ARTICLE VII [EXECUTIVE [EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT] DEPARTMENT]
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety reuires it, he may, for a period not e!ceedin" si!ty days, suspend the privile"e of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. #ithin forty-ei"ht hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privile"e of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writin" to the Con"ress. The Con"ress, votin" $ointly, $ointly, by a vote of at least a ma$ority of all its %embers in re"ular or special session, may revo&e such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. President. 'pon the initiative of the President, the Con"ress Con"ress may, in the same manner, e!tend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Con"ress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety reuires it. The Con"ress, Con"ress, if not in session, shall, shall, within twenty-four twenty-four hours followin" followin" such proclamation or suspension, suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. The Supreme Court may review, review, in an appropriate appropriate proceedin" proceedin" (led by any any citi)en, the the su*ciency su*ciency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privile"e of the writ of habeas corpus or the e!tension thereof, and must promul"ate its decision thereon within thirty days from its (lin". + state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functionin" of the civil courts or le"islative assemblies, nor authori)e the conferment of $urisdiction on military courts and a"encies over civilians where where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privile"e of the writ of habeas corpus. The suspension suspension of the privile"e privile"e of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons persons $udicially char"ed for rebellion or oenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion. urin" the suspension of the privile"e of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be $udicially char"ed within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
Aquino vs Enrile /0 SC+1823 FACTS: The events which form the bac&"round of these nine petitions are related, either brie4y or in "reat detail, in the separate opinions (led by the individual 5ustices. The petitioners were arrested and held pursuant to 6eneral 7rder o. 9 of the President :September 99, 10;9<, =for bein" participants or for havin" "iven aid and comfort in the conspiracy to sei)e political and state power in the country and to ta&e over the 6overnment by force >? 6eneral 7rder o. 9 was issued by the President in the e!ercise of the powers he assumed by virtue of Proclamation o. 1@81 :September 91, 10;9< placin" the entire country under martial law. ISSUE: The (rst ma$or issue raised by the parties is whether this Court may inuire into the
validity of Proclamation o. 1@81. Stated more concretely, is the e!istence of conditions claimed to $ustify the e!ercise of the power to declare martial law sub$ect to $udicial inuiryA Is the uestion political or $usticiable in characterA RULING: RULING: 5ustices %a&asiar, +ntonio, Bs"uerra, ernande) ernande) and +uino hold that the uestion is
political and therefore its determination is beyond the $urisdiction of this Court. The reasons are "iven at len"th in the separate opinions they have respectively si"ned. 5ustice ernande) adds that as a member of the Convention that drafted the 10;2 Constitution he believes that =the Convention put an imprimatur on the proposition that the validity of a martial law proclamation and its continuation is political and non-$usticiable in character.? character.? 5ustice Darredo, on the other hand, believes that political uestions are not per se beyond the CourtEs $urisdiction, the $udicial power vested in it by the Constitution bein" plenary and all-
ARTICLE VII [EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT]
embracin", but that as a matter of policy implicit in the Constitution itself the Court should abstain from interferin" with the B!ecutiveEs Proclamation, dealin" as it does with national security, for which the responsibility is vested by the charter in him alone. Dut the Court should act, 5ustice Darredo opines, when its abstention from actin" would result in manifest and palpable trans"ression of the Constitution proven by facts of $udicial notice, no reception of evidence bein" contemplated for purposes of such $udicial action. It may be noted that the postulate of non-$usticiability as discussed in those opinions involves disparate methods of approach. 5ustice Bs"uerra maintains that the (ndin"s of the President on the e!istence of the "rounds for the declaration of martial law are (nal and conclusive upon the Courts. Fe disa"rees vehemently with the rulin" in Lansang vs. Garcia, G9 SC+ GG8, ecember 11, 10;1, and advocates a return to Barcelon vs. Baker , / Phil. 8; :10@/<, and Montenegro vs. Castañeda, 01 Phil. 889 :10/9<. 5ustice Darredo, for his part, holds that Hansan" need not be overturned, indeed does not control in these cases. Fe draws a distinction between the power of the President to suspend the privile"e of the writ of habeas corpus, which was the issue in Hansan", and his power to proclaim martial law, callin" attention to the fact that while the Dill of i"hts prohibits suspension of the privile"e e!cept in the instances speci(ed therein, it places no such prohibition or uali(cation with respect to the declaration of martial law. 5ustice +ntonio, with whom 5ustices %a&asiar, ernande) and +uino concur, (nds that there is no dispute as to the e!istence of a state of rebellion in the country, and on that premise emphasi)es the factor of necessity for the e!ercise by the President of his power under the Constitution to declare
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such necessity is wholly con(ded to him and therefore is not sub$ect to $udicial inuiry, his responsibility bein" directly to the people. +rrayed on the side of $usticiability are 5ustices Castro, ernando, Teehan&ee and %uo) Palma. They hold that the constitutional su*ciency of the proclamation may be inuired into by the Court, and would thus apply the principle laid down in Hansan" althou"h that case refers to the power of the President to suspend the privile"e of the writ of habeas corpus. The reco"nition of $usticiability accorded to the uestion in Hansan", it should be emphasi)ed, is there e!pressly distin"uished from the power of $udicial review in ordinary civil or criminal cases, and is limited to ascertainin" =merely whether he :the President< has "one beyond the constitutional limits of his $urisdiction, not to e!ercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act.? The test is not whether the PresidentEs decision is correct but whether, in suspendin" the writ, he did or did not act arbitrarily . +pplyin" this test, the (ndin" by the 5ustices $ust mentioned is that there was no arbitrariness in the PresidentEs proclamation of martial law pursuant to the 102/ ConstitutionJ and I concur with them in that (ndin". The factual bases for the suspension of the privile"e of the writ of habeas corpus, particularly in re"ard to the e!istence of a state of rebellion in the country, had not disappeared, indeed had been e!acerbated, as events shortly before said proclamation clearly demonstrated. 7n this Point the Court is practically unanimousJ 5ustice Teehan&ee merely refrained from discussin" it. Insofar as my own opinion is concerned the cleava"e in the Court on the issue of $usticiability is of not much more than academic interest for purposes of arrivin" at a $ud"ment. I am not unduly
ARTICLE VII [EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT]
e!ercised by +mericas decisions on the sub$ect written in another a"e and political clime, or by theories of forei"n authors in political science. The present state of martial law in the Philippines is peculiarly ilipino and (ts into no traditional patterns or $udicial precedents. In the (rst place I am convinced :as are the other 5ustices<, without need of receivin" evidence as in an ordinary adversary court proceedin", that a state of rebellion e!isted in the country when Proclamation o. 1@81 was issued. It was a matter of contemporary history within the co"ni)ance not only of the courts but of all observant people residin" here at the time. %any of the facts and events recited in detail in the dierent =#hereases? of the proclamation are of common &nowled"e. The state of rebellion continues up to the present. The ar"ument that while armed hostilities "o on in several provinces in %indanao there are none in other re"ions e!cept in isolated poc&ets in Hu)on, and that therefore there is no need to maintain martial law all over the country, i"nores the sophisticated nature and rami(cations of rebellion in a modern settin". It does not consist simply of armed clashes between or"ani)ed and identi(able "roups on (elds of their own choosin". It includes subversion of the most subtle &ind, necessarily clandestine and operatin" precisely where there is no actual ("htin". 'nder"round propa"anda, throu"h printed news sheets or rumors disseminated in whispersJ recruitment of armed and ideolo"ical adherents, raisin" of funds, procurement of arms and material, (fth-column activities includin" sabota"e and intelli"ence K all these are part of the rebellion which by their nature are usually conducted far from the battle fronts. They cannot be counteracted eectively unless reco"ni)ed and dealt with in that conte!t. Secondly, my view, which coincides with that of other members of the Court as stated in their opinions, is that the uestion of validity of Proclamation o. 1@81 has been foreclosed by the transitory provision of the 10;2 Constitution +rt. LMII, Sec. 2:9<3 that =all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promul"ated, issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land and shall remain valid, le"al, bindin" and eective even after > the rati(cation of this Constitution >? To be sure, there is an attempt in these cases to resuscitate the issue of the eectivity of the new Constitution. +ll that, however, is behind us now. The uestion has been laid to rest by our decision in Javellana vs. Eecutive !ecretary :H-2N1G9, /@ SC+ 2@, %arch 21, 10;2<, and of course by the e!istin" political realities both in the conduct of national aairs and in our relations with other countries. 7n the eect of the transitory provision 5ustice %uo) Palma withholds her assent to any sweepin" statement that the same in eect validated, in the constitutional sense, all =such proclamations, decrees, instructions, and acts promul"ated, issued, or done by the incumbent President.? +ll that she concedes is that the transitory provision merely "ives them =the imprimatur of a law but not of a constitutional mandate,? and as such therefore =are sub$ect to $udicial review when proper under the Constitution. inally, the political-or-$usticiable uestion controversy indeed, any inuiry by this Court in the present cases into the constitutional su*ciency of the factual bases for the proclamation of martial law K has become moot and purposeless as a conseuence of the "eneral referendum of 5uly 9;-98, 10;2. The uestion propounded to the voters wasO ='nder the :10;2< Constitution, the President, if he so desires, can continue in o*ce beyond 10;2. o you want President %arcos
ARTICLE VII [EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT]
to continue beyond 10;2 and (nish the reforms he initiated under %artial HawA? The overwhelmin" ma$ority of those who cast their ballots, includin" citi)ens between 1/ and 18 years, voted a*rmatively on the proposal. The uestion was thereby removed from the area of presidential power under the Constitution and transferred to the seat of soverei"nty itself. #hatever may be the nature of the e!ercise of that power by the President in the be"innin" K whether or not purely political and therefore non-$usticiable K this Court is precluded from applyin" its $udicial yardstic& to the act of the soverei"n.
