ij"eClL literally: "another topic is to say that the reason why [TO oJ b ...a] something might be or might have come to be is the actual reason [TO.TO~ ' ••"a] for ... " We can simplify this without changing its meaning by translating: "Another topic is to say that the possible reason for a thing's existence or its having come into existence is the actual reason." All the edd. concur on the reading of the Greek text, as do Spengel and Freese. However, Cope reads at b 19: &••r7j, .1 /J1I yivo'To, TO.TO~ ••• , which is the reading of all the codd. and the scholiast Stephanus. Our reading 4• • r'lll ,/ivO'TO is hinted at by the scholiast Anonymus and can be seen in the comntent of Maximus Planudes atRhetores Gram, V 406 and in codex C. Cope, pp. 28I£, presents a more detailed discussion of both readings in which he leans toward our reading. The topic itself in my understanding is not to make an "inference from the possible to the real motive" as Cope following Brandis says (p. 281) but rather to infer a possible motive for an action and assert it as the real motive; sec, for example, b 28-30, r IS, 16b 9-IS. A. is not necessarily urging this course of argument. Rather he is calling attention (0 the possibility of this kind of argumentation.

On the use of 11." which Ross alone secludes, sec b 20 orov d &0['1) civ Goodwin, pp. 458, 506; Cope, II 331>-40. ~"'. eI = as i£ b 20-21 orov •.. l.uml"ll Victorius cites as an example Horace, Epp. 1.I8.31-36. In this· and the following examples at b 22-29 a possible motive for the action is asserted as the real motive: e.g., b :u: to cause pain; b 24: to make the misfortunes of men more obvious, etc. b 22-24 ..cIllo.~ ... m"PClV€....tpCls Cpo Caesar, The Galli, W or I. 14 (Victorius). At b 22 all the codd., Ross, Kas.el, Spongel, Cope read epeew, for epesv6iv (Schneidewin) read by the other edd. Our lines (also reading epe ••ai.) arc found in Nanck & Sncll, AJespo/4 82 (p. 8SS) but we do not know the author. b 25

MdEciypau ..eN·Av.."P""'''os

C£ 79b IS,

8sa 9 : 2, "b 19-20.

b 26-27 06x ... 'EUci&CI The fragment can be found in Nanck & Sncll, Antiphon 2, p. 792. The scholiast Anonymus say. by way of .explana-

COM.MBNTARY

tion that Antiphon wrote that eminent men of Aetolia came to King Oeoeus, father of Meleager, not to kill the Calydonian boar but to see Me!eager do it and so give public witness to his act. Ross reads .. ~ for

r....

b 28-29 AI..v..o~ ••• cbcoAOU8iiN On Theodectes cf. 97b 2-3, 98b 6 : 1. This play and this incident are mentioned again at ooa 28-29 and the incident alone at r IS, 16b 12-15. A citation of our lines as a fragment of Theodectes is found in Nauck & Shell, p. 801. For an explanation of the possible context of the citation cf. Cope, p. 283. b 30

w3tx ......,... mllijera,

C£ my comment at the end of 99b I!)-20.

b 31-32 cillo~ •.• oup.(!oul.eUOUC,. This 20th topic, whilemadespecific to deliberation and forensic rhetoric, needs but a moment's thought to make clear its usefulness and applicability to epideictic rhetoric as well, paa Spenge!, p. 325, and cf. 98a 3-4- A reading ofA 9 quickly makes this clear, and see 67b 36 - 68a 9. At 67b 36 A. remarks that "epideictic and deliberative rhetoric have a common nature." On this topic A 10, II, 12. on hwnan actions and A 6, 7 on the nature of the good and the greater good merit a casual review for an understanding of why men act. Cope, pp. 284-85, offers a running comment on the topic.

b 31 rcpoTP€7CCW"'C'U. •.. ci.7COTP€mN'rCl. Le., "inducements," udeterrents," to action, as cD" b87«J (b 32) denotes "reasons," llmotives," for acti.on/non-

action. b 32-34 '
",pel""".....

r"6T,, apparently refers back to rei

neoTein.n" ... eli. Iv.,." and forward to d"""rd. "d.; & is the object of "'ean... ... ,..q nearn... What A. means to say is reflected in the common interpretations, e.g. (Roberts): "These are the conditiODS which make us bound to act if they are for us...." However, this is not the Greek. To construe the Grode it helps to interpret ~"'dex." as "belong to, fall to" (LS, B.llI) and so "be on hand to (us)," "? be favorable to": ''For these are the conditions which, if favorable to us, one must actuate (i.e., one must act); if unfavorable, one must not actuate.' The necessity in d.;; is moral, not physical. b 33-34 <~clr....... "pci'<'1: ..... > This clause does not appear in any of the major codd. but is found in a later codex, and is read by all the edd., Spengd; Ross, Cope alone· read without the angle brackell. b 3S xa... m.~..;P.'DV ii, tAli.......... "and if the act is liable to punishment, the punishment being less than what is achieved." This is the reading whiclr Victorius co,yectured. It is read by Kasse!. The other edd. and Spengel read "a. 11 in.I;'>I,.•••, el (el is a conjecture of Spengd's, p. 326). Kassel referring to .r.. el (b 34) dismisses .1. As should be clear from my inter-

32 6

AllISTOTLB, 'RH1lTORIC' II

ooa7

protation above I can see no need at all for.1. All the codd. read "al h .. C~­ ,..'0•• ij 'Un",. which Cope accepts (as does Freese). On p. 284 Cope olfers an interpretation of his reading. The point here appears to be that which we met at A u. 72a 36 - 72.b I. 72a 4-9. For our passage at b 34-36 is speaking ofinducements to action. and as we see at the A I2 passages. any action whose reward is greater than whatever punishment it may bring is an inducement. a motive: for action, not a deterrent. b 36 ,.P.tYI'-""0S.

Ross alone punctuates with • comma.

Kassd secludes this and b 36 - ooa I XlIl "PO..pt,..."..CI' •.• atCIV..1co>v Ross secludes a'. 1q!OTeinoVTa, = "they urge men to action."

refers back to the motives/reasons for ooa I-2 be &~ .....aU....." acting or not acting. And so. "on these same grounds men prosecute or defend." He explains his meaning at a ~ ('" ,..i• ... "a""IY0eOva,.): those things which are deterrents to action offer material for defense. those which are inducements to action do the same for prosecution. This is the reading of Spengd. Cope, Ross. a 4 XCI.....yopOU."v. la.., Kassd (and Freese). Roemer. Dufour. Tovar read with cod. A "a"ll'0eovalV. anoAoyoiiv..a, ,..•• followed by a lacuna. Kassd. Der Text. p. I42. notes that ,..h is not in cod. A and that anoA0l'0v...a, is a mistaken repetition /rom the previous line. Kassd alone conjectures <7j> TBV'1 (c£ a 4-S la-., ... KtU.A1,.,."". end of this comment) and refers to oob I6 (IS in his text). On Callippus c£ 99& I7. Pamphilus is not known; see. e.g.• ?Cicero, De oral. 3.21.81. Whether Quintilian 3.6.34 refers to the same Pamphilus is questionable. Radermacher is uncertain (p. I92) that they are the same; Cope is not (p. 28S). On themeaning of A:s words, Radermacher, B.XXIX.4 (p. I92) argues against Spengd (p. 317), as we saw at 99ar7, believing that there is good reason to think that a work on rhetoric is intended. a 6-7 ilAos... 1jv The text here and in what follows to a IO is interpreted in different ways. E.g., how do we translate do"ou....,. here ("are thought to." "appear to")? Is On causal (because), or does it introduce an indirect statement (e.g., Cope's "you argue, namdy. that." p. 286)? Each of these is possible. I would construe the passage in this way: "Another topic is derived &om things which on the one hand are reputea 10 olXur but on the other are unbdievable because men would not have conceived of their occurrence if they had not happened or almost happened:' a ']-8 XCll a.., ... ,:,,,oAIII'-P.tV""O'v "And [one argues] that this is all the more so" - ("this," namdy. ov" d1' laoE .... i.e.. men would not have thought of these instances which are unbelievable) - "since the fa.ct is that

ooa

12

COMMENTARY

P7

men affirm the existence of those things which either are or arc probable." At the moment we arc at the stage that the fact that these unbelievable things are the object of men's thought makes them either real (truly existing) or probable. In shott. man's mind affirms the true (i.e.. that which is) or the probable (i.e.• that which for the most pan is or can be). This principle is the foundation for the following statement. a 8-10 doW... oG-rc..~

"Consequently. if the thing is unbelievable and not probable. it would really exist. For one does not think of it as one does r.IJTal,] because it is probable and plausible." If the human mind affirms either (a 8) Td6'....a (real entities) or Ta .....n.. (probabilities). and the matter at issue is clearly not TO (in fact. it is ","'aT.v. a 7). then it is real. TO 11•• The argument is: men affirm either that which actually is or that which is probable; but men affirm this thing which is improbable; therefore they are affirming this thing as something which actually is.

sI".,

a 10 • A,,6poXAij~ ... & nL.. 8.u~ On Andracles. cf. PW (4). CAR. V 286.291. 321. 326. Thucydides. 8.65. Cope. p. 287. A demagogue and prom-

inent member of the democratic party living in the latter pan of the fifth century. he was a firm opponent of Alcibiades (eE Plutarch. AldbiaJe, 19) whose banishment he helped to bting about and whose rctUm to Athens in 4II he opposed, only to be assassinared himsdf by the oligarchs. Pithos is a deme in Attica. eE Eliot. On a ID-13 (.r••.. . cpo Baircr & Sauppe. II 153-54. and denlCllt of Alexandria. Stromtlki. r .8.41.4. who in another ·context circs the words almost verbatim.

cU.,)

a

I2.-IS "&eovTIII. ... G.cxLou" Punctuation varies here. Roemer, Dufour, Tovar, Ross make this one citation, e.g., "diona, . .. elalov"; Kassel breaks it up into three (" dJ ......., ... a,Oe0o,aovT.,." """I ... IXOv., ""al Ta ... a-ri,.."",Aa iAalo~"). and Cope into two rdto....a' ... a'.e0rb-

cU.,."

a......' ... "" ..I,,1ie .. . lAatoo"). On setting apan the first citation I would agree with Cope. Kassel. and I would accept Kassd's pWlctuation. a II 180",,{3'10""" i.e.• the members of the Assembly in Athens were creating an uproar and disturbance over his starcment on the law in • ca.e whose issllC indicarcs that it was a matIcr for deliberative rhetoric. and therefore the Assembly. a 12 6'.p8c:.O"OV... ~

i.e.• " for the purpose of amending. correcting"

(5. 2065; cf. 2060). a 12-13 "xlll ymp ••• 1t."J.D~" Androcles' argument to confirm hi. statement on the law is the fact that fish need salt - for example. to preserve them after they have been caught.

328

ARISTOTLE, ·'RHETORIC' II

ooa 21

a 13-14 XClI...o, ... &>.O~

This is A.'s explanation relating the example to the topic: namdy, that it is neither probable nor credible (cp. i'm/aT,,', a 7; fb"'rTOV "ai pi} .1"tI~. a 9) that creatures whose environment is the brine (aAp1J) need salt.

a 14 "XCIi. 'fa: ... D..cdou"· Kcd~OL. • • In "alTO' a:JUa~O'll ••• eAalov we have (as in the note above) an explanation by A. of Androcl.... stat<>ment that "olive-cakes need olive-oil" as another improbable and incredible statement. On rn:ep'I"'Aa, Cope, p. 287. a IS li>.Ao~ .•. axo".iv On IlA."..."tI~ C£ 97a 2--4- Here its refutative force consists in looking (aHo".") for inconsistencies or contradictions in the statement of one's opponents; cpo 96b 26-28. From the use of dp'!'.afl1JToVvTO~ (a 17) and the three examples, the topic seemingly refers to judicial rhetoric and is so thought o£ But it is clearly of use in any of the three kinds of rhetoric. Cicero at Top. 3.n speaks of a topic ex repugnantibus and exemplifies it at 4-21; A., however, conveys the concept more fully and clearly.

a 16-17 d ..., ... l.Oyco>v

scl. axon.E.: "to examine whether there is any inconsistency (contradiction) &om among all the dates, actions, statements." All the edd. save Kassd read this clause immecliatdy after axo".'" In all the codd., however, it appears after X"'~l~ ... ap'!',afl1JTOV>To,. Mord placed it whete it is now. Kassd reads it where it i. found in the codd., but brackets it as an addition of A. Ross alone reads T."... for "dvT'" with Thurot, "Observations critiques [II]," 48. Thurot agrees with Mord's transposition but suggests that Ta dvopoloyov,...a should go since it looks like an interpolation. Lysias, Ag. Alcibiades I II exemplifies a contracliction in actions. .. 17 X",pl~ fIo6v Along with "wei, d' at a 18, 20 = "separately in the case of the opponent ... and in the case of onc.df ... and in the case of both together." It is usually interpreted: "in thr.. separate ways. First ... Secondly ... Thirdly ...."

a IS uxcd fP'IG'l ... "E'plcixav'TCI" an obvious contradiction; no one who worked with the Thirty (c£ ooa 33), who were viciously anti-democratic, could have affection for the demos. The Thirty took over Athens in the summer of 404 B.C. and were removed in Fcbruary 403; cf. CAH, V, 365-72. As example. of the topic, c£ !socrates, Ag. Cal/imamus 47-48 (Spengd); Lysias, Ag. Eratosthenes 25-29. a 19-20 "XCII ",,,,01 •.. SIx.,.,." ,!"M6",ov, i.e., "litigious"; c£ 73a 3S : J for the verb. 6/X1J' d",d~.aOa, = "to go to law with someone"; po is understood with 6ea,,,aapi-lo•• Cpo Lysias, Ag. Theomnestus 12-3, Ag. Eratosthenes 39-40· a 21-22 "XCII cro.... ~ ••. .:."""," Cpo Demosthenes, On the Palse Embassy 229-231, On the Crown 3XI-PO.

ODa

30

COMMENTARY

a 23-27 .nA0S ... 5'''(3oA>1 Ross alone reads a colon not a period after 'Palv""a, at a 2S. The statement of this topic contains a series of problems: e.g., (I) Toi~ ... do"o ..., (a 23-24): why the dative? (2) II do"o""" what is its meaning? (3) how are we to inteTpret vnop.pA'1,.b7J~ . .• uCav? To answer each: (I) a dative of interest (S. 1474); Spengel, p. P7, takes it with ruo~; (2) it modifies d0geo\no,~ Hal nea",.a.... as does neod,ap.{J).1J,.i.o,~; for another interpretation t£ Cope, p. 289; (3) the common interpretation of the clause is "who palmed off her son on another woman" (0£ LS, s.". II); the usual meaning of the middle, however, is not this, but "to bring in another's child as one's own." In the following translation I retain the common interpretation (but see following note). "Another topic with reference to men or their actions misrepresented by prejudgment in actual fact or seemingly so [i.e., thought to be by others] is to state the reason for the false impression [naeadOEov], for there is some reason why the false opinion is formed ['Pal.na" appears to be so). For example, the woman who palmed off her son on another woman was thought to be the young man's mistress because of the ardent embrace she gave him." It is this topic which Planudes exemplifies with 99b 16-17 (0£ 99b 16-17). a 2S-26 6tt0(3EIiA'IfLiv'lS ... l&OxE' c£ S. 2073 on the subject of the genitive absolute and that of the main verb as the same. Without pressing further on the meaning in vnop.pA.,,.b7J~ it should be clear that a mere kiss or embrace would hardly cause anyone to form the idea expressed in ...,..ioa, ... ,..'ea"lrp. I am inclined to bdieve that Victorius' comment (for part of it o£ Cope, p. 289) is a move in the right direetton, although Cope, pp. 28990, finds difficulty with the interpretation. A problem I have with Victorius' explanation (which does catch the meaning in vno{JdAA...9a,) is that it not ouly makes the mother's aetton quite unusual but also throws doubt on the fact that anyone seeing such action could be accused of"misrepresenting the aetton by prejudgment," which is the topic. A. seems to me to want to say that the mother wantouly abandoned hersde in embracing the young man who was in fact her sou. i.e., that the youth i. her own child. a 28-29 olov ... 06 50XEL Cpo 99b 28-29. On d,aTO (why) see 55a 20 : 1: "Odyssus tells Ajax wby ...." a 30-31 .nA0S •.. o6x l ..... 'v The general idea of the argument from cau.e to effect is mentioned in passing among the intrinsic (0£ 98b 20) arguments by Cicero, De part. orat. 2.7, and exemplified at De Drat. 2.40.171. At Top. 14.s8~ Cicero discus.es the variou. kinds of causes and the nature of their effects; cpo Quintilian, S.IO.SO£[ Our topic can be found at Rhetores Graea, V 404; IX 606. The argument is from cause to effect, i.e., from exi.t-

ARISTOTLB,

330

C

RHETORIC'

l[

coalS

ence or non-existence of the cause (Il•... ~"&em ... P7J ~"aem) to the existeoce/non-
a 33 8p ..cruli..u>.ou Athenian statesman and democrat who led the democratic opposition to the oligarchic governmeot of the Four Hundred at Athens in 4II :D.c. (CAH, V 330-34). A successful naval commander in the waning years of the Peloponnesian War (CAH, V 34Iff.), he was banished in 404 by the Thirty (on whom see aDa IS} but was ultimately responsible for the return of democracy to Athens in 403. Demosthenes, On the Palst Embassy zSo, call. him "the democrat who brought the people back from Phyle"; c£ OGD, PW, Thrasybulus (3).

p,m............

a 33-lS &.......... This could have occurred any time prior to the period between the summer of 404 and February 403, which saw the rule of the Thirty (i"l Tm. re.axopra). The reason for the public inscription is not known, but the implication is clear from a 3S-36: namely, that he opposed the democracy. Cope, pp. 29'-9Z, offers an explanation of the possible c;ircumstances and also of the procedure. a 34 :

1

a'"l>"'"1~

"inscribed on a stele." People could be honored

by this action (Lysias, Ag. Agoralu.! 72), or dishonored (Dernosthenes, Phil. III 41-42). • Ocxo
a 3S-36 "au........ 6;J1'-"" The arguntent is that the asserted cause is false for its effect would have been that the Thirty would have placed greater trust in Leodamas, and this did not happen. The example illustrates the second alternative: xap P7J ."aem, 8n 0.14 EUTIP. In Pro Milone 12.)2 Cicero argues that C10dius had many actual motives to atta~ Milo, leaving the effect to be drawn: C10dius was the aggressor - an argument using the first alternative: unt1eZ'!1'

on

60"Ct.

oob 6

COMMBNTARY

33 1

a 37 - oob 1 /i).).O~ ••• aXo"ELV "AnothO!' topic is to considO!'whethO!' the course of action which someone recommends or is taking or has taken was or is possibly done better in another way." On the use of ,I c£ S.2675. In the interpretation given hO!'e Wv (the course of action) is a genitive of attraction, .t (TO TOUT.,.) WV: if any of the things which. ••. C"pe, p. 293, views the topic as mosdy forensic (judicial) in character, and in this respect the Oxford (Roberts) translation is more an interpretation of the Greek, not a translation. I can perceive no reason to exclude this topic from any of the three kinds of discourse; c£ 99b 31-]2. However, this is a topic which (with topic 23, ooa 23-29) Spengel also would confine to one branch of rhetoric, e.g., judicial; c£ 98a 3-4. Cicero, Pro Milone 16.41 (Victorius) is an example of the topic directly to the point; Demosthenes, Ag. Aristocrates rro-U5 (Spengel) is far less obvious. All the codd. and edd. read oob 1
2

C£ A 10, 68b 9-12, 69b 18-]2; also 63a in this note read63a38-63b3), 6]&20: 1.

b 3 .uao~

i.e., fiillaciom, deceptive, and for the reason given at 3-4 namely, the more expeditious way may not have been known at the time of the action and therefore to infer from it anything about the action actually taken is misleading. ("o.ua".~

... .Id,/AO'):

All punctuate with a comma after ""'eayp~... b 4-5 oJ).).o~ ... axO".LV O.~ (Roemer alone places it after 8.pa). With the comma righdy placed 1J./J4 f1",eonei" = U to exa.nrine together": "Whenever some intended action is contrary to wh2t has been done, another topic is to examine (thetn both) together." On the idea in ba.Tlov, c£ 92a 9-II. Cpo SE 174b 19-23 (Spengel). b 5-8 olav ... fIoiJ MEtV This statement of Xenophanes (on whom c£ 99b 6) is found in Die!. & Kranz 21 A 13. Plutarch who is mentioned among the testimonia there in place of "the people of Elea" addresses the response to "the Egyptians." Blea on the southwest coast of Italy is associated with Xenoph2nes and gave its name to the Bleatic school of philosophy, which was actually started by Parmenides, a pupil of Xenophanes. On the use of .1 see S. 2675; the subjunctive repb 6 .t ... ~ flo"; resents a deliberative subjunctive in the direct question which is retained after primary sequence (S. 2677). Leucothea is a sea-goddess who was origi-

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

33 2

oob 13

nally Ino, the daughter of Cadmus and the wife of Athamas. She was transformed into a deity with her son Melicertes. C£ Euripides, Melka 12821292; OCD, PW. b 7..,1j "",,_~cNAEU"" ..• au_.v If the example exemplifies, then the people of Elea had done one of the actions (sacrificed to Leucothea or grieved for her) and Wete about to do the othet. Xenophanes advises them of the contradiction in the two actions: if a goddess, don't grieve for her; ifhuman; don't sacrifice. b 9-10 a>J.o~ ..• &,.0>.0y_',,8,", C£ Rhetore. Graed, V 406. Once again the extension of the topic is cballenged: e.g., Spengel, p. 329: "the whole topic i. misplaced for it belongs to forensic not to deliberative or epideictic oratory." The !reason for the restriction possibly resides in "aT1/'l'oe2i7 ij cbroAo"..a6a. (e.g., A 3, 58b 10-12). Once again, however, I fail to see why one cannot praise or blame an individual (epideictic), or e....nort or dissuade (deliberative) using thi. topic. Further reasons fOI limitiug the topic may be in the obsetVation (b 15-16) that thi. was the substance of the art of rhetoric before (0£ oob 15-16) Theodorus, a techne which was largely concerned with judicial rhetoric. On Spenge! see 9Sa 3-4. b

IO

X ..pxlvou

Our text here is cited in Nauck & Snell, p. 798. This

is the grandson of the tragic poet Carcinus much ridiculed by Aristophane•. Active in the fourth century, partieularly at the court (367-357 B.C.) ofDionysius the Younger at Syracuse, he was a productive tragic poet; o£ OeD (2), PW(5).

11 II

x ....1Jyopoii...v Again we appear to have the finite and infinitive construction with this verb; o£ ooa 34.

b 12-13 ijp.cop...... ,...1&"", Ross alone enclose. this in parentheses, and secludes the following ct7, writiug OV [117]; codd. ov" 11.7. The particle is repeated with the verb (b 14). At 08a 3" where the repeated If.7 is not in all the codd. as it is here Kassel reads it, remarking that he would not dare remove it when the repetition occurs at such a short interval. b 13-15 "II 6' ... b:ol1J""" Medea's mistake was in sending the children away, for their absence wa. the reason for the charge of murder against her. In reply Medea argues that (if she had doneany killiug) she would have killed not the children but Jason. Consequendy, if she had made any mi.take at all, it would have been in not killing Jason if she had killed the children. And Jason, as all know, is very much alive. The validity of her argument is confirmed by Jason's fierce reaction to the murder of the children in the MeJea of Euripides, 1293/£

oob IS

COMMENTARY

333

b IS-I6 ii......... "'''xV'! Cpo 99'1 rs-r6. ooa 4-S. "Tills topic and type of cnthymeme constitutes the whole art of rhetoric in use before Tbeodorus." This is the interpretation of Spcngel. pp. 329-30; Cope. p. 296. reading the same Greek interprets: " ... is the whole of the earlier art of Theodorus." Radermacher (B.XII.n) cites our passage and in his note agrees with Spcngel. Theodorus of Byzaotium (fl. 431>-400 B.C.) worked primarily in Athens. and A. places him (SE IS3b 26-33) with Tisias and Thrasymachus. identifying all three as esteemed men who advanced the study of rhetoric. From this comment. along with those of plato at Pluzed..... 2660, 2613-<: (and cpo Cicero. O,at. I2..39. Brutus I2..4S) and of A. at y I2a 2S - r2b 2, I4b 7-IS. I lean toward SpcngeI's view. The observations of A. and Plato are the earliest we have on Theodorus. and they suggest a larger view of rhetoric in general. one unlikdy to limit itsdf to the earlier and popular form of judicial rhetoric. 1 D.).o~ ... 6vOfLCl"'O~ The rdevance of this last topic to the general character of the other topics as forms of inference is not very clear.

b 17 :

Its effi:ctiveness as retort - on which see topic 6. 9Sa 3-14 and 98a 4 - or to emphasize and call attention to a statement in an argument is clearer. Used well, it can have a devastating effect, as can be seen in the reply of the Italian noblewoman to Napoleon's angry charge that aU Italians are scoundrels: "Non tutti, ma buona parte." From the examples given. it is clear that A. is thinking in terms of one's proper name, and is not thinking of etymologizing (i.e., tracing the meaning of a word to its root ideas), as we find it in Top. r 123 323S, Cicero, Top. S.3S-37- The idea in our present topic receives passiog mention in Cicero, De in •• 2.9.2S and is more or less dismissed as a technique in Quintilian, S.IO.31>-31. A.'s idea in the topic can be seen in Eteocles' taunt to Polyneices, Euripides, Phoenician Women 636-637, or !socrates, On the Team ojHo,stS 2S (a play on the .word Eupatrid, i.e., noble birth), or ru.etores Gr_ ci, V 406. Cope, p. 297, gives some examples from Greek tragedy. 2 olav ......ailvOfLlZ The fragment is from the Tyro of Sophocles and can be found in Pearson, II 6SS or Nauck & Snell. Sopko S97, or Radt, Sophocles, F 6SS. This last gives citations of our text by Eustathius in hi. commentary on the Odyssey and the Iliad, and cites the preceding line found also in the scholiast Anonymus, which explains the dative a''''Ie'l' read by all the edd. except Kassel. This line (alJT1/ dll in.. ct., ,",,1/) explains the dative ("d~e'l' as the object of ".xe1/,..iv1/. However, I would read the proper name L",d~e" with Spengel, Cope. Kassel. TIlls reading is also found in a good tradition and in the scholiast. As A. cites Sophocles here, usiog the proper name does make the meaning clearer. Kassd reads feoVoJaa for tpoeoiiaa.

,..ax,,...,

"'xerr

b IS c:.~ ... ".YE.V, XlZl c:.~ Only Roemer, Dufour read a lacuna before Hal Roemer conjectures that the tc:xt continued with the words

eli,.

A11ISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

334

oob 25

we find in the .cholia.t Stephanus, who explains the phrase .. , I. TOO, TW. 8sW. mat.o" thus: "as Zeus is given his name as the cause of our life" (Cm;M; this would be the lost clause. b 19

.:.~

K6vc.Jv . . , lxliJ...

C£ Did. &: Kranz 85 A 6. On Conon,

c£ 9!Ja 5 ; on Thrasybulus, ooa 33b 19-20 'HpoS'''Q~ 8pOl..u",OIXov "old ...•r' On Hcrodicu., 6xb 5: 1, he i. the author also of the following comments on Polus, Dracon. Thrasymachus of Chalcedon (JI. 430-400 B.C.), a Sophist who is important in the development of prose style, is well known from Plato's &publll: as an ardent defender of the theory that might makes right (c£ 338b-e); c£ also OCD, PW (1), Guthrie, Creek Philosophy, III 294-98, Radermacher, B.IX.I-I9. I would punctuate with the quotation marks as do Tovar, Ross, Kassel, Cope. b 20-21 1Iii">1ov "old ...•r' I would punctuate as here with Tovar, Ross, Kassel, Cope. Polus of Agrigentum is a younger contemporary of Socrates, and the author of a rhetorical tecbne. He is well known from Plato's Go'gias where at 463 e he i. called by Soaates "young and passionate." This dialogue at 461b 3 - 4C>1d 9 gives some sense of his "coltish" nature as h. breaks into a conversation between Socrates and Gorgias. C£ OCD, PW (3), Radermacher, B.XIV.I-n. ApcbcOV'l"OI ••• &pcbcOV"Q~ Cope and Kassd, reading with the more recent tradition, omit dv in this sentence; Ross secludes it; the other edd. and Spengd read it. Richards, p. III, co.yccturcs >fa"" for it, or po... sibly dittography from dv8ecb"ov. Dracon is one of the early lawgivers (~omothete, c£ S4b I) in Athens. His effort to counter social unrest arising in Athens was to enact this law code in 621 B. c. and thus make clear the rights and duties of all. These laws became rather notorious for the punishments attached to violations (c£ Pol. 1274b IS-I8) and won the reputation of being "written not in ink but in blood," as Plutarch (Solon 17) notes. On Dracon see OCD, PW (8), CAll, IV 28-36.

b 21-22

The citation is from the Trojan Women b 22-24 E6p ...(Sou .•. e~ 990. Eustathius in his commentary on the niaJ, p. 414.37 refers to this p.... sage of A. It can also be read in Spengel, pp. 330-31, and in Kassel, p. 137Spengel finds the reference to A.'. text unclear, as it is. b 25-26 XOI.pil/U'W ••. iml>vu",o~ C£ Nauclc &: Snell, p. 783; the fragment is attributed to the Dionysus of Chacrenwn (fl. ]50 B.C.), a play like the BtJtClute of Euripides. Chaeremon is a tragic playwright whose plays, A. teI!s us at I3b 12-14, were intended for reading (7 not acting); c£ OCD (I), PW (5). Pentheus, a king of Thebes in mythology, is well known from the BtJtCh"" of Euripides.

cob 33

COMMBNTAllY

3JS

b 27-30 ":'&OX."oL .•• p.iiillov In b 27-34. the end of the presentation of the common topics for demonstrative enthymemes, A. gives us a brief observation not SO much on demonstrative-re!Utative enthymem.es as on the essential character of enthymeme as he understand. it: an inference marked by such brevity and clarity of statement that the auditors readily apprehend it as it is delivered, and, ifnot, comprehend it as soon a. it is completely expressed. In our present passage (b 27-30) refutative enthymemes which conclude to the opposite of the opponent'. conclusion achieve this objective very effectively since they allow the auditor to compare opposite.; cf. r 17, 18b 2-5. The comparison of two opposites is seen rather well in the examples at 970 7-19. C£ Studies, pp. 8~I on the enthymeme as an abbreviated syllogism. sV~o"... lUi, cf. 9"b 20; h8~"'7J,..dT("" is a genitive of the whole; did TO .•• el."., articular infinitive with subject (TO oil."... 01.86,..71,..") and predicate (""""Y"Y>1v); the articular infinitive is still at work (e.g., ,..i• ... a~ in the following clause naf!' elll'll" ... ,..allo., "because .tatements set side by side are ..." (on nae' W7Jla, cf. Bonitz, Index, p. 340 13). Cpo r 9, loa 2.0-:>3. b 30-32 ...Ii",""" .•. dv... On 8oevpsiTa, cpo A 2, 56b 24- "AU such refutative and demonstrative syllogisms are particularly applauded which (the auditors) foresee from the beginning (as they are begun) not because they are superficial (.een at a glance)." TIP ... • l.a" articular infinitive, dative of cause; on .!n,,,oMi' 76b 14- On the idea cpo 94b 17-25, rIO, rob 21-27. b 32-33 (11..........po.....8czvo'""o.) "for at one and the same time men are delighted with themselves as they anticipate (the conclusion) with understanding." Auditors are pleased with the speaker's argument and also (d,..,,) with their ability to foresee its devdopment. C£ Studies, p. 88; r ro, rob 10-26, A 2, 570 r5-21. b 33-34 ....I a""", ... Y""'plt;••v "and all those enthymemes are applauded which they are late in apprehending only to the extent that they grasp then! as soon as they are stated." lIa.,. governed by 1laTEet\ovaIV.

CHAPTER 24

C£ the outline to chapter 23. I-alar 1a - oIa2-6 Ib - ala 12 II - ala 24-25 III - alb 3 IV - alb 9-10

v-

VI VII VIII IX

-

alb 15 alb 20 :2 alb 30-34 alb 35 028 3-9

oob 3S-3 8 t"d 6' ... auUoy"rl'-o~ "L~ As we begin this chapter on the apparent enthymeme, we should recall the statement at A I, ssa 29-38 that the student of rbctoric must be able to argue both sides of a subject simply because in this way one eomes to know the subject as it truly is and thus can then refute false statements about the subject; cf. ssa 2!r38. This study of the sources of false enthymematic reasoning is not at all in aid of the teclmiquc of deception as a positive factor in rbctorical discourse. On the contrary it is an effort to unmask false reasoning on the part of others. We read in SE (which in dialectics is eomparable to this study of the topics of apparent enthymemes): "It is the task: of one who has knowledge about a thing to speak the truth about what he knows, and to be able to expose the individual who makes false statements," 16sa 24-27 (0£ 174b I!r23). This S\lIllS up accurately the tenor of all A.' s writings: namely, the effort to apprehend and communicate, as far as possible, that which is. Viewing the discussion of apparent enthymeme as a study of the ways to misrepresent reality cannot be substantiated from the Rhetoric. and is totally at odds with the cJfort of all his work. C£ S6a 36 - S6b 4, Studies, pp. 94-99. One should also note the emphatic correlation here between syllogism and enthymeme; o£ 99b IS : 2, ala 7-8.

The usc of TO"D' here reveals once again the character of the b 38 "I:.mOL common topics; o£ 978 7 : 1. For it is obvious that in these nine topics we have nine principles from which inferences or arguments can be developed. These topoi are nine general propositions each of which can be used for &lse inference on any number of subjects. stoichcia (03a 17-19) into which many apparent enthymemes fall. Roemer. Dufour. Tovar number the nine as la, b, II, III. etc., a numbering found in the English translations, e.g., Roberts, Cooper. Jebb & Sandys. In a passage in SE (16Sb 23 - I68a 16) comparable

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

OIa 2

to chap. 24 thirteen topics are given. A distinction is also made (I65b 24) between fallacies which, while not stated in the Rhetoric, is valid for the topics there. We are told that there are two kinds of fallacies: (a) fallacies rooted in language, i.e., verbal, "oed -nj. lBE .. (c£ oIa I); (b) fallacies independent of language, lEO) Tii, UEBo)', i.e., grounded on principles which result in false inference. In the Rhetoric the following would fall among the verbal fallacies: la, b, ala 1-24 (ambiguity, amphiboly), on ala 12-24 cpo SE 165b 30 - 1600 23; II, ora 24 - alb 3 (composition and division), cpo SE 166a 23-38. Of the six verbal fallacies of SE all but the last two (wrong accent, form of expression used) are found in the Rhetoric. The following fallacies independent of language are found in the Rhetoric: V, oIb 15-20 (accident), cpo 166b 2a:-36; VI, oIb 20-30 (consequent), cpo I67b 1-20; VII, alb 30-34 (not cause as cause), cpo I67b 21-38; IX, alb 35 - 02a 27 (confosion of the ab_ lute and the qualified), cpo I66b 37 - 1670 20. Five of the SE fallacies have no formal counterpart among those of the Rhetoric, e.g., two verbal fallacies: wrong accent (I66b 1-9), form of expression (I66b 10-19), and three of the fallacies independent of language: ignorance of refutation (I67a 21-35), assumption of the point to be proved (1670 36-39), combining separate questions into one (I67b 38 - I68a 16). Of the Rhetoric fallacies only one, use of indignant language, alb 3-9, has no comparable paralld in SE, since the use of sign, alb 9-15, is included as a fallacy of consequent at SE 167b 8-u. On fallacy in Latin, c£ Cicero, Do inv. 1.47.87-95; Auct. ad H""",. 2.20.3146. Cope, pp. 300-302, and Hamblin, pp. 50-88, review the fallacies of the Rhetoric and SE. Chaps. 24-25 of the Rhetoric epitomize in a way the SE for rhetorical use, as·chap. 23 makes use of the Topics. oia I "lIpci •.. >.t;,v verbal fallacy, one occasioned by the use of language; cpo SE I65b 24. This is divided here into "oed ~d u1/ip.a XTA. (a 7)

and naea niSI op,ru,,'tJp.La'JI (a 12.).

a 2-6 c...",.p .•. £V8uP.>'IP.II.... ~. VlCtoriUS indicates wdl that the contrast in the sentence is between the procedure in dialectic (~,aA.,ip.aa,). The fallacious process in dialectic is to present a statement as the conclusion of a syllogistic inference although it is not such. In rhetoric the fallacy resides in making a compact and antithetical statement and p..sing it off as an enthymematic inference. In each case the form gives the appearance either of a syllogism or an enthymeme. In short A. has given us a single sentence as found now in the critical editions (Spengd, Cope, Freese give two sentences) contrasting this verbal fallacy as found in dialectic and in rhetoric. The reading of the codd., however, does not make this contrast clear. At a 4 ("al ~d ~oi, EvOvp.>ip.au,) the codd. start another sentence. The edd., following Vablen's suggestion ("Kritik arist. Schriften," 135-37), read < "al ••> ~o,~ or variants on the .. rde of a lau.: codex

.. "

OIa. 12

COMMENTARY

339

(e.g., Ross: h TO'~; Tovar: TO'~; Kassel: "all. Toi~) while Spengel and Cope read with the codd. but are aware of the problem. Even with oil. the adjustments the passage does not read satisfyingly: "One lcind of this £allacy is to present, as is done in dialectic, the final statement [TO TelsvraiO.) as the conclusion of a syllogism [""I""Sea"paT,x.;;d although it has not been inferred syllogistically: 'And so such and such is not true,' 'Therefore such and such must be true'; .unilarly in the case of enthymemes [i.e., in rhetoric) presenting a compact and antithetical statement gives the appearance of an enthymeme, for that lcind of language is the province of enthymeme." a" 1i""'.E1C"'L"OL~

e.g., SE I74b 8-n; cpo I76b 31-3".

lip..... "V"'L".L"'""",~ Ross alone encloses a 3-4: oux Ilea ... xal TO in quotation marks. Ross, Kassel, Spengd, Cope read dYdy,,'1 aea TO "al TO; the other edd. read d.dl''''l Ilea xal TO xal TO. Ross, Kassd, Cope read with a good tradition ...,....Teap,.h"'~ for the "",s""eappi.o. of the other edd. a 3-5

0(,,,

lv9u"'' ' ' .....

o~ Ross alone encloses this in parentheses. xr.IJea a 6 il ... = the locale, or the place where (T6"o~); on the statement cpo I9a 19, loa ":Ir "3· a 7 "Xii"," i.e., "the form of expression," and so both the lcind of statement made and the way, the form, in which it is expressed are the source of this £allacy.

a ']-8 Et~ ...O ••• l.EYELV "in regard to spealcing in a syllogistic manner by means of the lcind of wording used." In the context of oob 35-38 "".l.lo1',aT'x,;;~ is effectively h6.p'lpaT"'';;~, and so cf. oob 35-38, end of note. At a 8-9 TO ",,'\'\oy ...p';;•• •. Ail'S" ("to state the main points of several syllogisms") the articular infinitive is subject to l ..T' xe'lj ..,po.. On ".."d.la.a cpo Demosthenes, 01. 3."3. a 10 Dc.......""

i.e., a !rIO (0..... .• 1j.l8v6le"'..S); Spengel. p. 333, suggests

!socrates, Euagoras

65~.

a I I cillCo>v "from other evidence." As dn.6.IX6'1 indicates, each main argument set forth is itself the conclusion of a demonstration. When such final statements are combined there is the appearance of some new conclusion resulting from the union. Homonymy and amphiboly are forms of the £allaey of a I2. 6f1o"'Vu",l_ equivocation, which is rampant in the EuthyJemus of Plato, as Sprague analyzes the dialogue. Homonymy is the use of the same word in diiferent senses, as seen in the example. Amphiboly, mentioned in the SE passage similar to our present passage, is a form of equivocation occasioned by the double meaning of a phrase or clause, e.g., this commentary belongs to A.

340

ARISTOTLE. 'RHBTORIC' II

Ola 2.0

a 13 ..,,0118 ...011 C£ 6xa 25 :.: "held in respect." Baiter &: Sauppe (II 221, frg. 8) gives this as a fragment of Polycrates; e.g., oxb 16. On PoIycrates see OXa 33-35. i.e., a festival accompanied by mystic rites of initiation. a 14 : 1 TEA""", a l'uCJT>\p'" Cf. OeD, "Mysteries"; Burkert, pp. 276-304. The equivocation lie. in the as.umption that pv(mle,a (major annual religious solemnities celebrated by the Greek.) is derived &om pJ~ (mouse) and not pviw (initiate into the mysteries). a 15 Ti>v ••• aGp""c!> i.e., Sirius, the scorcher, brightest star in the constellation Canis Maior and known as the dog-star, harbinger of the "deg days." Its appearance marked the beginning of the hottest part of the year. C£ S8b 24: • for the idea: take along a 16 : 1 GUI',,"pd.CtI'(3civo, with, take in as an assistant. a Db.. For Pan, Cybele c£ OCD. There is no mention there, however, of this relationship between the two. It is spoken of by Pindar, frg. 86 (Bowra) and again in frg. 85. Both fragment. are from the Parthenea which were songs sung (and danced) by young girls to honor Pan; c£ Pindar, Pythi... 3.77-79. From frg. 85 Pan appears to be an attendant upon Cybele, the Magna Mater, and his statue to be placed before shrines. On Pindar (? 522/518-438 B.C.) the lyric poet see OCD, PW. a 11)-20 i\ 8T' .....11',011 "or to state that to be without a dog is the highest disgrace, and so it is clear that to be a dog [TO ".n.a (817a,)] is something honorable." In.. itself the statement is a puzzle, or in Victorius' words "to a hjgh degree ob.cure" (obscurus aurem lot:u.r admodum •.<1). Of the scholiasts, Stephanus suggests the possibility of equivocation inherent in the reference to either dog or Cyuic philosopher (Diogenes of Sinope, ca. 400 - ca. 325, the founder of Cynic philosophy received the nickname of"deg"); Anonymus reads "owei for ",s.a and is not helpful. Schrader's interpretation (Cope, p. 306) is substantially repeated in the modern interpretations and translations. I do not see the point of his "in the house" and prefer "to be without • dog." His Latin would read: ''That not even a dog is maintained in the house is the highest disgrace. Therefore to be a dog is honorable. The equivocation resides in the phrase 'to be a dog' which can mean either that a dog is in the house, or to be a Cynic. For Cynic philosophers are called dogs•... " "to claim that Hermes particularly a 20-21 XO'Vb>V,xOv... 'Epl'ij~ among the gods is the most sociable for he is the only one of the gods called 'sharer Hermes.'" Hermes (0£ OCD), like Pan, is Arcadian in his origins and has many facets: messenger of the great gods (e.g., Virgil, Am. 4-211)-276), guide of souls (Homer. od. 24-1-14), and here the god of good luck. On the chance discovery of money or anything else (such a find was called i1 TO Ie-

ora 27

COMMBNTARY

341

palOV), if anyone on hand cried out" ,.owo, 'Eepii'" (or OUI "halves'') he made a claim to a share in the find, e.g., Theophra.!tIlS describes the covetous character (Characters 30.9) a. one who when "some money is found in the streets by his slaves is clever at demanding part of it by crying out 'halves.'" The phrase x. 'Eepii' (luck: is common) is proverbial, e.g., Menander, Epitrepolltes 284 (108) and ef. 28G-28s (cd. Sandbach). The equivocation rests on the different meanings of x.w6" as in the following example it rests on the different meaning of .I6y., as speech (a n, To,. My.v) and as esteem (a 23, cU.Id

Adr"'), a U-23 " ..I,,~... ~,., On the equivocation here see previous note. ..,...,da,6TaTov, ef. ala 13; Spengel, pp. 333£, cites Diodoms Siculus 1.1-2, Anaximenes I42Da 6 - I42Ia 2, and Isocrates, Pallegyricus 47-49 as indicative of the high esteem in which logos was held. a 23-24 "~YdIp .•. ).EYE"'" "for the expression Ady.v !l.E,.v is not wed with a single meaning." On clnAw, see 560 7. dEt.Aoy., meaning "notable, distinguished" is a word special to Diodoms Siculus. a 24-2S lDJ.o~ .•. &LlILPoGv".. Ross (along with Bonitz, Studiell, p. 87) reads TO 6'TJe'7pbov. This topic is found in SE as two topics, oob 38. Here it is a single fallacy which in fact is twofold: composition, division. Composition is to assert of the whole what is true of a part or parts, e.g., a 24: "another topic of fallacious argument is for the speaker to combine [a""..,66na Myew] that which is separate [TO 6'TJe'7P"""]"; e.g., the Supreme Court is a prejudiced body since its members have prejudices. Division i. to as.ert of a part or parts what is true of the whole, e.g., a 2S: "or to divide [6Ia~.;;vTa] that which is combined [TO avyxstp...v]," e.g., all the faculty members of Oxbridge are distinguished scholars for the Oxbridge faculty is noted for its distinguished scholarship. a 25-26 ,brEl ... ....u.CbCL~ "for since what is not the same is often thought to be the same." On Tml",6. (not TaVr6 as at a 26) S. 32.8n.; theword refers to the whole and its parts which frequendy appear to be the same and therefore capable of the same attributes. a 26-27 6..6"EpOV .•. _'Ei" c£ oob 35-38. The import of the comment (e.g., 6•• ".'.'7) is, I would say, that one is to use the fallacy not in presenting an argument but in refuting the statement of an opponent who may have deliberately or inadvertendy used the fallacy. a 2.7 ".,;:;".... My.~ Kassel alone conjectures Tmo <0>. Euthydemus (ef. OGD, PW [13]), a Sophist from Chias, was a contemporary of Socrates and is known to us for the most part from Plato's dialogue Euthytkmus (ef. ola 12), a study of eristics and the use of fallacies; its character is

ARISTOTLE, 'R~TO'RIC' II

OIa 33

mirrored in A.' sSE. Whether the Euthydemus of Xenophon's Memorabili. is a different person is questioned; cpo PW, Euthydernus (13) with Kerferd, p·53· a 2.7-2.8 or.." ... 0[&611 This example is not in the EuthyJemus. Its OCCUIrence in a slightly different form at SE I77b 12.-13 would indicate that it is • sophism identified with Euthydemus. The kind of composition at issue is of the following sort: Patti is good; Patti is an artist; Patti is a good artist, (c£ D. into 2.ob 351f.). Thus we have here: What you know, you know in the Peiraeus where you now are; secondly, you know that there are triremes. And so the statement: you know that there are triremes in the Peiraeus. This p ....ge is explained by Victorius in terms of the SE passage 177b 12.-13 which, .. it stands, is the same kind of fallacious statement. Cope, pp. 3"730B, gives an exact citation of Victorius' wor.u and his difficulties with them .. an explanation of the Euthydeman logos. a 2.9 -rav.. .•",'......P.61IOV The accusative is the object of Uy ••• understood ("to say of the one who knows the lettets'I, which also governs the dependent /In clause; see use of My... at a 2.5. The scholi..t Anonymus intetprets bro, as "verse"- so too Cope - and not "word," citing by way of illustration the first few words of the Ili.d: I";j'" d••6. O.d. a 3~3 I xed mEl ... icnLV dt~ ToaouTo7 = twice as much: Iland since twice as much of a thing is hannful." ",a.a. is again a predicate infinitive (sc. allo, emf), governing the accusative I"716i Tel .. ("another topic is to say ~at not evc:n a "siDgI~ po~on") and infinitive 6l"a, ,sy,s,."d". IlTmro" (sc. san). iaTw, I.e., CODSbtute.

~ 32.-33 oikw ... ",..p(l),oy....."'6~ The first formulation is refutative since its conclusion - Two good things do not make one bad thing - is the contradiction apparently of what was originally stated: One portion of a thing is good, but its double is bad. This last statement is often correct but is open to this attack. Even the converse - One good thing does not make two bad things - though apparently demonstrative is not correct for it, too, is open to the fallacy of division. a 33-35 ",IU,,, ... Y"P On Polycrates see Radermaclrer, B.xXI.I-13 and particularly # 13, together with Baiter & Sauppe, II 2.2.1, ftg. 5. He is a rhetorician of the fourth century. His Aa:usation of Socrates, now lost, written somewhere about 394 B.C., may have been occasioned by Plato's Gorgias. It was criticized by !socrates, Busiris, 4-9 and answered by Xenophon, Mem. 1.2..1-<54 where Polycrates is apparently "the accuseT." He wrote a number of encomia on startling subjects such as mice (Ola 13), pebbles. c£ Cope, pp. 3II-I2.; oeD (2.); PW (7); Chroust, pp. 69-100; Dodds, Gorgias,pp. 2.B£ On Thrasybulus see ooa 33. On The Thirty as a collective name. for this

olb 3

COMMBNTAllY

343

tyranny, c£ ooa r8; here they are spoken of differendy. This is not an obvious example of composition. On the face of it this appears to h. the fallacy of division sinc. we think of The Thirty as individuals, and we might think that what we assert of them collectively we can assert of them as individuals. Thus Thorot ("Observations critiques [III," 49), for instance, considers this an example of division and the following an example of composition; see Kassel's apparatus criticus, p. 139. However, this could be composition. What is individually true of the patts here (namely: each was a tyrant, each was overthrown by Thrasybulus) is asserted as true of the whole; i.e., Thrasybulus overthrew 30 tyrants and so 30 tyrannies. But the 30 were a collective in fact constituting just one tyranny. Quintilian illustrates the point: "Me 30 awards owed to Thrasybulus?" for putting down The Thirty, 7-4.44 (c£ 3.6.2.6). On the matter of this fallacy Joseph's monitum (p. 58:1..1)"It is difficult to keep Composition and Division apart" - is worth noting. Joseph, pp. 586£, exemplifies A.'s mixup of the two. a 35- ~ ..o ... eEo&i..."ou

C£ 'iYfll 28-29, 97b 2.--3, and 97a 29 - 97b 6.

a 36 5,II,p£......~ The fallacy of division is to assert of a part or parts what is true of the whole, ala 24-25. We do not have that here as far as can be seen. Rather we have the fallacy of composition. For what is true of the parts has been asserted of the whole. It is right that she who murders her husband die; it is also right that a son avenge his father. But one is not justified in asserting of the whole (as A. says,olb 1-2, "IJlITB8ivTa .•. 61"a ...) -that it was rigbt for Orestes to kill his mother. In adding that the faIIacy may be the one of omission, A. bas in mind the faIIacy of the exchange of an absolute and a qualified statement; c£ orb 35 - 02a 3, olb 35. a 37

5IxlI'o" ... 1to.""

C£ Nauck & Snell, p. 803, frg. 5.

olb 1 06xoW."..;n1l XIII 1t£1tPIIX..II' "''''eaXTa. is the reading of all the codd., Cope, Spengel, Ross, Kassel. The odler edd. read """efix8a•. 0';"0;;" TO;;Ta "al is read by Kassel and in effect is the reading ofRoerner,Dufour, Tovar, and Spengel. Cope reads without explanation 0,)"0;;. "al TaiiTa "lIneIl>
4cplI'pd

"the statement (or, the speaker) leaves out at whose hand."

..,.£1.I'' ;.,,,

On the verb see S9b 14. To the references b 3 5e,"':'... , XII.... there may be added Cope, p. 311, on the use of the verb as a technical term for demonstrative syllogisms. In the same way its opposite here (as at An. Pr. 42" 1-3), d.o",,"vdC... , means to demolish (usually the opponent', argument) and i. used for refutative syllogisms. On (exaggeration) see 9sa 8-9. In most respects this is a fallacy more typical to rhetoric as an- art of discourse. Thus Quintilian, 6.2.24 speaks of deinosis as "language which

6.""b".,

344

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

olb· 10

gives added impetus to shameful, harsh, or hateful subjects." This, however, is but Ol1e aspect of the fallacy (see also Auaor oJ Herem,. 2.29.46), which, as we see here (b 4-6), also has a positive character. Ross alone conjectures ",oi"l"" <"'''Id' {In oil,. b 5 rnol'lO"EV, co61;>icrn '1 all~~"11. Spengel, p. 337, would also question our reading of all the cadd. ailEd.... can mean quite simply to amplify, eularge upon, strengthen (76b 34 : z), or to glorify, exaggerate, exalt. From the use of del..""., the latter is the meaning here. The subject of avE>1"11 is "the speaker" who is specified in what follows. Spengel, pp. 335Jf., exemplifies the fallacy from !socrates, Antidosis 88-92, Andocides, all the Mysteries 29-33, Lysias, Ag. the Subversion ~f the Ancestral Constitution 2-6. Another example would be Cicero,

Pro Milone 23.61. i.e., the accused, the defendant. b 7 : I opyl!;'1Tco, This reading of the codd. (except A: 6el17J', which for the sense I find more attractive) is accepted by the edd. save Ross, Kassel. • ."UUI'-'11'4 It fails to be an enthymeme because nothing is demonstrated or proven (oil dedo,,,,,,"o,,); any conclusion or inference by the hearer that something was or was not done is a groundless inference (",aea-

Ao"lCeT"'). b 9-ro IDo~... ToUTO This fallacy of sign, specifically semeia allonymo (non-necessary signs, S7b 1 : " 57b r0-21), is very much implicated with the fallacy of consequent (olb 20-30). In fact SE 167b 1-20 not only remarks that in rhetoric proofs frOlll signs are based on consequents (b 8-9) but exemplifies by using a sign argument (b 9-Il) which is the same example as that used in the Rhetoric to exemplify d,e fallacy of affirming the consequent (oIb 24), i.e., assuming that the consequent is convertible with the antecedent. On the other hand, there can be no question that non-lIecessary sign argument can be a form of valid inference which, however, is not logically conclusive; c£ Studies, pp. 96-99, 104-15. Since the argumentation concludes to the probable and not the certain, there is 110 inevitable demand that the assertion must be accepted. When used correcdy and with reasonable circumspection, sign inference can be highly suasive, as can be seen from the instance of seeking a bodyguard as a sign of conspiring for tyranny (A 2, 57b 20-36). But, by the very nature of the non-necessary (anonymon) sign, this can be challenged on the grounds that it involves the fallacy of the consequenL Thus it is that sign (i.e., semeion anonymon) can be used as a legitimate argument of persuasion, but the argument can be disproved as fallacious. b 10 Tcoi~ ",6).£0"' . • • "I"""copxov enclosed within quotation marks by Tovar, Ross, Kassel, Cope. Plato, Symposium 182C 4--'7 says substantially the

oIb 15

COMMENTARY

345

same thing. C£ Aeschines, Ag. Timarc"us I32-I35 (Spengel). On Harmodius, Aristogeiton, Hipparchus, 6Sa 17 : z, also 9Sa IS. "oAe". here denotes the Greek city-state in general. b II : 1 .pWvTES the reading of all the codd.; Kassel alone reads .e"'Te~. z 'API'-0&lou ~d. c£ 6Sa I7 : 2. Hipparchus, son of the Athenian tyrant Peisistraus, enjoyed a position of eminence in Athens when his brother Hippias assumed power in 527 B.C. on the death of their father. Hipparchus died in 5I4 B.C. b I2--I5 ij.[ T'S ••. 'l
a1.·

6 ~i"'"lS.·.. 7tOV'lPOS

Tovar omits ,.a:~; Ross omits

o.

b 15 ....1'-!3E(3'1"OS No one who speaks about the fallacy of accident as we meet it here and in the SE is really happy or secure with it. It is far more complicated than it appears, and in fact it is frequently explained as the fallacy secundum quid of which the following would be an example: freedom is man's supreme endowment, therefore do not discipline children. It would not misrepresent the actual situation to say, as Joseph, p. 84, does, "what Aristotle says about the Fallacy of Accident has seldom been clearly understood"; c£ also Connell. Fearnside & Holther, Pirie do not mention it. A. himself (SE I68b 6-10) remarks that "the experts and the wise" have trouble with it. He himself (SE T69b 3-'7, 168b 27-29) ties in the fallacy of consequent (as does Hamblin) with that of accident, as he also does with the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi (SE 168a 34 - I68b 5, I69a 3-5). The examples of "accident" which he offers at SE I66b 28-36, partly at 179a 26 - ISea 22, are the ones mostly featured even in the contemporary explanations of the fallacy, and thcy are not helpful. The RJ.etoric examples are ignored probably because the expositors do not understand how they exemplify the definitiOll of the fallacy of accident given at SE I66b 28-30: "Fallacies depending on Accident take place whenever any attribute is thought to belong in the same way to· a thing and to its accident." The first problem here is the meaning of"accident." Ordinarily what is meant by "accident" is that which belongs to something 110t always, not necessarily, not only (e.g., Michael is irritable). It seems to nle that Cope's explanation (pp. 3I2-14; but c£ 313nr) of b 15-20 understands the fallacy of accident in this sense, i.e., to assert an accidental attribute as an essential one. On the grounds that bombing is wanton violence one could say, but wrongly, that the destruction of Hiroshima was an act ofwanton violence. What can be truly said of the accidental attribute (bombing) cannot be said with truth of the subject (destruction of Hiroshima). Even with this understanding of

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' Il

orb

20

"accident" there is a problem insofar as it is not as simple as it sounds to decide with regard to many subjects what are aedelental and what are essential attributes. The second problem with the fallacy of accident is that in his explanation of it at SE 166b 28-30 A. offu-s a different bnt not for him an unusual meaning of "accident." "Accident" means any property of a thing which is not fully convertible with (i.e., has not the same defmition as) the thing, as, for example, rational animal would be with "man." And so what is true of the accident cannot be true of the thing (Joyce). Thus the fallacy of accident violates the principle that whatever can be predicated of a thing can be predicated of anything identical with it. For accident, particularly in this second meaning, is not identical with its subject. Thus in the first example at r66b 32-33: "Coriscus is different from 'man' and so different from. himself since he is a 'man. J., ""Mann is considered an accident of Coriscus, i.e., not convertible with Coriscus since not every man is Coriscus. I do not see, however, that this understanding of "accident" applies to our ruetoric examples. If anything, I would accept for them the first and more ordinary meaning of accident, i.e., asserting an accidental attribute as an essential one. b 16 Do>.uxpci"O)~ ... "'u~ C£ ola 33-35, OIa 13-14, Cope, p. 313; cpo Spenge!, p. 338 and Radermacher, B.XXI.IO both citing the scholiast Anonymous to the e.ffi:ct that the inhabitants of Troy honored the mice of the region for this action. A similar incident in another context is related in Herodotus, 2.141.5. b 17 jj et ....... ,"'..;,..........ov The articular infmitive (TO ... "A~81j.a.) is the subject of an understood "is" in the finite or infinitive construction. The non-invitation is the accidental reason for the anger, the substantial cause of which, as we see at a 19-20 (0 d' tb, . ..), was the disregard (d).'l''''eia) shown in the action; cf. A.'s comments on the concept, 78b 10 - 79a 8,,sa 32. The story is said to come from a play of Sophocles' called the Syndeipnoi (Companions at Table), whose subject is the Greeks gathered at Tenedos prior to the siege of Troy; cf. Pearson, II 198-209. In the past the incident has been confused with another Sophoclean play, Syl/ogos (The Gathering of the Greeks); cf. Pearson, 194-100, Nauck: & Snell, p. 161. Plutarch, Moralia 74" speaks of a Sophoclean play in which reference is made to Achilles and an invitation; cf. Pearson, II 205, Nauck & Snell, Radt, Sophocles, p. 425. b 20 :

I

&,« ...... "'~

Cope, Kassel read with a majority of the codd.:

hd TO;; p.o;" "on the occasion o£"

z ....0 "'rc6",EVov Fallacy VI is that of affirming the consequent. It is ordinarily understood of the hypothetical syllogism (If Bill is clever, he will see this deception; but he sees the deception; and so, Bill is clever). A., however, did not discuss the hypothetical syllogism. As A. underst\lod this

oIb 30

COMMBNTAllY

347

(inop ..o.; c£ 62a 29: z) is a predicate necessarily connected with the subject as umortal," "animal" are hropna of

fallacy in SE I67b 1-20, consequent

"man." However, the consequent is not convertible with its subject, and when it is so converted. we have the fallacy of consequent. In the example at a 21-24 the consequent is "disdain for society"; e.g., high-minded people have a disdain for society. When we affirm this of Paris, we conclude wrongly that it is convertible with ''high-minded'' and therefore that Paris is "highminded." This misapplies the rule that two things identical with the same thing are identical with each other. Thus. although A. did not speak of the hypothetical syllogism. his explanation of the fallacy of consequent is easily expressed in the antecedent-consequent statement of the hypothetical syllogism. C£ Poetics 14600 20-22; Rheto,es Gr._d. VII 322. On the encomium of Alexander b 21 ' A>.E1;.h6p'I'. hI fL£ycU"IruxD~ by Polycrates. see Baiter &: Sauppe, II 223. and 97b 21-22. With the comma after Alexander accepted by all. I would understand a predicate infinitive (lily ...). i.e., Ur.BT'; c£ OIa 29 or OIa 3G-31 ('I'''.a,). On p."aAO,,~ZO~ see 66b 17. Rheto,es G,aed, V 283 (Spengel) notes that Demosthenes commits the fallacy in the CroUl. speech 136. :'for seeing that the high-minded are such, so. b 23-24 3..1 yckp ... cIv then, should Paris be thought to be high-minded."

b 25

fLDIX6~' Wtoil..Dl

b 26 ~5oucrl ... 6PXoii,....1l

Cpo SE 167b 8-u.

TocoiiTOC sc.

i.e.. in begging for

pOC%ot.

alms.

b 27-29 hI yckp . . . iiv m&czlp.ovoiv The same struct\lre as aT' at b 25, 26; see Olb 21: "to state that since these qU2!ities belong to those who are thought to be prosperous and happy, so. then. those who possess these attributes should be considered prosperous and happy." As in the other examples the argument is: the very fortunate sing, dance, and travel, but so do the poverty",tricken and those sent into exile; therefore these latter are very fortunate. rsocrates. Hele. 8 uses a similar example of beggars and exiles. &111(1'011'£1 ... 111.,,1"""1 C£ below olb 35 - 020 3 on the diiference between an unqualified and a qualified statement. The ,.cii~ should

b 29-30

be obvious 6:om the last example given: exiles travel without choice as to the travel and the destination while the fortunate travel when and where they wish. On Ill"" .. see olb 35. b 3G-34 auo~ ... ,,6A'fLo~ This topic is cited almost verbatim by Dionysius of Halicarnassus in clrap. 12 of his First Letter to Ammaeus in his effort to show that the Rhetoric was composed after Demosthenes had reached hi. prime and had delivered most of hi. speeches, i.e.• post 330 B.C. A com-

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II

orb 13

parison of the statement of our topic with the fallacy in SE 167b 21-36 reveals a striking difference between the two. The SE fallacy (see also An. Pr. 6sa 3Sff.), although A. says that it is fairly common, is one infrequently referred to in modem books (Hamblin, p. 78). The interpretation of the fallacy of cause which is co=on in the modern books is that given here in the Rhetoric, e.g., the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy. The fallacy of non-cause as cause in the SE is a form of reductio ad impossible and was used to challenge (and presumably refute) an opponent's assertion. For example, if someone declares that the death penalty for murder is just, the sophist argues that the statement leads to nonsense because granting that the penalty of death for murder is just and that a just punishment is one that is an effICacious deterrent, then it would be equally just to inllict the death penalty for picking pockets (cf. Joyce, p. 281). The conclusion is made possible by the gratuitous insertion of a premiss (granting . . . that a just ... deterrent) which has nothing to do with the original statement. "Another fallacious topic is that dependent on b 30 a>.>.o~ "lIpa .. 6 (non-cause as cause)." naea here as elsewhere in this phrase is best interpreted as "depend upon," or "on aocount of" (a"'I, e.g., 02a 4; cf. Bonitz, Ind,,,, p. S62.12fE b 31 otav"'-;; ... YEY"""'IIL "for example, by reason of the fact that a thing occurred together with or after another...." "for men assume the fact of coming b 31-32 ..0 yap ... A.. ",~oi~QU"L~ after the other ("p fJtn:d. "06"0) to he the.ame as because of the other ("'~ d.d

-ro...ifro)." b 33 :

J Z

otav':'~ C£ fJ78. 2S-27 for the expression. 41J"'''&'IJ~''' 41J",oa61!~QU~ noA.«iao, aida., double accusa-

tive objects of l).ap. understood. Antony was similarly blamed by Cicero for the civil war between Caesar and Pompey, Philippics 2.22.SS (Victorius). On both these Athenians see OCD, PW, CAR, VI (passim). Demades (fl. 3SD-3I9 B.C.) as an active politician was an effective intermediary with Macedoni. (both Philip and Alexander) during the 405 and 30S of the fourth century. It is possible that he was in the pay of Macedon although he was fined along with Demosthenes in the Harpalus affair of 324/3'.3 B.C., the incident which brought to an end the distinguished career of Demosthenes (384-322 B.C.), polirically active as a Scltesman in Athens from the year 3S4. The objective of Demosthenes was to maintain Athenian freedom in the face of the advancing power of Macedonia under Philip and, later, Alexander, the very policy Demodes attacks here. Whether this is the only (Cope, I"trod., pp. 4S£) mention of Demosthenes in the Rhetoric is questioned; c£ 97b 7 : Z, 07" S (of the latter Spengd, p. 37S, remarks that Victorius and others "'1"ithout

02a 3

COMMBNTARY

349

reason" consider this a mention of the fifth-century general, but Cope, III S2, takes it to be a reference to the general). presumably the words ofDemades; cf. Baiter & b 34 1/.£"<' ... "';).£1/.0, Sauppe, II 3IS, frg. 3. It is commonly thought that the war was the conflict with. Philip ending at Chaeroneia in 33 8 B. C., the war which Aeschines, Ag. etesiphon 136 also blamed on Demosthenes' policy. This may be the event referred to, but I do not see any grounds fur certainty on the matter.

Ill.,,,,,...

b 3S This fallacy is a form of the fallacy which fullows and which is also found in SE, i.e., the confusion of absolute and qualified statement, or, as it is commonly called, the fallacy secuMum quid from its Latin formulation jal/a£ia a Jic/o simpliciter ad dictum secundum qUid. This fallacy has a converse: a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter. Something which is stated absolutely (as the first example: Hdeo was free to take the husband she wished) is wrong if it calls for a qualification which is omitted, e.g., naqd n). tA.l,,'P'. (in the example Hden's freedom was qualified as A. points out: .~"de ... ..ve'o,). The limitatiou exemplifies the omission of non (b 3S), a temporal dement qualifying Helen's freedom. A similar Ill,,'P" occurs in the second example. The omission of a necessary qualification of manner (n';;" b 3S) e.g., 6TaP ••• ddt" ..., makes the explanation of hybris taIse. In each example, if the qualified assertion is stated and one argues from it to the unqualified, we have another aspect of this fallacy: namely, that of a dicw secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter, e.g., to strike a free man without cause is .hybris, from which we would falsely infer: to strike a free man is hybris. Tyndareus was her father, and the story is b 36-37 otov ••. """
I,,,.,

02a.2

lIpp....

C£ 73> 13 :

J,

78b 14-IS : J.

liS",,,,,,

> 3 11"<"" .•. For the phrase see LS, liex"', 1.1: "to strike the first blow." Cope, p. 317, has other instances of the phrase. Demosthenes, Ag. Aristocrates So cites the law as making this distinction. > 3-9 l"f •.•. £Ix6, The meaning of this topic has been explained above at olb 3S. The difference from the previous topic is that there the qualified statement was restricted to time and manner while this topic refers to any qualification. Further, from the explanation given through 02a ::18, A. is demonstrating the fallacy involved not in arguing from the unqualified .... serrion to the qualified one but in arguing a dicta secundum quid ad dictum sim-

350

ARISTOTLE, 'RHlITOIIIC' II

02.6

plkiter: from the qualified to the unqualified - or, as he says at SE I66b 38£, "whenever a qualified assertion is taken as an absolute assertion." The point being made in these lines and then developed for rhetoric in the remainder of the paragraph is that false inference is the result of confusing an unqualified (absolute) statement with a qualified (non-absolute) one. In cristics and dialectics and rhetoric this produces apparent inferences; in eristics and dialectics, an apparent syllogism; in rhetoric, an apparent enthymeme. In short, the fallacy results in wrong reasoning in dialectics, for example, in proving that what is not known i. known, or in rhetoric, in demonstrating that the improbable is probable.

a 4 ~P'CJT'''Dit; C£ 7Jf11. I : • for the word as signifying what is mentally challenging, competitive. In discussion of the word in his commentary, I 2II (which is substantially repeated in II 318) Cope suggests that it indicates here a book or treatise as do the words for dialectic and rhetoric which follow. It could also be used, it would appear, for "eristic arguments" as eristics and dialectics are at SE 16sa 38 - 16sb 12; C£ l/48 12 :::1. The word carries two meanings, that noted above ("challenging," etc.) and that signifying "captiou., false reasoning," primarily for the sake of apparent victory just as sophistry infers falsely for the sake of apparent wisdom., SE 171b 24-34At SE 16sb 7-l! A. makes a statement about cristic argunrents similar to our statement here: arguments that infer or appear to infer from premisses that seem to be probable but are not; see also 16zb 3-S. a 4-S ""pm... CN>.ADyLC'I'6~ "an apparent syllogism results from something being stated both absolutely and not absolutely but with a qualification." With ""I1a TO ci:n;lw, ..TA. understand 1.,,01'''.'; ep. SE 166b 37l8. On the meaning of ci:n;lw, c£ S6a 7. The common interpretation of the clause follows essentially that of Cope, e.g., "from the substitution of, the interchange of, the confusion of the absolute with what is not absolute but particular." Certainly the idea but not the Greek.

1'1. solitarium, S. 2896. a 6 .....l ..1> 1'-1) av 1Sv This is the reading of all the codd. and the edd . •ave Ross, Kassd who seclude the final If.. The fallacy resides in a ddiberate confusion of two meanings of .l..." (a) that wbich signifies actual existence, which is the meaning of 'rm in this phrase, and so the second •• is superfluous; and (b) that which indicates that Ian is a mere copula joining a subject and predicate, which is its meaning in the following clause: Ian rae TO I'.q 8'l'iJ II•. a ~8 x ..lll.., ... a... liyvw....ov another example of the fallacy: on the fact that the unknown can be known (bnaT'7/To,) to be unknown (8T~ ll".....

oz. 13

COMMBNTARY

lSI

........) it is argued that the unknown can be known: "to argue that the unknown can be known for the unknown is known as unknown." a 8-9 oG.....~ ••• ..,1 d .. 6~. "So. too. in rh.toric an apparent enthymeme comes from that which is not absolutely probable, but only probable in some respect." This. on what groWlds I caunot say. is commonly turned "on the confusion of some particular probability with absolute probability." This clause responds to a 3: ';''''''/1 ... • /1' ..... & this eristic &IIacy of the exchange of the absolute and qualified statement gives rise to the apparent syllogism such as is found in dial.ctics. so. too. it appears in rh.toric as the apparent enthymeme based on • particular probability raised to an absolute probability. On sI,,&, c£ A Z, 57a 34 - 57b I. 57'1 34 : J.

"'0.'.

"'""<0

a9: 1 refers back: to TI .1,,&,. a particular probability: "But this particular probability is not universally probabl•. " • 'Ay48"", C£ 9Zb 7. a lo-II ftx· ...•1..6.... See Nauck: Il£ Snell. p. 765. ttg. 9. Poetics 1456a 23-25; Dionysius ofHalic.• Epistula ad Ammaeum 18. a 12-13 ylyvemL ••• orO .lx6~ "for that which is contrary to probability does occur and so that which is contrary to probability is ind••d probable." C£Poetics 1461b 15 : "it is probable that what is contrary to probability happens." At a 12 the codd. and edd. read: rl""na, rde TO; Kassel and apparently the scholiast read: "t"...a, "a/l TI <"al>; at a 13 Ross places a comma. not a period. after sbed,. a 13 el U ... EI..6~ This is the conclusion drawn on the previous statement. A. distinguishes on it in the following statement. a 13-16 clU' cNx ... ..,1 dx6~ Her. is the distinction mention.d in the preceding note: we cannot conclude to the absolute statement that the improbable is probable from such evidence. The reason is that necessary qualifications are ignored. i.•.• circumstantial qualifications such as "in respect of." "in relation to." "manner." etc.• which permit on. to make the original statement: namely. that which is contrary to probability does occur. The logic of a 13-16 is clear: just as in eristics such omissions lead to chicanery (';''''''/1 "al ... C11J".'Pa>Tia.) so here in rhetnric ("al mrz;jOa . .. sI"d,) it also CIeates deception. for it is deception when one leaps from a qualified statement to an absolute statement. The structure of the sentence at a 16 ("all..a;;" 8,. ... TI six.,) is elliptical. Literally the sentence reads: "so. too. here because the probability ["«ed TO .•.•17,.,] is not absolute but qualified." It is clear. however. that A. means to say: "so. too. here [in rhetoric] the fact that the probability is not absolute but a qualified probability creates the deception."

A1USTOTLE, 'RHBTOllIC' II

3S2.

o~a

2.2.

1 '
a 17 :

""XV'7

a 18-2.0 ii" '
a 18 alav...
a......

a 2.0 801;.,,, "because it was sure to seem probable." Antiphon, Tetralogy L (J.3 use. this very argument as Spengel, p. 344. noteS. Antiphon (48o-4II B.C.), an Attic orator, was influential in the formation of prose style; c£ OCD, PW (14) and S. 1.93, 3.12.5. The tetralogies, three groups of four speeches (two for prosecution, two for defense) on varied kinds of homicide, were possibly model speeches for his students. a 22-23 '1'..1,,£,<.., ... dp,!"'''' By way of summation and conclusion (,..h> oJ.) A. stateS that both ca.es which he has presented in a 18-2.0 appear to be probable but in one instance we have a true probability, in the other we do not. In the instance of the weak man liable to the charge of p!>ysical

02a 26

COMMBNTARY

353

assault (a 18-19), it is quite probable that he did not attack (jwt as we can also say that it is probable that the strong man did attack). This is the true probael,,6,. In the second instance of the strong man (a 19bility of a 22-23: T6 20) we have the untrue probability. In this instance it is said that it is probable that the strong man made no assault becawe he was bound to be considered the likely candidate. This untrue probability is the qualified probability of a' 23: T6 a. o~X .mAw,. In the very same way one can say of the weak man that ids probable that he made the assault becawe he was not likely to be considered a candidate. In the fint case (a 18-19) we have unqualified probability as .1,,6, is explained at A 2, 573 34 - 57b I. In the second (a 19-20) case we have a qualified probability or what A. calls d .l..6, at a 8-9, 16, and the qualification is the statement at a 20: If« .1"6, ... ME ..v. To raise this second case to the statu. of a general 81..", is an instance of Agathon's generalization that "the improbable is probable." This makes for the sophistry """otpa1lTiav (a IS) which A. speaks of, the sophistry described in the concluding lines of the chapter (a 23-28). Such argumentation he claims (a 2627) is counterfeit, built on apparent and not genuine probability. This interpretation of a 22-23, as far as I can see, not only explains A.'s comment here, but, more important, the logical connection with what follows at a 23-:;08.

,av

a 23-24 ""II ........." ... ,,, C£ Cicero, Brutus 8.3D-3r. Such, says Socrates (plato, Apol. I8b), was one of the charges leveled against him, a charge picked up in the Clouds of Ari.tophanes where at 889-II04 we have a debate between "e81TTOJv and "..-TOJV .10)10', right and wrong logic, in which the "better" argument naturally finds the going difficult with a self-assured "inferinr" argument. a 25 ...0 Dp........yop"" • ..;uyyu-p.cz I.e. "the profession" of Protagoras (?490-?42O B.C.), a very well-known Sophist to whom Plato devoted a dialogue. This together with other dialogues of Plato is the major source for Protagora' thought which, perhaps, is best characterized for many by his dictum: ."man is the measure of all things, of the existence of those that are and the non-existence of those that are not" (plato, TheOBt. IS2a). c£ OCD, PW (I), Guthrie, Greek Philosophy, III 262-69. What appears to be called a "fraud" here is the teachiog a 26 ojI£ij&o~ of Protagoras grounded in the lrind of relativism which we assume to be identified with him: namely, the acceptability of arguing either side of a question as expediency demanded. Troth was rdative, not absolute, and apparently if certain lrinds of improbability seemed probabilities to the individual, he could legitimately we them in argument, thw engaging in what Dionysiw of Halicamassw called that "most maliciow of arguments that the improbable is at times probable" (Epistula ad Ammaeum I 8).

354

AllISTOTLE, tRHBTOB.IC' II

02> 27

a 27 : J !ll' €v Ross alone reads dU' with Gomperz. Of this Kassel remarks "possibly right"; he rejects cLUd but does refer to Denniston (p. 4), who cites this passage and remarks "Here the rendering 'except' seems to be absolutely necessary.•.• Outside Anstode I can find no parallel except S. OT 1332•••• " 2 P'ITap,xii As should be clear from A I, SSb 17-2.1, there i. no word for false rhetoric or the misuse of rhetoric as there is for false dialectic, which is called sophistry. We have only 2j e'1"oe"'oj, which here denotes bad rhetoric. C£ ssb 17-2.1.

CHAPTER 25

I . Introduction: 02a 30-37

refutation of enthymemes by counrasyllogism or objection (enstasis)

II . Dcvdopment: 02« 37 - 03a IS I. oaa 37 - ozb 13 (0) 02a37-0.b4

(6) o>b 4-'1 (e) o>b 7-9 (J) o>b 9-J]

•. mb 13 - 03' IS (0) o>b J3-ZJ (6) o>b ZJ - 0 ] " (e) 0] ......5 (J) 03' 5-JO (.) ola Jo-I5

oza 28-29 "cal ",.pl ... • lp......, end of chap. 24-

the different kind. of objection &om the opponent·, eothymeme &om aD opposite &om. like fiom the judgmeoa penon.

of well-known

the different kinds of enthymetne and their refutation four kinds of eothymeme refutation of an eik:0I eothymeme refutation of semeia eothymomes refutation of • paradcigmatic eothythe tekmcrion eothymeme

Kassel alone places these lin.. at the

a 30 : 1 ).U ......~ This chapra on refutation is fairly sdf-explmatory in its analysis of the method. Afra the presentation of the varied ways in which one em argue by enthymeme validly (chap. :1.3) and sophistically (chap. 24), A. introduces the student to the methods of challenging the validity or exposing the falseness of such arguments. While in SOtne ways this chapra is compared with the concluding chapters of SE (chaps. 16-33), those chapters are primarily concerned with the refutation of fallacious reasoning. In the Rhetoric refutation is analyzed in terms of any kind of rhetorical inference. Apart from Top. S.IO there is no comparable discussion of ADa., in the Topia; and S.IO is dilIercnt from the Rhetoric. So, too, the discussion of lpf1Taa" in An. Pr. 2.26 dilfers from our dlscussion by analy:>.ing 1lll11:aa" in terms of syllogistic figures. I have briefly looked at SOtne of these problems in Studies, pp. 100-103. There is a running analysis of the whole chapra in Cope, Inlrod., pp. w,--,6. A. introduces the matter again at r 17, Isb 2-'3. On the

ARISTOTLB, 'RHBTORIC' II

02a 35

cluracter of refutation Ci=, De o,al. 2.53.215 repeats the twofuld classification we find here, i.e., counter-syllogism, and objection raised against one of the premisses in the opponent's >argument. other references to "refutation" in Greek or Latin authors should be examined with care since they probably are speaking about refutation as a part of the speech (exordium, narration, con£rmation, refutation, peroration). Tn our chapter A. is more concerned with an analysis of the technique of counter-argumentation. As he remarks. all inferences which reason to a false conclusion must be refuted (Audo.) by demolishing that which is the source of the fallacy (Top. 160b 23-24). At SE 1761> 29-36 and 179b 23-34 he specifies AVu" as the exposure offalse reasoning with respect to that which makes it false. And so it is that in this chapter his interest is in explaining the mechanics of handling the kind of false reasoning which is possible in rhetorical discourse. • ixcip.ovci~ laTL~ C£ 75" 22 : 3. " 31 : 1 e1p"p.~..... enthymemes.

i.e., both real (chap. 23) and apparent (chap. 24)

• olv"'Lau).).Oy"'ci:p.ov~ "either by stating a counter-syllogism"; together with iv"'''O.TCI \,or by bringing an objection") it is an accusative agreeing with the understood subject of A15.... A counter-syllogism would conclude to the opposite of the syllogism it refutes, and this is what A. calls at SE 170b I-II an l'.,,%o,: a refutative syllogism which concludes to the contradictory of what was affirmed.

"33 Clu...;;;~> ...ci""", i.e., the common topics of elIap. 23 (for valid enthymemes) and of elIap. 24 (for invalid).

l.aooa can be correctly desctibed as gen" a 33~34 01 p.~ .•. ~6ei~o>V erally accepted opinions of suelI • character that they are entertained by reputable people; C£ Top. locb 21-23. Dialectic and rhetoric use b60Ea in argumentation; cpo A I, 55a 1"7-18 and 2, 56b 33-35 (o~a• ... a.a'.'m"~). Ai: a 34-35 in the statement on opinions (aO"O;;.Ta) we have the reason for the possibility of counter-syllogismJenthymeme; c£ 02b 21-25 (TO a••1"0," ... rIJlaYHaioJl). " 35 lva...ci:a..~ •• IIT<1//" in the passive has as one of its meanings to "stand in the way of, to block," and so in logic to "object"; cpo 02b 25. The noun would appear to have two meanings fur A. (c£ Studies, p. 101). Tn the Rheto,ic we find the word at 97a 5 (a reference to our present chapter), in this chapter at 02a 35, 02b 2,5, 12,23,29, 37, at 03a 27,31-33; r 17, I8b 6. Tn all the.e places with one exception (see below) the explanation of enstasis given at An. P,. 69a 37 would fit the text: namely, "enstasis is a premiss contrary to another premiss"; c£ also 69b r, 28-31 whielI indicate that it is a proposition (Premiss) introduced as an objection to another statement. This inter-

COMMENTAllY

357

pret:ation is confumed by the remark in the final chaptet at 03a 31-33: "an enstasis is not an enthymeme but comists in stating a received opinion"; C£ 03a 33. Further. with one exception. each of the examples of CDStasis between 02a 35 and 02b 13 tolerates this meaning. The exception is at 02b 2-3: ",aua loa6.,. "'O"'leo.. and it brings us to the second meaning of enstasis found in Top. lIoa II: "emtasis will be an argument [i.e.. dialectical syll<>gismj against. thesis." This understanding of enstasis as an inferential process (found also in An. Pr. 6gb I - 70a 36 in a chaptet which as seen above also calls enstasis a premiss) does make it difficult to diJferentiate between refutation by countet-syllogism and refutation by custasis. e.g.• 02a 31-3:1. and Isb 6. The refutation offered at02b 2-3. "all want is an evil." does callforsorne kind of inferential procedure to refute the statement "love is good." Or are we to assume that everyone knows that love in one respect represents a need in the individual (on love as a need c£ Plato, Symp. I99o-:l.ooe)? By the same token it is possible to see how both meanings (premiss, syllogism) may be compatible. and to do so in An. Pr. 69a 37 - 70a 1 (i.e., :1..:1.6): emtasis as a premiss which is contrary to another premiss may have to be established as a valid counterstatement by the usc of inference. This would be the case with "all want is an evil" as an objection to "love is good.." Cpo Ross, Analyties, pp. 492-95·

.....

P'IJt...~ This is to clie best of our knowledge a a 36 : 1 ..o,,,,,o,~, reference not to the Topies but to the larger body ofhis writings on dialectics . in general; it is similar to the usc at Stib 13. S8a 29, and cpo ssa 9. The fact is that we have in the Topies no division of ..
a 37 : 1 Ev"v-.lou See 02b 4--'7; cpo 973 7 : 2, Top. II4b 6-15. and see Iub '-7 - 1I4a 6 (9:za 9--u). • ,.E.,p,,",,,,,,, Cpo 9Sb 20 - 99a 6, 98b 20, glib 20--25; 9Sb 32f[; on use, 02b 9-13.

02b

I

cmou8"io~

Cf. (b) in 6Ia 25 : •.

b 2 : 1 8,X"'~ a general or particular statement as an objection is also mentioned at An. Pr.69b 1-3. The two arc exemplified at 02b 2--3. On HaBoAov, "aTa peeo" see S4b 5.

02b 12

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' [[

• or.."".....

Same construction as at

02a

3I

: 2,

but here with

Eun U" ••• '!!'derstood, i.e., "it is possible for one to speak generally and to say that. ..• b 3 K ..u...,o~ a proverbial expression for forbidden love, one that is morally wrong. Caunus, as the story is told, was passionately fond of his sister Byblis, or she of him. To avoid the rdationship he went to Carla and founded the city Byblis. Ovid. M£I. 9-4S4~6S tells the story; cf. PW, Kaunos (3) Byblis (4).

b 4 btl5~ ...oi:i "in the case of. .."; the reading of all thecodd.and Kassd. The other edd., Cope read Spengd'. correction dna (p. 346). See o20b 7. b

s

6 ci.y..eD~

on the article,

.s..,. 22 : 4.

b 6 W ..o,.i, cUl.' ..u5' Ross alone reads dU'; cp, {IT. at b 8. Cf. Denniston, pp. 23-24 on dU' o~a.: "why not even...."

b 7 btl 5£ """" 6...... """', ot ii" is apparently the reading of all the codd. and ofKassd for the dnd 6~ TO;; o!'olov, olo. read by the other edd. Spengd conjectures dna; Roemer, or..; Spengd and Cope omit oro.. Cf. Top. 1I4b 25-36.

b 8-10 &.... , 'Pu,oi:i..."

Gaisford, p. 344, cites Victorius for the following comment on these lines (the comment is not in my copy). Victorius notes that this way of objecting from a like statement is the same as the one which immediatdy precedes it, i.e., from a contrary statement. For the "illgsed" are opposite to the "well-treated," and leto hate" is opposite to "to like." But, he continues, it is also an example for what it claims to be since those who always hate because they have been harmed are like to those who always love because they have been treated well. Spengd, p. 347, apparently did not agree with this for he claims that a more apt example is called for since the one given also exemplifies an objection from a contrary statement; see also Jebb & Sandys, p. 138n3. Victorius' answer to that (as cited by Gaisford) would be: ''There is no difficulty with the same instance exemplifying diJfering arguments understood in clillering ways." On ill' o~d' cf. O2ob 6. !rIO xp(a..~ ... yvwpl""", Judgments are acts made after ddibcration and reBection. Those of distinguished individuals are taken by A. to carry added weight because the very fact of their distinction marks the respect in which they are or were hdd by men, e.g., A IS, 7sb 26 - 76a 13 (where he speaks of "men of repute whose judgments are well known"); cf. 98b 20 99a 6.

b

cf.

89a

16.

02b 16

b 12

COMMBNTARY

359

C£ Pol.

I274b 18-23 where his "special" law on a heavier penalty fur assault when drunk is mentioned as it is also by D. Laertiw, Lives: Pittacus 1.76. Cope cites to the point EN II 13 b 30-33: the penalty fur drunken assault was twice the ordinary penalty becawe it is in the control of the offender not to become drunk. The verb is in the past potential; See S. 1785. ,,"o..o8EnjcrEII

.,,01

b 13-15 8l ... I .... , 8l .." ..,... "Inasmuch as enthymemes are detived fIom ... and these fuur sources are ... , some of them come fIom. ..." The modern English translations ignore ind.

>i........

b 13 """'..

Spengd gives the word a larger extension than that met in A 2, B 20 and refers the meaning to s6a 3-4 ("laT." do a~T.p T.p Ao"q> TO;; ...v.a. II tpalv.a9a. ...v.a.). In this way he would include "aeda"'Ypa under lvIMp'lpa. I do not accept this interpretation of s6a 3-4, e.g., Stia 3 : 3. See also S6a 35 - S6b II or 93a 24-25 where A. calls the two the "OLVa! "lar•• ,. Further I do not view Spengd's comment ("Nunc et "aeda.''Ypa in numerum enthymernatum referre licet'') as correct or necessary. It is not necessary as will be seen; and it /lies in the face of the constant distinctionmade between the two in the whole work, e.g., S7"n - s8a2.

a.a

a••

a••

b 14 : 1 ..t......p.. I have discussed these four sources in St..dies, pp. 104IS, as well as the seeming contradiction with statements in A, to say nothing of B 20, occosioned by the introduction of naeda.''Ypa as a source of enthymeme. In the context of the chapter A. is saying that enthymemes come £rom these sources and that such enthymesnes are open to objection becawe of either their inferential form or the statement of their premisses. Even the irrefutable enthymeme fIom infallible sign, the T."p>le'''' can be challenged on what it alleges as a fact, e.g., 03a 12-13. z elxo~ ... "'11"".... On 01"&, C£ S?a34 : 2, J, Grimaldi, "EfJp .... 0.," 389-90, ]95--97. On "aeda."Ypa: s6b 5 : 3, S7b 27 : 2, S?a 15-16; 93a 28 - 94" 19 with 1l0tes. On TB"p>le'oP; S7b 4. and on dvay"aiov, another name for the necessary sign (e.g., 02b 19): S?an : 1. On G'}p••ov: 57b I : " S7b 10-21. See also Studks, pp. 104-15; "1:fJp
2fYT-76. b 15-16 ,,"!,lv ... olx6........ "Some enthymemes drawn fIom ["""fI'Y""" va] what generally happens [TW' cr., h! TO noAv, S?a 34 : J) in fact or seemingly so are enthymesnes fIom probabilities." This is the reading of b 16-17 .." 8l 8,' .""'Y"'yij~ 8." ..oil ,,!,olou all the codd. and of Cope, Tovar, Freese (Loeb). Spengd, Roemer, Dufour, Kassd seclude a.' hayt»yii,; Ross reads I" TO;; 6polov with Richards, p. III. Dissatisfaction with the text probably begins with Victoriw who thought that a.d (2) should be dropped and the phrase interpreted: "other enthymemes

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' II

02b 21

are from the induction of a like instance either one or several." The text as it stands is aceeptable, and I would retain it: "other enthymemes come by way of induction from one or several like instances." The enthymeme A. speaks of here is the one whose source is n:aea6 ..y,.a, which at A 2, 57b 27 is called may.,,,>! or the inductive method of proving. This, of COllISe, is part of the problem (see O2b 13) since n:aea6 ..y,.a as a coordinate method of demonstration with blM,.7J,.a in the Rhetoric (mduction and deduction) is not something that is a part of enthymeme, O2b 13 (C£ the references in 02b 14 : z). See the next note. "whenever one by assuming the univerb 17-18 3TClV Aa(3cl>v ••• I'.po~ sal reasons deductivdy to the particular instances"; on "a6<110v - "aTa ,.ieo~ cf. 54b 5. From the analysis of n:aeda.'y,.a at 57b 26-30 - narndy, that it reasons from part to part, like to like - Vater, pp. 137-38, would drop this clause as one at odds with such an explanation. However, what A. says is perfectly correct. In order that an example be understood to be an example, one must in knowing the particular thing intuir the universal principle inherent in it which it shares with other things and thereby becomes an example; cf. 57b 27 : 2. This is what A. means when he says "by assuming the universal." This is what gives the person a probable universal premiss from which to "reason deductivdy to particular instances," e.g., from the example at S7b 20-36: the probable universal premiss is: "all who ask for a bodyguard are aiming at tyranny." b 19 vahlen's conjecture read by all the edel., Spei1gd, Cope. See O2b 3I; Cope, p. 328, cites a number of instances confirming this usage with d.ay"aio>: "enthymemes based upon that which is always and necessarily what it is." b 20-21 Ttl &. &'tI . . . '"11'£""" "Those enthymemes expressed by means of a universal or particular proposition whether true or not are sign enthymemes." Ross alone reads "a6&10v ["1 ...06. On the statement see 57& 10-21 and An. Pr. 700 3 -70b 37. In the interpretation given I understand 11 with id. 11• ... ,.>1; Cope (ad loc.) calls this "a rare ellipse of the subjunctive mood of elva" II

T.

b 21 - 03a 2 TO s. £txo~ ... El"o~ I'iill.ov As Spengd, p. 348, notes, ml TO "olv (02b Victorius (p. 443), Vater (p. 138) consider Td a~ 21-22) an insertion from a marginal note. Spengd disagrees, saying that zfter presenting the sources of enthymemes A. undertakes to show how each source can be refuted. Thus he returns here (02b 21 - 03a 2) to the first of the four, i.e., el"d" and at ala 2-I5 to fl7Jpsia, xa.eade&ypa. TBH"'''e'OV. While I would not remove the phrase, which also appears in the scholiast Anonymus, it is an awkward intrusion. I would resolve the logical articulation of

.l"d, ...

COMMBNTARY

o~b I3-~5 in which it appears in this way. There is a protasis at o~b I3-U (hr.t . .. ) which is followed by an apedosis at ~b ~:1.-~5 ('1"17Bedv • .•):

(13-21) Seeing that (hrB'1 enthymemes come from the four following sources. (21-2» and seeing that el"o~ means that which is generally true, (22-25) it is clear that enthymemes based on el"o~ (TOIaiiTa) can be refuted. This is then developed into an explanation of what a refutation of the probable means (o~b Z5-JI). the dif!iculty experienced by the auditors with such a

refutation (02b 31-35). and the way to counteract this diflieulty (02b 3503a 2). Cope. Introd.• pp. 271-'74. offers a loose paraphrase of 02b 21 - 03" 2. b

23

TOUZUTI1... lfCH't ,,"UCtY

i.e., enthymemes whose source is tlHor;;

but the fact is that all the sources except Te",..7je"" are sources of probable argumentation. Spengel cites as an example of the refutation of probable arguments AIltiphon. Tetml. III.y.z. b 24 .u1Jei)~ 6:d

"not always genuine"; Kassel alone secludes dBi.

b 24-~5 ~ ycip II... , ... 6:VOtY"Ot'OV "For the one who brings an objection offers a refutation not that the statement challenged is not a probable statement but that it is not a necessary statement." See following note. b 25 iv,.....ci"."o~ C£ 02a 35 on the word. The reason why the refutation is only an apparent and not a real refutation is that it must show that the statement which is being rejected is not a probable statement. which is all that it professes to be. To argue in refuting such a statement that it is not a necessary statement is no refutation, only an apparent refutation. Thus it is of no help in refuting the statement that all who seek a bodyguard are ainIing at tyranny to assert that this does not necessarily follow. The statement does not pretend to assert a necessary connection between subject and predicate but only a probable one. To refute it one must show that the asserted connection is not probable. C£ 60a 30 : 1. Spengel remarks (pp. 349-50) that b ~6 ""• .,..x....'V the orators db not agree. e.g.. Dernosthenes. On the Crown 6-7; Demades. On the Twelve Years 3 (the authenticity of the speech is questioned); lsocrates. Antidosis 17-19; Andocides. On the Mysteries 6; Lysias. On the Prop.rty of

Atistophanes 2-3. b ~7 : 1 1tOtpcz).oy,afLCN "False rea.oning "and the fallacy which causes the false reasoning ("aeaJ.oy'C&,.. ..o~. b 3~) on the part of the auditor is that explained in 02b ~5 and stated here in more detail at b 27-3 I; e.g.• you refute a probable statement or inference only by showing that it is not probable. 3 l1tEl ycip This introduces a number of statements whose consequence is at b 31 (d dA "e'T~~ ...). e.g.• "since the prosecutor proves ...• and since it is not the same thing to refute ... and since the probable statement

ARISTOTLE. 'RHETORIC' II

o2b 38

is always open to objection ... , the consequence is [6 dB "IJ'T~' ... b 3I] that the judge, if the .tatement is refuted in this way [i.e., as not necessary], reasoning falsely, as we said, thinks that the conclusion is not probable or that he must not decide the mattet." c£ ssa IO. b 28-3 I lenL 6E 06 ... Xld a.vaYXlliov· I would read this without any punctuation save a comma before it and a colon at the end as Spenge!, Cope, Kassel do. Tovar uses acceptable parentheses before and after with the colon. Ross reads the first part of the sentence as Spongel etc., but reads 30£ as: (0'; yae "" 11.,.' dBI slxo" del xal d.ayxaio.) followed by a comma; Roemer, Dufour punctuate b 28-3 I with dashes before and after and a colon at the end. At b 30 the edd. (save Ross who reads as cited above) read with Vablen: ; Cope omits it.

n

c£ ozb 27 : 2. The reading is that of the edd., b 3I iiv o6-n.> ).u8ij Spcngel, accepting Bonitz' change of the codd. lAuD,!. Cope accepts lAu8,!, reading .1 oOTo), ll.JB>7 with Bekker. Cpo s~ 22 : I, COMMENTARY I 355. Ross alone enclose. b 33-35 in parentheses (0'; yae . .. "e'.ew).

b 33 ""Ilyxcd"",

b 34-35 yvW,''"n··· a.pllJ'<"fI

7sa 29 : 4.

b 35-36 oGxouv ...• lxo~ "And so it is not sufficient to refute [a. Ava!1, general condition] by showing that the statement is not necessary but one must refute by showing that it is not probable." This rc-states by way of conclusion the problem with refuting the probable introduced at b 21-25, and b 2831.

37

b "ii).).ov ... "0).,, i.e., if the objection is "a more probable statement." For the use of "probable" here sec A 2, 57" 34. In Antiphon's Tetralogy III.y.:>. a refutative argument is urged as etxoneo, (more probable).

This is the twofold way whereby an b 38 : 1 XPOv'l"" "pciy"llalV enstasis becomes more probable. There are difficulties with the interpretation (and so the meaning) of both words, as a glance at Cope, p. 329, and [ntrod., p. :>'74, Jebb & Sandys, p. '40H:>', and Spengel, p. JI5, will reveal. "Facts" is the common interpretation of "edy,.aalV. I would accept that, or uactions," "circumstances," "incidents." The problem. is with xedvcp. If we assume fiom the context (e.g., b 25-28) that A. has only judicial rhetoric in mind here, then an interpretation of the word such as that of Cope, Jebb & Sandy. is normal, i.e., "time" when the action 'took place. This is acceptable, and such a meaning could apply in fact to other kinds of discourse. However, I am inclined to interpret ;ceo''!' (literally, "by means of time") as the scholiast Anonymas did and, later, Victorius, i.e., "by the frequency (of the act)." Tbis would mean that an enstasis by xew'!' cites more instances which are qpposite

·COMMBNTARY

OJ' 5

to what is claimed by the opponent. I find this meaning (which Cope says is impossible for xeoo'P) more likely, but I cannot offer an instance of xeo,o, so used. Still those points must be considered which make such an interpretation seem "more likely." At oja I in explanation of what he means by the statement the codd. read: sl yde Tel ""Bovd,,,, oih:w, ... (on which see 03a x). This means: "For if things (happen) in a similar way [OilT.,,] with more frequency ["lB••We.,], this is more probable." Further, the scholiast interpreting this Oja I reading of d,e codd. specifically in terms of time (dncl TO;; xeoo.,,) and action (dnd TO;; "edypaT.') understands it to mean: "If a larger number of incidents [Td nA.l.oa Tlii. "eayp,lT.,.] are such as I say and the incidents are more frequent [xai nABovd."" -liTO' bd l'cihl n:o .U.wv • xedvru,,], etc." Further still, we know (see Oja 5..{i) that enthymemes drawn from examples are refuted in the same way as those drawn from probabilities. But as can be seen at oja 5-10 both the idea of frequency of incident and similar incidents are stressed in Td "lei", ;j "i.e ••We., at oJa 7-8. It is quite possible, I would say, dIat with the sense of this whole passage (o2.b 3S - Oja ra) in mind as well as the schaliast's gloss Vicrorius conjectured as the reading of Oja I: el yde Td <",i.e/OJ "al> ",l ••• ,;".,. TherefOre I would understand the words in this way: xeo,'P, the sanle thing repeated a number of times; "'edypaa.., other instances or acts similar to it. For example, if I show that a man has violated the speed limit a number of times (xeo0'P) and has committed other violations - e.g., neglected traflic signals, passed other vehicles on the wrong side, ignored stop signs ("edypaaIV) - my objection to his probable innocence of traveling 80 miles an hour i~ a 40 mile an hour zo~~ is de£ini~~,more pro~ble. .. 2 xup ...........'" an adverb: best of all, most effecavely. ot y/&p "4 1 ",lB.VI"", which is read by Dufour, Tovar, Ross; Bottin, p. j2., finds Roemer's adaptation of Victorius supported by the Arab tradition. Roemer's I92.J ed. has an extra Td. 03a I

a 2r-5 AUo..""... aVa
1

"C'oiC; 1'CpW't'Dl4i

•

niiy '''I!,-orav

i.e.,

A

2.

57b

rO-I4, 17-21.

TB"poje'.p is a a~pe'.' - e.g., 57b 1-5 - but it is

nDt refutable, a, he al,o says at 57b 5-10, 14-17.

a5:

J

aVa
e.g., An. Pr. 2.2.7.

"against enthymemes based on examples"; cpo 56b 2.I-2.j where a distinction is made between enthymernatic and paradeigmatic rhetoric and speakers. In this chapter, however, A. speaks about 2

1<.. p..s"y!'-",""W5"1)

03a 15

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

the refutation of enthymemes, and here of those developed from example (02b I4). a 6 <&6..-l) ••• 01..0.... sc. ("ed~ .a) .I,,&.a: "the refutation is the same as that of probabilities," i.e., that found at 02b 21 - 03a 2. In the light of what we find at a 7-8 (.0. "kt., ... "l.o.a,,,~) we should keep in mind 02b 38 : I, ola I. On mlnj ... "at cf. Herodotus, 4.109. In the following note there is a ttanslation of 03a 5- ro. a 6-10 Uv"<€ yap ... Ix-' The edd., Spengel, Cope agree fairly much on the Greek of these lilles, which is that of the codd., with the exception at a 7 of .1 "al .d from the scholiast. The following co~ectures are found among the edd.: a 6: <"'>from VahIen and read by all except SpengeJ. Cope.

a 7: el "al Ta, from the ,choliast', reading; Spenge! accepts only .1 "ai. a 8: Ross places a comma not a colon after all.,,; Tovar reads la. as; Cope places a comma before, not after, oifr",; Kassel seeludes lW"" ... "Aeo.""")' a 9: Kassel conjectures 1>, paXeT....

In the following interpretation I accept both the text and the punctuation

usually read by the edd.; if I diverge from either I indicate it in a parenthesis. The intent of the passage is to show two ways to refute enthymemes from example, e.g., (a) a 6-8, (6) a 8-ro. "The refutation of enthymemes based on example is the same as that for those based on probabilities; for if we have one negative instance, there is a refutation, since the argument is not a necessary argument, even though there are more [i.e., diverse?] examples or several in,tance, of the example on the opponent's side; on the other hand, if[lo.. ~s] tIlere are more examples or several instances of the example favoring the opponent, we must contend that his present example is unlike those examples or shows dissimilarities or at least has some difference." Kassel, Vcr Text, pp. 143-44, explains his changes at a 8-9. Bottin discusses a 5-9 at length (pp. 33-39); on p. 38 he offCrs a summary account of his interpretation.

Cpo ola 5:

2.

a II 1CII"<,z "'~ ••• 4uulloy",.."" "on the ground of not forming a valid syllogism." The statement is answered at a 12: k""eTa. d'. a 12 liv,""....,""'"

C£ ola 5 :

I.

"£YO"'' ' ' '

a 13 "<0 "the fact alleged." But if, as A. goes on to say, the fact is true and it is a .."p>le'o, (on which see o2b 14 : a) there can be no refu-

tation. a I 5 1i,,0&€'1i~

"Fat the whole statement becomes at once a manifi:st

demonstration," i.e.. a reasoning from premisses that are alone read dnoa.t~B' from a good tradition.

true.

Cope, Freese

CHAPTER 26 I . 03a 17-25 II . 03a 25-33 III· 03a34-03b 2

amplification/depreciation is not a of enthymeme

TO".,

refutative and demonstrative enthymemes are not different in kind conclusion CO first two books and transition CO the third

03a 17 : I oW &'
366

ARISTOTLE, 'BHBTORIC' II

03' 19

4-'7, 92a 8 - 93' 21, Studin, pp. 36-38. On amplification/depreciation itself, .ee 93' 9-18 with notes; cpo olb S, 75.8 : 3. lu the "0"'& are explained by A., it can be seen th.t they form a general category applicable to all argwnentation. In this respect they are, like the common topics, basic components for reasoned discourse. lu the ". TOnO. are forms of inference for reasoning on the subject matter of rhetoric, the "0<>" are neces.ary specifications of that subject matter if one is to .peak intelligently. For some reason A. mentions here only amplification/depreciation, but the other "0"'", possible/impossible, past, present, foture fact, conld also be cited since what he says at a 20-23 could also apply to them; i.e., amplification/depreciation, just/mUust, etc. are constitutive aspects of the subject matter about which one reasons by syllogisms or enthymeme. We can see the point be is making at A 7 in the discussion of the greater good (ddiberative rhetoric); at A 9 (670 23-28, 68a 26-33), tbe more honorable (epideictic); and atA 14, the greater injustice Uudicial).

a 18 TO yap ..• TllmIV C£ 96b 21-22 and 96b 21-22, s8a 3S. We find category to which different kinds of enthymeme bdong (a 18-19). The point at issue in a 17-'5 is that aiJ~.w /I'",ov.is not > TO"O' i ... 8vl'fJl'aTO,. From the Rhetoric, however, there is no reason, with one exception, to think that aiJ~...JI'.IO;;" should be a topic of enthymeme. The one exception is at 97b U-'7 where the topic ofmorefless is given as one of the common topics of enthymeme. But this topic of more/less (l'iillo.MTTOV) is not the same as amplification/depreciation (aiJ~."'/I'.loiW). To amplify, enlarge, show the greatness of something, or, the opposite, to minimize, diminish it is to sdect dements directly or indirectly rdated to the subject which will enhance or depreciate it, indicate its importance or insignificance. To use the topic of more/less is to construct an argument either from the intrinsic nature of the subject matter or from a comparison of the subject with something dse in an attempt to demonstrate that something can or cannot be. The topic more/less is in fact the argument. fortiore/a minore/a pari, or what is known as the argument from comparison with a greater, or a smaller, or an equal. See the references to the Topics II4b 37lE, Cicero, Quintilian, etc. in 97b 12 : 2. On Tli"o. C£ S8a 2, Studies, pp. IIS-19; on the common topics, c£ S8a II, Studin, pp. 129-3S; on the particular topics, . c£ S8a 17, S8a 27-28, S9b 25-]2, Studies, pp. 122-29. a 19-22 TO Ii' ,,is;£,v ... 6T'oUv At a 20 1wonld agree with the seclusion of .,,8"l'fJl'aTa (Studies, p. 49) which appears in all the codd. and in Ano!,ymus

03a 26

COMMENTAllY

but is secluded by all the edd. except Ross, Cope. It also appears in Freese and in most English versions. What A. is apparendy saying is that greatness and smallness (achieved by means of ailEe••/,...'0;;") is one of the things like justice{ injustice, goodness/badness, the honorable/the dishonorable (i.e., the dl., of rhetOric, 58b 8-29) which the speaker (writer) attempts to demonstrate about the subject of discourse. such attributes of the subject can be proven in ways other than byenthymeme, e.g., by example, simple narration, etc. Thus there is no rcason to limit such demonstration to "enthymemes." Further, A. makes it clear (a 23: "eel Ii ... W8v,..>i,..aTa) that he is speaking about the subject m2tter enthymcmes utilize, not about the &mns of inference (T."O.) enthymemes take. The two arc different, as he says at a 23-24: Olen' .z ... TO"O,. I would interpret: "Amplification/depreciation has as its object to show that the subject is significant or insignificant, just as one shows [se. dBI"""a.] that a subject is good or bad, just or unjust, or anything else of that character." C£ his brief comments on this point in the Poetics 56b I and 4. a 21-22 tlyu86v ... Ii&ucav

C£ references at the end of 03a 17 : 2.

a 23 ...pi a . . . i.e., the subject matter of rhetOrical discourse as it is presented in genere atA 3, 58b 6 - 59a 10 as well as 59a II-29. a 25 : 1 .... AUTUC" se. bBv,..>i,..aTa; on refutation and its kinds, e£ chap. 25 where the refutative syllogism (enthymeme in rhetoric) was merely mentioned (oza 31-35). However, in that mention the grounds for the comments here at 03a 25-31, particularly 03a 29-30, Olan ..• d",,,."eoo, arc given at 02' 32-33 (dijl..... "0 ••••). On the refutative enthymeme, e£ Studies, pp. IOD-roI. 2 d&6~ .., "Nor arc refutative enthymemes some one specific kind; for it is clear ... "; e£ 96b 23-28 (laT<• ... <11I>a"s ..). In this earlier passage A. says that there arc .rd'1 .!vo of enthymemes. It is clear, however, that he means by the words simply two types of the same thing: namdy, two types of enthymcmes as there are two types of syllogism, one to demonstrate, one to refute. For example, lMyxo" which is the other eldo, of syllogism (96b 26-28), is defined dsewhere as In definition both types of enthymemes (as also syllogism) arc the same. Any diJference between them is accidental. It is not a specific difference (sldo, understood as species). He emphasizes this point when he says here (a 30) that both types use the same topics as forma of inference. The reason for his taking up the point is no more clear than that for the discussion of amplification. 3 [.nAo'nilv x ......"xou......'ICCiIvI This is secluded by the edd. and Spengd. Cope, Freese read it, and it appears in the English versions, e.g., "another kind from constructive syllogisms." On ""TaaxBtlaen•..aw, 5910 14-

""Alo".a,...,.

a 26 i\ &o(~l1~ "either by proving"; and from the conteXt "prove" means to make an inference. None of the edd., Spengd, Cope reads the ,;

rISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II

found according

to

Kassel (who secludes it) in many of the codd., e.g., [oj

a.IE",. a 27 :

1

lv.......,,'v C£ 02a 3S, 02a 3S - 02b 3. ~11:o&£,xWou",v "(by the first [i.e.,

a.tEa.]) they demonstrate in reply the opposite (of the opponent's conclusion)." The plural is read by all the edd. save Ross. Cope reads it; Spengel favors the singular (which is Ross's reading). 3 ......",&11'£11011 C£ 92& !rIl. The explanation of refutation by the rhetorical syllogism, which is the subject of these lines (a 27-31), was described at 02a 31-32 as d....."".uorl~.a8aL As the refutativc enthymeme is described here, "they prove in answer the opposite (of what was proven)," it is the definition of found .t SE I6S' 2-3: "refutation is • syllogism which entails the contradiction of a given conclusion." 2

.).."''0'

a 2!r3I Ei1J [iI] &"ltI'OP«' ..oi~ ... 'P~pCNCrLV Ros., Kassel, Spenge!
TO', ...

a 30: 1 ...i~ ~..oi~ Since enthymemes are spoken of (e.g., a 25-31), I would understand these words to refer to the topics (particular or general, i.e., to content or form of the argument), and I notice so does the scholiast Anonymus. See also oz. 31-33. 2 Ih:, ya.p rde = "since," "seeing that"; "Since they present cnthymemes to show ..." a 31 lv......,,~ C£ 02a 3S, particularly the first part of the note, which speaks of enstasis as"in objection, which is what A. intends here. On the other han~ as is pointed out in the rest of the note, it is not so certain from Top. I60b 23 - I6Ia IS or An. Pr. 69a 37 - 7D" I, or indeed from the Rlrttoric itself at ozb 2-3 (I) rde "a8o).ov . .. "O"'7eo.) that enstasis is simply an objection to a premiss, as explained at 023 35 - 02b 13. 'r011:'''O~

C£

c£ Studies, pp. IOD-I03.

36 : 1. However, see Vahlen, "Kritik arise. schriftcn." '40, and Brandis, p. 22, who understand it to refer only· to

a 32 :

1

02a

the Topics. 2

&cI~"v

opinion, view. Some such opinions were set forth at

02b 1-13. a 33 ~ fi~ ... £D.1J'P£1I This is a good explanation of l.aTaa.. as 3 propositional statement directed against the opponent's reasoning. For it includes an objection to formal or material error·in the reasoning. One presents an objection to the inference itself by showing either that a premiss is wrongly used and so the inference does not give the conclusion stated (an error in form; 06 av.u,Ur.aTa.), or that one of the premisses asserts something not true (m.terial error: "PriM. T • • rAws.).

COMMBNTARY

a 34 :

1

2

... 01 Ii. Ii'lj Ross alone reads: J",.I aBo "pezYf'G"1:Eu8ijvez, C£ S4a 16: 1.

a 35 :, Myov C£ s6a I : 2 ..ezpczli.,yp.ci....." ••.

2. lv8up.'1~

e.g., in a formal way

this

was done for the three in B 20, 21, 22-23. a 36 3Aw~ ... li,ci.oulY

"in general those matters which have to do

with the process of invention," i.e., Books 1-2. By "process of invention" I mean those matters which in the words of Dionysius of Halicamassus, On Literary Composition 1.3-4 could be called the substantive ideas, the subject

matter, of rhetoric (T."O' "earpa..".,), as distinguished from expression, diction (TO"'.' A'l
a,a..,..

T.".'

•• ,a.

o3b 1-2 >'Ol.."" . . . . .cili.... ~ This raises the problem mentioned in O]a 17 : 1: Is the third book part of A.'s original plan? Cope discusses it at pp. 333-35. There is no formal direct statement in Books 1-2 about the subject matter of Book 3. Further, it is true that the programmatic statement of the first three chapters of the first book presents in some dctaiJ the structure of the first two books. In the light of this detail one might expect that A. would also make some mention of UE'~, TdE" if they were part of his program at the time. Whether more than that can be said I am not sure - apart from the fact that I do not sec as likely (e.g., Studies, pp. SO-52) the appearance of Book 3 prior to the first two books; nor would I consider it an intelligible entity without. knowledge of the first two books.

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