API 580
1) A physical condition condition or a release of a hazardous hazardous material that that could result result from from component failure failure and result in human injury or death, loss or damage, or environmental degradation.
A. B. C.
Hazard Loss Failure
) Limitation of any negative conse!uence conse!uence or reduction reduction in pro"a"ility pro"a"ility of a particular event.
A. B. C.
Mitigation #eduction #esidual
$) %ethods that that use engineering engineering judgment judgment and e&perience e&perience as the "ases for the analysis analysis of pro"a"ilities and conse!uences of failure.
A. B. C.
Qualitative risk assessment #elative ris' (ominal ris'
) An analysis analysis that identi*es identi*es and delineates the com"inations com"inations of events estimates the fre!uency fre!uency of occurrence occurrence for each com"ination and estimates the conse!uences.
A. B. C.
Quantitative risk analysis +ualitative ris' analysis rocess hazard analysis
-) uses uses logic logic models models depicting depicting com"inations of events events
A. Quantitat Quantitative ive risk analysis analysis B. +ualitative ris' analysis C. rocess hazard analysis /) +uantitative ris' ris' analysis logic models models generally generally consist of ..and ..and
A. B. C.
Event tr trees and fault tr trees roduct tr trees an and lo loss tr trees Li' Li'eli elihood hood trees ees an and co cons nse! e!u uence ence tree trees s
0) .delineate .delineate initiating initiating events and com"inations com"inations of system successes successes and failures
A. B. C.
Event trees Fault trees Logic trees
) .. 2epict 2epict 3ays in 3hich 3hich the system failures failures represented represented in the event trees trees can occur. A. 4ven 4ventt tree trees s
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B. Fault trees C. Logic trees
5) 6he comparative ris' of a facility, process unit, system, e!uipment item or component to other facilities
A. B. C. 17)
A. B. C. 2. 11)
Relative risk A"solute ris' (o ris' Com"ination of the pro"a"ility of an event and its conse!uence.
Risk Failure Loss #eduction 8ystematic use of information to identify sources and to estimate the ris'.
A. #is' B. Risk analysis C. 9azard analysis 1)
.. rovides a "asis for ris' evaluation, ris' mitigation and ris' acceptance.
A. #is' B. Risk analysis C. 9azard analysis 1$) rocess used to assign values to the pro"a"ility and conse!uence of a ris'. A. #is' evaluation B. Risk estimation C. #is' identi*cation 1) rocess used to compare the estimated ris' against given ris' criteria to determine the signi*cance of the ris'.
A. Risk evaluation B. #is' estimation C. #is' identi*cation 1-) A. B. C. 1/)
A.
rocess to *nd, list, and characterize elements of ris'. #is' estimation #is' evaluation Risk identication Coordinated activities to direct and control an organization 3ith regard to ris'.
Risk management
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B. C. 10)
#is' evaluation #is' control 6hing or activity 3ith a potential for conse!uence.
A. ource B. 9azard C. 6o&ic 1)
..in a safety conte&t is a hazard.
A. ource B. 6o&ic 15)
A. B. C.
6he ris' prior to mitigation activities
!nmitigated risk :no3n ris' %itigated ris'
7) is the com"ination of the pro"a"ility of some event occurring during a time period of interest and the conse!uences, associated 3ith the event.
A. Risk B. Loss C. %itigated ris' 1)
A. B. C.
Act of mitigating a 'no3n ris' to a lo3er level of ris'
Risk reduction #is' mitigation #is' evaluation
) A process to assess ris's, to determine if ris' reduction is re!uired and to develop a plan to maintain ris's at an accepta"le level. A. B. C. $) A. B. C. 2.
#is' management #is' mitigation Risk control ;hen some ris' identi*ed as accepta"le then one of the follo3ing is not re!uired #is' reduction #is' evaluation Risk mitigation #is' control
)
A. B.
"ns#ection and testing #rograms Condition monitoring programs
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C. 2.
reventive maintenance programs
-) ;hen an e!uipment has lo3 deterioration rates as an inspector 3hat you decide in lieu of internal inspection
A. B. C.
$n%stream ins#ection >ut of service inspection 4&ternal inspection
/) represents the ne&t generation of inspection approaches and interval setting, recognizing that the ultimate goal of inspection is the safety and relia"ility of operating facilities.
A. B. C. 2. 0)
A. B. C.
RB" 9A 9A?> #C% For a typical inspection program, if e&cessive inspection is applied then,
&evel of risk may go u# Level of ris' may go do3n Level of ris' remain the same
) provides a consistent methodology for assessing the optimum com"ination of methods and fre!uencies. A. RB" B. #C% C. 9A 2. 9A?> 5) 6hrough , inspection activities are focused on higher ris' items and a3ay from lo3er ris' items.
A. B. C. 2. $7) A. B. C. '. $1)
A. B. C.
RB" 9A #C% 9A?> Follo3ing are not the residual ris' factors for loss of containment 9uman error (atural disasters Fundamental limitations of inspection method (o)ic *uid containment #B< is focused on a systematic determination of
Relative risks A"solute ris's Compara"le ris's
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2.
6otal ris's
$) Act of mitigating a 'no3n ris' to a lo3er level of ris'. A. Risk reduction B. #is' management C. #is' mitigation $$) 8ome failures have potentially serious conse!uences, "ut if the pro"a"ility of the incident is lo3, then
A. B. C.
(+e risk may not ,arrant immediate action 6he ris' may 3arrant immediate action 6he ris' may 3arrant appropriate mitigation action
$)
A. B. C. $/)
A. B. C. 2.
Quantitative risk assessment -QRA +ualitative ris' assessment 8emi !uantitative ris' assessment An #B< analysis shares many of the techni!ues and data re!uirements 3ith a .
QRA 9A 9A?> 4vent tree
$0)
A. B. C.
RB" conse/uence #B< li'elihood #B< pro"a"ility
$) 9azard identi*cation in a #B< analysis generally focuses on identi*a"le failure mechanisms in the e!uipment @inspect a"le causes) "ut does not e&plicitly deal 3ith
A. B. C. $5)
$t+er #otential failure scenarios resulting from events suc+ as #o,er failures or +uman errors. >ther potential failure resulting from events such as amma"le *re due to lea' from e!uipment 4nvironmental impact caused due to to&ic release ..deals 3ith total ris' than 3ith ris' involved only 3ith the e!uipment
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A. B. C. 2. 7)
A. B. C. 1) 2. E. F. ) A. B. C. 2.
QRA #B< 9A Fta #is' presented in !uantitative ris' analysis as a
0recise numeric value Form of ris' matri& Form of event tree and fault tree #is' presented in !ualitative ris' analysis as recise numeric value Form of risk matri) Form of event tree and fault tree #esults from !uantitative analysis logic models are validated "y E)#ert 1udgment. perations personnel
$) 6he suita"ility and current condition of the e!uipment 3ithin the current operating envelope 3ill determine the .of the e!uipment from one or more deterioration mechanisms.
A. B. C. '.
0ro2a2ility of failure -0$F Conse!uence of failure 6otal ris' #elative ris'
) 6he pro"a"ility of failure, 3hen coupled 3ith the associated conse!uence of failure @C>F) @see section 11) 3ill determine .associated 3ith the e!uipment item,
A. B. C. -)
A. B. C. /)
A. B. C.
$#erating risk #an'ing #esidual ris' .
"ns#ection 4valuation Analysis 6he primary product of a #B< eort should "e
An ins#ection #lan for eac+ e/ui#ment item evaluated %itigation plan for each e!uipment item evaluated #esidual ris' assessment plan for each e!uipment item evaluated
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0) Follo3ing are some of the recognized ris's 3hich cannot "e managed "y inspection alone e&cept one A. B. C. '.
) A. B. C. '. 5)
A. B. C. -7)
4!uipment nearing retirement. Failure mechanisms @such as "rittle fracture, fatigue) 3here avoidance of failure primarily depends on operating 3ithin a de*ned pressuretemperature envelope. Conse!uence=dominated ris's. (+e suita2ility and current condition of t+e e/ui#ment ,it+in t+e current o#erating envelo#e ,ill determine t+e #ro2a2ility of failure -0$F of t+e e/ui#ment from one or more deterioration mec+anisms. Follo3ing are the non=inspection mitigation actions e&cept one #eplacement or upgrade 4!uipment redesign %aintenance of strict controls on operating conditions Risk management 2y monitoring t+e deterioration
"ncrease t+e inventory 2ecrease the inventory (o harm to inventory otential hazards identi*ed in a 9A 3ill often aect the
A. 0ro2a2ility of failure side of t+e risk e/uation. B. Conse!uence of failure side of the e!uation
-1) #B< may include methodologies to assess the eectiveness of the management systems in maintaining. A. Mec+anical integrity B. 6otal asset integrity C. lant integrity -) 4!uipment relia"ility is especially important if lea's can "e caused "y A. econdary failures3 suc+ as loss of utilities B. rimary failures such as lea' due to severe corrosion C. 6ertiary failures due to valve gland pac'ing lea' -$) #elia"ility eorts, such as relia"ility centered maintenance @#C%), can "e lin'ed 3ith #B<, resulting in an integrated program toD Reduce do,ntime in an o#erating unit . A. B. #educe operating time of an unit C. 6o reduce ris' "y mitigation activities -) A. B. C.
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--) to "e esta"lished to judge accepta"ility of ris' could "e an o"jective of the #B< assessment if such criteria do not e&ist already 3ithin the userEs company.
A. B. C.
Risk criteria #is' plan #is' analysis
-/) ..
A. B. C.
Reducing ins#ection costs
-0) ;hen the inspection program is optimized "ased on an understanding of ris', one or more of the follo3ing cost reduction "ene*ts may "e realized. 4&cept one A. n=line or non=invasive inspection methods may "e su"stituted for invasive methods that re!uire e!uipment shutdo3n. 2. %ore eective infre!uent inspections may "e su"stituted for less eective fre!uent inspections. -) 6he follo3ing are the ris's identi*ed "y #B< assessment that may "e managed "y actions other than inspection. 4&cept one
A. B. C. '.
%odi*cation of the process to eliminate conditions driving the ris'. %odi*cation of operating procedures to avoid situations driving the ris'. Chemical treatment of the process to reduce deterioration ratessuscepti"ilities. "dentifying and detecting deterioration and #redicting future deterioration states ,it+ advanced ins#ection tec+ni/ue-s.
-5) For !ualitative #B< analysis it is important to esta"lish a set of rules to assure consistency in
A. B. C.
Categorization or classication 8egregation #an'ing
/7) enerally, a !ualitative analysis using "road ranges re!uires a ..from the user than a !uantitative approach.
A. B.
Hig+er level of 1udgment3 skill and understanding Lo3er level of judgment, s'ill and understanding
/1) 6he models are evaluated..to provide "oth !ualitative and !uantitative insights a"out the level of ris' and to identify the design, site, or operational characteristics that are the most important to ris'.
API 580
A. B. C. 2.
0ro2a2ilistically 8tatistically Linearly Logically
/$) otential source of errors in #B< analysis regarding data !uality are the follo3ing e&cept a. ". c. d.
Assumptions in e!uipment history >utdated dra3ings and documentation
/) 6he follo3ing assumption can "e made that signi*cantly impact the calculated corrosion rate early in the e!uipment life
A. B. C.
"f t+e 2ase line t+ickness ,ere not #erformed t+e nominal t+ickness may 2e used for t+e original t+ickness
/-) may result in the calculated corrosion rate appearing arti*cially high or lo3. A. B. C. 2. //)
Clerical error Measurement error
A. 6o comparing data from the inspections to the e&pected deterioration mechanism and rates. B. 6o compare the results 3ith previous measurements on that system, C. 8imilar systems at the site or 3ithin the company or pu"lished data. '. All of t+e a2ove
/0)
A. B. C.
the amount and type of codes and standards used "y a facility can have
ignicant im#act on RB" results (o impact on #B< results Less signi*cant impact on #B< results
/) ;ho should "e consulted to de*ne the e!uipment deterioration mechanisms, suscepti"ility and potential failure modesH A. A metallurgist or corrosion specialist B. A metallurgist and corrosion specialist C. A metallurgist only '. Corrosion s#ecialist only
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/5)
A. B. C. 2. 07)
==================are the primary inputs into the pro"a"ility of failure evaluation.
(+e deterioration mec+anisms3 rates and susce#ti2ilities Loss of containment f uid Fluid to&icity and its concentration 2amage mechanisms and its severity ==========================is 'ey to performing deterioration mechanism identi*cation.
A. !nderstanding e/ui#ment o#eration and t+e interaction ,it+ t+e c+emical and mec+anical environment. B. Gnderstanding e!uipment operation and process upsets C. Gnderstanding e!uipment operation and its safety protective measures 01) ;ho can provide useful input @such as the spectrum of process conditions, injection points etc.) 6o aid materials specialists in the identi*cation of deterioration mechanisms and rates.
A. B. C. 2. 0) A. B. C. 0$)
A. B. C.
0rocess s#ecialists lant operation specialists Asset integrity e&perts
Conducive to certain cracking mec+anisms Gnfavora"le to certain crac'ing mechanisms Gn"ene*cial to certain crac'ing mechanisms
0) ================are often necessary to esta"lish suscepti"ility of e!uipment to stress corrosion crac'ing.
A. B. C. 2.
&iterature3 e)#ert o#inion and e)#erience Crac'ing mechanisms 2amage mechanisms Fluid to&icity and its constituents
0-) curves are referred for htha deterioration mechanism for car"on and lo3 ally steel materials
A. B. C. 0/)
5elson curves h concentration curves 8chmidtt curves for sul*de corrosion Follo3ing are the critical varia"les for deterioration mechanism e&cept
API 580
A. B. C. '.
00) A. B. C. '.
%aterial of construction rocess operating 8tart up and shut do3n conditions "nsulation
Follo3ing are the common mechanical deterioration mechanisms e&cept Fatigue 8tresscreep rupture 6ensile overload "ntergranular corrosion
0) 2epending on the methodology employed in !ualitative analysis, the categories may "e descri"ed 3ith 3ords such as A. Hig+3 medium or lo, or may +ave numerical descri#tors. B. 9igh, medium or lo3 only C. (umerical discriptors only 05) ;hen in=accurate or insuIcient failure data e&ists on the speci*c e!uipment item for !uantities pro"a"ility of failure analysis then
A. B. C. 7)
A. B. C. '. E. 1) A. B. C. 2. E.
6eneral industry3 com#any or manufacturer failure data used rocess hazard analysis failure data may "e used rocess and to&ic concentration analysis may "e used 2eterioration rates can "e e&pressed in terms of
Corrosion rates for t+inning or susce#ti2ility for mec+anisms ,+ere deterioration rate is unkno,n Corrosion rates for thinning only
) 6he a"ility to state the rate of deterioration precisely is aected "y the follo3ing e&cept A. B. C. 2. E.
By e!uipment comple&ity 6ype of deterioration mechanism, process and metallurgical variations,
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$)
A. B. C. 2.
)
A. B. C. 2.
6he type of failure mode that li'ely to occur due to pitting
mall +ole sized leaks 8mall holes to ruptures Crac's Catastrophic rupture
6he type of failure mode that li'ely to occur due to 8CC
mall +oles to ru#ture 8mall holes Crac's >nly rupture
-) 6he type of failure mode that li'ely to occur due to mechanical and metallurgical deterioration
A. B. C. 2. /)
A. B. C. 2.
mall +oles to ru#tures Crac's Catastrophic ruptures Lea's 6he type of failure mode that li'ely to occur due to thinning
&arger leaks or ru#ture >nly rupture %etal loss Crac's
0)
A. Ra#id corrosion could result in failure in a fe, +ours or days. B. eneral corrosion over a period of time could result in metal loss C. (o deterioration 3ill ta'e place since car"on steel is resistant to aggressive acid )
A. B. C. 2. 5)
A. B. C. '.
Most recent ins#ection Base line inspection survey rocess conditions Corrosion survey ro"a"ility side of the ris' e!uation is normally managed "y lant inspectors or inspection engineers %aintenance planning engineers rocess safety personnel Bot+ a and 2
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57) A. B. C. 2. 51) A. B. C. '.
>ther functional failures are usually covered 3ithin #B< RCM 9A 9A?> Follo3ing 3ill cover the functional failures e&cept 9eat e&changer tu"e failure ressure relief device failure #otating e!uipment failure tatic e/ui#ment failure due to #rocess environment
5) +ualitative conse!uence analysis of failure can "e estimated separately for each unit, system, e!uipment group or individual e!uipment item.
A. B. C. 2. 5$)
A. B. C. 2.
$n t+e 2asis of e)#ert kno,ledge and e)#erience >n the "asis of availa"le data >n the "asis of process and environmental conditions (o "asis re!uired since it is !ualitative #esults of !uantitative conse!uence analysis are usually e&pressed in
5umeric #anges from high to lo3 Fre!uency >ccasion
5)
A. B. C.
(+e volume of *uid released. Amount of surface area e&posed due to to&ic release hysical area impacted "y release
5-) Follo3ing is the unit of measure of conse!uence that are least developed among those currently used for #B< assessment
A. B. C. '. 5/)
A. B. C. 2. 50)
Aected area Cost Environmental damage 8afety %ost of the damage from thermal eects tends to occur in
Close range ;ide range Large distance (one of the a"ove 6o&ic releases in #B< are only addressed 3hen they aect
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A. B. C. 5)
0ersonnel 4!uipment rocess 6he #B< program for environmental conse!uences, typically focuses
A. B. C. 55)
$n acute and immediate environmental risks3 rat+er t+an c+ronic risks from lo,%level emissions >n acute and immediate chronic ris's than immediate environmental ris's (on threat environmental ris's 6he conse!uences of environmental damage are "est understood "y
A. B. C. 2.
Cost #elease Jolume of uid 6o&ic concentration
177) %aintenance impact 3ill generally "e measured in monetary terms and typically includesD
A. Re#airs and e/ui#ment re#lacement B. %ethod of cleanup C. 8afety systems 171) ..is a po3erful tool that is "eing used "y many companies, governments and regulatory authorities as one method in determining ris' acceptance.
A. B. C. 2.
Cost%2enet analysis #is' analysis Cost conse!uence analysis #is' "ased cost analysis
17) Gsing ris' assessment the inspections are prioritized "ased on
A. B. C. 2.
Risk value #is' matri& #is' conse!uence #is' failure
17$) .typically involves revie3ing some or all input varia"les to the ris' calculation to determine the overall inuence on the resultant ris' value.
A. B. C. 2.
ensitivity analysis #is' analysis rocess hazard analysis 8afety ris' analysis
17) is an important part of the data validation hase of ris' assessment. A.
8ensitivity analysis
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B. C. 2.
#is' analysis ro"a"ility analysis rocess hazard analysis
17-) 6he information gathering performed after the sensitivity analysis should "e focused on developing
A. B. C. 2.
More certainty for t+e key in#ut varia2les. Less certainty for the 'ey input varia"les (o certainty for the 'ey input varia"les (one of the a"ove
17/) 6oo conservative assumptions made for the availa"le or unavaila"le data lead to overestimating conse!uences or pro"a"ility of failure values 3ill A. B. C. '.
170) >nce the ris' values are developed, one 3ay of presenting results of the ris' values are "y
A. B. C. D.
Risk matri) or #lot #is' indicators #is' ran'ing #is' occurrence
17) ;hen the conse!uence category is given a higher 3eight age than the pro"a"ility category, then the ris' matri& 3ill "e A. B. C. 2.
8ymmetrical Asymmetrical Logical (one of the a"ove
175) 9ighest ris' ran'ing in the ris' matri& is to3ard the
A. !##er rig+t corner of t+e matri) B. Gpper left corner of the matri& C. Lo3er right corner of the matri& 2. Lo3er left corner of the matri& 117) >nce the ris' plots have "een completed then the ris' plot or matri& can "e used as during the prioritization process A. creening tool B. uideline tool C. Control line tool 2. #is' determination tool 111) policies inuence the placement of ris' thresholds
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A. B. C. 2.
Cor#orate safety and nancial #olicies %aintenance inspection policies 4ngineering design policies (one of the a"ove
11) A pressure vessel 3hich is critical for operations, 3hose design pressure is 1- "ar and its operating pressure under normal conditions vary from / "ar to 17"ar. 6he vessel is in sulphuric acid process environment.
2. 4.
4!uipment to "e decommissioned 4!uipment redesign Reduction of o#erating #ressure acce#ta2le to t+e #rocess follo,ed 2y cost e4ective ins#ection #rogram ,it+ re#air as indicated 2y t+e ins#ection results All of the a"ove (one of the a"ove
11$) 6he !uality of the inspection data and the analysis or interpretation 3ill greatly aect the
A. B. C. 2.
&evel of risk mitigation Level of failure Level of prediction (one of the a"ove
11) Follo3ing are the tools critical to achieve ris' mitigation through inspection A. B. C. 2.
roper inspection methods roper data analysis tools Bot+ a and 2 All of the a"ove
11-) ;hich plays a major role in overall ris' management strategy
A. B. C. 2.
"ns#ection %itigation Conse!uence Failure
11/) ;hich inspection techni!ue for a piping circuit 3ould "e considered to have little or no "ene*t if the deterioration mechanism results in unpredicta"le localized corrosion
A. B. C. 2.
#ot t+ickness readings Gltrasonic readings #adiography All of the a"ove
110)
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A. B. C. 2.
Gltrasonic for thic'ness monitoring Radiogra#+y Gltrasonic a3 detection (one of the a"ove
11) ;hich are the "est cases that may cause deterioration and increase the ris' of the e!uipment 3hen managing the ris' 3ith inspection activities A. B. C. 2.
%oisture ingress to e!uipment leading to 8CC or polythionic acid crac'ing.
119) "e performed to determine 3hat size a3s, if found in future inspections, 3ould re!uire repair or e!uipment replacement. A. B. C. '.
Fitness for service -AME7FF%8 A0" 9:;%8 #B< analysis rocess hazard analysis All of the a"ove
+uestions completed up to 1.0 chapters 1. . $. . -. /. 0. . 5. 17. 11. 1. 1$. 1. 1-. 1/. 10. 1. 15. 7. 1. . $. . -. /. 0. .
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