ANSWERS TO BAR EXAMINATION QUESTIONS IN CRIMINAL LAW ARRANGED BY TOPIC (1975 – 2003)
Edited and Arranged by:
Janette Laggui-Icao and Alex Andrew P. Icao (Silliman University College of Law)
From the ANSWERS TO BAR EXAMINATION QUESTIONS IN CRIMINAL LAW by the UP LAW COMPLEX July 26, 2005
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This work is not intended for sale or commerce. This work is freeware. It may be freely copied and distributed. It is primarily intended for all those who desire to have a deeper understanding of the issues touched by the Philippine Bar Examinations and its trend. It is specially intended for law students from the provinces who, very often, are recipients of deliberately distorted notes from other unscrupulous law schools and students. Share to others this work and you will be richly rewarded by God in heaven. It is also very good karma. We would like to seek the indulgence of the reader for some Bar Questions which are improperly classified under a topic and for some topics which are improperly or ignorantly phrased, for the authors are just Bar Reviewees who have prepared this work while reviewing for the Bar Exams under time constraints and within their limited knowledge of the law. We would like to seek the reader’s indulgence for a lot of typographical errors in this work.
The Authors July 26, 2005
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Table of Contents Preliminary Title .............................................................................................. 1 Art 2; General principles ....................................................................... 7
Felonies .......................................................................................................... 14 Art 3; Definitions ................................................................................. 14 Art 4; Criminal Liability ........................................................................ 19 Art 6; Stages of execution................................................................... 26 Art 7; Light felonies ............................................................................. 29 Art 8; Conspiracy ................................................................................ 30
Justifying & Exempting Circumstances ................................................... 39 Art 11; Justifying circumstances ......................................................... 39 Art 12; Exempting circumstances ....................................................... 55
Mitigating Circumstances ........................................................................... 62 Aggravating Circumstances ....................................................................... 70 Alternative Circumstances.......................................................................... 85 Persons Criminally Liable for Felonies .................................................... 86 Art 16; Degree of participation ............................................................ 86 Art 19; Accessories ............................................................................. 94 Anti-fencing law .................................................................................. 96
Penalties ....................................................................................................... 102 Penalties ........................................................................................... 102 Indeterminate Sentence Law ............................................................ 111 Probation Law................................................................................... 116 Art 29; Destierro................................................................................ 125 Art 29; Preventive imprisonment....................................................... 126 Art 39; Subsidiary imprisonment ....................................................... 127 Art 45; Confiscation .......................................................................... 128 Art 47 & 83; Death penalty; crimes punishable ................................. 128 Art 48; Aberratio ictus/ error in personae/ prater intentionem ........... 130 Art 48; Complex crimes..................................................................... 133 Art 49; Error in personae................................................................... 139 Art 62; Habitual delinquency ............................................................. 141 Art 80; Suspension of sentence; minors ........................................... 143
Extinction of Criminal Liability .................................................................. 149 Art 89; Corporate officers.................................................................. 149 Art 89; Novation ................................................................................ 149 Art 89; Death of accused/ offended party.......................................... 150 Art 89; Payment ................................................................................ 152 Art 89; Pardon................................................................................... 153 Art 90; Prescription of crimes............................................................ 154
Civil Liability ................................................................................................. 162 Art 100; Effect of acquittal................................................................. 162 Art 101; Persons liable for acts committed by minor or insane ......... 162 Art 102; Subsidiary liability; inkeepers/ employers............................ 162
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Art 104; Civil liability; components .................................................... 164 Art 104; Civil liability; restitution ........................................................ 165 Art 112; Civil liability; effect of acquittal............................................. 165
Crimes Against National Security and the Law of Nations ............... 168 Art 122; Piracy .................................................................................. 168 Art 123; Qualified piracy.................................................................... 168
Crimes Against the Fundamental Law of the State ............................ 170 Art 124; Arbitrary detention ............................................................... 170 Art 125; Delay in the delivery of detained persons............................ 171 Art 128; Violation of domicile vs trespass to dwelling ....................... 171 Art 129; Unjust procurement of search warrant ................................ 172
Crimes Against Public Order ................................................................... 174 Art 134; Rebellion ............................................................................. 174 Art 134-A; Coup d’etat ...................................................................... 177 Art 136; Conspiracy to commit rebellion ........................................... 178 Art 141; Conspiracy to commit sedition............................................. 178 Art 146; Illegal Assembly .................................................................. 179 Art 148; Direct assault....................................................................... 180 Art 151; Resistance and disobedience ............................................. 187 Art 156; Delivery of prisoners from jail .............................................. 188 Art 157; Evasion of service of sentence............................................ 191 Art 160; Quasi-recidivism.................................................................. 191
Crimes against Public Interest................................................................. 193 Art 164; Mutilation of coins; bills excluded ........................................ 193 Art 168; Illegal possession of false notes.......................................... 193 Art 169 & 171; Forgery & falsification ............................................... 193 Art 171; Falsification of public documents........................................ 194 Art 172; Use of falsified documents .................................................. 198 Art 177; Usurpation of Official Functions........................................... 199 Art 181; False testimony ................................................................... 199 Art 183; Perjury................................................................................. 200 Art 184; Subornation of perjury ......................................................... 202 Art 200; Grave scandal ..................................................................... 203 Art 201; Obscene publications .......................................................... 203
Crimes Committed by Public Officers .................................................... 204 Art 203; Public Officers ..................................................................... 204 Art 208; Maliciously refraining from instituting prosecution ............... 204 Art 210; Bribery................................................................................. 205 Art 211; Indirect bribery..................................................................... 209 Art 213; Frauds against the public treasury ...................................... 209 Art 213; Illegal exaction..................................................................... 211 Art 217; Malversation ........................................................................ 211 Art 223; Infidelity in custody of prisoners .......................................... 218 Art 226; Removal of documents........................................................ 221
Crimes Against Persons ........................................................................... 223 Art 246; Parricide .............................................................................. 223
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Art 247; Death & Physical injuries under exceptional circumstances 225 Art 248; Murder................................................................................. 228 Art 249; Homicide ............................................................................. 238 Art 251; Death in tumultuous affray .................................................. 243 Art 255; Infanticide ............................................................................ 245 Art 256; Abortion............................................................................... 245 Art 256; Unintentional abortion ......................................................... 246 Art 266; Physical injuries................................................................... 247 Art 266-A; Rape ................................................................................ 249
Crimes against Personal Liberty and Security..................................... 257 Art 267; Kidnapping/ Illegal detention ............................................... 257 Art 269; Unlawful arrest .................................................................... 262 Art 275; Abandonment of a person in danger ................................... 262 Art 280; Tresspass to dwelling.......................................................... 262 Art 282; Grave threats....................................................................... 263 Art 286; Grave coercion .................................................................... 265 Art 287; Unjust vexation.................................................................... 270
Crimes Against Property ........................................................................... 272 Art 293; Robbery............................................................................... 272 Art 308; Theft .................................................................................... 282 Art 310; Qualified theft ...................................................................... 290 Art 312; Usurpation of real property & real rights.............................. 292 Art 315; BP 22 .................................................................................. 294 Art 315; Estafa .................................................................................. 297 Art 319; Removal, sale or pledge of mortgaged property.................. 313 Art 320; Arson................................................................................... 314 Art 328; Malicious mischief ............................................................... 318 Art 332; Absolutory cause................................................................. 319
Crimes Against Chastity ........................................................................... 321 Art 333; Adultery ............................................................................... 321 Art 334; Concubinage ....................................................................... 323 Art 336; Acts of lasciviousness ......................................................... 324 Art 337; Qualified seduction.............................................................. 326 Art 344; Extinction of criminal liability in crimes against chastity....... 328
Crimes Against the Civil Status of Persons .......................................... 329 Art 347; Simulation of birth................................................................ 329 Art 349; Bigamy ................................................................................ 329 Art 350; Marriage contracted against the provisions of the marriage law .......................................................................................................... 333 Art 351; Premature marriages........................................................... 334
Crimes Against Honor ............................................................................... 335 Art 353; Libel..................................................................................... 335 Art 355; Libel by theatrical exhibition ................................................ 339 Art 358; Oral defamation/ slander ..................................................... 339 Art 359; Slander by deed .................................................................. 341 Art 363; Incriminatory machination ................................................... 341
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Quasi-Offenses ........................................................................................... 343 Miscellaneous.............................................................................................. 345 Corpus delicti .................................................................................... 345 Entrapment/ instigation ..................................................................... 345 Finality of Judgements ...................................................................... 350
Special Penal Laws.................................................................................... 352 Anti-wire tapping act ......................................................................... 352 Carnapping ....................................................................................... 352 Child abuse; RA 7610 ....................................................................... 354 Dangerous Drugs Act........................................................................ 355 Hazing............................................................................................... 358 Highway Robbery ............................................................................. 358 Hijacking ........................................................................................... 359 Illegal possession of firearms............................................................ 361 PD 46................................................................................................ 362 PD 534; illegal fishing ....................................................................... 362 PD 704.............................................................................................. 363 PD 9; Illegal possession of bladed weapons..................................... 363 Plunder; prescription of crimes; prescription of right to recover properties .......................................................................................................... 364 RA 1379; prescriptive period for forfeiture ........................................ 364 RA 3019............................................................................................ 365 RA 6713; coverage ........................................................................... 372 RA 7438............................................................................................ 373 Subversion........................................................................................ 373
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Preliminary Title Art 2; General principles; Criminal law; characteristics 1988 No. 1: a) What are the limitations upon the power of congress to enact penal laws? c) State the characteristics of criminal law and explain each. Answer: a) The limitations upon the power of congress to enact penal laws are as follows: 1. Congress cannot enact an ex post facto law. 2. Congress cannot enact a bill of attainder. 3. Congress cannot provide for a cruel punishment. However, other limitations may be considered like: 1. Congress cannot enact a law which shall punish for a condition. Congress shall punish an act an3 not the condition or status. (?) (Robinson vs. California). 2. Congress should consider Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "penalties that may be imposed. No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission." c) The characteristics of criminal law are as follows: 1. GENERALITY — That the law is binding upon all persons who reside to sojourn in the Philippines, irrespective of age, sex, color, creed, or personal circumstances. 2. TERRITORIALITY — That the law is applicable to all crimes committed with in the limits of Philippine territory, which includes its atmosphere interiors waters and maritime zone (Art. 2). 3. PROSPECTIVITY — That the law does not have any retroactive effect, except if it favors the offender unless he is a habitual delinquent (Art. 22) or the law otherwise provides. Article 2 if the Revised Penal Code however provides for the following exception: a) "Treaty stipulations or by a law of preferential application" Art 2; General principles; diplomatic immunity 1975 No. III The American Consul accredited to the Philippines while driving his car recklessly and imprudently along Roxas Boulevard bumped a pedestrian who was crossing the street and the latter died as a consequence of his injuries. Prosecuted in court for the crime of homicide thru reckless imprudence, the Consul claimed diplomatic immunity, alleging that he is not subject to Philippine laws and regulations. Is his defense tenable? Why? Answer
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Under the principle of public international law, only sovereigns or heads of states, ambassadors, ministers plenipotentiary and ministers resident enjoy diplomatic immunity. Consuls do not enjoy immunity from criminal prosecution (Rep. Act No. 75, Schenecherberger v. Moran, 63 Phil. 250).
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Art 2; General principles; features of principles of criminal law 1978 No. I-a Discuss concisely the cardinal features of principles of criminal law. Give an exception to each principle and explain the same. Answer The Cardinal principles of Criminal Law are generality; territorially and prospectivity. Generality means that a penal law applies to all persons who live or sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and treaty stipulations. A penal law does not therefore apply to duly accredited foreign Ambassadors and Ministers in the Philippines since under international law they enjoy diplomatic immunity. Territoriality means that a penal law is enforceable within the territory of the Philippines. However, under Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code, its provisions shall be enforced outside of the jurisdiction of the Philippines against those, among others, who should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship. The exception will apply if the Philippine ship or airship is registered under the laws of the Philippines. The registered Philippine ship at the time of the commission of the crime must be in the air space not within the jurisdiction of a foreign country. Prospectivity means that a penal law does not have any retroactive effect. Otherwise, it will become an ex post facto law. However, if a penal law is favorable to the accused, it may be given retroactive effect, unless the accused is an habitual delinquent or the law otherwise expressly provides. Art 2; General principles; laws defining classes of crimes 1978 No. I-b Penal laws define distinct classes of crimes. Discuss and elucidate on their distinctions. Answer In general, penal laws refer to the Revised Penal Code and special laws. Crimes punished in the Revised Penal Code are called felonies and those punished in special laws are called offenses. A felony as a rule is an act mala in se which is wrongful from its very nature while an offense is an act mala prohibits, which is a wrong only because of the law punishing it. The Revised Penal Code also classifies felonies as intentional, if dolo or malice is present, and culpable, if there is culpa or fault. According to gravity, felonies are grave, if the penalty is capital or afflictive in any of its periods; less grave, if the penalty in its maximum period is correctional; and light, if the penalty is arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both. Art 2; General principles; schools of thought in criminal law 1996 No. 1 1} What are the different schools of thought or theories in Criminal Law and describe each briefly. 2) To what theory does our Revised Penal Code belong? Answer; 1) There are two schools of thought in Criminal Law, and these are (a) the classical theory, which simply means that the basis of criminal liabilities is human free will, and the purpose of the penalty is retribution which must be
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proportional to the gravity of the offense; and (b) the positivist theory, which considers man as a social being and his acts are attributable not just to his will but to other forces of society. As such, punishment is not the solution, as he is not entirely to be blamed; law and jurisprudence should not be the yardstick in the imposition of sanction, instead the underlying reasons would be inquired Into. 2) We follow the classical school of thought although some provisions of eminently positivist in tendencies, like punishment of impossible crime, Juvenile circumstances, are incorporated in our Code, Art 2; General principles; territoriality; exceptions 1982 No. 1 Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code states that the provisions of the said Code shall be applicable to crimes committed not only within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, but also outside thereof, in the five (5) instances mentioned therein. What are the underlying reasons behind, or rationale for, each of those five (5) instances? Explain fully one by one. Answer The five instances provided in Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code in which its provisions are applicable outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and the underlying reasons behind each of said instances are the following: 1. When the offender should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship. For this exception to apply, the Philippine ship or airship must be registered under Philippine laws. As such it is considered an extension of Philippine territory. 2. When the offender should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippines or obligations and securities issued by the government. The reason is to protect Philippine Currency notes and obligations or securities issued by the government in order to preserve the financial credit and stability of the government. 3. When the offender should be liable for acts committed with the introduction in the Philippines of obligations and securities mentioned in paragraph 2. The reason is to protect the economic interests of the Philippines as the introduction of such forged or counterfeit obligations and securities into the country is as dangerous, if not more, as the forging or counterfeiting of the same. 4. When the offender, while being a public officer or employee should commit an offense in the exercise of his functions. The offense committed by the public officer affects the integrity of the office and is against public administration of the Philippines. The law should follow the public officer wherever he may be. If such is not punished by the laws of the country where the public officer is at the time of its commission, or is not triable by its courts, the absence of this exception would not make the provisions of the Code applicable since the crime is committed outside of Philippine territory. 5. When the offender should commit any of the crimes against the national security and the law of nations. The reason is to safeguard the existence of the state. Art 2; General principles; territoriality 1994 No. 12:
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Abe, married to Liza, contracted another marriage with Connie in Singapore. Thereafter, Abe and Connie returned to the Philippines and lived as husband and wife in the hometown of Abe in Calamba, Laguna. 1) Can Abe be prosecuted for bigamy? Answer: 1) No, Abe may not be prosecuted for bigamy since the bigamous marriage was contracted or solemnized in Singapore, hence such violation is not one of those where the Revised Penal Code, under Art. 2 thereof, may be applied extraterritorially. The general rule on territoriality of criminal law governs the situation. Art 2; General principles; territoriality, generality, irretrospectivity 1998 No I. What are the three cardinal features or main characteristics of Philippine Criminal Law? |5%1 Answer: The three main characteristics of Philippine criminal law are: 1) Generality or its being binding to all persons who live or sojourn in Philippine territory subject to certain exceptions; 2) Territoriality or its having force and effect only within Philippine territory, subject to certain exceptions also; 3) Irretrospectivity or its application only to acts and omissions committed/incurred after the effectivity of the law. Art 2; General principles; territoriality; exception 1986 No. 1: Aaron is the defendant in a civil case being tried in the Manila Regional Trial Court Together with his lawyer, Aaron went to Singapore to take the deposition' of a witness who. Aaron hoped, would support his defense. The deposition was taken in a function room of the Singapore Hotel before Mr. Aguila, the Philippine Consul General. Neither plaintiff nor his counsel attended the proceeding. After the deposition taking, Aaron, not satisfied with the results, persuaded Aguila to make substantial changes in the transcripts of stenographic notes. Aaron offered $5,000.00 in Singaporean currency which Aguila readily accepted. Leona, vacationing daughter of Aguila, was given $200.00 by Aaron when she made the alterations in the transcripts. The deponent, with neither notice nor knowledge of the alterations, signed the deposition. May Aaron, Aguila, and Leona be prosecuted in a Philippine court for offenses punishable under our Revised Penal Code? What are the offenses, if any? Explain. Answer: Only Aguila can be prosecuted before the Philippine Court. Being the Philippine Consul General in Singapore, as a public officer, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code can be given extra-judicial application, as the crime committed by him is related to the duties of his office. Aaron and Leona, being private persons, cannot be prosecuted before the Philippine Court because regarding the offenses committed by them, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code cannot be given extra-territorial application. Page 11 of 374
Aguila committed bribery and Aaron corruption of a public officer. Leona committed falsification of a public document as a principal by direct participation and Aaron as a principal by inducement. (Art. 2, Revised Penal Code).
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Art 2; General principles; territoriality; jurisdiction over vessel 2000 No I After drinking one (1) case of San Miguel beer and taking two plates of "pulutan", Binoy, a Filipino seaman, stabbed to death Sio My, a Singaporean seaman, aboard M/V "Princess of the Pacific", an overseas vessel which was sailing in the South China Sea. The vessel, although Panamanian registered, is owned by Lucio Sy, a rich Filipino businessman. When M/V "Princess of the Pacific" reached a Philippine Port at Cebu City, the Captain of the vessel turned over the assailant Binoy to the Philippine authorities. An Information for homicide was filed against Binoy in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. He moved to quash the Information for lack of jurisdiction. If you were the Judge, will you grant the motion? Why? (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes. the Motion to Quash the Information should be granted. The Philippine court has no jurisdiction over the crime committed since it was committed on the high seas or outside of Philippine territory and on board a vessel not registered or licensed in the Philippines (US vs. Fowler, 1 Phil 614) It is the registration of the vessel in accordance with the laws of the Philippines, not the citizenship of her owner, which makes it a Philippine ship. The vessel being registered in Panama, the laws of Panama govern while it is in the high seas.
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Felonies Art 3; Common law crimes 1988 No. 1: b) Are there common law crimes in our jurisdiction? Answer: b) There are none. The rule is, nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, there is no crime if there is no law punishing it, Art 3; Criminal intent 1978 No. I-d Is malice or criminal intent an essential requisite of all crimes? Explain. May criminal intent be presumed to exist? Discuss. Answer Malice or criminal intent is not an essential element in all crimes. It is essential only in crimes which are mala in se. In an offense which is mala prohibita, criminal intent is not an element Criminal intent is presumed to exist if the act is unlawful. However, in some crimes, a specific intent cannot be presumed because it is an integral element thereof. For example, in frustrated homicide, the specific intent to kill is not presumed. If it is not proved, the crime will not be frustrated homicide but serious physical injuries. Art 3; Dolo vs culpa 1978 No. I-c Discuss the distinctions between dolo and culpa. Give an example of each. Answer "Dolo" implies deliberate intent. It is equivalent to malice. "Culpa" means fault, that is, there is no intent or malice. The wrongful act is the result of imprudence, negligence, lack of skill or lack of foresight. A felony is committed by means of dolo or culpa and must be voluntary, Art 3; Mala in se vs mala prohibita 1997 No. l: Distinguish between crimes mala in se and crimes mala prohibita. May an act be malum in se and be, at the same time, malum prohibitum? Answer. Crimes mala in se are felonious acts committed by dolo or culpa as defined in the Revised Penal Code. Lack of criminal intent is a valid defense, except when the crime results from criminal negligence. On the other hand, crimes mala prohibita are those considered wrong only because they are prohibited by statute. They constitute violations of mere rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society. Yes, an act may be malum in se and malum prohibitum at the same time. In People v. Sunico, et aL. (CA 50 OG 5880) it was held that the omission or failure of election inspectors and poll clerks to include a voter's name in the registry list of voters is wrong per se because it disenfranchises a voter of his right to vote. In this regard it is considered as malum in se. Since it is punished
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under a special law (Sec. 101 and 103, Revised Election Code), it is considered malum prohibitum.
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Art 3; Mala in se vs mala prohibita 2001 No VII b) Briefly state what essentially distinguishes a crime mala prohibita from a crime mala in se. (2%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: b) Crimes mala prohibita are distinguished from crimes mala in se as follows, to wit: In crimes mala prohibita, the acts are not by nature wrong, evil or bad. They are punished only because there is a law prohibiting them for public good, and thus good faith or lack of criminal intent in doing the prohibited act is not a defense. In crimes mala in se, the acts are by nature wrong, evil or bad, and so generally condemned. The moral trait of the offender is involved; thus, good faith or lack of criminal Intent on the part of the offender is a defense, unless the crime is the result of criminal negligence. Correspondingly, modifying circumstances are considered in punishing the offender. Art 3; Mala in se vs mala prohibita 2003 No I Distinguish, in their respective concepts and legal implications, between crimes mala in se and crimes mala prohibits. 4% SUGGESTED ANSWER: In concept: Crimes ma/a in se are those where the acts or omissions penalized are inherently bad, evil, or wrong that they are almost universally condemned. Crimes mala prohibita are those where the acts penalized are not inherently bad, evil, or wrong but prohibited by law for public good, public welfare or interest and whoever violates the prohibition are penalized. In legal implications: In crimes mala in se, good faith or lack of criminal intent/ negligence is a defense, while in crimes mala prohibita, good faith or lack of criminal intent or malice is not a defense; it is enough that the prohibition was voluntarily violated. Also, criminal liability is generally incurred in crimes mala in se even when the crime is only attempted or frustrated, while in crimes mala prohibits, criminal liability is generally incurred only when the crime is consummated. Also in crimes mala in se, mitigating and aggravating circumstances are appreciated in imposing the penalties, while in crimes mala prohibita, such circumstances are not appreciated unless the special law has adopted the scheme or scale of penalties under the Revised Penal Code. Art 3; Mala in se vs mala prohibita: criminal intent 1988 No. 2: a) Distinguish crime mala in se from crimes mala prohibita. b) May a crime be committed without criminal intent? Explain. Answer:
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a) There are three distinctions between mala in se and mala prohibita: 1. A crime mala in se is a natural wrong. On the other hand, an offense mala prohibita is a wrong only because it is prohibited by law; 2. In the commission of a crime mala in se, intent is an element whereas in the commission of an offense mala prohibits, criminal intent is immaterial; and 3. Crimes mala in se are punished by the Revised Penal Code although the Revised Penal Code may cover special laws while offense mala prohibita are punished by special laws. b) A crime may be committed without criminal intent in two cases: 1. Offense, punishable as mala prohibita; an 2. Felonies committed by means of culpa. Art 3; Mala in se vs mala prohibita: motive vs intent 1999 No IV (a) "intent". (3%)
Distinguish " mala in se" from " mala prohibita"; "motive" from
(b) When is motive relevant to prove a case? When is it not necessary to be established? Explain. (3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER; (a) In "mala in se", the acts constituting the crimes are inherently evil, bad or wrong, and hence involves the moral traits of the offender; while in "mala prohibita", the acts constituting the crimes are not inherently bad, evil or wrong but prohibited and made punishable only for public good. And because the moral trait of the offender is Involved in "mala in se". modifying circumstances, the offender's extent of participation in the crime, and the degree of accomplishment of the crime are taken into account in imposing the penalty: these are not so in "mala prohibita" where criminal liability arises only when the acts are consummated. "Motive " is the moving power which impels a person to do an act for a definite result; while "intent" is the purpose for using a particular means to bring about a desired result. Motive is not an element of a crime but intent is an element of intentional crimes. Motive, if attending a crime, always precede the intent. (b) Motive is relevant to prove a case when there is doubt as to the identity of the offender or when the act committed gives rise to variant crimes and there is the need to determine the proper crime to be imputed to the offender. It is not necessary to prove motive when the offender is positively identified or the criminal act did not give rise to variant crimes. Art 3; Mala prohibita or special laws; generally only consummated stage punished 2000 No XVI Mr. Carlos Gabisi, a customs guard, and Mr. Rico Yto, a private Individual, went to the office of Mr. Diether Ocuarto, a customs broker, and represented themselves as agents of Moonglow Commercial Trading, an Importer of children's clothes and toys. Mr. Gabisi and Mr. Yto engaged Mr. Ocuarto to prepare and file with the Bureau of Customs the necessary Import Entry and
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Internal Revenue Declaration covering Moonglow's shipment. Mr. Gabisi and Mr. Yto submitted to Mr. Ocuarto a packing list, a commercial invoice, a bill of lading and a Sworn Import Duty Declaration which declared the shipment as children's toys, the taxes and duties of which were computed at P60,000.00. Mr. Ocuarto filed the aforementioned documents with the Manila International Container Port. However, before the shipment was released, a spot check was conducted by Customs Senior Agent James Bandido, who discovered that the contents of the van (shipment) were not children's toys as declared in the shipping documents but 1,000 units of video cassette recorders with taxes and duties computed at P600,000.00. A hold order and warrant of seizure and detention were then issued by the District Collector of Customs. Further investigation showed that Moonglow is non-existent. Consequently, Mr. Gabisi and Mr. Yto were charged with and convicted for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 which makes it unlawful among others, for public officers to cause any undue Injury to any party, including the Government. In the discharge of official functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. In their motion for reconsideration, the accused alleged that the decision was erroneous because the crime was not consummated but was only at an attempted stage, and that in fact the Government did not suffer any undue injury. a)
Is the contention of both accused correct? Explain. (3%)
b) Assuming that the attempted or frustrated stage of the violation charged is not punishable, may the accused be nevertheless convicted for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code under the facts of the case? Explain. (3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: a) Yes, the contention of the accused that the crime was not consummated is correct, RA. 3019 is a special law punishing acts mala prohibita. As a rule, attempted violation of a special law is not punished. Actual injury is required. b) Yes, both are liable for attempted estafa thru falsification of commercial documents, a complex crime. ... Art 3; Motive vs intent 1996 No. 1 3) Distinguish intent from motive in Criminal Law. 4) May crime be committed without criminal intent? Answer; 3) Motive is the moving power which impels one to action for a definite result; whereas intent is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such results. Motive is not an essential element of a felony and need not be proved for purpose of conviction, while intent is an essential element of felonies by dolo. 4) Yes, a crime may be committed without criminal intent If such Is a culpable felony, wherein Intent is substituted by negligence or imprudence, and also in a malum prohibitum or if an act is punishable by special law. Art 3; Motive vs intent 1984 No. 5 (a) Distinguish intent from motive.
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(b) When does proof of motive become a crucial consideration in a criminal prosecution? (c) What categories of crime do not require criminal intent? Answer A.
Furnished by Office of Justice Palma
(a) Motive is the reason which impels one to commit an act for a definite result; intent is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such a result. Intent is an element of a crime, whereas motive is not. (b) It becomes a crucial consideration in criminal prosecution when there is doubt as to whether or not the accused committed the crime. (c) 1. felonies committed by means of culpa. 2. offenses punishable as mala prohibita. B.
Comments and Suggested Answer
1. Motive is the reason which impels one to commit an act for a definite result while intent is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such a result. Motive is not an element of the crime while intent is an element of the crime committed by dolo. 2. Proof of motive is a crucial consideration in a criminal prosecution if there is doubt whether the accused committed the crime or not or whether the evidence on the commission of the crime is circumstantial or inconclusive, or the identity of the accused is in question. 3. Criminal intent 'is not required in felonies committed by negligence or impudence and in offenses which are mala prohibita. Art 3; Motive vs intent 1978 No. II-a Is motive indicative of criminal intent? Is lack of motive proof of innocence? When is it necessary to prove motive? Explain your answers. Answer Motive may be indicative of criminal intent. The fact that the accused were losing heavily in their business operations indicated the motive and therefore the intent to commit arson for the purpose of collecting the insurance on their stock of merchandise. (U.S. u. Go Foo Suy, 25 Phil. 125). However, it is not sufficient to support a conviction if there is no reliable evidence from which it may deduced that the accused was the malefactor. (People vs. Marcos, 70 Phil. 468; People vs. Martinez, 106 Phil 597). Lack of motive is not necessarily proof of innocence because motive is not an essential element of the crime. A crime may be committed just for the sake of committing it due for example to the extreme moral perversion of the accused. (People vs. Taneo, 58 Phil. 255). It is necessary to prove motive when the identity of the person accused of committing the crime is in dispute (People vs. del Rosario Murray, 105 Phil. 591), or when there are no eyewitnesses to the crime and where suspicion is likely to fall upon a number of persons (People vs. Mario, CA G.R. No. 371-R, July 21, 1949). Art 4 1996 No. 4:
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1) Alexander, an escaped convict, ran amuck on board a Superlines Bus bound for Manila from Bicol and killed ten (10) persons. Terrified by the incident, Carol and Benjamin who are passengers of the bus, jumped out of the window and while lying unconscious after hitting the pavement of the road, were ran over and crushed to death by a fast moving Desert Fox bus tailing the Superlines Bus. Can Alexander be held liable for the death of Carol and Benjamin although he was completely unaware that the two jumped out of the bus? Explain. Answer: 1) Yes, Alexander can be held liable for the death of Carol and Benjamin because of felonious act of running was the proximate cause of the victim's death. The rule is that when a person, by a felonious act, generates in the mind of another a sense of imminent danger, prompting the latter to escape from or avoid such danger and In the process, sustains injuries or dies, the person committing the felonious act is responsible for such injuries or death. (US vs. Valdez, 41 Phil, 1497; People vs. Apra, 27 SCRA 1037.) Art 4 1996 No. 9: Vicente hacked Anacleto with a bolo but the latter was able to parry it with his hand, causing upon him a two-inch wound on his right palm. Vicente was not able to hack Anacleto further because three policemen arrived and threatened to shoot Vicente if he did not drop his bolo. Vicente was accordingly charged by the police at the prosecutor's office for attempted homicide. Twenty-five days later, while the preliminary investigation was in progress, Anacleto was rushed to the hospital because of symptoms of tetanus infection on the two-inch wound inflicted by Vicente. Anacleto died the following day. Can Vicente be eventually charged with homicide for the death of Anacleto? Explain. Answer: Yes, Vicente may be charged of homicide for the death of Anacleto, unless the tetanus infection which developed twenty five days later, was brought about by an efficient supervening cause. Vicente's felonious act of causing a twoinch wound on Anacleto's right palm may still be regarded as the proximate cause of the latter's death because without such wound, no tetanus infection could develop from the victim's right palm, and without such tetanus infection the victim would not have died with it. Art 4 1997 No. 2; While the crew of a steamer prepared to raise anchor at the Pasig River, A, evidently impatient with the progress of work, began to use abusive language against the men. B, one of the members of the crew, remonstrated saying that they could work best if they were not insulted. A took B's attitude as a display of insubordination and, rising in a rage, moved towards B wielding a big knife and threatening to stab B. At the instant when A was only a few feet from B, the latter, apparently believing himself to be in great and immediate peril, threw himself into the water, disappeared beneath the surface, and drowned. May A be held criminally liable for the death of B? Answer; Page 20 of 374
Yes. A can be held criminally liable for the death of B, Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides in part that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In U.S. vs. Valdez 41 Phil. 497. where the victim who was threatened by the accused with a knife, jumped into the river but because of the strong current or because he did not know how to swim, he drowned, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction for homicide of the accused because, if a person against whom a criminal assault is directed believes himself to be in danger of death or great bodily harm and in order to escape jumps into the water, impelled by the instinct of self-preservation, the assailant is responsible for the homicide in case death results by drowning. Art 4 1999 No II During the robbery in a dwelling house, one of the culprits happened to fire his gun upward in the ceiling without meaning to kill anyone. The owner of the house who was hiding thereat was hit and killed as a result. The defense theorized that the killing was a mere accident and was not perpetrated in connection with, or for purposes of, the robbery. Will you sustain the defense? Why? (4%) No, I will not sustain the defense. The act being felonious and the proximate cause of the victim's death, the offender is liable therefore although it may not be intended or different from what he intended. The offender shall be prosecuted for the composite crime of robbery with homicide, whether the killing was intentional or accidental, as long as the killing was on occasion of the robbery. Art 4 2001 No I Luis Cruz was deeply hurt when his offer of love was rejected by his girlfriend Marivella one afternoon when he visited her. When he left her house, he walked as if he was sleepwalking so much so that a teenage snatcher was able to grab his cell phone and flee without being chased by Luis. At the next LRT station, he boarded one of the coaches bound for Baclaran. While seated, he happened to read a newspaper left on the seat and noticed that the headlines were about the sinking of the Super Ferry while on its way to Cebu. He went over the list of missing passengers who were presumed dead and came across the name of his grandfather who had raised him from childhood after he was orphaned. He was shocked and his mind went blank for a few minutes, after which he ran amuck and, using his balisong, started stabbing at the passengers who then scampered away, with three of them Jumping out of the train and landing on the road below. All the three passengers died later of their injuries at the hospital. Is Luis liable for the death of the three passengers who jumped out of the moving train? State your reasons. (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes, Luis is liable for their deaths because he was committing a felony when he started stabbing at the passengers and such wrongful act was the proximate cause of said passengers' jumping out of the train; hence their deaths.
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Under Article 4, Revised Penal Code, any person committing a felony shall incur criminal liability although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In this case, the death of the three passengers was the direct, natural and logical consequence of Luis' felonious act which created an immediate sense of danger in the minds of said passengers who tried to avoid or escape from it by jumping out of the train. (People vs. Arpa, 27 SCRA 1O37; U.S. vs. Valdez, 41 Phil. 497} Art 4 2001 No II Maryjane had two suitors - Felipe and Cesar. She did not openly show her preference but on two occasions, accepted Cesar's invitation to concerts by Regine and Pops. Felipe was a working student and could only ask Mary to see a movie which was declined. Felipe felt insulted and made plans to get even with Cesar by scaring him off somehow. One day, he entered Cesar's room in their boarding house and placed a rubber snake which appeared to be real in Cesar's backpack. Because Cesar had a weak heart, he suffered a heart attack upon opening his backpack and seeing the snake. Cesar died without regaining consciousness. The police investigation resulted in pinpointing Felipe as the culprit and he was charged with Homicide for Cesar's death. In his defense, Felipe claimed that he did not know about Cesar's weak heart and that he only Intended to play a practical joke on Cesar. Is Felipe liable for the death of Cesar or will his defense prosper? Why? (5%} SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes, Felipe is liable for the death of Cesar but he shall be given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance that he did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as that which was committed (Art. 13, par. 3, RPC). When Felipe intruded Into Cesar's room without the latter's consent and took liberty with the letter's backpack where he placed the rubber snake. Felipe was already committing a felony. And any act done by him while committing a felony is no less wrongful, considering that they were part of "plans to get even with Cesar". Felipe's claim that he intended only "to play a practical joke on Cesar" does not persuade, considering that they are not friends but in fact rivals in courting Maryjane. This case is parallel to the case of People vs. Pugay, et al. ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: No, Felipe is not liable because the act of frightening another is not a crime. What he did may be wrong, but not all wrongs amount to a crime. Because the act which caused the death of Cesar is not a crime, no criminal liability may arise therefrom. Art 4 2003 No V. The conduct of wife A aroused the ire of her husband B. Incensed with anger almost beyond his control, B could not help but inflict physical injuries on A. Moments after B started hitting A with his fists, A suddenly complained of severe chest pains. B, realizing that A was indeed in serious trouble, immediately Page 22 of 374
brought her to the hospital. Despite efforts to alleviate A's pains, she died of heart attack. It turned out that she had been suffering from a lingering heart ailment. What crime, if any, could B be held guilty of? 8% SUGGESTED ANSWER: B could be held liable for parricide because his act of hitting his wife with fist blows and therewith inflicting physical injuries on her, is felonious. A person committing a felonious act incurs criminal liability although the wrongful consequence is different from what he intended (Art. 4, par. 1, Revised Penal Code). Although A died of heart attack, the said attack was generated by B's felonious act of hitting her with his fists. Such felonious act was the immediate cause of the heart attack, having materially contributed to and hastened A's death. Even though B may have acted without intent to kill his wife, lack of such intent is of no moment when the victim dies. However, B may be given the mitigating circumstance of having acted without intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed (Art. 13, par. 3, Revised Penal Code). Art 4 1976 No, VII-a X and Y ran amuck on board a train and killed ten persons. Four persons out of fear jumped out of the train while the same was running and died. Are X and Y liable for the deaths of the four persons who jumped out of the train? Reason. Answer X and Y are also liable for the deaths of the four persons who jumped out of the train. By running amuck on board the train and killing ten persons, the acts committed by X and Y are felonious and they are responsible for the direct, natural and logical consequences thereof. (Art. 4, par. 1, RPC). These acts of X and Y created fear in the minds of those four persons which caused them to jump out of the running train which resulted in their deaths. The rule is that if a man creates in another man's mind an immediate sense of danger which cause such person to try to escape and in so doing injures himself, the person who creates such state of mind is responsible for the injuries which result. (People vs. Toling, 62 SCRA 17; People vs. Arpa, 27 SCRA 1037; U.S. vs. Valdez, 41 PhiL 1497). Art 4 1994 No. 5; Bhey eloped with Scott. Whereupon, Bhey's father, Robin, and brother, Rustom, went to Scott's house. Upon reaching the house, Rustom inquired from Scott about his sister's whereabouts, while Robin shouted and threatened to kill Scott. The latter then went downstairs but Rustom held his (Scott's) waist. Meanwhile Olive, the elder sister of Scott, carrying her two- month old child, approached Rustom and Scott to pacify them. Olive attempted to remove Rustom's hand from Scott's waist. But Rustom pulled Olive's hand causing her to fall over her baby. The baby then died moments later. Is Rustom criminally liable for the death of the child? Answer: Yes, Rustom is criminally liable for the death of the child because his felonious act was the proximate cause of such death. It was Rustom's act of pulling Olive's hand which caused the latter to fall on her baby. Had It not been
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for said act of Rustom, which is undoubtedly felonious (at least slight coercion) there was no cause for Olive to fall over her baby. In short, Rustom's felonious act is the cause of the evil caused. Any person performing a felonious act is criminally liable for the direct, natural and logical consequence thereof although different from what he intended (Art. 4, par. 1, RFC; People vs, Pugay, et al, GR No. 74324, Nov. 18, 1988). Art 4 1975 No. IV The accused ran amuck aboard a moving train and killed eight persons. Terrified by the happening four passengers jumped oat of the train and died as a result of their fall. Can the accused be held liable for the death of the four although he did not even know that they jumped? Why? Answer The accused can be held liable. Because by running amuck aboard the train and killing eight persons, he committed acts which are felonious. The death of the four passengers who jumped out of the train because they were terrified by the happening is the direct, natural and logical consequence of the running amuck of the accused- (Art. 4, par, 1, Revised Penal Code; People v. Arpa, 27 SCRA 1037), Art 4; Impossible crimes 1976 No. IX-a X, a domestic servant of Y has been nurturing a grudge against him for long. One day, while Y was seated on his favorite rocking chair, X suddenly fired a volley of shots towards Y. It turned out, however, that Y has been dead from a severe stroke an hour ago. For what crime can X be held liable? Reasons. Answer X is liable for an impossible crime of murder. The reason is the inherent impossibility of killing Y since he has been dead due to a severe stroke one hour before X shot him. The acts of execution would have been a crime against persons were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment. (Art. 4, par. 12, RPC). Subjectively, X is a criminal although objectively, no crime is committed. X cannot be liable for trespass to dwelling because being a domestic servant, his entrance to the house of Y cannot be against the will of the latter. Art 4; Impossible crimes 1993 No. 12: Explain and illustrate the following: 1) aberratio ictus, 2) impossible crime, and 3) subornation of perjury. Answer; 2) Impossible crime - Killing a dead person. Art 4; Impossible crimes 1994 No. 10: JP, Aries and Randal planned to kill Elsa, a resident of Barangay Pula, Laurel, Batangas. They asked the assistance of Ella, who is familiar with the place.
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On April 3, 1992, at about 10:00 in the evening, JP, Aries and Randal, all armed with automatic weapons, went to Barangay Pula. Ella, being the guide, directed her companions to the room in the house of Elsa. Whereupon, JP, Aries and Randal fired their guns at her room. Fortunately, Elsa was not around as she attended a prayer meeting that evening in another barangay in Laurel. JP, et al, were charged and convicted of attempted murder by the Regional Trial Court at Tanauan, Batangas. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, all the accused ascribed to the trial court the sole error of finding them guilty of attempted murder. If you were the ponente, how will you decide the appeal? Answer: If I were the ponente, I will set aside the judgment convicting the accused of attempted murder and instead find them guilty of impossible crime under Art. 4, par. 2, RPC, in relation to Art. 59, RPC. Liability for impossible crime arises not only when the impossibility is legal, but likewise when it is factual or physical impossibility, as in the case at bar. Elsa's absence from the house is a physical impossibility which renders the crime intended Inherently incapable of accomplishment. To convict the accused of attempted murder would make Art. 4, par. 2 practically useless as all circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an incident independent of the actor's will which is an element of attempted or frustrated felony (Intod vs. CA, 215 SCRA 52). Art 4; Impossible crimes 1998 No XIV. Buddy always resented his classmate, Jun. One day. Buddy planned to kill Jun by mixing poison in his lunch. Not knowing where he can get poison, he approached another classmate, Jerry to whom he disclosed his evil plan. Because he himself harbored resentment towards Jun, Jerry gave Buddy a poison, which Buddy placed on Jun's food. However, Jun did not die because, unknown to both Buddy and Jerry, the poison was actually powdered milk. 1,
What crime or crimes, if any, did Jerry and Buddy commit? [3%]
2. Suppose that, because of his severe allergy to powdered milk, Jun had to be hospitalized for 10 days for ingesting it. Would your answer to the first question be the same? [2%] Answer: 1. Jerry and Buddy are liable for the so-called "impossible crime" because, with intent to kill, they tried to poison Jun and thus perpetrate Murder, a crime against persons. Jun was not poisoned only because the would-be killers were unaware that what they mixed with the food of Jun was powdered milk, not poison. In short, the act done with criminal intent by Jerry and Buddy, would have constituted a crime against persons were it not for the inherent inefficacy of the means employed. Criminal liability is incurred by them although no crime resulted, because their act of trying to poison Jun is criminal. 2. No, the answer would not be the same as above. Jerry and Buddy would be liable instead for less serious physical injuries for causing the hospitalization and medical attendance for 10 days to Jun. Their act of mixing with the food eaten by Jun the matter which required such medical attendance, committed with criminal intent, renders them liable for the resulting injury.
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Art 4; Impossible crimes 2000 No XVII a}
What is an impossible crime? (2%)
b)
Is an impossible crime really a crime? (2%)
c) A, B, C and D, all armed with armalites, proceeded to the house of X. Y, a neighbor of X. who happened to be passing by, pointed to the four culprits the room that X occupied. The four culprits peppered the room with bullets. Unsatisfied, A even threw a hand grenade that totally destroyed X's room. However, unknown to the four culprits, X was not inside the room and nobody was hit or injured during the Incident. Are A, B, C and D liable for any crime? Explain. (3%) d) Carla, 4 years old, was kidnapped by Enrique, the tricycle driver paid by her parents to- bring and fetch her to and from school. Enrique wrote a ransom note demanding P500,000.00 from Carla's parents in exchange for Carla's freedom. Enrique sent the ransom note by mail. However, before the ransom note was received by Carla's parents, Enrique's hideout was discovered by the police. Carla was rescued while Enrique was arrested and incarcerated. Considering that the ransom note was not received by Carla's parents, the investigating prosecutor merely filed a case of "Impossible Crime to Commit Kidnapping" against Enrique. Is the prosecutor correct? Why? (3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: a) An impossible crime is an act which would be an offense against person or property, were if not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means (Art. 4, par. 2, RPC), b) No, an impossible crime is not really a crime. It is only so-called because the act gives rise to criminal liability. But actually, no felony is committed. The accused is to be punished for his criminal tendency or propensity although no crime was committed. c) Yes. A, B. C and D are liable for destructive arson because of the destruction of the room of X with the use of an explosive, the hand grenade. Liability for an impossible crime Is to be imposed only if the act committed would not constitute any other crime under the Revised Penal Code. Although the facts involved are parallel to the case of Intod vs. Court of Appeals (215 SCRA 52), where it was ruled that the liability of the offender was for an impossible crime, no hand grenade was used in said case, which constitutes a more serious crime though different from what was intended, d) No, the prosecutor Is not correct in filing a case for "impossible crime to commit kidnapping" against Enrique. Impossible crimes are limited only to acts which when performed would be a crime against persons or property. As kidnapping is a crime against personal security and not against persons or property, Enrique could not have incurred an "impossible crime" to commit kidnapping. There is thus no impossible crime of kidnapping. Art 6; Desistance 2003 No III. A and B, both store janitors, planned to kill their employer C at midnight and take the money kept in the cash register. A and B together drew the sketch
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of the store, where they knew C would be sleeping, and planned the sequence of their attack. Shortly before midnight, A and B were ready to carry out the plan. When A was about to lift C's mosquito net to thrust his dagger, a police car with sirens blaring passed by. Scared, B ran out of the store and fled, while A went on to stab C to death, put the money in the bag, and ran outside to look for B. The latter was nowhere in sight. Unknown to him, B had already left the place. What was the participation and corresponding criminal liability of each, if any? Reasons. 8% SUGGESTED ANSWER: There was an expressed conspiracy between A and B to kill C and take the latter's money. The planned killing and taking of the money appears to be intimately related as component crimes, hence a special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The conspiracy being expressed, not just implied, A and B are bound as co-conspirators after they have planned and agreed on the sequence of their attack even before they committed the crime. Therefore, the principle in law that when there is a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all, already governs them. In fact, A and B were already in the store to carry out their criminal plan. That B ran out of the store and fled upon hearing the sirens of the police car, is not spontaneous desistance but flight to evade apprehension. It would be different if B then tried to stop A from continuing with the commission of the crime; he did not. So the act of A in pursuing the commission of the crime which both he and B designed, planned, and commenced to commit, would also be the act of B because of their expressed conspiracy. Both are liable for the composite crime of robbery with homicide. ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: A shall incur full criminal liability for the crime of robbery with homicide, but B shall not incur criminal liability because he desisted. B's spontaneous desistance, made before all acts of execution are performed, is exculpatory. Conspiracy to rob and kill is not per se punishable. The desistance need not be actuated by remorse or good motive. It is enough that the discontinuance comes from the person who has begun the commission of the crime but before all acts of execution are performed. A person who has began the commission of a crime but desisted, is absolved from criminal liability as a reward to one, who having set foot on the verge of crime, heeds the call of his conscience and returns to the path of righteousness. Art 6; Stage of execution 1976 No. III-b X, a physician, wanted to kill his wife. He gave her food with poison. After eating the food, the wife became unconscious. Bothered by his own conscience, X gave her medicine to counteract the effects of the poison and the wife was saved. X is prosecuted for frustrated parricide. Is he guilty of the charge? Reason, Answer X is not liable for frustrated parricide. Although he has already performed all the acts of execution to kill his wife, because she ate the food with poison which he gave her, she however did not die due to the medicine which he administered, after she became unconscious and because his conscience Page 27 of 374
bothered him. The death of the wife, therefore, did not result due to a cause which depended upon the voluntary will of X. In a frustrated felony, the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. (Art. 6, 2nd par, RPC). Art 6; Stage of execution; desistance 1985 No. 5 Intending to kill his estranged wife Myrna, Anthony mixed poison in her coffee which would have normally killed her. After drinking the coffee, Myrna felt nauseated and vomitted. Appalled by the suffering and helplessness of his wife, Anthony took pity on her and gave her an antidote. Myrna recovered completely after ten(10)days. Discuss with reasons the criminal liability, if any, of Anthony. May he invoke desistance in his favor? Answer: Anthony will not be liable for frustrated parricide. Although the wife, Myrna, had drank the poisoned coffee, and all the acts of execution to kill her were already committed, she did not however die due to the antidote administered by Anthony. The crime was therefore not produced due to the voluntary act of Anthony. In a frustrated felony, the acts of execution have been performed which would produce the felony as a consequence but nevertheless do not produce it by causes independent of the will of the offender. So, if the perpetrator himself prevented the consummation of the crime, it is not frustrated. In that sense, when Anthony gave the antidote to his wife, when he saw her suffering after drinking the poisoned coffee, such act may be considered desistance in killing her, although as a rule, desistance refers to acts of execution. The facts of the problem merely state that after the administration of the antidote, the wife recovered after ten (10) days. It may be presumed that she was ill during that period. Since there is no mention of medical attendance nor incapacity from work, the offense will be slight physical injuries under Par. 2 of Art. 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Art 6; Stage of execution; homicide 1979 No. XV X and Y had a heated altercation and then exchanged blows. X pulled out a knife and stabbed Y in the abdomen. Y ran away but before he could reach his house was struck by lightning and died. The Fiscal filed homicide against X. Decide. Answer X is not liable for homicide but for the crime constituting the stabbing of Y in the abdomen. Since the injury was mortal, the liability of X is for frustrated homicide. The death of the victim was caused by the lightning which struck him. Altho a felony was committed by X such was not the direct and proximate cause of the death of Y. The lightning was an efficient intervening cause (People vs. Rockwell, 39 Mich. 503). The rational of the rule is that the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused (People vs. Ural, 56 SCRA 138). Art 6; Stage of execution; when punishable 1977 No. I-b
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Acting under the impulse of hunger, Jose tried to steal the two-pesos (2) bill in the breast pocket of a stranger. But before he could get the money, he was seen and eventually apprehended by a policeman. Later on, Jose was charged of the light offense of attempted theft for P2.00. Was Jose correctly charged considering that light offenses are punishable only when consummated? State four reasons. Answer Jose was correctly charged for a light felony of attempted theft of P2.00 because theft is a crime against property and is punishable even though it is not consummated. (Art. 7, R.P.C.). Art 7; Light felonies 1988 No. 2: c) When are light felonies punishable and who are liable in light felonies? Answer: c) Light felonies, according to Article 7 of the Revised Penal Code are punishable "only when they have been consummated, with the exception of those committed against persons or property." Article 16 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the following are criminally liable for light felonies: 1. Principals 2. Accomplices,
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Art 8; Conspiracy 1976 No. I-b X, Y, and Z fired their guns almost simultaneously at the principal victim, resulting in his death and his driver. Is there conspiracy among the accused in the commission of the crime? Reason. Answer There is conspiracy among the accused X, Y and Z. The fact that the three fired almost simultaneously at the principal victim shows that they have acted in concert pursuant to a common criminal objective. (Define conspiracy). There is, therefore, a unity of action and intention (People v.San Luis, 86 Phil 485), To establish conspiracy, proof of previous agreement is not necessary. It is enough that if at the time of the commission of the crime, all the accused have the same purpose and were united in its execution. (People v. Binasing, et al, 63 O.G. 5208). Art 8; Conspiracy 1977 No. II-a When L, a notorious robber in the neighborhood, was apprehended by an irate crowd and while L was being held from behind by M, N stoned L, hitting him on the head. O hit him on the knee with a piece of wood, and P stabbed him on the chest, which stabbing was the cause of the death of L. Said acts were committed almost simultaneously to the surprise of M. What criminal liability, if any, was incurred by M, N, O and P? Reason fully. Answer M has no criminal liability for what N, O and P did because their acts surprised him and, hence, M was not aware of what they would have done. The criminal liability of N, O and P is individual and not collective. The facts of the problem show that these offenders did not act concertedly in pursuance of a common purpose. They had no knowledge of each other's criminal intent. There is no unity of action and intention to hold that the act of one is the act of all Mere "simultaneousness" of acts does not of itself indicate concurrence of will nor the unity of action and purpose, which are the basis of the opportunity of two or more persons. (People vs. Ibanez, 77 Phil. 664), Art 8; Conspiracy 1980 No. IV "H" made a bet of P10 with "I" in a game of "beto-beto". "H" won but "I" refused to pay the amount. A dispute arose between them, which culminated in a fist fight. "J", the father of "H", and "K", the brother of "H", intervened. When the fight began, "H" held the hand of "I", "J" seized the front part of "I's" shirt, and while they were dealing blows on one another, "K" came with a "balisong" and stabbed "I" inflicting upon him a mortal wound. "H", "J", and "K" were charged with Homicide. Is it proper to hold all the accused responsible for the fatal wound inflicted upon the victim by "K"? Answer It is not proper to hold H and J liable for the fatal wound inflicted upon the victim by K because of the absence of conspiracy. He and J are not co-principals of K in the killing of the victim. The liability of H, J and K is not collective but Page 30 of 374
individual They have not acted conceitedly for the realization of a common criminal objective. H and J who dealt blows on the victim without causing any physical injury could be liable for ill-treatment. (Art. 266, par. 3, R.P.C.) Art 8; Conspiracy 1988 No. 11: b) At a pre-wedding celebration where plenty of people were milling and walking about or standing close together, a mad killer shot up the wedding party. The three appellants were convicted by the owner court as co-conspirators of the killer because they were allegedly with him before, during, and after the shooting. It was proven conclusively that the appellant were friends of the killer; that they went together with the killer to the celebration; and that they left at the same time with the killer, after the shooting. However, the appellants had no guns and passively witnessed the shooting, without intervening in the killing in any way nor shielding killer. Is there conspiracy among them? Why? Answer; (b) There is no conspiracy among them because as the problem has stated, they passively witnessed the shooting. No overt act was committed therefore the element that the conspiracy must be proved as the essence of the crime itself is n9t present. Art 8; Conspiracy 1990 No. 1: Aki and Ben, while walking together, met Caloy. There was an altercation between Ben and Caloy so that Ben chased and stabbed Caloy with a knife hitting his right arm thereby causing slight physical injury. Ben desisted from further assaulting Caloy, but Aki lunged at Caloy and felled him this time with a bolo which mortally wounded Caloy. Thus, he died. a) What is the criminal liability of Aki? How about that of Ben? Explain your answers. b) Assuming conspiracy is established, will your answer in problem (a) be the same? Explain your answer. Answer: a) Aki is liable for homicide because, while it is clear that he intentionally caused the death of Caloy, none of the circumstances attendant to murder are present. Intent to kill is clear as Aki lunged at Caloy, after the latter was inflicted a wound at the right arm, and gave him a mortal wound. Ben is guilty only of slight physical injuries as it is evident from the wound he inflicted upon Caloy that he did not Intend to kill the latter. Also, there was no other act on the part of Ben to show such intent. b) No, there being no conspiracy each will be liable for their own individual act. This time both will be liable for homicide because in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all (People v. Damaso, G.R Nos. L-30116-7, 20 November 1978). Art 8; Conspiracy 1991 No. 9:
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During a fiesta, Simeon Marco, brandishing a knife, asked Constancio whether he was the one who slapped his (Simeon's) son the year previous. Vicente [father of Constancio) shouted at Constancio and his other son, Bienvenido, telling them to run away. When Bienvenido passed by Rafael Marco (brother of Simeon), Rafael stabbed him. Bienvenido parried the blow but fell down, his feet entangled with some vines. While Bienvenido was lying on the ground, Rafael continued to stab him, inflicting slight injuries on the shoulder of Bienvenido, after which Rafael stood up. At that moment, Dulcisimo Beltran (no relation to the Marco brothers), came out of nowhere and, together with Simeon, stabbed Bienvenido. Both of them inflicted fatal wounds resulting in the death of the victim, a) Discuss the criminal liability of Dulcisimo, Simeon and Rafael. b) Supposing Dulcisimo is a convict out on parole, will the aggravating circumstances of quasi-recidivism be appreciated against him? Answer: a) Simeon and Dulcislmo will be liable for the death of Bienvenido as the fatal injuries sustained by the victim were inflicted by the two. Rafael is not liable for slight physical injuries as conspiracy was not present, and there was no apparent intent to kill when he inflicted the slight physical injuries on the arm of the victim. Alternative Answer: Dulcisimo, Simeon and Rafael will all be liable under the principle of conspiracy, where the act of one becomes the act of all. Art 8; Conspiracy 1992 No. 3: As Sergio, Yoyong, Zoilo and Warlito engaged in a drinking spree at Heartthrob Disco, Special Police Officer 3 (SPO 3) Manolo Yabang suddenly approached them, aimed his revolver at Sergio whom he recognized as a wanted killer and fatally shot the latter. Whereupon, Yoyong, Zoilo and Warlito ganged up on Yabang. Warlilo, using his own pistol, shot and wounded Yabang. a) What are the criminal liabilities of Yoyong, Zoilo and Warlito for the injury to Yabang? Was there conspiracy and treachery? Explain. b) In turn, is Yabang criminally liable for the death of Sergio? Suggested Answer: a) If they have to be criminally liable at all each will be responsible for their individual acts as there appears to be no conspiracy, as the acts of the three were spontaneous and a reflex response to Yabang's shooting of Sergio. There was no concerted act that will lead to a common purpose. Art 8; Conspiracy 1993 No. 6: As a result of a misunderstanding during a meeting, Joe was mauled by Nestor, Jolan, Reden and Arthur. He ran towards his house but the four chased and caught him. Thereafter, they tied Joe's hands at his back and attacked him. Nestor used a knife; Jolan, a shovel; Arthur, his fists; and Reden, a piece of wood. After killing Joe, Reden ordered the digging of a grave to bury Joe's lifeless body. Thereafter, the four (4) left together. Convicted for the killing of Joe, Page 32 of 374
Arthur now claims that his conviction is erroneous as it was not he who inflicted the fatal blow. 1) Would you sustain his claim? Why? 2) reasons.
What was the crime committed by the four assailants? Discuss with
Answer; 1) No. Arthur's claim is without merit. The offenders acted in conspiracy in killing the victim and hence, liable collectively. The act of one is the act of all. The existence of a conspiracy among the offenders can be clearly deduced or inferred from the manner they committed the killing, demonstrating a common criminal purpose and intent. There being a conspiracy, the individual acts of each participant is not considered because their liability is collective. 2) The crime committed is murder, qualified by treachery ... Art 8; Conspiracy 1994 No. 9: At about 9:30 in the evening, while Dino and Raffy were walking along Padre Faura Street, Manila. Johnny hit them with a rock injuring Dino at the back. Raffy approached Dino, but suddenly, Bobby, Steve, Danny and Nonoy surrounded the duo. Then Bobby stabbed Dino. Steve, Danny, Nonoy and Johnny kept on hitting Dino and Raffy with rocks. As a result. Dino died, Bobby, Steve, Danny, Nonoy and Johnny were charged with homicide. 1)
Is there conspiracy in this case?
2) Can the court appreciate the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and band? Answer: 1) Yes, there is conspiracy among the offenders, as manifested by their concerted actions against the victims, demonstrating a common felonious purpose of assaulting the victims. The existence of the conspiracy can be inferred or deduced from the manner the offenders acted in commonly attacking Dino and Raffy with rocks, thereby demonstrating a unity of criminal design to inflict harm on their victims. Art 8; Conspiracy 1996 No. 2: 2) Jose, Domingo, Manolo, and Fernando, armed with bolos, at about one o'clock in the morning, robbed a house at a desolate place where Danilo, his wife, and three daughters were living. While the four were in the process of ransacking Danilo's house, Fernando, noticing that one of Danilo's daughters was trying to get away, ran after her and finally caught up with her in a thicket somewhat distant from the house. Fernando, before bringing back the daughter to the house, raped her first. Thereafter, the four carted away the belongings of Danilo and his family. a) Explain.
What crime did Jose, Domingo, Manolo and Fernando commit?
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b) Suppose, after the robbery, the four took turns in raping the three daughters of Danilo inside the latter's house, but before they left, they killed the whole family to prevent identification, what crime did the four commit? Explain. c) Under the facts of the case, what aggravating circumstances may be appreciated against the four? Explain. Answer: 2) (a) Jose, Domingo, and Manolo committed Robbery, while Fernando committed complex crime of Robbery with Rape, Conspiracy can be inferred from the manner the offenders committed the robbery but the rape was committed by Fernando at a place "distant from the house" where the robbery was committed, not in the presence of the other conspirators. Hence, Fernando alone should answer for the rape, rendering him liable for the special complex crime. (People vs. Canturia et. al, G.R. 108490, 22 June 1995} b) The crime would be Robbery with Homicide ... (implied: there is still conspiracy) Art 8; Conspiracy 1997 No. 4: A had a grudge against F. Deciding to kill F, A and his friends, B, C, and D, armed themselves with knives and proceeded to the house of F, taking a taxicab for the purpose. About 20 meters from their destination, the group alighted and after instructing E, the driver, to wait, traveled on foot to the house of F. B positioned himself at a distance as the group's lookout. C and D stood guard outside the house. Before A could enter the house, D left the scene without the knowledge of the others. A stealthily entered the house and stabbed F. F ran to the street but was blocked by C, forcing him to flee towards another direction. Immediately after A had stabbed F, A also stabbed G who was visiting F. Thereafter, A exited from the house and, together with B and C, returned to the waiting taxicab and motored away. G died. F survived. Who are liable for the death of G and the physical injuries of F? Answer: A alone should be held liable for the death of G. The object of the conspiracy of A. B, C, and D was to kill F only. Since B, C, and D did not know of the stabbing of G by A, they cannot be held criminally therefor. E, the driver, cannot be also held liable for the death of G since the former was completely unaware of said killing. For the physical injuries of F, A, B and C. should be held liable therefore. Even if it was only A who actually stabbed and caused physical injuries to G, B and C are nonetheless liable for conspiring with A and for contributing positive acts which led to the realization of a common criminal intent. B positioned himself as a lookout, while C blocked F's escape. D, however, although part of the conspiracy, cannot be held liable because he left the scene before A could enter the house where the stabbing occurred. Although he was earlier part of the conspiracy, he did not personally participate in the execution of the crime by acts which directly tended toward the same end (People vs. Tomoro, et al 44 Phil. 38),
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In the same breath, E, the driver, cannot be also held liable for the infliction of physical injuries upon F because there is no showing that he had knowledge of the plan to kill F. Art 8; Conspiracy 1998 No XVI. Juan and Arturo devised a plan to murder Joel. In a narrow alley near Joel's house, Juan will hide behind the big lamppost and shoot Joel when the latter passes through on his way to work. Arturo will come from the other end of the alley and simultaneously shoot Joel from behind. On the appointed day, Arturo was apprehended by the authorities before reaching the alley. When Juan shot Joel as planned, he was unaware that Arturo was arrested earlier. Discuss the criminal liability of Arturo, if any. [5%] Answer: Arturo, being one of the two who devised the plan to murder Joel, thereby becomes a co-principal by direct conspiracy. What is needed only is an overt act and both will incur criminal liability. Arturo's liability as a conspirator arose from his participation in jointly devising the criminal plan with Juan, to kill Jose. And it was pursuant to that conspiracy that Juan killed Joel. The conspiracy here is actual, not by inference only. The overt act was done pursuant to that conspiracy whereof Arturo is co-conspirator. There being a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Arturo, therefore, should be liable as a co-conspirator but the penalty on him may be that of an accomplice only (People vs. Nierra, 96 SCRA 1; People us. Medrano, 114 SCRA 335) because he was not able to actually participate in the shooting of Joel, having been apprehended before reaching the place where the crime was committed. Alternative Answer: Arturo is not liable because he was not able to participate in the killing of Joel. Conspiracy itself is not punishable unless expressly provided by law and this is not true in the case of Murder. A co-conspirator must perform an overt act pursuant to the conspiracy. Art 8; Conspiracy 2003 No III. A and B, both store janitors, planned to kill their employer C at midnight and take the money kept in the cash register. A and B together drew the sketch of the store, where they knew C would be sleeping, and planned the sequence of their attack. Shortly before midnight, A and B were ready to carry out the plan. When A was about to lift C's mosquito net to thrust his dagger, a police car with sirens blaring passed by. Scared, B ran out of the store and fled, while A went on to stab C to death, put the money in the bag, and ran outside to look for B. The latter was nowhere in sight. Unknown to him, B had already left the place. What was the participation and corresponding criminal liability of each, if any? Reasons. 8% SUGGESTED ANSWER: There was an expressed conspiracy between A and B to kill C and take the latter's money. The planned killing and taking of the money appears to be intimately related as component crimes, hence a special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The conspiracy being expressed, not just implied, A and B are bound as co-conspirators after they have planned and agreed on the Page 35 of 374
sequence of their attack even before they committed the crime. Therefore, the principle in law that when there is a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all, already governs them. In fact, A and B were already in the store to carry out their criminal plan. That B ran out of the store and fled upon hearing the sirens of the police car, is not spontaneous desistance but flight to evade apprehension. It would be different if B then tried to stop A from continuing with the commission of the crime; he did not. So the act of A in pursuing the commission of the crime which both he and B designed, planned, and commenced to commit, would also be the act of B because of their expressed conspiracy. Both are liable for the composite crime of robbery with homicide. ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: A shall incur full criminal liability for the crime of robbery with homicide, but B shall not incur criminal liability because he desisted. B's spontaneous desistance, made before all acts of execution are performed, is exculpatory. Conspiracy to rob and kill is not per se punishable. The desistance need not be actuated by remorse or good motive. It is enough that the discontinuance comes from the person who has begun the commission of the crime but before all acts of execution are performed. A person who has began the commission of a crime but desisted, is absolved from criminal liability as a reward to one, who having set foot on the verge of crime, heeds the call of his conscience and returns to the path of righteousness. Art 8; Conspiracy; extent of criminal liability 1986 No. 3: Mahigpit is the general manager of Blue Chips Co. He fired Alibugha, Bulagsak, Bisyoso, and Mabisyo for gross incompetence The following day, the four dismissed employees happened to meet by chance at a restaurant, a block from the residence of Mahigpit. Then and there, the four hatched a plan to beat up Mahigpit so he would not be so harsh to his personnel in the future. Immediately, thereafter, the four proceeded to Mahigpit's house. After being allowed to enter, a heated discussion ensued. Mahigpit ordered the four to leave his house immediately. Thereupon, Alibugha and Bulagsak started raining blows on Mahigpit while Bisyoso held him by his arms. Mabisyo proceeded to the second floor of the residence where he chanced upon Katulong, the housemaid of Mahigpit. Katulong saw what was going on and rushed to a window shouting for help. Mabisyo hit Katulong on the head with a metal flower vase. The four then fled from the house. When the police arrived at the scene, they found Mahigpit dead on the floor of the sala and Katulong, also dead, near the window on the second floor. Alibugha, Bulagsak, Bisyoso, and Mabisyo were charged with murder on two counts. The Fiscal stated that the two offenses were characterized by conspiracy and, therefore, all the accused should be equally guilty for all the consequences of their criminal acts. Is the Fiscal correct? Explain. Answer: Regarding the death of Mahigpit, only Alibugha, Bulagsak, and Bisyoso are criminally liable. They acted pursuant to a conspiracy to beat the deceased whose death is the direct, natural and logical consequence of the crime agreed upon to be committed. Mabisyo is not liable for the death of Mahigpit because
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although he participated in the plan to beat him, he did not personally perform any overt act as his contribution to realize the common criminal objective. Regarding the death of the housemaid, only Mabisyo will be liable. The others are not criminally liable as the death of the housemaid is not covered in the conspiracy nor is it a necessary consequence thereof. Art 8; Conspiracy; implied conspiracy 2003 No IV. (a)
State the concept of "implied conspiracy" and give its legal effects.
4% SUGGESTED ANSWER: (a) An "implied conspiracy" is one which is only inferred or deduced from the manner the participants in the commission of crime carried out its execution. Where the offenders acted in concert in the commission of the crime, meaning that their acts are coordinated or synchronized in a way indicative that they are pursuing a common criminal objective, they shall be deemed to be acting in conspiracy and their criminal liability shall be collective, not individual. The legal effects of an "implied conspiracy" are: 1 ). Not all those who are present at the scene of the crime will be considered conspirators; 2). Only those who participated by criminal acts in the commission of the crime will be considered as co-conspirators; and 3). Mere acquiescence to or approval of the commission of the crime, without any act of criminal participation, shall not render one criminally liable as co-conspirator. Art 8; Conspiracy; implied conspiracy 1998 No VIII. 1.
What is the doctrine of implied conspiracy? [3%]
Answer: 1. The doctrine of implied conspiracy holds two or more persons participating in the commission of a crime collectively responsible and liable as co-conspirators although absent any agreement to that effect, when they act in concert, demonstrating unity of criminal intent and a common purpose or objective. The existence of a conspiracy shall be inferred or deduced from their criminal participation in pursuing the crime and thus the act of one shall be deemed the act of all. Art 8; Conspiracy; Robbery with serious physical injuries 1992 No. 7 Efren, Greggy and Hilario. wearing fatigues and carrying unlicensed firearms, barged into the residence of Arnulfo Dilat at Scout Lazcano St. (Before making their entrance, they gave instructions to their companion Sakay to stand watch outside). Once inside, they announced that they were members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) on an official mission. Inside the master bedroom, they demanded from Luningning, the wife of Arnulfo, cash and jewelries. After receiving the jewelries but before the money could be handed to them, they heard their companion Sakay shouting: "Pulis! Pulis!" Panic-stricken,
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Efren shot Arnulfo who was seriously injured. Greggy and Hilario picked up the jewelry box whose contents spilled all over the floor as they rushed out. Before they could make good their escape, however, the police blocked their way, one of them clutching Sakay by the collar. They were forthwith brought to the Police Headquarters nearby. Discuss the individual and collective criminal liabilities of Efren, Greggy, Hilario and Sakay. Suggested Answer: There appears to be conspiracy amongst the four offenders; in which case the act of one becomes the act of all. Ergo, they are all liable for the consequent crime, which is robbery under Art. 299, special complex crime of robbery with serious physical injuries, committed in an inhabited house, by pretending to be persons in authority. There is no band as only three are armed. Sakay, who seems to have participated only as lookout, still will be liable as principal because of the conspiracy. Even if there is none, he is criminally liable as a principal by indispensable cooperation. The crime is definitely consummated as offenders have complete disposal of the subject matter of the offense.
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Justifying & Exempting Circumstances Art 11; Justifying circumstances; defense of relative 1989 No. 5: Boy Bala was a notorious gang leader who had previously killed a policeman. The Chief of Police ordered his vice squad headed by Captain Aniceto, to arrest Boy Bala and should he resist arrest, to shoot and kill him. Acting upon an informer's tip, Aniceto and two (2) of his trusted men went to the Corinthian nightclub where they saw Boy Bala dancing with a hostess. Without any warning, Aniceto shot Boy Bala who slumped on the dance floor. As Aniceto aimed another shot at Boy Bala, the brother of the latter, Pedro, who was seated at a table nearby, got hold of a table knife and stabbed Aniceto killing him instantly. The Chief of Police filed a homicide case against Pedro for the death of Aniceto. On the other hand, Pedro filed a complaint for murder against the Chief of Police for the death of Boy Bala alleging that the issuance of the shoot-to-kill order was illegal and the Chief of Police was liable as a principal by inducement. How tenable are the respective claims of the Chief of Police and Pedro? Explain. Answer: The charge for murder against the Chief of Police for the death of Boy Bala is not tenable. Although, the Chief of Police is the superior on Captain Aniceto who shot Boy Bala in cold blood, he cannot be held accountable for .the act of Aniceto. His order was specific; to arrest Boy Bala and should he resist arrest, to shoot and kill him. Aniceto did not act in compliance with this order. He shot Boy Bala without warning, without even attempting to make an arrest. Consequently, it could not be said that the killing of Bala by Aniceto was induced by the Chief of Police so as to make the latter criminally liable as a co-principal by inducement. The liability for the death of Bala is individual and not collective. On the other hand, the charge of homicide against Pedro for the stabbing of Aniceto is likewise not tenable. Pedro acted in legitimate defense of relative, he being the brother of Boy Bala. All the requisites of this justifying circumstance are present. Thus: 1. There was unlawful aggression. At the time that Pedro stabbed Aniceto, the latter had already shot at Boy Bala and was in the act of shooting him for the second time. The aggression is unlawful although Aniceto is a police officer and Boy Bala is notorious gangster. By shooting Boy Bala without warning instead of attempting to arrest him first, Aniceto became an unlawful agressor. 2. There was reasonable necessity of the means employed by Pedro to prevent or repel unlawful aggression. The use of a knife against a gun for defense is reasonable. 3. Assuming that Boy Bala had provoked that attack on his person by Aniceto because of his having earlier killed a policeman, it does not appear that Pedro, the one making the defense had taken any part in said provocation. Art 11; Justifying circumstances; defense of stranger 1984 No. 4 Despite denial of a rally permit from the City Mayor, a group of students from different schools held a rally at Liwasang Bonifacio. At the rally site, they were met by members of the WPD Dispersal Unit, armed with truncheons, water hose, etc.
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When student A saw a policeman striking a fellow-student, B, with a truncheon, he hit the forearm of the policeman with an empty bottle of Coke in order to prevent the latter from further hurting B. At this point, other policemen came, subdued A and arrested him. For what crime or crimes, if any, under the Revised Penal Cede may A be charged? If A is liable for any crime, what circumstances would mitigate or aggravate his liability under the given facts? Explain, Answer A. Furnished by Office of Justice Palma None. When the policeman struck B with a truncheon, he goes beyond the limits of his powers. Consequently, A who employed adequate means to prevent the policeman from hurting B could not be held liable for assault or resistance nor for physical injuries considering that he merely acted in defense of a stranger. B. Comments and Suggested Answer A is not liable under the Revised Penal Code. He is entitled to defense of stranger, which has the following-requisites: 1) unlawful aggression, 2) reasonable necessity to prevent or repel it, 3) the person defending is not induced by revenge, resentment of any evil motive. (Art. 11, par. 3, Rev. Penal Code People vs. Lara CA 43 O.G. 3152). The policeman who hit the student B with a truncheon, while the students were at the rally site, abused or exceeded his authority. In this case, the policeman would be an unlawful aggressor. A acted on impulse by striking the policeman on the forearm with an empty coke bottle to prevent him from farther hurting B. From the facts of the case B was already injured by the policeman when A hit him and the means employed under the circumstances would be reasonable. A was, not actuated by revenge, resentment or any evil motive. Alternative Answer A can be held liable for simple resistance When the policeman hit B with a truncheon the presumption is he acted in fulfillment of his duty as a peace officer to maintain and preserve order in the rally site. However, the act of the policeman can be considered sufficient provocation to A for him to bit the policeman on the arm with a coke bottle to prevent him from further hurting B. A can invoke such mitigating circumstance. The crime committed is not direct assault as a policeman is an agent of a person in authority and the act of A under the facts cannot constitute manifest defiance to the authority of the law. {U.S. vs. Tabiana, 37 Phil. 975) The aggravating circumstance of disregard of the rank of the policeman is also present. (People vs. Regala, 113 SCRA 613 [1982] ) Art 11; Justifying circumstances; defense of stranger 2002 No XV. B. A chanced upon three men who were attacking B with fist blows. C, one of the men, was about to stab B with a knife. Not knowing that B was actually the aggressor because he had earlier challenged the three men to a fight, A shot C as the latter was about to stab B. May A invoke the defense of a stranger as a justifying circumstance in his favor? Why? (2%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes. A may invoke the justifying circumstance of defense of stranger since he was not involved in the fight and he shot C when the latter was about to stab
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B. There being no indication that A was induced by revenge, resentment or any other evil motive in shooting C, his act is justified under par 3, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Art 11; Justifying circumstances; euthanasia 1990 No. 3: a) In mercy killing, is the attending physician criminally liable for deliberately turning off the life support system consequently costing the life of the patient? State reasons. b) How about in an instance when in saving the life of the mother, the doctor sacrificed the life of the unborn child? Explain your answer. Answer: a) The attending physician is criminally liable. Euthanasia is not a justifying circumstance in Philippine jurisdiction. b) There is no criminal liability on the part of the doctor because his acts are justified under Article 11(4) of the Revised Penal Code which provides that: The following do not incur any criminal liability: x x x 4) any person, who in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes damage to another, provided that the following requisites are present: First: That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it; Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it." Alternative Answer: There is no criminal liability on the part of the doctor because his acts are justified under Article 11(5) of the Revised Penal Code which provides that: "The following do not incur any criminal liability: x x x (5) Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office." Art 11; Justifying circumstances; fulfillment of duty 2000 No VI a) Lucresia, a store owner, was robbed of her bracelet in her home. The following day, at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, a neighbor, 22-year old JunJun, who had an unsavory reputation, came to her store to buy bottles of beer. Lucresia noticed her bracelet wound around the right arm of Jun-Jun. As soon as the latter left, Lucresia went to a nearby police station and sought the help of a policeman on duty, Pat. Willie Reyes. He went with Lucresia to the house of JunJun to confront the latter. Pat. Reyes introduced himself as a policeman and tried to get hold of Jun-Jun who resisted and ran away. Pat. Reyes chased him and fired two warning shots in the air. Jun-Jun continued to run and when he was about 7 meters away, Pat, Reyes shot him in the right leg. Jun-Jun was hit and he fell down but he crawled towards a fence, intending to pass through an opening underneath. When Pat. Reyes was about 5 meters away, he fired another shot at Jun-Jun hitting him at the right lower hip. Pat. Reyes brought JunJun to the hospital, but because of profuse bleeding, he eventually died. Pat Reyes was subsequently charged with homicide. During the trial, Pat Reyes raised the defense, by way of exoneration, that he acted in the fulfillment of a duty. Is the defense tenable? Explain. (3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER:
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a) No, the defense of Pat. Reyes is not tenable. The defense of having acted in the fulfillment of a duty requires as a condition, inter alia, that the Injury or offense committed be the unavoidable or necessary consequence of the due performance of the duty (People vs. Oanis, et.al., 74 Phil. 257). It is not enough that the accused acted in fulfillment of a duty. After Jun-Jun was shot in the right leg and was already crawling, there was no need for Pat, Reyes to shoot him further. Clearly, Pat. Reyes acted beyond the call of duty which brought about the cause of death of the victim. Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense 1992 No. 3: As Sergio, Yoyong, Zoilo and Warlito engaged in a drinking spree at Heartthrob Disco, Special Police Officer 3 (SPO 3) Manolo Yabang suddenly approached them, aimed his revolver at Sergio whom he recognized as a wanted killer and fatally shot the latter. Whereupon, Yoyong, Zoilo and Warlito ganged up on Yabang. Warlilo, using his own pistol, shot and wounded Yabang. a) What are the criminal liabilities of Yoyong, Zoilo and Warlito for the injury to Yabang? Was there conspiracy and treachery? Explain. b) In turn, is Yabang criminally liable for the death of Sergio? Suggested Answer: a) The acts of Yoyong, Zoilo and Warlito are justified under pars. 1 and 2 of Article 11, RPC, that is, self-defense or defense of a stranger, as they have reason to suspect that Yabang might not be satisfied in killing Sergio ONLY, the three being friends and companions of the victim. Hence, they are entitled to protect their own lives and limbs from the unlawful aggression of Yabang. Alternatively they have the justified right to defend a stranger (Sergio) whose life at that moment might still be saved by ganging up on Yabang to prevent the latter from any further attack by the latter. In either case reasonable necessity of the means employed and lack of sufficient provocation are present b) Yabang is liable for Homicide for the killing of Sergio as the attack was frontal (Alternative: Murder, because of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, in terms of weapon). Sergio, being a suspected killer, is no justification to be killed by Yabang (People vs. Oanis). Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense 1977 No. I-a When A saw B rushing towards him holding a bolo and poised to strike him, he immediately picked up a pointed iron bar and believing that his life was in danger as B was close enough, he made a trust on B hitting him on the stomach which caused the death of B thereafter. The truth, however, is that B was merely trying to play a joke on C who was then behind A. Is A criminally liable for the death of B? State your reasons. Answer A is not criminally liable because he acted in self-defense due to mistake of facts. As the facts of the problem state, A thrust the pointed iron bar on B, hitting him on the stomach as he believed that his life was in danger because B was close enough when he rushed towards A holding a bolo and poised to strike him. (U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488). Under the circumstances, he had no time or opportunity to verify whether B was only playing a joke on C who was behind Page 42 of 374
A. Hence, his mistake of the facts was without fault or carelessness. He had no alternative but to take the facts as they appeared to him to justify his act. So A acted in good faith without criminal intent.
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Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense 1978 No. IV-b B repeatedly stabbed A with a kitchen knife. A managed to escape with minor injuries, and to run away from B who continued to pursue him. A, upon reaching the safety of his house, took a scythe with which to defend himself against B. Thus armed, A went out of his house and dared B to come forward and fight. In the ensuing struggle, A killed B. Charged with homicide, A claimed self-defense. Is A entitled to the justifying circumstance? Decide and give your reasons. Answer: A is not entitled to the justifying circumstance of self-defense. There is no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim B. There are two stages in the fight. The first stage was when B stabbed A repeatedly with a kitchen knife, who managed however to escape and ran away, pursued by B. When A reached the safety of his house, he was already safe from the unlawful aggression of B and so such was deemed to have ceased. When A took a scythe inside his house and while thus armed he went out of his house and dared B to come forward and fight, be became therefore the challenger. From the facts, a struggle ensued, which implies that the challenge of A was accepted by B, which is an agreement to fight and hence there can be no unlawful aggression. (People vs. Astilla, CAGR No. 4391 6 Velayo's Digest, page 124). Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense 1979 No. VI X, a private citizen, saw two masked men break into a drug store across his home. He telephoned the police to come. Without waiting for the police, he went outside his house with a pistol and tried to intercept the thieves. He told them to stop but they did not. He fired several shots at them, wounded them and caused their hospitalization for 20 days. May the thieves file any criminal case against X? May X invoke the defense of the person or rights of a stranger? Answer The thieves can file a criminal action against X. In defense of the person or property of a stranger, the elements of (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) that the person defending must not be induced by revenge, resentment or any other evil motive, must be present. In self-defense of property, the doctrine is that the attack on the property must be coupled with an attack upon the person of the possessor of the property. (People vs. Apolinar, CA 38 O.G. 2870). The same rule should apply to defense of the property of a stranger since the first two elements of defense of a stranger are also the first two elements of self-defense, that is unlawful aggression and reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or to repel it. The means employed by X in firing several shots at the thieves was not reasonable as there was no attack upon the person of the owner of the drugstore or of any person present therein. Nor can there be defense of the person of a stranger since unlawful aggression is absent. Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense 1980 No. III "F" and "G" quarreled. "F" attacked "G" with a club two or three times, but "G" was able to parry the attack. "G" did not move backwards but struck back Page 44 of 374
hitting "F" on his head with a lead pipe which he picked up from the ground, causing "F's" death. "G" was charged with Homicide. If you were the Judge, would you find "G" guilty as charged? Answer If the term "quarreled" implies an agreement to a fight, G would be guilty of the crime charged. He cannot invoke, self-defense because if there is an agreement to fight there would be no unlawful aggression. Any attack is considered as a mere consequence of the agreement to fight. On the other hand, if the word "quarreled" involves only a verbal altercation, G would not be guilty because F committed unlawful aggression when he attacked G three times with a club. When G struck back hitting F on his head with a lead pipe which he picked up on the ground, he acted in self-defense because the aggression of F was still present and the pipe was the only means available to him in defending his person as he was acting under the instinct of self-preservation. The assumption is that G did not give any sufficient provocation which immediately preceded the attack made by F. Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense 1981 No. 3 "A" is the wife of "B", but she and "X", her former boyfriend, were having an illicit relation. One afternoon, "B", unnoticed by "A", followed his wife to a motel and saw her enter a room and close the door. After the lapse of some minutes, "B" managed to get in and found "A" and "X" lying together in bed. With his knife, "B" lunged at "X " but the latter parried the thrust and was able to wrest the weapon from "B" and stabbed the latter to death. Prosecuted for Homicide, "X" invoked the justifying circumstance of selfdefense in killing "B". Would you uphold the defense? Explain briefly. Answer X cannot invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense. An essential requisite of self-defense is unlawful aggression. The act of B in assaulting X when he found him and A, B's wife, lying together in bed in a room of the motel is natural and lawful, as it was made by B, the deceived and offended husband in order to defend his honor and rights. X should have known that having illicit relations with A, a married woman, X being her former boy friend, he was performing an unlawful and criminal act that would expose him to the vengeance of the offended husband. The act of B in assaulting X under the circumstances cannot constitute unlawful aggression (U.S. vs. Merced 39 Phil. 198). Furthermore, in view of his illicit relations with A, B's wife, and the situation in which B found them, lying together in bed, would constitute sufficient provocation to B for him to attack X. The third requisite of self-defense which is lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself is, therefore, also absent. Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense 1982 No. 2 "A", intending to kill "B", attacked the latter with a bolo. "In trying to defend himself with a piece of wood by parrying the blows delivered by "A", "B" hit "C", an onlooker, on the head, as a result of which "C" died. Is "B" liable for "C'"s
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death under the legal provisions that "although the wrong done be different from that intended?" Explain your answer. Answer B is not liable for C's death because he acted in self-defense. The legal provision that "although the wrong done be different from that intended" contemplates the commission of a felony and the wrong done is the direct, natural and logical consequence thereof even though not intended. Had B acted in incomplete self-defense, then this provision would apply, because there is mistake in the blow or aberratio ictus. In the case of self-defense, however, which is a justifying circumstance, the act committed is lawful, hence B would not incur any criminal or civil liability. Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense 1982 No. 3 "A" intending to kill "B", shot the latter with a gun at close range. Although hit but not mortally wounded, "B" grappled with "A" for the possession of the gun until "B" succeeded in wresting it from his adversary. Immediately thereafter, "B" fired the gun at "A" whom he killed. Prosecuted for homicide, "B" interposed selfdefense. The prosecution however contended self-defense was untenable because "A" had already been disarmed. Decide, explaining fully your decision. Answer The contention of the prosecution that self-defense was untenable because A had already been disarmed must be sustained. The reason is there is no more aggression to be prevented or repelled. Upon almost identical facts, in the case of People vs. Dayag et al, 98 SCRA 851 (1980) the Supreme Court held that as the victim was killed after the accused had wrested the gun from the former, since there was no more aggression to stop or repel as the victim was shot and killed when he was already unarmed and defenseless, self-defense cannot be invoked, Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense 1985 No. 9 Feeling homesick and terribly missing his wife after a long absence, Ronald, without notice, came home from Saudi. Arriving at their residence, he immediately proceeded to their bedroom where he saw his wife lying on their bed under a mosquito net locked in embrace with his compadre Dante Ayala He immediately drew his gun but was beaten to a draw by Dante whose bullet felled him. Prosecuted for Homicide for killing Ronald, Dante set up self-defense but was nevertheless convicted. (A)
Comment on the validity of Dante's conviction.
(B) In the above given case, supposing Ronald shot Dante and his (Ronald's) wife, while Dante was on top of the latter, thus killing both of them, will you grant him the benefit of Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code? Explain. Answer: (A) The conviction of Dante was valid. He cannot claim self-defense as there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. When Ronald drew his gun upon surprising his wife locked in embrace with his compadre Dante
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while lying on their bed at their residence, his act was natural and lawful as it was made by a deceived and offended husband. The act of Dante in maintaining illicit relations with the wife of his compadre was unlawful. (U.S. v. Merced 89 Phil. 189).
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Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense 1987 No. VII: Pedro confronted Jose one morning near the latter's house and angrily inquired why he let loose his carabaos which destroyed his plants. Pedro saw that Jose was armed with a dagger tucked on his waist and thinking that Jose would react violently. Pedro immediately drew his revolver. Instinctively, Jose grabbed the gun from Pedro's hand and a struggle for possession of the gun ensued, as a result of which the gun was thrown one meter away. Pedro jumped for the gun, and Jose unsheathed his dagger and stabbed Pedro at the base of his neck, causing the latter to fall down. Jose ran away as he was afraid Pedro's relatives might kill him. He was apprehended three days later in another barrio. Fortunately, Pedro survived after 40 days of hospitalization. The gun turned out to be without live bullets. During the trial for frustrated homicide against Jose, Pedro testified that he drew his gun even while he knew it had no bullets, merely to scare Jose, and he jumped for it when it was thrown away for the same purpose. Jose pleaded self-defense. The Fiscal argued that Jose's act of running away is evidence of guilt and negates self-defense. He also said that, in any event, there was no reasonable necessity of the means employed — namely, stabbing with a dagger - because Pedro's gun had no bullets. Decide the case. Answer: Jose is entitled to self-defense. Considering the circumstance of the case, unlawful aggression, the first element of self-defense is present. Pedro loose his carabaos which destroyed his plants and he then loose his carabaos which destroyed his plants and then immediately drew his revolver which Jose instinctively grabbed from Pedro's hand. In the struggle for the possession for the revolver, it was thrown one meter away, and when Pedro jumped for the gun, Jose unsheathed his dagger and stabbed Pedro who fell down. Jose ran away. The intimidating attitude of Pedro when he drew his revolver constitutes imminent unlawful aggression. Jose did not give any provocation to Pedro. Pedro was in a violent mood and in the mind of Jose, was armed, with revolver, in hand, and what Jose did in grabbing the gun was to prevent an aggression that is expected (People vs. Domingo CA 13 Rep. 1355). Stabbing Pedro with a dagger was the only available means to prevent the expected aggression considering that Jose acted by following his instinct of self-preservation. The flight of Jose after stabbing Pedro cannot be considered as evidence of guilt because he did so as he was afraid the relatives of Pedro might kill him. Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense 1993 No. 11 1] Pat. Negre saw Filemon, an inmate, escaping from jail and ordered the latter to surrender. Instead of doing so, Filemon attacked Pat. Negre with a bamboo spear, Filemon missed In his first attempt to hit Pat. Negre, and before he could strike again, Pat. Negre shot and killed him. Can Pat. Negre claim self defense? Explain. 2) Suppose Pat Negre missed in his shot, and Filemon ran away without parting with his weapon. Pat Negre pursued Filemon but the latter was running so fast that Pat Negre fired warning shots Into the air shouting for Filemon to Page 48 of 374
stop. Inasmuch as Filemon continued running Pat, Negre fired at him hitting and killing him. Is the plea of self-defense sustainable? Why would you then hold Pat, Negre criminally liable? Discuss. Answer; 1) Yes. self-defense can be claimed as there is an Imminent and great peril on the life of Negre. 2) No, self-defense is no longer sustainable as there is no more peril on his life; Yes, excessive force Is used. Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense; defense of honor 1998 No XV. One night, Una, a young married woman, was sound asleep in her bedroom when she felt a man on top of her. Thinking it was her husband Tito, who came home a day early from his business trip, Una let him have sex with her. After the act, the man said, "I hope you enjoyed it as much as I did." Not recognizing the voice, it dawned upon Lina that the man was not Tito, her husband. Furious, Una took out Tito's gun and shot the man. Charged with homicide Una denies culpability on the ground of defense of honor. Is her claim tenable? [5%] Answer: No, Una's claim that she acted in defense of honor, is not tenable because the unlawful aggression on her honor had already ceased. Defense of honor as included in self-defense, must have been done to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. There is no defense to speak of where the unlawful aggression no longer exists. Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense; defense of honor 2002 No XV. A. When A arrived home, he found B raping his daughter. Upon seeing A, B ran away. A took his gun and shot B, killing him. Charged with homicide, A claimed he acted in defense of his daughter's honor. Is A correct? If not, can A claim the benefit of any mitigating circumstance or circumstances? (3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, A cannot validly invoke defense of his daughter's honor in having killed B since the rape was already consummated; moreover, B already ran away, hence, there was no aggression to defend against and no defense to speak of. A may, however, invoke the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of having acted in immediate vindication of a grave offense to a descendant, his daughter, under par. 5, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense; defense of property 1983 No. 2 Considering that the Revised Penal Code provisions on justifying circumstances apply to anyone "who acts in defense of his person or rights," can there be self-defense when there is simply an aggression against one's property, not coupled with an attack against his person? Explain. Answer Page 49 of 374
No. Self-defense will be incomplete. Under the Civil Code there is unlawful aggression on the property rights of another. But to constitute self-defense of property two other elements must be considered, namely, reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending his property. People v. Apolinar (38 O.G. 2079 ) held that there is no self-defense of property if the attack on the property is not coupled with an attack on the person of the owner or possessor of the property. If for example, the owner shot the aggressor altho his person was not attacked, self-defense of property will not be present, altho there is unlawful aggression on his property right, because the means adopted to repel the aggression is not reasonable. (People vs. Navaez (1983) 121 SCRA 403) Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense; defense of property 1996 No. 6: 1) A security guard, upon seeing a man scale the wall of a factory compound which he was guarding, shot and killed the latter. Upon investigation by the police who thereafter arrived at the scene of the shooting, it was discovered that the victim was unarmed. When prosecuted for homicide, the security guard claimed that he merely acted in self-defense of property and in the performance of his duty as a security guard. If you were the judge, would you convict him of homicide? Explain. Answer: 1) Yes. I would convict the security guard for Homicide if I were the Judge, because his claim of having acted in defense of property and in performance of a duty cannot fully be Justified. Even assuming that the victim was scaling the wall of the factory compound to commit a crime inside the same, shooting him is never justifiable, even admitting that such act is considered unlawful aggression on property rights. In People vs. Narvaes, 121 SCRA 329, a person is justified to defend his property rights, but all the elements of self-defense under Art. 11, must be present. In the instant case, just like in Narvaes, the second element (reasonable necessity of the means employed) is absent. Hence, he should be convicted of homicide but entitled to Incomplete self-defense. Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense; defense of property 1977 No. II-b While C was approaching his car, he saw D slowly driving it away. So he shouted at D to stop but D instead accelerated his speed. To prevent his car from being car-napped, C drew at once hit revolver and fired at D who was by then about twenty meters away, fatally hitting him on the head. When charged for the death of D, C interpose the defense of his rights to property. If you were the judge, will you acquit or convict C? State your reason. Answer If I were the Judge, I would convict C. There is no defense of his right to property because although D drove the car of C away and he did not stop in spite of his shouts for him to do so, D had not attacked him. To be entitled to complete self-defense of property, the attack on the property must be coupled with an attack upon the person of the owner or possessor of said property. (People vs. Apolinar, CA 38 O.G. 2870). Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense; defense of property
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1990 No. 4: In the middle of the night, Enyong heard the footsteps of an intruder inside their house. Enyong picked up his rifle and saw a man, Gorio, with a pistol ransacking Enyong's personal effects in his study. He shot and killed Gorio. a) reasons.
Is Enyong criminally liable for killing the robber Gorio? State your
b) Suppose Enyong shot Gorio while he was running away from Enyong's house with his television set, what is Enyong liable for? Explain your answer. Answer; a) Enyong is not criminally liable because he was acting in defense of property rights. Under the case of People v. Narvaez (G.R Nos. L-33466-67, April 20, 1983, 121 SCRA 389} defense of property need not necessarily be coupled with aggression against persons. b) There is criminal liability this time with the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense. Under the case of People v. Narvaez, defense of property can be availed of even when there is no assault against a person. It is recognized as an unlawful aggression. Art 11; Justifying circumstances; self-defense; unlawful aggression & mistake of fact 2003 No II The accused lived with his family in a neighborhood that often was the scene of frequent robberies. At one time, past midnight, the accused went downstairs with a loaded gun to investigate what he thought were footsteps of an uninvited guest. After seeing what appeared to him an armed stranger looking around and out to rob the house, he fired his gun seriously injuring the man. When the lights were turned on, the unfortunate victim turned out to be a brotherin-law on his way to the kitchen to get some light snacks. The accused was indicted for serious physical injuries. Should the accused, given the circumstances, be convicted or acquitted? Why? 4% SUGGESTED ANSWER: The accused should be convicted because, even assuming the facts to be true in his belief, his act of shooting a burglar when there is no unlawful aggression on his person is not justified. Defense of property or property right does not justify the act of firing a gun at a burglar unless the life and limb of the accused is already in imminent and immediate danger. Although the accused acted out of a misapprehension of the facts, he is not absolved from criminal liability. ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: Considering the given circumstances, namely; the frequent robberies in the neighborhood, the time was past midnight, and the victim appeared to be an armed burglar in the dark and inside his house, the accused could have entertained an honest belief that his life and limb or those of his family are already in immediate and imminent danger. Hence, it may be reasonable to accept that he acted out of an honest mistake of fact and therefore without criminal intent. An honest mistake of fact negatives criminal intent and thus absolves the accused from criminal liability.
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Art 11; Justifying vs exempting circumstances 1978 No. II-b Justifying and exempting circumstances have some similar effects but are different concepts. Discuss their similarities and distinctions. Answer In justifying circumstance, the act committed is lawful, and the actor does not incur any criminal nor civil liability. In an exempting circumstance, a crime is committed but there is absent in the person of the offender any of the elements of voluntariness, and so he is not criminally liable but is civilly liable except in the exempting circumstances of accident and lawful or insuperable cause. To recapitulate, in a justifying circumstance, the act is lawful and hence, there is no crime committed. In an exempting circumstance, the actor does not incur any criminal nor civil liability. In an exempting circumstance, the offender is not criminally liable because the act is not committed voluntarily but he is civilly liable because the source of the obligation which is the crime is present. Art 11; Justifying vs exempting circumstances 1998 No IV 1.
Distinguish between justifying and exempting circumstances. [3%]
Answer; 1.
In justifying circumstances:
a) The circumstance affects the act, not the actor; b) The act is done within legal bounds, hence considered as not a crime; c) Since the act is not a crime, there is no criminal; d) There being no crime nor criminal, there is no criminal nor civil liability. Whereas, in an exempting circumstances: a) The circumstance affects the actor, not the act; b) The act is felonious and hence a crime but the actor acted without voluntariness; c) Although there is a crime, there is no criminal because the actor is regarded only as an instrument of the crime; d) There being a wrong done but no criminal, there is civil liability but no criminal liability. Art 11; Mistake of fact 1977 No. I-a When A saw B rushing towards him holding a bolo and poised to strike him, he immediately picked up a pointed iron bar and believing that his life was in danger as B was close enough, he made a trust on B hitting him on the stomach which caused the death of B thereafter. The truth, however, is that B was merely trying to play a joke on C who was then behind A. Is A criminally liable for the death of B? State your reasons. Answer A is not criminally liable because he acted in self-defense due to mistake of facts. As the facts of the problem state, A thrust the pointed iron bar on B,
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hitting him on the stomach as he believed that his life was in danger because B was close enough when he rushed towards A holding a bolo and poised to strike him. (U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488). Under the circumstances, he had no time or opportunity to verify whether B was only playing a joke on C who was behind A. Hence, his mistake of the facts was without fault or carelessness. He had no alternative but to take the facts as they appeared to him to justify his act. So A acted in good faith without criminal intent.
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Art 11; Mistake of fact 1988 No. 10: (b) Five laborers were hired by Manuel Diong to harvest coconuts from a plantation which he told them belonged to him. Unknown to them, the ownership of the land was in dispute, and the registered owner subsequently filed a case of qualified theft against them. How would you defend them? Explain briefly. Answer: b) I would defend them by citing U.S. vs. Ah Chong (15 Phil. 488) on mistake of facts and charge the owner with violation of Article 282 on grave threats. In U.S. vs. Ah Chong, the accused was exempted from criminal liability because he performed an act which would be lawful had it been true as he believed that "Grave, threats.— Any person who shall threaten another with the infliction upon the person, honor or property of the latter or of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime, shall suffer. ..". Art 11; Mistake of fact 1985 No. 6 Pat. Josue, a member of the INP Western Police District, together with two (2) other policemen, was chasing Katindig, a notorious police killer. Katindig entered a nearby dimly lighted warehouse. Josue and his companions continued pursuing him. When they reached the mezzanine, Josue saw a man crouching behind a pile of boxes, holding what appeared to be a long rifle. When the man suddenly stood up and faced Josue and his companions, Josue fired at the man hitting him fatally. It turned out, however, that the deceased was the warehouseman who was holding a mere lead pipe. Discuss Pat. Josue's criminal liability for the said killing stating your reasons. Answer: Patrolman Josue will not incur any criminal liability. He can invoked in his favor mistake of facts due to good faith. Under the circumstances, Patrolman Josue shot the victim in the honest belief that he was the notorious police-killer whom they were chasing until he entered a dimly lighted warehouse. In the mezzanine of the warehouse, Patrolman Josue saw a man crouching behind a pile of boxes holding what appeared to be a long rifle. The patrolman fired at the man when he suddenly stood up and faced him. He had no opportunity to verify first the identity of the victim before acting. He acted, therefore, without criminal intent and had the facts turned out to be true, as Patrolman Josue believed them to be, that is, that the victim was the notorious police-killer, that act committed would be lawful. Art 11; Qualifying circumstances as elements of a crime 2003 No IV. (b) When would qualifying circumstances be deemed, if at all, elements of a crime? 4% SUGGESTED ANSWER: (b). A qualifying circumstance would be deemed an element of a crime when Page 54 of 374
1). it changes the nature of the crime, bringing about a more serious crime and a heavier penalty; 2). it is essential to the crime involved, otherwise some other crime is committed; and 3).
it is specifically alleged in the Information and proven during the trial.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: A qualifying circumstance is deemed an element of a crime when it is specifically stated by law as included in the definition of a crime, like treachery in the crime of murder. Art 12; Exempting circumstances; accident 1981 No. 1 "A" and "B", both civilian guards, were seated inside the guardhouse. While "A" was cleaning his service pistol, "B" snatched it. In the ensuing struggle for the possession of the weapon. "A" succeeded in wresting it from the hand of "B". But then the pistol exploded with the bullet hitting the breast of "C", another civilian guard, who died as a consequence of the gunshot wound. Is "A " criminally liable for the death of "C''? Why? Answer A is not criminally liable. Since his service pistol was snatched by B, in trying to regain its possession, A was in the lawful exercise of a right. When A succeeded in wresting the pistol from the hand of B and it exploded with the bullet hitting C, A cannot incur any criminal liability as he was performing a lawful act. Even under the Civil Code, he is justified to employ reasonable force to repel the unlawful deprivation of his property, (Art. 429, Civil Code). Criminal intent is not present nor is there negligence under the circumstances. The death of C was, therefore, accidental. (People vs. Bindoy 56 Phil. 15). Art 12; Exempting circumstances; accident 1989 No. 2: Nicandro borrowed Valeriano's gun, a high-powered M-16 rifle, to hunt wild pigs. Nicandro was accompanied by his friend, Felix. On their way to the hunting ground, Nicandro and Felix met Pedro near a hut, Pedro told them where to hunt. Later, Nicandro saw a pig and then shot and killed it. The same bullet, however, that killed the pig struck a stone and ricocheted hitting Pedro on his breast. Pedro later died. May Nicandro be held liable for the death of Pedro? Explain. Answer: Nicandro may be held liable for the death of Pedro. While Pedro's death would seem to be accidental, the requisites of exempting circumstance of accident are not all present. Said requisites are: 1. A person is performing a lawful act; 2. With due care; 3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident; 4. Without fault or intention of causing it (Art. 12, par. 4, RPC).
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When Nicandro borrowed Valeriano's high powered M-16 rifle and used it for hunting wild pigs, he committed the crime of illegal possession of firearms, as he does not appear to have either a license to possess a high-powered gun or to carry the same outside of his residence. At the time he shot at the wild pig, therefore, Nicandro was not performing a lawful act. Furthermore, considering that the M-16 is a high-powered gun. Nicandro was negligent in not foreseeing that bullets fired from said gun may ricochet. Art 12; Exempting circumstances; Article 332 2000 No XI A, brother of B, with the intention of having a night out with his friends, took the coconut shell which is being used by B as a bank for coins from inside their locked cabinet using their common key. Forthwith, A broke the coconut shell outside of their home in the presence of his friends. What is the criminal liability of A, if any? Explain. (3%) Is A exempted from criminal liability under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code for being a brother of B? Explain. (2%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: a)
A is criminally liable for Robbery with force upon things.....
b) No, A is not exempt from criminal liability under Art. 332 because said Article applies only to theft, swindling or malicious mischief. Here, the crime committed is robbery. Art 12; Exempting circumstances; insanity 1991 No. 7: A raped X. In the process, X resisted and slapped A. Angered, A grabbed a stone and hit X. She was dying when A consummated the sexual attack. A psychiatrist from the National Center for Mental Health testified that he conducted physical, mental and psychological examinations on A and found him to be suffering from a mental disorder classified under organic mental disorder with psychosis. A's father testified that A was playful but cruel to his brothers and sisters, stole his mother's jewelry which he sold for low sums, wandered naked sometimes, and oftentimes did not come home for extended periods of time. The prosecution on the other hand, presented an array of witnesses to prove A that was lucid before and after the crime was committed and that he acted with discernment. After trial, the court convicted the accused and sentenced him to "life imprisonment" considering that under the Constitution death penalty could no longer be imposed. Given the conflicting testimonies as to sanity of the accused, was the trial court correct in ruling out insanity as an exempting circumstances in this case? Is the sentence of "life imprisonment" a correct imposition of penalty? Answer: Yes, the court is correct in ruling out insanity as an exempting circumstance. While there was testimony that A was suffering from a metal disorder, the testimony of A's father disclosed that A had lucid intervals. Because what is presumed is sanity, not insanity, it is to be presumed that A was sane when he committed the crime. Consequently, evidence being wanting that A is completely deprived of reason at the moment of committing the crime, he should
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be liable. Besides, the crime committed and the acts done by the accused in the commission of the crime hardly reconciles with Insanity of the offender, as rape presupposes evident premeditation. Art 12; Exempting circumstances; minority 1998 No IV 2. John, an eight-year old boy, is fond of watching the television program "Zeo Rangers." One evening while he was engrossed watching his favorite television show, Petra, a maid changed the channel to enable her to watch "Home Along the Riles." This enraged John who got his father's revolver, and without warning, shot Petra at the back of her head causing her instantaneous death. Is John criminally liable? [2%] Answer; 2. No, John is not criminally liable for killing Petra because he is only 8 years old when he committed the killing. A minor below nine (9) years old is absolutely exempt from criminal liability although not from civil liability. (Art. 12, par. 2, RPC). Art 12; Exempting circumstances; minority 2000 No IV While they were standing in line awaiting their vaccination at the school clinic, Pomping repeatedly pulled the ponytail of Katreena, his 11 years, 2 months and 13 days old classmate in Grade 5 at the Sampaloc Elementary School. Irritated, Katreena turned around and swung at Pomping with a ball pen. The top of the ball pen hit the right eye of Pomping which bled profusely. Realizing what she had caused. Katreena immediately helped Pomping. When investigated, she freely admitted to the school principal that she was responsible for the injury to Pomping's eye. After the incident, she executed a statement admitting her culpability. Due to the injury. Pomping lost his right eye. a)
Is Katreena criminally liable? Why? (3%)
b) Discuss the attendant circumstances and effects thereof. (2%) SUGGESTED ANSWER; a) No, Katreena is not criminally liable although she is civilly liable. Being a minor less than fifteen (15) years old although over nine (9) years of age, she is generally exempt from criminal liability. The exception is where the prosecution proved that the act was committed with discernment. The burden is upon the prosecution to prove that the accused acted with discernment. The presumption is that such minor acted without discernment, and this is strengthened by the fact that Katreena only reacted with a ballpen which she must be using in class at the time, and only to stop Pomping's vexatious act of repeatedly pulling her ponytail. In other words, the injury was accidental. b)
The attendant circumstances which may be considered are:
1. Minority of the accused as an exempting circumstance under Article 12. paragraph 3, Rev. Penal Code, where she shall be exempt from criminal liability, unless it was proved that she acted with discernment. She is however civilly liable; 2. If found criminally liable, the minority of the accused as a privileged mitigating circumstance. A discretionary penalty lower by at least two (2) degrees Page 57 of 374
than that prescribed for the crime committed shall be imposed in accordance with Article 68. paragraph 1, Rev. Penal Code. The sentence, however, should automatically be suspended in accordance with Section 5(a) of Rep. Act No. 8369 otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997"; 3. Also if found criminally liable, the ordinary mitigating circumstance of not Intending to commit so grave a wrong as that committed, under Article 13, paragraph 3, Rev. Penal Code; and 4. The ordinary mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the act. Art 12; Exempting circumstances; uncontrollable fear 1979 No. V X, engaged in illegal gambling, was accused of bribing Y, a policeman. X's defense was fear of reprisal from the police in case of non-payment of bribe money. He testified that when he attempted to stop giving bribe money to Y, the police raided his establishment without warrant for half a dozen times. Y also threatened to plant incriminating evidence on him. X was also manhandled by Y on the pretext of resisting arrest. X would park his police jeep in front of his house obviously to drive away his regular customers. X's defense is that he bribe Y under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. Please decide. Answer X's defense that he bribed Y, a policeman, under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury, is untenable. This exempting circumstance can be appreciated if a person is compelled to commit a crime by another through intimidation. It is also essential that the person intimidated must not have any opportunity for escape or to avoid the threat. The facts of the problem show that X could have easily reported to the authorities the alleged acts of harassment committed by the policeman. Lastly, the fear must not be speculative or fanciful but must be actual or real. All the acts testified to by X do not show any actual or direct intimidation on the part of Y in case of non-payment of the bribe. Art 12; Minority; effect on accused’s liabilities 1984 No. 2 In what specific ways does the Revised Penal Code exhibit due regard for the minority of an accused; (a)
in the determination of is criminal liability
(b)
in the determination of the degree of his culpability
(c)
in the imposition of penalties upon him
Answer: A,
Furnished by Office of Justice Palma (a)
Re:
Criminal liability of a
minor Under Art. 12 of the RPC: A person under nine years of age is exempt from criminal liability. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen is also exempt from criminal liability, except when he acts with discernment in which case he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Art. 80 of the RPC, which suspends the Page 58 of 374
sentence of minor delinquents. Under Art. 80 of RPC, whenever a minor under 16 years of age at the date of the commission of the offense, a grave or less grave felony, is accused thereof, the court after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit such minor to the custody or care of a public or private benevolent or charitable institution, established under the law for the care, correction or education of orphaned, homeless, defective and delinquent children, or to the custody or care of any responsible person — until such minor shall have reached his majority age or for such less period as the court may deem proper. However, under P.D. 1179, which amended P.D. 603 (The Child and Youth Welfare Code), which in turn, under Articles 189 and 192, thereof {P.D. 603), amended Art. 80 of RFC, the suspension of sentence and commitment of youthful offenders covers minors over nine years and under eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of the offense who acts with discernment. If he acts without discernment, then he is exempt from criminal liability. (b)
Re:
Degree of Culpability
Minority is treated as a mitigating circumstance under Art. 13 of the RPC, Under said article, a minor is a person under 18 years of age, in which case he shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Article 80 (as amended by P.D. 603, as amended by P.D, 1179.) But the rule is now settled that minority under 18 years is a privileged mitigating circumstance under Art 68 of the RPC, which provides for the imposition of penalty one or two degrees lower than that prescribed for the offense. (e) Re: Imposition of Penalties on Minors — Article 68 of RPC provides: When the offender is a minor under 18 years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the Code (RPC), the following rules shall be observed: 1. Upon a person under 15 but over 9 years of age, who is not exempted from liability by reason of the court having declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by two degrees at least than that provided by law for the crime which he committed. 2. Upon a person over 15 and under 18 years of age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. — The provisions of P.D. 603, as amended by P.D. 1179, on suspension of penalties in the case of youthful offenders (under 18) are also applicable. A. Comments and Suggested Answer The specific ways provided by the Revised Penal Code regarding the minority of an accused follow: a) In the determination of his criminal liability A minor 9 years of age and under at the time of the commission of the crime is exempt from criminal liability, A minor over nine years and under fifteen years of age at the time of the commission of the crime is also exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted with discernment. (Art. 12, Rev. Penal Code as amended by Art. 189, P.D. 603 amended by P.D. 1179) Page 59 of 374
A minor 15 years and under 21 years of age is dealt with like an adult offender: (b) In the determination of his degree of culpability A minor under eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of the crime is entitled to a privileged mitigating circumstance, (Art. 68 Rev. Penal Code, People vs. Jose et a! (1975) 71 SCRA 273). A minor 18 years and under 21 years of age is not entitled to a mitigating circumstance, whether ordinary or privileged. c) In the imposition of the penalty A minor over 9 years and under 15 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, who acted with discernment, is entitled to a discretionary penalty lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime committed. If he is 15 years and under 18 years of age, the penalty lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed in the proper period. Under P.O. 603 as amended by P.D. 1179, the imposition of the sentence may be suspended upon the application of the minor if found guilty after trial. If granted by the court, the minor is ordered committed to an institution until he reaches the age of majority. If the minor during confinement has been found to be incorrigible, he is returned to the court for the pronouncement of the sentence. He shall be credited in the service of the sentence the full time spent in actual confinement and detention in said institution. The benefit of this provision shall not apply to a minor who has already enjoyed suspension of sentence nor to one convicted of an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment. The minor is under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime (P.D. 1179) and at the time of the trial (People vs. Casiguran L 43387, Nov. 7, 1979) Art 80 of the Rev. Penal Code has been expressly repealed by Presidential Decree 1179 which amended Presidential Decree 603. Under Art. 189 thereof said minor who acted with discernment shall be proceeded against under Art, 192 of said Presidential Decree as amended. Art 12; Minors; liability 1995 No. 7: Victor, Ricky, Rod and Ronnie went to the store of Mang Pandoy. Victor and Ricky entered the store while Rod and Ronnie posted themselves at the door. After ordering beer Ricky complained that he was shortchanged although Mang Pandoy vehemently denied it. Suddenly Ricky whipped out a knife as he announced "Hold-up ito!" and stabbed Mang Pandoy to death. Rod boxed the store's salesgirl Lucy to prevent her from helping Mang Pandoy. When Lucy ran out of the store to seek help from people next door she was chased by Ronnie. As soon as Ricky had stabbed Mang Pandoy, Victor scooped up the money from the cash box. Then Victor and Ricky dashed to the street and shouted, "Tumakbo na kayo!" Rod was 14 and Ronnie was 17. The money and other articles looted from the store of Mang Pandoy were later found in the houses of Victor and Ricky. 1. Discuss fully the criminal liability of Victor, Ricky, Rod and Ronnie. Answer: 1. All are liable for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The acts of Ricky in stabbing Mang Pandoy to death, of Rod in .boxing the salesgirl to prevent her from helping Mang Pandoy, of Ronnie in chasing the Page 60 of 374
salesgirl to prevent her in seeking help, of Victor in scooping up money from the cash box, and of Ricky and Victor in dashing to the street and announcing the escape, are all indicative of conspiracy. The rule is settled that when homicide takes place as a consequence or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part in the robbery are guilty as principals of the crime of robbery with homicide, unless the accused tried to prevent the killing (People vs. Baello, 224 SCRA 218). Further, the aggravating circumstance of craft could be assessed against the accused for pretending to be customers of Mang Pandoy, Although Rod is only 14 years old, his act of boxing Lucy to prevent her from helping Mang Pandoy is a clear sign of discernment, thus he cannot invoke exemption from criminal liability under Art. 12, par. 3, RPC. Rod and Ronnie are, however, entitled to two and one degrees lower, respectively from the penalty of the principal under Art. 68. RPC.
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Mitigating Circumstances Art 13; Mitigating and aggravating; when not considered 1975 No. VI In what cases are mitigating and aggravating circumstances not considered in the imposition of the penalty? Answer a) If the penalty is single and indivisible. b) If the offense is punished by a special law. c) If the penalty provided in an ordinance is a fine. d) In felonies committed by negligence or imprudence. e) If the offender is a Muslim or a non-Christian, (Sec. 106, Rev, Adm. Code; People v. Moro Disim-ban, L-1746, Jan. 31, 1951). Art 13; Mitigating circumstance; voluntary surrender 1996 No. 3 1) Hilario, upon seeing his son engaged in a scuffle with Rene, stabbed and killed the latter. After the stabbing, he brought his son home. The Chief of Police of the town, accompanied by several policemen, went to Hilario's house, Hilario, upon seeing the approaching policemen, came down from his house to meet them and voluntarily went with them to the Police Station to be investigated in connection with the killing. When eventually charged with and convicted of homicide, Hilario, on appeal, faulted the trial court for not appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Is he entitled to such a mitigating circumstance? Explain. Answer: 1} Yes, Hilario is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The crux of the Issue is whether the fact that Hilario went home after the incident, but came down and met the police officers and went with them is considered "Voluntary surrender," The voluntariness of surrender is tested if the same is spontaneous showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities. This must be either (a) because he acknowledges his guilt, or (b) because he wishes to save them the trouble and expenses necessarily incurred in his search and capture. (Reyes' Commentaries, p. 303). Thus, the act of the accused in hiding after commission of the crime, but voluntarily went with the policemen who had gone to his hiding place to investigate, was held to be mitigating circumstance.(People vs. Dayrit, cited in Reyes' Commentaries, p. 299) Art 13; mitigating circumstance; voluntary surrender 1999 No I When is surrender by an accused considered voluntary, and constitutive of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender? (3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: A surrender by an offender is considered voluntary when it is spontaneous, indicative of an intent to submit unconditionally to the authorities. To be mitigating, the surrender must be:
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(a) spontaneous, i.e., indicative of acknowledgment of guilt and not for convenience nor conditional; (b) made before the government incurs expenses, time and effort in tracking down the offender's whereabouts; and (c)
made to a person in authority or the latter's agents.
Art 13; Mitigating circumstances; analogous circumstances 1979 No. IV X is charged with (1) assaulting a policeman, and (2) serious physical injury thru reckless imprudence. The prosecution evidence shows that X, while driving his car, ran through a red light, hit a bystander along a street curve that caused his hospitalization for more than 30 days and when arrested by a policeman, assaulted the arresting officer. The defense evidence shows that three (3) days before the incident, X saw a doctor for treatment of a recurring back problem. He was prescribed valium. X declared that on the day of the incident, the valium had strange effects on him and that he completely lost control of himself. A medical expert testified that drowsiness, fatigue, ataxia, and confusion are the normal side effects of valium. He added that hyperexcitability, though rare, was a possible side effect. If you were the judge, how would you decide the case? Answer If I were the judge, I would hold X criminally liable. Loss of control of X as a result of the administration of the valium is not an exempting circumstances since there is no deprivation of freedom of action nor of intelligence. At most X would be entitled to a mitigating circumstance analogous to passion or illness since there is loss of self-control and reason. (Art. 13, par. 10). Art 13; Mitigating circumstances; applicability in special laws 1981 No. 6 An accused was charged with Illegal Possession of a caliber .45 pistol. Upon arraignment, he pleaded "guilty" to the charge and invoked his plea as a mitigating circumstance. Can the court consider that plea as a mitigating circumstance in imposing the proper penalty on him? Why? Answer The plea of guilty cannot be considered a mitigating circumstance. Alleged possession of a firearm is punished by a special law. The imposition of the penalty provided in a special law rests upon the discretion of the court. Furthermore, the plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance under the Revised Penal Code, is appreciated only in a divisible penalty. It cannot be applied to a penalty which is indeterminate, that is, not divisible into periods of fixed duration, which is the penalty provided in special laws like the law punishing illegal possession of firearms. Art 13; Mitigating circumstances; applicability in special laws 1989 No. 8: Andres is charged with an offense defined by a special law. The penalty prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not less than five (5) years but not more than ten (10) years. Upon arraignment, he entered the plea of guilty. Page 63 of 374
a) In the imposition of the proper penalty, should the Indeterminate Sentence Law be applied? b) If you were the judge trying the case, what penalty would you impose on Andres? Answer: The plea of guilty cannot be considered as a mitigating circumstance in this case. The imposition of the indeterminate penalty in a special law rests upon the discretion of the court. Also, the pleas of guilty as a mitigating circumstance under the Revised Penal Code is appreciated only in a divisible penalty. It cannot be applied to a penalty which is not divisible into periods of fixed duration, like the penalty provided in special laws. Art 13; Mitigating circumstances; immediate vindication 1988 No. 13: (a) The victim Dario went to the Civil Service Commission at about 11:00 a.m. to have some documents signed, and because his efforts were frustrated, he angrily remarked in the presence of the accused Benito that the Civil Service Commission is a hang-out of thieves. The accused felt alluded to because he was then facing criminal and administrative charges on several counts involving his honesty and integrity, and pulling out a gun from his desk, he shot Dario, inflicting a fatal wound. Benito is now invoking the mitigating circumstances of immediate vindication of grave offense. Decide the case. Answer: (a) The mitigating circumstances of immediate vindication of grave offense cannot be considered because to be applicable, Article 13 par. 5 requires that: "Mitigating circumstances.— xxxx 5. That the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony (delito) his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters or relatives by affinity within the same degrees." Instead, the circumstances of passion or obfuscation should be considered. Benito should be charged with frustrated homicide with the mitigating circumstances of passion. Art 13; Mitigating circumstances; immediate vindication 2000 No II Osang, a married woman in her early twenties, was sleeping on a banig on the floor of their nipa hut beside the seashore when she was awakened by the act of a man mounting her. Thinking that it was her husband, Gardo,who had returned from fishing in the sea, Osang continued her sleep but allowed the man, who was actually their neighbor, Julio, to have sexual intercourse with her. After Julio satisfied himself, he said "Salamat Osang" as he turned to leave. Only then did Osang realize that the man was not her husband. Enraged, Osang grabbed a balisong from the wall and stabbed Julio to death. When tried for homicide, Osang claimed defense of honor. Should the claim be sustained? Why? (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, Osang"s claim of defense of honor should not be sustained because the aggression on her honor had ceased when she stabbed the aggressor. In
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defense of rights under paragraph 1, Art. 11 of the RPC, It is required inter alia that there be (1) unlawful aggression, and (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it. The unlawful aggression must be continuing when the aggressor was injured or disabled by the person making a defense. But if the aggression that was begun by the injured or disabled party already ceased to exist when the accused attacked him, as in the case at bar, the attack made is a retaliation, and not a defense. Paragraph 1, Article 11 of the Code does not govern. Hence, Osang's act of stabbing Julio to death after the sexual intercourse was finished, is not defense of honor but an immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against her, which is only mitigating. Art 13; Mitigating circumstances; incomplete self-defense 1990 No. 4: In the middle of the night, Enyong heard the footsteps of an intruder inside their house. Enyong picked up his rifle and saw a man, Gorio, with a pistol ransacking Enyong's personal effects in his study. He shot and killed Gorio. a) reasons.
Is Enyong criminally liable for killing the robber Gorio? State your
b) Suppose Enyong shot Gorio while he was running away from Enyong's house with his television set, what is Enyong liable for? Explain your answer. Answer; a) Enyong is not criminally liable because he was acting in defense of property rights. Under the case of People v. Narvaez (G.R Nos. L-33466-67, April 20, 1983, 121 SCRA 389} defense of property need not necessarily be coupled with aggression against persons. b) There is criminal liability this time with the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense. Under the case of People v. Narvaez, defense of property can be availed of even when there is no assault against a person. It is recognized as an unlawful aggression. Art 13; Mitigating circumstances; minority 1985 No. 1 Minority is generally a privileged mitigating circumstance which entitles the minor offender to a suspended sentence. It may however, under certain circumstances, be considered as a mere ordinary circumstance in which case the offender may be immediately sentenced and made to serve the penalty imposed upon him instead of being placed under suspended sentence. Discuss. Answer Minority as a privileged mitigating circumstance is considered in the imposition of the penalty, (Art. 68, Revised Penal Code). However, the age of the minor at the time of the commission of the crime may be considered in suspending the sentence upon conviction. So under the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree 603, as amended) a minor under 18 years old at the time of the commission of the offense and at the time of the trial, if found guilty after trial may apply for the suspension of the sentence. The only instance where Page 65 of 374
there is no suspension of the sentence in spite of minority is that provided in Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code where the minor under 16 years old at the time of the commission of a light felony if found guilty, the sentence is immediately imposed. But Article 80 has been expressly repealed by Presidential Decree 1179 which took effect on August 15, 1977. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court held in People vs, Sanchez (132 SCRA 103 1984) that there are only two instances where there can be no suspended sentence, to wit: 1) if the offense committed by a minor is punishable by death or life imprisonment; 2) if the minor is 18 years and above at the time of the commission of the offense and at the time of the trial.
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Art 13; Mitigating circumstances; minority; vindication 1993 No. 18: B, who is blind in one eye, conspired with M, a sixteen year old boy, with C, who had been previously convicted of Serious Physical Injuries, and with R, whose sister was raped by X a day before, to kill the latter. B, C and R were armed with .38 caliber revolvers, while M carried no weapon and acted only as a look out. They proceeded to the house of X riding in a motorized tricycle. Thereupon, C, on instruction of B to give X no chance, shot X who was then sleeping. Indicted for Homicide, as the information alleges no qualifying circumstance, specify the mitigating and aggravating circumstances present, and explain In whose favor, and against whom, must they be considered. Answer: 1. Mitigating circumstances: a) B is entitled to the mitigating circumstance under paragraph 8 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code; b) M is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstances of minority under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code; c) Vindication of a grave offense in favor of R because his sister was raped by X a day before the shooting, and even if there was an interval of one [1) day between the rape and the killing. Art 13; Mitigating circumstances; no intent to commit so grave a wrong; intoxication 2000 No XIV Despite the massive advertising campaign in media against firecrackers and gun-firing during the New Year's celebrations, Jonas and Jaja bought ten boxes of super lolo and pla-pla in Bocaue, Bulacan. Before midnight of December 31, 1999, Jonas and Jaja started their celebration by having a drinking spree at Jona's place by exploding their high-powered firecrackers in their neighborhood. In the course of their conversation, Jonas confided to Jaja that he has been keeping a long-time grudge against his neighbor Jepoy in view of the latter's refusal to lend him some money. While under the influence of liquor, Jonas started throwing lighted super lolos inside Jepoy's fence to irritate him and the same exploded inside the latter's yard. Upon knowing that the throwing of the super lolo was deliberate, Jepoy became furious and sternly warned Jonas to stop his malicious act or he would get what he wanted. A heated argument between Jonas and Jepoy ensued but Jaja tried to calm down his friend. At midnight, Jonas convinced Jaja to lend him his .45 caliber pistol so that he could use it to knock down Jepoy and to end his arrogance. Jonas thought that after all, explosions were everywhere and nobody would know who shot Jepoy. After Jaja lent his firearm to Jonas, the latter again started started throwing lighted super lolos and pla-plas at Jepoy's yard in order to provoke him so that he would come out of his house. When Jepoy came out, Jonas immediately shot him with Jaja's .45 caliber gun but missed his target. Instead, the bullet hit Jepoy's five year old son who was following behind him, killing the boy instantaneously, a)
What crime or crimes can Jonas and Jaja be charged with? Explain.
(2%) b) If you were Jonas' and Jaja's lawyer, what possible defenses would you set up in favor of your clients? Explain. (2%) Page 67 of 374
c)
If you were the Judge, how would you decide the case? Explain. (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: a) Jonas and Jaja, can be charged with the complex crime of attempted murder with homicide because a single act caused a less grave and a grave felony (Art. 48. RPC).... b)
If I were Jonas' and Jaja's lawyer, I will use the following defenses:
(1) That the accused had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed as they merely intended to frighten Jepoy; (2) That Jonas committed the crime in a state of intoxication thereby impairing his will power or capacity to understand the wrongfulness of his act. Non-intentional intoxication is a mitigating circumstance (People us. Fortich, 281 SCRA 600 (1997); Art. 15, RPC.). Art 13; Mitigating circumstances; plea of guilty 1999 No X (a) In order that the plea of guilty may be mitigating, what requisites must be complied with? (2%) (b) An accused charged with the crime of homicide pleaded "not guilty" during the preliminary investigation before the Municipal Court. Upon the elevation of the case to the Regional Trial Court the Court of competent jurisdiction, he pleaded guilty freely and voluntarily upon arraignment. Can his plea of guilty before the RTC be considered spontaneous and thus entitle him to the mitigating circumstance of spontaneous plea of guilty under Art. 13(7), RPC? (3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: (a)
For plea of guilty to be mitigating, the requisites are:
1. That the accused spontaneously pleaded guilty to the crime charged; 2. That such plea was made before the court competent to try the case and render judgment; and 3. That such plea was made prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. (b) Yes, his plea of guilty before the Regional Trial Court can be considered spontaneous, for which he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. His plea of not guilty before the Municipal Court is immaterial as it was made during preliminary investigation only and before a court not competent to render judgment. Art 13; Mitigating circumstances; plea of guilty and voluntary surrender 1997 No 5: After killing the victim, the accused absconded. He succeeded in eluding the police until he surfaced and surrendered to the authorities about two years later. Charged with murder, he pleaded not guilty but, after the prosecution had presented two witnesses implicating him to the crime, he changed his plea to that of guilty. Should the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty be considered in favor of the accused?
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Answer; 1. Voluntary surrender should be considered as a mitigating circumstance. After two years, the police were still unaware of the whereabouts of the accused and the latter could have continued to elude arrest. Accordingly, the surrender of the accused should be considered mitigating because it was done spontaneously, indicative of the remorse or repentance on the part of said accused and therefore, by his surrender, the accused saved the Government expenses, efforts, and time. Alternative Answer: Voluntary surrender may not be appreciated in favor of the accused. Two years is too long a time to consider the surrender as spontaneous (People us. Ablao, 183 SCRA 658). For sure the government had already incurred considerable efforts and expenses in looking for the accused. 2. Plea of guilty can no longer be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance because the prosecution had already started with the presentation of its evidence (Art. 13, par. 7. Revised Penal Code). Art 13; Mitigating; voluntary surrender; plea of guilty 1992 No. 5 Upon learning that the police wanted him for the killing of Polistico, decided to visit the police station to make inquiries. On his way, he policeman who immediately served upon him the warrant for his arrest. the trial, in the course of the presentation of the prosecution's evidence, withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty.
Jeprox met a During Jeprox
Can he invoke the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty? Explain. Suggested Answer: Jeprox is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender as his going to the police station was only for the purpose of verification of the news that he is wanted by the authorities. In order to be mitigating, surrender must be spontaneous and that he acknowledges his guilt. Neither is plea of guilty a mitigating circumstances because it was qualified plea; besides, Art. 13, par. 7 provides that confession of guilt must be done before the prosecution had started to present evidence.
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Aggravating Circumstances Art 14; Aggravating circumstances 1996 No. 2: 2) Jose, Domingo, Manolo, and Fernando, armed with bolos, at about one o'clock in the morning, robbed a house at a desolate place where Danilo, his wife, and three daughters were living. While the four were in the process of ransacking Danilo's house, Fernando, noticing that one of Danilo's daughters was trying to get away, ran after her and finally caught up with her in a thicket somewhat distant from the house. Fernando, before bringing back the daughter to the house, raped her first. Thereafter, the four carted away the belongings of Danilo and his family. a) Explain.
What crime did Jose, Domingo, Manolo and Fernando commit?
b) Suppose, after the robbery, the four took turns in raping the three daughters of Danilo inside the latter's house, but before they left, they killed the whole family to prevent identification, what crime did the four commit? Explain. c) Under the facts of the case, what aggravating circumstances may be appreciated against the four? Explain. Answer: 2) (a) Jose, Domingo, and Manolo committed Robbery, while Fernando committed complex crime of Robbery with Rape... b) The crime would be Robbery with Homicide because the killings were by reason (to prevent identification) and on the occasion of the robbery. The multiple rapes committed and the fact that several persons were killed [homicide), would be considered as aggravating circumstances. The rapes are synonymous with Ignominy and the additional killing synonymous with cruelty, (People vs. Solis, 182 SCRA; People vs. Plaga, 202 SCRA 531) c) The aggravating circumstances which may be considered in the premises are: i) Band because all the four offenders are armed; ii) Noctumity because evidently the offenders took advantage of nighttime; iii) dwelling; and iv) Uninhabited place because the house where the crimes were committed was "at a desolate place" and obviously the offenders took advantage of this circumstance in committing the crime. Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; abuse of confidence 1981 No. 5 "H" and "W" are husband and wife living in an apartment within the University belt. They took in "S", a male student-townmate, as a boarder. Before long, "W" and "S" fell in love with each other until one day "H" caught them in bed. If you were the Investigating Fiscal to whom "H" complained, what aggravating circumstance or circumstances would you allege in your Information for Adultery against "W" and "S"? Why?
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Answer If I were the Fiscal, I would allege as an aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed with abuse of confidence. Evidently, S was taken in as a boarder by the spouses M and W because he was their townmate. Such engendered trust and confidence in the relationship of the Spouses with S. By committing adultery with W, abuse of confidence was availed of by S in the commission of the crime, since he took advantage of the favorable position in which he was placed by the injured party as boarder in their house. (U.S. vs. Barbicho 12 Phil. 616). Dwelling cannot be alleged as an aggravating circumstance because the wife and the paramour were living in the same house where they had a right to be. (U.S. vs. Distrito et al 23 Phil. 23). Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; abuse of superior strength 1978 No. III-b A wealthy 65-year old landed proprietor (haciendero) with failing eyesight and defective hearing who has been a tubercular patient for the last 10 years, was robbed and killed in cold blood while asleep. A was found guilty as principal, B and C as his accomplices. In passing sentence, the judge considered abuse of superior strength as aggravating circumstance correctly appreciated against the three. Explain. Answer: There is no abuse of superior strength since A participated in the commission of the crime as principal and B and C as accomplices. This is inconsistent, since the offenders did not take advantage of their combined strength in the commission of the crime. (People vs. Cortes, 56 Phil. 143). Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; abuse of superior strength; dwelling 1976 No. I-a At about midnight, A, the accused, attacked fatally an unarmed, 4 feet, 11 inches girl with a hunting knife while she was alone in her room. What aggravating circumstance or circumstances were present in the commission of the crime? Reason. Answer Abuse of superior strength and dwelling. There is abuse of superior strength because the girl was defenseless since she was unarmed and A was armed with a hunting knife, which is a deadly weapon. The abuse of superiority of A lies in his sex and the weapon he used, from which the woman would be unable to defend herself (U.S. u. Consuelo, 13 Phil. 612). Dwelling is also an aggravating circumstance because the girl was attacked in her room. The facts of the problem do not show that she has given any provocation. (People v. Pakah, 81 Phil. 426), Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; cruelty 1985 No 4 A case of MURDER was filed against MN for killing XY, solely on the basis of a finding that XY sustained more than 200 stab wounds, only three of which were fatal. Discuss the propriety of the charge filed against MN. Answer: Page 71 of 374
The charge for Murder against MN is not tenable. Any qualifying circumstance of murder cannot be inferred but must be proved satisfactorily and conclusively as the act itself. The fact that the victim sustained more than 200 stab wounds, of which only three were fatal, does not indicate cruelty as a qualifying circumstance of murder. Cruelty requires deliberate prolongation of suffering of the victim. The number of wounds in itself does not show cruelty as it is essential to prove that the wounds were inflicted unnecessarily while the victim was alive to prolong his physical suffering. In cruelty, the wrong done in the commission of the crime is deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary in the commission of the crime. Cruelty cannot be presumed (People vs. Artienda 90 SCRA 944). Scoffing or outraging at the corpse of the victim cannot also be invoked as the facts do not show that wounds were inflicted when the victim was already dead or in what part of the body were the wounds inflicted. Besides, being a qualifying circumstance, it cannot also be presumed. Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; cruelty 1988 No. 13: (b) The robbers killed a mother and her baby, then threw the body of the baby outside the window. Can the aggravating circumstances of "cruelty" be considered in this case? Reasons. Answer: (b) Cruelty cannot be considered in this case because the aggravating circumstance of cruelty requires deliberates prolongation of the suffering of the victim. In this case, the baby was dead already so that there is no more prolongation to speak of. Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; cruelty; relationship 1994 No. 8: Ben, a widower, driven by bestial desire, poked a gun on his daughter Zeny, forcibly undressed her and tied her legs to the bed. He also burned her face with a lighted cigarrete. Like a madman, he laughed while raping her. What aggravating circumstances are present in this case? Answer; a) Cruelty, for burning the victim's face with a lighted cigarrete, thereby deliberately augmenting the victim's suffering by acts clearly unnecessary to the rape, while the offender delighted and enjoyed seeing the victim suffer in pain (People vs. Lucas, 181 SCRA 316). b) Relationship, because the offended party is a descendant (daughter) of the offender and considering that the crime is one against chastity, Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; evident premeditation, treachery, nighttime, unlawful entry 1997 No. 3: The accused and the victim occupied adjacent apartments, each being a separate dwelling unit of one big house. The accused suspected his wife of having an illicit relation with the victim. One afternoon, he saw the victim and his wife together on board a vehicle. In the evening of that day, the accused went to Page 72 of 374
bed early and tried to sleep, but being so annoyed over the suspected relation between his wife and the victim, he could not sleep. Later in the night, he resolved to kill victim. He rose from bed and took hold of a knife. He entered the apartment of the victim through an unlocked window. Inside, he saw the victim soundly asleep. He thereupon stabbed the victim, inflicting several wounds, which caused his death within a few hours. Would you say that the killing was attended by the qualifying or aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery, nighttime and unlawful entry? Answer: 1. Evident premeditation cannot be considered against the accused because he resolved to kill the victim "later in the night" and there was no sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution, to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will. 2. Treachery may be present because the accused stabbed the victim while the latter was sound asleep. Accordingly, he employed means and methods which directly and specially insured the execution of the act without risk himself arising from the defense which the victim might have made (People vs. Dequina. 60 Phil. 279 People vs. Miranda, et at. 90 Phil. 91). 3. Nighttime cannot be appreciated because there is no showing that the accused deliberately sought or availed of nighttime to Insure the success of his act. The Intention to commit the crime was conceived shortly before its commission (People vs Pardo. 79 Phil, 568). Moreover, nighttime is absorbed in treachery. 4. Unlawful entry may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, inasmuch as the accused entered the room of the victim through the window, which is not the proper place for entrance into the house (Art. 14. par. 18. Revised Penal Code, People vs. Baruga 61 Phil. 318). Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; generic vs qualifying 1984 No. 13 From the standpoint of legal, effect and weight, how would you distinguish generic aggravating from qualifying circumstances? Answer: A. Furnished by Office of Justice Palma 1. A generic aggravating circumstance can be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance which is not so in qualifying circumstance. 2. A qualifying aggravating circumstance cannot be proved as such unless alleged in the information whereas a generic aggravating circumstance may be proved even though not alleged. 3. A generic aggravating circumstance increases the penalty to the maximum hut not beyond that provided by law, whereas a qualifying aggravating circumstance changes the nature and even the name of the offense to one more serious. B.
Comments and Suggested Answer
Generic aggravating and qualifying circumstances are distinguished as to legal effect and weight, as follows: Page 73 of 374
1. A generic aggravating circumstance can be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance which is not so in a qualifying circumstance. 2. A qualifying circumstance cannot be proved unless alleged in the information whereas a generic aggravating circumstance may be proved even though not alleged. 3. A generic aggravating not offset has the effect of increasing the penalty to the maximum but not beyond that provided by law. A qualifying circumstance changes not only the nature but also the name of the crime and the offender becomes liable for the new offense which is more serious in nature.
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Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; kinds 1999 No IX (a) Name the four (4) kinds of aggravating circumstances and state their effect on the penalty of crimes and nature thereof. (3%) (b) Distinguish generic aggravating circumstance from qualifying aggravating circumstance. (c) The charge against the accused was raised to murder on the basis of the allegation in the Information of the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation both of which circumstances were supported by evidence. Murder was proved during the trial but the accused proved the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Should the accused be entitled to the minimum of the penalty for murder? (3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: (a)
The four (4) kinds of aggravating circumstances are:
1. Generic aggravating or those that can generally apply to all crimes, and can be offset by mitigating circumstances, but if not offset, would affect only the maximum of the penalty prescribed by law; 2. Specific aggravating or those that apply only to particular crimes and cannot be offset by mitigating circumstances: 3. Qualifying circumstances or those that change the nature of the crime to a graver one, or brings about a penalty next higher in degree, and cannot be offset by mitigating circumstances; 4. Inherent aggravating or those that essentially accompany the commission of the crime and does not affect the penalty whatsoever. (b)
Generic aggravating circumstances:
1. affects only the imposition of the penalty prescribed, but not the nature of the crime committed; 2. can be offset by ordinary mitigating circumstances; 3. need not be alleged in the Information as long as proven during the trial, the same shall be considered in imposing the sentence. Qualifying circumstances: 1. must be alleged in the Information and proven during trial; 2. cannot be offset by mitigating circumstances; 3. affects the nature of the crime or brings about a penalty higher in degree than that ordinarily prescribed. Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; must be alleged in the information 2000 No VI b) Rico, a member of the Alpha Rho fraternity, was killed by Pocholo, a member of the rival group, Sigma Phi Omega. Pocholo was prosecuted for homicide before the Regional Trial Court in Binan, Laguna. During the trial, the prosecution was able to prove that the killing was committed by means of poison in consideration of a promise or reward and with cruelty. If you were the Judge, with what crime will you convict Pocholo? Explain. (2%) Page 75 of 374
SUGGESTED ANSWER: b) Pocholo should be convicted of the crime of homicide only because the aggravating circumstances which should qualify the crime to murder were not alleged in the Information. The circumstances of using poison, in consideration of a promise or reward, and cruelty which attended the killing of Rico could only be appreciated as generic aggravating circumstances since none of them have been alleged in the information to qualify the killing to murder. A qualifying circumstance must be alleged in the Information and proven beyond reasonable doubt during the trial to be appreciated as such. Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; need to be alleged 1982 No. 18 "A" is prosecuted for homicide under proper information. At the time of the trial, it was established that the crime was committed with treachery, premeditation, at nighttime and with abuse of superior strength. (a) If you were the judge, what crime should you convict "A" of? Why? (b) How would you dispose of the circumstances stated above? Answer (b) Treachery, premeditation, nighttime, abuse of superior strength do not appear to be alleged in the information. Treachery, (which absorbs nighttime and abuse of superior strength) and evident premeditation will be considered as generic aggravating circumstances. Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; nighttime; band 1994 No. 9: At about 9:30 in the evening, while Dino and Raffy were walking along Padre Faura Street, Manila. Johnny hit them with a rock injuring Dino at the back. Raffy approached Dino, but suddenly, Bobby, Steve, Danny and Nonoy surrounded the duo. Then Bobby stabbed Dino. Steve, Danny, Nonoy and Johnny kept on hitting Dino and Raffy with rocks. As a result. Dino died, Bobby, Steve, Danny, Nonoy and Johnny were charged with homicide. 1)
Is there conspiracy in this case?
2) Can the court appreciate the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and band? Answer: 2) No, nighttime cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance because there is no indication that the offenders deliberately sought the cover of darkness to facilitate the commission of the crime or that they took advantage of nighttime (People vs. De los Reyes, 203 SCRA 707). Besides, judicial notice can be taken of the fact that Padre Faura Street is well-lighted. However, band should be considered as the crime was committed by more than three armed malefactors; in a recent Supreme Court decision, stones or rocks are considered deadly weapons.
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Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; recidivism 2001 No III Juan de Castro already had three (3) previous convictions by final judgment for theft when he was found guilty of Robbery with Homicide. In the last case, the trial Judge considered against the accused both recidivism and habitual delinquency. The accused appealed and contended that in his last conviction, the trial court cannot consider against him a finding of recidivism and, again, of habitual delinquency. Is the appeal meritorious? Explain. (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, the appeal is not meritorious. Recidivism and habitual delinquency are correctly considered in this case because the basis of recidivism is different from that of habitual delinquency. Juan is a recidivist because he had been previously convicted by final judgment for theft and again found guilty for Robbery With Homicide, which are both crimes against property, embraced under the same Title (Title Ten, Book Two] of the Revised Penal Code. The implication is that he is specializing in the commission of crimes against property, hence aggravating in the conviction for Robbery With Homicide. Habitual delinquency, which brings about an additional penalty when an offender is convicted a third time or more for specified crimes, is correctly considered ... Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; recidivism 1983 No. 8 Three persons — A, B and C — were found guilty of homicide. Each of them had been previously convicted of an offense: A for robbery; B for estafa; and C for frustrated murder. In the homicide case, against whom may the aggravating circumstance of recidivism be appreciated. Why? Answer Only against C. The reason is homicide for which A, B and C were found guilty is embraced in the same title of the Code as frustrated homicide, for which C had been previously convicted. Recidivism is a personal cause which should affect only C to whom it is attendant. (Art. 62, par. 3) Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; recidivism vs habitual delinquency 1986 No. 5: Give at least four distinctions between habitual delinquency and recidivism. Can a person be a habitual delinquent without being a recidivist? Explain. Answer: The four distinctions between habitual delinquency and recidivism are: 1. In habitual delinquency, the crimes are specified, which are robbery, theft, estafa, falsification, serious and less serious physical injuries. In recidivism, the crimes are embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code. 2. In recidivism, no period of time is fixed between the former conviction and the last conviction. In habitual delinquency, conviction of any of Page 77 of 374
the specified crimes must take place within 10 years from the last conviction or release. 3. In recidivism, it is enough that there be a second conviction of any crime embraced in the same title of the last or the first crime. In habitual delinquency, there must be at least a third conviction of any of the specified crimes. 4. Recidivism is an aggravating circumstance and if not offset serves to increase the penalty. Habitual delinquency provides for the imposition of an additional penalty. There may be habitual delinquency without recidivism if the three convictions refer to crimes not embraced in the same title Code, like, robbery in the first conviction, a crime against property, falsification, the second conviction, a crime against public interest and serious physical injuries, the third conviction, a crime against persons. Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; recidivism vs habitual delinquency 1983 No. 3 X already had three previous convictions by final judgment for theft when he was found guilty of robbery with homicide. In the last case, the trial judge considered against X both recidivism and habitual delinquency, X appealed, contending that conviction for one crime cannot twice be considered against the accused, once for the purpose of using it as basis for a finding of recidivism, and again, to establish habitual delinquency. Resolve with reasons. Answer The appeal is not meritorious. Recidivism and habitual delinquency have different legal effects. In the conviction for robbery with homicide, recidivism is appreciated as an aggravating circumstance because the previous convictions for theft are embraced in the same title of the Code as robbery with homicide, which are crimes against property. Habitual deliquency is also considered because of the three previous convictions by final judgment for theft, for the imposition of the additional penalty. Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; recidivism vs quasi-recidivism 1998 No VIII. 2.
Distinguish between recidivism and quasi-recidivism. [2%]
Answer: 2.
In recidivism -
a) The convictions of the offender are for crimes embraced in the same Title of the Revised Penal Code; and b) This circumstance is generic aggravating and therefore can be effect by an ordinary mitigating circumstance. Whereas in quasi-recidivlsm a) The convictions are not for crimes embraced in the same Title of the Revised Penal Code, provided that it is a felony that was committed by the offender before serving sentence by final judgment for another crime or while serving sentence for another crime; and Page 78 of 374
b) This circumstance is a special aggravating circumstance which cannot be offset by any mitigating circumstance.
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Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; recidivism; habituality 1989 No. 4: Andres was earlier convicted of adultery and served an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which did not exceed two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correctional. A month after his release from prison, he was charge with the crime of serious physical injuries. Later, Andres was again charged with homicide punishable by re-elusion temporal. He entered a plea of guilty in the homicide case. May the aggravating circumstances of recidivism and/or habituality (reiteracion) be appreciated against Andres? Explain. Answer: The aggravating circumstance of recidivism cannot be taken against Andres, For this circumstance to exist, it is necessary that — 1. The offender is on trial for an offense; 2. He was previously convicted by final judgment of another crime; 3. Both the first and second offenses are embraced in the same title of the Code; and 4. The offender is convicted of the new offense (Art. 14, par. 9 RPC). At the time of his trial for homicide, Andres was not previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code. Adultery, which is his only previous conviction by final judgment is a crime against chastity, and therefore is not embraced in the same title of the Code as homicide, which is a crime against person. As for the charge of serious physical injuries, although serious physical is also a crime against person, it appears that he had not as yet been convicted, much less by final judgment, of the charge at the time that he was facing trial for homicide. The aggravating circumstance of habituality or reiteracion can likewise not be taken against Andres because in order that this circumstance can exist, it is necessary that he was facing trial for homicide. The aggravating circumstance of habituality or reiteracion can likewise not be taken against Andres because in order for this circumstance to exist, it is necessary that— 1. The accused is on trial for an offense; 2. He previously served sentence for another offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty, or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty than that for the new offense; 3. He is convicted of the new offense. In the case at bar, Andres had previously served sentence only for one offense, that of adultery, but the penalty for adultery (prison correctional) is lighter than the penalty for homicide (reclusion-temporal). Consequently, there is no aggravating circumstance of habituality or reiteracion.
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Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; recidivism; motor vehicle; treachery 1993 No. 18: B, who is blind in one eye, conspired with M, a sixteen year old boy, with C, who had been previously convicted of Serious Physical Injuries, and with R, whose sister was raped by X a day before, to kill the latter. B, C and R were armed with .38 caliber revolvers, while M carried no weapon and acted only as a look out. They proceeded to the house of X riding in a motorized tricycle. Thereupon, C, on instruction of B to give X no chance, shot X who was then sleeping. Indicted for Homicide, as the information alleges no qualifying circumstance, specify the mitigating and aggravating circumstances present, and explain In whose favor, and against whom, must they be considered. Answer: 2. Aggravating circumstances: a) The aggravating circumstance of recidivism under paragraph 9, Article 14 should be considered against C if alleged in the Information (People vs. Peter Cadevida, et al, G.R No. L-94528. March 1, 1993). b) The aggravating circumstance of motor vehicle under paragraph 20 of Article 14 of the Code, all the accused having used a motorized tricycle; c) Treachery should be aggravating against all of the accused including M who acted as a lookout because all of them were present when X was shot [Article 62, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code). X was sleeping when shot to death. Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; treachery 1979 No. XI X was slapped by Z in front of many people. X went to his house, got a knife and waited for Z who was gambling in the upper floor of a house. When Z came down the house, X approached him from behind to stab him. Somebody shouted to warn Z and Z was able to turn around on time to parry the stab of X. The two fought each other until Z, while in process of retreating, fell in a canal, face upward. X then mounted him and succeeded in stabbing Z fatally. Is there treachery? Answer Treachery is not present While it is true that X approached Z from behind to stab him, Z, however, was not deprived of any opportunity to defend himself because of the warning from somebody and as a matter of fact because of it he was able to turn around in time to parry the stab of X. He was not deprived of an opportunity to defend himself. The stabbing of the victim by X who mounted him when he fell in a canal face upward as a result of the fight which followed when the victim was able to parry the stab of X does not constitute treachery since it was a mere continuation of the fight. It was spontaneous and a mere incident of the fight, Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; treachery 1980 No. XV In the course of a fight, the accused assaulted the victim with a knife inflicting upon the latter a serious- cut on his left arm prompting the said victim to run and flee. He was pursued by the accused. After having fled for a short
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distance, the victim fell on the ground, face downward, and before he could stand, the accused delivered a fatal stab with his knife on the back of the victim. What crime did the accused commit? Answer Since the accused assaulted the victim with a knife in the course of a fight, it cannot be said that the attack was treacherous because the victim would have been placed on his guard. (People, vs. Gonzales, 76 Phil. 473; People vs. Ardisa, 55 SCKA 345). Besides, from the location of the wound of the victim, which was on his left arm, it can reasonably be inferred that the attack was frontal. Treachery cannot be presumed but must be proved conclusively as the crime itself. So, the inception of the attack was not attended by treachery. When the victim after having been seriously wounded ran and was pursued by the accused, fell on the ground, face downward, was fatally stabbed on the back, the accused acted spontaneously. The stabbing at the back was a continuation of the fight, and if the fight is continuous, even if treachery is present at the latter stage of the fight, treachery cannot be appreciated as attendant (People vs. Canete, 44 Phil. 478). Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; treachery 1984 No. 14 Aside from the procedural requirements, what are the other requisites for treachery to be considered as a qualifying circumstance? Answer A.
Furnished by Office of Justice Palma
1. By employment of means, method or manner of execution which would insure the offenders safety front any defensive retaliatory act on the part of the offended party. 2. By the fact that such means, method or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously chosen. B.
Comments and Suggested Answer
The other requisites of treachery as a qualifying circumstance aside from the procedural requirements are: 1. Employment of means, method or manner of execution which would insure the offender's safety from any defensive or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party, which means no opportunity is given to the latter to defend himself or retaliate, and 2. Such means, method or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously chosen. (People vs, Barnayo, L-64164, June 22, 1934, 129 SCRA 725), Art 14; Aggravating Circumstances; treachery 1993 No. 6: As a result of a misunderstanding during a meeting, Joe was mauled by Nestor, Jolan, Reden and Arthur. He ran towards his house but the four chased and caught him. Thereafter, they tied Joe's hands at his back and attacked him. Nestor used a knife; Jolan, a shovel; Arthur, his fists; and Reden, a piece of wood. After killing Joe, Reden ordered the digging of a grave to bury Joe's lifeless body. Thereafter, the four (4) left together. Convicted for the killing of Joe, Page 82 of 374
Arthur now claims that his conviction is erroneous as it was not he who inflicted the fatal blow. 1) Would you sustain his claim? Why? 2) reasons.
What was the crime committed by the four assailants? Discuss with
Answer; 1) No. Arthur's claim is without merit. The offenders acted in conspiracy in killing the victim and hence, liable collectively. ... 2) The crime committed is murder, qualified by treachery because the offenders, taking advantage of their superiority in number, rendered the victim defenseless and without any chance to retaliate, by tying his hands at his back before attacking him. Treachery exists at least in the second and final stage of the attack, after the offenders caught up with the victim. Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; treachery & abuse of superior strength 1992 No. 3: As Sergio, Yoyong, Zoilo and Warlito engaged in a drinking spree at Heartthrob Disco, Special Police Officer 3 (SPO 3) Manolo Yabang suddenly approached them, aimed his revolver at Sergio whom he recognized as a wanted killer and fatally shot the latter. Whereupon, Yoyong, Zoilo and Warlito ganged up on Yabang. Warlilo, using his own pistol, shot and wounded Yabang. a) What are the criminal liabilities of Yoyong, Zoilo and Warlito for the injury to Yabang? Was there conspiracy and treachery? Explain. b) In turn, is Yabang criminally liable for the death of Sergio? Suggested Answer: a) Treachery cannot likewise be appreciated as there was no conscious adoption of means, methods or form to facilitate the commission of the felony. b) Yabang is liable for Homicide for the killing of Sergio as the attack was frontal (Alternative: Murder, because of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, in terms of weapon). Sergio, being a suspected killer, is no justification to be killed by Yabang (People vs. Oanis). Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; treachery, nighttime, superior strength and uninhabited place 1982 No. 6 "A", a suitor of girl "B", saw the latter at about midnight walking along a dark and deserted alley near her house. "A" sneaked up to her, grabbed her breasts from behind, kissed her, and at the same time raised her dress. At that moment, a noise was heard frightening "A", who immediately ran away. If you were the fiscal, for what crime would you prosecute "A"? Would you allege treachery, nighttime, superior strength and uninhabited place as aggravating circumstances? Reasons. Answer The crime committed is acts of lasciviousness. Stealthily kissing, embracing and fondling the breast of complainant and raising her dress constitute lewd or lascivious acts. (People vs. Yabut, CA G.R, No. 2550-R Aug. 5, 1960). More so, as the acts were committed at midnight and in a dark and Page 83 of 374
deserted alley altho near the house of the girl. Treachery is not present because this aggravating circumstance applies only to crimes against persons. Acts of lasciviousness is a crime against chastity. Nighttime is not present because the facts do not show that the accused took advantage of the darkness of the night to facilitate the commission of the crime to insure immunity from capture. Superior strength is not aggravating because mere physical superiority is not taking advantage of superior strength. It is necessary to prove the relative strength of the parties (People vs. Bustos, 51 Phil 385). Uninhabited place is also not present because the place of the commission of the crime was near the house of the offended party and the fact that A heard some noise which frightened him show that the place was not uninhabited. Besides, the facts do not show that the place was purposely chosen for the easy and uninterrupted accomplishment of the crime (People vs. Luneta et at., 45 O.G. 2832). Art 14; Aggravating circumstances; treachery; evident premeditation; nocturnity 1991 No 10: In an information for Murder against A, B, and C, the prosecution alleges Treachery as the qualifying circumstance and the following generic aggravating circumstances: (l) nocturnity. (2) abuse of superior strength, and (3} employing means to weaken the defense. At the trial, the prosecution, without objection from the de oficio counsel for the accused, proved evident premeditation. It likewise successfully proved the qualifying and the generic aggravating circumstances alleged in the information. a) For the purpose of determining the appropriate penalty to be imposed upon the accused, may the court take into account evident premeditation and the other generic aggravating circumstances? Answer: a) Yes, as far as evident premeditation is concerned, but only as a generic aggravating circumstance. Since treachery absorbs nocturnity, abuse of superior strength and employing means to weaken the defense, they can no longer be considered as additional circumstances. b) Supposing that treachery was not proved, may evident premeditation, which was duly proved, be considered as the qualifying circumstances? Answer: b) No, since it was not alleged in the information; qualifying circumstances not alleged if proved during trial will only be considered as generic. c) If the prosecution failed to prove treachery and did not offer any evidence to prove evident premeditation, does acquittal of the accused follow? Answer; c) No, but liability will only be for homicide, as there is no circumstances to qualify it to murder.
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Alternative Circumstances Art 15; Alternative circumstances; intoxication 1978 No. VII-b A, not being used to liquor, became drunk at a party. When he reached home, with the help of his friends, B, and C, his wife .W berated him so harshly, and a violent quarrel ensued. He squeezed her neck, banged her head against the wall and kicked her repeatedly in the stomach. The next day, W vomitted profusely and died thereafter. Cause of death was established to be hemorrhage cause by A's assault upon his wife. During the trial, A's counsel argued that A did not have the intention to kill his wife and alleged intoxication as an exempting circumstance. Decide with reasons. Answer The intoxication was not habitual as A was not used to liquor. He only became drunk during a party and so the intoxication was not subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. It is not exempting but an alternative mitigating circumstance. Since intoxication involves loss of reason and self-control, A could not have any intention to kill his wife. A is liable for parricide. The mitigating circumstances of intoxication and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that which resulted cannot, however, be appreciated in his favor to lower the penalty by one degree because the penalty for parricide consists of two single and indivisible penalties which are reclusion perpetua to death. (Art 246; Art. 63, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Monleon, 74 SCR A 263). Art 15; Alternative circumstances; intoxication 2002 No I A was invited to a drinking spree by friends. After having had a drink too many, A and B had a heated argument, during which A stabbed B. As a result, B suffered serious physical injuries. May the intoxication of A be considered aggravating or mitigating? (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: The intoxication of A may be prima facie considered mitigating since it was merely incidental to the commission of the crime. It may not be considered aggravating as there is no clear indication from the facts of the case that it was habitual or intentional on the part of A. Aggravating circumstances are not to be presumed; they should be proved beyond reasonable doubt
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Persons Criminally Liable for Felonies Art 16; Degree of participation 1976 No. II-a X, after promising Y to give him P10,000.00, induced the latter (Y) to kill Z, who at the time was vacationing in an isolated island in the sea which can easily be reached by a boat W, who owns the only motor boat in the locality, offered to transport and actually transported Y to said island. Upon reaching the island, Y killed Z, Indicate whether X, Y and W is a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime. Reason. Answer X is a principal by inducement. By promising to give Y P10.00 to kill Z, which is an agreement for a consideration, the inducement was made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime. Further, the facts show that Y has no personal reason to kill Z except the inducement, which is therefore, the determining cause for the commission of the crime by Y. (People v. Kiichi, 61 Phil. 609). Y is a principal by direct participation because he killed Z pursuant to the inducement or agreement for a consideration and he, therefore, personally took part in the execution of the act constituting the crime, (Art. .17) par. 1). W is neither a principal nor an accomplice. Although W offered and actually transported y to the island where Z was vacationing as he owns the only motor boat in the locality, the facts of the problem do not show that W has any knowledge of the criminal design nor purpose of Y. To be a principal by indispensable cooperation, it is essential that there be either anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention immediately before the commission of the crime. This means participation in the same criminal resolution of Y, the principal by direct participation. W is not a principal by direct participation because he did not participate directly in the execution of the act constituting the crime. Clearly, he also is not a principal by inducement because he did not induce Y to kill Z. W is not an accomplice because he has also no knowledge of the criminal design of Y, the principal by direct participation. If W has knowledge of the criminal purpose of Y then he will be a principal by indispensable cooperation because he cooperated in the commission of the crime by Y, which is the transporting of Y to the island in his boat which is the only one in the locality, without which the crime would not have been accomplished. (Art. 17, par. 3). Art 16; Degree of participation 1984 No. 1 A kidnapped a boy and demanded a ransom of P100,000 from the boy's parents. In time, the ransom was paid and the victim was released. When X (A's adopted sister) learned that A was being hunted by the police for kidnapping, she took him into her house and concealed him. A was thus able to elude the police. Did X incur any criminal responsibility? Explain. Answer. A.
Furnished by Office of Justice Palma,
X has no criminal liability. She is not a principal because she did not take part in the commission of the act, or induce another to commit, or cooperated in Page 86 of 374
the commission of the offense by another act without which it will not have been accomplished. (Art. 17, 12 RPC). Neither is she an accomplice because she did not cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts (Art. 18). She is not also an accessory because, although she harbored, or concealed or assisted in the escape of the principal, the crime is not treason, parricide, murder or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive or the author thereof is known to be habitually guilty of same other crime (Art, 19 (3): R.P.C.). A.
Comments and Suggested Answer
X did not incur any criminal liability. X learned that A was being hunted by the police for kidnapping and so being an adopted sister, she took A in her house and concealed him, thus enabling him to elude the police. X cannot be a principal nor accomplice because her participation is subsequent to the commission of the crime. Being a private person, she is also not an accessory, as the crime of kidnapping is not included among the cases, where such private person harbors, conceals or assists in the escape of the author of the crime who is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, attempt against the life of the Chief Exe-cutive or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. (Art. 19, par. 3, Revised Penal Code), Art 16; Degree of participation 1987 No I: Juan had a land dispute with Pedro for a number of years. As Juan was coming down his house, he saw his brother, Rodolfo attack Pedro with a bolo from behind. Rodolfo was about to hit Pedro a second time while the latter was prostrate on the ground, when Carling, Pedro's son, shouted, "I'll kill you." This distracted Rodolfo who then turned to Carling. Rodolfo and Carling fought with their bolos. While the two were fighting, Juan shouted to his brother Rodolfo: "Kill them both, they are our enemies," Carling suffered a number of wounds and died on the spot. Pedro who was in serious condition was rushed to the hospital. He died five days later for loss of blood because the blood purchased from Manila which could have saved him, according to the doctor, did not arrive on timer Jose, father of Juan and Rodolfo, told his sons to hide in Manila and he gave them money for the purpose. When the police investigators saw Jose, he told the police investigators that Juan and Rodolfo went to Mindanao. What crimes, if any, did (a) Rodolfo, (b) Juan and (c) Jose commit? Explain your answer and state whether the acts committed are accompanied by circumstances affecting criminal liability. Answer: a) Rodolfo committed murder regarding the killing of Pedro since Pedro was attacked from behind. The killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The mode of attack deprived Pedro of any chance to defend himself or to retaliate. Rodolfo is also liable for homicide regarding the killing of Carling, Pedro's son. as that is the result of a fight, both of them being armed with bolos. Although Pedro died five days later, since the blood purchased which would have saved him did not arrive on time, Rodolfo is still liable for the death of Pedro as that is the direct, natural and logical result of the wound inflicted by him. Page 87 of 374
b) Juan, the brother of Rodolfo, has no criminal liability. What he shouted to Rodolfo "Kill them both, they are our enemies," when Rodolfo and Carling were fighting, was not the only reason why Carling was killed; and hence, he cannot be a principal by inducement. The doctrine is to be a principal by inducement, the inducement must be the only reason why the crime is committed. (People vs. Kiichi et. al. 61 Phil. 609). c) Jose, father of Juan and Rodolfo, is an accessory to the crime of murder committed by Rodolfo because he assisted him to escape to Manila. But he is not criminally liable because of his relationship to Rodolfo (Article 20). He is not an accessory to the crime of homicide, because this crime is not included in treason, parricide, murder, attempt against the life of the Chief Executive or the principal is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime if the accessory is a private person. However, this is moot and academic because of the relationship of Jose to Rodolfo. Art 16; Degree of participation 1989 No. 15: Emilio and Andres were walking home from the farm at 8:00 o'clock in the evening when they met Asiong whom Emilio suspected as the one who stole his fighting cock two (2) days before; Emilio confronted Asiong and after a heated discussion, a bolo fight between the two (2} ensued. Asiong sustained fatal wounds and died. Emilio asked Andres to help him carry the body of Asiong and bury it behind the bushes. After burying Asiong, Emilio picked up tbe jute bag Asiong was then holding and found inside P600 which Emilio and Andres divided each getting P300. A week after the investigation by the police, a complaint was filed in the Office of Provincial Fiscal against Emilio and Andres for robbery with homicide with the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and uninhabited place. If you were the fiscal, what information or informations will you file against Emilio and Andres? What are their respective criminal liabilities? Answer: If I were the fiscal, I would file two separate informations against Emilio and Andres, one for homicide with Emilio as principal and Andres as accessory, and another for theft against both Emilio and Andres as principals. This is so because of the following reasons: 1. The killing of Asiong by Emilio is homicide. It is not attended by any qualifying circumstance of murder. It was a killing at the spur of the moment, in the course of a bolo fight, as an aftermath of a heated discussion. 2. Neither was the killing by reason of or on the occasion of a robbery. There was no intention of either Emilio or Andres to rob Asiong either prior to or in the course of the killing. The taking of Asiong's P600 was only an AFTERTHOUGHT, after the killing was already perpetrated. There is no causal or other connection between the act of killing and the act of taking the money3. Andres is liable as an accessory in the homicide case because he had no participation either as co-principal or accomplice in the killing of Asiong who died solely because of the wounds inflicted on him in his bolo-fight with Emilio, the principal. However, when Andres agreed to help Emilio carry the body of Asiong and bury it behind the bushes, thus concealing or destroying the body of the crime (corpus delicti) to prevent its discovery, he became an accessory to the crime of homicide (Art. 19, RPC),
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4. With respect to the taking of the P600.00 which Emilio and Andres divided between themselves, they committed the crime of theft as co-principals. Theft because with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons no force upon things, they took personal property of another without the latter's consent. They acted with unity of purposes and intention, thus making them co-principals by direct participation.. Art 16; Degree of participation 1994 No. 6: Tata owns a three-storey building located at No. 3 Herran Street. Paco, Manila. She wanted to construct a new building but had no money to finance the construction. So, she insured the building for P3,000,000.00. She then urged Yoboy and Yongsi, for monetary consideration, to bum her building so she could collect the insurance proceeds. Yoboy and Yongsi burned the said building resulting to its total loss. 1) What crime did Tata, Yoboy and Yongsi commit? 2) What is their respective criminal liability? Answer: 1) Tata, Yoboy and Yongsi committed the crime of destructive arson because they collectively caused the destruction of property by means of fire under the circumstances which exposed to danger the life or property of others (Art, 320, par. 5, RPC. as amended by RA No. 7659). 2) Tata is a principal by inducement because she directly induced Yoboy and Yongsi, for a price or monetary consideration, to commit arson which the latter would not have committed were it not for such reason. Yoboy and Yongsi are principals by direct participation (Art. 17, pars. 21 and 3, RPC). Art 16; Degree of participation 2000 No XIV Despite the massive advertising campaign in media against firecrackers and gun-firing during the New Year's celebrations, Jonas and Jaja bought ten boxes of super lolo and pla-pla in Bocaue, Bulacan. Before midnight of December 31, 1999, Jonas and Jaja started their celebration by having a drinking spree at Jona's place by exploding their high-powered firecrackers in their neighborhood. In the course of their conversation, Jonas confided to Jaja that he has been keeping a long-time grudge against his neighbor Jepoy in view of the latter's refusal to lend him some money. While under the influence of liquor, Jonas started throwing lighted super lolos inside Jepoy's fence to irritate him and the same exploded inside the latter's yard. Upon knowing that the throwing of the super lolo was deliberate, Jepoy became furious and sternly warned Jonas to stop his malicious act or he would get what he wanted. A heated argument between Jonas and Jepoy ensued but Jaja tried to calm down his friend. At midnight, Jonas convinced Jaja to lend him his .45 caliber pistol so that he could use it to knock down Jepoy and to end his arrogance. Jonas thought that after all, explosions were everywhere and nobody would know who shot Jepoy. After Jaja lent his firearm to Jonas, the latter again started started throwing lighted super lolos and pla-plas at Jepoy's yard in order to provoke him so that he would come out of his house. When Jepoy came out, Jonas immediately shot him with Jaja's .45 caliber gun but missed his target. Instead, the bullet hit Jepoy's five year old son who was following behind him, killing the boy instantaneously, Page 89 of 374
a)
What crime or crimes can Jonas and Jaja be charged with? Explain.
(2%) b) If you were Jonas' and Jaja's lawyer, what possible defenses would you set up in favor of your clients? Explain. (2%) c)
If you were the Judge, how would you decide the case? Explain. (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: a) Jonas and Jaja, can be charged with the complex crime of attempted murder with homicide ... c) I would convict Jonas as principal by direct participation and Jaja as co-principal by Indispensable cooperation for the complex crime of murder with homicide. Jaja should be held liable as co-principal and not only as an accomplice because he knew of Jonas' criminal design even before he lent his firearm to Jonas and still he concurred in that criminal design by providing the firearm. Art 16; Degree of participation {affects nature of crime committed} 1987 No. XIV: A, B, C, D, and E were members of a gang operating in Mindanao with Gorio as over-all leader, Gorio assigned A B, and C to get money from Pedro, a businessman from Agusan. As instructed, A, B, and C, armed with guns, went to see Pedro and demanded P100,000.00. When Pedro refused, A pointed his gun at him while B hit him with the butt of his gun, Pedro gave the amount demanded. After the three (3) left, Pedro went to the PC Command to tell them what happened. On the way, he met Orlando, also a businessman. Orlando told him that D and E, week earlier, wrote him a letter asking P50,000.00 and threatening to kill his son and wife should he fail to give the amount. Afraid that the two would make good their threat, he gave the money when D called him that day. Orlando was also on his way to the PC to report what happened. (a)
What crime did A, B, and C commit?
(b) What crime did D and E commit? If the crimes committed by A B and C on one hand and D and E on the other hand are different. Explain why they are different when the purpose is the same, i.e. to extort money. (c)
Did Gorio commit any crime?
Answer: a) A, B, and C committed robbery. They were able to make Pedro give them the P100,000 that they demanded when A pointed his gun at Pedro because he refused at first to accede to their demand and B hit him with the butt of his gun. They employed violence and intimidation in the taking of the money with intent to gain. b) D and E committed Grave Threats. The reason is the intimidation employed refers to the killings of the wife and son of Orlando should he failed to give the amount of P50,000 demanded in the latter which D and E sent him. The distinction between robbery and grave threats when the purpose is the same, that is, to extort money, is that in robbery, the intimidation is actual and immediate whereas on grave threats, the intimidation is future and conditional.
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c) Gorio, being the over-all leader of the group, is a principal by inducement in the robbery committed against Pedro. He has no liability regarding the grave threats committed by D and E against Orlando because the facts of the problem do not specifically mention his intervention in the activities of D and E. Art 16; Degree of participation; 1989 No. 6: Mario, a law student, wanted to avenge the death of his brother, Jose, in the hands of Pedro and his gang. So, Mario talked to Dalmacio, known tough guy, to kill Pedro by promising him P50,000 to be paid after he had accomplished the killing. Dalmacio agreed. Since Pedro was to appear in court the following day at 9:00 a.m. at the city hall to attend the hearing involving the death of Jose, Mario told Dalmacio to carry out the plan at that exact time in the court room, to which Dalmacio assented. At 8:50 a.m., Mario went to see Captain Malonso of the Police Department and told him that Dalmacio would kill Pedro at9:00 a.m. at the city hall. He asked Captain Malonso to prevent it and so the latter rushed to the city hall but arrived at 9:05 a.m. when Dalmacio had already killed Pedro. Is Mario liable as co-principal with Dalmacio for the killing of Pedro? Give your reasons. Answer: Mario is a principal by inducement. By promising to give P50,000.00 to Dalmacio, which is an agreement for a consideration for the purpose of avenging his brother's death the inducement was made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime. Furthermore, the facts show that Dalmacio has no personal reason to kill Pedro except the inducement, which is therefore the determining cause for the commission of the crime by Dalmacio. Mario's change of mind and heart at the last minute, which did not, after all, prevent the consummation of the crime, because it was too late, does not alter the course of his criminal liability as a co-principal by inducement. Desistance from carrying out a criminal design is no defense if such desistance has not actually and successfully prevented the commission of the crime. Art 16; Degree of participation; accessories who are exempt 1982 No. 5 "A" committed the crime of murder. His father, "B", the chief of police of "X" town, who had knowledge of "A"'s commission of the crime, concealed his son to evade arrest and prosecution. Is "B" guilty as accessory to the crime or murder? Is "B" guilty of some other crime? If he is, what crime did he commit? If not, why not? Reasons. Answer B is not guilty as an accessory to the crime of murder committed by his son whom he concealed to evade arrest and prosecution. The reason is B is a relative of A and under Art. 20 of the Revised Penal Code is exempt from criminal liability as an accessory except if he profited or assisted the offender to profit from the effects of the commission of the crime, B, however, should be guilty of prevaricacion or derelection of duty for having failed maliciously to institute the prosecution for the punishment of A, his son, whom he knew to have committed a crime as B is an officer of the law charged with the prosecution of offenses. Page 91 of 374
Art 16; Degree of participation; accomplice 1980 No. V "L" pointed a .45. caliber revolver at "M" without good reason. There ensued a struggle between the two for the weapon. "N", a female companion of "L" approached the combatants and quickly wounded "M" in the chest with a knife, as a consequence of which "M" died almost instantly. Can "L" be convicted as an accomplice? Answer L is not liable as an accomplice. An accomplice must be aware of the criminal design of the principal and must perform acts, whether previous or simultaneous, showing his approval or concurrence to said criminal design. The facts of the problem clearly show that while L ,and M were struggling for the possession of the revolver, N, the female companion of L, approached the combatants and wounded M in the chest with a knife which caused his death. L had no knowledge of what N would do, and he did not perform any act subsequent to the stabbing to show that he approved of what N did. (People vs. Cajandab, 52 SCRA 161) Art 16; Degree of participation; principal by inducement 1981 No. 4 In the course of an argument over a parcel of land, which each one claimed as his own, "B" hit "A" on the face. A week later, "C", father of "A", and "B" were disputing the ownership of the same property. Coming from behind, "A" clubbed "B" on the head causing him to topple unconscious to the ground. Then "C" told "A": "that serves him right." Postmortem examination disclosed that "B" died instantly from the blow he received on the head, "A" and "C" were charged by the Prosecuting Fiscal for the death of "B". Is "C" criminally liable as a principal by inducement for the death of "B"? Why? Answer C is not a principal by inducement. The requisites of a principal by inducement are: (1) that the inducement be made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime and (2) that such inducement be the determining cause of the said commission of the crime induced. (People vs. Omine Kiichi 61 Phil. 609; People vs. de la Cruz, L-30912, April 30, 1980, 97 SCRA 385). The facts of the problem show that when C told A after A clubbed B's head causing him to topple unconscious to the ground that serves him right, A had already committed the crime of killing B. So, the utterances of C cannot be the determining cause of the commission of the crime. Furthermore, A had a reason of his own in committing the crime. (People vs Caimbre et al 110 Phil 370; People vs. Castillo et al 17 SCRA 721). There was no inducement. Art 16; Degree of participation; Principal by inducement 2002 No II A asked B to kill C because of a grave injustice done to A by C. A promised B a reward. B was willing to kill C, not so much because of the reward promised to him but because he also had his own long-standing grudge against
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C, who had wronged him in the past. If C is killed by B, would A be liable as a principal by inducement? (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. A would not be liable as a principal by inducement because the reward he promised B is not the sole impelling reason which made B to kill C. To bring about criminal liability of a co-principal, the inducement made by the inducer must be the sole consideration which caused the person induced to commit the crime and without which the crime would not have been committed. The facts of the case indicate that 0, the killer supposedly induced by A, had his own reason to kill C out of a long standing grudge.
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Art 19; Conviction of principal before conviction of accessory 1978 No. III-a An accessory's liability is subordinate to that of the principal. Is it necessary that the principal should first be found and declared guilty before the accessory can be held liable? Discuss. Answer It is not necessary that the principal be first found guilty before the accessory can be held liable provided the evidence is clear as to the commission of the crime. What is controlling is the Spanish text of the Revised Penal Code which provides that the principal "may be" found guilty and not the English translation which speaks of the author being "guilty" of treason, parricide, murder, etc, (People w. Billon, CA 48 O.G. 1391). This was reiterated in the more recent case of People vs. Inovero, CA No. 04426-27 CR Feb 5, 1968, 65 O.G, 748, where it was held that the death of the principal does not preclude the conviction of an accessory in a murder case. What death extinguishes is the criminal liability of the principal but not the crime committed, and the accessory, having something to do with the commission of the crime, must suffer its consequence. (Also, People vs. Nueva, 74 O.G. 1424), Art 19; Conviction of principal before conviction of accessory 1981 No, 8 Is it necessary that the principal of a crime be convicted first before one may be found guilty and punished as an accessory? Explain your answer. Answer It is not necessary that the principal be convicted before the accessory be found guilty and punished. Neither the letter nor the spirit of the law (Art. 19, Revised Penal Code) requires that the principal be convicted before one may be punished as an accessory. As long as the corpus delicti is conclusively proved and the accessory's participation is established he can be held criminally responsible and meted the corresponding penalty. (People vs. Inovero. CA 63 O.G, 3160). The Spanish text of the Revised Penal Code was held to prevail, which does not require that the principal be guilty, unlike in the English text. (People vs. Villon, CA 48 O.G. 1931). Art 19; Degree of participation; accessory 1986 No. 16: Brothers Aber and Bobot, 16 and 17 years old, respectively, have had no food for the past two days. Suffering from severe hunger, they hatched a plan to break into a store to steal some food. Five days later, at 12 midnight, they were able to enter the store by breaking the hinges of the door. Aber took ten cans of sardines worth P50.00. Bobot wandered into a nearby room where the store owner, Cosme, was sleeping Cosme, awakened by Bobot's footsteps, attacked Bobot with a club. Bobot avoided the blow and hit Cosme in the chest with his fist. Aber, upon hearing the commotion, entered the room and tried to pull Bobot away from Cosme. Cosme, however, continued to attack Bobot forcing the latter to box Cosme in the face. Cosme collapsed on the floor. Bobot and Aber fled. The following day, Aber sold six of the sardine cans taken from the store to Dimas who lives a block from the store. Earlier that day Dimas heard rumors that
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the nearby store had been robbed and that his friend Cosme was found dead. Dimas thought of asking Aber and Bobot where they got the sardines to clear away this doubt, but on second thought did not. He bought the cans for P20.00 and sold them for P30.00. The fiscal charged Aber and Bobot with the complex crime of robbery with homicide aggravated by nighttime, evident premeditation and dwelling. The fiscal charged Dimas as an accessory of Aber and Bobot and for violation of the AntiFencing Law (PD No. J612). d) If you were the counsel of Aber, what defenses would you raise? Explain. (2) If you were the counsel of Bobot, what defenses would you raise? Explain. (3) If you were the counsel of Dimas, what defenses would you raise? Explain, (4) If you were the judge, how would you decide the case? Explain, Answer: (3) If I were the counsel of Dimas, I would maintain that he could not be liable as an accessory to the crime of homicide attributed to Bobot because he had no knowledge of its commission. Regarding the violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, he can maintain that he bought the tins of sardines in good faith without any knowledge that these were the proceeds of the crime of theft. (4) Dimas will be liable for fencing as he bought the tins of sardines without inquiring from Aber where he got the sardines and under the circumstances he could have known that those were the proceeds of the crime of theft. He bought them with intent to gain as in fact he sold them for a profit. (impliedly, he is not liable as an accessory) Art 19; Degree of participation; accessory 1983 No. 4 A proposed to B that they rob a certain store, to which B agreed. Later, however, B undertook the robbery alone and made off with P2,000 cash. The following day, after making some shallow explanation, B apologized to A and gave the latter P500, which A somewhat grudgingly accepted. What is A's liability, if any, and the legal basis thereof? Answer A is liable as an accessory. Altho A proposed that robbery be committed in a certain store, such proposal is not punished by law. So if B, to whom the proposal was made committed the robbery alone, only he will be liable for the robbery. But since A received from B P500 which he knew to be part of the amount of P2,000, which was robbed, A is liable as an accessory because he profited from the proceeds of the commission of the crime. Alternative Answer. A is liable for the offense of fencing. The reason is A with intent to gain for himself, received, possessed and kept an article or object of value which he knew to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery. (Presidential Decree No. 1612) Money is an article of value.
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Art 19; Degrees of participation; accessories & fence 1998 No VII. King went to the house of Laura who was alone. Laura offered him a drink and after consuming three bottles of beer. King made advances to her and with force and violence, ravished her. Then King killed Laura and took her jewelry. Doming, King's adopted brother, learned about the incident. He went to Laura's house, hid her body, cleaned everything and washed the bloodstains inside the room. Later, King gave Jose, his legitimate brother, one piece of jewelry belonging to Laura. Jose knew that the jewelry was taken from Laura but nonetheless he sold it for P2,000. What crime or crimes did King, Doming and Jose commit? Discuss their criminal liabilities. [10%] Answer; King committed the composite crime of Rape with homicide as a single indivisible offense, not a complex crime, and Theft. ... Doming's acts, having been done with knowledge of the commission of the crime and obviously to conceal the body of the crime to prevent its discovery, makes him an accessory to the crime of rape with homicide under Art. 19, par. 2 of the Rev. Penal Code, but he is exempt from criminal liability therefor under Article 20 of the Code, being an adopted brother of the principal. Jose incurs criminal liability either as an accessory to the crime of theft committed by King, or as fence. Although he is a legitimate brother of King, the exemption under Article 20 does not include the participation he did, because he profited from the effects of such theft by selling the jewelry knowing that the same was taken from Laura. Or Jose may be prosecuted for fencing under the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 (PD No. 1612) since the jewelry was the proceeds of theft and with intent to gain, he received it from King and sold it. Art 19; Anti-fencing law 1987 No. X: Pedro, a municipal treasurer, received from the Provincial Treasurer of the Province five (5) brand new typewriters for use in the municipal treasurer's office. Each typewriter is valued at P10,000.00. Since Pedro needed money for the hospitalization of his sick son, he sold four (4) of the typewriters to his friend, Rodolfo, a general merchant in San Isidro for P2,000.00 each or a total of P8,000.00. Rodolfo as a general merchant knew that one typewriter could easily be between P6,000.00 to P10,000.00, and for this reason he readily agreed to buy the four typewriters, Rodolfo then resold the typewriters at P6,000.00 thus, making a profit of P16,000. Two months after the transaction, Pedro was audited and the investigation as to his accountabilities led to the discovery that Rodolfo bought the four (4) typewriters from Pedro, (a)
What crime did Pedro commit?
(b)
Is Rodolfo liable as an accessory or for violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law? Answer:
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b) Rodolfo is not liable for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law as this law refers only to the buy and sell of articles of value which are the proceeds of robbery and theft, Rodolfo is liable as an accessory to the crime of malversation as he purchased the typewriter for P2,000. each only although he knew it could easily be sold for P6,000, to P10,000, Therefore he profited or assisted the principal to profit from the effects or proceeds of the commission of the crime.
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Art 19; Anti-fencing law 1992 No. 4: At the height of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo at around midnight, Aniceto joined some neighbors in evacuating his family, a few possessions and two horses to higher ground. Miguel, taking advantage of the darkness and the confusion, got one of the horses and asked his friend Doro to accompany him to Angeles City where he sold the same to an acquaintance Peping. Searching for his horse, Aniceto found it, with identifying brand intact, in the possession of Peping who refused to surrender the same saying that he had paid good money for it. Whereupon, Aniceto reported the matter to the police who promised to accompany him to the Prosecutor's office. c) May Peping be indicted under the Anti-Fencing Law? Explain. Suggested Answer: c) Peping should be held liable for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, P.D, No. 1612. He brought the horse which he should have known to have been derived from robbery or theft. The horse was duly branded; this should have forewarned Peping. Besides, he should have demanded a certificate of ownership from Miguel. Art 19; Anti-fencing law 1981 No. 17 Without asking for any document of ownership, "A" bought from "B", a person who claimed to be a "balik-bayan" from Saudi Arabia, a 1980 model National TV set for P500.00. Two days later, a policeman visited "A" and informed him that the TV set he had bought from "B", who already confessed to the robbery, was stolen from the house of "C". Claiming that he bought the TV set in good faith, "A" refused to surrender it to "C", So "A" was charged under the Anti-Fencing Act of 1979 (Presidential Decree No. 1612). Is "A" criminally liable under this Act? Why? Answer "A" is criminally liable under the Anti-Fencing Act of 1979. Under this law, mere possession of any goods, article, item, object or anything of value which has been the object of robbery of theft shall be prime facie evidence of fencing. Fencing is committed if a person who with intent to gain for himself or another shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value, which he knows or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft. The law involves second hand articles. A purchased the 1980 model National TV set as a second hand item. His failure to ask any document of ownership and if "B" was indeed a "balikbayan" whether he brought the TV set with him when he returned to the Philippines as evidenced by a carrier manifest since the TV set certainly cannot be hand carried, and since the price was considerably cheap, are circumstances which show that he should have known that the TV set was a proceed of robbery or theft. Art 19; Anti-fencing law 1985 No. 12 While waiting for his car, AB was approached by CD, who offered him a new set of auto mechanic tools coating P3,000.00 for only P500. AB paid CD Page 98 of 374
P500 and thereafter gave the brand new set of tools as a birthday gift to his godson, an auto mechanic. It turned out later that CD is the object of a police manhunt upon complaint of his employer for the theft of more than 100 sets of similar tools. Threatened with criminal prosecution for violation of the AntiFencing Law, he consulted you as to his probable criminal liability for the said transaction. Put down in writing your advice and explanation on his query. Answer: Fencing is the act of any person, who with intent to gain for himself, or for another shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of or shall buy and sell or in any other manner deal in any article, item or object or anything of value, which he knows or should be known to him to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft (P.D. No. 1612), Considering that CD was a total stranger to AB, that the former was the one who approached the latter to sell auto mechanic tools costing P3.000 for only P500, that CD was not in the business of selling auto mechanic tools nor was he representing any store engaged in such business, AB should have been placed on guard that the object purchased by him was the proceed of the crime of robbery or theft. AB should be liable for fencing. I would advice him to show his good faith in purchasing the auto mechanic tools—that he requested from CD, the seller, a receipt, with a warranty to defend his ownership from a claim of any person whatsoever. Art 19; Anti-fencing law 1986 No. 16: Brothers Aber and Bobot, 16 and 17 years old, respectively, have had no food for the past two days. Suffering from severe hunger, they hatched a plan to break into a store to steal some food. Five days later, at 12 midnight, they were able to enter the store by breaking the hinges of the door. Aber took ten cans of sardines worth P50.00. Bobot wandered into a nearby room where the store owner, Cosme, was sleeping Cosme, awakened by Bobot's footsteps, attacked Bobot with a club. Bobot avoided the blow and hit Cosme in the chest with his fist. Aber, upon hearing the commotion, entered the room and tried to pull Bobot away from Cosme. Cosme, however, continued to attack Bobot forcing the latter to box Cosme in the face. Cosme collapsed on the floor. Bobot and Aber fled. The following day, Aber sold six of the sardine cans taken from the store to Dimas who lives a block from the store. Earlier that day Dimas heard rumors that the nearby store had been robbed and that his friend Cosme was found dead. Dimas thought of asking Aber and Bobot where they got the sardines to clear away this doubt, but on second thought did not. He bought the cans for P20.00 and sold them for P30.00. The fiscal charged Aber and Bobot with the complex crime of robbery with homicide aggravated by nighttime, evident premeditation and dwelling. The fiscal charged Dimas as an accessory of Aber and Bobot and for violation of the AntiFencing Law (PD No. J612). (1) If you were the counsel of Aber, what defenses would you raise? Explain. (2) If you were the counsel of Bobot, what defenses would you raise? Explain.
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(3) If you were the counsel of Dimas, what defenses would you raise? Explain, (4) If you were the judge, how would you decide the case? Explain, Answer: (4) Dimas will be liable for fencing as he bought the tins of sardines without inquiring from Aber where he got the sardines and under the circumstances he could have known that those were the proceeds of the crime of theft. He bought them with intent to gain as in fact he sold them for a profit. Art 19; Anti-fencing law 1990 No. 7: Oscar owns and operates a gift and jewelry shop. Pilar sold to him for P1,000.00 a five [5] carat diamond ring which she stole. a) May Oscar be held criminally liable under the Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. No. 1612)? Explain your answer. b) How can Oscar acquire immunity from criminal prosecution for purchasing the diamond ring from Pilar and thus enable him to sell the same to the general public for a profit? Explain your answer. Answer: a) Yes, he is liable for fencing. The price is unconscionable. This shows that he would have known of the fact that the ring was stolen. Section 2 of P.D. 1612., the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979, provides that: a. "Fencing" is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive x x x, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article x x x of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft". b) Oscar should secure a clearance/permit to sell the second-hand ring from the proper INP station commander pursuant to Section 6, P.D. 1612. The said section states that any person who fails to secure the clearance or permit, upon conviction, shall be punished as a fence. Art 19; Anti-fencing law 1995 No. 5: 1. What are the elements of fencing? 2. a) What is the difference between a fence and an accessory to theft or robbery? Explain. (b) Is there any similarity between them? Answer: 1. The elements of fencing are: (a) a crime of robbery or theft has be en committed; (b) accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the crime, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item , object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of said crime; (c) the accused knows or should have known that said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
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(d) there is. on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another. 2.a) One difference between a fence and an accessory to theft or robbery is the penalty involved; a fence is punished as a principal under P.D. No. 1612 and the penalty is higher, whereas an accessory to robbery or theft under the Revised Penal Code is punished two degrees lower than the principal, unless he bought or profited from the proceeds of theft or robbery arising from robbery in Philippine highways under P.D. No. 532 where he is punished as an accomplice, hence the penalty is one degree lower. Also, fencing is a malum prohibition and therefore there Is no need to prove criminal intent of the accused; this is not so in violations of Revised Penal Code. (b) Yes, there is a similarity in the sense that all the acts of one who is an accessory to the crimes of robbery or theft are included in the acts defined as fencing. In fact, the accessory in the crimes of robbery or theft could be prosecuted as such under the Revised Penal Code or as a fence under P.D. No. 1612. (Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People, 234 SCRA 63] Art 19; Anti-fencing law 1996 No. 7: 2) Flora, who was engaged in the purchase and sale of jewelry, was prosecuted for the violation of P.D. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law, for having been found to be in possession of recently stolen Jewelry valued at P100,000.00 at her jewelry shop at Zapote Road, Las Pinas, Metro Manila. She testified during the trial that she merely bought the same from one named Cecilino and even produced a receipt covering the sale. Cecilino, in the past, used to deliver to her jewelries for sale but is presently nowhere to be found. Convicted by the trial court for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, she argued (or her acquittal on appeal, contending that the prosecution failed to prove that she knew or should have known that the Jewelries recovered from her were the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. Answer: 2) No, Flora's defense is not well-taken because mere possession of any article of value which has been the subject of theft or robbery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing (P.D.No. 1612). The burden is upon the accused to prove that she acquired the jewelry legitimately. Her defense of having bought the Jewelry from someone whose whereabouts is unknown, does not overcome the presumption of fencing against her (Pamintuan us People, G.R 111426, 11 July 1994). Buying personal property puts the buyer on caveat because of the phrases that he should have known or ought to know that it is the proceed from robbery or theft. Besides, she should have followed the administrative procedure under the decree that of getting a clearance from the authorities in case the dealer is unlicensed. in order to escape liability.
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Penalties Art 25; Penalties 1988 No. 3: a) State the two classes of penalties under the revised Penal Code. Define each. b) May censure be included in a sentence of acquittal? Why or why not? Answer: a) The two classes of penalties under Article 25 of the Revise Penal Code are as follows: 1. Principal 2. Accessory A principal penalty is defined as that provided for a felony and which is imposed by court expressly upon conviction. An accessory penalty is defined as that deemed included in the imposition of the principal penalty. b) Censure may not be included in a sentence of acquittal, because a censure is a penalty. Censure is repugnant and is essentially inconsistent and contrary to an acquittal (People vs. Abellera, 69 Phil. 623.) Art 25; Penalties 1997 No. 7: A was convicted of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document. Since the amount Involved did not exceed P200.00, the penalty prescribed by law for estafa is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods. The penalty prescribed by law for falsification of public document is prision mayor plus fine not to exceed P5,000.00. Impose the proper prison penalty. Answer: The proper penalty Is ANY RANGE WITHIN prision correccional (six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years) as MINIMUM, to ANY RANGE within prision mayor maximum (ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years) as MAXIMUM. This is in accordance with People us, Gonzales, 73 Phil, 549, where It was ruled that for the purpose of determining the penalty next lower in degree, the penalty that should be considered as a starting point is the whole of prision mayor, it being the penalty prescribed by law, and not prision mayor in its maximum period, which is only the penalty actually applied because of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty next lower in degree therefor is prision correccional and it is within the range of this penalty that the minimum should be taken. Art 25; Penalties 1997 No. 8: Assume in the preceding problem that there were two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance. Impose the proper prison penalty. Answer:
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There being two (2) mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance, the proper prison penalty is arresto mayor (in any of its periods, ie. ranging from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months) as MINIMUM to prision correccional in its maximum period four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day to six (6) years as MAXIMUM. Under Art. 64, par. 5 of the Revised Penal Code, when a penalty contains three periods, each one of which forms a period in accordance with Article 76 and 77 of the same Code, and there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances, the penalty next lower in degree should be imposed. For purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in degree should be determined without regard as to whether the basic penalty provided by the Revised Penal Code should be applied in its maximum or minimum period as circumstances modifying liability may require. The penalty next lower in degree to prision correccional. Therefore, as previously stated, the minimum should be within the range of arresto mayor and the maximum is within the range of prision correctional in its maximum period. Art 25; Penalties; appreciation of modifying circumstances 1997 No. 6: A and B pleaded guilty to the crime of parricide. The court found three mitigating circumstances, namely, plea of guilty, lack of Instruction and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. The prescribed penalty for parricide is reclusion perpetua to death. Impose the proper principal penalty. Answer: The proper penalty is reclusion perpetua. Even if there are two or more mitigating circumstances, a court cannot lower the penalty by one degree (Art. 63. par. 3, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 685). In U.S. vs. Relador 60 Phil. 593, where the crime committed was parricide with the two (2) mitigating circumstances of illiteracy and lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong, and with no aggravating circumstance, the Supreme Court held that the proper, penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua. Art 25; Penalties; appreciation of modifying circumstances 1977 No. IV-a During the trial for homicide, the defense was able to prove four generic mitigating circumstances while the State was able to prove only one aggravating circumstance. Offsetting the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, there still remain three mitigating circumstances. So the judge imposed a penalty lower by one degree than the penalty provided by law. Did the judge err in imposing a penalty lower by one degree than the penalty provided by law? State your reasons. Answer The Judge erred in imposing the penalty lower by one degree. Article 64 par. 5 which prescribes the penalty next lower in degree if the imposable penalty is divisible as is the penalty for homicide which is reclusion temporal, applies if there are two or more mitigating circumstances present without any attending aggravating circumstance. (People v. Soriano, 70 Phil. 334; People v, Dayrit, 108 Phil. 100). However, in a case decided by the Court of Appeals, par. 5 of Article 64 was applied where there were three mitigating circumstances and one Page 103 of 374
aggravating after one mitigating- was made to offset the aggravating circumstance. The decision was by a division of five (People v. Gamboa, O.G, 1947). The Supreme Court decisions are obviously controlling. Art 25; Penalties; appreciation of modifying circumstances 1982 No. 7 Homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal. The accused, 17 years of age, committed the crime of frustrated homicide while under the state of passion and obfuscation and acting in immediate vindication of a grave offense committed by the deceased against Ms wife. Accused thereafter surrendered voluntarily immediately after the commission of the offense, and pleaded guilty at the trial. What is the proper penalty to be imposed upon him? In your answer disregard the civil liability but consider the Indeterminate Sentence Daw. Explain fully the procedure adopted in the computation of the penalty. Answer The proper penalty to be imposed upon A is Arresto Mayor in its Minimum period. Frustrated Homicide is punished by one degree next lower than Consummated Homicide, Since the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal, one degree next lower will be prision mayor, which is the penalty for Frustrated Homicide. The accused was 17 years old when he committed the crime. Such minority is a privileged mitigating circumstance. Prision Mayor should be lowered by one degree under Art. 68 of the Revised Penal Code which will be Prision Correctional. Voluntary Surrender and Voluntary Plea of Guilty will reduce again the imposable penalty by one degree as there was no aggravating circumstance present and the imposable penalty is divisible in nature (Art. 64, par. 5 R.P.C.) So Prision Correctional will be lowered by one degree which is Arresto Mayor. The maximum imprisonment in Arresto Mayor is six months. The Indeterminate Sentence Law will not apply under Section 2 thereof because the term of imprisonment in the penalty does not exceed one year. Since passion and obfuscation and immediate vindication of a grave offense were also present whether based on the same fact or on different facts Arresto Mayor is to be imposed in the minimum period as there is no attending aggravating circumstance. Art 25; Penalties; appreciation of modifying circumstances 1985 No. 2 Arthur, a 17 year old student and aggrieved by the death of his only brother in a previous rally at the hands of the police, fired at a motorcycle cop passing by their place. He, however, missed his target and instead hit Jason, a passerby, who died instantaneously. (A) As an investigating fiscal, what charge or charges will you file against Arthur? Reasons. (B) Upon arraignment, Arthur pleaded guilty and invoked the additional mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. As a judge and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, what penalty will you impose upon Arthur? Discuss. (C) May Arthur apply for and be entitled to probation under P.D. 968, as amended by P.D. 1251 and Batas Pambansa 76? Answer:
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(B) As a judge, I will first consider the imposable penalty under the Revised Penal Code for the complex crime of Direct Assault with Homicide. The penalty is for the more serious crime to be imposed in its maximum period, (Art 48, Revised Penal Code). The age of Arthur at the time of the commission of the crime, which is 17 years, is a privileged mitigating circumstance. Under Art. 68, par. 2, Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty is to be lowered by one degree. There being two mitigating circumstances which are voluntary plea of guilty and voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty, being divisible, is attain to be lowered by one degree. (Art. 64, par. 5, Revised Penal Code). The imposable penalty, lowered by two degrees, will be the maximum of the indeterminate sentence. The mini-mum will be one degree next lower than the maximum. (Act. 4103 as amended, Indeterminate Sentence Law). Art 25; Penalties; appreciation of modifying circumstances 1989 No. 9: Jose is charged with bigamy. The Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of prision mayor for this offense. The information filed against Jose alleged one aggravating circumstance. Upon being arraigned, he entered the plea of guilty and invoked the additional mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender which the trial fiscal admitted. If you were the judge trying the case, from what range of the prescribed penalty would you determine the proper penalty (to constitute the maximum term of an indeterminate sentence) to be imposed on Jose? Answer: I would take the maximum term of the Indeterminate sentence from the range of prision mayor in its minimum period. This is so because while there are two ordinary mitigating circumstances present, one of them is offset by an aggravating circumstance. Consequently, it is as if the crime is attended by only one ordinary circumstance and this will result in the imposition of the minimum period of the penalty prescribed by law. The presence of two or more ordinary mitigating circumstances will give rise to a privileged mitigating circumstance only if there is no aggravating circumstance present and the penalty prescribed by law is divisible. In this case, while the penalty of prision mayor is divisible, and while there are two ordinary mitigating circumstances present, there is an aggravating circumstance. This precludes the reduction of the penalty by one degree lower inasmuch as the two ordinary mitigating circumstances cannot be considered as a privileged mitigating circumstance. Art 25; Penalties; appreciation of modifying circumstances 1991 No. 12: Rolando was charged with murder. The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. The trial court convicted Rolando, but lowered the penalty by one (1) degree because of the attendance of three (3) ordinary mitigating circumstances and the absence of any aggravating circumstance. The court then imposed an indeterminate sentence of 6 years 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Page 105 of 374
Is the penalty correct? Answer: Technically and legally, the sentence of 6 years and one day to 17 years and one day is correct. Since there are three mitigating without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty provided for by law should be reduced by one degree, that is, prision mayor (maximum) to reclusion temporal (medium), which will be the MAXIMUM of the indeterminate sentence. Otherwise stated, the maximum will have a range of 10 years and one day (the starting point of prision mayor maximum) up to 17 years and four months (the end of reclusion temporal medium). Since the maximum sentence imposed by the Judge is 17 years and one day, it is well within the maximum range. The minimum of six years and one day is also within the range of the next lower in degree of prision correctional maximum (4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 6 years) up to prision mayor medium (8 years, 1 day to 10 years). Alternative Answer: Since there are three mitigating circumstances which justify the lowering of the penalty by one degree, and only the presence of two mitigating circumstances will be enough to lower the penalty by one degree, the excess of one mitigating circumstance should justify the Judge to impose the minimum of the minimum (4 years, 2 months, 1 day) and the minimum of the maximum (10 years, 1 day). Art 25; Penalties; appreciation of modifying circumstances 1995 No. 10: Homer was convicted of homicide. The trial court appreciated the following modifying circumstances: the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and the mitigating circumstances of passion and obfuscation, no intent to commit so grave a wrong, illiteracy and voluntary surrender. The imposable penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal the range of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Taking into account the attendant aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, determine the proper penalty to be imposed on the accused. Answer: It appears that there is one aggravating circumstance (nocturnity), and four mitigating circumstances (passion and obfuscation, no intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed and voluntary surrender). Par. 4, Art. 64 should be applied. Hence there will be off-setting of modifying circumstances, which will now result in the excess of three mitigating circumstances. This will therefore justify in reducing the penalty to the minimum period. The existence of an aggravating circumstance, albeit there are four aggravating, will not justify the lowering of the penalty to the next lower degree under paragraph 5 of said Article, as this is applicable only if THERE IS NO AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE present. Since the crime committed is Homicide and the penalty therefor is reclusion temporal, the MAXIMUM sentence under the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be the minimum of the penalty, which is 12 years and 1 day to 14 Page 106 of 374
years and 8 months. The MINIMUM penalty will thus be the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor in its full extent (6 years and 1 day to 12 years). Ergo, the proper penalty would be 6 years and 1 day, as minimum, to 12 years and 1 day, as maximum. I believe that because of the remaining mitigating circumstances after the off-setting it would be very logical to impose the minimum of the MINIMUM sentence under the ISL and the minimum of the MAXIMUM sentence. Art 25; Penalties; concurrent service of sentence 1982 No. 8 What penalties, among those mentioned in the Revised Penal Code, may be served concurrently and what penalties cannot be served concurrently? Explain. Answer Penalties which may be served concurrently: Perpetual or Temporary absolute disqualification or perpetual or temporary special disqualification, public censure or suspension from public office. These penalties may be served with imprisonment. Penalties which cannot be served concurrently; Imprisonment like Reclusion Temporal and Prision Mayor which must be served successively, one after the other, in the order of severity. Art 25; Penalties; death; effect of modifying circumstances 1980 No. VII Convicted of the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide, an accused was sentenced to death. On automatic review to the Supreme Court, his counsel pleaded the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender which were not offset by any aggravating circumstance and prayed that the penalty be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The existence of said modifying circumstances was, in fact, established. Is the contention legally tenable? Answer The intention is not legally tenable. Death is a single and indivisible penalty. Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, it could be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances which attended the commission of the crime. (People vs. Amit, 32 SCRA 95). The mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender cannot have the affect of reducing the death penalty to reclusion perpetua. Art 25; Penalties; factors to consider 1991 No. 11: Imagine that you are a Judge trying a case, and based on the evidence presented and the applicable law, you have decided on the guilt of two (2) accused. Indicate the five (5) steps you would follow to determine the exact penalty to be imposed. Stated differently, what are the factors you must consider to arrive at the correct penalty? Answer; 1,
Determine the crime committed;
2,
Stage of execution and degree of participation;
3. Determine the penalty;
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4. Consider the modifying circumstances; 5. Determine whether Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable or not. Art 25; Penalties; reclusion perpetua vs life imprisonment 1991 No. 7: A raped X. In the process, X resisted and slapped A. Angered, A grabbed a stone and hit X. She was dying when A consummated the sexual attack. A psychiatrist from the National Center for Mental Health testified that he conducted physical, mental and psychological examinations on A and found him to be suffering from a mental disorder classified under organic mental disorder with psychosis. A's father testified that A was playful but cruel to his brothers and sisters, stole his mother's jewelry which he sold for low sums, wandered naked sometimes, and oftentimes did not come home for extended periods of time. The prosecution on the other hand, presented an array of witnesses to prove A that was lucid before and after the crime was committed and that he acted with discernment. After trial, the court convicted the accused and sentenced him to "life imprisonment" considering that under the Constitution death penalty could no longer be imposed. Given the conflicting testimonies as to sanity of the accused, was the trial court correct in ruling out insanity as an exempting circumstances in this case? Is the sentence of "life imprisonment" a correct imposition of penalty? Answer: The sentence of "life imprisonment" is not a correct imposition of penalty for the rape: it should be reclusion perpetua, the technical designation of the penalty for the crime under the Revised Penal Code. It is not correct to use the term "life imprisonment" because the accessory penalties to reclusion perpetua does not follow the penalty of "life imprisonment". Furthermore, in reclusion perpetua the duration is stated to be for 30 years. Art 25; Penalties; reclusion perpetua vs life imprisonment 1994 No. 4: 1) Differentiate reclusion perpetua from life imprisonment. Answer; 1) Reclusion perpetua is that penalty provided for In the Revised Penal Code for crimes defined in and penalized therein except for some crimes defined by special laws which impose reclusion perpetua, such as violations of Republic Act 6425, as amended by Republic Act 7659 or of PD 1860; while life imprisonment is a penalty usually provided for in special laws. Reclusion perpetua has a duration of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty [40] years under Republic Act 7659, while life imprisonment has no duration; reclusion perpetua may be reduced by one or two degrees; reclusion perpetuates accessory penalties while life imprisonment does not have any accessory penalties (People vs. Baguio, 196 SCRA 459, People vs. Panellos, 205 SCRA 546). Art 25; Penalties; reclusion perpetua vs life imprisonment 2001 No VII a) After trial, Judge Juan Laya of the Manila RTC found Benjamin Garcia guilty of Murder, the victim having sustained several bullet wounds in his
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body so that he died despite medical assistance given in the Ospital ng Manila. Because the weapon used by Benjamin was unlicensed and the qualifying circumstance of treachery was found to be present. Judge Laya rendered his decision convicting Benjamin and sentencing him to "reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment". Are "reclusion perpetua" and life imprisonment the same and can be imposed interchangeably as in the foregoing sentence? Or are they totally different? State your reasons. (3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: a) The penalty of reclusion perpetua and the penalty of life Imprisonment are totally different from each other and therefore, should not be used interchangeably. Reclusion perpetua is a penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, with a fixed duration of imprisonment from 20 years and 1 day to 40 years, and carries it with accessory penalties. Life imprisonment, on the other hand, is a penalty prescribed by special laws, with no fixed duration of imprisonment and without any accessory penalty.
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Art 25; Penalties; subsidiary penalty 1989 No. 7: Pedro was convicted of the crime of damage to property through reckless imprudence for bumping the car of Jose and the court of sentenced him to pay a fine of P3,000. Pedro failed to pay the amount of the fine for he was insolvent. Later, the court ordered the incarceration of Pedro so that the latter could serve subsidiary imprisonment to satisfy the fine. Pedro filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging that his confinement is illegal. Will the petition prosper? Give your reasons. Answer: The petition for habeas corpus will prosper. Subsidiary penalty is not an accessory penalty which inheres to a principal penalty and may therefore be imposed even if it is not expressly provided in the sentence. It is a penalty in lieu of the penalty imposed in the sentence. Hence, unless the judgment or sentence expressly provides for subsidiary imprisonment, the culprit cannot be made to undergo the same {People vs. Fajardo, 65 Phil. 639). In this case, the court merely sentenced Pedro to pay a P3,000.00 fine. It was only LATER that the Court ordered the incarceration of Pedro to serve subsidiary imprisonment AFTER Pedro failed to pay the amount of the fine. Subsidiary imprisonment cannot be imposed unless it is expressly provided in the sentence. Art 25; Penalties; successive service of sentence 1980 No. VI (b) An accused was found guilty of double murder and was meted out two sentences of reclusion perpetua. How would the accused serve the sentences? Answer (b) The rule is if two or more penalties in view of their nature cannot be served simultaneously, such must be served successively in the order of severity in accordance with the scale of the severity of penalties provided in Art. 70 R.P.C., but in no case is he to serve more than three times the most severe penalty, and which is not to exceed 40 years. If the penalties are the same, such is to be considered as the most severe penalty. (Aspra vs. Director of Prisons, 85 Phil. 737), In the problem, two penalties of reclusion perpetua were imposed upon the accused. In view of their nature, these penalties cannot be served simultaneously. Reclusion perpetua has a duration of thirty years, Multiplied by 3 (three times the most severe penalty) the result is 90 years. The accused should serve however imprisonment not exceeding 40 years, (Art. 70 R.P.C.) Art 25; Penalties; three-fold rule 1985 No. 7 Finding Carlos Torres guilty of ROBBERY as charged, Judge Cruz nevertheless dismissed the case against him it appearing from the evidence that Carlos Torres had already been previously convicted in fifteen (15) other criminal cases and sentenced to a total penalty of 305 years,... his HONOR ruling that anyway the total penalty which he may be compelled to serve cannot in any case exceed forty (40) years under the "three-fold rule". Comment on the legality of His HONOR'S aforesaid pronouncement.
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Answer: The dismissal of the robbery case by Judge Cruz is improper and irregular. Dismissal is inconsistent with the finding of guilt of the accused. The duty of the Court is to apply the law and to impose the penalty provided upon the accused found guilty of the crime charged. The reason that the accused, Carlos Torres, had been previously convicted in fifteen (15) other crimes and sentenced to a total penalty of three hundred five (305) years and the total penalty that the accused may be compelled to serve cannot exceed forty (40) years under the three-fold rule, does not find application in law. The threefold rule applies to the service of the penalties and not in the imposition of the penalties. (People vs Escares 102 Phil. 677). Art 25; Indeterminate Sentence Law 1975 No. VII The purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is "to uplift and redeem valuable human material and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic unusefullness". Explain how the law achieves that purpose. Answer The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides for an indeterminate sentence which has a minimum and a maximum. After the prisoner has served the minimum, depending upon his conduct and behavior during confinement, he may be released on parole. The law, therefore, encourages the prisoner to reform. Once released on parole, provided the conditions are not violated, he will no longer serve the remainder of the sentence. The law hence treats the accused first as an individual and second as a member of society. It shortens his term of imprisonment, depending upon his behavior. Art 25; Indeterminate Sentence Law 1983 No. 11 A convict serving sentence for robbery escaped from the penitentiary and killed a rival gang member. Found guilty of homicide, he was given a straight prison term. He moved for reconsideration, contending that not being a habitual delinquent, he was entitled to an indeterminate sentence. Decide with reasons. Answer The convict is not entitled to an indeterminate sentence because when he committed the crime of homicide he escape from the penitentiary while serving the sentence for robbery. Section 2 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law enumerates the cases in which the law cannot apply and one of those is if the offender escaped from confinement or evaded his sentence. Art 25; Indeterminate Sentence Law 1988 No. 4: a) State the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Answer: a) The Indeterminate Sentence Law applies in cases where the penalty imposed is more than one year and the ISL shall apply where there is a minimum penalty which is not lower than the penalty next lower in degree provided by law Page 111 of 374
and the maximum not higher than the maximum penalty provided by law in cases of felonies but when it comes to statutory offenses it must be lower than the minimum penalty provided by law and not higher than the maximum penalty provided by law except in the following cases as provided by section 2 of Art. 4103: 1. life imprisonment 2. those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason 3. to those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage 4. to those convicted of piracy 5. those who are habitual delinquents 6. to those who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence 7. to those who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated the terms thereof 8. to those whose maximum term of- imprisonment does not exceed one year, not to those already sentenced by final judgment at the time of approval of this Act, except as provided in Section 5 hereof. Art 25; Indeterminate Sentence Law 1989 No. 8: Andres is charged with an offense defined by a special law. The penalty prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not less than five (5) years but not more than ten (10) years. Upon arraignment, he entered the plea of guilty. a) In the imposition of the proper penalty, should the Indeterminate Sentence Law be applied? b) If you were the judge trying the case, what penalty would you impose on Andres? Answer: a) The Indeterminate Sentence Law should be applied in this case. By express provision of said law (section 1) it is applicable to offenses punished by special laws. The indeterminate sentence in such cases shall consist of a maximum term which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by the special law and a minimum term which shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. If I were the judge trying the case, I would impose a penalty consisting of any duration not less than 5 years as minimum term and any duration not more than 10 years as maximum term. It could be five years and 1 day to 7 years; 7 years, six months and 1 day to 9 years; or any other sentence where the minimum term is not less than 5 years and the maximum term not more than 10 years. Art 25; Indeterminate Sentence Law 1990 No. 12; a) Carlos was charged and convicted of murder. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P30,000. He sought a reconsideration of the penalty on the ground that he should be entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Decide with reasons. Page 112 of 374
b) Suppose that instead of filing a motion for reconsideration he applies for probation. If you were the judge, will you grant the same? Explain your answer. Answer; a) Carlos is not entitled to avail of the Indeterminate Sentence Law because Section 2 of said law specifically disqualifies and disallows application thereof to persons sentenced to life imprisonment. Art 25; Indeterminate Sentence Law 1991 No, 6: A was charged with homicide. During the trial, un-contradicted evidence consisting of medical certificates were presented showing that the accused had sustained injuries in ten (10) previous occasions while engaged in fisticuffs with different persons. He was also confined at the National Mental Hospital for mental ailment diagnosed as "homicidal and suicidal instincts." During his second confinement thereat, he escaped. Upon conviction, the prosecutor objected to the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law contending that the accused is a habitual delinquent and an escapee from the National Mental Hospital. If you are the Judge, rule on the objection. Answer: The objection should be overruled. A could not be legally considered a habitual delinquent. Habitual delinquency cannot be validly invoked without being alleged in the Information and proven during the trial. Besides there is no indication that A was convicted within ten (10) years from last conviction or release, three times or oftener of the crimes of robbery, theft, estafa, physical injuries or falsification. Being an escapee from the Mental Hospital will not disqualify him from the application of the ISL as Section 2 thereof contemplates having escaped from confinement or evaded sentence. Confinement presupposes imprisonment by virtue of a final judgment. Art 25; Indeterminate Sentence Law 1994 No. 11: Itos was convicted of an offense penalized by a special law. The penalty prescribed is not less than six years but not more than twelve years. No modifying circumstance attended the commission of the crime. If you were the judge, will you apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law? If so, how will you apply it? Answer; If I were the judge, I will apply the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as the last sentence of Section 1 Act 4103, specifically provides the application thereof for violations of special laws. Under the same provision, the minimum must not be less than the minimum provided therein (six years and one day) and the maximum shall not be more than the maximum provided therein, i.e. twelve years. (People vs. Rosalina Reyes, 186 SCRA 184) Art 25; Indeterminate Sentence Law 1999 No VIII
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Andres is charged with an offense defined by a special law. The penalty prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not less than five (5) years but not more than ten [10) years. Upon arraignment, he entered a plea of guilty. In the imposition of the proper penalty, should the Indeterminate Sentence Law be applied? If you were the Judge trying the case, what penalty would you impose on Andres? (4%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes, the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be applied because the minimum imprisonment is more than one (1) year. If I were the Judge, I will impose an indeterminate sentence, the maximum of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum penalty prescribed by the same. I have the discretion to impose the penalty within the said minimum and maximum. Art 25; Indeterminate Sentence Law 1999 No XII Under what circumstances is the Indeterminate Sentence Law not applicable? (2%) A was convicted of illegal possession of grease guns and two Thompson sub-machine guns punishable under the old law [RA No,4] with imprisonment of from five (5) to ten (10) years. The trial court sentenced the accused to suffer imprisonment of five (5) years and one (1) day. Is the penalty thus imposed correct? Explain. ANSWER:
(3%) SUGGESTED
Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply to: 1. Persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life imprisonment; 2. treason;
Those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit
3. espionage;
Those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or
4.
Those convicted of piracy;
5.
Those who are habitual delinquents;
6. sentence;
Those who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded
7. Those who violated the terms of conditional pardon granted to them by the Chief Executive; 8.
Those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one
year; 9. Those who, upon the approval of the law (December 5, 1933). had been sentenced by final Judgment; 10.
Those sentenced to the penalty of destierro or suspension.
The penalty imposed, being only a straight penalty, is not correct because it does not comply with the Indeterminate Sentence Law which applies to this case. Said law requires that if the offense is punished by any law other than the
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Revised Penal Code, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum penalty fixed by the law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum penalty prescribed by the same. Art 25; Indeterminate Sentence Law 2002 No III A. How are the maximum and the minimum terms of the indeterminate sentence for offenses punishable under the Revised Penal Code determined? (3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: For crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code, the maximum term of the Indeterminate sentence shall be the penalty properly imposable under the same Code after considering the attending mitigating and/or aggravating circumstances according to Art, 64 of said Code. The minimum term of the same sentence shall be fixed within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed for the crime under the said Code. B. Under the law, what is the purpose for fixing the maximum and the minimum terms of the indeterminate sentence? (2%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: The purpose of the law in fixing the minimum term of the sentence is to set the grace period at which the convict may be released on parole from imprisonment, unless by his conduct he is not deserving of parole and thus he shall continue serving his prison term in Jail but in no case to go beyond the maximum term fixed in the sentence. Art 25; Indeterminate Sentence Law; exceptions 2003 No XIII. When would the Indeterminate Sentence Law be inapplicable? 4% SUGGESTED ANSWER: The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to: (1) those persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life-imprisonment or reclusion perpetua; (2) (3) espionage;
those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason; those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or
(4)
those convicted of piracy;
(5)
those who are habitual delinquents;
(6)
those who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence;
(7) those who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated the terms thereof; (A)
those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one
year; (9) those already sentenced by final judgment at the time of approval of this Act; and
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(10) those whose sentence imposes penalties which do not involve imprisonment, like destierro. Art 25; Probation Law 1984 No 11 Under the probation law, the filing of an application for probation "shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal." Is this waiver mandatory or irrevocable? Explain. A. of Justice Palma,
Furnished by Office
Despite the provision in the Probation Law that the filling of an application for probation "shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal", it has been held that such a waiver is not irrevocable, hence an accused may withdraw his application for probation and instead opt to pursue appeal from conviction. (Yusi v. Morales, 121 SCRA 853). For the purposes of probation what the law gives more importance to is the offender, not the crime (To v. Cruz Pano, 120 SCRA 8). In line with the public policy behind probation, the right of appeal should not be irrevocably lost from the moment a convicted accused files an application for probation. Appeal and probation spring from the same policy, considering justice, humanity and compassion {Yusi v. Morales, Supra). B.
Comments and Suggested Answer
The waiver provided in the Probation Law is not irrevocable. The offender may still withdraw his application for probation and file an appeal if the period to do so has not yet prescribed. Probation Law is interpreted liberally in favor of the accused. It is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of its provisions. Appeal and probation spring from the same policy considerations of justice, humanity and compassion. If it appears that the application for probation was improvidently filed by the offender who was assisted by counsel de oficio and not by his counsel of record who was in a better position to consider fully the strength of a possible appeal, being fully familiar with the case, the waiver rule cannot be considered irrevocable. (Yusi et al vs. Judge Morales L-61958, April 28, 1983, 121, SCRA 653). Art 25; Probation Law 1989 No, 20: "A" was charged with theft and upon arraignment, pleaded guilty to the charge. He was detained for failure to post bail. After "two (2) months, a decision was rendered, sentencing "A" to an indeterminate sentence of six (6) months and one (1) day as a minimum, to one (1) year and one (1) month as maximum, and to pay the offended party the amount of P700, On January 16, 1985, the very day the sentence was read to "A," the Judge issued a Commitment Order addressed to the Provincial Jail Warden. On January 28", 1985, "A applied for probation but his application was denied on the ground that the sentence of conviction became final and executory on January 16, 1985, when "A" commence to serve his sentence, a) Is "A" eligible for probation? b) What is the purpose of the probation law? Answer: a) A is still eligible for probation since he filed his application for probation within 15 days from the promulgation of the judgment. Under the Probation Law; the accused may apply for probation WITHIN THE PERIOD FOR PERFECTING AN APPEAL which is 15 days from promulgation or notice thereof. Page 116 of 374
The judge committed an error in issuing a Commitment Order on the same day of promulgation. A commitment order for the convict to begin serving his sentence can be validly issued only if the period for perfecting an appeal has expired with no appeal being taken. The fact that in compliance with such-order, which is void, the accused commenced to serve his sentence does not bar him from availing himself of the benefits of the Probation Law. It is true that under the new Rules on Criminal Procedure it is provided that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the accused has applied for probation (Sec. 7, Rule 120). But Section 9 of the same Rule provides that "nothing in this Rule shall be construed as affecting any existing provision in the law governing suspension of sentence, probation or parole." The probation law does not speak of filing an application for probation BEFORE judgment has become final. It only speaks of filing the application WITHIN THE PERIOD FOR PERFECTING AN APPEAL. There is nothing in the Probation Law that bars an accused who has commenced to serve his sentence from filing an application for probation provided he does so WITHIN THE PERIOD FOR PERFECTING AN APPEAL. What the Probation Law provides is that no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment or conviction. It does not say that no application shall be entertained if the judgment has become final because the convict has commenced to serve his sentence. b) The purposes of the Probation Law are: 1. to promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender providing him with individualized treatment;
by
2. to provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence; and 3.
to prevent the commission of offenses.
Art 25; Probation Law 1990 No. 12; a) Carlos was charged and convicted of murder. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P30,000. He sought a reconsideration of the penalty on the ground that he should be entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Decide with reasons. b) Suppose that instead of filing a motion for reconsideration he applies for probation. If you were the judge, will you grant the same? Explain your answer. Answer; b) I will not grant the application for probation as it is clear in the Probation Law that the benefits thereof shall not apply to those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6) years, (P.D. 1990). Art 25; Probation Law 1991 No. 13: a) Boyet Mar was charged with consented abduction by a 17-year old complainant. The accused made wedding arrangements with the girl, but her Page 117 of 374
parents insisted on the prosecution of the case. To avoid further embarrassment of a court trial for him and the girl, the accused entered a plea of guilty. He then filed a petition for probation before serving sentence, but the court denied the petition on the ground that "it would be better for the accused to serve sentence so that he would reform himself and avoid the scandal in the community that would be caused by the grant of the petition." The accused served sentence but he brought the matter to the Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari. Did the trial court act correctly in denying the petition for probation? Answer: The trial court acted incorrectly. In Balleta us. Leviste, 92 SCRA 719, the Judge precisely denied the petition for probation on the same excuse stated in the problem. The Supreme Court held that an accused must fall within any one of the disqualifications stated in Section 9 of P.D. 960 in order to be denied probation,
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Art 25; Probation Law 1993 No. 2: Juanito was found guilty of Robbery by the RTC of Manila and sentenced to four (4} Years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correctional as minimum to eight (8) years and twenty (20) days of prision mayor as maximum. Juanito appealed to the Court of Appeals which found him guilty only of Theft and sentenced him to a straight penalty of one (1) Year. The decision of the appellate court was promulgated in May, 1993. 1) Is Juanito entitled to the benefits of the Probation Law which became effective on Jan. 3, 1978? Why? 2) Suppose the prison term imposed by the RTC in the above example is only two (2) years as minimum to six (6) years as maximum and Juanito did not appeal. When he applied for probation. It was discovered that in March, 1960, a Municipal Court has sentenced him to a six-month imprisonment for less serious physical Injuries which he fully served. May his application for probation be granted? Reason out. Answer; 1) Juanito is not entitled to probation because the law, as amended, requires the filing of the application within the period for perfecting an appeal. 2) He is not entitled to the Probation Law because Section 9 (c) provides that probation shall not be extended to those "who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punishable by Imprisonment of not less than one (1) month and one (1) day or a fine of not more than P200.00." Art 25; Probation Law 1981 No. 9 Isidro, 21, was convicted of Consented Abduction and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of three (3) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correctional, as maximum. Isidro did not appeal but he filed a petition for probation. The probation officer recommended favorable action on the application stating that the accused did not intend to cause a grave wrong and had the potential of a good probationer. The trial court denied probation on the ground that it would be better for the accused to serve his sentence so that he could reform himself and correct his selfish tendencies. Admittedly, Isidro does not fall within any of the classes of disqualified offenders under the Probation Law. Would you sustain the action of the trial Judge in a Certiorari case assailing it? Reasons. Answer I will not sustain the action of the trial judge. His denial of the application for probation because it would be better for the accused to serve his sentence so that he could reform himself and correct his selfish tendencies was arbitrary, capricious and whimsical. He should have considered the recommendation of the Probation Officer which was made after a post investigation of the offender in accordance with the Probation Law, that the offender was entitled to probation because he had not intended to commit a grave wrong when he committed the
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crime of consented abduction and that he had the potential of a good probationer. (Balleta Jr. vs. Judge Leviste, 92 SCRA 715 (1979). Art 25; Probation Law 1984 No. 15 On a plea of guilty, X was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence and was sentenced to a prison term. The judgment made no pronouncement regard* ing his civil liability. X forthwith applied for probation, The following day, the private prosecutor, who was not given the chance to present evidence on X's civil liability, filed a motion to set the case for the reception of said evidence. Although supported by the fiscal, the motion was denied by the judge on the ground that it was filed out of time. According to the judge, "the prosecution should have asked for leave to prove the civil liability of the defendant before judgment was rendered, not thereafter, for a hearing for that purpose after judgment would in effect nullify the order of suspension of the sentence and would defeat the very purpose of the Probation Law." Was the denial of the motion in accordance with law? Explain. Answer A. Furnished by Office of Justice Palma, No, The denial of the motion was not proper. In Bud-long vs. Apalisok (122 SCRA 935), it was held that probation affects only the criminal aspect of the case. The suspension of the sentence imposed on the accused who is granted probation, has no bearing on his civil liability. The court must hear the civil aspect of the case where accused pleads guilty and at the same time. In the example given, the judgment was not final. Hence, the court should have re-opened the case for reception of evidence in support of the civil aspect. It would be contrary to the rule against multiplicity of suits should the private prosecutor be compelled to institute a separate civil action for the recovery of the civil liability, either on the concept principle of ex-delicto or ex-quasi-delicto, since the same acts may be both considered as delict or quasi-delict giving rise to civil liability. B.
Comments and Suggested Answer
The denial of the motion was not in accordance with law. The granting of probation affects only the criminal liability of the offender. This is shown by the statutory definition of probation which is a disposition under which the defendant after convicton and sentence is released subject to the conditions imposed by the court and to the supervision of the probation officer. The "conviction and sentence" phrase shows that probation affects only the criminal aspects of the case. The suspension of the sentence imposed on the accused who is granted probation has no bearing on his civil liability. There is no legal basis in the conclusion of the trial court that a hearing to prove the civil liability of the accused would nullify the order of suspension of the sentence and would defeat the very purpose of the Probation Law. The denial of the motion would violate the right of the complainant to due process. The motion was filed on the day after the judgment of conviction was rendered and hence before it became final. Besides the civil liability of the accused is not part of the penalty for the crime committee. It is personal to the offended party. (Burlong vs. Apalisok L-60151 June 24,1983, 122 SCRA 935). Page 120 of 374
Art 25; Probation Law 1985 No. 2 Arthur, a 17 year old student and aggrieved by the death of his only brother in a previous rally at the hands of the police, fired at a motorcycle cop passing by their place. He, however, missed his target and instead hit Jason, a passerby, who died instantaneously. (A) As an investigating fiscal, what charge or charges will you file against Arthur? Reasons. (B) Upon arraignment, Arthur pleaded guilty and invoked the additional mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. As a judge and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, what penalty will you impose upon Arthur? Discuss. (C) May Arthur apply for and be entitled to probation under P.D. 968, as amended by P.D. 1251 and Batas Pambansa 76? Answer: (C) Arthur may apply for and be entitled to probation if the maximum of the indeterminate sentence does not exceed six years and one day. (Pres. Decree 968 as amended by Pres. Decree 1257 and Batas 76). Art 25; Probation Law 1986 No. 6: Aristides was found guilty by the trial court of challenging Bodinus to a duel and scoffing at Bodinus because of the latter's refusal to accept the challenge. The court sentenced Aristides to a penalty of imprisonment from four months and one day to two years and four months. In the dispositive portion of the decision, the court found Aristides entitled to probation and suspended the execution of the sentence for a period of two years. Aristides did not appeal the decision. State the purposes of the Probation Law and explain whether or not the action of the Judge promotes or serves these purposes. Answer: The purposes of the Probation Law are: 1. To promote the correction and rehabilitation of the offender by providing him with individualized treatment; 2. To provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence; 3.
To prevent the commission of offenses.
The action of the judge certainly promotes or serves these purposes because it gives a first time offender a second chance to maintain his place in society, through a process of reformation, which is better achieved, when he is not mixed with hardened criminals. The accused is afforded to reform and rehabilitate himself without the stigma of a prison record. However, probation cannot be granted without an application filed by the offender after conviction and sentence. Besides, if probation is granted, mandatory and optional conditions must be provided in the order of the court,
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Art 25; Probation Law 1988 No. 4: b) Who are the offenders disqualified from availing themselves of the benefits of the probation law (P.D. 968, as amended)? Answer: b) The following offenders are disqualified from availing of the benefits of the Probation Law: 1. those sentenced to serve maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years; 2. those convicted of subversion or any crime against the national security of the public order; 3. those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and or a fine of not less than two hundred pesos; 4. those who have been once on probation under the provisions of this decree; and 5. those who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of this decree applicable pursuant to Section 33 of P.D. 968. Art 25; Probation Law 1995 No. 3: In a case for violation of Sec. 8, RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. accused Vincent was given the benefit of the mitigating circumstances of voluntary plea of guilt and drunkenness not otherwise habitual. He was sentenced to suffer a penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day and to pay a fine of P6,000.00 with the accessory penalties provided by law, plus costs. Vincent applied for probation. The probation officer favorably recommended his application. 1. If you were the Judge, what action will you take on the application? Discuss fully. 2. Suppose that Vincent was convicted of a crime for which he was sentenced to a maximum penalty of ten (10) years. Under the law, he is not eligible for probation. He seasonably appealed his conviction. While affirming the judgment of conviction, the appellate court reduced the penalty to a maximum of four (4) years and four (4) months taking into consideration certain modifying circumstances. Vincent now applies for probation. How will you rule on his application? Discuss fully. Answer: 1. If I were the judge, I will deny the application for probation. The accused is not entitled to probation as Sec. 9 of the Probation Law, PD NO. 968, as amended, specifically mentions that those who "are sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years" are not entitled to the benefits of the law. 2. The law and jurisprudence are to the effect that appeal by the accused from a sentence of conviction forfeits his right to probation.(Sec. 4, PD No. 968. as amended by PD 1990; Bernardo us. Balagot; Francisco vs. CA: Llamado vs. CA; De la Cruz vs. Judge Callejo, CA case).
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N.B. to No. 2. This is the second consecutive year that this question was asked. It is the sincere belief of the Committee that there is a need to re-examine the doctrine. Firstly, much as the accused wanted to apply for probation he is proscribed from doing so as the maximum penalty is NOT PROBATIONABLE. Secondly, when the maximum penalty was reduced to one which allows probation it is but fair and just to grant him that right because it is apparent that the trial judge committed an error and for which the accused should not be made to suffer. Judicial tribunals in this jurisdiction are not only courts of law but also of equity. Thirdly, the judgment of the appellate court should be considered a new decision as the trial court's decision was vacated; hence, he could take advantage of the law when the decision is remanded to the trial court for execution (Please see Dissenting opinion in Francisco vs. CA). It is suggested, therefore, that an examinee answering in this tenor should be credited with some points. Art 25; Probation Law 1997 No. 9: The accused was found guilty of grave oral defamation in sixteen (16) informations which were tried jointly and was sentenced in one decision to suffer In each case a prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional. Within the period to appeal, he filed an application for probation under the Probation Law of 1976, as amended. Could he possibly qualify for probation? Answer: Yes. In Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 384, the Supreme Court held that in case of one decision imposing multiple prison terms, the totality of the prison terms should not be taken into account for the purposes of determining the eligibility of the accused for the probation. The law uses the word "maximum term", and not total term. It is enough that each of the prison terms does not exceed six years. The number of offenses is immaterial for as long as the penalties imposed, when taken Individually and separately, are within the probationable period. Art 25; Probation Law; applicability 2003 No XIV. Juan was convicted of the Regional Trial Court of a crime and sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a minimum of eight years. He appealed both his conviction and the penalty imposed upon him to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court ultimately sustained Juan's conviction but reduced his sentence to a maximum of four years and eight months imprisonment. Could Juan forthwith file an application for probation? Explain. 8% SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, Juan can no longer avail of the probation because he appealed from the judgment of conviction of the trial court, and therefore, cannot apply for probation anymore. Section 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, mandates that no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the accused has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction. Art 25; Probation Law; barred by appeal
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2001 No XVII A, a subdivision developer, was convicted by the RTC of Makati for failure to issue the subdivision title to a lot buyer despite full payment of the lot, and sentenced to suffer one year Imprisonment. A appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals but his appeal was dismissed. May A still apply for probation? Explain. (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, A is no longer qualified to apply for probation after he appealed from the judgment of conviction by the RTC. The probation law (PD 968, as amended by PD1990) now provides that no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the accused has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Sec. 4, PD 968). Art 25; Probation Law; effect of application 1992 No. 9: Johnny Gitara was convicted of the crime of estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Manila. He was imposed the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 3 years, 2 months and 1 day as minimum and six years as maximum, both of prision correctional and was ordered to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P3,000.00. He filed an application for probation upon the promulgation of the judgment. What is the legal effect of his application for probation on the judgment of conviction? Does said application interrupt the running of the period of appeal? Suggested Answer: The filing of the application for probation is considered as a waiver of the right of the accused to appeal; the decision has become final. In view of the finality of the decision there is no period of appeal to speak of, Art 25; Probation Law; effect of discharge 1983 No. 17 When a person convicted by final judgment is placed on probation and finally discharged after the probation period, is he still required to satisfy his pecuniary liabilities under the Revised Penal Code? Why? Answer Under the Probation Law (Presidential Decree No. 968 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1257) if the person who is placed on probation is finally discharged, such will operate to fully discharge the offender of his liability for the fine imposed. Under Art. 38 of the Revised Penal Code, fine is one of the pecuniary liabilities of the offender. The other pecuniary liabilities which are reparation for damages caused and indemnification for consequential damage. (Art 38, Supra) which constitute the civil liability of the offender, are not extinguished because probation affects only the criminal aspect of the case. This is clearly evident in the "conviction and sentence" clause of the definition of probation under Presidential Decree No. 968. (Budlong vs. Judge Apalisok L60151, June 24, 1983) (Note: The question should have referred to the civil liability of the offender as that seems to be the intention of the examiner) Art 25; Probation Law; entitlement to probation; appeals 2002 No IV. Page 124 of 374
A was charged with homicide. After trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to six (6) years and one (1) day in prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Prior to his conviction, he had been found guilty of vagrancy and imprisoned for ten (10) days of arresto manor and fined fifty pesos (P50.00). Is he eligible for probation? Why? (3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, he Is not entitled to the benefits of the Probation Law (PD 968, as amended) does not extend to those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years (Sec. 9a). It is of no moment that in his previous conviction A was given a penalty of only ten (10) days of arresto mayor and a fine of P50.00. B. May a probationer appeal from the decision revoking the grant of probation or modifying the terms and conditions thereof? (2%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. Under Section 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, an order granting or denying probation is not appealable. Art 25; Probation Law; qualifications for probation 1994 No. 17: On February 3, 1986, Roberto was convicted of arson through reckless imprudence and sentenced to pay a fine of P15,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On February 10, 1986, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. Several months later, he filed a motion to withdraw the appeal on the ground that he is applying for probation. On May 7, 1987, the Court of Appeals granted the motion and considered the appeal withdrawn. On June 10, 1987, the records of the case were remanded to the trial court. Roberto filed a "Motion for Probation" praying that execution of his sentence be suspended, and that a probation officer be ordered to conduct an Investigation and to submit a report on his probation. The judge denied the motion on the ground that pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1990, which took effect on July 16,1986, no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction. Is the denial of Roberto's motion correct? Answer; Yes. Even if at the time of his conviction Roberto was qualified for probation but that at the time of his application for probation, he is no longer qualified, he is not entitled to probation. The qualification for probation must be determined as of the time the application is filed in Court (Bernardo vs. Judge, etal. GRNo. L86561,Nov, 10. 1992; Edwin de la Cruz vs. Judge Callejo. et al, SP-19655, April 18, 1990, citing Llamado vs. CA, et al, GR No. 84859, June 28, 1989; Bernardo us. Judge Balagot, etal, GR 86561, Nov. 10, 1992). Art 29; Destierro 1982 No. 15 May an accused person sentenced to destierro be credited with a portion of the time during which he had undergone preventive imprisonment? Page 125 of 374
If not, why not? If in the affirmative, what portion of the time of preventive imprisonment should be credited to him? Answer An accused sentenced to destierro can be credited with a portion of his period of preventive imprisonment in the service of the sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty because destierro as a penalty involves also deprivation of liberty although partial. (People vs. Bastasa et al, 88 SCRA 184). Art 29; Preventive imprisonment 1980 No. VI (a) Under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, offenders who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment. An accused was sentenced to "destierro" for having killed his wife under exceptional circumstances. He had been preventively detained for a period of almost twelve years. Would he be entitled to the benefits of Art. 29 in so far as his preventive imprisonment is concerned? Answer (a) Article 29 as amended by R.A. No. 6127 provides that an offender who has undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time of the period of his preventive imprisonment if he has agreed in writing to observe the rules of discipline applied to convicted prisoners and four-fifth if there is no written commitment. The penalty of destierro involves also deprivation of liberty (People vs. Abilong, 82 Phil. 172). The problem does not show whether there is a written commitment. So, the deduction of the full period of preventive imprisonment cannot technically be applied. However, the period of preventive imprisonment is almost 12 years. Hence, even if four-fifth thereof of 12 years is applied, the result will be more than 8 years. The duration of destierro is from 6 months 1 day to 6 years. The accused therefore is entitled to be released because the period of his preventive imprisonment exceeds the penalty of destierro imposed upon him. Art 29; Preventive imprisonment 1983 No, 10 Having caught A in flagrante delicto doing the sex act with his [B's] wife, B shot and killed A while the latter was still in the compromising act. B was sentenced to reclusion perpetua for murder after a protracted trial. It was only on appeal that he was given the proper penalty of destierro under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. During the pendency of the case, the accused was under preventive detention which lasted for about eight years. (a) In serving his sentence, is B entitled to credit for his preventive imprisonment? Explain. (b) What is the philosophy of the legal provision imposing the penalty of destierro for the above crime? Answer
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a) A can be credited for his preventive imprisonment. Destierro as a penalty involves also deprivation of liberty. (People vs.. Bastasa (1979) of 6 O.G. 6844) Art 29; Preventive imprisonment 1994 No. 3: 1) When is there preventive imprisonment? 2) When is the accused credited with the full time of his preventive imprisonment, and when is he credited with 4/5 thereof? Answer; 1) There is preventive imprisonment when [a) an offender is detained while the criminal case against him is being heard, either because the crime committed is a capital offense and not bailable, or even if the crime committed was bailable, the offender could not post the required bail for his provisional liberty. 2) An accused is credited with the full time of his preventive imprisonment if he voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by the rules of the institution imposed upon its prisoners, provided that: a) the penalty imposed on him for the crime committed consists of a deprivation of liberty; b) he is not disqualified from such credit for being a recidivist, or for having been previously convicted for two or more times of any crime, or for having failed to surrender voluntarily for the execution of the sentence upon being so summoned (Art. 29, RPC). Where the accused however did not agree he would only be credited with 4/5 of the time he had undergone preventive Imprisonment. Art 39; Subsidiary imprisonment 1978 No. IV-a A bus driver was found guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence. He was sentenced "to pay a fine of P5,000 and the costs". The driver was insolvent and could not pay the fine. May the driver be required to serve subsidiary imprisonment? Explain, Answer No, because subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay the fine, is not expressly provided in the sentence. (People vs. Fajardo, 65 Phil. 639). Art 39; Subsidiary imprisonment 1980 No. VIII "P" was sentenced from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and one (1) day, and ordered to pay a fine of P2,000.00. May "P" be compelled to serve subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay the fine? Answer P cannot be compelled to serve subsidiary imprisonment. Art. 39 par. 3 (R.P.C.) provides that there is no subsidiary imprisonment if the principal penalty is higher than prision correccional. The penalty of 6 years 1 day to 12 years and Page 127 of 374
1 day is higher than prision correccional which has a maximum of 6 years only. The mere addition of 1 day to 6 years is already higher than prision correccional and in such a case there can be no subsidiary imprisonment for failure to pay the fine. (Rosario vs. Director of Prisons, L-03463, March 6, 1950) Art 39; Subsidiary imprisonment 1983 No. 13 Charged with estafa in September 1983, the accused was found guilty and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P3,000, aside from the indemnification of the victim, with subsidiary imprisonment for both fine and indemnity in case of insolvency. Was subsidiary imprisonment properly imposed? Explain. Answer Subsidiary imprisonment was not properly imposed because the principal penalty which is 4 years, 2 months 1 day of prision correcional as minimum to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum, is higher than prision correcional. (Art, 39, par. 3, Rev. Penal Code) Besides, there is no subsidiary imprisonment for indemnity, as subsidiary imprisonment is limited to non-payment of fine. (Art. 39 as amended by Act 5465) Art 45; when not subject to confiscation 1987 No XV: Jose, Pedro and Juan, robbed ABC Bank of P200,000 and using a stolen car, immediately proceeded to Quezon City. The police recovered the money and the car. After the trial, during which the bank lawyer intervened as private prosecutor, the court convicted Jose, Pedro and Juan of robbery and ordered the forfeiture of the money (P200,000.00) and the car in favor of the government as proceeds and instrument of the crime, respectively. The bank lawyer received copy of the judgment, but did not do anything. Jose, Pedro and Juan did not appeal the judgment, and began service of sentence. Two months later, realizing that the court did not order the return of the money to the bank, the bank lawyer filed a motion for modification of the judgment and prayed that the money be ordered returned to the bank. Two months later, Armando, the owner of the stolen car, learned of the judgment even much later. He comes to you seeking your well considered opinion on whether it is still possible to recover his car. (a) As legal counsel, what will you tell him? Explain briefly. (b) Under the facts given, would the bank be entitled to the return of the money? Why? Answer: a) As legal counsel, I would advise Armando to file a civil action for the recovery of his car against its legal custodian. The car was stolen and therefore it belonged to Armando, an innocent party, who has not participated in the commission of the robbery by Jose, Pedro and Juan. The car, is therefore, not subject to confiscation. Art 47 & 83; Death penalty; crimes punishable 1988 No. 3:
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c) What offenses, if any, may be punished with the death penalty in our jurisdiction at present? Explain. Answer: c) At present, no offense may be punished with the death penalty in our jurisdiction at present. The 1987 Constitution has abolished the death penalty and the abolition affects even those who has already been sentenced to death penalty. Therefore, unless Congress enacts a law, no offense may be punished with the death penalty at present. But until today, Congress has not yet passed a law to this effect. Art 47 & 83; Death penalty; exceptions thereto 1998 No XIII. 1. Under Article 47 of RA. 7659, the death penalty shall be imposed In all cases in which it must be imposed under existing laws. What are the exceptions to the imposition of the death penalty? [3%] Answer: 1. The death penalty shall not be imposed although prescribed under existing laws: (1) When the accused is less than 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense; (2)
When the accused is more than 70 years of age already;
(3) When upon appeal or automatic review of the case by the Supreme Court, the required majority vote for the imposition of the death penalty is not obtained. Art 47 & 83; Death penalty; heinous crimes 1995 No. 1: 1. (a) When was the constitutional proscription against the imposition of the death penalty lifted? (b) When is the execution of the death penalty suspended under the Revised Penal Code? (c) When is the death penalty commuted under the same Code? 2.
(a) What are heinous crimes?
(b) Name ten (10) specific heinous crimes. Answer: 1. (a) The constitutional proscription against the imposition of the death penalty was lifted with the enactment of RA 7659, otherwise known as the Heinous Crimes Law, which took effect fifteen (15) days after publication on December 16, 1993,that is on December 3l, 1993 (People vs. Martin Simon, 234 SCRA 555). (b) Death penalty shall not be executed (a) upon a woman within three years after date of the sentence, (b) while she is pregnant, (c) upon a person over 70 years old (Art. 83 RPC), or (4) upon a convict who becomes insane after final sentence (Art. 79, RPC). (c) When the convict reaches the age of 70 years the death sentence is commuted to reclusion perpetua (Art. 83, RPC).
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2. (a) Heinous crimes are those which are punishable by death for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their Inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society. (b) The ten specific heinous crimes are: 1
Treason
2. Qualified Piracy 3
Qualified Bribery
4. Parricide 5. Murder 6. Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention 7. Robbery with Homicide 8
Destructive Arson
9. Rape committed by two or more persons, or with a deadly weapon or with homicide 10. Plunder Art 47 & 83; death penalty; heinous crimes 1997 No 10: (a) What do you understand by the so-called heinous crimes? (b) What are the instances when the death penalty could not be imposed, although it should otherwise ordinarily be meted out? Answer: (a) Heinous crimes are those grievous, odious, and hateful offenses and which by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity, and perversity, are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society. They are punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment to death. (WHEREAS CLAUSE. RA. 7659) (b)
1. When the guilty party is below 18 years of age
at the time of the commission of the crime or when the offender is more than 70 years of age. 2. When upon appeal or automatic review of the case by the Supreme Court, the required majority vote is not obtained for the imposition of the penalty, in which case the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua. Art 48; Aberratio ictus 1993 No. 12: Explain and illustrate the following: 1) aberratio ictus, 2) impossible crime, and 3) subornation of perjury. Answer; 1) Aberratio ictus - A fired a gun at his father to kill him but hit instead a stranger. Art 48; aberratio ictus
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1996 No. 2: 1) At the height of an altercation, Pedrito shot Paulo but missed, hitting Tiburcio instead, resulting in the death of the latter. Pedrito, invoking the doctrine of aberratio ictus, claims exemption from criminal liability. If you were the judge, how would you decide the case? Answer: 1) If I were the Judge, I will convict Pedrito and find him guilty of the complex crime of Homicide with Attempted Homicide. The single act of firing at Paulo resulted in the commission of two felonies, one grave (homicide) and the other less grave (attempted homicide) thus falling squarely under Art. 48, RPC; hence, the penalty would be for the more serious crime (homicide} in its maximum period (17 years 4 months and 1 day to 20 years). Aberratio ictus (mistake in the blow) could not be used as a defense as it is not an exempting circumstance. Pedrito is liable under the principle of Art. 4, RPC, which makes a person criminally liable for all the natural and logical consequences of his felonious act, Art 48; Aberratio ictus vs error in personae 1994 No. 2; 1) Distinguish aberratio ictus from error in personae. Answer: 1) Aberratio ictus or mistake in the blow occurs when a felonious act missed the person against whom it was directed and hit instead somebody who was not the intended victim. Error in personae, or mistake in identity occurs when the felonious act was directed at the person intended, but who turned out to be somebody else. Aberratio ictus brings about at least two (2) felonious consequence, ie. the attempted felony on the intended victim who was not hit and the felony on the unintended victim who was hit. A complex crime of the first form under Art. 48, RPC generally result. In error in personae only one crime is committed, Art 48; Aberratio ictus, error in personae & praeter intentionem 1989 No. 1: What do you understand by aberratio ictus; error in personae; and praeter intentionem? Do they alter the criminal liability of an accused? Explain. Answer: Aberation ictus, error in personae and praeter intentionem are the three ways by which a person may commit a felony although the wrongful act done is different from that which he intended. In aberratio ictus, there is a mistake in the blow meaning to say that the offender intending to cause an injury to one person actually inflicts it on another because of lack of precision, as far for example when A, intending to kill B, fires his gun at the latter but because of poor aim or lack of precision, he hits C instead, who suffers serious physical injury. In error in personae, there is a mistake in the identity of the victim, as for instance, when A, intending to kill B, his enemy lay in ambush for the latter to pass along a dark alley. Because of the darkness, A fired his gun at a person
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passing by, thinking him to be B. It turned out that the person shot was C, A's father. In praeter intentionem, the injurious result is greater than that intended by the offender, the act exceeds the intent, as for instance, where A, without intent to kill, strikes B with his fist at the back of the head, causing B to fall down with his head hitting the asphalt pavement, resulting in the fracture of his head that caused his death. The presence of these circumstances will alter the criminal liability of the accused. Thus: In aberratio ictus, two offenses are actually committed by the offender, that which he intended to commit and that which he actually committed. But if these two offenses are both either grave or less grave, since they are produced by one single act, a complex crime will result. In the case of error in personae, the offender shall be guilty of the crime actually committed by him, but the penalty to be imposed shall either be the penalty for the crime actually committed or that for the crime intended to be committed. Which ever is lower, but the same will be imposed in its maximum period. In the case praeter intentionem, the offended, will incur criminal liability for the felony actually committed by him, but he will be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of not having intended to commit so grave a wrong as that which he committed. Art 48; Aberratio ictus, Error in personae & praeter intentionem 1999 No VI What do you understand by aberratio ictus: error in personae; and praeter intentionem? Do they alter the criminal liability of an accused? Explain. (4%) SUGGESTED ANSWER; Aberratio ictus or mistake in the blow occurs when the offender delivered the blow at his intended victim but missed, and instead such blow landed on an unintended victim. The situation generally brings about complex crimes where from a single act, two or more grave or less grave felonies resulted, namely the attempt against the Intended victim and the consequence on the unintended victim. As complex crimes, the penalty for the more serious crime shall be the one imposed and in the maximum period. It Is only when the resulting felonies are only light that complex crimes do not result and the penalties are to be imposed distinctly for each resulting crime. Error in personae or mistake in identity occurs when the offender actually hit the person to whom the blow was directed but turned out to be different from and not the victim intended. The criminal liability of the offender is not affected, unless the mistake in identity resulted to a crime different from what the offender intended to commit, in which case the lesser penalty between the crime intended and the crime committed shall be imposed but in the maximum period (Art. 49, RFC). Praeter intentionem or where the consequence went beyond that intended or expected. This is a mitigating circumstance (Art. 13. par. 3, RPC) when there is a notorious disparity between the act or means employed by the offender and the resulting felony, i,e., the resulting felony could not be reasonably anticipated or foreseen by the of fender from the act or means employed by him. Page 132 of 374
Art 48; aberratio ictus; attempted murder with homicide 2000 No XIV Despite the massive advertising campaign in media against firecrackers and gun-firing during the New Year's celebrations, Jonas and Jaja bought ten boxes of super lolo and pla-pla in Bocaue, Bulacan. Before midnight of December 31, 1999, Jonas and Jaja started their celebration by having a drinking spree at Jona's place by exploding their high-powered firecrackers in their neighborhood. In the course of their conversation, Jonas confided to Jaja that he has been keeping a long-time grudge against his neighbor Jepoy in view of the latter's refusal to lend him some money. While under the influence of liquor, Jonas started throwing lighted super lolos inside Jepoy's fence to irritate him and the same exploded inside the latter's yard. Upon knowing that the throwing of the super lolo was deliberate, Jepoy became furious and sternly warned Jonas to stop his malicious act or he would get what he wanted. A heated argument between Jonas and Jepoy ensued but Jaja tried to calm down his friend. At midnight, Jonas convinced Jaja to lend him his .45 caliber pistol so that he could use it to knock down Jepoy and to end his arrogance. Jonas thought that after all, explosions were everywhere and nobody would know who shot Jepoy. After Jaja lent his firearm to Jonas, the latter again started throwing lighted super lolos and pla-plas at Jepoy's yard in order to provoke him so that he would come out of his house. When Jepoy came out, Jonas immediately shot him with Jaja's .45 caliber gun but missed his target. Instead, the bullet hit Jepoy's five year old son who was following behind him, killing the boy instantaneously, a)
What crime or crimes can Jonas and Jaja be charged with? Explain.
(2%) b) If you were Jonas' and Jaja's lawyer, what possible defenses would you set up in favor of your clients? Explain. (2%) c)
If you were the Judge, how would you decide the case? Explain. (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: a) Jonas and Jaja, can be charged with the complex crime of attempted murder with homicide because a single act caused a less grave and a grave felony (Art. 48. RPC). Attempted murder Is a less grave felony, while consummated homicide is a grave felony: both are punishable by afflictive penalties. Art 48; Complex crime; incriminatory machination with unlawful arrest 1977 No. III-b A police officer surreptitiously placed a marijuana cigarette in the breast pocket of the polo shirt of a student and then arrested the student for illegal possession of marijuana cigarette. For what crime or crimes will the police officer be liable? Reason fully. Answer The police officer will be liable for the complex crime of incriminatory machination with unlawful arrest. (People v. Alagao, et al., L-20721, April 30, 1966). The placing of marijuana cigarette in the breast pocket of the polo shirt of the student is incriminatory machination, which is "planting evidence". The arrest of the student for illegal possession of the marijuana cigarette is unlawful arrest.
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The two acts followed closely each other. Incriminatory machination is the means to commit unlawful arrest and is, therefore, a complex crime. Art 48; Complex crimes; applies only to felonies; estafa & bp 22 1987 No. VIII; Jose purchased roofing materials worth P20,000.00 from PY & Sons Construction Company owned by Pedro, and paid the latter a check in the said amount. The following day, Pedro deposited the check, but it was returned dishonored because it was drawn against a closed account. Notwithstanding written demands, Jose failed to make good said check. Atty. Saavedra, counsel for Pedro, filed two complaints against Jose with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, one for estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code and another for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg, 22. Atty. San Pascual, counsel for Jose, claimed that if his client was at all liable, he could only be liable for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and not for estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code because one precludes the other and because Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is more favorable to the accused as it carries a lighter penalty.-The investigating fiscal, on his resolution, stated that only one crime was committed, namely, the complex crime of estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 because the single act of issuing the bouncing check constitutes two offenses, one under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code and another under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. If you were the Provincial Fiscal asked to review the matter, how would you resolve it? Answer: The resolution of the investigating fiscal is erroneous. There is no complex crime of estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code and the violation of BP 22. A complex crime refers only to felonies which are punished in the Revised Penal Code. Batas 22 which punishes the offense of issuing a worthless check is a special law. The contention of Atty. San Pascual, counsel of Jose that his client should be liable only for Batas 22 and for estafa under the Revised Penal Code because one precludes the other and because Batas 22 is more favorable to the accused as it carries a lighter penalty cannot also be sustained. Batas 22 specifically provides that liability under said act is without prejudice to any liability for estafa under the Revised Penal Code. The check issued by Jose in payment of roofing materials from PY and Sons was worthless. Said bouncing check having been issued in payment of a simultaneous obligation constitutes estafa under the Revised Penal Code and also the offense punished under Batas 22. There is no identity of offenses. Damage is not an element of the offense punished in Batas 22 whereas in estafa damage is an element. Estafa is an act mala in se in which requires intent as an element while the offense punished in Batas 22 is an act mala prohibita where intent is not an element. Art 48; Complex crimes; applies only to felonies; illegal possession of firearms 1975 No. I A shot and killed D with an unlicensed firearm. The Fiscal filed charges against A — one for Homicide and another for Illegal Possession of Firearm. The defense counsel contended that only one charge should have been filed —the complex crime of Homicide with Illegal Possession of Firearm as the use of the
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unlicensed firearm was a necessary means to commit the homicide. Is the contention meritorious? Why? Answer a) The contention of defense counsel is not meritorious, A complex crime refers only to felonies. (Art. 48, Revised Penal Code, People vs. Araneta, 48 Phil. 650). The offender will be liable for two crimes. One for homicide, which is a felony punished in the Revised Penal Code, and another for illegal possession of firearm, which is an offense punished in a special law. b) People vs. Alger, 92 Phil 227. Art 48; Complex crimes; Coup d’etat & rebellion & sedition 2003 No X. (b)
Can there be a complex crime of coup d'etat with rebellion? 2%
(c)
Can there be a complex crime of coup d'etat with sedition? 2%
SUGGESTED ANSWER: (b) Yes, if there was conspiracy between the offender/ offenders committing the coup d'etat and the offenders committing the rebellion. By conspiracy, the crime of one would be the crime of the other and vice versa. This is possible because the offender in coup d'etat may be any person or persons belonging to the military or the national police or a public officer, whereas rebellion does not so require. Moreover, the crime of coup d'etat may be committed singly, whereas rebellion requires a public uprising and taking up arms to overthrow the duly constituted government. Since the two crimes are essentially different and punished with distinct penalties, there is no legal impediment to the application of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code. (c) Yes, coup d'etat can be complexed with sedition because the two crimes are essentially different and distinctly punished under the Revised Penal Code. Sedition may not be directed against the Government or non-political in objective, whereas coup d'etat is always political in objective as it is directed against the Government and led by persons or public officer holding public office belonging to the military or national police. Art. 48 of the Code may apply under the conditions therein provided. ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: The crime of coup d'etat cannot be complexed with the crime of rebellion because both crimes are directed against the Government or for political purposes, although the principal offenders are different. The essence may be the same and thus constitute only one crime. In this situation, the two crimes are not distinct and therefore, may not be proper to apply Article 48 of the Code. Art 48; Complex crimes; either must not be slight 1989 No. 3: Rodolfo, a policeman, was cleaning his service pistol inside his house when it fell from his hand and fired. The bullet hit a neighbor on the stomach and a second neighbor on the leg. The injuries sustained by the two neighbors required thirty-five (35) days and nine (9) days of medical attendance, respectively. The investigating fiscal later filed an information for frustrated homicide and slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence against Rodolfo, Is the charge correct? Explain.
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Answer: The charge is not correct. One single act of accidental shooting cannot give rise to two felonies. One of which is intentional and the other negligent. Frustrated homicide presupposes intent to kill. The facts do not show any intent to kill on the part of Rodolfo. At most, he was careless, and therefore only negligent. Two separate crimes of serious physical injuries (against the first neighbor whose injuries requires 35 days of medical attendance), and slight physical injuries (against the second neighbor), both through reckless imprudence, were committed by Rodolfo. Although both of these offenses were the result of one single act, a complex crime is not committed because it is only when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies that a complex crime may be committed under the first clause of article 48, RPC, Slight physical injuries is not a grave or less grave felony. Art 48; Complex crimes; either must not be slight: prescription 1980 No. X "T" was charged in an Information with the complex crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting in Damage to Property in the sum of P700.00 and Slight Physical Injuries, both resulting from a single act of imprudence. The incident which gave rise to the quasi-offense occurred on November 14, 1979. The accused was charged on March 14, 1980. Should the resulting offenses be considered a complex crime subject to one penalty? Answer The resulting offenses cannot be considered as a complex crime. The slight physical injuries which resulted from a single act of imprudence which occurred on Nov. 14, 1979, prescribed already when the accused was charged on March 14, 19SO. Slight physical injuries, being a light felony, prescribes in two months, (Art. 90, R.P.C.). Another reason is that a complex crime exists if a single act results in two grave or less grave felonies. If one of the resulting felonies is light, like slight physical injuries, as stated in the problem there can be no complex crime. (Lontok vs. Gorgonio, L-37396 April 30, 1979)
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Art 48; Complex crimes; nature 1999 No XV (a) A, actuated by malice and with the use of a fully automatic M-14 sub-machine gun, shot a group of persons who were seated in a cockpit with one burst of successive, continuous, automatic fire. Four (4) persons were killed thereby, each having hit by different bullets coming from the sub-machine gun of A. Four (4) cases of murder were filed against A. The trial court ruled that there was only one crime committed by A for the reason that, since A performed only one act, he having pressed the trigger of his gun only once, the crime committed was murder. Consequently, the trial judge sentenced A to just one penalty of reclusion perpetua. Was the decision of the trial judge correct? Explain. (4%) (b) What constitutes a complex crime? How many crimes maybe involved in a complex crime? What is the penalty therefor? (4%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: (a) The decision of the trial judge is not correct. When the offender made use of an automatic firearm, the acts committed are determined by the number of bullets discharged Inasmuch as the firearm being automatic, the offender need only press the trigger once and it would fire continually. For each death caused by a distinct and separate bullet, the accused incurs distinct criminal liability. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the trigger which should be considered as producing the several felonies, but the number of bullets which actually produced them. (b) A complex crime is constituted when a single act caused two or more grave or less grave felonies or when an offense is committed as a necessary means to commit another offense (Art. 48, RPC). At least two (2) crimes are involved in a complex crime; either two or more grave or less grave felonies resulted from a single act, or an offense is committed as a necessary means for committing another, The penalty for the more serious crime shall be imposed and in its maximum period. (Art. 48, RPC) Crimes against persons; homicide, infanticide; parricide; murder 1999 No XVI Who may be guilty of the crime of parricide? (3%) A killed: (1) a woman with whom he lived without benefit of clergy, (2) their child who was only two days old, (3) their daughter, and (4) their adopted son. What crime or crimes did A commit? (3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: (a) Any person who kills his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or his ascendants or descendants, or spouse, shall be guilty of parricide. (Art. 246, RPC) (b)
A committed the following crimes:
1. Homicide or murder as the case may be, for the killing of his commonlaw wife who is not legally considered a "spouse" 2. Infanticide for the killing of the child as said child is less than three (3) days old. (Art. 255, RPC) However, the penalty corresponding to parricide shall
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be imposed since A is related to the child within the degree defined in the crime of parricide. 3. Parricide for the killing of their daughter, whether legitimate or illegitimate, as long as she is not less than three (3) days old at the time of the killing. 4. Murder for the killing of their adopted son as the relationship between A and the said son must be by blood in order for parricide to arise. Art 48; Complex crimes; Ordinary complex crime vs special complex crime 2003 No X. (a) Distinguish between an ordinary complex crime and a special complex crime as to their concepts and as to the imposition of penalties. 2% SUGGESTED ANSWER: (a)
In concept -
An ordinary complex crime is made up of two or more crimes being punished in distinct provisions of the Revised Penal Code but alleged in one Information either because they were brought about by a single felonious act or because one offense is a necessary means for committing the other offense or offenses. They are alleged in one Information so that only one penalty shall be imposed. A special complex crime, on the other hand, is made up of two or more crimes which are considered only as components of a single indivisible offense being punished in one provision of the Revised Penal Code. As to penalties In ordinary complex crime, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed and in its maximum period. In special complex crime, only one penalty is specifically prescribed for all the component crimes which are regarded as one indivisible offense. The component crimes are not regarded as distinct crimes and so the penalty for the most serious crime is not the penalty to be imposed nor in its maximum period. It is the penalty specifically provided for the special complex crime that shall be applied according to the rules on imposition of the penalty. Art 48; Continuing offense vs Delito continuado 1994 No. 4: 2) Differentiate delito continuado from a continuing offense. Answer; 2) Delito continuado, or continuous crime, is a term used to denote as only one crime a series of felonious acts arising from a single criminal resolution, not susceptible of division, which are carried out in the same place and at about the same time, and violating one and the same penal provision. The acts done must be impelled by one criminal intent or purpose, such that each act merely constitutes a partial execution of a particular crime, violating one and the same penal provision. It involves a concurrence of felonious acts violating a common right, a common penal provision, and Impelled by a single criminal impulse (People vs. Le-desma, 73 SCRA 77).
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On the other hand, a continuing offense is one whose essential ingredients took place in more than one municipality or city, so much so that the criminal prosecution may be instituted and the case tried in the competent court of any one of such municipality or city. The term "continued crime" or delito continuado mandates that only one information should be filed against the offender although a series of felonious acts were performed; the term "continuing crime" is more pertinently used with reference to the venue where the criminal action may be instituted. Art 48; Continuous crimes 1976 No. VIII-a X filed 50 complaints of estafa with the Fiscal's Office against his employee, Y, claiming that Y misappropriated sums of money on various dates representing the amounts he collected on different dates from Ms (X's) customers. All in all, the Fiscal filed 50 informations for estafa in court. Y questioned the filing of 50 different informations of estafa against him on the ground that the charges were components of one crime as this was impelled by a single criminal intent. Is Y's contention tenable? Reason. Answer Y's contention is not tenable. The 50 different informations for estafa filed against Y refer to misappropriations of money on various dates representing amounts collected on different dates from the customers of X. Misappropriation on each date is a separate crime of estafa because it is motivated by an independent criminal impulse. Misappropriations on different dates constitute several cases of estafa because each misappropriation is generated by a distinct criminal resolution. This case refers to material plurality of crimes as the different acts committed on different dates have separate criminal resolutions which should result in different crimes which are judicially independent. The charges cannot be mere components of one crime impelled by a single criminal intent because the misappropriations were committed on various dates and not on the same occasion. The different criminal acts have different criminal intent or resolutions. In a continuous crime, the criminal acts arise from a single criminal intent or resolution which is not susceptible of division. (Gamboa, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 72 O.G. 3658), Art 49; error in personae 1983 No. 12 Julius planned to do away with Mario, a business rival. With a bolo in hand, Julius waited in ambush at a dark alley where Mario used to pass every night on his way home. When a figure came by, Julius struck him with the bolo again and again, thinking that he , was Mario. It turned out that the victim was Julius' own father who had the same general appearance as Mario. What crime was committed? Citing applicable legal principles, for what crime should Julius be punished? Why? Answer The crime committed is parricide. The problem refers to mistake in identity because the crime intended which is the killing of Mario, a business rival, is different from the crime committed, which is the killing of the father of Julius, the
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offender. Under Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code, the offender, however, will be punished for the crime intended, which is murder, as the victim was ambushed at right and therefore treachery attended the killing of the victim, the penalty of which is to be imposed in its maximum period. The reason is the penalty for the crime committed which is parricide prescribes a penalty higher than murder which the accused intended to commit Art 49; error in personae 1986 No. 7: Roberto Cortez is the general manager of the family corporation. Because of his incompetence, inability to control his temper, and frequent quarrels with employees, his father finally decided to dismiss him. As Roberto was about to leave his office at six o'clock in the evening, his father went to his room, lambasted and fired him in the presence of several members of the office staff. Thoroughly enraged, Roberto ran out of the office, and, deciding to get even, waited at the exit of the parking lot where his father always passes at the close of each working day. A few minutes later, Roberto saw his father's car approach. He fired his pistol in the direction of the driver thinking that the latter was his father. The man died instantly. Unknown to Roberto, the victim of his fire was Taga-hatid, a company messenger whom the father had instructed to drive his car home. Roberto surrendered to the authorities. (a) After investigation, the fiscal filed an information against Roberto for murder. He alleged that the killing was characterized by treachery as the victim was ambushed. Roberto's counsel insists that if any crime was committed, it should only be homicide attended by mitigating circumstances. Was the killing characterized by treachery? Explain. (b) The penalty for parricide is reclusion perpetua to death. The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. Assume that you are the trial judge. Given the circumstances cited above, state the offense committed by Roberto Cortez and impose the correct penalty under circumstances. Explain why you have decided to impose this penalty. Answer: a. Murder is the crime committed qualified by treachery. The fact that the victim was ambushed shows that the accused deliberately and consciously adopted a means to insure specially and directly the commission of the crime without any risk from any defense that the person attacked might make. b. The offense committed by Roberto Cortez is murder. The penalty will be for murder to be imposed in its maximum period. The reason is murder which is the crime committed is different from the crime intended, the killing of the father of Roberto Cortez, which is parricide. This is a case of mistake of identity. The rule is if the penalty for the crime intended is higher than the penalty for the crime committed, the offender will be liable for the crime committed, but the penalty which shall be imposed is in its maximum period (Art. 49, par. 2, Revised Penal Code). Art 49; error in personae; murder & parricide 1986 No. 7: Page 140 of 374
Roberto Cortez is the general manager of the family corporation. Because of his incompetence, inability to control his temper, and frequent quarrels with employees, his father finally decided to dismiss him. As Roberto was about to leave his office at six o'clock in the evening, his father went to his room, lambasted and fired him in the presence of several members of the office staff. Thoroughly enraged, Roberto ran out of the office, and, deciding to get even, waited at the exit of the parking lot where his father always passes at the close of each working day. A few minutes later, Roberto saw his father's car approach. He fired his pistol in the direction of the driver thinking that the latter was his father. The man died instantly. Unknown to Roberto, the victim of his fire was Taga-hatid, a company messenger whom the father had instructed to drive his car home. Roberto surrendered to the authorities. (a) After investigation, the fiscal filed an information against Roberto for murder. He alleged that the killing was characterized by treachery as the victim was ambushed. Roberto's counsel insists that if any crime was committed, it should only be homicide attended by mitigating circumstances. Was the killing characterized by treachery? Explain. (b) The penalty for parricide is reclusion perpetua to death. The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. Assume that you are the trial judge. Given the circumstances cited above, state the offense committed by Roberto Cortez and impose the correct penalty under circumstances. Explain why you have decided to impose this penalty. Answer: a. Murder is the crime committed qualified by treachery. The fact that the victim was ambushed shows that the accused deliberately and consciously adopted a means to insure specially and directly the commission of the crime without any risk from any defense that the person attacked might make. b. The offense committed by Roberto Cortez is murder. The penalty will be for murder to be imposed in its maximum period. The reason is murder which is the crime committed is different from the crime intended, the killing of the father of Roberto Cortez, which is parricide. This is a case of mistake of identity. The rule is if the penalty for the crime intended is higher than the penalty for the crime committed, the offender will be liable for the crime committed, but the penalty which shall be imposed is in its maximum period (Art. 49, par. 2, Revised Penal Code). Art 62; Habitual delinquency 1991 No, 6: A was charged with homicide. During the trial, un-contradicted evidence consisting of medical certificates were presented showing that the accused had sustained injuries in ten (10) previous occasions while engaged in fisticuffs with different persons. He was also confined at the National Mental Hospital for mental ailment diagnosed as "homicidal and suicidal instincts." During his second confinement thereat, he escaped. Upon conviction, the prosecutor objected to the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law contending that the accused is a habitual delinquent and an escapee from the National Mental Hospital.
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If you are the Judge, rule on the objection. Answer: The objection should be overruled. A could not be legally considered a habitual delinquent. Habitual delinquency cannot be validly invoked without being alleged in the Information and proven during the trial. Besides there is no indication that A was convicted within ten (10) years from last conviction or release, three times or oftener of the crimes of robbery, theft, estafa, physical injuries or falsification. Being an escapee from the Mental Hospital will not disqualify him from the application of the ISL as Section 2 thereof contemplates having escaped from confinement or evaded sentence. Confinement presupposes imprisonment by virtue of a final judgment. Art 62; Habitual delinquency & recidivism 2001 No III Juan de Castro already had three (3) previous convictions by final judgment for theft when he was found guilty of Robbery with Homicide. In the last case, the trial Judge considered against the accused both recidivism and habitual delinquency. The accused appealed and contended that in his last conviction, the trial court cannot consider against him a finding of recidivism and, again, of habitual delinquency. Is the appeal meritorious? Explain. (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, the appeal is not meritorious. Recidivism and habitual delinquency are correctly considered in this case because the basis of recidivism is different from that of habitual delinquency. Juan is a recidivist ... Habitual delinquency, which brings about an additional penalty when an offender is convicted a third time or more for specified crimes, is correctly considered because Juan had already three (3) previous convictions by final judgment for theft and again convicted for Robbery With Homicide. And the crimes specified as basis for habitual delinquency includes, inter alia, theft and robbery. Art 62; Habitual delinquency vs recidivism 1986 No. 5: Give at least four distinctions between habitual delinquency and recidivism. Can a person be a habitual delinquent without being a recidivist? Explain. Answer: The four distinctions between habitual delinquency and recidivism are: 1. In habitual delinquency, the crimes are specified, which are robbery, theft, estafa, falsification, serious and less serious physical injuries. In recidivism, the crimes are embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code. 2. In recidivism, no period of time is fixed between the former conviction and the last conviction. In habitual delinquency, conviction of any of the specified crimes must take place within 10 years from the last conviction or release.
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3. In recidivism, it is enough that there be a second conviction of any crime embraced in the same title of the last or the first crime. In habitual delinquency, there must be at least a third conviction of any of the specified crimes. 4. Recidivism is an aggravating circumstance and if not offset serves to increase the penalty. Habitual delinquency provides for the imposition of an additional penalty. There may be habitual delinquency without recidivism if the three convictions refer to crimes not embraced in the same title Code, like, robbery in the first conviction, a crime against property, falsification, the second conviction, a crime against public interest and serious physical injuries, the third conviction, a crime against persons. Art 80; Suspension of sentence; minors 2003 No VIII. (a) A was 2 months below 18 years of age when he committed the crime. He was charged with the crime 3 months later. He was 23 when he was finally convicted and sentenced. Instead of preparing to serve a jail term, he sought a suspension of the sentence on the ground that he was a juvenile offender Should he be entitled to a suspension of sentence? Reasons. 4% (b) Can juvenile offenders, who are recidivists, validly ask for suspension of sentence? Explain. 4% SUGGESTED ANSWER: (a) No, A is not entitled to a suspension of the sentence because he is no longer a minor at the time of promulgation of the sentence. For purposes of suspension of sentence, the offender's age at the time of promulgation of the sentence is the one considered, not his age when he committed the crime. So although A was below 18 years old when he committed the crime, but he was already 23 years old when sentenced, he is no longer eligible for suspension of the sentence. (b) Yes, so long as the offender is still a minor at the time of the promulgation of the sentence. The law establishing Family Courts, Rep. Act 8369, provides to this effect: that if the minor is found guilty, the court should promulgate the sentence and ascertain any civil liability which the accused may have incurred. However, the sentence shall be suspended without the need of application pursuant to PD 603, otherwise known as the "Child and Youth Welfare Code" (RA 8369, Sec. 5a), It is under PD 603 that an application for suspension of the sentence is required and thereunder it is one of the conditions for suspension of sentence that the offender be a first time convict: this has been displaced by RA 8369. Art 80; Suspension of sentence; minors; PD603 1977 No. III-a The accused was seventeen (17) years old when he was charged of grave coercion. Because of protracted trial, he was already twenty-one (21) years old when the decision was promulgated convicting him of the offense charged the accused asked for the suspension of his sentence pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603 for he was a minor at the time of the commission of the offense. If you were the judge, will you suspend the sentence or not? State your reasons.
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Answer If I were the Judge I would not suspend the sentence. The benefits of Article 80 as modified by Presidential Decree 603, as amended, would apply only to minors under eighteen years old not only at the time of the commission of the crime but also at the time of the trial. (People v. Celespara, 82 Phil. 399; People vs. Capistrano, 92 Phil. 127). The law provides that if the Court grants the request of the minor found guilty of the offense charged for the suspension of the pronouncement of the sentence, said minor is ordered committed to an institution under the supervision of the Department of Social Services "until such minor shall have reached his majority x x x". This means that if he is already of age at the promulgation of the sentence, he cannot be committed anymore.
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Art 80; Suspension of sentence; minors; PD603 1985 No. 1 Minority is generally a privileged mitigating circumstance which entitles the minor offender to a suspended sentence. It may however, under certain circumstances, be considered as a mere ordinary circumstance in which case the offender may be immediately sentenced and made to serve the penalty imposed upon him instead of being placed under suspended sentence. Discuss. Answer Minority as a privileged mitigating circumstance is considered in the imposition of the penalty, (Art. 68, Revised Penal Code). However, the age of the minor at the time of the commission of the crime may be considered in suspending the sentence upon conviction. So under the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree 603, as amended) a minor under 18 years old at the time of the commission of the offense and at the time of the trial, if found guilty after trial may apply for the suspension of the sentence. The only instance where there is no suspension of the sentence in spite of minority is that provided in Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code where the minor under 16 years old at the time of the commission of a light felony if found guilty, the sentence is immediately imposed. But Article 80 has been expressly repealed by Presidential Decree 1179 which took effect on August 15, 1977. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court held in People vs, Sanchez (132 SCRA 103 1984) that there are only two instances where there can be no suspended sentence, to wit: 1) if the offense committed by a minor is punishable by death or life imprisonment; 2) if the minor is 18 years and above at the time of the commission of the offense and at the time of the trial. Art 80; Suspension of sentence; minors; PD603 1980 No. XII Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, what is the controlling criterion to determine whether or not an accused is a youthful offender so as to entitled him to suspension of sentence? Is there any difference between the Revised Penal Code and the Child and Youth Welfare Code in so far as suspension of the sentence of a juvenile offender is concerned? Answer Under the Youth and Child Welfare Code, the youthful offender must be under eighteen years old not only at the time of the commission of the crime but also at the time of the trial so as to be entitled to suspension of sentence. (People va. Casiguran, L-45387, Nov. 7, 1979) Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, the youthful offender who is found guilty after trial, must file an application for the suspension of the pronouncement of the sentence, which the Court may grant if the interest of the minor and of the public so requires. Under Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code which covers a minor under 16 years of age at the time of the commission of a grave or less grave felony and at the time of the trial, which was expressly repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1179, the suspension of the pronouncement of the sentence upon the minor where there is evidence of guilt is automatic. Art 80; Suspension of sentence; youthful offender 1995 No. 7: Page 145 of 374
Victor, Ricky, Rod and Ronnie went to the store of Mang Pandoy. Victor and Ricky entered the store while Rod and Ronnie posted themselves at the door. After ordering beer Ricky complained that he was shortchanged although Mang Pandoy vehemently denied it. Suddenly Ricky whipped out a knife as he announced "Hold-up ito!" and stabbed Mang Pandoy to death. Rod boxed the store's salesgirl Lucy to prevent her from helping Mang Pandoy. When Lucy ran out of the store to seek help from people next door she was chased by Ronnie. As soon as Ricky had stabbed Mang Pandoy, Victor scooped up the money from the cash box. Then Victor and Ricky dashed to the street and shouted, "Tumakbo na kayo!" Rod was 14 and Ronnie was 17. The money and other articles looted from the store of Mang Pandoy were later found in the houses of Victor and Ricky. 1. Discuss fully the criminal liability of Victor, Ricky, Rod and Ronnie. 2. Are the minors Rod and Ronnie entitled to suspended sentence under The Child and Youth Welfare Code? Explain. Answer: 1 . All are liable for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.... 2. No, because the benefits of suspension of sentence is not available where the youthful offender has been convicted of an offense punishable by life imprisonment or death, pursuant to P.D. No. 603, Art. 192, The complex crime of robbery with homicide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under Art. 294 (1), RFC [People vs. Galit. 230 SCRA 486). Art 80; Suspension of sentence; minors; PD603 1986 No. 16: Brothers Aber and Bobot, 16 and 17 years old, respectively, have had no food for the past two days. Suffering from severe hunger, they hatched a plan to break into a store to steal some food. Five days later, at 12 midnight, they were able to enter the store by breaking the hinges of the door. Aber took ten cans of sardines worth P50.00. Bobot wandered into a nearby room where the store owner, Cosme, was sleeping Cosme, awakened by Bobot's footsteps, attacked Bobot with a club. Bobot avoided the blow and hit Cosme in the chest with his fist. Aber, upon hearing the commotion, entered the room and tried to pull Bobot away from Cosme. Cosme, however, continued to attack Bobot forcing the latter to box Cosme in the face. Cosme collapsed on the floor. Bobot and Aber fled. The following day, Aber sold six of the sardine cans taken from the store to Dimas who lives a block from the store. Earlier that day Dimas heard rumors that the nearby store had been robbed and that his friend Cosme was found dead. Dimas thought of asking Aber and Bobot where they got the sardines to clear away this doubt, but on second thought did not. He bought the cans for P20.00 and sold them for P30.00. The fiscal charged Aber and Bobot with the complex crime of robbery with homicide aggravated by nighttime, evident premeditation and dwelling. The fiscal charged Dimas as an accessory of Aber and Bobot and for violation of the AntiFencing Law (PD No. J612). d) If you were the counsel of Aber, what defenses would you raise? Explain. (2) If you were the counsel of Bobot, what defenses would you raise? Explain. Page 146 of 374
(3) If you were the counsel of Dimas, what defenses would you raise? Explain, (4) If you were the judge, how would you decide the case? Explain, Answer: (1) If I were the counsel of Aber, I would question the validity of the charge. Robbery with homicide is not proper crime because there was no breaking of the door but only its hinges. (People vs Lising CA 62 OG. 9879) The crime is theft. Since Aber was only l6 years old at the time of the commission of the crime he should be prosecuted under the Youth and Child Welfare Code, where in case of conviction, he could apply for suspension of sentence. If granted, during confinement upon his good behavior, he would be entitled to be discharged. Aber cannot be liable for the killing of Cosme because he has no part in its commission. (2) If I were the counsel of Bobot, I would invoke his age at the time of the commission of the crime for the application of the Child and Youth Welfare Code. The crimes committed are theft and homicide. Regarding the homicide, Bobot can maintain that Cosme hit him with a club and continued to do so forcing Bobot to attack him in the face. He can also invoke the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that which resulted. (3) If I were the counsel of Dimas, I would maintain that he could not be liable as an accessory to the crime of homicide attributed to Bobot because he had no knowledge of its commission. Regarding the violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, he can maintain that he bought the tins of sardines in good faith without any knowledge that these were the proceeds of the crime of theft. (4) If I were the Judge, I would convict Aber and Bobot for the crime and theft. The breaking of the hinges of the door is not the breaking of the door as provided in the law. So the crime committed is not robbery. Only Bobot will be liable for the death of Cosme. Aber has no participation in his death aside from the fact that the crime is not a necessary consequence of the plan to steal food in the store. Besides the act of Aber in trying to pull Bobot away from Cosme is an attempt to prevent Bobot from injuring Cosme. In the crimes of theft and homicide, only nighttime and dwelling are aggravating. Evident premeditation is inherent in theft which is a crime against property. It cannot be considered in homicide as there is no showing of any previous planning to commit it. However, both Aber and Bobot being 16 and 17 years respectively at the time of the commission of the crime should be proceeded under the provisions of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, if still under 18 years at the time of the trial. If convicted, they could apply for the suspension of the sentence, and if granted, they would be committed to an institution until they reach the age of majority If they behave properly during confinement, they would be returned to the court to be discharged; but if they proved themselves to be incorrigible, then for the imposition of the sentence. Dimas will be liable for fencing as he bought the tins of sardines without inquiring from Aber where he got the sardines and under the circumstances he could have known that those were the proceeds of the crime of theft. He bought them with intent to gain as in fact he sold them for a profit.
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Art 80; PD 603; confidentiality of records of minor offenders 1978 No. X-b Jose, a teenager of 16 years, was found guilty of homicide. Because of his age, he was held to be a youthful offender pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, and instead of passing sentence, the judge ordered him committed to the government rehabilitation center in Tanay, Rizal. Jose was released after a year and a half because of good behavior. He later applied for and was appointed to the position of clerk in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Among the papers he submitted was an application form under oath in which Jose stated he had never been charged with, much less convicted of, any crime, in complete disavowal of his previous conviction. What offense/offenses did Jose commit? State your reasons. Answer Jose did not commit any offense. Under Presidential Decree No. 603 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1179, the records of his case are deemed privileged, and there is no liability for perjury or for concealment or misrepresentation by reason of his failure to acknowledge the case or recite any fact related thereto in response to any inquiry made to him for any purpose. (Art. 200) Art 80; PD 603; youthful offenders 1975 No. XX What is a youthful offender as defined in Presidential Decree No. 603 amending Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code? If you were a judge and found a youthful offender guilty of a crime, how would you sentence him? Answer A youthful offender is one who is over nine years old and under 21 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense. If a youthful offender is found guilty, if I were the judge, I would defer his sentence and suspend all proceedings after determining the imposable penalty and his civil liability, if any, I would then order the minor committed to the custody of the Department of Social Welfare or to any training institution operated by the government until ho reaches 21 years or for a shorter period as I might deem proper after considering the reports of the Department of Social Welfare or of such training agency under whose care the minor was committed. (Art. 192, Presidential Decree No. 603). If the youthful offender is found incorrigible or his continued stay in the training institution is found inadvisable and is returned to the court, the judgment would be pronounced. The youthful offender shall be credited in the service of the sentence with the full time spent in actual confinement. (Art. 197, Presidential Decree No, 608). If he behaved properly during confinement, upon recommendation of the Department of Social Welfare, his case will be dismissed (Art. 196, Presidential Decree Ho. 608), but it shall not obliterate his civil liability for damages. (Art, 198, Presidential Decree No. 603).
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Extinction of Criminal Liability Art 89; Criminal liability; corporate officers 1986 No. 2: Two hardware stores are located two blocks apart along Avenida Rizal in Manila. One store is named Glorious Hardware Co. while the other is Glorioso and Sons Hardware, Inc. Two hundred bags of cement ordered by Glorious Hardware were brought by the driver of Hi-Cement Corporation to Glorioso and Sons. The driver inquired from the manager of Glorioso and Sons, a certain Pedro Mendoza, whether that company ordered the cement, Mendoza answered "Yes" and directed the driver to the warehouse of Glorioso and Sons where their laborers unloaded the cargo. Learning of the misdelivery, Jose Roxas, manager of Hi-Cement went to Glorioso and Sons and met with Pablo Glorioso and Cesar Glorioso, President and Vice-President, respectively, of the firm. Roxas explained that the cement belonged to his company and that the cargo was intended for Glorious Hardware. Roxas showed them the purchase order and other documents indicating that Glorious Hardware had already paid for the cement. Pablo and Cesar assured Roxas that they would look into the matter. A month passed but Glorioso and Sons did not return the bags of cement. Unknown to Pablo and Cesar, manager Mendoza sold the cement to another dealer Estafa charges were filed against Pablo Glorioso, Cesar Glorioso, and Pedro Mendoza. Pablo and Cesar contended that they took no part in the misappropriation committed by Mendoza and, at any rate, as corporate officers they are not liable for the acts of other corporate officers. Discuss if the three accused persons may be held criminally liable. If so, in what capacity or capacities? Explain. Answer: Only Pedro Mendoza, the Manager will be liable for estafa. A corporate officer cannot be liable for the acts of another corporate officer except if he directly took part or aided in the commission of the felonious Act. Pablo and Cesar Glorioso, President and Vice-President, respectively, of the firm had no knowledge of the sale of the bags of cement by the Manager Pedro Mendoza (People vs. Montilla CA520G.4327). Art 89; Criminal liability; novation 1988 No. 14: (b) Raul Doria gave in trust two acrylic paintings to Amar Solo to be sold on commission basis for P20,000. Failing to sell them to George Ty, Amar consigned the paintings to Alcanto Gallery. In the same month, Amar retrieved one painting and tried to return in to Raul who refused to receive it without the other painting. The other painting was bought by Mr. Lomot whose check, which Amar gave to Raul, bounced, so that Amar paid Raul his own check of P6,500.00 promising in writing to pay the P3,500-00 balance less his commission. Is Amar liable for estafa? Why? How about Mr. Lomot, what crime, if any did he commit? ANSWER:
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(b) Amar is not liable for estafa but is liable for violation of BP 22, There is only civil liability because as long as no case has been filed in court, an obligation can still be novated. In this case there was novation. Mr. Lomot is liable for violation of BP 22. Art 89; Extinction of civil liability; death of accused after judgment 1981 No. l0 "M" is a Municipal Treasurer convicted for Malversation of Public Funds in the amount of P10,000.00. He was sentenced by the Court of First Instance to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years, and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to eleven (11) years, six months and twenty-one (21) days also of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the Municipality in the amount of P10,000.00. "M" appealed the decision of the Trial Court to the Court of Appeals. Pending the appeal, "M" died of heart attack. Will "M's" death extinguish his civil liability? Why? Answer M's death did not extinguish his civil liability. The obligation to indemnify the government for the amount malversed survived because the death occurred after final judgment as rendered by the Court of First Instance. In the case of People vs. Sendaydiego, et al (L-33252-54, Jan. 20, 1978, 81 SCRA 124), it was held that an accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly disbursed although he has no criminal liability. In the problem given, the death of M extinguished his criminal liability. But the appeal will continue with respect to his civil liability as if no criminal case has been instituted against him, thus making applicable Art. 30 of the Civil Code. In other words, as affirmed in the case of People vs. Tirol, (L-30538, Jan, 31, 1981, 102 SCRA 558) the appeal will continue to determine the criminal liability of the deceased accused as the basis of the civil liability for which his estate may be liable. Art 89; Extinction of criminal and civil liabilities; death of accused pending appeal 1992 No. 1 Librado was convicted of malversation for which he has imposed the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment with the following accessory penalties provided by law - a fine of P6,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; perpetual special disqualification; indemnification to the government in the amount of P6,000.00 and to pay the costs. If he dies pending appeal, what is the legal effect of his death on his criminal and pecuniary liabilities? Suggested Answer: Under Art. 89, RPC, and jurisprudence (People vs. Jose, 71 SCRA 273, People vs. Alison 44 SCRA 523; etc.), death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes his criminal and civil liabilities. Civil liability includes pecuniary liabilities, such as fine. Hence, the same, together with the disqualification and the costs are extinguished. Alternative Answer:
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In Petralba vs. Sandiganboyan, 200 SCRA 644, however, extinction of criminal liability arising from the death of the accused pending appeal likewise extinguishes the pecuniary liability such as fine, but not the civil liability, such as the indemnification of P6,000.00 in the instant case. The same is a claim of the government against the estate but ONLY IF THE OFFENSE CAN BE PROVED in the appellate court. In other words, the latter should still decide the appeal as far as the civil liability of P6,000.00 is concerned. Art 89; Extinction of criminal and civil liabilities; death of offended party 2000 No V a) For defrauding Lorna, Alma was charged before the Municipal Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan. After a protracted trial, Alma was convicted. While the case was pending appeal in the Regional Trial Court of the same province, Lorna who was then suffering from breast cancer, died. Alma manifested to the court that with Lorna's death, her (Alma's) criminal and civil liabilities are now extinguished. Is Alma's contention correct? What if it were Alma who died, would it affect her criminal and civil liabilities? Explain. (3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: a) No. Alma's contention is not correct. The death of the offended party does not extinguish the criminal liability of the offender, because the offense is committed against the State [People vs. Misola, 87 Phil. 830, 833). Hence, it follows that the civil liability of Alma based on the offense committed by her is not extinguished. The estate of Lorna can continue the case. On the other hand, if it were Alma who died pending appeal of her conviction, her criminal liability shall be extinguished and therewith the civil liability under the Revised Penal Code (Art. 89, par. 1, RPC). However, the claim for civil indemnity may be instituted under the Civil Code (Art. 1157) if predicated on a source of obligation other than delict, such as law, contracts, quasicontracts and quasi-delicts (People vs. Bayotas 236 SCRA 239, G.R. 152007, September 2. 1994), Art 89; Extinction of criminal and civil liability; death of accused 1990 No. 5: Rico was convicted of raping Letty, his former sweetheart, by the Regional Trial Court of Manila and he was ordered to serve the penalty of life imprisonment, to indemnify Letty in the amount of P30,000.00 and to support their offspring. Pending appeal in the Supreme Court, Rico died. His widow, Bernie, moved for a dismissal of the case. a) What is the legal effect of Rico's death on his criminal liability? Explain your answer b) How about on his civil liability? State your reasons. Answers; a) The criminal liability of Rico is extinguished on the basis of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that: " How criminal liability is extinguished - Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment,
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b) The civil liability of Rico survives. (People v. Sendaydiego, January 20, 1978. 74 O.G, 4371; People v, Tirol G.R No. L-30588, January 31, 1981; People v. Naboa, et al.,132 SCRA 410). Art 89; Extinction of criminal and civil liability; death of accused 1987 No. XI: PM, a rich businessman, was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment by the Regional Trial Court, and to pay the heirs of the victim the total amount of P250,000.00. While has appeal was pending before the Supreme Court, PM died. The defense counsel manifested that PM's death extinguished not only the criminal liability but also the pecuniary liability because the death occurred before the final judgment, since the case was pending appeal. He invoked Art 89 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "criminal liability is totally extinguished: I. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before the final judgment." As a Solicitor in the Office of the Solicitor General, do you agree with the defense counsel's argument? Answer: As Solicitor General, I will not agree to the argument of the defense counsel that the death of PM while his appeal was pending extinguished not only his criminal liability but also his pecuniary liability Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that the pecuniary liability of the accused is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurred before the final judgment", refers to his liability to pay the fine. (People vs. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120). The civil liability, however, survives the death of the offender because death is not a valid cause of the extinguishment of civil obligation. (Torijos vs. Court of Appeals 67 SCRA 394). Art 89; Extinction of criminal liability; payment 1985 No. 15 Garcia, an importer, succeeded in convincing his bank to release his importation under a trust receipt agreement he signed last January 15, 1985. Upon maturity of the trust receipts on February 5, 1985, Garcia paid the bank in check which was however dishonored. Informed of the said dishonor, Garcia paid only 60% of the amount of his check and refused to pay the balance despite demands. (A) On the basis of the foregoing facts, what may Garcia be prosecuted for? Reasons. (B) What is the effect of the 50% payment made by Garcia on his criminal liability? Discuss. Answer: (B) Partial payment does not extinguish criminal liability because a criminal offense is committed. (Javier vs. People 40 O.G. 67). Art 89; Extinction of criminal liability; total and partial 1988 No. 5: a) How is criminal liability totally extinguished? b) How is criminal liability extinguished partially? Page 152 of 374
Explain briefly. Answer: a) Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the following causes of total extinction of criminal liability: 1. Death of the convict as to personal penalties, as to the pecuniary liabilities, liability therefore is extinguished only when death occurs before final judgment. 2. Service of Sentence 3. Amnesty 4. Absolute pardon 5. Prescription of the crime 6. Prescription of the penalty 7. Marriage of the offended woman as provided in Article 344. b) Article 94 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the following causes of partial extinction of criminal liability: 1. Condition pardon 2. Communication of sentence 3. Good conduct allowances during confinement 4. Parole 5. Probation Art 89; Pardon; effect thereof; reinstatement 1994 No 15: Linda was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of estafa, through falsification of public document. She was sentenced accordingly and ordered to pay, among others, P5,000.00 representing the balance of the amount defrauded. The case reached the Supreme Court which affirmed the judgment of conviction. During the pendency of Linda's motion for reconsideration in the said Court, the President extended to her an absolute pardon which she accepted. By reason of such pardon, she wrote the Department of Finance requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant treasurer, which is still vacant. , The Department ruled that Linda may be reinstated to her former position without the necessity of a new appointment and directed the City Treasurer to see to it that the sum of P5,000.00 be satisfied. Claiming that she should not be made to pay P5,000.00, Linda appealed to the Office of the President. The Office of the President dismissed the appeal and held that acquittal, not absolute pardon. Is the only ground for reinstatement to one's former position and that the absolute pardon does not exempt the culprit from payment of civil liability. Is Linda entitled to reinstatement? Answer;
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No, Linda is not entitled to reinstatement to her former position inasmuch as her right thereto had been relinquished or forfeited by reason of her conviction. The absolute pardon merely extinguished her criminal liability, removed her disqualification, and restored her eligibility for appointment to that office. She has to re-apply for such position and under the usual procedure required for a new appointment. Moreover, the pardon does not extinguish the civil liability arising from the crime. (Monsanto vs.Factoran, Jr., 170 SCRA 191); see Art. 36, RPC) Art 90; Prescription of crime; commencement 2000 No VII One fateful night in January 1990, while 5-year old Albert was urinating at the back of their house, he heard a strange noise coming from the kitchen of their neighbor and playmate, Ara. When he peeped inside, he saw Mina, Ara's stepmother, very angry and strangling the 5-year old Ara to death. Albert saw Mina carry the dead body of Ara, place it Inside the trunk of her car and drive away. The dead body of Ara was never found. Mina spread the news in the neighborhood that Ara went to live with her grandparents in Ormoc City. For fear of his life, Albert did not tell anyone, even his parents and relatives, about what he witnessed. Twenty and a half (20 & 1/2) years after the incident, and right after his graduation in Criminology, Albert reported the crime to NBI authorities. The crime of homicide prescribes in 20 years. Can the state still prosecute Mina for the death of Ara despite the lapse of 20 & 1/2 years? Explain, (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER; Yes, the State can still prosecute Mina for the death of Ara despite the lapse of 20 & 1/2 years. Under Article 91, RPC, the period of prescription commences to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents. In the case at bar, the commission of the crime was known only to Albert, who was not the offended party nor an authority or an agent of an authority. It was discovered by the NBI authorities only when Albert revealed to them the commission of the crime. Hence, the period of prescription of 20 years for homicide commenced to run only from the time Albert revealed the same to the NBI authorities. Art 90; Prescription of crimes 1993 No. 1: B Imitated the signature of A, registered owner of a lot, in special power of attorney naming him (B) as the attorney-in-fact of A. On February 13, 1964, B mortgaged the lot to a bank using the special power of attorney to obtain a loan of P8,500.00. On the same day, both the special power of attorney and the mortgage contract were duly registered in the Registry of Deeds. Because of B's failure to pay, the bank foreclosed the mortgage and the lot was sold to X in whose name a new title was issued. In March, 1974, A discovered that the property was already registered in the name of X because of an ejectment case filed against him by X. 1) If you were the lawyer of A, with what crime or crimes would you charge B? Explain. 2)
If you were the counsel of B, what would be your defense? Discuss.
Answer; 1) The crime committed is estafa thru falsification of public document. Page 154 of 374
2) My defense will be prescription because the crime was committed in 1964 and almost twenty nine years had already elapsed since then. Even if we take Falsification and Estafa individually, they have already prescribed. It is to be noted that when it comes to discovery, the fact that the crime was discovered in 1964 will be of no moment because the offended party is considered to have constructive notice on the forgery after the Deed of Sale where his signature had been falsified was registered in the office of the Register of Deeds (Cabral vs. Puno, 70 SCRA 606). Art 90; Prescription of crimes 1994 No. 13: Paolo was charged with homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Andrew, a prosecution witness, testified that he saw Paolo shoot Abby during their heated argument. While the case is still pending, the City Hall of Manila burned down and the entire records of the case were destroyed. Later, the records were reconstituted. Andrew was again called to the witness stand. This time he testified that his first testimony was false and the truth was he was abroad when the crime took place. The judge immediately ordered the prosecution of Andrew for giving a false testimony favorable to the defendant in a criminal case. 1) Will the case against Andrew prosper? 2) Paolo was acquitted. The decision became final on January 10, 1987. On June 18. 1994 a case of giving false testimony was filed against Andrew. As his lawyer, what legal step will you take? Answer: 1) Yes. ... 2) As lawyer of Andrew, I will file a motion to quash the Information on the ground of prescription. The crime of false testimony under Art. 180 has prescribed because Paolo, the accused in the principal case, was acquitted on January 10, 1987 and therefore the penalty prescribed for such crime is arresto mayor under Art. 180, par. 4, RPC. Crimes punishable by arresto mayor prescribes in five (5) years (Art. 90, par. 3, RPC). But the case against Andrew was filed only on June 18, 1994, whereas the principal criminal case was decided with finality on January 10, 1987 and, thence the prescriptive period of the crime commenced to run. From January 10, 1987 to June 18, 1994 is more than five (5) years. Art 90; Prescription of crimes 1995 No. 2; Joe and Marcy were married in Batanes in 1955. After two years, Joe left Marcy and settled in Mindanao where he later met and married Linda on 12 June 1960. The second marriage was registered in the civil registry of Davao City three days after its celebration. On 10 October 1975 Marcy who remained in Batanes discovered the marriage of Joe to Linda. On 1 March 1976 Marcy filed a complaint for bigamy against Joe. The crime of bigamy prescribed in fifteen years computed from the day the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents. Joe raised the defense of prescription of the crime, more than fifteen years having elapsed from the celebration of the bigamous marriage up to the filing of Marcy's Page 155 of 374
complaint. He contended that the registration of his second marriage in the civil registry of Davao City was constructive notice to the whole world of the celebration thereof thus binding upon Marcy. Has the crime of bigamy charged against Joe already prescribed? Discuss fully, Answer: No. The prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy is computed from the time the crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents. The principle of constructive notice which ordinarily applies to land or property disputes should not be applied to the crime of bigamy, as marriage is not property. Thus when Marcy filed a complaint for bigamy on 7 March 1976, it was well within the reglamentary period as It was barely a few months from the time of discovery on 10 October 1975. (Sermonia vs. CA, 233 SCRA 155)
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Art 90; Prescription of crimes 1997 No. 12: A was charged in an information with the crime of grave oral defamation but after trial, the court found him guilty only of the offense of simple slander. He filed a motion for reconsideration contending that, under the law, the crime of simple slander would have prescribed in two months from commission, and since the information against him was filed more than four months after the alleged commission of the crime, the same had already prescribed. The Solicitor General opposed the motion on two grounds: first, in determining the prescriptive period, the nature of the offense charged in the Information should be considered, not the crime proved; second, assuming that the offense had already prescribed, the defense was waived by the failure of A to raise it in a motion to quash. Resolve the motion for reconsideration. Answer; The motion for reconsideration should be granted.a) The accused cannot be convicted of the offense of simple slander although it is necessarily included in the offense of grave slander charged in the information, because, the lesser offense had already prescribed at the time the information was filed (People us. Rarang, (CA) 62 O.G. 6468; Francisco vs. CA, 122 SCRA 538; Magat vs. People. 201 SCRA 21) otherwise prosecutors can easily circumvent the rule of prescription in light offenses by the simple expediment of filing a graver offense which includes such light offense. b) While the general rule is the failure of an accused to file a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, the exceptions to this are: (1) no offense was charged in the complaint or information; (2) lack of Jurisdiction; (3) extinction of the offense or penalty; and (4) double jeopardy. Since the ground invoked by the accused in his motion for reconsideration is extinction of the offense, then it can be raised even after plea. In fact, it may even be invoked on appeal (People us. Balagtas) Art 90; Prescription of crimes 2001 No XVI On June 1,1988, a complaint for concubinage committed in February 1987 was filed against Roberto in the Municipal Trial Court of Tanza, Cavlte for purposes of preliminary investigation. For various reasons, it was only on July 3, 1998 when the Judge of said court decided the case by dismissing it for lack of jurisdiction since the crime was committed in Manila. The case was subsequently filed with the City Fiscal of Manila but it was dismissed on the ground that the crime had already prescribed. The law provides that the crime of concubinage prescribes in ten (10) years. Was the dismissal by the fiscal correct? Explain, (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER; No, the Fiscal's dismissal of the case on alleged prescription is not correct. The filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court, although only for preliminary investigation, interrupted and suspended the period of prescription in as much as the jurisdiction of a court in a criminal case is determined by the Page 157 of 374
allegations in the complaint or information, not by the result of proof. (People vs. Galano. 75 SCRA 193)
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Art 90; Prescription of crimes; interruption of prescriptive period 1977 No. IV-b On June 1, 1960, a complaint for falsification of private document committed on March 1, 1960, was filed against V with the Municipal Court of Polo, Bulacan for preliminary investigation. For one reason or another it was only on July 2, 1972, that the Municipal Court decided the case by dismissing it for lack of jurisdiction as the crime was committed in Quezon City. So the case was filed with the City Fiscal of Quezon City but the case was dismissed for the reason that it had already prescribed. Actually, falsification of private document prescribes in ten years. Do you agree with the action taken by the City Fiscal? Reason fully, Answer I do not agree with the action taken by the City Fiscal of Quezon City because the crime has not yet prescribed. The complaint for falsification of a private document committed on March 1, 1960 filed in the Municipal Court of Polo, Bulacan on June 1, 1960 interrupted the running of the period of prescription of the crime. The doctrine is that the filing of a complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it is merely for the purpose of preliminary investigation, where the offense charged is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court interrupts the period of prescription. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the interruption of prescription by the filing of the complaint or information and does not distinguish whether the complaint is filed in court for preliminary examination or investigation or for action on the merits. The delay in the decision of the case by the Municipal Court which was promulgated on July 2, 1972 only was beyond the control of the offended party and in accordance with a case recently decided by the Supreme Court should not deprive the offended party of his right to obtain vindication. (People v. Galano, L-42925, January 31, 1977, citing People v. Olarte, 75 SCRA 193). Art 90; Prescription of crimes; slander 1987 No. III: Maria called Lydia names and slapped her at the dance floor in the presence of many people because she suspected that Lydia was flirting with her boyfriend. The following day, Lydia filed with the Fiscal's Office a complaint for slander by deed against Maria. After preliminary investigation, the Fiscal forgot all about the case until the 179th day, which was a Saturday, from the commission of the crime. Since the following day was a Sunday, the fiscal filed the information in court on Monday, the 181st day from the commission of the crime. After trial, the Judge convicted Maria. She engaged another lawyer who on appeal asserted that the crime of slander by deed had prescribed because it was filed in court one day after the six-month period of prescription under Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code. The Fiscal argued that since the 180th day fell on a Sunday, he could file the information the following Monday. He also said that, in any event, Maria waived the defense of prescription because she did not raise it during the trial of case. Decide the case. Answer: The crime of slander by deed has already prescribed as it was tiled one day after the six month period of prescription. The rule is if the last day of the period of prescription of a crime falls on a Sunday, as in the problem, the information cannot be filed on the next working day, which is Monday as that will Page 159 of 374
lengthen the period of prescription, which will not be favorable to the accused. (Yapdiangco vs. Bartolome 122 SCRA 713). The contention of the Fiscal that Maria waived the defense of prescription because she did not raise it during the trial of the case is untenable. It has already been settled that prescription, although not raised in the trial may be invoked on appeal. (People vs. Balagtas 105 Phil-1362; People vs. Castro 95 Phil 462). Art 90; Prescription of crimes; when to file if last day falls on a Sunday or holiday 1983 No. 15 When the last day of the prescriptive period for the filing of a criminal information falls on a Sunday or any other holiday, may it be filed in court on the next working day? Why? Answer The information cannot be filed on the next working day following the last day of the prescriptive period for the filing of a criminal information which falls on a Sunday or on a holiday. Statutes of limitations in criminal cases are granted by the State as an amnesty and are liberally construed in favor of the accused. The provisions of the Revised Administrative Code or of the Rules of Court cannot apply as it will lengthen the period of prescription of the crime. (Yapdiangco vs. Buencamino L28841, June 24, 1983) Art 94; Extinction of criminal liability; pardon of offended party 1976 No. II-b X seduced Y, a minor. He was prosecuted for seduction. After pleading for forgiveness, Y without even consulting her parents, pardoned X. Did the pardon extinguish the criminal action against X? Reason. What about his civil liability? Reason. Answer The pardon of X by Y who is a minor did not extinguish the criminal liability of X, To extinguish the criminal liability of the offender in the crime of seduction and similar private crimes, the pardon of the offended party who is a minor must have the concurrence of her parents. The reason is seduction strikes at the family's honor and inflicts injury not only to the offended party but also to her parents {People v. Lacson, Jr., CA 56 O.G. 9460). Since she is a minor, she is still under patria protestas. The civil liability is also not extinguished, for the same reason, since there is no express waiver (Art. 23, RPC). Besides, in the crime of seduction, not only the offended party but also her parents are entitled to moral damages. (Art. 2219, Civil Code, People v. Fontanilia, G.R. No, L-25354, June 28, 1968), The right to support cannot also be renounced. (Art. 321, Civil Code). Art 94; Extinction of criminal liability; pardon, when available 1990 No. 8: Rina, who was a suspended Clerk of Court, was convicted of malversation and was sentenced to imprisonment, to pay a fine of P5,000.00 and to indemnify the government in the same amount. Pending appeal in the Court of Appeals, she was extended an absolute pardon by the President. Thus, she applied for reinstatement, payment of backwages, and absolution from payment of the fine and indemnify. Decide the issue with reasons. Page 160 of 374
Answer: Rina cannot apply for reinstatement, etc. as there was no effective pardon by the President. It is basic that pardon can only be granted after final conviction (Barrioquinto v, Fernandez, 85 Phil. 642).
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Civil Liability Art 100; Civil liability; effect of acquittal 2000 No V b) Name at least two exceptions to the general rule that in case of acquittal of the accused in a criminal case, his civil liability is likewise extinguished. (2%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: b) Exceptions to the rule that acquittal from a criminal case extinguishes civil liability, are: 1. When the civil action is baaed on obligations not arising from the act complained of as a felony; 2. When acquittal is based on reasonable doubt or acquittal is on the ground that guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt (Art. 29, New Civil Code); 3. Acquittal due to an exempting circumstance, like Insanity; 4. Where the court states in its Judgment that the case merely involves a civil obligation; 5. action;
Where there was a proper reservation for the filing of a separate civil
6. In cases of independent civil actions provided for in Arts. 31, 32, 33 and 34 of the New Civil Code; 7. When the judgment of acquittal includes a declaration that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist (Sapiera vs. CA, 314 SCRA 370); 8. Where the civil liability is not derived or based on the criminal act of which the accused is acquitted (Sapiera vs. CA. 314 SCRA 370). Art 101; Civil liability; PD 603; persons liable for acts committed by minor or insane 1975 No. XVIII Who are civilly liable for the act of the insane or minor exempt from criminal liability? Answer Under par, 1 of Art. 101, those civilly liable for the act of the insane or minor exempt from criminal liability are those who have such person under their legal authority, guardianship or control except if there was no fault or negligence on their part. Under Presidential Decree No. 603, the civil liability of a youthful offender shall devolve upon his father, and in case of his death or incapacity, upon his mother, or in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian. (Art. 201). If they are insolvent, the insane or minor shall respond with his property which are not exempt from execution. Art 102; Subsidiary liability; hotel owner 1977 No V-a T lodged in the Maharlika Hotel without notifying the management of the hotel of the goods he brought along with him. Neither did he follow the directions Page 162 of 374
of the hotel with respect to the care and vigilance over said goods. One evening, the bellboy of the hotel poked a gun on T and divested him of his goods. Assuming that the said bellboy absconded, may the owner of the hotel be made subsidiarily liable for the restitution of said goods, or to pay the value thereof? Reason fully. Answer The owner of the hotel is subsidiarily civilly liable for the restitution of the goods or to pay the value thereof. The nature of the business of the hotel is to provide not only lodging for the guests but also security to their persons and effects. The necessity for this security is apparent from the provisions of Articles 1998-2003 of the new Civil Code and Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code. The security mentioned is not confined to effects delivered to the hotel management for safekeeping but also to all effects brought in the hotel. The reason is that the hotel management has supervision and control over their inns and the premises thereof. (De los Santos v. Tam Kheng, CA 58 O.G. 7693). Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code expressly provides for subsidiary civil liability of the innkeeper for any robbery through violence or intimidation committed by the innkeeper's employees as in the problem which is committed by the bellboy of the hotel. Art 102; Subsidiary liability; innkeepers, owners of establishments 1986 No. 8: Aristarchus, a resident of Iloilo, checked in at the Manila Hotel while attending to some business in Manila. Heeding the notice posted in his room requesting the tenants to deposit their valuables in one of the hotel's deposit boxes near the reception counter in the lobby, Aristarchus deposited P10,000.00 cash in one of the hotel's deposit boxes. As he was about to go up to his room, armed men entered the lobby, told everybody to lie flat on the floor, and divested the guests of their money and valuables. They also forcibly opened the safety deposit boxes, scooped out their contents and fled. Aristarchus sued the hotel claiming that the hotel is subsidiarily liable for the P10,000.00 deposited in the safety deposit box and for P5,000.00 taken from his wallet while he was lying face down on the floor. Is the hotel subsidiarily liable? Explain. Answer: Manila Hotel is not subsidiarily civilly liable. Although Aristarchus has complied with the notice of the hotel regarding the depositing of his money in one of the hotel's deposit boxes, the hotel is not liable as such were lost because of robbery committed with violence or intimidation against persons. (Art 102 par. 2, RPC) Art 103; Subsidiary civil liability; employers 1998 No XI. Guy, while driving a passenger jeepney owned and operated by Max, bumped Demy, a pedestrian crossing the street. Demy sustained injuries which required medical attendance for three months. Guy was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to physical injuries. Convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court. Guy was sentenced to suffer a straight penalty of three months of arresto mayor and ordered to indemnify Demy in the sum of P5,000 and to pay P1,000 as attorney's fees.
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Upon finality of the decision, a writ of execution was served upon Guy, but was returned unsatisfied due to his insolvency. Demy moved for a subsidiary writ of execution against Max. The latter opposed the motion on-the ground that the decision made no mention of his subsidiary liability and that he was not impleaded in the case. How will you resolve the motion? [5%] Answer: The motion is to be granted. Max as an employer of Guy and engaged in an industry (transportation business) where said employee is utilized, is subsidiarily civilly liable under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. Even though the decision made no mention of his subsidiary liability, the law violated (Revised Penal Code) itself mandates for such liability and Max is deemed to know it because ignorance of the law is never excused. And since his liability is not primary but only subsidiary in case his employee cannot pay. he need not be impleaded in the in the criminal case. It suffices that he was duly notified of the motion for issuance of a subsidiary writ of execution and thus given the opportunity to be heard. Art 103; Subsidiary liability; employer 1988 No. 6: Juan Cruz, driver of a cargo truck owned and operated by VICMICO a sugar central, while driving recklessly caused Jorge Abad to fall from the truck resulting in injuries which caused his death. Juan Cruz was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence and was ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Abad P12,000. The respondent judge issued an order granting a motion for execution of the civil service liability of the accused Juan Cruz, but the return of the Sheriff showed that the accused was insolvent. Petitioners, heirs of the deceased Abad, now filed a motion for execution of the employers subsidiary liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent judge denied the motion, stating that the employer VICMICO, not having been notified that his driver was facing a criminal charge, a separate action had to be filed. Hence, a petition for mandamus was filed. Decide the case. Answer: Mandamus will lie. There is no need for a separate civil action because the driver was convicted (Martinez vs. Barredo). All you need is a motion for execution with a notice to the employer that states compliance with the requisites imposed by Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code (that there is employeremployee relationship, that the employer is engaged in an industry and that the driver is insolvent). Art 104; Civil liability; components 1978 No. II-c Discuss the components of civil liability arising from crimes. Do these components exist in all crimes? Explain. Answer The components of civil liability are restitution, reparation for damages caused and indemnification for consequential damages. These components do not exist in all crimes. For example, if the crime is not against property, like less serious physical injuries, there is no restitution nor reparation for damages
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caused. In the crime of occupation of real property, which is a crime against property, these three forms of civil liability may exist, that is, there must be restoration of the property occupied, reparation for any damages caused, and indemnification for any damages suffered by the commission of the crime. Art 104; Civil liability; restitution 1975 No. VIII A stole the car of B and later sold it to C, who purchased the car in good faith, for valuable consideration, and without any knowledge that it was stolen. A was subsequently convicted for the theft of the car and the judgment became final and executory. B thereafter filed a petition in the criminal case that an order be issued directing C to return the car to him (B) but C opposed the petition alleging that he bought the car in good faith and that the proper relief is for B to file a separate civil action before the proper court where the ownership of the car may be litigated. The court granted B's petition and ordered C to return the car to B. Is the court order correct? Why? Answer a) The order of the court is correct. The civil liability of the accused in the crime of theft, which is against property, includes restitution of the thing stolen, even if it be found in the possession of another who acquired it in good faith, (Art. 106, Revised Penal Code). The order of restitution may be made in the same criminal case upon petition of the complainant. There is no need for a separate civil action. (Reyes v. Ruiz, 27 Phil. 478). Art 112; Civil liability; effect of acquittal 1984 No. 6 Does acquittal in a criminal case carry with it exemption from civil liability? Explain. Answer; A.
Furnished by Office of Justice Palma
Except in those instances where the law provides for the prosecution of the criminal action independently of the civil action, about the only known case where the accused may be exempted from civil liability is the case of his acquittal from the criminal responsibility and its judgment in court accordingly makes a pronouncement that the basis for civil liability does not exist. B.
Comments and Suggested Answer
Acquittal in a criminal case carries with its exemption from civil liability when there is a declaration in A final judgment that the fact from which the civil action might arise does not exist (Sec. 3 C Rule 111, Rules of Ct.) (Tan vs. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., et a1 91 Phil. 672) In the following cases, acquittal in the criminal action does not carry with it exemption from civil liability: 1) When the acquittal is on the ground that the guilt of the accused has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt (Art 29, Civil Code); 2) When the acquittal is due to an exempting circumstance except accident and lawful or insuperable cause (Art 12, Rev, Penal Code); 3) in cases of quasi-delict (Art 2177 Civil Code) 4) when the finding of the court in acquitting the accused is that there is only civil responsibility and not criminal responsibility (De Guzman et al vs. Alva et al 51 O.G. 1311) 5) in case of independent civil action under articles 31, 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code)
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Art 112; Civil liability; effect of acquittal 1988 No. 5: c) If an accused is acquitted, does it necessarily follows that no civil liability arising from the acts complained of may be awarded in the same judgment? Explain briefly. Answer: c) If an accused is acquitted, it does not necessarily follow that no civil liability arising from the acts complained of may be awarded in the same judgment except: If there is an express waiver of the liability; and if there is a reservation of file a separate civil action (Rule 107; Padilla vs. CA People vs. Jalandoni), Art 112; Civil liability; effect of acquittal 1975 No. V As a rule, if the offender in a criminal case is acquitted, his civil liability is also extinguished. What are the exceptions? Answer a) If the guilt of the accused has not been established beyond reasonable doubt (Art. 29, Civil Code). b) If the acquittal is due to non-imputability or an exempting circumstance. c) In independent civil actions for torts under Articles 31, 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code. d) In case the civil action is based on a quasi-delict under Article 2177 of the Code. e) In case the judgment in the criminal action does not declare that the fact upon which the civil action might arise does not exist (Rule III, Sec. 3. par. c). Art 112; Civil liability; effect of acquittal 2000 No IX A was a 17-year old working student who was earning his keep as a cigarette vendor. B was driving a car along busy Espana Street at about 7:00 p.m. Beside B was C. The car stopped at an intersection because of the red signal of the traffic light. While waiting for the green signal, C beckoned A to buy some cigarettes. A approached the car and handed two sticks of cigarettes to C. While the transaction was taking place, the traffic light changed to green and the car immediately sped off. As the car continued to speed towards Quiapo, A clung to the window of the car but lost his grip and fell down on the pavement. The car did not stop. A suffered serious injuries which eventually caused his death. C was charged with ROBBERY with HOMICIDE. In the end, the Court was not convinced with moral certainty that the guilt of C has been established beyond reasonable doubt and, thus, acquitted him on the ground of reasonable doubt. Can the family of the victim still recover civil damages in view of the acquittal of C? Explain. (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: Page 166 of 374
Yes, as against C, A's family can still recover civil damages despite C's acquittal. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence {Art. 29, CC). If A's family can prove the negligence of B by preponderance of evidence, the civil action for damages against B will prosper based on quasi-delict. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, about pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict [Art. 2176, CC). This is entirely separate and distinct from civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code [Arts, 31, 2176, 2177, CC}.
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Crimes Against National Security and the Law of Nations Art 122; Piracy 1977 No. V-b While V was soundly asleep in his fishing boat then moored in the Pasig River near Jones Bridge, Manila, W beat V to unconsciousness and thereafter took his cash and valuables. What crime did W commit? Give your reasons. Answer Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes piracy in Philippine waters and refers to any vessel or watercraft which includes boats used for fishing. Under the decree, piracy is committed not only by attacking or seizing any vessel but includes the taking away of the personal belonging of a passenger irrespective of the value thereof by any person. Since W beat V to unconsciousness while he was sound asleep in his fishing boat then moored in the Pasig River near the Jones Bridge and. then took his cash and valuables, the crime committed by W is piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532. Art 123; Qualified piracy 1986 No. 10: The interisland vessel, M/V Sweet Aspirations, while travelling from Davao City to Jolo, was blown by a powerful typhoon towards the coast of Sabah. While anchored within two, miles off the coast of Sabah, it was accosted by four armed men - Abdul, Ahmed, Aurelio and Archimedes - who arrived on board a motorized kumpit. The armed men fired Armalites at the interisland vessel, boarded it, and divested the passengers of their money and jewelry. A passenger by the name of Barnabas took advantage of the confusion to settle an old grudge with an enemy, entered the cabin of that enemy and killed him. Abdul, Ahmed, Aurelio, Archimedes, and Barnabas were eventually apprehended by men of the Philippine Constabulary. All five of them were prosecuted for qualified piracy before the Regional Court of Tawi-Tawi. (a) Were Abdul, Ahmed, Aurelio, and Archimedes correctly charged before a Philippine court with qualified piracy? Explain your answer. (b) Was Barnabas correctly" charged before a Philippine court with qualified piracy? If yes, explain. If not, enlighten the Fiscal and the Judge on the matter. Answer: (a) Abdul, Ahmed, Aurelio and Archimedes are correctly charged with qualified piracy. Being committed within two miles off the coast of Sabah, it is deemed commuted in the high seas which is any body of water beyond the territorial waters of the Philippines even though such may be within the waters of a foreign country. Under the Revised Penal Code, one of the qualifying circumstances of Qualified Piracy is seizing a vessel by firing and boarding a vessel while in the high seas. (Art. 125, par. 1) Alternative Answer: Since the facts of the problem only state that the accused fired at the interisland vessel, boarded it and divested the passengers of their money and jewelry, such do not indicate seizure of the vessel. So simple piracy is the crime committed, which however is also triable before the Philippine Court since it was committed in the high seas. Page 168 of 374
(b) Because Barnabas is merely a passenger of the vessel .attacked by the pirates, he cannot be liable for piracy. Besides, piracy in the high seas is committed only by a stranger to the vessel. The crime committed by Barnabas is murder, which is triable before the Philippine Court, since it was committed on board a Philippine vessel.
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Crimes Against the Fundamental Law of the State Art 124; Arbitrary detention 1975 No, XIX How is arbitrary detention committed? What are the legal grounds for detention? Answer Arbitrary detention is committed by a public officer who deprives another of his liberty without legal grounds. The legal grounds for detention are: 1) commission of a crime; 2) violent insanity; 3) any illness requiring compulsory confinement, (Art. 124, Revised Penal Code). Art 124; Arbitrary detention 1980 No. XI Patrolman Cruz, acting under orders of the Municipal Mayor, who wanted to put a stop to the frequent occurrence of robbery in sitio Masukal, patrolled the place. At about midnight, seeing three persons acting suspiciously in front of an uninhabited house and entering the same, he arrested them without warrant and took them to the municipal building where they were detained in jail for about five hours before they were released. Patrolman Cruz was accused of arbitrary detention. If you were the Judge, would you convict him of the crime charged ? Answer Patrolman Cruz cannot be accused of arbitrary detention. Since the three persons acted suspiciously in front of an uninhabited house at midnight, and entered the same, the policeman was justified to arrest them even without a warrant, considering the circumstances of the case, mainly, since he was patrolling the place upon orders of the Mayor to put a stop to frequent occurrences of robberies therein. The three persons were arrested in a suspicious place at midnight and under suspicious circumstances that they were about to commit a crime or breach of peace. Good people do not ordinarily lurk in uninhabited places at midnight. (U.S. vs. Santos, 36 Phil. 853) Art 124; Arbitrary Detention 1992 No. 12: Major Menor, while patrolling Bago-Bago community in a police car with SPO3 Caloy Itliong, blew his whistle to stop a Nissan Sentra car which wrongly entered a one-way street. After demanding from Linda Lo Hua, the driver, her driver's license, Menor asked her to follow them to the police precinct. Upon arriving there, he gave instructions to Itliong to guard Lo Hua in one of the rooms and not to let her out of sight until he returns; then got the car key from Lo Hua. In the meantime, the latter was not allowed to make any phone calls but was given food and access to a bathroom. When Menor showed up after two days, he brought Lo Hua to a private house and told her that he would only release her and return the car if she made arrangements for the delivery of P500,000 in a doctor's bag at a certain place within the next twenty-four hours. When Menor went to the designated spot to pick up the bag of money, he suddenly found himself surrounded by several armed civilians who introduced themselves as NBI agents.
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a) What criminal offense has Menor committed? Explain. Suggested Answer: a) Menor is liable under Art. 124, RPC (Arbitrary Detention) he being a public officer who detained a person without legal grounds. Violation of a traffic ordinance by entering a one-way street is not a valid reason to arrest and detain the driver. Such only merits the issuance of a traffic violation ticket. Hence, when Lo Hua was ordered to follow the police officers to the precinct (confiscating her license to compel her to do so), and confining her in a room for two days and prohibiting her to make phone calls, is a clear case of deprivation of personal liberty. Giving her food and access to the bathroom will not extinguish or mitigate the criminal liability. Menor is further liable for robbery, because money or personal property was taken, with intent to gain, and with intimidation. The peculiar situation of Lo Hua practically forced her to submit to the monetary demands of the major. b) May Itliong be held likewise criminally liable? Suggested Answer; b) Itliong is equally liable with Menor the felony of arbitrary detention, either by conspiracy or indispensable cooperation. He cannot successfully put up the defense of obedience to a superior order, as the same was done for a lawful purpose. Art 125; Delay in the delivery of detained persons 1990 No. 11; Amy was apprehended and arrested by Patrolman Bart for illegal parking. She was detained at the police precinct, underwent investigation, and released only after 48 hours a)
Patrolman Bart liable for any offense? Explain your answer.
b) Suppose Amy resisted the arrest and grappled with patrolman Bart, is she criminally liable thereby? State your reasons. Answer: a) Patrolman Bart is liable for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code - Delay on the Delivery of Detained Persons to the Proper Judicial Authorities. b) She is criminally liable for slight disobedience under Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code - Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person. Art 128; Violation of domicile vs trespass to dwelling 1989 No. 10: Alberto, Bernado and Carlos were looking for a person named Virgilio whom Carlos suspected of stealing his fighting cock. Alberto and Bernardo were policemen, while Carlos was a caretaker of fighting cocks. Carlos requested Alberto and Bernardo, then in uniform, to accompany him to Virgilio's house to look for the fighting cock. Alberto, Bernardo and Carlos went to Virgilio's house. When the policemen knocked on the door, Virgilio's wife, Maria, opened it. The policemen told Maria that they came to inquire about a lost fighting cock. Before Maria could utter a word, the trio barged inside, the house. Once inside, the policemen told Maria that Carlos was suspecting her husband, Virgilio, to have Page 171 of 374
stolen his fighting cock, Maria protested and immediately required the three to leave. The policemen refused. Instead, they started searching the house for the fighting cock over the objections of Maria who said that she would file a complaint against them after her husband comes from work. As they did not see any fighting cock, the three left. What crimes, if any, did Alberto, Bernardo and Carlos commit? Answer: Alberto and Bernardo, being policemen, committed the crime of VIOLATION OF DOMICILE (Art. 128, RPC). There are three ways by which a public officer or employee may commit this crime, namely; 1. By entering any dwelling against the will of the owner, The door having been opened by Maria, although Alberto, Bernardo and Carlos barged inside the house before Maria could utter a word, they did not enter against Maria's will, there being no opposition or prohibition against entrance whether express or implied. Without the consent is not against the will (People vs. Sane, CA 40 OG Supp 5, 113), 2. By searching papers or other effects found therein without the previous consent of such owner. Maria, had objected to the search for the fighting cock inside her dwelling, but despite said objection, the policemen searched the house. This makes them criminally liable for the second way of committing the crime of VIOLATING OF DOMICILE. 3. By refusing to leave the premises, after having surreptitiously entered said dwelling and after having been required to leave the same. Although the policemen were ordered to leave the house, they did not enter it surreptitiously, meaning clandestinely or secretly. Insofar as Carlos is concerned, not being a public officer or employee, he cannot commit the crime of VIOLATION OF DOMICILE. He is not guilty of trespass to dwelling, either because he did not enter the dwelling AGAINST THE WILL of the owner, which is the essential element of Trespass. Art 128; Violation of domicile vs trespass to dwelling 2002 No VI. A What is the difference between violation of domicile and trespass to dwelling? (2%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: The differences between violation of domicile and trespass to dwelling are; a. The offender in violation of domicile is a public officer acting under color of authority; in trespass to dwelling, the offender is a private person or public officer acting in a private capacity. b. Violation of domicile is committed in 3 different ways: (1) by entering the dwelling of another against the will of the latter; (2) searching papers and other effects Inside the dwelling without the previous consent of the owner; or (3) refusing to leave the premises which he entered surreptitiously, after being required to leave the premises. Trespass to dwelling is committed only in one way; that is, by entering the dwelling of another against the express or implied will of the latter. Art 129; Unjust procurement of search warrant
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1975 No. XII Under Article 129 of the Revised Penal Code, any public officer who shall procure a search warrant without "just cause" shall be punished by fine and imprisonment. What do you understand by "just cause"? Answer "Just cause" means such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his action, and the means taken in presenting it, is legally just and proper, (U.S. v. Vallison, 28 Phil. 580).
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Crimes Against Public Order Art 134; Rebellion 1988 No. 9: a) An armed group, avowed to overthrow the duly constituted authorities, captured five officers' and five members of the armed forces and held them in their mountain lair for seventy-five days and then voluntarily released them in consideration of the promise of medical treatment to be given to some of their comrades who were under detention by the authorities. What crime or crimes had been committed? Reasons. Answer: (a.l) Rebellion was committed because their purpose was to overthrow the government and all other acts committed in the further of this purpose are absorbed by rebellion. (a.2) The armed group committed the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention in violation of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "kidnapping and serious illegal detention.— Any private individual who shall kidnap another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. ..". Art 134; Rebellion 1991 No. 2: a) May a ranking leader of the NPA who has taken up arms against the government be simultaneously prosecuted for violation of Section 1 of RA. 1700 (the Anti-Subversion Act) and for rebellion under Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended? Answer; Yes, because the two offenses are punished Besides, the elements of the two offenses differ.
under separate laws.
Art 134; Rebellion 1998 No III On May 5, 1992, at about 6:00 a.m., while Governor Alegre of Laguna was on board his car traveling along the National Highway of Laguna, Joselito and Vicente shot him on the head resulting in his instant death. At that time. Joselito and Vicente were members of the liquidation squad of the New People's Army and they killed the governor upon orders of their senior officer. Commander Tiago. According to Joselito and Vicente, they were ordered to kill Governor Alegre because of his corrupt practices. If you were the prosecutor, what crime will you charge Joselito and Vicente? [5%J Answer: If I were the prosecutor, I would charge Joselito and Vicente with the crime of rebellion, considering that the killers were members of the liquidation squad of the New People's Army and the killing was upon orders of their commander; hence, politically-motivated. This was the ruling in People us. Avila, 207 SCRA 1568. involving identical facts which is a movement taken judicial notice of as engaged In rebellion against the Government.
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Alternative Answer: If I were the prosecutor, I would charge Joselito and Vicente for the crime of murder as the purpose of the killing was because of his "corrupt practices ", which does not appear to be politically motivated. There is no indication as to how the killing would promote or further the objective of the New Peoples Army. The killing is murder because it was committed with treachery. Alternative Answer: The crime should be rebellion with murder considering that Art. 135 of the Revised Penal Code has already been amended by Rep. Act No. 6968, deleting from said Article, common crimes which used to be punished as part and parcel of the crime of rebellion. The ruling in People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1994), that rebellion may not be completed with common crimes committed in furtherance thereof, was because the common crimes were then penalized in Art. 135 together with the rebellion, with one penalty and Art. 48 of the Rev. Penal Code cannot be applied. Art. 135 of said Code remained exactly the same when the case of Enrile vs, Salazar, 186 SCRA 217 (1990) was resolved. Precisely for the reason that Art. 48 cannot apply because the common crimes were punished as part of rebellion in Art. 135, that this Article was amended, deleting the common crimes therefrom. That the common crimes were deleted from said Article, demonstrates a clear legislative intention to treat the common crimes as distinct from rebellion and remove the legal impediment to the application of Art. 48. It is noteworthy that in Enrile vs. Salazar (supra) the Supreme Court said these: "There is an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbed thereby, so that if cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this matter, which is purely with in its province," And significantly the said amendment to Art. 135 of the Rev. Penal Code was made at around the time the ruling in Salazar was handled down, obviously to neutralize the Hernandez and the Salazar rulings. The amendment was sort of a rider to the coup d'etat law, Rep. Act No 6968. Art 134; Rebellion & Coup d’etat 1991 No. 1; In the early morning of 25 October 1990, the troops of the Logistics Command (LOGCOM) of the AFP at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo headed by their Operations Officer, Col. Rito Amparo, withdrew firearms and bullets and, per prior agreement, attacked, in separate teams, the offices of the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of National Defense, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and other offices, held hostage the Chief of Staff of LOGCOM and other officers, killed three (3) pro-Government soldiers, inverted the Philippine flag, barricaded all entrances and exits to the camp, and announced complete control of the camp. Because of the superiority of the proGovernment forces, Col. Amparo and his troops surrendered at 7:00 o'clock in the morning of that day. Page 175 of 374
a) Did Col. Amparo and his troops commit the crime of coup d'etat (Article 134-A, Revised Penal Code or of rebellion? Answer: a) Under the facts stated, the crime committed would be coup d'etat (Republic Act No. 6988 incorporating Art. 134-A). However, since the law was' not yet effective as of October 25, 1990, as the effectivity thereof [Section 8) is upon its approval (which is October 24, 1990) and publication in at least two [2] newspapers of general circulation, the felony committed would be rebellion. Comment: If the answer given is coup d'etat, substantial credit should be given as the tenor of the question seems to indicate that coup d'etat as a felony was already existing. b) Distinguish rebellion from coup d'etat Answers: Answer: b) Rebellion distinguished from coup d'etat: 1. AS TO OVERT ACTS: In rebellion, there is public uprising and taking up arms against the Government. In coup d'etat, public uprising is not necessary. The essence of the crime is a swift attack, accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, directed against duly constituted authorities of the Government, or any military camp or installation, communication networks, public utilities or facilities needed for the exercise and continued possession of government power; 2. OBJECTIVE OR PURPOSE: In rebellion, the purpose is to remove from the allegiance of the Philippines, the whole or any part or the Philippines or any military or naval camps, deprive the Chief Executive or Congress from performing their functions. In coup d'etat the objective is to seize or diminish state powers. 3. PARTICIPATION In rebellion, any person. In coup d'etat, any person belonging to the military or police or holding public office, with or without civilian participation. Art 134; Rebellion; absorption of other crimes 1990 No. 15; a) Ka Jacinto, who is an NPA commander, was apprehended with unlicensed firearms and explosives. He was accordingly charged with illegal possession of said firearms and explosives. He now questions the filing of the charges on the ground that they are deemed absorbed in a separate charge of rebellion filed against him. Decide the issue. b) Suppose Ka Jacinto, using one of the unlicensed firearms, shot and killed his neighbor in an altercation. May the charge of murder and Illegal possession of firearms be deemed absorbed in the separate charge of rebellion filed against him? Resolve the matter with reasons. Answer:
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a) The charge of illegal possession of firearms and explosives is deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion, such possession being a necessary means for the perpetration of the latter crime. (Elias v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659). b) The charges here could not be absorbed in the separate charge of rebellion as it is clear that the act of murder, coupled with the possession of an unlicensed firearm, was not in furtherance of the rebellion. Art 134; Rebellion; theory of absorption 1982 No. 19 Explain the theory of "absorption" in rebellion* Answer "Absorption" in rebellion is enunciated in the leading cases of People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 and People perpetrated in furtherance of rebellion, a political offense, perpetrated in furtherance of rebellion, a political offense, assumes the political complexion of rebellion of which it is merely ingredient and consequently cannot be punished separately from rebellion, or complexed with the same to justify the imposition of a graver penalty. In law such an offense is part and parcel of the rebellion itself and cannot be considered as giving rise to separate crime. However, this doctrine is modified now by Article 142-A, incorporated in the Revised Penal Code by Presidential Decree No. 942, which provides that if by reason of or on the occasion of a rebellion, an offense more serious than rebellion is committed, the offender is to be punished for the more serious offense, and the penalty is to be imposed in its maximum period. Murder is unquestionably more serious than rebellion as it is punishable by death. So, if during a rebellion, murder is committed to further the ends of rebellion, the murder cannot be absorbed in rebellion. The penalty for murder in this case will be imposed in its maximum period as provided in Art. 142-A. (PD 942 was repealed by EO 187) Art 134-A; Coup d’etat 1998 No V. 1.
How is the crime of coup d'etat committed? [3%]
2. Supposing a public school teacher participated in a coup d'etat using an unlicensed firearm. What crime or crimes did he commit? [2%] Answer: 1. The crime of coup d'etat is committed by a swift attack, accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth against the duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines, military camps and installations, communication networks, public utilities and facilities needed for the exercise and continued possession of power, carried out singly or simultaneously anywhere in the Philippines by persons belonging to the military or police or holding public office, with or without civilian support or participation, for the purpose of seizing or diminishing state power. (Art 134-A, RPC). 2. The public school teacher committed only coup d'etat for his participation therein. His use of an unlicensed firearm is absorbed in the coup d'etat under the new firearms law (Rep. Act No. 8294). Art 134-A; Coup d’etat
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2002 No XIX. A. If a group of persons belonging to the armed forces makes a swift attack, accompanied by violence, intimidation and threat against a vital military installation for the purpose of seizing power and taking over such installation, what crime or crimes are they guilty of? (3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: The perpetrators, being persons belonging to the Armed Forces, would be guilty of the crime of coup d'etat, under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, because their attack was against vital military installations which are essential to the continued possession and exercise of governmental powers, and their purpose is to seize power by taking over such installations. B. If the attack is quelled but the leader is unknown, who shall be deemed the leader thereof? (2%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: The leader being unknown, any person who in fact directed the others, spoke for them, signed receipts and other documents issued in their name, or performed similar acts, on behalf of the group shall be deemed the leader of said coup d'etat (Art 135, R.P.C.) Art 136; Conspiracy to commit rebellion 1994 No. 14: VC, JG. GG and JG conspired to overthrow the Philippine Government. VG was recognized as the titular head of the conspiracy. Several meetings were held and the plan was finalized. JJ, bothered by his conscience, confessed to Father Abraham that he, VG, JG and GG have conspired to overthrow the government. Father Abraham did not report this information to the proper authorities. Did Father Abraham commit a crime? If so, what crime was committed? What is his criminal liability? Answer; No, Father Abraham did not commit a crime because the conspiracy involved is one to commit rebellion, not a conspiracy to commit treason which makes a person criminally liable under Art 116, RFC. And even assuming that it will fall as misprision of treason, Father Abraham is exempted from criminal liability under Art. 12, par. 7, as his failure to report can be considered as due to "insuperable cause", as this involves the sanctity and inviolability of a confession. Conspiracy to commit rebellion results in criminal liability to the coconspirators, but not to a person who learned of such and did not report to the proper authorities (US vs. Vergara, 3 Phil. 432; People vs. Atienza. 56 Phil. 353). Art 141; Conspiracy to commit sedition 1987 No. XII: A, B, C, D, and E were former soldiers who deserted their command in Mindanao. Jose and Pedro, two big landowners, called A, B, C, D, and E to a conference. Jose and Pedro proposed to these former soldiers that they recruit their comrades and organize a group of 100 for the purpose of challenging the government by force of aims in order to prevent the enforcement or implementation of the Land Reform Law in Cotabato Province. Jose and Pedro Page 178 of 374
promised to finance the group and to buy firearms for the purpose. The former soldiers agreed. After Jose and Pedro left, A, the leader of the former soldiers, said that in the meanwhile he needed money to support his family. D suggested that they rob a bank and agreed to carry out the plan on the 15th day of the month. Unknown to all of them, as they were conferring with Jose and Pedro and as they were planning to rob the bank,. Rosauro, a houseboy, was within hearing distance. On the pretext of buying cigarettes, Rosauro instead went directly to the Police and told them what transpired. All the former soldiers, as well as Jose and Pedro, were arrested. (a) What crime, if any, did the former soldiers commit? (b) What about Jose and Pedro? Answer: a) The former soldiers committed the crime of conspiracy to commit sedition. What Jose and Pedro proposed to the soldiers that they recruit their comrades and organize a group of 100 for the purpose of challenging the government by force of arms in order to prevent the implementation of the Land Reform Law in Cotabato Province is to commit sedition. Proposal to commit sedition is not punished. But since the soldiers agreed, a conspiracy to commit sedition resulted which is now punishable. Conspiracy arises on the very moment the plotters agree (People vs. Peralta 25 SCRA 759; People vs. Tiongson 12 SCRA 402). b) Jose and Pedro will also be liable for conspiracy to commit sedition since they are members of the conspiracy where the act of one is the act of all. If the soldiers did not agree to their proposal, they would not incur any criminal liability because there is no proposal to commit sedition. Art 146; Illegal Assembly 1985 No. 14 At a meeting of about fifty (50) residents of Bo. Ta-talon, Quezon City, Juan, whose son was shot by the marines, told the residents that it was hopeless to seek redress from the authorities and that the only recourse was to topple it by force. Among those in the meeting were four (4) Burly looking men in civilian clothes but with sidearms, all of whom stayed up to the end of the meeting. They even participated therein by edging and cheering Juan. Quezon City policemen arrived and they arrested Juan together with Pedro and Jose who were with Juan on the platform. The four (4) armed persons, however quietly disappeared when the policemen arrived. (A) As a prosecutor, what case will you file against Juan, Pedro and Jose? State your reasons. (B) Would your answer be the same if the four (4) armed men turned out to be intelligence operatives of the Philippine Constabulary ? Explain your answer. Answer: (A) As a prosecutor, I will file against Juan, Pedro and Jose, a charge of Illegal Assembly under Art. 146 as amended by P.O. 1834. What Juan told the residents during the meeting, that "it was hopeless to seek redress from the authorities and that the only recourse was to topple it by force," is an act of propaganda against the government in order to destabilize the government or to undermine the authorities by eroding the faith and loyalty of the people,
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(B) The answer is still the same as when the four burly men participated in the meeting by "edging and cheering" Juan while he was speaking, the crime of Illegal Assembly was already being committed. Art 148; Direct assault 1976 No. VII-b X, a Division Superintendent of Schools of the Bureau of Public Schools, while working in his office was given a fist blow on the left temple by. Y. As a result of the blow, he suffered contusion in his head. The assault upon X by Y was due to a standing grudge of Y for blocking his promotion. Is Y guilty of assaulting a person in authority ? Answer Y is liable for direct assault upon a person/in authority. A Division Superintendent of Schools is a person in authority because under the law, he is directly vested with jurisdiction since he is given the power of general superintendence over the schools in his division, with the right to appoint municipal school teachers and to fix their salaries, aside from the fact that public policy demands adequate protection to those engaged in education which is a state function. The fist blow was given while X was in the performance of his duties. The first blow resulting in contusion constitutes the qualifying aggravating circumstances of laying hands upon a person in authority. (Art. 148, RPC; People vs. Benitez, 73 Phil 671). Art 148; Direct Assault 1985 No. 2 Arthur, a 17 year old student and aggrieved by the death of his only brother in a previous rally at the hands of the police, fired at a motorcycle cop passing by their place. He, however, missed his target and instead hit Jason, a passerby, who died instantaneously. (A) As an investigating fiscal, what charge or charges will you file against Arthur? Reasons. (B) Upon arraignment, Arthur pleaded guilty and invoked the additional mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. As a judge and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, what penalty will you impose upon Arthur? Discuss. (C) May Arthur apply for and be entitled to probation under P.D. 968, as amended by P.D. 1251 and Batas Pambansa 76? Answer: (A) If I were the investigating fiscal, I would file against Arthur an information for the complex crime of Direct Assault with Homicide. The motorcycle cop is an agent of a person in authority. Firing at the peace officer is attacking him, one of the modes of committing Direct Assault. (Art. 148, Revised Penal Code). Since a third person was hit instead, resulting in his instantaneous death, the single act of shooting resulted in two grave felonies, to wit, direct assault and homicide, a compound complex crime. (Art 48, Revised Penal Code). Art 148; Direct Assault 1987 No. V.
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Jose was charged with slight physical injuries before a Municipal Trial Judge. He listened attentively as the Judge read the sentence. When the Judge reached the dispositive portion and pronounced Jose guilty, the latter was enraged, got hold of an ashtray, and threw it at the Judge hitting him in the eye. As his defense lawyer Pedro attempted to restrain him, Jose boxed him and knocked him down. The judge became blind in one eye as a consequence. What crime or crimes did Jose commit? Answer: Jose is liable for Qualified Direct Assault with Serious Physical Injuries. The throwing of the ashtray at the Judge hitting him in the eye is laying of hands on the Judge who is a person in authority while in the performance of duties, Jose is also liable for qualified direct assault when he boxed his defense lawyer, knocking him down while in the act of restraining him Under Batas 873 a lawyer is considered a person in authority if assaulted while in the performance of duties.
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Art 148; Direct assault 1993 No. 17 Pablo, disobeying a judicial order, was punished by an RTC Judge of Manila for contempt. He waited for the judge to go out into the street. Upon seeing the Judge, Pablo hurriedly approached him, and without saying a word struck him with his fist causing a slight contusion on the face of the judge. Rex came to the rescue of the judge but because he was taller and bigger than Pablo, the latter used a knife in attacking Rex. Pablo limited his assault to the arms of Rex, inflicting lesiones graves which incapacitated Rex from labor for forty five (45) days. If you were the prosecutor called to institute a criminal action against Pablo, with what crime or crimes would you charge him? Explain. Answer; The crime of direct assault upon a person in authority with respect to the slight contusion on the face of the Judge, Direct assault with serious physical injuries with respect to the assault on Rex. Art 148; Direct Assault vs Resistance and disobedience 2001 No XV A, a teacher at Mapa High School, having gotten mad at X, one of his pupils, because of the latter's throwing paper clips at his classmates, twisted his right ear. X went out of the classroom crying and proceeded home located at the back of the school. He reported to his parents Y and Z what A had done to him. Y and Z immediately proceeded to the school building and because they were running and talking in loud voices, they were seen by the barangay chairman, B, who followed them as he suspected that an untoward incident might happen. Upon seeing A inside the classroom, X pointed him out to his father, Y, who administered a fist blow on A, causing him to fall down. When Y was about to kick A, B rushed towards Y and pinned both of the latter's arms. Seeing his father being held by B, X went near and punched B on the face, which caused him to lose his grip on Y. Throughout this incident, Z shouted words of encouragement at Y, her husband, and also threatened to slap A. Some security guards of the school arrived, intervened and surrounded X, Y and Z so that they could be investigated in the principal's office. Before leaving, Z passed near A and threw a small flower pot at him but it was deflected by B. a) b)
What, if any, are the respective criminal liability of X Y and Z? (6%) Would your answer be the same if B were a barangay tanod only?
(4%) SUGGESTED ANSWER; a) X is liable for Direct Assault only, assuming the physical injuries inflicted on B, the Barangay Chairman, to be only slight and hence, would be absorbed in the direct assault. A Barangay Chairman is a person in authority (Art. 152, RPC) and in this case, was performing his duty of maintaining peace and order when attacked. Y is liable for the complex crimes of Direct Assault With Less Serious Physical Injuries for the fist blow on A, the teacher, which caused the latter to fall down. For purposes of the crimes in Arts. 148 and 151 of the Revised Penal Page 182 of 374
Code, a teacher is considered a person in authority, and having been attacked by Y by reason of his performance of official duty, direct assault is committed with the resulting less serious physical injuries completed. Z, the mother of X and wife of Y may only be liable as an accomplice to the complex crimes of direct assault with less serious physical injuries committed by Y. Her participation should not be considered as that of a co-principal, since her reactions were only incited by her relationship to X and Y. as the mother of X and the wife of Y. b) If B were a Barangay Tanod only, the act of X of laying hand on him, being an agent of a person in authority only, would constitute the crime of Resistance and Disobedience under Article 151, since X, a high school pupil, could not be considered as having acted out of contempt for authority but more of helping his father get free from the grip of B. Laying hand on an agent of a person in authority is not ipso facto direct assault, while it would always be direct assault if done to a person in authority in defiance to the latter is exercise of authority. Art 148; Direct Assault with murder 2000 No VIII b) Because of the approaching town fiesta in San Miguel, Bulacan, a dance was held in Barangay Camias. A, the Barangay Captain, was invited to deliver a speech to start the dance. While A was delivering his speech. B, one of the guests, went to the middle of the dance floor making obscene dance movements, brandishing a knife and challenging everyone present to a fight. A approached B and admonished him to keep quiet and not to disturb the dance and peace of the occasion. B, instead of heeding the advice of A, stabbed the latter at his back twice when A turned his back to proceed to the microphone to continue his speech. A fell to the ground and died. At the time of the incident A was not armed. What crime was committed? Explain. (2%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: b) The complex crime of direct assault with murder was committed. A, as a Barangay Captain, is a person in authority and was acting in an official capacity when he tried to maintain peace and order during the public dance in the Barangay, by admonishing B to keep quiet and not to disturb the dance and peace of the occasion. When B, instead of heeding A's advice, attacked the latter, B acted in contempt and lawless defiance of authority constituting the crime of direct assault, which characterized the stabbing of A. And since A was stabbed at the back when he was not in a position to defend himself nor retaliate, there was treachery in the stabbing. Hence, the death caused by such stabbing was murder and having been committed with direct assault, a complex crime of direct assault with murder was committed by B. Art 148; Direct Assault with murder 1995 No. 6: 2. Pascual operated a rice thresher in Barangay Napnud where he resided. Renato, a resident of the neighboring Barangay Guihaman, also operated a mobile rice thresher which he often brought to Barangay Napnud to thresh the palay of the farmers there. This was bitterly resented by Pascual, One afternoon Pascual, and his two sons confronted Renato and his men who were operating their mobile rice thresher along a feeder road in Napnud. A heated
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argument ensued. A barangay captain who was fetched by one of Pascual's men tried to appease Pascual and Renato to prevent a violent confrontation. However, Pascual resented the intervention of the barangay captain and hacked him to death. What crime was committed by Pascual? Discuss fully. Answer: 2. Pascual committed the complex crime of homicide with assault upon a person in authority (Arts. 148 and 249 in relation to Art, 48, RPC). A barangay chairman, is in law (Art. 152), a person in authority and if he is attacked while in the performance of his official duties or on the occasion thereof the felony of direct assault is committed. Art. 48, RPC, on the other hand, provides that if a single act produces two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is committed. Here, the single act of the offender in hacking the victim to death resulted in two felonies, homicide which is grave and direct assault which is less grave. Art 148; Direct Assault with murder; explosion 1991 No 4: Two [2] Philippine National Police (PNPJ officers. X and Y, on board on motorboat with Z, a civilian as motor-man, arrested A and B who were in a banca, for dynamite fishing. The latter's banca was towed towards the municipality. On the way, the PNP motorboat was intercepted by a third banca whose occupants, C, D, and E, tried to negotiate for the release of A and B and their banca. The PNP officers refused and instead shouted at C, D. and E that they are all under arrest. Thereupon, C, D, and E simultaneously threw dynamite sticks at the PNP motorboats. The first explosion killed X. A and B also reacted by throwing dynamite at the PNP motorboat: its explosion killed Y and Z. What crime or crimes did A, B, C, D and E commit? Suggested Answer: C, D and E are liable for the complex crime of Murder, qualified by explosion, with direct assault for the death of X. A and B are liable for the complex crime of Murder Qualified by explosion as to death "of Y, and simple Murder qualified by explosion for the death of Z. No crime of direct assault can be filed insofar as the death of Z is concerned, he being a civilian. This, of course, assumes that there is no conspiracy among A, B, C, D and E, otherwise all would have the same criminal liability as the act of one becomes the act of all. Additional Answer: Firstly, A and B committed a violation of Pres. Decree No. 534 (on illegal fishing] as amended by Pres. Decree Nos. 704 and 1058. Fishing with the use of explosives is punishable under said Decree. Art 148; Direct assault; indirect assault 1989 No. 11: Edgardo, a policeman, accompanied by Florencio went to serve a warrant of arrest on Emilio, a professional boxer, at the hitter's apartment. Upon seeing Edgardo, Emilio immediately boxed him. Edgardo fell flat on the floor. As Page 184 of 374
Florencio tried to help Edgardo on his feet, Emilio also boxed Florencio. The injuries inflicted upon Edgardo and Florencio required medical attendance for nine (9) days. What crime or crimes were committed by Emilio? Give your reasons. Answer: If Emilio was not aware that Edgardo was a police officer who was going serve a warrant of arrest on him, Emilio would be guilty only of slight physical injuries on two counts, one against Edgardo and the second against Florencio. If Emilio knew Edgardo as a policeman and of the latter's purpose to serve a warrant of arrest on him, and that is why he boxed Edgardo, then he will be guilty of either DIRECT ASSAULT UPON A PERSON IN AUTHORITY or RESISTANCE OR DISOBEDIENCE TO AN AGENT OF A PERSON in authority, depending on the degree of force employed by him. A person who attacks, employs force makes a serious intimidation or makes a serious resistance against a person in authority or his agent, if at the time of the assault the latter is engaged in the actual performance of his official duties, the offended party knowing that the person he is assaulting is a person in authority or his agent, it liable for the crime of DIRECT ASSAULT. A policeman is an agent of a person in authority. As for Florencio, the crime committed by Emilio against him would be indirect Assault provided that Emilio has committed DIRECT ASSAULT against Edgardo, This is so because any person who shall make use of force or intimidation upon any person coming to the aid of the authorities or their agents on occasion of the commission of the crime of DIRECT ASSAULT, is criminally liable for the crime of INDIRECT ASSAULT. However, if Emilio is guilty only of RESISTANCE or disobedience as against Edgardo; then his crime against Florencio would only be slight physical injuries. Art 148; Direct assault; person in authority 1977 No. VI-a When the barangay chairman was presiding over the barrio meeting regarding cleanliness of the community, he was immediately assaulted by his creditor whom he has not paid for a long time despite his repeated promises to pay. The barangay chairman suffered serious physical injuries. The creditor also assaulted a stranger who came to the aid of the barangay chairman. If you were the fiscal, what crime or crimes will you file against the creditor? Reason fully. Answer 1) Under Article 152, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code, a barangay chairman is a person in authority. Since he was assaulted by his creditor while he was presiding over a barrio meeting, the assault was committed while the barangay chairman was actually engaged in the performance of his duties. The motive of the creditor in assaulting the barangay chairman is therefore immaterial Since the barangay chairman suffered serious physical injuries, the creditor will be liable for a complex crime of direct assault with serious physical injuries. The direct assault is qualified since the creditor laid hands upon a person in authority. (Art. 148, R.P.C. U.S. v. Balagot, 40 Phil. 385). 2) The creditor also committed direct assault upon the stranger who came to the aid of the barangay chairman because the stranger in doing so was an Page 185 of 374
agent of a person in authority since the barangay chairman is a person in authority. Any person coming to the aid of a person in authority shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority, (Art. 152 as amended by Rep. Act No. 1978). The scope of Art. 149 which punishes indirect assault is modified by Rep. Act No. 1978.
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Art 148; Direct Assault; teachers and professors 2002 No VII. A, a lady professor, was giving an examination. She noticed B, one of the students, cheating. She called the student's attention and confiscated his examination booklet, causing embarrassment to him. The following day, while the class was going on, the student, B, approached A and, without any warning, slapped her. B would have inflicted further injuries on A had not C, another student, come to A's rescue and prevented B from continuing his attack. B turned his ire on C and punched the latter. What crime or crimes, if any, did B commit? Why? (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: B committed two (2) counts of direct assault: one for slapping the professor, A, who was then conducting classes and thus exercising authority; and another one for the violence on the student C, who came to the aid of the said professor. By express provision of Article 152, in relation to Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, teachers and professors of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities in the actual performance of their professional duties or on the occasion of such performance are deemed persons in authority for purposes of the crimes of direct assault and of resistance and disobedience in Articles 148 and 151 of said Code. And any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority. Accordingly, the attack on C is, in the eyes of the law, an attack on an agent of a person in authority, not just an attack on a student. Art 148; Persons in authority/ agents of persons in authority 2000 No VIII a) Who are deemed to be persons in authority and agents of persons in authority? (3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: a) Persons in authority are persons directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or government corporation, board, or commission. Barrio captains and barangay chairmen are also deemed persons in authority. (Article 152, RPC) Agents of persons in authority are persons who by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, are charged with maintenance of public order, the protection and security of life and property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman, barangay leader and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority (Art. 152, RPC), In applying the provisions of Articles 148 and 151 of the Rev. Penal Code, teachers, professors and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of their professional duties or on the occasion of such performance, shall be deemed persons in authority. (P.D. No. 299, and Batas Pambansa Blg. 873). Art 151; Resistance and disobedience 1990 No. 11;
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Amy was apprehended and arrested by Patrolman Bart for illegal parking. She was detained at the police precinct, underwent investigation, and released only after 48 hours a)
Patrolman Bart liable for any offense? Explain your answer.
b) Suppose Amy resisted the arrest and grappled with patrolman Bart, is she criminally liable thereby? State your reasons. Answer: a) Patrolman Bart is liable for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code - Delay on the Delivery of Detained Persons to the Proper Judicial Authorities. b) She is criminally liable for slight disobedience under Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code - Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person. Art 151; Simple resistance 1979 No. VII While on patrol, X, a policeman, spotted Y standing in a dark street corner, X accosted Y suspecting him to be a long wanted criminal on the basis of appearance. Y had no identification papers but he gave his name and address. X told Y he would be brought to headquarters for questioning. When Y refused, X told him to remove his coat so he could find if he has a tattoo on his left forearm, a mark of the wanted criminal X was hunting, Y refused again and resisted all efforts of X by pushing and pulling him. X charged Y with assault. Do you agree? Answer The crime committed is not assault but simple resistance. The policeman was on patrol when he spotted Y standing in a dark street corner, where he had no reason to be. X was hunting a wanted criminal. A duty of a policeman is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them at the disposal of judicial or executive authorities. One means to achieve this end is the identification of the alleged lawbreaker. (U.S. vs. Sanches, 27 Phil. 442). A peace officer might arrest for examination persons walking in the street at night when there's reasonable ground to suspect that a felony is committed although there is no proof thereof (People vs. Santos, 36 Phil, 853). Y was not arrested but only accosted on suspicion of being a long wanted criminal because of his appearance. X's request that Y would be brought to the headquarters was refused and Y also refused that he remove his coat to find out if he has a tattoo in his left forearm, a mark of the wanted criminal whom X was hunting. X was therefore acting in the legitimate performance of his duties. Y pushed and pull X in resisting his efforts to find out whether he has a tattoo. The acts committed by Y however do not" constitute assault but simple resistance because such do not indicate manifest defiance to the authority of the law (US, vs. Tabiana, 37 Phil. 515, People vs. Baesa, CA 55 O.G. 10291). Art 156; Delivery of prisoners from jail 2002 No VI. B. A, a detention prisoner, was taken to a hospital for emergency medical treatment. His followers, all of whom were armed, went to the hospital to take him away or help him escape. The prison guards, seeing that they were outnumbered and that resistance would endanger the lives of other patients, deckled to allow
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the prisoner to be taken by his followers. What crime, if any, was committed by A's followers? Why? (3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: A's followers shall be liable as principals in the crime of delivery of prisoner from Jail (Art. 156, Revised Penal Code). The felony is committed not only by removing from any jail or penal establishment any person confined therein but also by helping in the escape of such person outside of said establishments by means of violence, intimidation, bribery, or any other means. Art 156; Delivery of prisoners from jail & Infidelity in custody of prisoners & Evasion of service of sentence 1989 No. 13: Ernani was accused of estafa. Unable to post a bail bond for his provisional liberty pending trial of his case, he was detained in the city jail. On the date of the hearing of the estafa case, Daniel, a policeman detailed in the city jail, escorted Ernani to the city hall for the trial. Daniel removed the handcuffs of Ernani and allowed him to sit on one of the chairs inside the courtroom. As Daniel was talking to a lawyer inside the courtroom, Ernani, with the help of a cigarette vendor, Meynardo, who used his cigarette container as cover, surreptitiously moved out of the room and escaped, Ernani and Meynardo went to the comfort room for a while, then went down the stairs and lost themselves in the crowd. What crime or crimes were committed by Ernani, Daniel and Meynardo? Give your reasons. Answer: 1. Daniel, the policeman, committed the crime of EVASION THRU NEGLIGENCE, one of the forms of Infidelity in the custody of Prisoner (Art. 224),, the essential elements of which offense are: (1) That the offender is a public officer. (2) That he has in his custody or charge a prisoner, either detention prisoner or prisoners by final judgement. (3) That such prisoner escaped from his custody thru his negligence. All of these elements are present, Daniel, a policeman detailed in the city jail, is a public officer. As the escort for Ernani in the latter's trial, he had custody of charge of a detention prisoner, Ernani's escape was thru his negligence because after removing Ernani's handcuffs and allowing him to sit in one of the chairs inside the courtroom, he should have taken the necessary precautions to prevent Ernani's escape by keeping an eye on him. Instead, he provided the opportunity for the escape by talking with a lawyer and not keeping watch over his prisoner. 2. Meynardo, not being a public officer, is guilty of the crime of DELIVERING PRISONERS FROM JAILS (Art. 156), which is committed by any person who either removes from any jail or penal establishment any person confined therein, or WHO HELPS the escape of such person by means of violence, intimidation, bribery of OTHER MEANS. The act of Meynardo in giving to Ernani his cigarette container is helping in the latter's escape by OTHER MEANS.
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3. Ernani, the escaped prisoner himself is not criminally liable for any offense. The detention prisoner who escapes from detention does not commit any crime. If he were a convict by final judgment who is serving a sentence which consists of deprivation of liberty and he escapes during term of his sentence, he would be liable for EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE (Art. 157).
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Art 157; Evasion of service of sentence 1975 No. XIII The accused was found guilty of a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act and was deported. After four months, he returned to the Philippines. The fiscal prosecuted him for Evasion of Service of Sentence but the defense contended that the accused is not guilty of the charge because he did not break out of a jail. Is the defense tenable? Why? Answer a) The defense is tenable. Evasion of sentence is jail breaking. (Tanega v. Masakayan, 19 SCRA 564). So, it does not apply to the accused who was deported and who returned to the Philippines in violation of the sentence, since deportation is not imprisonment. (17.5. v. Laio Hoc, 36 Phil. 867). b) If the deportation was an act of the Chief Executive completely of the judgment of conviction, then, there can be no evasion of sentence. Art 157; Evasion of service of sentence 1998 No X. Manny killed his wife under exceptional circumstances and was sentenced by the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City to suffer the penalty of destierro during which he was not to enter the city. While serving sentence, Manny went to Dagupan City to visit his mother. Later, he was arrested in Manila. 1.
Did Manny commit any crime? [3%]
2.
If so, where should he be prosecuted? [2%] Answer:
1. Yes. Manny committed the crime of evasion of service of sentence when he went to Dagupan City, which he was prohibited from entering under his sentence of destierro. A sentence imposing the penalty of destierro is evaded when the convict enters any of the place/places he is prohibited from entering under the sentence or come within the prohibited radius. Although destierro does not involve imprisonment, it is nonetheless a deprivation of liberty. (People vs. Abilong. 82 Phil. 172). 2. Manny may be prosecuted in Dagupan City or in Manila where he was arrested. This is so because evasion of service of sentence is a continuing offense, as the convict is a fugitive from justice in such case. (Parulan vs. Dir. of Prisons, L-28519, 17 Feb. 1968) Art 160; Quasi-recidivism 1983 No. 7 X, an unlettered prisoner serving sentence for homicide, killed a coprisoner with evident premeditation, after which he voluntarily surrendered to the prison guard and confessed his wrongdoing. Upon arraignment, he pleaded guilty to the murder charge. After a brief trial to ascertain beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused and the presence or absence of modifying circumstances, the trial judge imposed the penalty prescribed by law for murder in its maximum period [death], disregarding the mitigating circumstances established by the defense. Page 191 of 374
(a)
Did the judge act correctly? Why?
(b) If the murder was committed outside of prison before X began to serve his sentence for homicide, would your answer be different? Reasons. Answer a) The judge acted correctly. The reason is because X was a quasirecidivist as he killed his fellow prisoner while he was serving the sentence for homicide. (Art. 160 Rev. Penal Code) The penalty for the second crime is to be imposed in its maximum period without regard to the attending mitigating and aggravating circumstances. (People vs. Bautista (1978) of 2 O.G. 2117) b) The same answer because there is quasi-recidivism since the offender who was convicted by final judgment of homicide committed the second felony, which in this case is murder, before beginning to serve the sentence for homicide. (Art. 160 Rev. Penal Code) Art 160; Quasi-recidivism 1991 No. 9: During a fiesta, Simeon Marco, brandishing a knife, asked Constancio whether he was the one who slapped his (Simeon's) son the year previous. Vicente [father of Constancio) shouted at Constancio and his other son, Bienvenido, telling them to run away. When Bienvenido passed by Rafael Marco (brother of Simeon), Rafael stabbed him. Bienvenido parried the blow but fell down, his feet entangled with some vines. While Bienvenido was lying on the ground, Rafael continued to stab him, inflicting slight injuries on the shoulder of Bienvenido, after which Rafael stood up. At that moment, Dulcisimo Beltran (no relation to the Marco brothers), came out of nowhere and, together with Simeon, stabbed Bienvenido. Both of them inflicted fatal wounds resulting in the death of the victim, a) Discuss the criminal liability of Dulcisimo, Simeon and Rafael. b) Supposing Dulcisimo is a convict out on parole, will the aggravating circumstances of quasi-recidivism be appreciated against him? Answer: b) No, because quasi-recidivism under Art. 160, RPC occurs when the accused commits a felony while serving or about to serve sentence (or if he escapes from prison]. A parolee who commits a felony cannot be a quasirecidivist,
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Crimes against Public Interest Art 164; Mutilation of coins; bills excluded 1988 No. 9: c) Two Japanese were passing through immigration and customs preparatory to their departure for Japan at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport. A bundle of P2,000 peso bills was discovered in one of them, and to prevent their being delayed, his companion took the bundle of bills and then and there tore up the bills. As City Fiscal of Pasay, what crimes, if any, would you charge the two Japanese? Explain. Answer: c) The two Japanese cannot be charged of any crime. They committed no crime. Article 164 of the Revised Penal Code on mutilation of coins cannot be applied to the Japanese because said article refers to coins and not to bills. Art 168; Illegal possession of false notes 1999 No XIII (b) Is mere possession of false money bills punishable under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code? Explain. (3%) (c) The accused was caught in possession of 100 counterfeit P20 bills. He could not explain how and why he possessed the said bills. Neither could he explain what he intended to do with the fake bills. Can he be held criminally liable for such possession? Decide. (3%} SUGGESTED ANSWER: (b) No. Possession of false treasury or bank note alone without an intent to use it, is not punishable. But the circumstances of such possession may indicate intent to utter, sufficient to consummate the crime of illegal possession of false notes. (c) Yes. Knowledge that the note is counterfeit and intent to use it may be shown by the conduct of the accused. So, possession of 100 false bills reveal: (a) knowledge that the bills are fake; and (b) intent to utter the same. Art 169 & 171; Forgery & falsification 1999 No XIII (a)
How are "forging" and "falsification" committed? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: (a) Forging or forgery is committed by giving to a treasury or bank note or any instrument payable to bearer or to order the appearance of a true and genuine document; or by erasing, substituting, counterfeiting, or altering by any means the figures, letters, words or signs contained therein. Falsification, on the other hand, is committed by: 1.
Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate; 3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them; Page 193 of 374
4.
Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5.
Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning; 7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or 8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book. Art 171; Falsification of public documents 1977 No. VIII-b A teller of the provincial treasurer's office told the landowner that his real estate tax due is P500.00 when actually it is only P400. The landowner paid as told. In order that the landowner will not discover the excess, the teller made it appear in the original of the official receipt to be given to the landowner that P500.00 was paid but in the duplicate left with him, the true amount of P400.00 was stated. Thereafter, the teller misappropriated the entire amount of P500.00. Assuming that you are the investigating fiscal, what crime will you file against the teller? State your reasons. Answer As investigating fiscal, I would file against the teller three crimes, to wit: (1) illegal exaction or estafa, (2) falsification of public document, and (3) malversation. By telling the landowner that his real estate tax due was P500.00 which was paid, when actually it was only P400.00 the teller of the provincial treasurer's office collected an amount bigger than that authorized by law. The teller is a public officer and in view of his duties is entrusted with the collection of taxes. Illegal exaction is committed. The total amount of P500.00 was paid in the concept of tax and forms a part of the public funds. The misappropriation of P500.00 would constitute malversation of public funds since the one prejudiced is the government (People v. Policher, 60 Phil. 771). However, if the teller by means of deceit, collected the sum of P500.00 to misappropriate the excess of P100.00, estafa and not illegal exaction is committed (U.S. Lopez, et al, 10 Phil. 480). The falsification of the original of the official receipt is an independent crime since it was committed in order that the landowner would not discover the excess. The misappropriation of the P400 being paid as a tax is malversation. Art 171; Falsification of private document 1989 No. 12: Oscar, a former welder and painter at the Caloocan Motor Works owned by Arturo, went to the Downtown Hardware Store where Arturo gets materials on credit, and presented to its manager a typewritten order for two (2) cans of "Dietsler" car paint. The signature of Arturo on the order was falsified. After receiving the paint, Oscar sold them and kept the proceeds therefrom. If you were the investigating fiscal, what charge or charges will you file against Oscar? Explain. Answer: The proper charge against Oscar is Falsification of a Private Document. This is so for the following reasons: Page 194 of 374
By forging the signature of Arturo on the typewritten purchase order for two cans of car paint, Oscar committed the crime of falsification. The document falsified by him, however, is a private document. A typewritten purchase order is neither a public, official or commercial document. It is a private document. Falsification of a private document, however, is not a crime unless there is damage or intent to cause damage. When Oscar used the falsified private document to obtain the two cans of paint from the hardware store, the element of damage arose, thus consummating the crime of FALSIFICATION OF A PRIVATE DOCUMENT. Precisely because damage is an essential element of the crime of falsification of a private document, Oscar cannot be convicted of the complex crime of ESTAFA THRU FALSIFICATION OF PRIVATE DOCUMENT. Only one single crime of FALSIFICATION OF PRIVTE DOCUMENT is committed here. The damage to another is caused by the commission of said crime. The intent to defraud in using falsified private document is part and parcel of said crime and cannot give rise to the crime of estafa, because damage, which is also an essential element of estafa, is caused by, and becomes the element of, the crime of falsification of private document. The crime of estafa is not committed, as it cannot exist without its own element of damage. If the private document in the case was falsified, not to induce the offended party to part with something of value but to cover up or conceal a defraudation previously made, then the crime committed would be ESTAFA, The falsification would be absorbed in said offense, the element of damage in one being the same as that required in the other. Art 171; Falsification of private document 1975 No. XV The accused was a bookkeeper in a department store. He purchased on credit several items in the store and signed chits for them. In order to avoid paying for the foods, he did not record in his personal account with the store the items he purchased and tore up the chits he had signed What crime, if any, did he commit? Why? Answer Falsification of a private document by omission. It is the duty of the accused as bookkeeper to record in his personal account with the store the items he purchased. By tearing the chits which he signed for the purchases, damage is present. (People v. Dizon, 47 Phil. 360). Art 171; Falsification of private document 1982 No. 12 "A", son of "B", knowing that "X" owed "B" Pl,000.00 which had already matured, wrote a collection letter to "X", falsifying "B'"s signature in the letter which "A" himself delivered to "X" without "B" 's knowledge. "X" paid the amount to "A" and thereupon appropriated the money for his personal use. Upon learning of the action of his son, "B" filed a complaint against the former. If you were the fiscal, for what crime or crimes would you prosecute "A"? Answer If I were, the Fiscal I would prosecute A for the crime of falsification of private document. Altho, the falsification was used as a means for A to misappropriate the amount delivered to him by X, a complex crime of estafa thru Page 195 of 374
falsification of a private document is not committed because the element of damage in estafa is the same damage which is an element of falsification of a private document. (People vs. Dizon, CA 48 O.G. 168). The crime is not estafa because without the falsification of the private document A would not have committed the defraudation. There is no complex crime of estafa thru falsification of a private document. In spite of the relationship there is criminal liability. Relationship is an absolutory cause in the crimes of theft, estafa and malicious mischief only. Art 171; Falsification of private document 1991 No. 3: In a civil case for recovery of a sum of money filed against him by A, B interposed the defense of payment. In support thereof, he identified and offered in evidence a receipt which appears to be signed by A On rebuttal, A denied having been paid by B and having signed the receipt. He presented a handwriting expert who testified that the alleged signature of A on the receipt is a forgery and that a comparison thereof with the specimen signatures of B clearly shows that B himself forged the signature of A a) Is B liable for the crime of using a falsified- document in a judicial proceeding (last paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code)? b) If he is not, what offense or offenses may he be charged with? Answer: a) No, B should not be liable for the crime of using a falsified document, under the last paragraph of Art. 172, Revised Penal Code. He would be liable for forgery of a private document under the second mode of falsification under Art. 172, Revised Penal Code. Being the possessor and user of the falsified document he is presumed to be the forger or falsifier and the offense of introducing falsified document is already absorbed in the main offense of forgery or falsification. b) B should be charged for the crime of falsification of a private document, since the document falsified is a private document and done with intent to cause damage. Although there was an attempt on the part of B to defraud A thru the use of the false document, such deceit cannot give rise to estafa because this crime cannot co-exist or be complexed with the crime of falsification when the document falsified is a private document. Additional Answer; b) If he testified on the genuineness of the document, he should also be held liable under Art. 182, which is false testimony in civil cases. Art 171; Falsification of public documents 1988 No. 14: (a) Andrea signed her deceased husband's name in endorsing his three treasury warrants which were delivered to her directly by the district supervisor who knew that her husband had already died, and she used the proceeds to pay for the expenses of her husband's last illness and his burial. She knew that her husband had accumulated vacation and sick leaves the money value of which exceeded that value of the three treasury warrants, so that the government suffered no damage. Andrea's appeal is based on her claim of absence of criminal intent and of good faith.
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Should she be found guilty of falsification? Discuss briefly. ANSWER: (a) Andrea should be held guilty of falsification of public documents. Her claim of absence of criminal intent and of good faith cannot be considered because she is presumed to know that her husband is dead. The element of damage required in falsification does not refer to pecuniary damage but damage to public interest. Executive clemency can however be sought for by Andrea. Art 171; Falsification of public documents 1992 No. 11 Jose Dee Kiam, a Chinese citizen born in Macao, having applied with a recruitment agency to work in Kuwait, went to Quezon City Hall to procure a Community Tax Certificate, formerly called Residence Certificate. He stated therein that his name is Leo Tiampuy, A Filipino citizen born in Binan, Laguna. As he paid for the Community Tax Certificate, Cecille Delicious, an employee in the office recognized him and reported to her boss that the information written in the Community Tax Certificate were all lies. Treat each of the above contentions separately. a) Shortly thereafter, an information was filed against Dee Kiam alias Tiampuy. What crime, if any, may he be indicted for? Why? Suggested Answer; a) Dee Kiam can be indicted for the felony of Falsification of a Public Document committed by a private individual under Art. 172 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Art. 171 thereof. A residence certificate is a public or official document within the context of said provisions and jurisprudence. Since Dee Kiam made an untruthful statement in a narration of facts (Art. 171, par. 4), and he being a private individual, he is culpable thereunder. b) The accused moved to quash the information on the ground that it did not allege that he had the obligation to disclose the truth in the Community Tax Certificate; that the same is a useless scrap of paper which one can buy even in the Quiapo underpass and that he had no intent of deceiving anybody, much less the government. If you were the trial judge, would you grant the motion to quash the information on the basis of Dee Kiam's allegations? Suggested Answer: b) Falsification of public documents under Arts. 171 and 172, RFC, does not require that the document is required by law. The sanctity of the public document, a residence certificate, cannot be taken lightly as being a "mere scrap of paper". Intent to cause damage, or actual damage, is not an indispensable requisite for falsification of public document. Art 171; Falsification of public documents 1993 No 10: L, a Municipal Mayor, issued an appointment in favor of his legitimate son. S, as meat inspector in the Office of the Municipal Treasurer. He also issued a certification that S is not related to him within the third degree of consanguinity. The Civil Service Commission approved the appointment.
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L, was charged and found guilty of falsification of public document. In his appeal, he argued that his conviction is erroneous because he had no legal obligation to disclose the truth about his relationship with the appointee and that he was in good faith as he later on revoked the appointment. Resolve his plea, supporting your resolution with reasons. Answer: The conviction is correct. L had the legal obligation to issue a certification to the effect that the appointee is not related to him within the third degree of consanguinity (Laino vs. Sandiganbayan). The revocation of the appointment did not extinguish the incipient criminal liability of L, the crime having been already consummated. Besides, good faith may not be invoked in the crime of falsification of a public document as criminal intent and the will to commit the crime are presumed to exist unless the contrary appears (Manuel Siquuian vs People. 171 SCRA 223). Art 171; Falsification; presumption of falsification 1999 No XIII (d) A falsified official or public document was found in the possession of the accused. No evidence was introduced to show that the accused was the author of the falsification. As a matter of fact, the trial court convicted the accused of falsification of official or public document mainly on the proposition that "the only person who could have made the erasures and the superimposition mentioned is the one who will be benefited by the alterations thus made" and that "he alone could have the motive for making such alterations". Was the conviction of the accused proper although the conviction was premised merely on the aforesaid ratiocination? Explain your answer. (3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: (d) Yes. the conviction is proper because there is a presumption in law that the possessor and user of a falsified document is the one who falsified the same. Art 172; Use of falsified documents 1987 No. VI: M was forced by a policeman to sign a document entitled "Sinumpaang Salaysay" in which M implicated X as the brain behind the robbery of a bank where P500,000.00 were lost. The document was prepared by the policeman upon advice of B, the bank's lawyer, who was present when the policeman asked M to sign the document. As M refused to sign it, the policeman held him by the neck and forced him to sign, which he did as he was afraid he might be bodily harmed. During the hearing of the robbery before the Fiscal's Office, B submitted the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" as evidence, on the basis of which X was included in the information filed by the Fiscal in court. When M testified in court, he repudiated the document and told the court there was no truth to its contents as he was merely forced to sign it. (a)
May M be held liable for perjury?
(b) Did lawyer B commit any crime when he used the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" as evidence. Answer
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b) The lawyer would be liable under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code for the offense of introducing a false document in a judicial proceeding, as he knew the same to be false. Art 177; Usurpation of Official Functions 1985 No. 8 While his marriage to Sylvia was subsisting, Rollie took Cynthia, who had been legally separated from her husband, to Ramon Abad, who, in priestly attire and posing as Fr. Chavez of the Aglipayan Church, solemnized their marriage. After the marriage, Rollie took Cynthia to Baguio on a week-long honeymoon. As a fiscal and based on the foregoing facts, what charge or charges will you file and against whom? Discuss. Answer: As a fiscal, I will file a charge of Usurpation of Official Functions against Ramon Abad. He merely posed as a priest of the Aglipayan Church and was not therefore authorized to solemnize a marriage. Solemnization of a marriage is an official function. (U.S. v. Hernandez, 29 Phil. 109). Against Rollie, the charge will be a marriage contracted in contravention of law which is penalized in Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code as an Illegal Marriage, It cannot be bigamy as the marriage with Cynthia did not have all the essential requisites of a valid marriage, (People v. Peralta CA-GR No. 13130-R, June 30, 1955). Art 181; False testimony 1994 No. 13: Paolo was charged with homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Andrew, a prosecution witness, testified that he saw Paolo shoot Abby during their heated argument. While the case is still pending, the City Hall of Manila burned down and the entire records of the case were destroyed. Later, the records were reconstituted. Andrew was again called to the witness stand. This time he testified that his first testimony was false and the truth was he was abroad when the crime took place. The judge immediately ordered the prosecution of Andrew for giving a false testimony favorable to the defendant in a criminal case. 1) Will the case against Andrew prosper? 2) Paolo was acquitted. The decision became final on January 10, 1987. On June 18. 1994 a case of giving false testimony was filed against Andrew. As his lawyer, what legal step will you take? Answer: 1) Yes. For one to be criminally liable under Art. 181, RFC, it is not necessary that the criminal case where Andrew testified is terminated first. It is not even required of the prosecution to prove which of the two statements of the witness is false and to prove the statement to be false by evidence other than the contradictory statements (People vs. Arazola, 13 Court of Appeals Report, 2nd series, p. 808). 2) As lawyer of Andrew, I will file a motion to quash the Information on the ground of prescription. The crime of false testimony under Art. 180 has prescribed because Paolo, the accused in the principal case, was acquitted on Page 199 of 374
January 10, 1987 and therefore the penalty prescribed for such crime is arresto mayor under Art. 180, par. 4, RPC. Crimes punishable by arresto mayor prescribes in five (5) years (Art. 90, par. 3, RPC). But the case against Andrew was filed only on June 18, 1994, whereas the principal criminal case was decided with finality on January 10, 1987 and, thence the prescriptive period of the crime commenced to run. From January 10, 1987 to June 18, 1994 is more than five (5) years. Art 183; Perjury 1978 No. VIII-a A was defendant in a collection suit for an unpaid loan extended to him by B. In his answer under oath, A swore he did not owe B anything, much less did he borrow any amount from him. The court found A's answer to be false and rendered judgment for B. A was later charged with, and prosecuted for, perjury for making a false statement under oath. Decide, state your reasons. Answer A is not liable for perjury. Verification of the answer is not required by law (People vs. Tupasi, 36 O.G. 2038). In a recent decision, the Supreme Court also held that a verified answer pertinent to the issue is absolutely privileged (Flordelis vs. Himalaloan, et al. L-8088, July 31, 1978). Perjury is any sworn false statement on any material matter made before a person authorized to administer oath whenever the law so requires, (Art. 183, R.P.C.) Art 183; Perjury 1984 No. 8 A executed an affidavit in support of a criminal complaint for estafa he filed against B. After an amicable settlement under which A was paid the swindled amount, he made another affidavit wherein he detailed events totally inconsistent with the facts narrated in the first affidavit. Later, B filed a complaint for perjury against A with the Fiscal's Office and presented in support thereof the two contradictory affidavits of A. No other evidence was submitted. If you were the investigating fiscal, how would you resolve the case? Why? Answer: A.
Furnished by Office of Justice Palma
The complaint should be dismissed. The respondent or accused cannot be convicted of the crime of perjury solely on the basis of his contradictory sworn statements. It is further necessary to prove which of the two statements is false by evidence other than the contradictory statements. B.
Comments and Suggested Answer
If I were the fiscal, I would dismiss the complaint for perjury. There is no perjury solely on the basis of two contradictory statement. There must be further evidence to show which of the two sworn statements is false. (U.S. vs. Capistrano 40 Phil. 902). Art 183; Perjury
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1987 No. VI: M was forced by a policeman to sign a document entitled "Sinumpaang Salaysay" in which M implicated X as the brain behind the robbery of a bank where P500,000.00 were lost. The document was prepared by the policeman upon advice of B, the bank's lawyer, who was present when the policeman asked M to sign the document. As M refused to sign it, the policeman held him by the neck and forced him to sign, which he did as he was afraid he might be bodily harmed. During the hearing of the robbery before the Fiscal's Office, B submitted the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" as evidence, on the basis of which X was included in the information filed by the Fiscal in court. When M testified in court, he repudiated the document and told the court there was no truth to its contents as he was merely forced to sign it. (a)
May M be held liable for perjury?
(b) Did lawyer B commit any crime when he used the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" as evidence. Answer a) M is not liable for perjury. He did not sign the document freely and voluntarily but due to the force employed by the policeman. Perjury refers to deliberate distortion of truth. The facts of the problem do not state that the documents was signed before an officer authorized to administer oath. It is, therefore, doubtful that the facts would constitute perjury. Art 183; Perjury 1991 No. 18: A, who was the client of B (a lawyer), signed a retainer agreement for the payment of attorney's fees. After B rendered satisfactory service, A refused to pay the attorney's fees. B sued. In her verified answer, A alleged that she did not owe money to plaintiff B nor did she engage his legal services. These statements under oath were false. B filed a criminal complaint for perjury against A, and an information was filed in court. If you are the lawyer for accused A, what Is your defense, if any? Answer: I will move for the dismissal of the complaint for perjury. The falsity of sworn statement must be required or authorized by law (Flordeliz v. Himalalaon, 84 SCRA 277). Art 183; Perjury 1996 No. 13; Sisenando purchased the share of the stockholders of Estrella Corporation in two installments, making him the majority stockholder thereof and eventually, its president. Because the stockholders who sold their stocks failed to comply with their warranties attendant to the sale, Sisenando withheld payment of the second installment due on the shares and deposited the money in escrow instead, subject to release once said stockholders comply with their warranties. The stockholders concerned, in turn, rescinded the sale in question and removed Sisenando from the Presidency of the Estrella Corporation, Sisenando then filed a verified complaint for damages against said stockholders in his capacity as president and principal stockholder of Estrella Corporation. In retaliation, the
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stockholders concerned, after petitioning the Securities and Exchange Commission to declare the rescission valid, further filed a criminal case for perjury against Sisenando, claiming that the latter perjured himself when he stated under oath in the verification of his complaint for damages that he is the President of the Estrella Corporation when in fact he had already been removed as such. Under the facts of the case, could Sisenando be held liable for perjury? Explain. Answer; No, Sisenando may not be held liable for perjury because It cannot be reasonably maintained that he willfully and deliberately made an assertion of a falsehood when he alleged in the complaint that he is the President of the Corporation, obviously, he made the allegation on the premise that his removal from the presidency is not valid and that is precisely the issue brought about by his complaint to the SEC. It is a fact that Sisenando has been the President of the corporation and it Is from that position that the stockholders concerned purportedly removed him, whereupon he filed the complaint questioning his removal. There is no willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood which is a requisite of perjury, Art 183; Perjury 1997 No 14: A, a government employee, was administratively charged with immorality for having an affair with B, a co-employee in the same office who believed him to be single. To exculpate himself, A testified that he was single and was willing to marry B, He Induced C to testify and C did testify that B was single. The truth, however, was that A had earlier married D, now a neighbor of C. Is A guilty of perjury? Are A and C guilty of subordination of perjury? Answer No. A is not guilty of perjury because the willful falsehood asserted by him is not material to the charge of immorality. Whether A is single or married, the charge of immorality against him as a government employee could proceed or prosper. In other words, A's civil status is not a defense to the charge of immorality, hence, not a material matter that could influence the charge. There is no crime of subornation of perjury. The crime is now treated as plain perjury with the one inducing another as the principal inducement, and the latter, as principal by direct participation (People vs. Podol 66 Phil. 365). Since in this case A cannot be held liable for perjury, the matter that he testified to being immaterial, he cannot therefore be held responsible as a principal by inducement when he induced C to testify on his status. Consequently, C is not liable as principal by direct participation in perjury, having testified on matters not material to an administrative case. Art 184; Subornation of perjury 1993 No. 12: Explain and illustrate the following: 1) aberratio ictus, 2) impossible crime, and 3) subornation of perjury. Answer;
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3) Subornation of perjury - Procuring another to swear falsely and testify under circumstances rendering him guilty of perjury. Art 200; Grave scandal 1996 No. 15: Pia, a bold actress living on top floor of a plush condominium in Makati City sunbathed naked at its penthouse every Sunday morning. She was unaware that the business executives holding office at the adjoining tall buildings reported to office every Sunday morning and, with the use of powerful binoculars, kept on gazing at her while she sunbathed. Eventually, her sunbathing became the talk of the town. 1) What crime, if any, did Pia commit? Explain, 2) What crime, if any, did the business executives commit? Explain. Answer: 1) Pia did not commit a crime, The felony closest to making Pia criminally liable is Grave Scandal, but then such act is not to be considered as highly scandalous and offensive against decency and good customs. In the first place, it was not done in a public place and within public knowledge or view. As a matter of fact it was discovered by the executives accidentally and they have to use binoculars to have public and full view of Pia sunbathing in the nude. 2) The business executives did not commit any crime. Their acts could not be acts of lasciviousness [as there was no overt lustful act), or slander, as the eventual talk of the town, resulting from her sunbathing, is not directly imputed to the business executives, and besides such topic is not intended to defame or put Pia to ridicule. Art 201; obscene publications 1993 No. 8: Juan and Petra are officemates. Later, intimacy developed between them. One day, Juan sent to Petra a booklet contained in a pay envelope which was securely sealed. The booklet is unquestionably indecent and highly offensive to morals. Juan was thereafter charged under par. 3 of Art. 201 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by P.D. 969, which provides that the penalty of prision mayor or a fine from P6,000 to P12,000, or both such imprisonment and fine shall be imposed upon those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or literature which are offensive to morals. Is Juan guilty of the crime charged? Reasons. Answer: No. Juan is not guilty of the crime charged because the law (Art. 201, RPC) covers only the protection of public moral and not only the moral of an individual.
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Crimes Committed by Public Officers Art 203; Public Officers; definition 1999 No VII (a) Who are public officers? (2%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: (a) Public Officers are persons who, by direct provision of the law, popular election or appointment by competent authority, takes part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippines, or performs in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official, of any rank or class (Art. 203, RPC) Art 208; maliciously refraining from instituting prosecution & Robbery 1992 No. 6: Mrs. Lydia Cortes presented herself to Special Police Officer 2 (SPO 2} Cirio Cellado at the Northern Police Headquarters with her niece Nani, age 17, and the latter's friend, Chabeng, age 16, asking for help in filing a criminal case. It appears that while working as househelp in the home of Col. Rolando Donido (retired), the latter would call them alternately, lock them up with him in a room and force his lustful desires upon them. Sobbing violently, Nani narrated how finally her employer succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her because he kept on threatening to kill her if she refused to submit to him or if she told Mrs. Donido about what was happening. On the other hand, Chabeng described how their employer took liberties with her body, short of destroying her virginity. If they so much as resisted, they were subjected to a lot of verbal abuse and harassment. Unable to bear it any longer, both of them ran away. Nani got married immediately to a former boyfriend to save herself from the humiliation of appearing in their hometown, pregnant but still single. She ended her story saying that no housegirl ever stayed long in that household "kasi walang patawad iyang D.O.M. (Dirty Old Man ) na iyan". b) After SPO2 Cirio Cellado heard the story of the two girls, he took aside Mrs. Cortes and made this proposition: "Let me tell you what I plan to do. Since the D.O.M. is probably well-known in his community, he will not want his reputation tarnished, I'll tell him that you have reported him to us and you are all set to file criminal charges against him at the Prosecutor's Office. But if he will give us P50,000.00, you may be persuaded not to file the suit anymore. Actually, after he gives that amount, which he surely will, I shall visit him regularly for more. We shall then divide equally the money we shall get from him. Suppose Cellado proceeds to carry out his plan and is caught by his Chief with incontrovertible evidence, what action or actions may be brought by his superiors to penalize him and to recover whatever sums of money he may have received from his victim? Suggested Answer: b) Cellado should be charged of robbery because he took personal property from, Donido, with intent to gain, with intimidation on the person of the latter. The money passed into the hands of Cellado involuntarily because of fear (intimidation) on the part of the offended party, Donido. Likewise, Cellado can be held liable under Art. 208, RPC, he being a public officer who maliciously refrained from instituting prosecution against violators of the law. An agent of a person in authority charged with the Page 204 of 374
apprehension and investigation of a crime is an integral part of the prosecution of offenses. Art 208; Negligence or tolerance in prosecution of offenses 1991 No. 20: A, an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu, was assigned to conduct the preliminary investigations of two criminal cases: (1) for rape against X, and (2) for estafa against Y. Unknown to the complainants, both respondents were schoolmates of A in their high school years in Lanao del Norte. Despite the overwhelming evidence against X, A dismissed the rape case. Despite the overwhelming evidence against Y, A did not file the information for estafa because according to him, the folder of the case to which were attached the dishonored checks and other documents offered in evidence by the complainant was stolen. Contrary to such claim, the folder was kept in a safe in his house. What offense or offenses under the Title on Crimes Committed By Public Officers of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code may A be charged with? Answer: Art. 208 is violated, that is maliciously refraining from instituting prosecution for punishment of violators of the law. Likewise, the prosecutor is liable under Art. 226 for removing and cancelling public document entrusted to his custody. Art 210; Bribery 1975 No XI A municipal judge, in consideration of Pl,000.00 given him by the complainant and at the latter's request, rendered a decision convicting the accused. If you were the fiscal, would you prosecute him for bribery or for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment? Why? Answer If I were the fiscal, I would prosecute him for bribery. By receiving money from the complainant and at his request, rendering a decision convicting the accused, the judge, for a consideration, performed an act related to the duties of his office. Such constitutes bribery. The facts do not sustain the offense of knowingly rendering unjust judgment. First, it does not appear that the judgment is unjust, that is against the law and the evidence and second, even if it is assumed it is unjust, it also does not appear that the judge rendered the judgment knowing it is un-just, that is, maliciously and in bad faith. (U.S. v. Gacutan, 28 Phil. 100), Art 210; Bribery 1977 No. VIII-a A policeman told the overspeeding driver whom he arrested that he will release him without any case being filed if he will give him P10.00. The driver refused, and instead filed a case of attempted bribery against the policeman. Did the driver file the proper case? State your reasons, Answer The driver did not file the proper case. There is no attempted bribery because of the nature of the crime. To solicit a bribe is not punished in Art. 210 which refers to the agreeing to perform or not to perform an act in consideration Page 205 of 374
of a gift or promise. Par. 3 of said article punishes the act of receiving a gift or accepting a promise if given or promised to make the public officer refrain from doing something which it was his official duty to do. Art 210; Bribery & Corruption of public official 1993 No. 3: Arevalo, a judge who heard a civil case, received gifts from Maricel, the plaintiff therein, but rendered judgment in favor of Julie, the defendant therein. Who are criminally liable, and for what crime or crimes? Explain. Answer; 1) Arevalo, the Judge, is liable for Indirect bribery (Art. 210 RPC) and for violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standard (Sec. 7 (d) RA 6713 and also PD 46). 2)
Maricel is liable for corruption of public officer (Art, 212, RFC and PD
46). Art 210; Bribery & Corruption of public official 1985 No. 18: While manning the traffic lights at the intersection of Espana and Washington Streets, Patrolman Torres ordered BB to stop his taxi, threatened to arrest him and confiscate his driver's license allegedly for speeding and reckless driving. Conversant with the dirty ways of some traffic officers, BB pulled out his wallet, picked up his driver's license with the hidden P20.00 bill inside the same and handed it to Patrolman Torres, Thereafter, Patrolman Torres returned SB's license and allowed him to go. What criminal prosecution may be filed against Pat, Torres and/or BB under the circumstances? Discuss. Answer: Patrolman Torres should be charged with bribery and BB the driver for corruption of a public officer, in the supposition that the driver was speeding and for reckless driving. The money was given by the driver so as not to be arrested and for his driver's license not to be confiscated. But if the driver was not speeding nor was there reckless driving but the policeman threatened to arrest him and confiscate his driver's license, the giving of the P20.00 bill would be due to the intimidation employed by the policeman. In this case, the policeman will be liable for robbery thru intimidation. The driver will not incur any criminal liability. Art 210; Bribery & Corruption of public official 1983 No. 14 A building contractor offered a bribe to an engineer employed in the Ministry of public Works and Highways. The latter refused the offer, not because of moral scruples but because he thought he was being entrapped. (a) What crime or crimes, if any, under the Revised Penal Code were committed and by whom? Give the basis of the liability or non-liability of both the building contractor and the engineer. (b) Did either or both offerer and offeree commit any offense under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act [Republic Act No. 3019}? Why? Answer
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a) The building contractor is liable for attempted corruption of a public officer because the bribe offered was not accepted by the engineer of the Ministry of Public Works and Highways, who is a public officer. (Art. 212 Rev. Penal Code) The engineer does not incur any criminal liability. The reason for the refusal is immaterial. Art 210; Bribery & Corruption of public official 2001 No X Deputy Sheriff Ben Rivas received from the RTC Clerk of Court a Writ of Execution in the case of Ejectment filed by Mrs. Maria Estrada vs. Luis Ablan. The judgment being in favor of Estrada, Rivas went to her lawyer's office where he was given the necessary amounts constituting the sheriffs fees and expenses for execution in the total amount of P550.00, aside from P2,000.00 in consideration of prompt enforcement of the writ from Estrada and her lawyer. The writ was successfully enforced. a)
What crime, if any, did the sheriff commit? (3%)
b) Was there any crime committed by Estrada and her lawyer and if so, what crime? (2%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: a) The sheriff committed the crime of Direct Bribery under the second paragraph of Article 210, Revised Penal Code, since the P2,000 was received by him "in consideration" of the prompt enforcement of the writ of execution which is an official duty of the sheriff to do. ALTERNATIVE ANSWER; a) On the premise that even without the P2,000, Sheriff Ben Rivas had to carry out the writ of execution and not that he would be implementing the writ only because of the P2,000.00, the receipt of the amount by said sheriff may be regarded as a gift received by reason of his office and not as a "consideration" for the performance of an official duty; hence, only indirect Bribery would be committed by said sheriff. b) On the part of the plaintiff and her lawyer as giver of the bribe-money, the crime is Corruption of Public Officials under Article 212, Revised Penal Code. Art 210; Bribery; direct 1990 No. 9; a) Melda, who is the private secretary of Judge Tolits Naya. was persuaded by a litigant, Jumbo, to have his case calendared as early as possible for a consideration of P500. May she be held criminally liable for this accommodation? Explain your answer. b) What will be the criminal liability of Melda if she volunteered to persuade Judge Tolits Naya to rule in Jumbo's favor without asking any consideration? Explain your answer. Answer: a) The answer would depend/be qualified by the implication of the phrase "to have his case calendared as early as possible". If the phrase is interrupted as an unjust act and in violation of the rule to give priority to the older cases, then she would be liable under direct bribery for an act which does not constitute a crime but is unjust. He may also be held liable Page 207 of 374
under Section 3(e) of RA. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended: "x x x giving any private party any unwarranted benefits". If you interpret the phrase as a non-violation of the rules and regulations then he can only be held liable for direct bribery. b) Melda is not criminally liable because the act of volunteering to persuade is not a criminal act. It is the act of persuading that is considered a criminal act. The act does not fall under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code on Direct Bribery nor does it fall under Article 211 of the RPC on Indirect Bribery. Neither does it fall under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 3(a) of RA. 3019 refers to acts of persuading another public official to violate rules and regulations. Art 210; Bribery; immunity from liability of bribe-giver 1978 No. X-a (2) A public official is liable for prosecution under the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" if he directly or indirectly requests or receives any gift or other pecuniary benefit from any person for whom he has secured or will secure any government permit or license in consideration of such help. In a case, the fiscal prosecuted both the bribe-giver and the public official under the Act. The bribegiver engaged your services as his counsel. What action will you take in his defense? Explain. Answer As counsel of the bribe-giver, I would advise him to take advantage of the immunity given to the bribe-giver under Presidential Decree No. 749 by testifying for the prosecution. Art 210; Bribery; immunity from liability of bribe-giver 1984 No. 7 Under what conditions is a bribe-giver immune from criminal prosecution? What is the scope of his immunity? Answer A. Furnished by Office of Justice Palma 1.
When the information refers to consummated offense of bribery.
2. When the information and testimony of the giver are necessary for the conviction of the accused public official. 3. When such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the State. 4. When the informant has not yet been previously convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The givers of bribes and their accomplices are exempt from prosecution or punishment for the offense with reference to which their information and testimonies were given. B.
Comments and Suggested Answer
A bribe giver is immune from criminal prosecution if the following requisites are present: 1) the information must refer to consummated bribery; 2) the information and testimony are necessary for the conviction of the accused
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public officer; 3) such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the State; 4) such information and testimony can be corroborated on material points; and 5) the informant or witness has not been previously convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The informant or witness shall be exempt from prosecution or punishment for the offense to which the information or testimony where given and this immunity may be enjoyed by such informant or witness notwithstanding that he offered the bribe to the public official or is an accomplice for such bribe giving or even in cases where the information and testimony are given against a person who is not a public officer but who is a principal or accomplice or accessory in the commission of the bribery. Art 211; Indirect bribery 1997 No. 16: A, who is the private complainant in a murder case pending before a Regional Trial Court Judge, gave a judge a Christmas gift, consisting of big basket of assorted canned goods and bottles of expensive wines, easily worth P10.000.00. The judge accepted the gift knowing it came from A. What crime or crimes, if any, were committed? Answer: The Judge committed the crime of Indirect bribery under Art. 211 of the Revised Penal Code. The gift was offered to the Judge by reason of his office. In addition, the Judge will be liable for the violation of P.D. 46 which punishes the receiving of gifts by pubic officials and employees on occasions like Christmas. Art 213; Frauds against the public treasury 1988 No. 12: (b) A city official ordered one million pesos (P1M) worth of T-shirts at public expense for the underprivileged residents of his city. After full payment with city funds was made, it was discovered that only a fourth of the T-shirts had been delivered and that the rest of the deliveries were so-called "ghost deliveries." Answer: (b) (1) The city official is liable for violation of Article 213 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that: Article 213. Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses,—The penalty of prision correccional in its medium period to prision mayor in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from P200 to P10,000 shall be imposed upon any public officer who: 1. In his official capacity, in dealing with any person with regard to furnishing supplies, the making of contracts, or the adjustment or settlement of accounts relating to public property of funds, shall enter into an agreement with any interested party or speculator or make use of any other scheme, to defraud the government; 2. Being entrusted with the collection of taxes, licenses, fees and other impost, shall be guilty of any of the following acts or omissions: (a) Demanding, directly or indirectly, the payment of sums different from or larger than those authorized by law.
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(b) Failing voluntarily to issue a receipt, as provided by law, for any sum of money collected by him officially. (c) Collecting or receiving, directly or indirectly, by way of payment or otherwise, things or objects of a different nature from that provided by law. When the culprit is an officer or employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Bureau of Customs, the provisions of the Administrative Code shall be applied; and violation of: (b) (2) Act 3019 sec. 3 (g) which provides that: Corrupt practices of public officers "IN ADDITION" to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful."
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Art 213; Illegal exaction 1975 No. IX A municipal treasurer received P500.00 from a taxpayer but neglected to issue the corresponding receipt. Is he criminally liable? Why? Answer The law provides that the failure of the Municipal Treasurer to issue a receipt for the amount paid as a tax must be "voluntary" in order that illegal exaction may be committed. (Art. 213, par. 2). The mere fact, however, that he "neglected" to issue the receipt would not make him necessarily liable because in a crime against public officers like illegal exaction, negligence is not mere laxity but laxity in the performance of duties approximating fraud and malice or the negligence must be shown to be positively and clearly inexcusable. (People v. Bernas, CA 53 O.G. 1106). Art 213; illegal exaction vs estafa 1977 No. VIII-b A teller of the provincial treasurer's office told the landowner that his real estate tax due is P500.00 when actually it is only P400. The landowner paid as told. In order that the landowner will not discover the excess, the teller made it appear in the original of the official receipt to be given to the landowner that P500.00 was paid but in the duplicate left with him, the true amount of P400.00 was stated. Thereafter, the teller misappropriated the entire amount of P500.00. Assuming that you are the investigating fiscal, what crime will you file against the teller? State your reasons. Answer As investigating fiscal, I would file against the teller three crimes, to wit: (1) illegal exaction or estafa, (2) falsification of public document, and (3) malversation. By telling the landowner that his real estate tax due was P500.00 which was paid, when actually it was only P400.00 the teller of the provincial treasurer's office collected an amount bigger than that authorized by law. The teller is a public officer and in view of his duties is entrusted with the collection of taxes. Illegal exaction is committed. The total amount of P500.00 was paid in the concept of tax and forms a part of the public funds. The misappropriation of P500.00 would constitute malversation of public funds since the one prejudiced is the government (People v. Policher, 60 Phil. 771). However, if the teller by means of deceit, collected the sum of P500.00 to misappropriate the excess of P100.00, estafa and not illegal exaction is committed (U.S. Lopez, et al, 10 Phil. 480). The falsification of the original of the official receipt is an independent crime since it was committed in order that the landowner would not discover the excess. The misappropriation of the P400 being paid as a tax is malversation. Art 217; Malversation 1975 No. XVI Can a private person commit malversation? If so, in what instances? Answer In two cases, to wit: 1) if the private person conspired with an accountable public officer in the misappropriation of public funds or property in his custody; 2) if a private person misappropriates any insular, provincial or municipal funds or property of which he has charge in any capacity. (Art. 222, Revised Penal Code). Page 211 of 374
Art 217; Malversation 1977 No. VIII-b A teller of the provincial treasurer's office told the landowner that his real estate tax due is P500.00 when actually it is only P400. The landowner paid as told. In order that the landowner will not discover the excess, the teller made it appear in the original of the official receipt to be given to the landowner that P500.00 was paid but in the duplicate left with him, the true amount of P400.00 was stated. Thereafter, the teller misappropriated the entire amount of P500.00. Assuming that you are the investigating fiscal, what crime will you file against the teller? State your reasons. Answer As investigating fiscal, I would file against the teller three crimes, to wit: (1) illegal exaction or estafa, (2) falsification of public document, and (3) malversation. By telling the landowner that his real estate tax due was P500.00 which was paid, when actually it was only P400.00 the teller of the provincial treasurer's office collected an amount bigger than that authorized by law. The teller is a public officer and in view of his duties is entrusted with the collection of taxes. Illegal exaction is committed. The total amount of P500.00 was paid in the concept of tax and forms a part of the public funds. The misappropriation of P500.00 would constitute malversation of public funds since the one prejudiced is the government (People v. Policher, 60 Phil. 771). However, if the teller by means of deceit, collected the sum of P500.00 to misappropriate the excess of P100.00, estafa and not illegal exaction is committed (U.S. Lopez, et al, 10 Phil. 480). The falsification of the original of the official receipt is an independent crime since it was committed in order that the landowner would not discover the excess. The misappropriation of the P400 being paid as a tax is malversation. Art 217; Malversation 1978 No. VIII-b Upon examination of the accounts of a municipal treasurer of Valenzuela, Metro Manila (formerly Bulacan), the auditor found a shortage of Pl,000.00. When informed of the shortchange, the treasurer took out P1,000.00 from his wallet and turned over the amount to the auditor, who accepted the same. One month later, the treasurer was charged with, and prosecuted for, malversation. His defense was that he had balanced his accounts. Decide with reasons. Answer The treasurer is not liable for malversation. Because, when the shortchange of Pl,000.00 was discovered and the treasurer was notified, he at once took out Pl,000.00 from his wallet and turned over the amount to the auditor who accepted the same. There is, therefore, no prima facie evidence of malversation. (U.S. vs. Feliciano, 15 Phil. 149). Art 217; Malversation 1987 No. X: Pedro, a municipal treasurer, received from the Provincial Treasurer of the Province five (5) brand new typewriters for use in the municipal treasurer's office. Each typewriter is valued at P10,000.00. Since Pedro needed money for the hospitalization of his sick son, he sold four (4) of the typewriters to his friend,
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Rodolfo, a general merchant in San Isidro for P2,000.00 each or a total of P8,000.00. Rodolfo as a general merchant knew that one typewriter could easily be between P6,000.00 to P10,000.00, and for this reason he readily agreed to buy the four typewriters, Rodolfo then resold the typewriters at P6,000.00 thus, making a profit of P16,000. Two months after the transaction, Pedro was audited and the investigation as to his accountabilities led to the discovery that Rodolfo bought the four (4) typewriters from Pedro, (a)
What crime did Pedro commit?
(b)
Is Rodolfo liable as an accessory or for violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law? Answer: a) Pedro committed malversation. The five (5) brand new typewriters received by him from the Provincial Treasurer for use in the Municipal Treasurer's Office were under his custody for which he was accountable as Municipal Treasurer. Selling four (4) of the typewriters to Rodolfo, a general merchant, because he needed the money for the hospitalization of his son constitutes misappropriation as he applied the same for his personal benefit. Art 217; Malversation 1988 No. 12: (a) A public official charged with purchasing rice stocks under government subsidy falsely reported that his stocks of rice worth P17 million on board two barges sank off a neighboring island on their way to their destination and were completely lost. Meanwhile, the rice was surreptitiously sold to rice warehouses in the provinces. What is the criminal liability of this government official? Explain. Answer: (a) The government official being an accountable officer can be charged with malversation thru falsification of official documents. Art 217; Malversation 2001 No IV Accused Juan Santos, a deputy sheriff in a Regional Trial Court, levied on the personal properties of a defendant in a civil case before said court, pursuant to a writ of execution duly Issued by the court. Among the properties levied upon and deposited Inside the "evidence room" of the Clerk of Court for Multiple RTC Salas were a refrigerator, a stock of cassette tapes, a dining table set of chairs and several lampshades. Upon the defendant's paying off the judgment creditor, he tried to claim his properties but found out that several Items were missing, such as the cassette tapes, chairs and lampshades. After due and diligent sleuthing by the police detectives assigned to the case, these missing items were found in the house of accused Santos, who reasoned out that he only borrowed them temporarily. If you were the fiscal /prosecutor, what would be the nature of the Information to be filed against the accused? Why? (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: If I were the fiscal/prosecutor, I would file an Information for Malversation against Juan Santos for the cassette tapes, chain and lampshades which he, as Page 213 of 374
deputy sheriff, levied upon and thus under his accountability as a public officer. Said properties being under levy, are in custodia legis and thus impressed with the character of public property, misappropriation of which constitutes the crime of malversation although said properties belonged to a private individual (Art. 222, RPC). Juan Santos misappropriated such properties when, in breach of trust, he applied them to his own private use and benefit. His allegation that he only borrowed such properties is a lame excuse, devoid of merit as there is no one from whom he borrowed the same. The fact that it was only "after due and diligent sleuthing by the police detectives assigned to the case", that the missing items were found in the house of Santos, negates his pretension. ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: An Information for Theft may be filed, considering that the sheriff had already deposited the properties levied upon in the "evidence room" of the Clerk of Court and may have already been relieved of his accountability therefor. If Juan Santos was no longer the public officer who should be accountable for the properties levied upon and found in his house, his taking of such properties would no longer constitute Malversation but Theft, as there was taking with intent to gain, of personal property of another without the consent of the latter. Art 217; Malversation 2001 No V Alex Reyes, together with Jose Santos, were former warehousemen of the Rustan Department Store. In 1986, the PCGG sequestered the assets, fund and properties of the owners-incorporators of the store, alleging that they constitute "Ill-gotten wealth" of the Marcos family. Upon their application, Reyes and Santos were appointed as fiscal agents of the sequestered firm and they were given custody and possession of the sequestered building and its contents, including various vehicles used in the firm's operations. After a few months, an inventory was conducted and it was discovered that two (2) delivery vans were missing. After demand was made upon them, Reyes and Santos failed to give any satisfactory explanation why the vans were missing or to turn them over to the PCGG; hence, they were charged with Malversation of Public Property. During the trial, the two accused claimed that they are not public accountable officers and, if any crime was committed, it should only be Estafa under Art. 315, par. l(b) of the Revised Penal Code. What is the proper offense committed? State the reason(s) for your answer. (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER; The proper offense committed was Malversation of Public Property, not estafa, considering that Reyes and Santos, upon their application, were constituted as "fiscal agents" of the sequestered firm and were "given custody and possession" of the sequestered properties, including the delivery vans which later they could not account for. They were thus made the depositary and administrator of properties deposited by public authority and hence, by the duties of their office/position, they are accountable for such properties. Such properties, having been sequestered by the Government through the PCGG, are in custodia
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legis and therefore impressed with the character of public property, even though the properties belong to a private individual (Art. 222, RPC). The failure of Reyes and Santos to give any satisfactory explanation why the vans were missing, is prima facie evidence that they had put the same to their personal use. Art 217; Malversation 1996 No. 5; Elizabeth is the municipal treasurer of Masinloc, Zambales. On January 10, 1994, she received, as municipal treasurer, from the Department of Public Works and Highways, the amount of P100,000.00 known as the fund for construction, rehabilitation, betterment, and Improvement (CRBI) for the concreting of Barangay Phanix Road located in Masinloc, Zambales, a project undertaken on proposal of the Barangay Captain. Informed that the fund was already exhausted while the concreting of Barangay Phanix Road remained unfinished, a representative of the Commission on Audit conducted a spot audit of Elizabeth who failed to account for the Pl00,000 CRBI fund. Elizabeth, who was charged with malversation of public funds, was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan of that charge but was nevertheless convicted, in the same criminal case, for illegal use of public funds. On appeal, Elizabeth argued that her conviction was erroneous as she applied the amount of P50,000.00 for a public purpose with out violating any law or ordinance appropriating the said amount for any specific purpose. The absence of such law or ordinance was, in fact, established. Is the contention of Elizabeth legally tenable? Explain. Answer: Elizabeth's contention that her conviction for illegal use of public funds (technical malversation) was erroneous, is legally tenable because she was charged for malversation of public funds under Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code but was convicted for Illegal use of public funds which is defined and punished under Art. 220 of said Code. A public officer charged with malversation may not be validly convicted of illegal use of public funds (technical malversation) because the latter crime is not necessarily included nor does it necessarily Include the crime of malversation. The Sandiganbayan should have followed the procedure provided in Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court and order the filing of the proper Information. (Parungao us. Sandiganbayan. 197 SCRA 173.) From the facts, there is no showing that there Is a law or ordinance appropriating the amount to a specific public purpose. As a matter of fact, the problem categorically states that The absence of such law or ordinance was, in fact, established." So, procedurally and substantially , the Sandiganbayan's decision suffers from serious Infirmity. Art 217; Malversation 1999 No XI What constitutes the crime of malversation of public funds or property? (2%) How Is malversation distinguished from estafa? A Municipal Treasurer, accountable for public funds or property, encashed with public funds private checks drawn in favor of his wife. The checks bounced, the drawer not having enough cash in the drawee bank. The Municipal
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Treasurer, in encashing private checks from public funds, violated regulations of his office. Notwithstanding restitution of the amount of the checks, can the Municipal Treasurer nevertheless be criminally liable? What crime did he commit? Explain. (2%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: Malversation of public funds or property is committed by any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, (Art, 217, RPC) Malversation differs from estafa ... Yes, notwithstanding the restitution of the amount of the check, the Municipal Treasurer will be criminally liable as restitution does not negate criminal liability although it may be considered as a mitigating circumstance similar or analogous to voluntary surrender. (People vs. Velasquez, 73 Phil 98), He will be criminally liable for malversation. However, if the restitution was made immediately, under vehement protest against an imputation of malversation and without leaving the office, he may not be criminally liable. Art 217; Malversation 1994 No. 16 Randy, an NBI agent, was issued by the NBI an armalite rifle (Ml6) and a Smith and Wesson Revolver. Cal. 38. After a year, the NBI Director made an inspection of all the firearms issued. Randy, who reported for work that morning, did not show up during the inspection. He went on absence without leave (AWOL). After two years, he surrendered to the NBI the two firearms issued to him. He was charged with malversation of government property before the Sandiganbayan. Randy put up the defense that he did not appropriate the armalite rifle and the revolver for his own use, that the delay in accounting for them does not constitute conversion and that actually the firearms were stolen by his friend, Chiting. Decide the case. Answer: Randy is guilty as charged under Art. 217, RPC. He is accountable for the firearms they issued to him in his official capacity. The failure of Randy to submit the firearms upon demand created the presumption that he converted them for his own use. Even if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation. his failure to account for the government property is enough factual basis for a finding of malversation. Indeed, even his explanation that the guns were stolen is incredible. For if the firearms were actually stolen, he should have reported the matter immediately to the authorities. (People vs. Baguiran , 20 SCRA 453; Felicilda us. Grospe, GR No. 10294, July 3, 1992) Art 217; Malversation 1990 No, 2; Dencio, who is the Municipal Treasurer of the town, was also the treasurer of a charity ball of the church. Because he was short of payroll funds for the Page 216 of 374
municipal employees, he used part of the church funds to replenish the payroll funds with the Intention of returning the same when the public funds came. a) Is Dencio guilty of malversation under the revised Penal Code? State your reasons, b) Assuming that he failed to replenish the church funds, may he be held criminally liable thereby? Explain. Answer: a) No. The church funds used by Dencio do not constitute public funds which are the proper subject of malversation. Neither does said funds constitute the so-called private funds, which could be the proper subject of malversation under Article 222, Revised Penal Code which pertain to private property placed in the custody of public officers by reason of their office. Art 217; Malversation & Estafa 1986 No 21: Corporal Hamak and Sergeant Salat, both policemen, responded to a call for assistance from Maglimayon, the owner of a bar along Mabini Street. It appears that Maligalig, a customer, had been creating trouble in the bar, prompting the owner to request him to leave. Maligalig pulled a gun and shot Maglimayon, Slightly wounded, Maglimayon reached for his own gun but before he could shoot, other customers subdued Maligalig. Corporal Hamak and Sergeant Salat questioned the protagonists and got an admission from Maligalig that the gun he used was unlicensed. On the other hand, Maglimayon produced the license and permit for his firearm. Hamak confiscated Maligalig's firearm. Salat asked for Maglimayon's firearm, explaining that he had to bring it to the police headquarters for examination but promised that he would return it to Maglimayon in five days. (a) Hamak sold the firearm of Maligalig. What offense, if any did Hamak commit? Give the elements of the offense as part of the explanation in your answer. (b) Salat gave away Maglimayon's firearm as a gift to his girlfriend. What offense, if any, did Salat Commit? Explain. Answer: (a) Hamak will be liable for malversation. Since the firearm was unlicensed, then it should be confiscated by the Government as what Hamak did. Such partake of the nature of public property with Hamak, a public officer, having the custody thereof. (People vs. Magsino CA 50 O.G. 678), The elements of malversation are: 1.
The offender is a public officer
2. He has the custody or control of public funds or property by reason of his office. 3.
He is accountable for these public funds or property.
4. He appropriates, takes, misappropriates, consents, or through abandonment or negligence, permits another to take the same (Art. 217, Revised Penal Code).
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(b) Salat committed estafa. He received the licensed firearm from the owner who is a private person with the promise to return it after it has been examined in the police headquarters. The fact that he gave it to his girlfriend constitutes misappropriation as he has the obligation to return it to the owner. Art 217; Malversation & estafa 1999 No XI How Is malversation distinguished from estafa? SUGGESTED ANSWER: Malversation differs from estafa in that malversation is committed by an accountable public officer Involving public funds or property under his custody and accountability; while estafa is committed by non-accountable public officer or private individual involving funds or property for which he is not accountable to the government. Art 217; Malversation thru falsification of public document 1980 No. IX "Q", a postmaster, stole a treasury warrant payable to "R" valued at P30, increased the amount to P230.00 by adding the figure "2" before "3", and forged "R's" name as well as that of "S", making it appear that "R" had endorsed the warrant to "S" and then later cashed it. "Q" thereafter misappropriate the amount represented by the altered warrant. Of what complex crime would you hold "Q" liable? Which crime would control the penalty to be imposed on him, assuming that he is found guilty? Answer The facts of the problem are similar to those in the case of People vs. Silvallana, 61 Phil. 636 altho in this case the postmaster Q was the one who stole the treasury warrant payable to R and who raised the amount stated therein from P30.00 to P230,00 and forged R's name as well as that of S making it appear that R had endorsed the warrant to S. In the problem, the fact is stated that the postmaster cashed the forged treasury warrant and misappropriated the amount represented in the altered warrant. Falsification of a public document (treasury warrant) is committed because of the alteration of the amount appearing in the treasury warrant, a genuine document am] by causing it to appear that "R", the payee, endorsed the document to "S" and "S" encashed it which is false. (Art. 171 pars. 2 and 6, R.P.C.) The falsification was committed to facilitate the misappropriation by Q of the proceeds of the treasury warrant, which are public funds, Q, therefore, committed the complex crime of malversation thru falsification of public document. The more serious crime, which in this case is the falsification, will control the penalty, which is to be imposed in its maximum period. In a complex crime, the penalty is for the more serious crime, to be imposed in its maximum period. (Art. 48 R.P.C.) Art 223; Infidelity in custody of prisoners 1996 No. 14:
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A chief of police of a municipality, believing in good faith that a prisoner serving a ten-day sentence in the municipal jail, would not escape, allowed said prisoner to sleep at the latter's house because the municipal Jail was so congested and there was no bed space available. Accordingly, the prisoner went home to sleep every night but returned to jail early each morning, until the tenday sentence had been fully served. Did the Chief of Police commit any crime? Explain. Answer: The Chief of Police is guilty of violation of Art. 223, RPC, consenting or conniving to evasion, the elements of which are (a) he is a public officer, (b) he is in charge or custody of a prisoner, detention or prisoner by final judgment, (c) that the prisoner escaped, and (d) there must be connivance. Relaxation of a prisoner is considered infidelity, thus making the penalty ineffectual; although the convict may not have fled (US vs. Bandino, 9 Phil. 459) it Is still violative of the provision. It also includes a case when the guard allowed the prisoner, who is serving a six-day sentence in the municipal Jail, to sleep in his house and eat there (People vs. Revilla). Art 223; Infidelity in custody of prisoners 1981 No. 15 "D", a detention prisoner for Homicide, escaped while working at the guest house of a provincial governor, which at the time was being rented by the province. The detainee worked at the guest house pursuant to a note of the Governor to the Assistant Provincial Warden asking for five men to work in the guest house. The note did not mention the names of the prisoners under surveillance, who picked the men to compose the work party. Would you find the Governor and the Assistant Provincial Warden guilty of Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoners? Answer The Provincial Governor and the Assistant Provincial Warden cannot be guilty of Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoners. This crime is committed in two ways, to wit: (1) by a public officer who shall consent to the escape of a prisoner in his custody or charge (Art. 223, Rev. Penal Code) and (2) by a public officer in whose custody on charge a prisoner has escaped by reason of his negligence (Art. 224, Rev. Penal Code). Under the first mode, connivance in the escape of the prisoner on the part of the public officer is an essential condition in the commission of the crime of infidelity in the custody of the prisoner. No connivance in the escape of the detention prisoner "D" from the custody of the Provincial Guard charge with the duty of keeping prisoner under surveillance can be deduced from the note of the Governor to the Assistant Provincial Warden asking for five men to work in the guest house as the note does not mention the names of the prisoners to be brought to the guest house. The provincial guard was the one who picked the men to compose the work party. Nor is the crime committed under the second mode. Since negligence resulting in evasion is definite laxity amount to deliberate won performance of duty. If there is negligence committed, it must be that of the Provincial Guard who is the public officer charged with the custody and guarding of the prisoner "D" (Alberto vs. Judge de la Cruz, L-31939, June 30, 1980. 98 SCRA 406). Page 219 of 374
Art 223; Infidelity in custody of prisoners 1979 No. X X is serving a 6-year prison term. In his fourth year in prison, he discovered that the judge committed a mistake in giving him a 6-year sentence when the law he violated called for a 3 years imprisonment only. Y, the jail guard and a law student chucked X's contention and found it correct X did not want to go to court anymore as he did not have any money to hire a lawyer to file habeas corpus and he had lost faith in the competence of judges. X then informed Y he would just escape and the latter did not object. As soon as Y turned his back X sprinted out of his cell. What crime was committed? Answer Y, the jail guard, is liable for infidelity in the custody of prisoner and X, for evasion of sentence. The jail guard is a public officer who has the custody of X, as prisoner. But not objecting to the intention of X to escape, who in fact did as soon as Y turned his back, Y either connived or consented in the escape of the prisoner X, (U.S. vs. Bandino, 29 Phil. 429). The presumption is that the sentence by final judgment which was being served by X was correct. If the court committed an error in sentencing him to an erroneous prison term, that must be remedied according to law. Surely, the remedy is not to commit an act which is felonious as that will disesteem any final judgment rendered by the court. Art 223; Infidelity in custody of prisoners 1997 No. 11: During a town fiesta. A, the chief of police, permitted B, a detention prisoner and his compadre, to leave the municipal jail and entertain visitors in his house from 10:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. B returned to the municipal jail at 8:30 p.m. Was there any crime committed by A? Answer; Yes, A committed the crime of infidelity in the custody of a prisoner. Since B is a detention prisoner. As Chief of Police, A has custody over B. Even if B returned to the municipal Jail at 8:30 p.m. A, as custodian of the prisoner, has maliciously failed to perform the duties of his office, and when he permits said prisoner to obtain a relaxation of his imprisonment, he consents to the prisoner escaping the punishment of being deprived of his liberty which can be considered real and actual evasion of service under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code (People vs. Leon Bandino 29 Phil. 459). Alternative Answer: No crime was committed by the Chief of Police. It was only an act of leniency or laxity in the performance of his duty and not in excess of his duty (People vs. Evangelista (CA) 38 O.G. 158), Art 223; Infidelity in custody of prisoners & Delivery of prisoners from jail & Evasion of service of sentence 1989 No. 13: Ernani was accused of estafa. Unable to post a bail bond for his provisional liberty pending trial of his case, he was detained in the city jail. On the date of the hearing of the estafa case, Daniel, a policeman detailed in the city jail, escorted Ernani to the city hall for the trial. Daniel removed the handcuffs of Ernani and allowed him to sit on one of the chairs inside the courtroom. As Daniel was talking to a lawyer inside the courtroom, Ernani, with the help of a Page 220 of 374
cigarette vendor, Meynardo, who used his cigarette container as cover, surreptitiously moved out of the room and escaped, Ernani and Meynardo went to the comfort room for a while, then went down the stairs and lost themselves in the crowd. What crime or crimes were committed by Ernani, Daniel and Meynardo? Give your reasons. Answer: 1. Daniel, the policeman, committed the crime of EVASION THRU NEGLIGENCE, one of the forms of Infidelity in the custody of Prisoner (Art. 224),, the essential elements of which offense are: (1) That the offender is a public officer. (2) That he has in his custody or charge a prisoner, either detention prisoner or prisoners by final judgement. (3) That such prisoner escaped from his custody thru his negligence. All of these elements are present, Daniel, a policeman detailed in the city jail, is a public officer. As the escort for Ernani in the latter's trial, he had custody of charge of a detention prisoner, Ernani's escape was thru his negligence because after removing Ernani's handcuffs and allowing him to sit in one of the chairs inside the courtroom, he should have taken the necessary precautions to prevent Ernani's escape by keeping an eye on him. Instead, he provided the opportunity for the escape by talking with a lawyer and not keeping watch over his prisoner. 2. Meynardo, not being a public officer, is guilty of the crime of DELIVERING PRISONERS FROM JAILS (Art. 156), which is committed by any person who either removes from any jail or penal establishment any person confined therein, or WHO HELPS the escape of such person by means of violence, intimidation, bribery of OTHER MEANS. The act of Meynardo in giving to Ernani his cigarette container is helping in the latter's escape by OTHER MEANS. 3. Ernani, the escaped prisoner himself is not criminally liable for any offense. The detention prisoner who escapes from detention does not commit any crime. If he were a convict by final judgment who is serving a sentence which consists of deprivation of liberty and he escapes during term of his sentence, he would be liable for EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE (Art. 157). Art 226; Removal of documents 1991 No. 20: A, an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu, was assigned to conduct the preliminary investigations of two criminal cases: (1) for rape against X, and (2) for estafa against Y. Unknown to the complainants, both respondents were schoolmates of A in their high school years in Lanao del Norte. Despite the overwhelming evidence against X, A dismissed the rape case. Despite the overwhelming evidence against Y, A did not file the information for estafa because according to him, the folder of the case to which were attached the dishonored checks and other documents offered in evidence by the complainant was stolen. Contrary to such claim, the folder was kept in a safe in his house. What offense or offenses under the Title on Crimes Committed By Public Officers of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code may A be charged with? Answer:
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Art. 208 is violated, that is maliciously refraining from instituting prosecution for punishment of violators of the law. Likewise, the prosecutor is liable under Art. 226 for removing and cancelling public document entrusted to his custody.
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Crimes Against Persons Art 246; Parricide 1982 No. 16 "A", a prominent and high official, had illicit relationship with "B", a girl very much below his social standing. A child was born to them as a result thereof. "A" killed the child, over three days old, so as to conceal his dishonor. (a) What crime did'"A" commit? (b) Does relationship in this case constitute a privileged mitigating circumstance? (c) How would you answer the questions less than three days old?
(a) and (b) if the child were
Answer (a) "A" committed parricide as this crime is committed even though the relationship of the father "A" with the child, over three days old, is illegitimate. (b) The answer is no because relationship in parricide is inherent, aside from the fact that it is not provided in the Code as a privileged mitigating circumstance? (c) If the child were less than three days old, the crime would be infanticide. Relationship of "A" the illegitimate father, is not privileged mitigating. Art, 255, provides for such privileged mitigating circumstance if the offender is the mother and the child was killed to conceal her dishonor. Art 246; Parricide 1996 No. 16; In 1975, Pedro, then a resident of Manila, abandoned his wife and their son, Ricky, who was then only three years old. Twenty years later, an affray took place in a bar in Olongapo City between Pedro and his companions, on one hand, and Ricky and his friends, upon the other, without the father and son knowing each other. Ricky stabbed and killed Pedro in the fight, only to find out, a week later, when his mother arrived from Manila to visit him in jail, that the man whom he killed was his own father. 1) What crime did Ricky commit? Explain. 2) Suppose Ricky knew before the killing that Pedro is his father, but he nevertheless killed him out of bitterness for having abandoned him and his mother, what crime did Ricky commit? Explain. Answer: 1) Ricky committed parricide because the person killed was his own father, and the law punishing the crime (Art. 246, RPC) does not require that the crime be "knowingly" committed. Should Ricky be prosecuted and found guilty of parricide, the penalty to be imposed is Art. 49 of the Revised Penal Code for Homicide (the crime he intended to commit) but in its maximum period. Alternative Answer: Ricky should be held criminally liable only for homicide not parricide because the relationship which qualified the killing to parricide is virtually absent for a period of twenty years already, such that Ricky could not possibly be aware
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that his adversary was his father. In other words, the moral basis for imposing the higher penalty for parricide is absent. 2) The crime committed should be parricide if Ricky knew before the killing that Pedro is his father, because the moral basis for punishing the crime already exists. His having acted out of bitterness for having been abandoned by his father may be considered mitigating. Art 246; Parricide with unintentional abortion; complex crime 1994 No. 7: Aldrich was dismissed from his Job by his employer. Upon reaching home, his pregnant wife, Carmi, nagged him about money for her medicines. Depressed by his dismissal and angered by the nagging of his wife, Aldrich struck Carmi with his fist. She fell to the ground. As a result, she and her unborn baby died. What crime was committed by Aldrich? Answer: Aldrich committed the crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. When Aldrich struck his wife, Carmi, with his fist, he committed the crime of maltreatment under Art, 266, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, Since Carmi died because of the felonious act of Aldrich, he is criminally liable of parricide under Art. 246, RPC in relation to Art. 4, par. 1 of the same Code. Since the unborn baby of Carmi died in the process, but Aldrich had no intention to cause the abortion of his wife, Aldrich committed unintentional abortion as defined in Art. 257, RPC. Inasmuch as the single act of Aldrich produced two grave or less grave felonies, he falls under Art, 48, RPC, ie. a complex crime (People vs. Salufrancia, 159 SCRA 401). Art 246; Parricide; homicide 1997 No. 17: A, a young housewife, and B, her paramour, conspired to kill C. her husband, to whom she was lawfully married, A and B bought pancit and mixed it with poison. A gave the food with poison to C, but before C could eat it. D, her illegitimate lather, and E, her legitimate son, arrived. C. D and E shared the food in the presence of A who merely watched them eating. C, D and E died because of having partaken of the poisoned food. What crime or crimes did A and B commit? Answer: A committed the crime of multiple parricide for the killing of C, her lawful husband, D, her illegitimate father, and E, her legitimate son. All these killings constitute parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code because of her relationship with the victims. B committed the crime of murder as a co-conspirator of A in the killing of C because the killing was carried out by means of poison (Art. 248. par. 3, Revised Penal Code). But for feloniously causing the death of D and E, B committed two counts of homicide. The plan was only to kill C. Art 246; Parricide; proof of marriage 1978 No, VI-a Juana was charged with parricide, i.e., poisoning her husband Justo with whom she had seven (7) children, the eldest, 21 years old and the youngest, eleven (11). The act of poisoning was proven beyond reasonable doubt, but the prosecution failed to present the marriage certificate to prove Juana's marriage to
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Justo, The trial judge rendered a judgment of conviction. Juana appealed on the ground that the marriage was not proven. Decide with reasons. Answer The appeal of Juana on the ground that the marriage was not proven is meritorious. The best proof of marriage is the marriage certificate. Failure of the prosecution to present the marriage certificate to prove Juana's marriage to Justo was fatal, unless there was oral evidence to prove it and not objected to (People vs. Remegio Cruz, 108 Phil 288), Art 247; Absolutory cause; less serious physical injuries under exceptional circumstances 1977 No. VI-b The husband having discovered his wife in sexual intercourse with her paramour, immediately fired upon the latter inflicting on him less serious physical injuries. The same bullet that hit the paramour also hit a stranger killing him instantly. 1) Did the husband incur criminal liability in wounding the paramour? 2) Will you make the husband liable for the death of the stranger? Reason out your answers to the two questions. Answer 1) The husband did not incur criminal liability because the injuries inflicted upon the paramour are not serious. This is considered an absolutory cause (Art 247 R.P.C.). 2) The husband is also not liable for the death of the stranger since the stranger was killed by the same bullet which hit the paramour for the reason that the husband in shooting at the paramour who suffered merely less serious physical injuries did not incur any criminal liability. In a case decided by the Supreme Court, the assault made by the offended husband was made in order to defend his honor and rights by punishing the offender of his honor and is deemed to be in the exercise of a lawful right. (U.S. v. Merced, 39 Phil. 198, 203), The death of the stranger would therefore be due to an accident, which is exempting. Art 247; Death & Physical injuries under exceptional circumstances 1988 No. 7: Pedro Orsal and the wife of accused Juan Santos started having illicit relations while the accused was in Manila reviewing for the 1983 Bar Examinations and his wife was left behind in Davao City. In the morning of July 15, 1984, the accused went to the bus station in Davao City to go to Cagayan de Oro City to fetch his daughter, but after he failed to catch the first trip in the morning, and because the 2:00 o'clock bus had engine trouble and could not leave, the accused, after passing the residence of his father, went home and arrive at his residence at around six o'clock in the afternoon. Upon reaching his home, the accused found his wife Laura, and Pedro Orsal in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and Pedro Orsal noticed the accused, the wife pushed her paramour who got his revolver. The accused, who has then peeping above the built in cabinet in their, room, jumped down and ran away. He went to the house of his PC soldier-friend, and neighbor, got his (soldier's) M-16 rifle and immediately, it was almost 6:30 p.m. then, went back to his house. Not finding his wife there, he went to the hangout of Pedro Orsal and found the latter playing mahjong there. The accused fired at Pedro three times with his rifle, hit him and
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two bystanders. Pedro died instantaneously of wounds in the head, trunk, and abdomen. The two bystanders were seriously injured but survived. a) Can Juan Santos be held guilty for homicide for the death of Pedro Orsal? Explain. b) What offense did Juan Santos commit with regard to the two bystanders? Explain. c) What offense, did the wife of Juan Santos commit, if any why? Answer a) Juan Santos cannot be held guilty of homicide for the death of Pedro Orsal. Instead, Juan is liable for violation of Article 247 "Death inflicted under exceptional circumstances because there was one continuous act, (People vs. Abarca). b) With regards to the two bystanders, Juan Santos committed the crime of serious physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. (Art. 247 Revised Penal Code; People vs. Abarca). Art 247; Death under exceptional circumstances 1985 No. 9 Feeling homesick and terribly missing his wife after a long absence, Ronald, without notice, came home from Saudi. Arriving at their residence, he immediately proceeded to their bedroom where he saw his wife lying on their bed under a mosquito net locked in embrace with his compadre Dante Ayala He immediately drew his gun but was beaten to a draw by Dante whose bullet felled him. Prosecuted for Homicide for killing Ronald, Dante set up self-defense but was nevertheless convicted. (A)
Comment on the validity of Dante's conviction.
(B) In the above given case, supposing Ronald shot Dante and his (Ronald's) wife, while Dante was on top of the latter, thus killing both of them, will you grant him the benefit of Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code? Explain. Answer: (B) If Ronald shot Dante and his wife while Dante was on top of the latter, killing both of them, Ronald can avail of the benefit of Article 247, Revised Penal Code). The basic element of this article is that the unfaithful wife and her paramour were surprised by the offended husband during the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter. To an ordinary, prudent person who surprised a man lying on top of his wife in their marital bed such act in the mind of the husband would mean nothing else but sexual intercourse. Art 247; Death under exceptional circumstances 1991 No. 14; At 10:00 o'clock in the evening of 10 November 1990, upon his arrival from Cebu City, Marco surprised his wife. Rosette, and her former boyfriend, Raul, both naked and in the act of illicit copulation. Raul got his revolver and, upon seeing the revolver, Marco ran toward the street, took a pedicab and proceeded to the house of his brother, a policeman, from whom he borrowed a revolver. With the weapon, he returned to his residence. Unable to find Raul and Rosette, Marco proceeded to a disco jointly owned and operated by Haul. It was Page 226 of 374
already 11:00 o'clock that evening when he arrived at the joint. Upon seeing Raul with two (2) male companions, A arid B, drinking beer at one of the tables, Marco fired two (2) shots at Raul, who was hit on his forehead with one of the bullets; the other bullet hit A, injuring him on his stomach. As a consequence of the gunshot wound, Haul died instantaneously. Due to the timely medical attention given to him, A survived; he was, however, hospitalized for 45 days, Marco was prosecuted for Murder for the death of Raul and for frustrated murder in the case of A. The informations in both cases allege the qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery and the generic aggravating circumstance of nighttime. You are Marco's lawyer. What would be your defense(s)? Answer: The defense with respect to the death of Raul is death under exceptional circumstances [Art. 247, People vs. Aborca 153 SCRA 735). Although the killing happened one hour after having surprised the spouse, that would still be within the contest of "immediately thereafter". With respect to the wounding of the stranger, the defense of lawful exercise of a right is a justifying circumstance. Under Article 11, par. 5 could be invoked. At the time accused shot Raul, he was not committing a felonious act and therefore could not have been criminally liable under Art. 4, RPC. Art 247; Death under exceptional circumstances 2001 No XIII A and B are husband and wife. A is employed as a security guard at Landmark, his shift being from 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. One night, he felt sick and cold, hence, he decided to go home around midnight after getting permission from his duty officer. Upon reaching the front yard of his home, he noticed that the light in the master bedroom was on and that the bedroom window was open. Approaching the front door, he was surprised to hear sighs and giggles inside the bedroom. He opened the door very carefully and peeped inside where he saw his wife B having sexual intercourse with their neighbor C. A rushed inside and grabbed C but the latter managed to wrest himself free and jumped out of the window, A followed suit and managed to catch C again and after a furious struggle, managed also to strangle him to death. A then rushed back to his bedroom where his wife B was cowering under the bed covers. Still enraged, A hit B with fist blows and rendered her unconscious. The police arrived after being summoned by their neighbors and arrested A who was detained, inquested and charged for the death of C and serious physical Injuries of B. a)
Is A liable for C's death? Why? (5%)
b)
Is A liable for B's injuries? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: a) Yes, A is liable for C's death but under the exceptional circumstances in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code, where only destierro is prescribed. Article 247 governs since A surprised his wife B in the act of having sexual intercourse with C, and the killing of C was "Immediately thereafter" as the discovery, escape, pursuit and killing of C form one continuous act. (U.S. vs. Vargas, 2 Phil. 194)
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b) Likewise, A la liable for the serious physical injuries he inflicted on his wife B but under the same exceptional circumstances in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code, for the same reasons. Art 247; death under exceptional circumstances 1978 No. IX-a Juan came upon his wife and Isabelo in a secluded place covered with underbush. His wife was getting up while Isabelo was standing and zipping up his pants. Isabelo took to his heels when he saw Juan, who chased him with a balisong knife. Unable to catch up with Isabelo, Juan returned to his wife and, completely obfuscated by what he had seen, stabbed her repeatedly with the knife, killing her immediately. Juan's defense at the trial was his having surprised his wife under circumstances indicative of carnal intercourse with Isabelo, and claimed that he should be acquitted. Decide with reasons. Answer Parricide is committed. Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable as the wife was not surprised committing sexual intercourse with Isabelo. When Juan came upon his wife and Isabelo, his wife was getting up and Isabelo was standing zipping up his pants, (People vs. Gonzalez, 39 Phil 66). Art 247; Death under exceptional circumstances; destierro 1983 No, 10 Having caught A in flagrante delicto doing the sex act with his [B's] wife, B shot and killed A while the latter was still in the compromising act. B was sentenced to reclusion perpetua for murder after a protracted trial. It was only on appeal that he was given the proper penalty of destierro under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. During the pendency of the case, the accused was under preventive detention which lasted for about eight years. (a) In serving his sentence, is B entitled to credit for his preventive imprisonment? Explain. (b) What is the philosophy of the legal provision imposing the penalty of destierro for the above crime? Answer b) The philosophy of the legal provision imposing the penalty of destierro is that it is intended more for the protection of the offender rather than as a penalty (People vs. Coricor 79 Phil. 672) which is to remove the offender from the vicinity and to protect him from acts of retaliative or reprisal principally from the relatives of the deceased spouse (People vs. Lauron CA 67 O.G. 7369) Art 248; Murder 1987 No I: Juan had a land dispute with Pedro for a number of years. As Juan was coming down his house, he saw his brother, Rodolfo attack Pedro with a bolo from behind. Rodolfo was about to hit Pedro a second time while the latter was
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prostrate on the ground, when Carling, Pedro's son, shouted, "I'll kill you." This distracted Rodolfo who then turned to Carling. Rodolfo and Carling fought with their bolos. While the two were fighting, Juan shouted to his brother Rodolfo: "Kill them both, they are our enemies," Carling suffered a number of wounds and died on the spot. Pedro who was in serious condition was rushed to the hospital. He died five days later for loss of blood because the blood purchased from Manila which could have saved him, according to the doctor, did not arrive on timer Jose, father of Juan and Rodolfo, told his sons to hide in Manila and he gave them money for the purpose. When the police investigators saw Jose, he told the police investigators that Juan and Rodolfo went to Mindanao. What crimes, if any, did (a) Rodolfo, (b) Juan and (c) Jose commit? Explain your answer and state whether the acts committed are accompanied by circumstances affecting criminal liability. Answer: a) Rodolfo committed murder regarding the killing of Pedro since Pedro was attacked from behind. The killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The mode of attack deprived Pedro of any chance to defend himself or to retaliate. Rodolfo is also liable for homicide regarding the killing of Carling, Pedro's son. as that is the result of a fight, both of them being armed with bolos. Although Pedro died five days later, since the blood purchased which would have saved him did not arrive on time, Rodolfo is still liable for the death of Pedro as that is the direct, natural and logical result of the wound inflicted by him. b) Juan, the brother of Rodolfo, has no criminal liability. What he shouted to Rodolfo "Kill them both, they are our enemies," when Rodolfo and Carling were fighting, was not the only reason why Carling was killed; and hence, he cannot be a principal by inducement. The doctrine is to be a principal by inducement, the inducement must be the only reason why the crime is committed. (People vs. Kiichi et. al. 61 Phil. 609). c) Jose, father of Juan and Rodolfo, is an accessory to the crime of murder committed by Rodolfo because he assisted him to escape to Manila. But he is not criminally liable because of his relationship to Rodolfo (Article 20). He is not an accessory to the crime of homicide, because this crime is not included in treason, parricide, murder, attempt against the life of the Chief Executive or the principal is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime if the accessory is a private person. However, this is moot and academic because of the relationship of Jose to Rodolfo. Art 248; Murder 1993 No. 6: As a result of a misunderstanding during a meeting, Joe was mauled by Nestor, Jolan, Reden and Arthur. He ran towards his house but the four chased and caught him. Thereafter, they tied Joe's hands at his back and attacked him. Nestor used a knife; Jolan, a shovel; Arthur, his fists; and Reden, a piece of wood. After killing Joe, Reden ordered the digging of a grave to bury Joe's lifeless body. Thereafter, the four (4) left together. Convicted for the killing of Joe, Arthur now claims that his conviction is erroneous as it was not he who inflicted the fatal blow. 1) Would you sustain his claim? Why?
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2) reasons.
What was the crime committed by the four assailants? Discuss with
Answer; 1) No. Arthur's claim is without merit. The offenders acted in conspiracy in killing the victim and hence, liable collectively.... 2) The crime committed is murder, qualified by treachery because the offenders, taking advantage of their superiority in number, rendered the victim defenseless and without any chance to retaliate, by tying his hands at his back before attacking him. Treachery exists at least in the second and final stage of the attack, after the offenders caught up with the victim. Art 248; Murder 1999 No V Define murder. What are the elements of the crime? [3%] The accused, not Intending to kill the victim, treacherously shot the victim while the victim was turning his back to him. He aimed at and hit the victim only on the leg. The victim, however, died because of loss of blood. Can the accused be liable for homicide or murder, considering that treachery was clearly involved but there was no attempt to kill? Explain your answer. (3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: (a) Murder is the unlawful killing of a person which otherwise would constitute only homicide, had it not been attended by any of the following circumstances: 1. With treachery or taking advantage of superior strength, or with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity; 2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise; 3. By means or on the occasion of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin; 4. On occasion of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity; 5. With evident premeditation; 6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse. (b) The elements of murder are: (1) that a person was unlawfully killed; (2) that such a killing was attended by any of the above-mentioned circumstances; (3) that the killing is not parricide nor infanticide; and (4) that the accused killed the victim. The accused is liable for the death of the victim even though he merely aimed and fired at the latter's leg, "not intending to kill the victim", considering that the gunshot was felonious and was the proximate cause of death. An offender is liable for all the direct, natural, and logical consequences of his felonious act although different from what he intended.
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However, since specific intent to kill is absent, the crime for said death is only homicide and not murder (People vs. Pugay and Samson, 167 SCRA 439) ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: The accused is liable for the death of the victim in as much as his act of shooting the victim at the leg is felonious and is the proximate cause of death. A person performing a felonious act is criminally liable for all the direct, natural, and logical consequences of such act although different from what he intended. And since such death was attended by treachery, the same will constitute murder but the accused should be given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance that he did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as that which was committed (Art. 13(3), RPC) Art 248; Murder 2001 No VI Mang Jose, a septuagenarian, was walking with his ten-year old grandson along Paseo de Roxas and decided to cross at the intersection of Makati Avenue but both were hit by a speeding CRV Honda van and were sent sprawling on the pavement a meter apart. The driver, a Chinese mestizo, stopped his car after hitting the two victims but then reversed his gears and ran over Mang Jose's prostrate body anew and third time by advancing his car forward. The grandson suffered broken legs only and survived but Mang Jose suffered multiple fractures and broken ribs, causing his instant death. The driver was arrested and charged with Murder for the death of Mang Jose and Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence with respect to the grandson. Are the charges correct? Explain. (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes, the charges are correct. For deliberately running over Mang Jose's prostrate body after having bumped him and his grandson, the driver indeed committed Murder, qualified by treachery. Said driver's deliberate intent to kill Mang Jose was demonstrated by his running over the latter's body twice, by backing up the van and driving it forward, whereas the victim was helpless and not in a position to defend himself or to retaliate. As to the serious physical injuries sustained by Mang Jose's 10-year old grandson, as a result of having been hit by the speeding vehicle of said driver, the same were the result of reckless imprudence which is punishable as a quasioffense in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. The charge of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Serious Physical Injuries is correct. The penalty next higher in degree to what ordinarily should be imposed is called for, since the driver did not lend help on the spot, which help he could have given to the victims. Art 248; Murder & Arson 1985 No, 17 B set the house of A on fire by way of revenge against the latter. B did not know that A was inside. A died because of the fire, (A)
What crime or crimes did B commit?
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(B) commit?
Suppose B knew that A was inside, what crime or crimes did B
(C) Suppose before setting it on fire, B entered the house and killed A. Then B set the house on fire to hide the body of A. What crime or crimes did B commit? Explain your answers. Answer: (A) B will be liable for the special complex crime of arson with homicide as provided in Presidential Decree No. 1613, because the death resulted from the arson. The case of People v. Paterno (L-2665, March 6, 1960)—that the arson absorbed the death, is no longer controlling. (B) If B knew that A was in the house when it was set on fire, the crime will be murder. The fire is the qualifying circumstance. (C) If B killed A before the house was set on fire, two crimes are committed, murder and arson. The arson was committed to conceal the crime of murder. Art 248; Murder & Theft 1984 No. 19 Melencio gave Janet, a call girl, P5,000 as blood money with the understanding that she would poison a business executive in the course of a tryst. She did so. But before she left the scene of the crime, she got the victim's expensive watch, gold ring and wallet containing about P5,000. What crime or crimes were committed and by whom? Reasons. Answer A.
Furnished by Office of Justice Palma,
Janet committed two crimes: 1. murder: as qualified by circumstance of consideration of a price or reward, or by means of poison, or with evident premeditation, and 2. theft: If the motive is to kill and the taking of the valuables is committed thereafter, the crimes committed are homicide and theft (People v. Elizaga, G.R. No. 2487, as cited in Gregorio, Fundamentals). B.
Comments and Suggested Answer
1. Melencio and Janet are liable for murder. Melencio is a principal by inducement and Janet is a principal by direct participation. Murder is the crime committed because the killing was in consideration of & price and by means of poison. Either will be sufficient to qualify the crime of murder. 2. Janet will also be liable for theft. As an afterthought she got the victim's expensive watch, gold ring and wallet containing about P5,000. Melencio will not be liable because the theft was not included in the inducement nor is it a necessary consequence thereof. Art 248; Murder (through use of fire) & Arson & Homicide 1989 No. 14: Diego and Pablo were both farmers residing in Barangay Damayan. On one occasion, Diego called Pablo to come down from his house in order to ask Page 232 of 374
him why he got his (Diego's) plow without permission. One word led to another. Diego, in a fit of anger, unsheathed his bolo and hacked Pablo to death. Pablo's 9-year old son, Mario, who was inside the house, saw the killing of his father. Afraid that he might also be killed by Diego, Mario covered himself with a blanket and hid in a corner of the house. To conceal the killing of Pablo, Diego brought Pablo's body inside the house and burned it, Mario was also burned to death. What crime or crimes did Diego commit? Answer: Diego committed two crimes (1) homicide for the death of Pablo and (2) the special complex crime of arson with homicide as provided in PD 1613 for the burning of the house and the death of Mario. The hacking of Pablo to death is homicide, the killing not being attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder. It was killing in the course of a quarrel. The burning of the house to conceal the killing of Pablo is a separate crime. Were it not for the death of Mario, this separate offense would have been arson. But inside the house was unknown to Diego, the resulting crime is under PD No. 1613, because the death resulted from the arson. If by reason or on the occasion of the arson, death results, the offense is the special complex or arson with homicide (Sec. 5, PD 1613, which expressly repealed Art. 320 and consequently the ruling case therein, People v. Paterno (L-2665, March 6, 1950). If Diego knew that Mario was inside the house when he set it on fire, the crime committed, instead of arson, would be MURDER, with fire as the qualifying circumstance. Art 248; Murder vs homicide 1982 No. 14 "A" and "B" were both astride the same carabao, the latter being behind the former. "X", intending to kill "A", aimed his gun at "A" and fired, inflicting a fatal wound on the chest which produced "A'"s death. "X" shot "A" again, but this time the bullet hit and passed through "A'"s left arm, causing less serious physical injuries, then lodged itself in "B'"s heart, causing his death. What crime or crimes is "X" guilty of? Answer X committed murder regarding the killing of A because he was shot deliberately while astride with B on a carabao without giving him any chance to defend himself. Treachery is therefore present. X committed homicide regarding the lulling of B as the second shot hit A who was already dead and the bullet lodged in B's heart. The intention of X was to kill A and not B. Art 248; Murder vs illegal detention 1978 No. V-b Juan and Pedro harbored a long-standing grudge/ resentment against Jose who eloped with their sister, Maria, and later abandoned her. They laid meticulous plans to kill him. After weeks of waiting, their chance came when late one night, they cornered Jose as he was coming out of a disco-beer house in Makati, Metro Manila. The two forcibly shoved him into a waiting car and droved to Tagaytay City, where they kept Jose hog-tied in a 2 x 3 meter room. Two (2) days later, they killed Jose and dumped his body into ravine.
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What was the crime/crimes committed by Juan and Pedro? Discuss briefly. Answer: Murder, since the purpose of Juan and Pedro was to kill the victim. The detention of the victim for two days before he was killed was merely incidental. (People vs. Camo, 91 Phil. 240; People vs. Ong, 69 SCRA 174). Art 248; Murder vs illegal detention 1996 No. 4: 2) Fidel and Fred harbored a long standing grudge against Jorge who refused to marry their sister Lorna, after the latter got pregnant by Jorge. After weeks of surveillance, they finally cornered Jorge in Ermita, Manila, when the latter was walking home late at might. Fidel and Fred forcibly brought Jorge to Zambales where they kept him hog-tied in a small nipa house located in the middle of a rice field. Two days later, they killed Jorge and dumped his body into the river. What crime or crimes did Fidel and Fred commit? Explain. Answer: 2) Fidel and Fred committed the crime of Murder under Art 248, RPC . the killing being qualified by evident premeditation. This is due to the long standing grudge entertained by the two accused occasioned by the victim's refusal to marry their sister after Impregnating her. In People vs. Alfeche. 219 SCRA 85, the intention of the accused is determinative of the crime committed. Where the intention is to kill the victim and the latter is forcibly taken to another place and later killed, it is murder. There is no indication that the offenders intended to deprive the victim of his liberty. Whereas, if the victim is kidnapped, and taken to another situs and killed as an afterthought, it is kidnapping with homicide under Art. 267, RPC.
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Art 248; Murder with direct assault 1995 No. 6: 2. Pascual operated a rice thresher in Barangay Napnud where he resided. Renato, a resident of the neighboring Barangay Guihaman, also operated a mobile rice thresher which he often brought to Barangay Napnud to thresh the palay of the farmers there. This was bitterly resented by Pascual, One afternoon Pascual, and his two sons confronted Renato and his men who were operating their mobile rice thresher along a feeder road in Napnud. A heated argument ensued. A barangay captain who was fetched by one of Pascual's men tried to appease Pascual and Renato to prevent a violent confrontation. However, Pascual resented the intervention of the barangay captain and hacked him to death. What crime was committed by Pascual? Discuss fully. Answer: 2. Pascual committed the complex crime of homicide with assault upon a person in authority (Arts. 148 and 249 in relation to Art, 48, RPC). A barangay chairman, is in law (Art. 152), a person in authority and if he is attacked while in the performance of his official duties or on the occasion thereof the felony of direct assault is committed. Art. 48, RPC, on the other hand, provides that if a single act produces two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is committed. Here, the single act of the offender in hacking the victim to death resulted in two felonies, homicide which is grave and direct assault which is less grave. Art 248; Murder with direct assault; explosion 1991 No 4: Two [2] Philippine National Police (PNPJ officers. X and Y, on board on motorboat with Z, a civilian as motor-man, arrested A and B who were in a banca, for dynamite fishing. The latter's banca was towed towards the municipality. On the way, the PNP motorboat was intercepted by a third banca whose occupants, C, D, and E, tried to negotiate for the release of A and B and their banca. The PNP officers refused and instead shouted at C, D. and E that they are all under arrest. Thereupon, C, D, and E simultaneously threw dynamite sticks at the PNP motorboats. The first explosion killed X. A and B also reacted by throwing dynamite at the PNP motorboat: its explosion killed Y and Z. What crime or crimes did A, B, C, D and E commit? Suggested Answer: C, D and E are liable for the complex crime of Murder, qualified by explosion, with direct assault for the death of X. A and B are liable for the complex crime of Murder Qualified by explosion as to death "of Y, and simple Murder qualified by explosion for the death of Z. No crime of direct assault can be filed insofar as the death of Z is concerned, he being a civilian. This, of course, assumes that there is no conspiracy among A, B, C, D and E, otherwise all would have the same criminal liability as the act of one becomes the act of all. Additional Answer:
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Firstly, A and B committed a violation of Pres. Decree No. 534 (on illegal fishing] as amended by Pres. Decree Nos. 704 and 1058. Fishing with the use of explosives is punishable under said Decree. Art 248; Murder, by treachery 1995 No. 6: 1. On his way to buy a lotto ticket, a policeman suddenly found himself surrounded by four men. One of them wrestled the police officer to the ground and disarmed him while the other three companions who were armed with a hunting knife, an ice pick, and a balisong, repeatedly stabbed him. The policeman died as a result of the multiple stab wounds inflicted by his assailants. What crime or crimes were committed? Discuss fully. Answer: 1. All the assailants are liable for the crime of murder, qualified by treachery, (which absorbed abuse of superior strength) as the attack was sudden and unexpected and the victim was totally defenseless. Conspiracy is obvious from the concerted acts of the assailants. Direct assault would not complex the crime, as there is no showing that the assailants knew that the victim was a policeman; even if there was knowledge, the fact is that he was not in the performance of his official duties, and therefore there is no direct assault. Art 248; Murder/ hijacking/ frustrated coercion 1978 No. VII-a A boarded a plane at the Manila Domestic Airport bound for Davao City. While the plane was still on the tarmac, its doors still open and waiting for the last passenger to board, A ordered the pilot P at gunpoint, to take the plane to Singapore. When P refused, A shot him to death. What offense/offenses did A commit? Discuss with reasons. Answer Frustrated coercion and murder. When the crimes were committed, the plane was not "in flight" as the doors were still open for embarkation. So, hijacking was not committed (Rep. Act No. 6235, Sec. 1). The facts are almost similar to the facts of the case of People vs. Ang Chio Kio, 95 Phil. 475, where the accused was convicted of frustrated coercion because of the refusal of the pilot to comply with the order of the accused to take the plane to Amoy, China instead of to Aparri and murder, because the accused shot the pilot to death. Alternative Answer Murder because when the pilot was shot the plane was still in the tarmac and the engine had not yet started. Coercion could not be committed, or if all, would be incidental to the killing. Art 248; Murder; explosion 1991 No 4: Two [2] Philippine National Police (PNP) officers. X and Y, on board on motorboat with Z, a civilian as motor-man, arrested A and B who were in a banca, for dynamite fishing. The latter's banca was towed towards the municipality. On the way, the PNP motorboat was intercepted by a third banca whose occupants, C, D, and E, tried to negotiate for the release of A and B and their banca. The PNP officers refused and instead shouted at C, D. and E that Page 236 of 374
they are all under arrest. Thereupon, C, D, and E simultaneously threw dynamite sticks at the PNP motorboats. The first explosion killed X. A and B also reacted by throwing dynamite at the PNP motorboat: its explosion killed Y and Z. What crime or crimes did A, B, C, D and E commit? Suggested Answer: C, D and E are liable for the complex crime of Murder, qualified by explosion, with direct assault for the death of X. A and B are liable for the complex crime of Murder Qualified by explosion as to death "of Y, and simple Murder qualified by explosion for the death of Z. No crime of direct assault can be filed insofar as the death of Z is concerned, he being a civilian. This, of course, assumes that there is no conspiracy among A, B, C, D and E, otherwise all would have the same criminal liability as the act of one becomes the act of all. Additional Answer: Firstly, A and B committed a violation of Pres. Decree No. 534 (on illegal fishing] as amended by Pres. Decree Nos. 704 and 1058. Fishing with the use of explosives is punishable under said Decree. Art 248; Murder; treachery 1991 No. 5: A, a 76-year old woman, was brought to the hospital in a coma with slight cerebral hemorrhage. An endotracheal tube was inserted in her mouth to facilitate her breathing. B, a hospital janitor, who had no business in the emergency room, for reasons known only to himself, removed the plaster holding the tube in place. A doctor saw him and told him to get out of the room. The plaster was replaced. But when the doctor was gone, B came back and removed the tube. The victim started to convulse and bleed in the mouth. Only the timely arrival of the nurse prevented the patient's death. The patient was then transferred to another hospital where she died the next day of cardio-respiratory arrest. Is B criminally liable? If you believe so, what crime was committed by B, if any? Answer: Yes, B is criminally liable for Murder (qualified by treachery) because the death of A appears to be the proximate cause of the overt acts of B. A died of cardio respiratory arrest which evidently was brought about by the convulsion and bleeding in the mouth of the victim due to the removal by B of the endoctracheal tube twice. The two acts of B can be considered as the result of one criminal design. In People vs. Umaging, 107 SCRA 166, the Supreme Court ruled that removal of the endotracheal tube is attempted murder, qualified by treachery, because the patient did not die. Art 248; Murder; treachery/ error in personae 1986 No. 7: Roberto Cortez is the general manager of the family corporation. Because of his incompetence, inability to control his temper, and frequent quarrels with employees, his father finally decided to dismiss him. As Roberto was about to Page 237 of 374
leave his office at six o'clock in the evening, his father went to his room, lambasted and fired him in the presence of several members of the office staff. Thoroughly enraged, Roberto ran out of the office, and, deciding to get even, waited at the exit of the parking lot where his father always passes at the close of each working day. A few minutes later, Roberto saw his father's car approach. He fired his pistol in the direction of the driver thinking that the latter was his father. The man died instantly. Unknown to Roberto, the victim of his fire was Tagahatid, a company messenger whom the father had instructed to drive his car home. Roberto surrendered to the authorities. (a) After investigation, the fiscal filed an information against Roberto for murder. He alleged that the killing was characterized by treachery as the victim was ambushed. Roberto's counsel insists that if any crime was committed, it should only be homicide attended by mitigating circumstances. Was the killing characterized by treachery? Explain. (b) The penalty for parricide is reclusion perpetua to death. The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. Assume that you are the trial judge. Given the circumstances cited above, state the offense committed by Roberto Cortez and impose the correct penalty under circumstances. Explain why you have decided to impose this penalty. Answer: a. Murder is the crime committed qualified by treachery. The fact that the victim was ambushed shows that the accused deliberately and consciously adopted a means to insure specially and directly the commission of the crime without any risk from any defense that the person attacked might make. b. The offense committed by Roberto Cortez is murder. The penalty will be for murder to be imposed in its maximum period. The reason is murder which is the crime committed is different from the crime intended, the killing of the father of Roberto Cortez, which is parricide. This is a case of mistake of identity. The rule is if the penalty for the crime intended is higher than the penalty for the crime committed, the offender will be liable for the crime committed, but the penalty which shall be imposed is in its maximum period (Art. 49, par. 2, Revised Penal Code). Art 249; Homicide through negligence 1988 No. 11: a) In the course of funeral procession, a young mourner who was marching in front of the funeral hearse, momentarily stooped down to tie her shoelaces which had become untied. The driver of the hearse, who was driving at 5 miles an hour, was then looking at the stores by the roadside and did not see her. He continued to drive on and ran over the girl. When the people around shouted and gestured, he backed up and ran over the girl a second time, killing her. If you were the parent of the girl-victim, what crime would you charge, if you think a crime had been committed, and against whom? Explain your answer briefly. Answer; Page 238 of 374
(a) Only the driver could be charged of homicide thru reckless imprudence or homicide thru simple negligence which preclude conspiracy against those who shouted and gestured. Art 249; Homicide vs murder 1982 No. 14 "A" and "B" were both astride the same carabao, the latter being behind the former. "X", intending to kill "A", aimed his gun at "A" and fired, inflicting a fatal wound on the chest which produced "A'"s death. "X" shot "A" again, but this time the bullet hit and passed through "A'"s left arm, causing less serious physical injuries, then lodged itself in "B'"s heart, causing his death. What crime or crimes is "X" guilty of? Answer X committed murder regarding the killing of A because he was shot deliberately while astride with B on a carabao without giving him any chance to defend himself. Treachery is therefore present. X committed homicide regarding the killing of B as the second shot hit A who was already dead and the bullet lodged in B's heart. The intention of X was to kill A and not B. Art 249; Homicide vs physical injuries 1990 No. 1: Aki and Ben, while walking together, met Caloy. There was an altercation between Ben and Caloy so that Ben chased and stabbed Caloy with a knife hitting his right arm thereby causing slight physical injury. Ben desisted from further assaulting Caloy, but Aki lunged at Caloy and felled him this time with a bolo which mortally wounded Caloy. Thus, he died. a) What is the criminal liability of Aki? How about that of Ben? Explain your answers. b) Assuming conspiracy is established, will your answer in problem (a) be the same? Explain your answer. Answer: a) Aki is liable for homicide because, while it is clear that he intentionally caused the death of Caloy, none of the circumstances attendant to murder are present. Intent to kill is clear as Aki lunged at Caloy, after the latter was inflicted a wound at the right arm, and gave him a mortal wound. Ben is guilty only of slight physical injuries as it is evident from the wound he inflicted upon Caloy that he did not Intend to kill the latter. Also, there was no other act on the part of Ben to show such intent. b) No, there being no conspiracy each will be liable for their own individual act. This time both will be liable for homicide because in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all (People v. Damaso, G.R Nos. L-30116-7, 20 November 1978). Art 249; Homicide vs physical injuries 1992 No. 2: Tommy saw Lino and Okito engaged in a street fight. Lino then suddenly drew his balisong and lunged at Okito. In an effort to break up the fight, Tommy tried to snatch the balisong from Lino but not before the latter had inflicted a wound on Okito. As Lino withdrew the weapon and attempted to stab Okito a Page 239 of 374
second time, Tommy tried to grab the weapon again. In so doing, his left forearm was slashed. As he succeeded in snatching away the balisong with his right arm, it flew with such force, that it hit Nereo, a passerby who was seriously injured. Explain your answers fully. a) What is the criminal liability of Lino with respect to Okito, Tommy and Nereo? Suggested Answer: a) As far as Okito is concerned. Lino is liable for frustrated homicide, assuming that the wound suffered by Okito is such that for reasons or causes independent of the will of Lino [such as timely medical attention) Okito would have died. If the injury is not serious enough, the liability is only attempted homicide. Intent to kill is manifest because of the use of a deadly weapon. For the injury on the arm of Tommy, Lino is liable only for physical injuries (serious, less serious or slight, depending on the nature of the injury). Apparently there is no intent to kill. For Nereo, Lino should be liable for serious physical injuries as the wounding of Nereo was the natural and logical consequence of Lino's felonious act. b) In turn, is Tommy criminally liable to Nereo? Suggested Answer: b) Tommy is exempted from criminal liability for the injury to Nereo as he was performing a lawful act with due care and the Injury was caused by mere accident (Art. 12, par. 4), or that he was in lawful exercise of a right, [Art. 11, par. 6), that is, defense of a stranger. Art 249; Homicide vs physical injuries 1994 No. 20: At about 11:00 in the evening, Dante forced his way inside the house of Mamerto. Jay. Mamerto's son, saw Dante and accosted him, Dante pulled a knife and stabbed Jay on his abdomen. Mamerto heard the commotion and went out of his room. Dante, who was about to escape, assaulted Mamerto. Jay suffered injuries which, were it not for the timely medical attendance, would have caused his death. Mamerto sustained Injuries that incapacitated him for 25 days. What crime or crimes did Dante commit? Answer: Dante committed qualified trespass to dwelling, frustrated homicide for the stabbing of Jay, and less serious physical injuries for the assault on Mamerto. The crime of qualified trespass to dwelling should not be complexed with frustrated homicide ... Dante committed frustrated homicide for the stabbing of Jay because he had already performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the intended felony of homicide were it not for causes independent of the act of Dante. Dante had the intent to kill judging from the weapon used, the manner of committing the crime and the part of the body stabbed. Dante is guilty of less serious physical injuries for the wounds sustained by Mamerto. There appears to be no intent to kill because Dante merely assaulted Mamerto without using the knife. Page 240 of 374
Art 249; Homicide vs physical injuries; intent to kill inherent in use of firearm 2003 No VI. In a free-for-all brawl that ensued after some customers inside a night club became unruly, guns were fired by a group, among them A and B, that finally put the customers back to their senses. Unfortunately, one customer died. Subsequent investigation revealed that A's gunshot had inflicted on the victim a slight wound that did not cause the deceased's death nor materially contribute to it. It was B's gunshot that inflicted a fatal wound on the deceased. A contended that his liability should, if at all, be limited to slight physical injury. Would you agree? Why? 6% SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. I beg to disagree with A's contention that his liability should be limited to slight physical injury only. He should be held liable for attempted homicide because he inflicted said injury with the use of a firearm which is a lethal weapon. Intent to kill is inherent in the use of a firearm. (Araneta, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA 123 [1990]) ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: Yes, I would agree to A's contention that his criminal liability should be for slight physical injury only, because he fired his gun only to pacify the unruly customers of the night club and therefore, without intent to kill. B's gunshot that inflicted a fatal wound on the deceased may not be imputed to A because conspiracy cannot exist when there is a free-for-all brawl or tumultuous affray. A and B are liable only for their respective act Art 249; Homicide vs robbery with homicide 1983 No. 6 Insulted by the manager of the bank where he was employed as security guard, A, enraged, shot the former, who died on the spot. As A was about to leave the bank premises, he noticed the vault open. He entered it, forced open a locked container and got the jewelry therein. If you were the fiscal, for what crime or crimes would you prosecute A? Explain. Answer Homicide and Robbery. It is not robbery with homicide because the purpose of A, the security guard, was not to commit robbery. It is not murder because the aggression was preceded by the insult of the manager which enraged the offender. So the killing was attended by passion which negates the presence of treachery. The taking of the jewelries was an afterthought as the offender entered the vault only when he noticed it was open when he was about to leave the bank premises. The jewelries were in a locked receptacle which he forced open while inside the bank premises. This is robbery with force upon things under Article 299, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. Art 249; Homicide/theft 1976 No. VIII-b
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X killed Y in a fit of anger. While in the act of disposing of, or concealing the body, he found some money in one of the victim's pockets and took it. What crime has X committed? Reasons. Answer Two crimes are committed by X namely, homicide and theft. Since the purpose of X was not to commit robbery, the crime cannot to robbery with homicide, (US. vs. Villorente, et at., 30 Phil 59). Since X killed Y in a fit of anger, the motive for the crime is clear. The taking of the money in the pockets of the victim occurred after the killing, and as a matter of fact, while in the act of disposing of or concealing the body. The taking was conceived only after the victim was killed. Two separate crimes of homicide and theft are therefore committed. (People vs. Elizaga, 86 Phil. 364; People vs. Glore, 87 Phil. 789). Art 249; Homicide/theft 1989 No. 15: Emilio and Andres were walking home from the farm at 8:00 o'clock in the evening when they met Asiong whom Emilio suspected as the one who stole his fighting cock two (2) days before; Emilio confronted Asiong and after a heated discussion, a bolo fight between the two (2} ensued. Asiong sustained fatal wounds and died. Emilio asked Andres to help him carry the body of Asiong and bury it behind the bushes. After burying Asiong, Emilio picked up the jute bag Asiong was then holding and found inside P600 which Emilio and Andres divided each getting P300. A week after the investigation by the police, a complaint was filed in the Office of Provincial Fiscal against Emilio and Andres for robbery with homicide with the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and uninhabited place. If you were the fiscal, what information or informations will you file against Emilio and Andres? What are their respective criminal liabilities? Answer: If I were the fiscal, I would file two separate informations against Emilio and Andres, one for homicide with Emilio as principal and Andres as accessory, and another for theft against both Emilio and Andres as principals. This is so because of the following reasons: 1. The killing of Asiong by Emilio is homicide. It is not attended by any qualifying circumstance of murder. It was a killing at the spur of the moment, in the course of a bolo fight, as an aftermath of a heated discussion. 2. Neither was the killing by reason of or on the occasion of a robbery. There was no intention of either Emilio or Andres to rob Asiong either prior to or in the course of the killing. The taking of Asiong's P600 was only an AFTERTHOUGHT, after the killing was already perpetrated. There is no causal or other connection between the act of killing and the act of taking the money3. Andres is liable as an accessory in the homicide case because he had no participation either as co-principal or accomplice in the killing of Asiong who died solely because of the wounds inflicted on him in his bolo-fight with Emilio, the principal. However, when Andres agreed to help Emilio carry the body of Asiong and bury it behind the bushes, thus concealing or destroying the body of the crime (corpus delicti) to prevent its discovery, he became an accessory to the crime of homicide (Art. 19, RPC), 4. With respect to the taking of the P600.00 which Emilio and Andres divided between themselves, they committed the crime of theft as co-principals. Page 242 of 374
Theft because with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons no force upon things, they took personal property of another without the latter's consent. They acted with unity of purposes and intention, thus making them co-principals by direct participation.. Art 249; Homicide; execution by firing squad 1979 No. XIV X, is a death convict. On the day set for his electrocution, a power failure occurred. The Director of Prisons then ordered that X be executed by firing squad. A, B and C were chosen by him to constitute the firing squad. A, B, and C shot to death X as per order of their Director. What crime, if any, was committed by the Director and A, B and C? Answer Homicide is committed. Since the victim was a death convict, he therefore expected his death. However, the order of the Director of Prisons that X be executed by a firing squad was unlawful. Altho there was no criminal intent to kill the convict M the Director of Prisons was performing a duty for the execution of the convict, the means employed was not as provided by law. Presumably, the order that the convict be executed by a firing squad was made at the spur of the moment because of the power failure. It was spontaneous and not deliberate. A, B, C chosen to constitute the firing squad are liable as principals by direct participation since the order being clearly unlawful, they were not bound to obey it. The Director of Prisons is liable as principal by inducement. Art 249; Homicide; information for homicide but murder is proven 1982 No. 18 "A" is prosecuted for homicide under proper information. At the time of the trial, it was established that the crime was committed with treachery, premeditation, at nighttime and with abuse of superior strength. (a) If you were the judge, what crime should you convict "A" of? Why? Answer (a) If I were the judge, I would convict A of homicide as that is the crime charged in the information. Art 251; Death in tumultuous affray 1985 No. 10 After engaging in a drinking spree at Celia's birthday party, a turbulent commotion took place in Celia's premises involving no less than forty (40) guests during which occasion Tito was killed by shots fired from a .45 cal. pistol. The fiscal filed a case of "Death in TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY" against all the participants in the melee. Do you agree? Reasons. Answer: The charge of "Death in Tumultuous Affray" against all the participants in the melee is not proper. In a tumultuous affray the actual killer of the person killed is not known. Then the one liable will be the person known to have inflicted serious physical injuries upon the victim. If he is also not known, the one liable will be the person known to have employed violence upon the victim. Death in a tumultuous affray under Article 261 of the Revised Penal Code applies if the killer Page 243 of 374
of the person killed in the course of the affray cannot be ascertained. (U.S. v. Tan-doc 40 Phil. 954). Art 251; Tumultous affray 1997 No. 18: During a town fiesta, a free-for-all fight erupted in the public plaza. As a result of the tumultuous affray, A sustained one fatal and three superficial stab wounds. He died a day after. B, C, D and E were proven to be participants in the "rumble", each using a knife against A, but it could not be ascertained who among them inflicted the mortal Injury. Who shall be held criminally liable for the death of A and for what? Answer: B, C, D, and E being participants in the tumultuous affray and having been proven to have inflicted serious physical injuries, or at least, employed violence upon A, are criminally liable for the latter's death. And because it cannot be ascertained who among them inflicted the mortal injury on A, there being a freefor-all fight or tumultuous affray. B, C, D, and E are all liable for the crime of death caused in a tumultuous affray under Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code.
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Art 255; Infanticide 1982 No. 16 "A", a prominent and high official, had illicit relationship with "B", a girl very much below his social standing. A child was born to them as a result thereof. "A" killed the child, over three days old, so as to conceal his dishonor. (a) What crime did'"A" commit? (b) Does relationship in this case constitute a privileged mitigating circumstance? (c) How would you answer the questions less than three days old?
(a) and (b) if the child were
Answer (a) "A" committed parricide as this crime is committed even though the relationship of the father "A" with the child, over three days old, is illegitimate. (b) The answer is no because relationship in parricide is inherent, aside from the fact that it is not provided in the Code as a privileged mitigating circumstance? (c) If the child were less than three days old, the crime would be infanticide. Relationship of "A" the illegitimate father, is not privileged mitigating. Art, 255, provides for such privileged mitigating circumstance if the offender is the mother and the child was killed to conceal her dishonor. Art 256; Abortion 1979 No. I X and Y had been married for 5 years. They had no child due to X's impotence. X learned that Y was having an affair with Z. In a confrontation, X came to know that Y was pregnant. In a fit of rage, X pushed down Y, shoved his knee to her abdomen, and slapped her several times until she lost consciousness. Y was rushed to a hospital where she had a caesarian operation. The fetus was examined in utero, its head was fractured and it was delivered stillborn. The evidence was in conflict as to the age of the fetus; the expert testimony, however, concluded "with reasonable medical certainty" that the fetus had developed to the stage of viability, i.e., that in the event of premature birth on the date of X's assault, it would have had a 75% to 96% chance of survival. Y wants to know if X can be charged with murder. Please give your opinion. Answer X cannot be charged with murder. Murder is the killing of a person with the attendance of any of the qualifying aggravating circumstances provided in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the offender not related to the victim as in parricide. If the person killed is a child less than three (3) days old, the crime committed is infanticide, whoever the offender may be. (Art. 255, Revised Penal Code). The facts of the problem refer to a fetus which was delivered stillborn. The cause was the fracture of the head undoubtedly due to the acts of violence of X in shoving his knee on the abdomen of his pregnant wife and slapping her several times. Murder is not committed but abortion. The death of the fetus when expelled violently from the mother's womb, irrespective of its age, in legal contemplation is abortion. (Viada, V, page 13. 5th ed.)
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Art 256; Abortion 1979 No. XIII X, a beauty queen was raped by three American Blacks. Out of extreme shame and after 3 months, X went to Dr. YES and asked for an abortion. Dr. YES steadfastly refused until X produced a bottle of iodine and informed him that if he would not abort her baby, she would right then and there commit suicide. With hesitation but pitying X, Dr. YES performed an abortion on X which was successful. Dr. YES was charged with intentional abortion. Decide. Answer Dr. Yes is criminally liable for abortion, X's threat that if Dr. Yes would not abort her baby, she would commit suicide is not an uncontrollable fear from which Dr. Yes could not escape. As a matter of fact, Dr, Yes performed the abortion not because he feared that X would commit suicide but because of pity. Such is not exempting because what Dr. Yes performed was not involuntary. Art 256; Unintentional abortion 1976 No. V-a X, single, 21 years old, had a date with Y. After several meetings Y became pregnant. To hide her dishonor, she attempted to commit suicide by jumping from a tall building. Fortunately, she was saved by by-standers who saw the incident. Because of the fall she incurred several injuries and contusions and suffered an abortion. Is she liable for the abortion she caused upon herself? Reasons. Answer Y is liable for unintentional abortion thru reckless negligence. Her act of attempting suicide by jumping from a tall building is not felonious and she incurred no criminal liability although she survived. However, the jumping from the tall building was voluntary and the violence was incidental to the fall which resulted in injuries causing her abortion. The abortion was not intentional, but she could have foreseen under the circumstances that by jumping from the tall building, the fall might cause her death or result in her abortion. One is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except thru culpable abandonment. {US v. Maleza, et al. 14 Phil. 469). There is, therefore, negligence. (People v. BAnas, Jr., (UNREP) II CA Rep. 1135). Answer depends on reasoning of examinee as to whether committing suicide is a lawful or unlawful act. Art 4, RPC. Art 256; Unintentional abortion 1986 No. 12: Kaakitakit, the beautiful wife of Nahahabag, is terminally ill and bedridden with cancer. Kaakitakit begs her husband Nahahabag to assist her in committing suicide to end her suffering. Nahahabag agreed and bought a bottle of sleeping pills. He brought the bottle to his wife and gave her a glass of water to down the pills. Kaakitakit took the pills but because she did not take sufficient quantity and due to the timely arrival of her attending physician, she survived the suicide attempt. Moreover, because of resort to faith healing, Kaakitakit miraculously recovered from the cancer. However, unknown to either husband or wife,
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Kaakitakit was already three months pregnant when she took the sleeping pills resulting in the expulsion of the fetus. The Fiscal prosecuted both Kaakitakit and Nahahabag for unintentional abortion. Is the charge correct? Explain. Answer: The charge of unintentional abortion is not correct. This crime is committed by means of violence upon a pregnant woman as a result of which she aborted. The taking of the pill is not an act of violence. It was taken by the wife not to abort but to end her suffering from cancer, of which she was terminally ill. Art 266; Physical injuries; inflicted by teacher on pupils 1981 No. 16 "T" is a public school teacher. One of her pupils, "B", tripped another classmate "C", causing "C" to fall on the floor and suffer a contusion on the forehead. So, "T", with her bamboo pointer, whipped "B" on the thigh, which produced a linear bruise. If you were the Judge before whom a Slight Physical Injury case was filed against "T", how would you decide the case? Select the correct answer from the following, and explain: (1) I will acquit "T" because in school and during school activities, the teacher exercises parental authority over her pupils. (2) I will acquit "T" because she just tried to discipline "B" for his misconduct. It was farthest from "T's" thought to commit any criminal offense. The means she actually used to punish "B" was moderate and she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or malevolent intent. (3) I will convict "T" because the State should exercise utmost vigilance to assure that teachers should refrain from inflicting corporal punishment. (4) I will convict "T" because teachers in the exercise of their authority in loco parentis cannot inflict any corporal punishment even though moderate. (5) I will convict "T" because if no physical injuries resulted the act is still penalized by the Revised Penal Code as ill-treatment. Answer (1) I will acquit "T" because in school and during school activities, the teacher exercises parental authority over her pupils. The teacher, under the Civil Code, exercises substitute parental authority over the students. As such, the teacher can discipline the pupil in the same manner that the parent does to the child. (2) I will acquit "T" because she just tried to discipline "B" for his misconduct. It was farthest from "T's" thought to commit any criminal offense. The means she actually used to punish "B" was moderate and she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred and malevolent intent. The whipping of the student for the act she had done in tripping another classmate, who suffered contusion on her forehead because she fell on the floor, was to discipline her. The teacher did not, therefor act, with criminal intent. That nature of the injuries suffered by the student, linear bruises on the thigh, show
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that the teacher merely intended to discipline her. She was not motivated by illwill, hatred or malevolent intent.
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Art 266-A; Rape 1979 No. XII Adan and Eve were lovers but their relationship turned sour. Adan tried to win back Eve but to no avail. Almost hopeless, Adan went to see two of his friends, Bruno and Cora. Adan asked the two to accompany him to the house of Eve. He told the two: "This is my last attempt of reconciliation. I must succeed even if I have to rape Eve." The trio proceeded to the house of Eve using the car owned and driven by Bruno. When they reached the house, Adan went up, Cora stayed near the gate as lookout and Bruno remained in the car, Adan failed to win back Eve and true to his threat raped her. He went down the house, informed Bruno and Cora about the incident and they thereafter went to a Disco Club and danced the night away. Will a charge of rape prosper against the three? Answer Adan, Bruno and Cora can be charged with rape. Adan as a principal by direct participation, Bruno and Cora as accomplices. When Bruno and Cora brought Adan to the house of Eve, they knew of the criminal design of Adan which is to rape Eve if there would be no reconciliation. Cora acted as a look-out and Bruno remained in the car while Adan went inside the house. They there-lore performed acts showing their approval or concurrence to the criminal design of Adan, which facilitated the commission of the crime. There is no conspiracy because concerted acts have not been performed to realize the same criminal objective. Art 266-A; Rape 1985 No. 11 Ernesto, a rejected suitor of Madonna, waited one evening for the latter to come out of her school. Catching Madonna by surprise, Ernesto succeeded in forcing Madonna to his car and thereafter drove off for his hometown in Calamba, Laguna. He kept Madonna in his parents' house solely to convince her to accept his marriage proposal. Frustrated after three (3) days, Ernesto succeeded, after kissing her, fondling her breast and touching her private parts, in forcibly having carnal knowledge of Madonna once everyday for the next three (3) days. On the 7th day, Madonna was rescued by the police authorities. What crime or crimes did Ernesto commit? State your reasons. Answer: Ernesto committed serious illegal detention and three (3) rapes. As long as there is restraint of liberty, Illegal Detention is committed. Since the offended party is a woman, the crime is serious illegal detention. (Art. 267 Revised Penal Code). Madonna was deprived of her liberty for six days although in the first three days Ernesto kept the offended party in the house of his parents solely to convince her to accept his marriage proposal. (People vs. Crisostomo et. al., 46 Phil. 775). In the next three days, by forcing Madonna, Ernesto had sexual intercourse with her once a day. Rape is not a continuous crime and so three rapes are committed. A complex crime is not committed because the serious illegal detention is not a means necessary to commit rape. Besides rape can be committed even without serious illegal detention. (People vs. Beraal 131 SCRA 1984).
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Art 266-A; Rape 1987 No. II: AJ, a medical student, was a boarder in the house of Mr. and Mrs. M who had a good-looking 25-year old retarded daughter with the mental age of an 11year old girl. One day when the couple were out, Perlita, the retarded daughter, entered AJ's room, came near him and started kissing him. He tried to avoid her. "But she persisted. They had sexual intercourse. This was repeated every time Perlita's parents were out until Perlita got pregnant. Mr and Mrs. M filed a complaint of rape against AJ who claimed that it was Perlita who seduced him; that Perlita was intelligent, clearly understood what she was doing; and that since Perlita was already 25 years old did not herself file the complaint, her parents had no personality to file the complaint for rape. How would you resolve the case? Answer: The contention of AJ cannot be sustained. Sexual intercourse with Perlita, who is a mental retardate, although 25 years old but with a mental age of 11-year old girl is rape. She is the same class as a woman deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious. (People vs. Sunga L-456S3 June 24, 1985). Since she is suffering from an incapacity, being incompetent on account of her mental age, the parents have the right to file the complaint for rape. Art 266-A; Rape 1995 No. 11: 1. Gavino boxed his wife Alma for refusing to sleep with him. He then violently threw her on the floor and forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. As a result Alma suffered serious physical injuries. (a) Can Gavino be charged with rape? Explain. (b) Can Gavino be charged with serious physical injuries? Explain (c) Will your answers to (a) and (b) be the same if before the incident Gavino and Alma were legally separated? Explain. 2. Three policemen conducting routine surveillance of a cogonal area in Antipole chanced upon Ruben, a 15-year old tricycle driver, on top of Rowena who was known to be a child prostitute. Both were naked from the waist down and appeared to be enjoying the sexual activity. Ruben was arrested by the policemen despite his protestations that Rowena enticed him to have sex with her in advance celebration of her twelfth birthday. The town physician found no semen nor any bleeding on Rowena's hymen but for a healed scar. Her hymenal opening easily admitted two fingers showing that no external force had been employed on her. Is Ruben liable for any offense? Discuss fully. Answer; 1. (a) No. A husband cannot be charged with the rape of his wife because of the matrimonial consent which she gave when she assumed the marriage relation, and the law will not permit her to retract in order to charge her husband with the offense (Sate us. Haines, 11 La. Ann. 731 So. 372; 441 RA 837). [b) Yes, he may be guilty of serious physical injuries. This offense is specially mentioned in Art. 263 [4], paragraph 2 which imposes a higher penalty for the crime of physical injuries in cases where the offense shall have been committed against any of the persons enumerated in Art 246 (the crime of parricide). Page 250 of 374
(c) No, my answer will not be the same. If Gavino, and Alma were legally separated at the time of the incident, then Gavino could be held liable for rape. A legal separation is a separation of the spouses from bed and board (U.S. vs. Johnson, 27 Phil. 477, cited in II Reyes, RFC, p. 853. 1981 edition), In the crime of rape, any crime resulting from the infliction of physical injuries suffered by the victim on the occasion of the rape, is absorbed by the crime of rape. The Injuries suffered by the victim may, however, be considered in determining the proper penalty which shall be imposed on the offender. Serious physical injuries cannot be absorbed in rape; it can be so if the injury is slight. 2. Ruben is liable for rape, even if force or intimidation is not present. The gravamen of the offense is the carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years of age (People vs. Dela Cruz, 56 SCRA 84) since the law doesn't consider the consent voluntary and presumes that a girl below twelve years old does not and cannot have a will of her own. In People us. Perez, CA 37 OG 1762, it was held that sexual intercourse with a prostitute below twelve years old is rape. Similarly, the absence of spermatozoa does not disprove the consummation as the important consideration is not the emission but the penetration of the female body by the male organ (People vs. Jose 37 SCRA 450; People vs. Carandang. 52 SCRA 259). Art 266-A; Rape 1996 No. 12: The complainant, an eighteen-year old mental retardate with an intellectual capacity between the ages of nine and twelve years, when asked during the trial how she felt when she was raped by the accused, replied "Masarap, it gave me much pleasure." With the claim of the accused that the complainant consented for a fee to the sexual intercourse, and with the foregoing answer of the complainant, would you convict the accused of rape if you were the judge trying the case? Explain. Answer; Yes, I would convict the accused of rape. Since the victim is a mental retardate with an intellectual capacity of a child less than 12 years old, she is legally incapable of giving a valid consent to the sexual Intercourse. The sexual intercourse is tantamount to a statutory rape because the level of intelligence is that of a child less than twelve years of age. Where the victim of rape is a mental retardate, violence or Intimidation is not essential to constitute rape. (People us. Trimor, G,R. 106541-42, 31 Mar 95) As a matter of fact, RA No. 7659, the Heinous Crimes Law, amended Art. 335, RPC, by adding the phrase "or is demented." Art 266-A; Rape 2000 No X Flordeluna boarded a taxi on her way home to Quezon City which was driven by Roger, Flordeluna noticed that Roger was always placing his car freshener in front of the car aircon ventilation but did not bother asking Roger why. Suddenly, Flordeluna felt dizzy and became unconscious. Instead of bringing her to Quezon City, Roger brought Flordeluna to his house in Cavite where she was detained for two (2) weeks. She was raped for the entire duration Page 251 of 374
of her detention. May Roger be charged and convicted of the crime of rape with serious illegal detention? Explain. (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, Roger may not be charged and convicted of the crime of rape with serious illegal detention. Roger may be charged and convicted of multiple rapes. Each rape is a distinct offense and should be punished separately. Evidently, his principal intention was to abuse Flordeluna; the detention was only incidental to the rape. ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: No, Roger may not be charged and convicted of the crime of rape with serious illegal detention, since the detention was incurred in raping the victim during the days she was held. At most, Roger may be prosecuted for forcible abduction for taking Flordeluna to Cavite against the latter's will and with lewd designs. The forcible abduction should be complexed with one of the multiple rapes committed, and the other rapes should be prosecuted and punished separately, in as many rapes were charged and proved. Art 266-A; Rape & acts of lasciviousness 1992 No. 6: Mrs. Lydia Cortes presented herself to Special Police Officer 2 (SPO 2} Cirio Cellado at the Northern Police Headquarters with her niece Nani, age 17, and the latter's friend, Chabeng, age 16, asking for help in filing a criminal case. It appears that while working as househelp in the home of Col. Rolando Donido (retired), the latter would call them alternately, lock them up with him in a room and force his lustful desires upon them. Sobbing violently, Nani narrated how finally her employer succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her because he kept on threatening to kill her if she refused to submit to him or if she told Mrs. Donido about what was happening. On the other hand, Chabeng described how their employer took liberties with her body, short of destroying her virginity. If they so much as resisted, they were subjected to a lot of verbal abuse and harassment. Unable to bear it any longer, both of them ran away. Nani got married immediately to a former boyfriend to save herself from the humiliation of appearing in their hometown, pregnant but still single. She ended her story saying that no housegirl ever stayed long in that household "kasi walang patawad iyang D.O.M. (Dirty Old Man ) na iyan". a) What crime has Col. Donido committed against Nani? What crime has he committed against Chabeng? Explain fully. Suggested Answer: a) Against Nani, the crime committed by Col. Donido is rape, because he had sexual intercourse with her with the attendant circumstance of force and intimidation, (Art, 335, par. 1). As far as Chabeng is concerned, since Col. Donido only took liberties on her body, short of sexual intercourse, he is liable of Acts of Lasciviousness under Art. 336, RPC which is committed by any person who commit acts of lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances in Rape. Art 266-A; Rape with homicide & theft 1998 No VII.
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King went to the house of Laura who was alone. Laura offered him a drink and after consuming three bottles of beer. King made advances to her and with force and violence, ravished her. Then King killed Laura and took her jewelry. Doming, King's adopted brother, learned about the incident. He went to Laura's house, hid her body, cleaned everything and washed the bloodstains inside the room. Later, King gave Jose, his legitimate brother, one piece of jewelry belonging to Laura. Jose knew that the jewelry was taken from Laura but nonetheless he sold it for P2,000. What crime or crimes did King, Doming and Jose commit? Discuss their criminal liabilities. [10%] Answer: King committed the composite crime of Rape with homicide as a single indivisible offense, not a complex crime, and Theft. The taking of Laura's jewelry when she is already dead is only theft. xxx Art 266-A; Rape; acknowledgement of offspring 1982 No. 11 "A", "B" and "C" took turns in raping a woman "X". If all of them were finally convicted, would it be correct for the judge to order each of them to acknowledge and support the offspring of "X"? Reason. Answer It would not be correct for the judge to order each of the accused to acknowledge the offspring of X because it is impossible to determine the paternity thereof. (People vs. de Leon et al., L-2094, April 1950), It would be correct, however, for the court to order each of them to support the offspring as anyone of them may be the father and that each and everyone of them is directly responsible that an unwilling mother may give birth to an undesired offspring as each and everyone of them contributed to and cooperated in giving birth to the child. (People vs. Velo et aL, 80 Phil 438). Art 266-A; Rape; attempted 1983 No. 5 With lewd design, an illiterate newsboy forced a 16-year old girl to lie on the grass and tried to make love to her, but no penetration was effected because of the valiant resistance of the victim. What crime was committed? What mitigating circumstance, if any, would you appreciate in favor of the offender? Explain. Answer Attempted rape. When the newsboy forced the girl to lie on the grass and tried to make love to her, his intention was to have sexual intercourse with her. But there was no penetration because of the resistance of the girl. So all the acts of execution to produce the crime of rape were not performed due to a cause other than the spontaneous desistance of the offender. There is no mitigating circumstance. Although the newsboy is illiterate, that in itself is not mitigating. Lack of sufficient intelligence and knowledge of the
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full significance of all acts constitute the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction. (People vs. Geronimo (1973) 55 SCRA 246) Besides, in crimes against chastity, like rape lack of instruction or low degree of intelligence is not mitigating (People vs. Lopez L14347, April 29, 1960) Art 266-A; Rape; Effect of affidavit of desistance 1993 No. 14: 1) Ariel intimidated Rachel, a mental retardate, with a bolo into having sexual Intercourse with him. Rachel's mother immediately filed a complaint, supported by her sworn statement, before the City Prosecutor's Office. After the necessary preliminary investigation, an information was signed by the prosecutor but did not contain the signature of Rachel nor of her mother. Citing Art. 344 of the RPC (prosecution of the crimes of rape, etc.), Ariel moves for the dismissal of the case. Resolve with reasons. 2) After the prosecution had rested its case, Ariel presented a sworn affidavit of desistance executed by Rachel and her mother stating that they are no longer interested in prosecuting the case and that they have pardoned Ariel. What effect would this affidavit of desistance have on the criminal and civil aspects of the case? Explain fully. Answer: 1) The case should not be dismissed. ... 2) The affidavit of desistance will only amount to the condonation of civil liability but not criminal liability hence the case should still proceed. Art 266-A; Rape; male victim 2002 No IX. A. A, a male, takes B, another male, to a motel and there, through threat and intimidation, succeeds in inserting his penis into the anus of B. What, if any, is As criminal liability? Why? SUGGESTED ANSWER: A shall be criminally liable for rape by committing an act of sexual assault against B, by inserting his penis into the anus of the latter. Even a man may be a victim of rape by sexual assault under par. 2 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, "when the offender's penis is inserted into his mouth or anal orifice." B. A with lewd designs, took a 13-year old girl to a nipa hut in his farm and there had sexual intercourse with her. The girl did not offer any resistance because she was infatuated with the man, who was good-looking and belonged to a rich and prominent family in the town. What crime, if any, was committed by A? Why? (2%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: A committed the crime of consented abduction under Article 343 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The said Article punishes the abduction of a virgin over 12 and under 18 years of age, carried out with her consent and with lewd designs. Although the problem did not indicate the victim to be virgin, virginity should not be understood in its material sense, as to exclude a virtuous woman of good reputation, since
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the essence of the crime is not the injury to the woman but the outrage and alarm to her family (Valdepenas vs. People,16 SCRA 871 [1966]). ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: A committed "Child Abuse" under Rep. Act No. 7610. As defined in said law, "child abuse" includes sexual abuse or any act which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being, whose age is below eighteen (18) years. Art 266-A; Rape; marriage of accused with offended party 1982 No 9 "A", "B" and "C", helping one another, raped a woman "X" three times, each of them taking turns in having sexual intercourse with her. Accordingly, three rape cases were filed against "A", "B" and "C": Case 1, wherein "A" had sexual intercourse with "X"; Case 2, wherein "B" had intercourse with "X"; Case 3, wherein "C" had intercourse with "X". While the cases were pending trial, "A" married "X". What effect has this marriage on the criminal liability of "A", "B" and "C" in each of the three cases? Explain. Answer The marriage of A with X will extinguish his criminal liability in the rape committed by A upon X. The criminal liability of B and C as co-principals in the rape committed, by A upon X for having helped A in committing the crime is also extinguished because under Article 344 R.P.C. such marriage will benefit also the co-principals. The criminal liability of A in the rapes committed by B and C upon the offended party is not extinguished because these rapes are separate and independent from the rape committed by A. Art 266-A; Rape; necessity of medical examination 1978 No. VI-b Bella, a 25-year old owner of a beauty shoppe was sleeping in her house one afternoon. Her husband was in the office while their children were in school. Knowing that Bella was alone, Basilio, a former rejected suitor, went up the house, proceeded to the room where Bella wit asleep. Then, threatening Bella with a bladed weapon, and in spite of her protests and resistance, Basilio had forcible sexual intercourse with Bella. During the trial, no medical certificate was presented since Bella refused to submit to a medical examination. Basilio was convicted on the strength alone of Bella's testimony. Basilio appealed and contended that the rape was not proven beyond reasonable doubt due to the failure of the prosecution to present the medical certificate to show vaginal lacerations. Decide with reasons, Answer The sentence of conviction must be affirmed. Medical examination of the victim is not always necessary in rape cases. Whether the charge will prosper depends upon all evidence, (People vs. Selfaison, 110 Phil. 809). Art 266-A; Rape; new acts considered as rape 2002 No VIII. A. What other acts are considered rape under the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, amending the Revised Penal Code? (3%) Page 255 of 374
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The other acts considered rape under the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 are: 1. having carnal knowledge of a woman by a man by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority, 2. having carnal knowledge of a demented woman by a man even if none of the circumstances required in rape be present; and 3. committing an act of sexual assault by inserting a person's penis into the victim's mouth or anal orifice, or by inserting any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. B. The Anti-Rape Law of 1997 reclassified rape from a crime against honor, a private offense, to that of a crime against persons. Will the subsequent marriage of the offender and the offended party extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed? Explain. (2%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes. By express provision of Article 266-C of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the subsequent valid marriage between the offender and offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed, although rape has been reclassified from a crime against chastity, to that of a crime against persons. Art 266-A; Rape; who must file 1993 No. 14: 1) Ariel intimidated Rachel, a mental retardate, with a bolo into having sexual Intercourse with him. Rachel's mother immediately filed a complaint, supported by her sworn statement, before the City Prosecutor's Office. After the necessary preliminary investigation, an information was signed by the prosecutor but did not contain the signature of Rachel nor of her mother. Citing Art. 344 of the RPC (prosecution of the crimes of rape, etc.), Ariel moves for the dismissal of the case. Resolve with reasons. Answer: 1) The case should not be dismissed. This is allowed by law (People us. Ilarde, 125 SCRA 11). It is enough that a complaint was filed by the offended party or the parents in the Fiscal's Office.
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Crimes against Personal Liberty and Security Art 267; Illegal detention vs Grave Coercion 1999 No III (a)
Distinguish coercion from illegal detention. (3%)
What crime was committed by the agents of the law? Explain your answer. (3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: (a) Coercion may be distinguished from illegal detention as follows: in coercion, the basis of criminal liability is the employment of violence or serious intimidation approximating violence, without authority of law, to prevent a person from doing something not prohibited by law or to compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong; while in Illegal detention, the basis of liability is the actual restraint or locking up of a person, thereby depriving him of his liberty without authority of law. If there was no intent to lock up or detain the offended party unlawfully, the crime of illegal detention is not committed. Art 267; Illegal detention vs murder 1978 No. V-b Juan and Pedro harbored a long-standing grudge/ resentment against Jose who eloped with their sister, Maria, and later abandoned her. They laid meticulous plans to kill him. After weeks of waiting, their chance came when late one night, they cornered Jose as he was coming out of a disco-beer house in Makati, Metro Manila. The two forcibly shoved him into a waiting car and droved to Tagaytay City, where they kept Jose hog-tied in a 2 x 3 meter room. Two (2) days later, they killed Jose and dumped his body into ravine. What was the crime/crimes committed by Juan and Pedro? Discuss briefly. Answer: Murder, since the purpose of Juan and Pedro was to kill the victim. The detention of the victim for two days before he was killed was merely incidental. (People vs. Camo, 91 Phil. 240; People vs. Ong, 69 SCRA 174). Art 267; Illegal detention vs murder 1996 No. 4: 2) Fidel and Fred harbored a long standing grudge against Jorge who refused to marry their sister Lorna, after the latter got pregnant by Jorge. After weeks of surveillance, they finally cornered Jorge in Ermita, Manila, when the latter was walking home late at might. Fidel and Fred forcibly brought Jorge to Zambales where they kept him hog-tied in a small nipa house located in the middle of a rice field. Two days later, they killed Jorge and dumped his body into the river. What crime or crimes did Fidel and Fred commit? Explain. Answer: 2) Fidel and Fred committed the crime of Murder under Art 248, RPC . the killing being qualified by evident premeditation. This is due to the long standing grudge entertained by the two accused occasioned by the victim's refusal to marry their sister after Impregnating her.
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In People vs. Alfeche. 219 SCRA 85, the intention of the accused is determinative of the crime committed. Where the intention is to kill the victim and the latter is forcibly taken to another place and later killed, it is murder. There is no indication that the offenders intended to deprive the victim of his liberty. Whereas, if the victim is kidnapped, and taken to another situs and killed as an afterthought, it is kidnapping with homicide under Art. 267, RPC. Art 267; Kidnapping 2002 No XVI. A and B were legally separated. Their child C, a minor, was placed in the custody of A the mother, subject to monthly visitations by B, his father. On one occasion, when B had C in his company, B decided not to return C to his mother. Instead, B took C with him to the United States where he intended for them to reside permanently. What crime, if any, did B commit? Why? (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: B committed the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 271, in relation to Article 270, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Article 271 expressly penalizes any parent who shall take from and deliberately fail to restore his or her minor child to the parent or guardian to whom custody of the minor has been placed. Since the custody of C, the minor, has been given to the mother and B has only the right of monthly visitation, the latter's act of taking C to the United Slates, to reside there permanently, constitutes a violation of said provisions of law. Art 267; Kidnapping and serious illegal detention 1991 No, 15; A charged B with the crime of rape. While the case was pending in court, B, together with his mother and brother, overpowered A while riding a tricycle, dragged her inside a carinderia owned by them and detained her for two (2) days. They demanded that she sign an affidavit of desistance and reimburse B the sum of P5,000.00 which he paid to his lawyer in the case. She was released only after she signed the affidavit asking for the dismissal of the case and delivered to B P 1,000.00. She promised to deliver the balance of P4,000.00 thirty (30) days later. What crime or crimes was/were committed by B, his mother, and brother? Answer: This is Kidnapping with Ransom which Is kidnapping or illegal detention committed by a private person for the purpose of extorting ransom. Since the victim is a woman, it is serious. Art 267; Kidnapping and serious illegal detention 1997 No. 15: A and B. conspiring with each other, kidnapped C and detained him. The duo then called up C's wife informing her that they had her husband and would release him only if she paid a ransom in the amount of P10,000,000 and that, if she were to fail, they would kill him. The next day, C, who had just recovered from an illness had a relapse. Fearing he might die if not treated at once by a doctor, A and B released C during the early morning of the third day of detention. Charged with kidnapping and serious illegal detention provided in Article 267, RPC, A and B filed a petition for bail. They contended that since they had Page 258 of 374
voluntarily released C within three days from commencement of the detention, without having been paid any amount of the ransom demanded and before the institution of criminal proceedings against them, the crime committed was only slight illegal detention prescribed in Article 268, RPC. After hearing, the trial court found the evidence of guilt to be strong and therefore denied the petition for bail. On appeal, the only issue was: Was the crime committed kidnapping and serious detention or slight Illegal detention? Decide. Answer: The crime committed by A and B is kidnapping and serious illegal detention because they made a demand for ransom and threatened to kill C if the latter's wife did not pay the same. Without the demand for ransom, the crime could have been slight illegal detention only. The contention of A and B that they had voluntary released C within three days from the commencement of the detention is immaterial as they are charged with a crime where the penalty prescribed is death (Asistio vs. San Diego. 10SCRA673). They were properly denied bail because the trial court found that the evidence of guilt in the information for kidnapping and serious Illegal detention is strong. Art 267; Kidnapping or illegal detention 1979 No. VIII Madam X was approached by Y after she had parked and locked her car near her home. Y grabbed her arm and with a screwdriver told her to unlock her ear. Y told X "we are going in my car". Frightened, X instead handed her car key to Y. While Y was looking for the right key, the police came and arrested Y. Y was charged with attempted kidnapping. Is the charge correct? Answer The charge of attempted kidnapping is not correct. Kidnapping or illegal detention implies deprivation of the liberty of another. The facts of the problem do not show any manifest intention on the part of Y to kidnap Madam X. The acts performed by Y are not direct overt acts indicative of intent to deprive Madam X of her liberty. The utterance of Y to X that "we are going in my car" maybe for a purpose other than to restrain X of her liberty. Coercion is committed because grabbing the arm of X by Y and telling her to unlock her car with a screwdriver are acts of violence or intimidation which caused fear in the mind of X, which made her act against her will. Art 267; Kidnapping/Illegal detention 1978 No V-a Discuss how the crime of illegal detention is committed. When does illegal detention become serious? When qualified? Answer Illegal detention is committed by a private person who shall kidnap or detain another or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty. The essential element is the actual confinement or restraint of the victim or the deprivation of his liberty. (People vs. Suarez, 82 Phil. 484; People vs. Ablaza, 30 Phil. 178). Page 259 of 374
Illegal detention is serious, if any of the following circumstances is present: 1} If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days. 2) If it shall have been committed simulating public authority. 3) If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or if threats to kill him shall have been made. 4} If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female, or public officer. Illegal detention is qualified if it is committed for the purpose of exhorting ransom from the victim or any other person. Art 267; Kidnapping/Serious illegal detention 1985 No. 11 Ernesto, a rejected suitor of Madonna, waited one evening for the latter to come out of her school. Catching Madonna by surprise, Ernesto succeeded in forcing Madonna to his car and thereafter drove off for his hometown in Calamba, Laguna. He kept Madonna in his parents' house solely to convince her to accept his marriage proposal. Frustrated after three (3) days, Ernesto succeeded, after kissing her, fondling her breast and touching her private parts, in forcibly having carnal knowledge of Madonna once everyday for the next three (3) days. On the 7th day, Madonna was rescued by the police authorities. What crime or crimes did Ernesto commit? State your reasons. Answer: Ernesto committed serious illegal detention and three (3) rapes. As long as there is restraint of liberty, Illegal Detention is committed. Since the offended party is a woman, the crime is serious illegal detention. (Art. 267 Revised Penal Code). Madonna was deprived of her liberty for six days although in the first three days Ernesto kept the offended party in the house of his parents solely to convince her to accept his marriage proposal. (People vs. Crisostomo et. al., 46 Phil. 775). In the next three days, by forcing Madonna, Ernesto had sexual intercourse with her once a day. Rape is not a continuous crime and so three rapes are committed. A complex crime is not committed because the serious illegal detention is not a means necessary to commit rape. Besides rape can be committed even without serious illegal detention. (People vs. Beraal 131 SCRA 1984). Art 267; Kidnapping; stage of execution 1996 No. 8 1} Edgardo induced his friend Vicente, in consideration of money, to kidnap a girl he is courting so that he may succeed to raping her and eventually making her accede to many him. Vicente asked for more money which Edgardo failed to put up. Angered because Edgardo did not put up the money he required, he reported Edgardo to the police. May Edgardo be charged with attempted kidnapping? Explain. Answer; 1) No, Edgardo may not be charged with attempted kidnapping inasmuch as no overt act to kidnap or restrain the liberty of the girl had been commenced.
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At most, what Edgardo has done In the premises was a proposal to Vicente to kidnap the girl, which is only a preparatory act and not an overt act. The attempt to commit a felony commences with the commission of overt act, not preparatory act. Proposal to commit kidnapping is not a crime.
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Art 269; Unlawful arrest 1977 No. III-b A police officer surreptitiously placed a marijuana cigarette in the breast pocket of the polo shirt of a student and then arrested the student for illegal possession of marijuana cigarette. For what crime or crimes will the police officer be liable? Reason fully. Answer The police officer will be liable for the complex crime of incriminatory machination with unlawful arrest. (People v. Alagao, et al., L-20721, April 30, 1966). The placing of marijuana cigarette in the breast pocket of the polo shirt of the student is incriminatory machination, which is "planting evidence". The arrest of the student for illegal possession of the marijuana cigarette is unlawful arrest. The two acts followed closely each other. Incriminatory machination is the means to commit unlawful arrest and is, therefore, a complex crime. Art 275; Abandonment of a person in danger 1977 No. XI-a One early morning while the physician was jogging in the Rizal Park, he saw a man in danger of dying. He ignored to give help to the dying man because he was in a hurry to go home as he will still drive his children to school, After an hour, the man died which death could have been prevented had he been attended to by the physician. For what crime, if any, is the physician liable? State your reason. Answer The physician is not liable for abandonment of a person in danger under par. 1 of Art. 275. Rizal Park cannot be considered an uninhabited place since it is within the radium of one kilometer from where inhabited buildings are located. Besides Rizal Park at that early morning would be teeming with joggers and other persons aside from the physician. Decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain held that a place is uninhabited if there is no population or group of persons, (March 9, 1883, 28 JUR Crim. 216). Art 280; Tresspass to dwelling 1979 No. II X was awakened by a loud noise coming from the first floor of his house. He went down and discovered that the screen door to the kitchen had been cut and the door itself opened. He called the police. When they arrived, they saw Y lying on the sala. They arrested Y but found no weapon, burglary tool or stolen goods in his person. They examined the whole house and found everything in order. No valuable was missing. Can the crime of attempted robbery be charged against Y? If not, what crime did he commit? Answer The crime committed is consummated qualified trespass to dwelling. (Art. 280, Revised Penal Code). The-intention of Y in entering the house of X was indeterminate. For this reason, it cannot be attempted robbery because the overt acts committed had no direct and immediate relation to robbery. (People vs. Lamahang, 61 Phil. 703). Since the screen door of the kitchen had been cut and the door opened, the entrance was against the will of the owner.
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Art 280; Tresspass to dwelling 1981 No. 2 Patrolman "A" caught "B" one night in the act of removing the glass jalousies of the window of the house of "C", which was closed. "B" had already detached three glass blades. "A" arrested "B" and booked him for "Attempted Robbery." Do you agree? If not, and if you were the investigating Fiscal, with what offense would you charge "B"? Give your reasons for either answer. Answer I do not agree with A who booked B for attempted robbery. If I were the Fiscal, I would charge B for attempted trespass to dwelling. In an attempted felony, the offender begins the commission of a felony by overt acts which must have a direct connection with the felony. It is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution if carried to its complete termination following its natural course without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the offender, will logically and necessarily ripen to a concrete offense. The removal of the three glass blades of the jalousies have no direct connection with the crime of robbery by force upon things. The purpose of removing the glass blades to enter the house was still indeterminate. But certainly in making the opening, the intention of the offender was to enter the house against the will of the owner of the house. (People vs. Lamahang 61 Phil. 703). So, the crime for which B should be charged, is attempted trespass to dwelling. Art 280; Tresspass to dwelling; rule of absorption/ complexion 1994 No. 20: At about 11:00 in the evening, Dante forced his way inside the house of Mamerto. Jay. Mamerto's son, saw Dante and accosted him, Dante pulled a knife and stabbed Jay on his abdomen. Mamerto heard the commotion and went out of his room. Dante, who was about to escape, assaulted Mamerto. Jay suffered Injuries which, were it not for the timely medical attendance, would have caused his death. Mamerto sustained Injuries that incapacitated him for 25 days. What crime or crimes did Dante commit? Answer: Dante committed qualified trespass to dwelling, frustrated homicide for the stabbing of Jay, and less serious physical injuries for the assault on Mamerto. The crime of qualified trespass to dwelling should not be complexed with frustrated homicide because when the trespass is committed as a means to commit a more serious offense, trespass to dwelling is absorbed by the greater crime, and the former constitutes an aggravating circumstance of dwelling (People vs. Abedoza, 53 Phil.788). Dante committed frustrated homicide for the stabbing of Jay.... Dante is guilty of less serious physical injuries for the wounds sustained by Mamerto... Art 282; Grave threats 1987 No. XIV: A, B, C, D, and E were members of a gang operating in Mindanao with Gorio as over-all leader, Gorio assigned A B, and C to get money from Pedro, a Page 263 of 374
businessman from Agusan. As instructed, A, B, and C, armed with guns, went to see Pedro and demanded P100,000.00. When Pedro refused, A pointed his gun at him while B hit him with the butt of his gun, Pedro gave the amount demanded. After the three (3) left, Pedro went to the PC Command to tell them what happened. On the way, he met Orlando, also a businessman. Orlando told him that D and E, week earlier, wrote him a letter asking P50,000.00 and threatening to kill his son and wife should he fail to give the amount. Afraid that the two would make good their threat, he gave the money when D called him that day. Orlando was also on his way to the PC to report what happened. (a)
What crime did A, B, and C commit?
(b) What crime did D and E commit? If the crimes committed by A B and C on one hand and D and E on the other hand are different. Explain why they are different when the purpose is the same, i.e. to extort money. (c)
Did Gorio commit any crime?
Answer: a) A, B, and C committed robbery. They were able to make Pedro give them the P100,000 that they demanded when A pointed his gun at Pedro because he refused at first to accede to their demand and B hit him with the butt of his gun. They employed violence and intimidation in the taking of the money with intent to gain. b) D and E committed Grave Threats. The reason is the intimidation employed refers to the killings of the wife and son of Orlando should he failed to give the amount of P50,000 demanded in the latter which D and E sent him. The distinction between robbery and grave threats when the purpose is the same, that is, to extort money, is that in robbery, the intimidation is actual and immediate whereas on grave threats, the intimidation is future and conditional. c) Gorio, being the over-all leader of the group, is a principal by inducement in the robbery committed against Pedro. He has no liability regarding the grave threats committed by D and E against Orlando because the facts of the problem do not specifically mention his intervention in the activities of D and E. Art 282; Grave threats 1988 No. 10: a) Jorge is the owner of 10 hectares of land in the foothills which he planted to lanzones. On his last visit there he was shocked to discover that his land had been taken over by a group of 15 families whose members had forcibly driven away his caretaker, had appropriated the fruits for themselves, and were now threatening to kill him should he try to eject them. What crime should Jorge charge these 15 families? Explain. How would you defend them? Explain briefly. Answer: a) Jorge can charge the 15 families of 2 separate crimes namely: 1} Violation of Article 282 which provides that "Grave threats.— Any person who shall threaten another with the infliction upon the person, honor or
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property of the latter or of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime shall suffer..." and 2) Violation of Article 312 which provides that: "Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property.— Any person who, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, shall take possession of any real property or shall usurp any real rights in property belonging to another, in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him, shall be punished by a fine from P50.00...". Art 282; Grave threats; when absorbed in usurpation of real property 1989 No. 17: "A" and "B", both farmers, entered the land owned by "X" and planted palay thereon. When "X" came to know about it, he confronted "A" and "B" and inquired why the latter occupied his land and planted palay thereon. "A", with a bolo in hand, replied that the land belongs to the family of "S", and not to "X" and at the same time said, "If you touch this land and my palay, blood will flow on this ground." Because of said remark, "X" went to the Chief of Police and complained. The Chief of Police filed a complex crime of Usurpation of Real Property with Grave Threats. What crime or crimes were committed? Answer: The crime committed by A and B is squatting under PD 772 and not usurpation of Real Property because in the latter crime, there must be violence against or intimidation of persons employed in taking possession of any real property or in usurping any real rights in property belonging to another (Art, 312, RPC). In this case, it appears that A and B entered X's land without the owner's consent or against his will but without any violence against or intimidation of persons. The crime of squatting is committed by any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will for residential, commercial or any other purposes. The threat uttered by A not having been used IN THE TAKING OF POSSESSION of the land, it is not absorbed in the crime of SQUATTING, When A threatened X that blood will flow if X touches the land and his palay, he committed the crime of grave threats by threatening another with the infliction of a wrong amounting to a crime. Only A is criminally liable for the crime of grave threats. Art 286; Furstrated coercion/ murder/ hijacking 1978 No. VII-a A boarded a plane at the Manila Domestic Airport bound for Davao City. While the plane was still on the tarmac, its doors still open and waiting for the last passenger to board, A ordered the pilot P at gunpoint, to take the plane to Singapore. When P refused, A shot him to death. What offense/offenses did A commit? Discuss with reasons. Answer Frustrated coercion and murder. When the crimes were committed, the plane was not "in flight" as the doors were still open for embarkation. So, hijacking was not committed (Rep. Act No. 6235, Sec. 1). The facts are almost Page 265 of 374
similar to the facts of the case of People vs. Ang Chio Kio, 95 Phil. 475, where the accused was convicted of frustrated coercion because of the refusal of the pilot to comply with the order of the accused to take the plane to Amoy, China instead of to Aparri and murder, because the accused shot the pilot to death. Alternative Answer Murder because when the pilot was shot the plane was still in the tarmac and the engine had not yet started. Coercion could not be committed, or if all, would be incidental to the killing. Art 286; Grave coercion 1978 No. VII-a A boarded a plane at the Manila Domestic Airport bound for Davao City. While the plane was still on the tarmac, its doors still open and waiting for the last passenger to board, A ordered the pilot P at gunpoint, to take the plane to Singapore. When P refused, A shot him to death. What offense/offenses did A commit? Discuss with reasons. Answer Frustrated coercion and murder. When the crimes were committed, the plane was not "in flight" as the doors were still open for embarkation. So, hijacking was not committed (Rep. Act No. 6235, Sec. 1). The facts are almost similar to the facts of the case of People vs. Ang Chio Kio, 95 Phil. 475, where the accused was convicted of frustrated coercion because of the refusal of the pilot to comply with the order of the accused to take the plane to Amoy, China instead of to Aparri and murder, because the accused shot the pilot to death. Alternative Answer Murder because when the pilot was shot the plane was still in the tarmac and the engine had not yet started. Coercion could not be committed, or if all, would be incidental to the killing. Art 286; Grave coercion 1979 No. IX X, a police captain, arrested Y on suspicion of robbery. X interrogated Y bat Y denied knowledge and participation in any crime of robbery, X then ordered Z, his assistant, to torture Y. As a result of the torture, Y confessed despite his innocence. What crime, if any, was committed by X? Answer X is liable for grave coercion. He is a principal by inducement. The person arrested on suspicion of robbery was not yet a prisoner since the facts do not show that he was already booked and detained in jail at the time of his investigation. So maltreatment of a prison is not committed. Since Z, the assistant of X, was ordered to torture Y and as a result Y confessed despite his innocence, grave coercion is committed, as the order is unlawful Art 286; Grave coercion 1981 No. 12 The goats of "G" entered the garden of "H" and destroyed the vegetables growing thereon. "H" caught the animals and tethered them near the hut. Soon
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"G" arrived and told "H" to release the goats as they were his. "H" refused; telling "G" to pay first for the value of "H's" damaged vegetables. With threats of bodily harm, "G" compelled "H" to turn the goats loose. What crime was committed by "G", if any? Why? Answer G committed grave coercion. Coercion is committed not only by violence but also by intimidation, like threat of bodily harm which compelled H to turn the goats loose, whether it was just or unjust. G had not acted under authority of law or exercise of a lawful right since the goats of G destroyed the vegetables growing on the garden of H, who refused to release the goats tethered near his hut until G pay first for the value of the damaged vegetables. (U.S. vs. Mena 11 Phil. 543), Art 286; Grave coercion 1998 No II. Isagani lost his gold necklace bearing his initials. He saw Roy wearing the said necklace. Isagani asked Roy to return to him the necklace as it belongs to him, but Roy refused. Isagani then drew his gun and told Roy, "If you will not give back the necklace to me, I will kill you!" Out of fear for his life and against his will, Roy gave the necklace to Isagani, What offense did Isagani commit? (5%1 Answer; Isagani committed the crime of grave coercion (Art. 286, RPC) for compelling Roy, by means of serious threats or intimidation, to do something against the latter's will, whether it be right or wrong. Serious threats or intimidation approximating violence constitute grave coercion, not grave threats. Such is the nature of the threat in this case because it was committed with a gun, is a deadly weapon. The crime is not robbery because intent to gain, which is an essential element of robbery, is absent since the necklace belongs to Isagani. Art 286; Grave Coercion vs illegal detention 1999 No III (a)
Distinguish coercion from illegal detention. (3%)
What crime was committed by the agents of the law? Explain your answer. (3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: (a) Coercion may be distinguished from illegal detention as follows: in coercion, the basis of criminal liability is the employment of violence or serious intimidation approximating violence, without authority of law, to prevent a person from doing something not prohibited by law or to compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong; while in Illegal detention, the basis of liability is the actual restraint or locking up of a person, thereby depriving him of his liberty without authority of law. If there was no intent to lock up or detain the offended party unlawfully, the crime of illegal detention is not committed. Art 286; Grave coercion vs maltreatment of prisoner 1999 No III
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(b) Forcibly brought to the police headquarters, a person was tortured and maltreated by agents of the law in order to compel him to confess a crime imputed to him. The agents failed, however, to draw from him a confession which was their intention to obtain through the employment of such means, What crime was committed by the agents of the law? Explain your answer. (3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: (b) Evidently, the person tortured and maltreated by the agents of the law is a suspect and may have been detained by them. If so and he had already been booked and put in jail, the crime is maltreatment of prisoner and the fact that the suspect was subjected to torture to extort a confession would bring about a higher penalty. In addition to the offender's liability for the physical injuries inflicted. But if the suspect was forcibly brought to the police headquarters to make him admit the crime and tortured/ maltreated to make him confess to such crime, but later released because the agents failed to draw such confession, the crime is grave coercion because of the violence employed to compel such confession without the offended party being confined in jail. (US vs. Cusi, 10 Phil 143) It is noted that the offended party was merely "brought" to the police headquarters and is thus not a detention prisoner. Had he been validly arrested, the crime committed would be maltreatment of prisoners. Art 286; Grave coercion vs robbery 1989 No. 16: "A", by using force, grabbed the bicycle of "B" and ran away. The following day, "B" asked "C" to get back his bicycle from "A" and promised to pay him P100 if successful, "C" agreed. "C" went to "A's" house but it was locked from inside. Since "A" refused to let "C" in, "C" kicked the door open, confronted "A" and with a dagger in hand, told "A" to give "B’s” bicycle. Intimidated, "A" gave the bicycle to "C" who, in turn, gave it to "B". "B" paid "C" P100 for his efforts. What crime or crimes did "A", "B" and "C" commit, if any? Answer: B is not liable for any crime. Although he promised to pay C P100 if the latter would get back his bicycle from A, he did not induce C to commit any crime. He had no participation in any plan to take back the bicycle by unlawful means. C's act of kicking open "A's" door and intimidating "A" to return the bicycle is C's act alone for which he will individually be liable. There is even no showing that B approved of C's act. While A paid C the P100.00 he promised upon the return of his bicycle, it does not appear that he knew the manner and method by which C recovered the bicycle from A. C committed grave coercion, attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling when he forced his way into A's house and recovered the bicycle from A at dagger-point. This is so because he compelled A by means of intimidation to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong, namely to give the bicycle to him. Since his purpose is to return the bicycle to its rightful owner, there is no intent to gain that would make the crime robbery. The elements of the crime of grave coercion are:
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1. That a person prevented another from doing something not prohibited by law, or that he compelled him to do something against his will be it right or wrong; 2. That the prevention or compulsion be effected by violence, either by material force or such a display of force as would produce intimidation and control the will of the offended party; and 3. That the offender did not act with authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right,
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Art 287; Unjust vexation 1975 No, XIV A disliked the long hair that his brother, B, was sporting. So one night, while B was asleep, A cut short his brother's hair. Is A criminally liable? Why? Answer A will be criminally liable for unjust vexation. In a case decided by the Supreme Court of Spain, it was held that cutting the hair of another to humiliate or ridicule him is slander by deed. (Dec. Sup. Ct. Spain, April 13, 1896). In the case of People v. Motita, CA 59 O.G. 3020, it was held that the common denominator between unjust vexation and slander by deed is the act which annoys, vexes or irritates the offended party. Without any other concurring factor, the offense would be merely unjust vexation as it is equated with anything which annoys or irritates another. Surely, the act of A caused his brother annoyance and irritation. However laudable the purpose may be, to perform an act against the will of another to his annoyance and irritation and without justification is unjust vexation. Art 287; Unjust vexation 1976 No. IX-b X, a dashing bachelor of 18, fell in love with and started courting Y, a beautiful girl of 16. X's offer of love was, however, unrequited by Y. So, X decided to waylay Y on the way home from school One afternoon at the usual hour of Y's trek to her house, X had himself behind the thick cogon grass. Moments later, a person in velvet blue, the favorite color of Y, appeared. Sensing that his time has come, X sprang from his hideout, grabbed the person, and commenced kissing the cheeks and other parts of the body. It turned out, however, that the person is the twin brother of Y, a hermophrodite. Is X liable for any crime? Reasons. Answer X is liable for unjust vexation. The acts of X are annoying, irritating, vexatious and are unjustified. However, the mere acts of kissing the cheeks and other parts of the body of the twin brother of Y, the girl whom X was courting, and without his knowledge as to the identity are not lascivious. As a matter of fact, even kissing a girl, and holding her tightly is only unjust vexation. (People vs. Climaco, 40 O.G. 3186). Since X did the acts because his offer of love was unrequited by Y, his motive was not lustful but merely to spite her or to force her to accept his love. (People vs. Anonuevo, CA 35 O.G. 2018). If X was impelled by lust, he would have touched the breast and the private parts of the offended party. (People vs. Buenafe, 54 O.G. 610). Art 287; Unjust vexation vs acts of lasciviousness 1994 No. 1; 1) When is embracing, kissing and touching a girl's breast considered only unjust vexation instead of acts of lasciviousness? Answer; 1) The acts of embracing, kissing of a woman arising either out of passion or other motive and the touching of her breast as a mere incident of the embrace without lewd design constitutes merely unjust vexation (People us, Ignacio. CA GRNo. 5119-R, September 30, 1950). However, where the kissing, Page 270 of 374
embracing and the touching of the breast of a woman are done with lewd design, the same constitute acts of lasciviousness (People vs. Percival Gilo, 10 SCRA 753).
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Crimes Against Property Art 293; Ordinary robbery committed on a highway vs highway robbery under PD 532 2000 No XV a) Distinguish Highway Robbery under Presidential Decree No. 532 from Robbery committed on a highway. (3%) b) A, B, C, D and B were in a beerhouse along MacArthur Highway having a drinking spree. At about 1 o'clock in the morning, they decided to leave and so asked for the bill. They pooled their money together but they were still short of P2,000.00. E then orchestrated a plan whereby A, B, C and D would go out, flag a taxicab and rob the taxi driver of all his money while E would wait for them in the beerhouse. A. B, C and D agreed. All armed with balisongs, A, B, C and D hailed the first taxicab they encountered. After robbing X, the driver, of his earnings, which amounted to P1,000.00 only, they needed P1 ,000.00 more to meet their bill. So, they decided to hail another taxicab and they again robbed driver T of his hard-earned money amounting to P1,000. On their way back to the beerhouse, they were apprehended by a police team upon the complaint of X, the driver of the first cab. They pointed to E as the mastermind. What crime or crimes, if any. did A, B, C, D and B commit? Explain fully. (3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: a) Highway Robbery under Pres. Decree 532 differs from ordinary Robbery committed on a highway in these respects: 1) In Highway Robbery under PD 532, the robbery is committed indiscriminately against persons who commute in such highways, regardless of the potentiality they offer; while in ordinary Robbery committed on a highway, the robbery is committed only against predetermined victims; 2) It is Highway Robbery under PD 532, when the offender is a brigand or one who roams in public highways and carries out his robbery in public highways as venue, whenever the opportunity to do so arises. It is ordinary Robbery under the Revised Penal Code when the commission thereof In a public highway is only incidental and the offender is not a brigand: and 3) In Highway Robbery under PD 532, there is frequency in the commission of the robbery in public highways and against persons travelling thereat; whereas ordinary Robbery in public highways is only occasional against a predetermined victim, without frequency in public highways, b) A. B, C, D and E are liable for two (2) counts of robbery under Article 294 of the Rev. Penal Code; not for highway Robbery under PD 532. The offenders are not brigands but only committed the robbery to raise money to pay their bill because it happened that they were short of money to pay the same. Art 293; Robbery 1987 No. XIV: A, B, C, D, and E were members of a gang operating in Mindanao with Gorio as over-all leader, Gorio assigned A B, and C to get money from Pedro, a businessman from Agusan. As instructed, A, B, and C, armed with guns, went to see Pedro and demanded P100,000.00. When Pedro refused, A pointed his gun at him while B hit him with the butt of his gun, Pedro gave the amount demanded. After the three (3) left, Pedro went to the PC Command to tell them what happened. On the way, he met Orlando, also a businessman. Orlando told him Page 272 of 374
that D and E, week earlier, wrote him a letter asking P50,000.00 and threatening to kill his son and wife should he fail to give the amount. Afraid that the two would make good their threat, he gave the money when D called him that day. Orlando was also on his way to the PC to report what happened. (a)
What crime did A, B, and C commit?
(b) What crime did D and E commit? If the crimes committed by A B and C on one hand and D and E on the other hand are different. Explain why they are different when the purpose is the same, i.e. to extort money. (c)
Did Gorio commit any crime?
Answer: a) A, B, and C committed robbery. They were able to make Pedro give them the P100,000 that they demanded when A pointed his gun at Pedro because he refused at first to accede to their demand and B hit him with the butt of his gun. They employed violence and intimidation in the taking of the money with intent to gain. b) D and E committed Grave Threats. The reason is the intimidation employed refers to the killings of the wife and son of Orlando should he failed to give the amount of P50,000 demanded in the latter which D and E sent him. The distinction between robbery and grave threats when the purpose is the same, that is, to extort money, is that in robbery, the intimidation is actual and immediate whereas on grave threats, the intimidation is future and conditional. c) Gorio, being the over-all leader of the group, is a principal by inducement in the robbery committed against Pedro. He has no liability regarding the grave threats committed by D and E against Orlando because the facts of the problem do not specifically mention his intervention in the activities of D and E. Art 293; Robbery 2001 No XIV A and B are neighbors in Barangay Nuevo I, Silang, Cavite. A is a barangay Kagawad and known to be a bully, while B is reputed to be gay but noted for his industry and economic savvy which allowed him to amass wealth in leaps and bounds, including registered and unregistered lands in several barangays. Resenting B's riches and relying on his political influence, A decided to harass and intimidate B into sharing with him some of his lands, considering that the latter was single and living alone. One night, A broke into B's house, forced him to bring out some titles and after picking out a title covering 200 square meters in their barangay, compelled B to type out a Deed of Sale conveying the said lot to him for P1.00 and other valuable considerations. All the while, A carried a paltik caliber .45 in full view of B, who signed the deed out of fear. When A later on tried to register the deed, B summoned enough courage and had A arrested and charged in court after preliminary investigation. What charge or charges should be filed against A? Explain. (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: The charge for Robbery under Article 298 of the Revised Penal Code should be filed against A. Said Article provides that any person who, with intent to defraud another, by means of violence or intimidation, shall compel him to Page 273 of 374
sign, execute and deliver any public instrument or document shall be held guilty of robbery. The paltik caliber .45 firearm carried by A was obviously intended to Intimidate B and thus, used in the commission of the robbery. If it could be established that A had no license or permit to possess and carry such firearm, it should be taken only as special aggravating circumstance to the crime of robbery, not subject of a separate prosecution. ALTERNATIVE ANSWER; On the premise that the Deed of Sale which A compelled B to sign, had not attained the character of a "public" instrument or document, A should be charged for the crime of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling under Article 280 of the Revised Penal Code for having intruded into B’s house, and for the crime of Grave Coercion under Article 286 of same Code, for compelling B to sign such deed of sale against his will. Art 293; Robbery & Art 208 – maliciously refraining from instituting prosecution 1992 No. 6: Mrs. Lydia Cortes presented herself to Special Police Officer 2 (SPO 2} Cirio Cellado at the Northern Police Headquarters with her niece Nani, age 17, and the latter's friend, Chabeng, age 16, asking for help in filing a criminal case. It appears that while working as househelp in the home of Col. Rolando Donido (retired), the latter would call them alternately, lock them up with him in a room and force his lustful desires upon them. Sobbing violently, Nani narrated how finally her employer succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her because he kept on threatening to kill her if she refused to submit to him or if she told Mrs. Donido about what was happening. On the other hand, Chabeng described how their employer took liberties with her body, short of destroying her virginity. If they so much as resisted, they were subjected to a lot of verbal abuse and harassment. Unable to bear it any longer, both of them ran away. Nani got married immediately to a former boyfriend to save herself from the humiliation of appearing in their hometown, pregnant but still single. She ended her story saying that no housegirl ever stayed long in that household "kasi walang patawad iyang D.O.M. (Dirty Old Man ) na iyan". b) After SPO2 Cirio Cellado heard the story of the two girls, he took aside Mrs. Cortes and made this proposition: "Let me tell you what I plan to do. Since the D.O.M. is probably well-known in his community, he will not want his reputation tarnished, I'll tell him that you have reported him to us and you are all set to file criminal charges against him at the Prosecutor's Office. But if he will give us P50,000.00, you may be persuaded not to file the suit anymore. Actually, after he gives that amount, which he surely will, I shall visit him regularly for more. We shall then divide equally the money we shall get from him. Suppose Cellado proceeds to carry out his plan and is caught by his Chief with incontrovertible evidence, what action or actions may be brought by his superiors to penalize him and to recover whatever sums of money he may have received from his victim? Suggested Answer: b) Cellado should be charged of robbery because he took personal property from, Donido, with intent to gain, with intimidation on the person of the
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latter. The money passed into the hands of Cellado involuntarily because of fear (intimidation) on the part of the offended party, Donido. Likewise, Cellado can be held liable under Art. 208, RPC, he being a public officer who maliciously refrained from instituting prosecution against violators of the law. An agent of a person in authority charged with the apprehension and investigation of a crime is an integral part of the prosecution of offenses. Art 293; Robbery through violence or intimidation of persons 2002 No XIV. A. A entered the house of another without employing force or violence upon things. He was seen by a maid who wanted to scream but was prevented from doing so because A threatened her with a gun. A then took money and other valuables and left. Is A guilty of theft or of robbery? Explain. (3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: A is liable for robbery because of the intimidation he employed on the maid before the taking of the money and other valuables. It is the intimidation of person relative to the taking that qualifies the crime as robbery, instead of simply theft The non-employment of force upon things is of no moment because robbery is committed not only by employing force upon things but also by employing violence against or intimidation of persons. B. A fire broke out in a department store, A, taking advantage of the confusion, entered the store and carried away goods which he later sold. What crime, if any, did he commit? Why? (2%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: A committed the crime of qualified theft because he took the goods on the occasion of and taking advantage of the fire which broke out in the department store. The occasion of a calamity such as fire, when the theft was committed, qualifies the crime under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Art 293; Robbery thru force or intimidation against persons 1987 No. IX: Posing as a detective in the Manila Police and flashing a police badge, Jose, jobless and without any known address and occupation, told Manding and Liling, who were then sitting in a dark corner in the Luneta Park, that he was placing them under arrest for vagrancy and taking them to the police station for booking. Manding and Liling protested, saying that they were merely enjoying the evening alone, as they were sweethearts and both gainfully employed. Jose told them that they can give their explanations at the Police Station. Not wanting to be bothered and embarrassed, Manding offered Jose P200.00 to let them go. Jose agreed, got the money, and left. Explain whether under the facts given Jose committed any crime Answer: Jose is liable for robbery. By posing as a detective with a police badge, telling Manding and Liling, who were sitting in a dark comer in Luneta Park that they would be placed under arrest for vagrancy and brought to the police station for booking and by not listening to the explanation of Manding and Liling that they were sweethearts and gainfully employed which Jose said they could explain in
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the Police Station, created fear in the mind of the couple or a sense of mental distress in view of the risk or evil or embarrassment that is impending. This fear continued in the mind of the offended parties when they offered the P200 to Jose which he accepted and then received the money. Art 293; Robbery with force upon things 2000 No XI A, brother of B, with the intention of having a night out with his friends, took the coconut shell which is being used by B as a bank for coins from inside their locked cabinet using their common key. Forthwith, A broke the coconut shell outside of their home in the presence of his friends. What is the criminal liability of A, if any? Explain. (3%) Is A exempted from criminal liability under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code for being a brother of B? Explain. (2%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: a) A is criminally liable for Robbery with force upon things, because the coconut shell with the coins inside, was taken with intent to gain and broken outside of their home, (Art. 299 (b) (2). RPC). b) No, A is not exempt from criminal liability under Art. 332 because said Article applies only to theft, swindling or malicious mischief. Here, the crime committed is robbery. Art 293; Robbery with homicide 1977 No, VII-b E, F, G and H, all armed, ransacked the house of I, a paralytic, and in the process, E shot I to death when he refused to bring out his money. The shooting awakened the ten-year old son of I who immediately rushed to his father, but he, too, was shot to death in cold blood. In the meantime, F went to the room of the wife of I and had carnal knowledge with her through force. Thereafter; E, F, G and H fled with their loot. What criminal liability did E, F, G and H incur? Reason fully. Answer E, F, G and H are all liable for robbery with homicide since they constitute a band. The others who were present at the time of the commission of the robbery did not prevent the killings of I and his ten-year old son by E and the rape of the wife of I by F (Art 296, R.P.C.). The two killings are merged in the composite, integrate whole that is, robbery with homicide, as the killings were perpetrated by reason or on occasion of the robbery (People v. Madrid, 68 Phil. 2), Although rape also accompanied the robbery, the legal definition of the crime is still robbery with homicide but the rape is to be considered as an aggravating circumstance. (People v: Ganal, et al., 85 Phil. 743; People v. Basea, 104 Phil. 136; People v. Mongado, et aJL.t 28 SCRA 642). Art 293; Robbery with homicide 1980 No XVI Five men, one of them armed with a carbine, entered the hut of an octogenarian, who was living by himself, ransacked his things and took his carpentry tools and cash worth P100. "Y" saw them going towards the hut and sensing their evil intentions called some friends to act as a rescue party. As the Page 276 of 374
five men were going out with their loot, the rescue party opened fire and there was an exchange of gunshot between the two groups. Killed were one in the fiveman team, and another in the rescue party. The articles taken were recovered. Four of the 5 men were charged with Robbery in Band with Homicide. Their common defenses were that they could not be convicted of the crime charged because (a) the killing occurred after the consummation of the robbery; (b) the octogenarian victim of the robbery was not the victim of the homicide; and (c) the crime was committed by a band. Evaluate the different defenses of the accused. Answer 1) Although the killing was committed after the consummation of the robbery, robbery with homicide is committed because the killing was committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery. If the killing is prior or subsequent to the robbery so long as it is directly related to the robbery, the crime committed is robbery with homicide, (People vs. Hernandez, 48 Phil. 48). 2) Even if the victim of the robbery is not the victim of the homicide, robbery with homicide is committed because the law does not require that the person killed is the victim of the robbery. (People vs. Barut, L-42666, March 13, 1979). As a matter of fact, even if the victim killed is a mere bystander robbery with homicide is committed. (People vs. Disimban, 88 Phil. 120). 3) There seems to be a typographical error in the question. That band is a defense does not make sense. Obviously, the question would refer to the defense that the accused did not constitute a band. This is tenable because of the five accused, only one was armed with a carbine. There is a band if more than three armed malefactors take part in the commission of a robbery. (Art. 296, R.P.C.; People vs. Barut, supra). This is not, however, a defense because there is conspiracy among the five accused as shown by the facts of the problem that "as the five men were going out with their loot, the rescue party opened fire and there was an exchange of gunshots between the two groups." When homicide takes place on the occasion of the robbery, all who took part in the robbery are guilty as principals of the complex crime of robbery with homicide whether or not they actually participated in the killing, unless they had endeavored to prevent the killing. (People vs. Berudes, L-30966, Dec. 14, 1979) Art 293; Robbery with homicide 1988 No. 8: a) An armed band tried to stop a passenger bus, and the driver who sensed that the band might commit robbery; did not stop the bus but drove it faster. The members of the band then fired at the bus, killing one passenger who was hit in the head. b) As the malefactor were about to enter the house of A, the latter hid himself inside the ceiling. Once inside the house, the malefactor took from A's wife cash and pieces of jewelry. One of the malefactors stood on a table and fired his gun at the ceiling. After they had left A's wife called for him and receiving no answer, she went up the ceiling and found him already dead. What crime was committed? Explain. c) In the course of robbery there was confusion and in the exchange of shots between the robbers and the victims, one of the robbers happened to shoot one of his own companions. Page 277 of 374
What crime was committed? Explain. Answer: a) They committed the crime of attempted robbery with homicide with band as a generic aggravating circumstance. Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "Attempted. .. robbery committed under certain circumstances.—When... on the occasion of an attempted robbery a homicide is committed the person guilty of such offenses shall be punished by reclusion temporal b) Robbery with homicide was committed by the malefactors. Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "Attempted and frustrated robbery committed under certain circumstances.— When by reason. . .of an attempted or frustrated robbery a homicide is committed the person guilty of such offenses shall be punished by reclusion temporal...". c) The robber committed the crime of robbery with homicide in violation of Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "... when... on the occasion of an attempted robbery a homicide is committed the person guilty of such offenses shall be punished by reclusion temporal. ..". Art 293; Robbery with homicide 1995 No. 7: Victor, Ricky, Rod and Ronnie went to the store of Mang Pandoy. Victor and Ricky entered the store while Rod and Ronnie posted themselves at the door. After ordering beer Ricky complained that he was shortchanged although Mang Pandoy vehemently denied it. Suddenly Ricky whipped out a knife as he announced "Hold-up ito!" and stabbed Mang Pandoy to death. Rod boxed the store's salesgirl Lucy to prevent her from helping Mang Pandoy. When Lucy ran out of the store to seek help from people next door she was chased by Ronnie. As soon as Ricky had stabbed Mang Pandoy, Victor scooped up the money from the cash box. Then Victor and Ricky dashed to the street and shouted, "Tumakbo na kayo!" Rod was 14 and Ronnie was 17. The money and other articles looted from the store of Mang Pandoy were later found in the houses of Victor and Ricky. 1. Discuss fully the criminal liability of Victor, Ricky, Rod and Ronnie. Answer: 1 . All are liable for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The acts of Ricky in stabbing Mang Pandoy to death, of Rod in .boxing the salesgirl to prevent her from helping Mang Pandoy, of Ronnie in chasing the salesgirl to prevent her in seeking help, of Victor in scooping up money from the cash box, and of Ricky and Victor in dashing to the street and announcing the escape, are all indicative of conspiracy. The rule is settled that when homicide takes place as a consequence or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part in the robbery are guilty as principals of the crime of robbery with homicide, unless the accused tried to prevent the killing (People vs. Baello, 224 SCRA 218). Further, the aggravating circumstance of craft could be assessed against the accused for pretending to be customers of Mang Pandoy, Art 293; Robbery with homicide 1996 No. 2:
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2) Jose, Domingo, Manolo, and Fernando, armed with bolos, at about one o'clock in the morning, robbed a house at a desolate place where Danilo, his wife, and three daughters were living. While the four were in the process of ransacking Danilo's house, Fernando, noticing that one of Danilo's daughters was trying to get away, ran after her and finally caught up with her in a thicket somewhat distant from the house. Fernando, before bringing back the daughter to the house, raped her first. Thereafter, the four carted away the belongings of Danilo and his family. a) Explain.
What crime did Jose, Domingo, Manolo and Fernando commit?
b) Suppose, after the robbery, the four took turns in raping the three daughters of Danilo inside the latter's house, but before they left, they killed the whole family to prevent identification, what crime did the four commit? Explain. Answer: 2) (a) Jose, Domingo, and Manolo committed Robbery, while Fernando committed complex crime of Robbery with Rape, Conspiracy can be inferred from the manner the offenders committed the robbery but the rape was committed by Fernando at a place "distant from the house" where the robbery was committed, not in the presence of the other conspirators. Hence, Fernando alone should answer for the rape, rendering him liable for the special complex crime. (People vs. Canturia et. al, G.R. 108490, 22 June 1995} b) The crime would be Robbery with Homicide because the killings were by reason (to prevent identification) and on the occasion of the robbery. The multiple rapes committed and the fact that several persons were killed [homicide), would be considered as aggravating circumstances. The rapes are synonymous with Ignominy and the additional killing synonymous with cruelty, (People vs. Solis, 182 SCRA; People vs. Plaga, 202 SCRA 531) Art 293; Robbery with homicide 1998 No XVIII. A, B, C and D all armed, robbed a bank, and when they were about to get out of the bank, policemen came and ordered them to surrender but they fired on the police officers who fired back and shot it out with them. 1. Suppose a bank employee was killed and the bullet which killed him came from the firearm of the police officers, with what crime shall you charge A, B. C and D? |3%| 2. Suppose it was robber D who was killed by the policemen and the prosecutor charged A, B and C with Robbery and Homicide. They demurred arguing that they (A, B and C) were not the ones who killed robber D, hence, the charge should only be Robbery. How would you resolve their argument? (2%) Answer: 1. A, B, C and D should be charged with the crime of robbery with homicide because the death of the bank employee was brought about by the acts of said offenders on the occasion of the robbery. They shot it out with the policeman, thereby causing such death by reason or on the occasion of a robbery; hence, the composite crime of robbery with homicide.
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2. The argument is valid, considering that a separate charge for Homicide was filed. It would be different if the charge filed was for the composite crime of robbery with homicide which is a single, indivisible offense. Alternative Answer: 2. The argument raised by A, B and C is not correct because their liability is not only for Robbery but for the special complex crime of Robbery with homicide. But the facts stated impresses that separate crimes of Robbery "and" Homicide were charged, which is not correct. What was committed was a single indivisible offense of Robbery with homicide, not two crimes. Art 293; Robbery with homicide 2003 No IX. A learned two days ago that B had received dollar bills amounting to $10,000 from his daughter working in the United States With the intention of robbing B of those dollars, A entered B's house at midnight, armed with a knife which he used to gain entry, and began quietly searching the drawers, shelves, and other likely receptacles of the cash. While doing that, B awoke, rushed out from the bedroom, and grappled with A for the possession of the knife which A was then holding. After stabbing B to death, A turned over B's pillow and found the latter's wallet underneath the pillow, which was bulging with the dollar bills he was looking for. A took the bills and left the house. What crime or crimes were committed? 8% SUGGESTED ANSWER: The crime committed is robbery with homicide, a composite crime. This is so because A's primordial criminal intent is to commit a robbery and in the course of the robbery, the killing of B took place. Both the robbery and the killing were consummated, thus giving rise to the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The primary criminal intent being to commit a robbery, any killing on the "occasion" of the robbery, though not by reason thereof, is considered a component of the crime of robbery with homicide as a single indivisible offense. Art 293; Robbery with homicide vs homicide 1983 No. 6 Insulted by the manager of the bank where he was employed as security guard, A, enraged, shot the former, who died on the spot. As A was about to leave the bank premises, he noticed the vault open. He entered it, forced open a locked container and got the jewelry therein. If you were the fiscal, for what crime or crimes would you prosecute A? Explain. Answer Homicide and Robbery. It is not robbery with homicide because the purpose of A, the security guard, was not to commit robbery. It is not murder because the aggression was preceded by the insult of the manager which enraged the offender. So the killing was attended by passion which negates the presence of treachery. The taking of the jewelries was an afterthought as the offender entered the vault only when he noticed it was open when he was about to leave the bank premises. The jewelries were in a locked receptacle which he forced open while inside the bank premises. This is robbery with force upon things under Article 299, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
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Art 293; Robbery with rape 1999 No XVII Two young men, A and B, conspired to rob a residential house of things of value. They succeeded in the commission of their original plan to simply rob. A, however, was sexually aroused when he saw the lady owner of the house and so. raped her. The lady victim testified that B did not in any way participate in the rape but B watched the happening from a window and did nothing to stop the rape. Is B as criminally liable as A for robbery with rape? Explain. (4%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes, B is as criminally liable as A for the composite crime of robbery with rape under Art. 294 (1). Although the conspiracy of A and B was only to rob, B was present when the rape was being committed which gave rise to a composite crime, a single indivisible offense of robbery with rape. B would not have been liable had he endeavored to prevent the commission of the rape. But since he did not when he could have done so, he in effect acquiesced with the rape as a component of the robbery and so he is also liable for robbery with rape. Art 293; Robbery; homicide; arson 1995 No. 12: Harry, an overseas contract worker, arrived from Saudi Arabia with considerable savings. Knowing him to be "loaded", his friends Jason, Manuel and Dave invited him to poker session at a rented beach cottage. When he was losing almost all his money which to him was his savings of a lifetime, he discovered that he was being cheated by his friends. Angered by the betrayal he decided to take revenge on the three cheats. Harry ordered several bottles of Tanduay Rhum and gave them to his companions to drink, as they did, until they all fell asleep. When Harry saw his companions already sound asleep he hacked all of them to death. Then he remembered his losses. He rifled through the pockets of his victims and got back all the money he lost. He then ran away but not before burning the cottage to hide his misdeed. The following day police investigators found among the debris the charred bodies of Jason, Manuel, Dave and the caretaker of the resort. After preliminary investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor charged Harry with the complex crime of arson with quadruple homicide and robbery. Was Harry properly charged? Discuss fully. Answer: No, Harry was net properly charged. Harry should have been charged with three (3) separate crimes, namely: murder, theft and arson. Harry killed Jason, Manuel and Dave with evident premeditation, as there was considerable lapse of time before he decided to commit the crime and the actual commission of the crime. In addition, Harry employed means which weakened the defense of Jason, Manuel and Dave. Harry gave them the liquor to drink until they were drunk and fell asleep. This gave Harry the opportunity to carry out his plan of murder with impunity. The taking of the money from the victims was a mere afterthought of the killings. Hence, Harry committed the separate crime of theft and not the complex Page 281 of 374
crime of robbery with homicide. Although theft was committed against dead persons, it is still legally possible as the offended party are the estates of the victims. In burning the cottage to hide his misdeed. Harry became liable for another separate crime, arson. This act of burning was not necessary for the consummation of the two (2) previous offenses he committed. The fact that the caretaker died from the blaze did not qualify Harry's crime into a complex crime of arson with homicide for there is no such crime. Hence, Harry was improperly charged with the complex crime of arson with quadruple homicide and robbery. Harry should have been charged with three (3) separate crimes, murder, theft and arson. Art 293; Robbery; multiplicity of crimes 1996 No. 8 2) Five robbers robbed, one after the other five houses occupied by different families located inside a compound enclosed by a six-feet high hollow block fence. How many robberies did the five commit? Explain. Answer; 2) The offenders committed only one robbery in the eyes of the law because when they entered the compound, they were impelled only by a single indivisible criminal resolution to commit a robbery as they were not aware that there were five families inside said compound, considering that the same was enclosed by a six-feet high hollow-block fence. The series of robbery committed in the same compound at about the same time constitutes one continued crime, motivated by one criminal impulse, Art 293; Robbery; rape 1997 No. 19: After raping the complainant in her house, the accused struck a match to smoke a cigarette before departing from the scene. The brief light from the match allowed him to notice a watch in her wrist. He demanded that she hand over the watch. When she refused, he forcibly grabbed it from her. The accused was charged with and convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with rape. Was the court correct? Answer: No. the court erred in convicting the accused of the special complex crime of robbery with rape. The accused should instead be held liable for two (2) separate crimes of robbery and rape, since the primary intent or objective of the accused was only to rape the complainant, and his commission of the robbery was merely an afterthought. The robbery must precede the rape. In order to give rise to the special complex crime for which the court convicted the accused. Art 308; Theft 1976 No. III-a X, a commission agent, without being authorized by his principal, pulled out several typewriters and adding machines from the prospective buyers, who, after the period of trial of said machines, decided not to buy them. Instead of returning the machines to the company, X pawned them with the different
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pawnshops for sums of money which he used for his own behalf. What crime has X committed? Reason: Answer X committed the crime of theft. When X pulled out the typewriters and adding machines from the prospective buyers, who, after the period of trial, decided not to buy them, X, as commission agent, made them believe that he acted on behalf of his principal, who is his employer, although in truth, he did not as he was not authorized. When he took away the machines without the knowledge and consent of his principal, he had only acquired physical possession of the same, (People v. Maglaya, 30 SCRA 606). Art 308; Theft 1976 No. IV-a X found in the street amount of P200.00. He did not report his finding of the money to the proper authorities nor did he return the same to the owner whose address is inscribed in the bag containing the money. Instead, he used the money for his benefit. What crime has X committed? Reason. Answer X committed theft. Theft is committed by any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner (Art, 308, No. 1, RPC). Since X found the bag containing the money in the street, he had reason to know that the property was lost and it was his duty to turn it over to the owner, whose address is inscribed in the bag or to the authorities. Intent to gain is actually present since he used the money for his benefit knowing that it did not belong to him. The Revised Penal Code does not even require knowledge of the owner of the lost property. (People v. Panotes, et al., CA 36 0G. 1008). Art 308; Theft 1976 No VI-b X and his companions got six roosters from a coop, one yard high, five yards long and one yard wide, by breaking the door of the coop located outside the house of Y, the owner of the coop and the roosters. The taking of the roosters as well as the breaking of the coop's door was done without the knowledge and consent of the owner. What crime have X and his companions committed? Reason. Answer X and his companions committed theft. The chicken coop is not a building as contemplated in Art. 299 and Art. 302 of the Revised Penal Code. Since the coop is located outside the house of Y, it is not a dependency under Art. 301 of the Code. (People vs. Jaranilla, et a/., L-28547, February 24, 1974). Art 308; Theft 1977 No. VII-a Juan, a commission salesman of an office supply company, without the knowledge and consent of the company, went to one of its customers who has defaulted in paying the last three installments of a typewriter purchased on credit and withdrew the said typewriter. The customer, thinking that Juan was authorized to do so, allowed the withdrawal. Later on, Juan sold the typewriter
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and misappropriated the proceeds thereof for his own benefit. What crime did Juan commit? Reason fully. Answer Juan will be liable for theft. Since he took the typewriter without the knowledge and consent of the company from the purchaser who defaulted in paying the last three installments, and the customer allowed Juan to withdraw it thinking that he was authorized to do so, Juan had only the physical possession of the typewriter, which did not vest in him juridical possession, which is necessary in estafa. (People v Maglaya, 30 SCRA 606). Art 308; Theft 1978 No. IX-b AB accidentally left her purse with P500.00 inside a taxi cab. The driver brought the purse and money to the police station and handed them to the desk sergeant with the request that they be delivered to AB, the owner, whose name and address were on a piece of paper inside the purse. The sergeant did not do as requested but spent the money. What was the offense/offenses committed by the sergeant? Discuss. Answer The offense committed is theft. The sergeant had only the physical possession of the money although he received the same from the finder. The possession of the money by the finder, who was the driver of the taxicab, was physical. When the driver handed the money to the sergeant with the request that it be delivered to AB, the owner, what was transferred to the sergeant is the physical possession which the driver had on the money. The sergeant assumed by voluntary substitution, as to both property and its owner, the same relation as was occupied by the finder, (People vs. Avila, 44 Phil. 720). Art 308; Theft 1980 No. II "D and "E" intended to steal two bags of cement from a "bodega". They placed the cement in a jeep and left with their loot. After travelling some distance, they changed their minds and decided to take the two bags of cement back. While in the compound of the "bodega", they were apprehended by a police officer. Are "D" and "E" liable for any crime? Answer D and E are liable for consummated theft. When they placed the two bags of cement in a jeep and left with their loot, they had already performed all the acts of execution necessary for the accomplishment of the crime of theft. (U.S, vs. Adiao, 38 Phil. 754) Theft was already consummated when after travelling a certain distance, they changed their minds and decided to take the two bags of cement back. In theft, the offender must have the possession and dominion of the thing taken coupled with the intention at the time of taking of withholding it with the character of permanency. (People vs. Solis et al, 12 CA Rep. 202) Art 308; Theft 1980 No. XVII "AA" was the owner of a jeepney for hire. When his driver was hospitalized, he hired "BB" as driver on a temporary basis and entrusted to him Page 284 of 374
the vehicle for transporting passengers from Quiapo to Taft-Baclaran with a compensation of P30 a day. "BB" never returned the vehicle and after a search, the vehicle was found in Ternate, Cavite, about to be sold. "BB" was charged with Qualified Theft and was convicted. Appealing the judgment of conviction, defense counsel contends that "BB" may have committed Estafa but not Qualified Theft on the theory that the possession of the vehicle was obtained with the consent of "AA", the owner, and therefore, there was no illegal taking. Decide the case. Answer The crime committed by BB is qualified theft. Estafa cannot be committed altho the possession of the vehicle was obtained with the consent of AA, the owner. BB was hired as a temporary driver and therefore was an employee of the owner of the jeepney for hire. So he had only the physical or material possession of jeepney. The established rule is that when the delivery of a chattel does not have the effect of transferring the juridical possession thereof, the act of disposing it with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner constitutes the crime of theft. (U.S. vs. De Vera, 43 PhiL 100). In this case, the juridical possession of the vehicle remained with AA, the owner. (People vs. Isaac, 96 Phil. 931) Art 308; Theft 1982 No. 13 "A" broke open a window and, without entering the house, took a wooden chest lying just underneath the window. He brought out the chest to the yard where he broke it open and took away the contents thereof, all valued at P1,000.00. What crime did he commit? Reason. Answer The crime committed by A is theft. For robbery with force upon things to be committed, the offender should have entered the house. The facts of the problem show that A without entering the house took the wooden chest lying underneath the window which he broke open. To constitute robbery the offender who brought outside the locked receptacle must have entered it; otherwise, the crime committed is theft. Art 308; Theft 1984 No. 19 Melencio gave Janet, a call girl, P5,000 as blood money with the understanding that she would poison a business executive in the course of a tryst. She did so. But before she left the scene of the crime, she got the victim's expensive watch, gold ring and wallet containing about P5,000. What crime or crimes were committed and by whom? Reasons. Answer A.
Furnished by Office of Justice Palma,
Janet committed two crimes: 1. murder: as qualified by circumstance of consideration of a price or reward, or by means of poison, or with evident premeditation, and
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2. theft: If the motive is to kill and the taking of the valuables is committed thereafter, the crimes committed are homicide and theft (People v. Elizaga, G.R. No. 2487, as cited in Gregorio, Fundamentals). B.
Comments and Suggested Answer
1. Melencio and Janet are liable for murder. Melencio is a principal by inducement and Janet is a principal by direct participation. Murder is the crime committed because the killing was in consideration of & price and by means of poison. Either will be sufficient to qualify the crime of murder. 2. Janet will also be liable for theft. As an afterthought she got the victim's expensive watch, gold ring and wallet containing about P5,000. Melencio will not be liable because the theft was not included in the inducement nor is it a necessary consequence thereof. Art 308; Theft 1986 No. 16: Brothers Aber and Bobot, 16 and 17 years old, respectively, have had no food for the past two days. Suffering from severe hunger, they hatched a plan to break into a store to steal some food. Five days later, at 12 midnight, they were able to enter the store by breaking the hinges of the door. Aber took ten cans of sardines worth P50.00. Bobot wandered into a nearby room where the store owner, Cosme, was sleeping Cosme, awakened by Bobot's footsteps, attacked Bobot with a club. Bobot avoided the blow and hit Cosme in the chest with his fist. Aber, upon hearing the commotion, entered the room and tried to pull Bobot away from Cosme. Cosme, however, continued to attack Bobot forcing the latter to box Cosme in the face. Cosme collapsed on the floor. Bobot and Aber fled. The following day, Aber sold six of the sardine cans taken from the store to Dimas who lives a block from the store. Earlier that day Dimas heard rumors that the nearby store had been robbed and that his friend Cosme was found dead. Dimas thought of asking Aber and Bobot where they got the sardines to clear away this doubt, but on second thought did not. He bought the cans for P20.00 and sold them for P30.00. The fiscal charged Aber and Bobot with the complex crime of robbery with homicide aggravated by nighttime, evident premeditation and dwelling. The fiscal charged Dimas as an accessory of Aber and Bobot and for violation of the AntiFencing Law (PD No. J612). (1) If you were the counsel of Aber, what defenses would you raise? Explain. (2) If you were the counsel of Bobot, what defenses would you raise? Explain. (3) If you were the counsel of Dimas, what defenses would you raise? Explain, (4) If you were the judge, how would you decide the case? Explain, Answer: (1) If I were the counsel of Aber, I would question the validity of the charge. Robbery with homicide is not proper crime because there was no breaking of the door but only its hinges. (People vs Lising CA 62 OG. 9879) The crime is theft. Since Aber was only l6 years old at the time of the commission of the crime he should be prosecuted under the Youth and Child Welfare Code,
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where in case of conviction, he could apply for suspension of sentence. If granted, during confinement upon his good behavior, he would be entitled to be discharged. Aber cannot be liable for the killing of Cosme because he has no part in its commission. (2) If I were the counsel of Bobot, I would invoke his age at the time of the commission of the crime for the application of the Child and Youth Welfare Code. The crimes committed are theft and homicide. Regarding the homicide, Bobot can maintain that Cosme hit him with a club and continued to do so forcing Bobot to attack him in the face. He can also invoke the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that which resulted. (3) If I were the counsel of Dimas, I would maintain that he could not be liable as an accessory to the crime of homicide attributed to Bobot because he had no knowledge of its commission. Regarding the violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, he can maintain that he bought the tins of sardines in good faith without any knowledge that these were the proceeds of the crime of theft. (4) If I were the Judge, I would convict Aber and Bobot for the crime and theft. The breaking of the hinges of the door is not the breaking of the door as provided in the law. So the crime committed is not robbery. Only Bobot will be liable for the death of Cosme. Aber has no participation in his death aside from the fact that the crime is not a necessary consequence of the plan to steal food in the store. Besides the act of Aber in trying to pull Bobot away from Cosme is an attempt to prevent Bobot from injuring Cosme. In the crimes of theft and homicide, only nighttime and dwelling are aggravating. Evident premeditation is inherent in theft which is a crime against property. It cannot be considered in homicide as there is no showing of any previous planning to commit it. However, both Aber and Bobot being 16 and 17 years respectively at the time of the commission of the crime should be proceeded under the provisions of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, if still under 18 years at the time of the trial. If convicted, they could apply for the suspension of the sentence, and if granted, they would be committed to an institution until they reach the age of majority If they behave properly during confinement, they would be returned to the court to be discharged; but if they proved themselves to be incorrigible, then for the imposition of the sentence. Dimas will be liable for fencing as he bought the tins of sardines without inquiring from Aber where he got the sardines and under the circumstances he could have known that those were the proceeds of the crime of theft. He bought them with intent to gain as in fact he sold them for a profit. Art 308; Theft 1989 No. 16: "A", by using force, grabbed the bicycle of "B" and ran away. The following day, "B" asked "C" to get back his bicycle from "A" and promised to pay him P100 if successful, "C" agreed. "C" went to "A's" house but it was locked from inside. Since "A" refused to let "C" in, "C" kicked the door open, confronted "A" and with a dagger in hand, told "A" to give "B’s” bicycle. Intimidated, "A" gave the bicycle to "C" who, in turn, gave it to "B". "B" paid "C" P100 for his efforts. What crime or crimes did "A", "B" and "C" commit, if any?
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Answer: A, by grabbing the bicycle of B and running away with it committed the crime of THEFT, there being no showing that there was violence against or intimidation of B to accomplish the snatching of the bicycle away from him. In a case where the accused snatched from behind the bag the offended party was then carrying, it was held that there being no violence against the offended party immediately before, after or at the time the bag was snatched from her, the accused was not liable for robbery, but only for theft (People vs. Villar, CA-GR No. 14289, July 29, 1955; People vs. Jose, CA 62 O.G. 4604). In this case, all the elements of theft are present: intent to gain, taking of personal property of another without the latter's consent, and absence of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. There is intent to gain which is presumed from the unlawful taking of the bicycle. Art 308; Theft 2001 No IX Francis Garcia, a Jollibee waiter, found a gold bracelet in front of his working place in Makati and, upon inspecting it, saw the name and address of the owner engraved on the inside. Remembering his parents' admonition that he should not take anything which does not belong to him, he delivered the bracelet to PO1 Jesus Reyes of the Makati Quad precinct with the instruction to locate the owner and return it to him. PO1 Reyes, instead, sold the bracelet and misappropriated the proceeds. Subsequent events brought out the fact that the bracelet was dropped by a snatcher who had grabbed it from the owner a block away from where Francis had found it and further investigation traced the last possessor as PO1 Reyes. Charged with theft, PO1 Reyes reasoned out that he had not committed any crime because it was not he who had found the bracelet and, moreover, it turned out to have been stolen. Resolve the case with reasons. (10%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: Charged with theft, PO1 Reyes is criminally liable. His contention that he has not committed any crime because he was not the one who found the bracelet and it turned out to be stolen also, is devoid of merit. It is enough that the bracelet belonged to another and the failure to restore the same to its owner is characterized by intent to gain. The act of PO1 Reyes of selling the bracelet which does not belong to him and which he only held to be delivered to its owner, is furtive misappropriation with intent to gain. Where a finder of lost or mislaid property entrusts it to another for delivery to the owner, the person to whom such property is entrusted and who accepts the same, assumes the relation of the finder to the owner as if he was the actual finder: if he would misappropriate it, he is guilty of theft (People vs. Avila, 44 Phil. 720). Art 308; Theft 2002 No V. A vehicular accident occurred on the national highway in Bulacan. Among the first to arrive at the scene of the accident was A, who found one of the victims already dead and the others unconscious. Before rescuers could come, A, taking advantage of the helpless condition of the victims, took their wallets and jewelry. Page 288 of 374
However, the police, who responded to the report of the accident, caught A. What crime or crimes did A commit? Why? (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: A committed the crime of qualified theft because he took the wallets and jewelry of the victims with evident intent to gain and on the occasion of a vehicular accident wherein he took advantage of the helpless condition of the victims. But only one crime of qualified theft was committed although there were more than one victim divested of their valuables, because all the taking of the valuables were made on one and the same occasion, thus constituting a continued crime. Art 308; Theft & Homicide 1976 No. VIII-b X killed Y in a fit of anger. While in the act of disposing of, or concealing the body, he found some money in one of the victim's pockets and took it. What crime has X committed? Reasons. Answer Two crimes are committed by X namely, homicide and theft. Since the purpose of X was not to commit robbery, the crime cannot to robbery with homicide, (US. vs. Villorente, et at., 30 Phil 59). Since X killed Y in a fit of anger, the motive for the crime is clear. The taking of the money in the pockets of the victim occurred after the killing, and as a matter of fact, while in the act of disposing of or concealing the body. The taking was conceived only after the victim was killed. Two separate crimes of homicide and theft are therefore committed. (People vs. Elizaga, 86 Phil. 364; People vs. Glore, 87 Phil. 789). Art 308; Theft; issue of ownership 1998 No XIX. Mario found a watch in a jeep he was riding, and since it did not belong to him, he approached policeman P and delivered the watch with instruction to return the same to whoever may be found to be the owner. P failed to return the watch to the owner and, instead, sold it and appropriated for himself the proceeds of the sale. Charged with theft, P reasoned out that he cannot be found guilty because it was not he who found the watch and, moreover, the watch turned out to be stolen property. Is P's defense valid? [5%] Answer: No, P's defense is not valid. In a charge for theft, it is enough that the personal property subject thereof belongs to another and not to the offender (P). It is irrelevant whether the person deprived of the possession of the watch has or has no right to the watch. Theft is committed by one who, with intent to gain, appropriates property of another without the consent of its owner. And the crime is committed even when the offender receives property of another but acquires only physical possession to hold the same. Art 308; Theft; stage of execution 1998 No XVII In the jewelry section of a big department store, Julia snatched a couple of bracelets and put these in her purse. At the store's exit, however, she was Page 289 of 374
arrested by the guard after being radioed by the store personnel who caught the act in the store's moving camera. Is the crime consummated, frustrated, or attempted? [5%] Answer: The crime is consummated theft because the taking of the bracelets was complete after Julia succeeded in putting them in her purse. Julia acquired complete control of the bracelets after putting them in her purse; hence, the taking with intent to gain is complete and thus the crime is consummated. Art 308; Theft; stage of execution 2000 No III Sunshine, a beauteous "colegiala" but a shoplifter, went to the Ever Department Store and proceeded to the women's wear section. The saleslady was of the impression that she brought to the fitting room three (3) pieces of swimsuits of different colors. When she came out of the fitting room, she returned only two (2] pieces to the clothes rack. The saleslady became suspicious and alerted the store detective. Sunshine was stopped by the detective before she could leave the store and brought to the office of the store manager. The detective and the manager searched her and found her wearing the third swimsuit under her blouse and pants. Was the theft of the swimsuit consummated, frustrated or attempted? Explain. (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: The theft was consummated because the taking or asportation was complete. The asportation is complete when the offender acquired exclusive control of the personal property being taken: in this case, when Sunshine wore the swimsuit under her blouse and pants and was on her way out of the store. With evident intent to gain, the taking constitutes theft and being complete, it is consummated. It is not necessary that the offender is in a position to dispose of the property, ALTERNATIVE ANSWER; The crime of theft was only frustrated because Sunshine has not yet left the store when the offense was opportunely discovered and the article seized from her. She does not have yet the freedom to dispose of the swimsuit she was taking (People vs. Dino, CA 45 O.G. 3446). Moreover, in case of doubt as to whether it is consummated or frustrated, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the milder criminal responsibility, Art 310; Qualified theft 1975 No. X A, a receiving teller of the Philippine National Bank, taking advantage of his position, appropriated the amount of Pl,000.00 which he had in his possession. Did he commit malversation, estafa, theft, or qualified theft? Why? Answer The crime is qualified theft. The receiving teller has only the physical possession of the amount of P1,000, which is presumably a deposit received from a client of the bank. Altho the Philippine National Bank is a government bank, it however, performs proprietary functions and the receiving teller cannot be considered a public officer under Art. 203 of the Revised Penal Code. In any event, malversation is committed by an accountable public officer to whom public Page 290 of 374
funds or property are entrusted for his custody. It cannot be estafa as the teller does not have juridical possession of the amount. The teller is in possession of the amount as an employee of the bank. His possession of the money is the possession of the bank. The crime cannot be simple theft because the duties of a receiving teller being pecuniary are clothed with monetary responsibilities and confidential in nature. The position involves trust and confidence. So qualified theft is committed as the misappropriation is with grave abuse of confidence. (People v. Lacson, 57 Phil. 325). Art 310; Qualified theft 1976 No. V-b X left for the province with Ms family to take a vacation. But before doing so, he entrusted the key to the main door of his house to Y, his neighbor. One day, anxious to find out the contents of the house, Y opened the same with the key X left him and once inside took some belongings of Y. What crime has X committed? Reason. Answer Y committed the crime of qualified theft with grave abuse of confidence. The fact that X and Y are neighbors and X having entrusted to Y the key to the main door of his house when he and his family left for the province to take a vacation shows a relation of intimacy, dependence, guardianship, and vigilance between Y and the offended party, which created a high degree of confidence between them and which the accused abused. In a case where the watchman of the offended party delivered the key to the session hall of the provincial building and with the key opened the session hall and stole a typewriter, it was held that the theft was simple because the offended party was not the watchman but his employer, unlike the facts in the problem. (People vs. Cabahug, CA 48 O.G. 2818). The crime is not robbery with force upon things because the key is not a false key, as defined and included in Art. 305 (RPC). Expand to explain the meaning of false key. Art 310; Qualified theft 1976 No VI-a X stole two goats valued at P150.00 each. He was charged by the Fiscal's Office with qualified theft. Is the charge proper? Reason. The charge for qualified theft is not proper. Goats are not large cattle but small cattle. (People vs. Nazareno, L-40037, April 30, 1976). The correct charge should be simple theft.
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Art 310; Qualified theft {Carnapping} 1985 No. 19: CB, a driver of RM, on the boundary system, ran away with the jeepney of the latter and sold the same, pocketing the proceeds thereof to the prejudice of the aforesaid owner. What crime or crimes were committed by CB? Discuss. Answer: The driver will be liable for qualified theft. Under the boundary system, the driver is an employee of the owner of the vehicle. He has only the physical possession of the vehicle. By running away with the vehicle and selling the same and misappropriating the proceeds thereof, qualified theft is committed. Art 310; Qualified Theft of large cattle 1992 No. 4: At the height of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo at around midnight, Aniceto joined some neighbors in evacuating his family, a few possessions and two horses to higher ground. Miguel, taking advantage of the darkness and the confusion, got one of the horses and asked his friend Doro to accompany him to Angeles City where he sold the same to an acquaintance Peping. Searching for his horse, Aniceto found it, with identifying brand intact, in the possession of Peping who refused to surrender the same saying that he had paid good money for it. Whereupon, Aniceto reported the matter to the police who promised to accompany him to the Prosecutor's office. a) May Miguel and Doro be charged criminally for any offense? If you were the counsel for both, what defense could you possibly set up for them? Suggested Answer: a) Miguel should be charged of Qualified Theft of Large Cattle, a horse being classified as such under Art. 310, RPC. Doro, on the other hand, should be charged as accessory if he is aware that the horse was stolen as he assisted the principal, Miguel, in profiting from the crime. If I were the defense counsel, I will put up the defense of consent of the owner; hence, there is only civil liability. Art 312; Usurpation of real property 1988 No. 10: a) Jorge is the owner of 10 hectares of land in the foothills which he planted to lanzones. On his last visit there he was shocked to discover that his land had been taken over by a group of 15 families whose members had forcibly driven away his caretaker, had appropriated the fruits for themselves, and were now threatening to kill him should he try to eject them. What crime should Jorge charge these 15 families? Explain. Answer: a) Jorge can charge the 15 families of 2 separate crimes namely: 1} Violation of Article 282 which provides that "Grave threats.— Any person who shall threaten another with the infliction upon the person, honor or
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property of the latter or of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime shall suffer..." and 2) Violation of Article 312 which provides that: "Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property.— Any person who, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, shall take possession of any real property or shall usurp any real rights in property belonging to another, in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him, shall be punished by a fine from P50.00...". Art 312; Usurpation of real property vs (SPL) squatting 1989 No. 17: "A" and "B", both farmers, entered the land owned by "X" and planted palay thereon. When "X" came to know about it, he confronted "A" and "B" and inquired why the latter occupied his land and planted palay thereon. "A", with a bolo in hand, replied that the land belongs to the family of "S", and not to "X" and at the same time said, "If you touch this land and my palay, blood will flow on this ground." Because of said remark, "X" went to the Chief of Police and complained. The Chief of Police filed a complex crime of Usurpation of Real Property with Grave Threats. What crime or crimes were committed? Answer: The crime committed by A and B is squatting under PD 772 and not usurpation of Real Property because in the latter crime, there must be violence against or intimidation of persons employed in taking possession of any real property or in usurping any real rights in property belonging to another (Art, 312, RPC). In this case, it appears that A and B entered X's land without the owner's consent or against his will but without any violence against or intimidation of persons. The crime of squatting is committed by any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will for residential, commercial or any other purposes. The threat uttered by A not having been used IN THE TAKING OF POSSESSION of the land, it is not absorbed in the crime of SQUATTING, When A threatened X that blood will flow if X touches the land and his palay, he committed the crime of grave threats by threatening another with the infliction of a wrong amounting to a crime. Only A is criminally liable for the crime of grave threats. Art 312; Usurpation of real property vs (SPL) squatting 1977 No. X-a P occupied a parcel of land when the owner thereof went abroad. When the owner returned and tried to enter the land, P successively shot him for around ten times to scare him from entering the land. The landowner was not hit. P was charged of usurpation of real property and attempted homicide for said acts. Was P correctly charged? If your answer is in the negative, what crime or crimes will you file against P? Reason out your answer. Answer P was not correctly charged. Occupation of real property is not committed because in this crime there must be employment of violence or intimidation (Art
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312, R.P.C.). The offense committed is squatting under Presidential Decree No. 772 as P occupied the parcel of land when the owner was abroad. Squatting is committed by the offender taking advantage of the absence of the landowner occupying his property for commercial, residential or other purposes. When P successively shot the owner around ten times to scare him from entering the land, there could be no intent to kill. "To scare" does not indicate intent to kill. The crime committed is not attempted homicide but illegal discharge of firearm. (Art. 254, R.P.C.) Art 312; Usurpation of real rights 1996 No, 17: Teresita is the owner of a two-hectare land in Bulacan which she planted to rice and corn. Upon her arrival from a three-month vacation in the United States, she was surprised to discover that her land had been taken over by Manuel and Teofilo who forcibly evicted her tenant-caretaker Juliana, after threatening to kill the latter if she would resist their taking of the land. Thereafter, Manuel and Teofilo plowed, cultivated and appropriated the harvest for themselves to the exclusion of Teresita. 1) What crime or crimes did Manuel and Teofilo commit? Explain. 2) Suppose Manuel and Teofilo killed Juliana when the latter refused to surrender possession of the land, what crime or crimes did the two commit? Explain. Answer; 1) Manuel and Teofilo committed the crime of usurpation of real rights under Art. 312 of the Revised Penal Code for employing violence against or Intimidation of persons. The threats to kill employed by them in forcibly entering the land is the means of committing the crime and therefore absorbed in the felony, unless the intimidation resulted in a more serious felony. 2} The crime would still be usurpation of real rights under Art. 312, RPC, even if the said offenders killed the caretaker because the killing is the Violence against persons" which is the means for committing the crime and as such, determinative only. However, this gives way to the proviso that the penalty provided for therein is "in addition to the penalty incurred in the acts of violence (murder or homicide] executed by them. The crime is similar to a robbery where a killing is committed by reason thereof, giving rise only to one indivisible offense (People vs. Judge Alfeche, plus the fine mentioned therein. Art 315; BP 22 1980 No. XX A check for P20,000.00 was drawn by the Federal Financing Corporation in favor of "CC", duly signed by "DD", the corporate President, and "EE", the corporate Treasurer. On the date of the presentation of the said check with the drawee bank, the check was dishonored but the aforesaid corporate officials were no longer connected with the corporation. Charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the "Act Penalizing the Making or Drawing of Check without Sufficient Funds and for Other Purposes", "DD" and "EE" contend that they can no longer be held liable for the offense charged because they are no longer officials of the said corporation. Decide the case.
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Answer DD, the Corporate President and EE, the Corporate Treasurer, who signed the check for the Federal Financing Corporation as drawer, are liable under Batas Pambansa No. 22 if the check, when presented to the drawee bank, was dishonored for insufficiency of funds, even though when the check was presented for payment and was dishonored, the said corporate officials were no longer connected with the corporation. Batas Pambansa No. 22 is explicit about the liability of the officers of a corporation who signed the bouncing check for the corporation altho they had ceased to be officers of the corporation when the check was dishonored. As a matter of fact, an amendment introduced, during the deliberations of the bill in the Batasang Pambansa, to exempt from liability the officers of a corporation or association who were no longer officers when the check was dishonored was not approved by the body. Art 315; BP 22 1986 No. 14: On January 1, 1986, Bonifacio sold to Antonio a wrist-watch for P1 ,000.00. Antonio took the watch and drew a check forPl,000 payable to Bonifacio or order. Per agreement, the check was postdated to January 25, 1986. On January 25, 1986, Antonio called up Bonifacio and requested him not to present the check until January 30, 1986 by which time the check would be fully funded, Bonifacio agreed but on the condition that Antonio issue to him another check for P200 to cover the interest. Antonio agreed and issued the second check to Bonifacio. On January 25, 1986, Bonifacio discounted the first check to Carlos for P900. Carlos paid Bonifacio P900.00 and Bonifacio endorsed the check to Carlos, Bonifacio assured Carlos that the check was good and may be encashed on the date indicated thereon. Carlos presented the check on January 30, 1986. The check was dishonored by the bank for lack of funds. Carlos immediately notified Antonio and Bonifacio of the dishonor of the check. Both failed to make good the check. May Antonio and Bonifacio, both be held liable under B.P No. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law? Explain your answer. Answer: Only Antonio will be liable under Batas 22 because he issued the check without sufficient funds. Under the law, said check although postdated, was issued in payment of the price of a watch for P1,000 and was therefore issued for value. The check was presented for payment within 90 days from the date of issue. Of course, if Antonio, within 5 banking days from notice of dishonor, paid Carlos the value of the check or made a credit arrangement with the bank for its liquidation, then there will be no more liability under the law. Bonifacio will not be liable under Batas 22 because he endorsed the check. Under this law, the one liable is "any person who makes or draws or issues" any check which is not funded. Art 315; BP 22 1991 No. 16: As security for a loan of P50,000.00 he obtained from his friend, Joseph David, payable not later than 17 April 1990, Roger Vasquez drew and delivered
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to Joseph a check for P50,000 dated 17 April 1990. Upon its presentment on due date, the check was dishonored on the ground of insufficiency of funds. On the basis of the complaint of Joseph, and after appropriate preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor filed against Roger an Information for violation of B.P. Big. No. 22 alleging therein, inter alia, that Roger "with intent to defraud, by means of deceit, knowing fully well that he had no funds and/or sufficient funds in the bank, for value received, did then and there, willfully and feloniously, issue the aforesaid check" but "when the said check was presented for encashment, said check was dishonored and returned" on the ground of insufficiency of funds. In a decision rendered thereafter, the trial judge ruled that Roger cannot be convicted of the offense charged because the information failed to allege that he knew, when he issued the check, that he would have sufficient- funds for its payment in full upon its presentment to the drawee bank. Is the Judge correct? Answer: The Judge is not correct in dismissing the case. The allegation satisfies the legal definition of the offense. The maker's knowledge of insufficiency of his funds is legally presumed from the dishonor of the check for lack of funds. (People vs. Laggui 171 SCRA 305). Art 315; BP 22; memorandum check 1994 No. 1; 2) What is a memorandum check? 3) Is the "bouncing" thereof within the purview of BP Blg. 22? Answer; 2) A "Memorandum Check" is an ordinary check, with the word "Memorandum", "Memo" or "Mem" written across its face, signifying that the maker or drawer engages to pay its holder absolutely thus partaking the nature of a promissory note. It is drawn on a bank and is a bill of exchange within the purview of Section 185 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (People vs. Judge David Nitafan, G.R. No. 75954, October 22, 1992). 3) Yes, a memorandum check is covered by Batas Pambansa No. 22 because the law covers any check whether it is an evidence of Indebtedness, or in payment of a pre-existing obligation or as a deposit or guarantee (People versus Nita-fan). Art 315; BP 22; memorandum check 1995 No. 4: 1.
(a) What is a memorandum check ?
(b) Is a person who issues a memorandum check without sufficient funds necessarily guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22? Explain. 2. Jane is a money lender. Edmund is a businessman who has been borrowing money from Jane by rediscounting his personal checks to pay his loans. In March 1989, he borrowed P100,000 from Jane and issued to her a check for the same amount. The check was dishonored by the drawee bank for having been drawn against a closed account. When Edmund was notified of the dishonor of his check he promised to raise the amount within five days. He failed. Consequently, Jane sued Edmund for violation of the Bouncing Checks Page 296 of 374
Law (BP. Blg. 22). The defense of Edmund was that he gave the check to Jane to serve as a memorandum of his indebtedness to her and was not supposed to be encashed. Is the defense of Edmund valid? Discuss fully. Answer; 1. (a) A memorandum check is an ordinary check with the word "Memorandum", "Memo", or "Mem" written across the face, signifying that the maker or drawer engages to pay its holder absolutely thus partaking the nature of a promissory note. It is drawn on a bank and is a bill of exchange within the purview of Section 185 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. (People vs. Nitafan, 215 SCRA 79) (b) Yes, a person who issued a memorandum check without sufficient funds is guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22 as said law covers all checks whether it is an evidence of indebtedness, or in payment of a pre-existing obligation, or as deposit or guarantee. (People vs. Nitafan) 2. The defense of Edmund is NOT valid. A memorandum check upon presentment is generally accepted by the bank. It does not matter whether the check is in the nature of a memorandum as evidence of indebtedness. What the law punishes is the mere issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating thereto. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is a malum prohibitum. The understanding that the check will not be presented at the bank but will be redeemed by the maker when the loan falls due is a mere private arrangement which may not prevail to exempt It from the penal sanction of B.P. Blg. 22. (People vs. Nitafan) Art 315; BP 22; presumption of knowledge 2002 No XIII. A a businessman, borrowed P500,000.00 from B, a friend. To pay the loan, A issued a postdated check to be presented for payment 30 days after the transaction. Two days before the maturity date of the check, A called up B and told him not to deposit the check on the date stated on the face thereof, as A had not deposited in the drawee bank the amount needed to cover the check. Nevertheless, B deposited the check in question and the same was dishonored of insufficiency of funds. A failed to settle the amount with B in spite of the latter's demands. Is A guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law? Explain. (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes, A Is liable for violation of BP. Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law), Although knowledge by the drawer of insufficiency or lack of funds at the time of the issuance of the check is an essential element of the violation, the law presumes prima facie such knowledge, unless within five (5) banking days of notice of dishonor or non-payment, the drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such checks A mere notice by the drawer A to the payee B before the maturity date of the check will not defeat the presumption of knowledge created by the law; otherwise, the purpose and spirit of B.P. 22 will be rendered useless. Art 315; Estafa
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1977 No XI-b 0 June 2, 1976, L drew a check in favor of M for P200 in the payment of goods that he purchased from him on May 25, 1976. The check, when presented for payment, was dishonored for insufficient funds, hence, M notified L of the fact. But notwithstanding the lapse of three days from receipt of said notice, L failed to pay or deposit the necessary amount to cover said check. Did L commit estafa? Reason fully. Answer L is not liable for estafa. The bouncing check was issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation. The drawer did not obtain anything by the issuance of said check (People v. Canlas, CA 38 O.G. 1032). To constitute estafa even under the law as amended, the check dishonored for lack of sufficient funds must be issued at the time of contracting the obligation in payment thereof. (People v Teodorico, CA 69 O.G. 4928). Alternative Answer Estafa is committed. Under the new law, the mere issuance of a check, whether postdated or not in payment of an obligation, is estafa when the drawer had no funds in the bank or his funds deposited were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The drawer can no longer avail of the defense of a preexisting obligation or that he did not know that he had insufficient funds or no funds in the bank. If within three days from notice, the drawer failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover the check as what is indicated in the problem, there is a prima, facie evidence of deceit constituting the false pretense or the fraudulent act. This is the intention of the amendment according to its author, former Senator Padilla. Art 315; Estafa 1979 No. III X called up Y, proprietor of a restaurant, and inquired how much would he spend for a party of 20 people where 6 specific viands were to be served. Upon information that the cost would be P600, X and his party proceeded to Y's restaurant and ordered the food as agreed upon. When the bill came, X found that he was being charged P700.00. Y told him he committed a mistake in informing him that the cost was only P600.00. X refused to pay. After an altercation, Y said he would accept P600 but X replied that the incident had embarrassed him. X refused to pay a single centavo and threatened to sue Y for damages, Y filed an estafa case against X. Will the charge prosper? Answer The case will prosper. The refusal of X to pay the amount of P600.00 which Y already agreed to accept would constitute defraudation of the owner of the restaurant since X and his party obtained the food served therein. (Art. 315, par. 2(5), Revised Penal Code). The embarrassment suffered by X during the altercation regarding the correct price of the food is not any justification for him to refuse payment. If at all, to vindicate his injured feelings, he has another remedy other than refusal to pay the price. Art 315; Estafa 1989 No. 18:
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Alfredo is the corporate treasurer of Multimillion Insurance Company. As corporate treasurer, he would have in his possession an average of P5,000,000 at any given time. In 1984, when the money market rate of interest ranged from 35% to 50%, Alfredo place P1,000,000 of the corporate funds in the money market in his name without the knowledge of any other corporate official of the company. Upon maturity of the money market placement, Alfredo returned the amount of P1,000,000 to the corporation, but kept to himself the interest income of P250,000, At the end of 1984, when audit examinations of his accounts were undertaken, the auditors found no shortage in his accountabilities. Did Alfredo commit any crime? Answer: Yes, Alfredo committed the crime of estafa thru abuse of confidence, even if he had no intention to permanently misappropriate the corporate funds for himself. The law on estafa is clear and does not make any distinctions between permanent and temporary misappropriations, for as long as damage is suffered by the offended party. Damage was suffered by the corporation in this case because if the Pl million pesos had not been withdrawn from the corporate coffers it would have earned interest for the benefit of the company. Estafa, and not qualified theft, is committed because as corporate treasurer. Alfredo has juridical possession of the P5 million pesos in his custody. This was in the nature of a trust fund entrusted to him for corporate purposes. While it is a general principle that misappropriation of trust funds for short periods does not always amount to estafa, it has been held that his principle cannot extend to cases where officers of corporations converted corporate funds to their own use, (U,S. vs. Sevilla, 43 Phil. 190). Fraudulent intent is not even necessary in such cases because the breach of confidence involved in the misappropriation or conversion of trust funds takes the place of fraudulent intent and is in itself sufficient. Art 315; Estafa 1990 No, 2; Dencio, who is the Municipal Treasurer of the town, was also the treasurer of a charity ball of the church. Because he was short of payroll funds for the municipal employees, he used part of the church funds to replenish the payroll funds with the Intention of returning the same when the public funds came. a) Is Dencio guilty of malversation under the revised Penal Code? State your reasons, b) Assuming that he failed to replenish the church funds, may he be held criminally liable thereby? Explain. Answer: b) Yes, momentary use of funds, since there is defraudation, is tantamount to estafa under Article 215 of the Revised Penal Code. This is because he received the funds in his fiduciary capacity as treasurer and there was temporary damage caused. Personal benefit is not an element of the crime of estafa. Art 315; Estafa 1991 No. 19: A entrusted her car to B for repainting at the agreed cost of P7,800.00. When the painting job was finished, A wanted to get the car but B refused to
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deliver until payment is made. When A came back the next day, the shop was already closed, and B and the car were nowhere to be found. When finally B was located, he told A that he sold the car and applied the amount to the repainting cost and labor. A sued B for estafa. The information related the above facts, indicating the car as the subject of the felony. The Regional Trial Court convicted B for the crime charged, Under the facts, is the conviction proper? Answer: Conviction was correct. Estafa was really committed as B had both physical and juridical possession of the car, Having painted the car, he acquired a lien thereto, and therefore could exercises that right against the whole world, including the owner. Art 315; Estafa 1992 No. 4: At the height of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo at around midnight, Aniceto joined some neighbors in evacuating his family, a few possessions and two horses to higher ground. Miguel, taking advantage of the darkness and the confusion, got one of the horses and asked his friend Doro to accompany him to Angeles City where he sold the same to an acquaintance Peping. Searching for his horse, Aniceto found it, with identifying brand intact, in the possession of Peping who refused to surrender the same saying that he had paid good money for it. Whereupon, Aniceto reported the matter to the police who promised to accompany him to the Prosecutor's office. b) Suppose, before the eruption, Miguel had borrowed the horse for a couple of days from Aniceto. When the eruption occurred and after evacuating his family, Aniceto asked Miguel to return the horse to him. Miguel answered that the horse had run away and he could not locate it. Aniceto, however, found the beast in the possession of Peping who told him that it was sold to him (Peping) by Miguel. What criminal offense has Miguel committed, if any? Suggested Answer: b) Miguel having borrowed the horse, he has obligation to return the same. His failure to return the same upon demand will make him criminally liable for Estafa under Art. 315, par. 1(b), RPC. Art 315; Estafa 1998 No XII. Divina, is the owner of a 500-square meter residential lot in Makati City covered by TCT No. 1998. As her son needed money for his trip abroad, Divina mortgaged her lot to her neighbor Dino for P1,000,000. Later Divina sold the same lot to Angel for P2,000,000. In the Deed of Sale, she expressly stated that the property is free from any lien or encumbrance. What crime, if any, did Divina commit? [5%] Answer: Divina committed estafa or swindling under Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code because, knowing that the real property being sold is encumbered, she still made a misrepresentation in the Deed of Sale that the same is free from any lien or encumbrance. There is thus a deceit or fraud causing damage to the buyer of the lot.
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Art 315; Estafa 1999 No XIV (a)
Is there such a crime as estafa through negligence? Explain. (2%)
(b) Aurelia introduced Rosa to Victoria, a dealer in jewelry who does business in Timog, Quezon City. Rosa, a resident of Cebu City, agreed to sell a diamond ring and bracelet to Victoria on a commission basis, on condition that, if these items can not be sold, they may be returned to Victoria forthwith. Unable to sell the ring and bracelet, Rosa delivered both items to Aurelia In Cebu City with the understanding that Aurelia shall, in turn, return the items to Victoria in Timog, Quezon City. Aurelia dutifully returned the bracelet to Victoria but sold the ring, kept the cash proceeds thereof to herself, and issued a check to Victoria which bounced. Victoria sued Rosa for estafa under Article 315, R.P.C., Victoria insisting that delivery to a third person of the thing held in trust is not a defense in estafa. Is Rosa criminally liable for estafa under the circumstances? Explain, [4%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: (a) There is no such crime as estafa through negligence. In estafa, the profit or gain must be obtained by the accused personally, through his own acts, and his mere negligence in allowing another to take advantage of or benefit from the entrusted chattel cannot constitute estafa. (People v. Nepomuceno, CA, 46OG 6135) (b) No, Rosa cannot be held criminally liable for estafa. Although she received the jewelry from Victoria under an obligation to return the same or deliver the proceeds thereof, she did not misappropriate it. In fact, she gave them to Aurelia specifically to be returned to Victoria. The misappropriation was done by Aurelia, and absent the showing of any conspiracy between Aurelia and Rosa, the latter cannot be held criminally liable for Amelia's acts. Furthermore, as explained above, Rosa's negligence which may have allowed Aurelia to misappropriate the jewelry does not make her criminally liable for estafa. Art 315; Estafa & BP 22 1988 No. 14: (b) Raul Doria gave in trust two acrylic paintings to Amar Solo to be sold on commission basis for P20,000. Failing to sell them to George Ty, Amar consigned the paintings to Alcanto Gallery. In the same month, Amar retrieved one painting and tried to return in to Raul who refused to receive it without the other painting. The other painting was bought by Mr. Lomot whose check, which Amar gave to Raul, bounced, so that Amar paid Raul his own check of P6,500.00 promising in writing to pay the P3,500-00 balance less his commission. Is Amar liable for estafa? Why? How about Mr. Lomot, what crime, if any did he commit? ANSWER: (b) Amar is not liable for estafa but is liable for violation of BP 22, There is only civil liability because as long as no case has been filed in court, an obligation can still be novated. In this case there was novation. Mr. Lomot is liable for violation of BP 22. Page 301 of 374
Art 315; Estafa & BP 22 1983 No. 16 A issued to B a P30,000 check in payment of the jewelry the former simultaneously received from the latter. The check bounced. For what offense or offenses may A be indicted? If accused for violation of two separate laws, could A be held liable under both? Reasons. Answer A can be indicted for estafa under Act 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Rep. Act 4885 and under Batas 22 for the offense of issuing a bouncing check. Under the Revised Penal Code the bouncing check was issued in payment of the jewelry received, which is, therefore a simultaneous obligation. Under Batas 22 the check is issued for value. The accused can be held liable for both. Sections 5 of Batas 22 provides that liability under the law is without prejudice to any liability under the Revised Penal Code. There is no double jeopardy because the two offenses are not the same. In estafa, damage is an element. The offense punished in Batas 22 does not require damage. Besides Batas 22 as a special law punishes an offense which is Malum Prohibitum. Criminal intent is not an element. In estafa, intent to defraud is an element. Art 315; Estafa & BP 22 1988 No. 14: (b) Raul Doria gave in trust two acrylic paintings to Amar Solo to be sold on commission basis for P20,000. Failing to sell them to George Ty, Amar consigned the paintings to Alcanto Gallery. In the same month, Amar retrieved one painting and tried to return in to Raul who refused to receive it without the other painting. The other painting was bought by Mr. Lomot whose check, which Amar gave to Raul, bounced, so that Amar paid Raul his own check of P6,500.00 promising in writing to pay the P3,500-00 balance less his commission. Is Amar liable for estafa? Why? How about Mr. Lomot, what crime, if any did he commit? ANSWER: (b) Amar is not liable for estafa but is liable for violation of BP 22, There is only civil liability because as long as no case has been filed in court, an obligation can still be novated. In this case there was novation. Mr. Lomot is liable for violation of BP 22. Art 315; Estafa & BP 22 1990 No. 10: Exidor issued a check in payment of goods delivered to him by Virginia. Unfortunately the check bounced for lack of sufficient funds. a) What Is the criminal liability of Exidor? Explain your answer. b) Suppose the bouncing check was postdated, will your answer be the same? State your reasons. Answer;
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a) Exidor is liable under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. 22) and for estafa under Article 315, par. 2[d), Revised Penal Code b)
He will only be liable under the Bouncing Checks Law. (B.P. 22)
Art 315; Estafa & BP 22 1992 No. 10: Pedro Pobre sought financial assistance from his millionaire friend Joey Manriquez who accomodated him by issuing in his favor a postdated check in the amount of P10,000.00. Both of them knew that said check was not duly funded in the bank. The two then approached Marie Vic Bautista and asked her to change the check with cash, adding that even P9,500.00 will do, on the assurance that it shall be funded on the due date. When Bautista presented the check to the bank for encashment on its due date, it was dishonored as the account was closed. What action may Bautista bring against Pobre and Manriquez to hold them criminally liable to recover the P9,500.00 she gave them? Explain, Suggested Answer: Both Pobre and Manriquez can be successfully charged of estafa under Art. 315. RPC. and violation of BP No. 22. Estafa, because Manriquez (in conspiracy with Pobre) issued a post-dated check in payment of a simultaneous obligation, that is the cash of P9,500.00, and when the check was presented for payment the same bounced. Manriquez cannot even hide behind the alibi that he issued the check as an accomodation or as a guarantee for the obligation of Pobre. Jurisprudence are extant that extends the sanction of bouncing checks even under those circumstances. BP No. 22 was likewise transgressed because the postdated check was made and issued "on account or for value". Prosecution can he resorted to under both statutes, as the elements in the two offenses vary, and besides Estafa is a crime against property whereas violation of the special law is an offense against public interest. Art 315; Estafa & BP 22 1996 No. 7: 1) The accused was convicted under B.P, Blg. 22 for having issued several checks which were dishonored by the drawee bank on their due date because the accused closed her account after the issuance of checks. On appeal, she argued that she could not be convicted under B.P. Blg. 22 by reason of the closing of her account because said law applies solely to checks dishonored by reason of insufficiency of funds and that at the time she issued the checks concerned, she had adequate funds in the bank. While she admits that she may be held liable for estafa under Article 215 of the Revised Penal Code, she cannot however be found guilty of having violated B.P. Blg. 22. Is her contention correct? Explain. Answer: 1) No, the contention of the accused is not correct. As long as the checks issued were issued to apply on account or for value, and was dishonored upon presentation for payment to the drawee bank for lack of insufficient funds on their due date, such act falls within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22. Said law expressly Page 303 of 374
punishes any person who may have insufficient funds in the drawee bank when he issues the check, but fails to keep sufficient funds to cover the full amount of the check when presented to the drawee bank within ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon. Art 315; Estafa & BP 22 2003 No XII. A and B agreed to meet at the latter's house to discuss B's financial problems. On his way, one of A's car tires blew up. Before A left following the meeting, he asked B to lend him (A) money to buy a new spare tire. B had temporarily exhausted his bank deposits, leaving a zero balance. Anticipating, however, a replenishment of his account soon, B issued A a postdated check with which A negotiated for a new tire. When presented, the check bounced for lack of funds. The tire company filed a criminal case against A and B. What would be the criminal liability, if any, of each of the two accused? Explain. 8% SUGGESTED ANSWER: A who negotiated the unfunded check of B in buying a new tire for his car may only be prosecuted for estafa if he was aware at the time of such negotiation that the check has no sufficient funds in the drawee bank; otherwise, he is not criminally liable. B who accommodated A with his check may nevertheless be prosecuted under BP 22 for having issued the check, knowing at the time of issuance that it has no funds in the bank and that A will negotiate it to buy a new tire, i.e., for value. B may not be prosecuted for estafa because the facts indicate that he is not actuated by intent to defraud in issuing the check which A negotiated. Obviously, B issued the postdated check only to help A: criminal intent or dolo is absent. Art 315; Estafa & BP22 1984 No 12 A issued and delivered a check to his friend B. Both A and B knew that the check was not funded. In payment of some goods, B indorsed the check to C, who immediately deposited it with his bank. When presented for payment to the drawee bank, the check was dishonored. Notices for dishonor were sent to A and B. One month thereafter, C went to the City Fiscal's Office to file a criminal complaint. Against whom should the complaint be filed and for what crime or crimes, if any? Explain. A. Furnished 6y Office of Justice Palma A is liable for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 or the Bouncing Check Law, which punishes the mere act of issuing a check not sufficiently funded. B is liable for estafa for negotiating in bad faith the check to C that the same was not funded. B. Comments and Suggested Answer Under the Revised Penal Code, A, the drawer is not liable for estafa, as he delivered the check to B, a friend, who knew that the check was not funded.
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Deceit was not employed by A in the issuance of the check. B, however, who endorsed the check as payee to C in payment of some goods, with knowledge that the check was not funded, acted in bad faith or with deceit, and with intent to defraud C, the endorsee, is liable for estafa. (People vs. Isleta et al 61 Phil. 332). Under Batas No. 22, A is liable for the offense of issuing a check without sufficient funds. The presumption is the check was issued for a consideration or for value and A made, drew or issued said check knowing at the time of issue that he did not have sufficient funds to pay the check in full when presented for payment B, the endorser, is not liable under Batas 22 as he is not the maker, drawer or issuer of said bouncing check. Art 315; Estafa & BP22 1987 No. VIII; Jose purchased roofing materials worth P20,000.00 from PY & Sons Construction Company owned by Pedro, and paid the latter a check in the said amount. The following day, Pedro deposited the check, but it was returned dishonored because it was drawn against a closed account. Notwithstanding written demands, Jose failed to make good said check. Atty. Saavedra, counsel for Pedro, filed two complaints against Jose with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, one for estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code and another for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg, 22. Atty. San Pascual, counsel for Jose, claimed that if his client was at all liable, he could only be liable for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and not for estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code because one precludes the other and because Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is more favorable to the accused as it carries a lighter penalty.-The investigating fiscal, on his resolution, stated that only one crime was committed, namely, the complex crime of estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 because the single act of issuing the bouncing check constitutes two offenses, one under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code and another under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. If you were the Provincial Fiscal asked to review the matter, how would you resolve it? Answer: The resolution of the investigating fiscal is erroneous. There is no complex crime of estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code and the violation of BP 22. A complex crime refers only to felonies which are punished in the Revised Penal Code. Batas 22 which punishes the offense of issuing a worthless check is a special law. The contention of Atty. San Pascual, counsel of Jose that his client should be liable only for Batas 22 and for estafa under the Revised Penal Code because one precludes the other and because Batas 22 is more favorable to the accused as it carries a lighter penalty cannot also be sustained. Batas 22 specifically provides that liability under said act is without prejudice to any liability for estafa under the Revised Penal Code. The check issued by Jose in payment of roofing materials from PY and Sons was worthless. Said bouncing check having been issued in payment of a simultaneous obligation constitutes estafa under the Revised Penal Code and also the offense punished under Batas 22. There is no identity of offenses. Damage is not an element of the offense punished in Batas 22 whereas in estafa damage is an element. Estafa is an act mala in se in which requires intent as an element while the offense punished in Batas 22 is an act mala prohibita where intent is not an element.
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Art 315; Estafa & Malversation 1986 No 21: Corporal Hamak and Sergeant Salat, both policemen, responded to a call for assistance from Maglimayon, the owner of a bar along Mabini Street. It appears that Maligalig, a customer, had been creating trouble in the bar, prompting the owner to request him to leave. Maligalig pulled a gun and shot Maglimayon, Slightly wounded, Maglimayon reached for his own gun but before he could shoot, other customers subdued Maligalig. Corporal Hamak and Sergeant Salat questioned the protagonists and got an admission from Maligalig that the gun he used was unlicensed. On the other hand, Maglimayon produced the license and permit for his firearm. Hamak confiscated Maligalig's firearm. Salat asked for Maglimayon's firearm, explaining that he had to bring it to the police headquarters for examination but promised that he would return it to Maglimayon in five days. (a) Hamak sold the firearm of Maligalig. What offense, if any did Hamak commit? Give the elements of the offense as part of the explanation in your answer. (b) Salat gave away Maglimayon's firearm as a gift to his girlfriend. What offense, if any, did Salat Commit? Explain. Answer: (a) Hamak will be liable for malversation. Since the firearm was unlicensed, then it should be confiscated by the Government as what Hamak did. Such partake of the nature of public property with Hamak, a public officer, having the custody thereof. (People vs. Magsino CA 50 O.G. 678), The elements of malversation are: 1.
The offender is a public officer
2. He has the custody or control of public funds or property by reason of his office. 3.
He is accountable for these public funds or property.
4. He appropriates, takes, misappropriates, consents, or through abandonment or negligence, permits another to take the same (Art. 217, Revised Penal Code). (b) Salat committed estafa. He received the licensed firearm from the owner who is a private person with the promise to return it after it has been examined in the police headquarters. The fact that he gave it to his girlfriend constitutes misappropriation as he has the obligation to return it to the owner. Art 315; Estafa through falsification of a commercial document 1986 No. 9: Sumaway stole Magtamo's savings deposit passbook after waiting for the latter to leave the room. Sumaway proceeded immediately to the bank and misrepresented himself as the owner of the passbook. He also forged the signature of Magtamo on the withdrawal slip. Because of this acts, he was able to withdraw P10,000.00 from Magtamo's savings account. What offense or offenses did Sumaway commit? State your reasons. Answer: Page 306 of 374
The crime committed is estafa thru falsification of a commercial document (People vs. Pineda CA 37 O/G. 525). The forging of the signature of Magtamo in the withdrawal slip constitutes falsification of a commercial document. The crime, is a means necessary to defraud the owner of the savings passbook. Alternative Answer: Two crimes are committed. 1. Theft of the savings pass book. It was taken with intent to gain without force upon things as in robbery nor violence or intimidation. 2. Estafa thru falsification of commercial document. The forging of the signature of the owner of the savings pass book in the withdrawal slip is falsification of a commercial document which is a means to commit estafa. Art 315; Estafa through falsification 2000 No XVI Mr. Carlos Gabisi, a customs guard, and Mr, Rico Yto, a private Individual, went to the office of Mr. Diether Ocuarto, a customs broker, and represented themselves as agents of Moonglow Commercial Trading, an Importer of children's clothes and toys. Mr. Gabisi and Mr. Yto engaged Mr. Ocuarto to prepare and file with the Bureau of Customs the necessary Import Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration covering Moonglow's shipment. Mr. Gabisi and Mr. Yto submitted to Mr. Ocuarto a packing list, a commercial invoice, a bill of lading and a Sworn Import Duty Declaration which declared the shipment as children's toys, the taxes and duties of which were computed at P60,000.00. Mr. Ocuarto filed the aforementioned documents with the Manila International Container Port. However, before the shipment was released, a spot check was conducted by Customs Senior Agent James Bandido, who discovered that the contents of the van (shipment) were not children's toys as declared in the shipping documents but 1,000 units of video cassette recorders with taxes and duties computed at P600,000.00. A hold order and warrant of seizure and detention were then issued by the District Collector of Customs. Further investigation showed that Moonglow is non-existent. Consequently, Mr, Gabisi and Mr. Yto were charged with and convicted for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 which makes it unlawful among others, for public officers to cause any undue Injury to any party, including the Government. In the discharge of official functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. In their motion for reconsideration, the accused alleged that the decision was erroneous because the crime was not consummated but was only at an attempted stage, and that in fact the Government did not suffer any undue injury. a)
Is the contention of both accused correct? Explain. (3%)
b) Assuming that the attempted or frustrated stage of the violation charged is not punishable, may the accused be nevertheless convicted for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code under the facts of the case? Explain. (3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: a) Yes, the contention of the accused that the crime was not consummated is correct, ...
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b) Yes, both are liable for attempted estafa thru falsification of commercial documents, a complex crime. They tried to defraud the Government with the use of false commercial and public documents. Damage is not necessary. Art 315; Estafa through falsification of commercial documents 1997 No. 13: The accused opened a saving account with Bank A with an initial deposit of P2,000.00. A few days later, he deposited in the savings account a Bank B check for P 10,000.00 drawn and endorsed purportedly by C. Ten days later, he withdrew P 10,000.00 from his savings account. C complained to Bank B when the check was deducted from his account. Two days thereafter, the accused deposited another Bank B check of P 10,000.00 signed and endorsed allegedly by C. A week later, the accused went to Bank A to withdraw P10,000.00. While withdrawing the amount, he was arrested. Convicted under two informations of estafa and attempted estafa both through falsification of commercial documents, he set up the defenses that, except for the showing that the signature of C had been forged, no further evidence was presented to establish (a) that he was the forger of the signature of C nor (b), that as to the second charge. C suffered any damage. Rule on the defense. Answer; The defense is not tenable; (a) the possessor of a falsified document is presumed to be the author of the falsification (People vs. Sendaydtego, 81 SCRA 120; Koh Tiek vs. People, et al, Dec. 21, 1990); (b) In estafa. a mere disturbance of property rights, even if temporary, would be sufficient to, cause damage. Moreover, in a crime of falsification of a commercial document, damage or intent to cause damage is not necessary because the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.
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Art 315; Estafa through falsification of private document 1984 No. 9 Can the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of a private document be committed? State your reasons. Answer: A.
Furnished by Office of Justice Palma.
There is no such crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, so it cannot be committed under any circumstance. The reason for this is that the falsification of a private document to be punishable requires damage to a third person or intent to cause damage, consequently, where there is conversion to his own use of the amount collected through the use of falsified documents, the crime committed is that of falsification of private document with prejudice to a third person and not estafa through falsification of private document. B.
Comments and Suggested Answer
There is no complex crime of estafa thru falsification of a private document The reason is the damage which is an element of estafa in the very same damage which is caused by the falsification of a private document, as an element thereof. So, the falsification of a private document cannot be a means to commit estafa as the immediate effect of the falsification which is the damage, is the same as that of estafa. If a private document is falsified to cause damage to the offended party the crime is falsification of a private document. (People vs. Reyes 56 Phil. 286). If a private document is falsified to conceal the misappropriation by the accused of the money belonging to the offended party, the crime is estafa. (People vs. Co Beng CA 40 O.G. 1919). Art 315; Estafa through falsification of public document 1993 No. 1: B Imitated the signature of A, registered owner of a lot, in special power of attorney naming him (B) as the attorney-in-fact of A. On February 13, 1964, B mortgaged the lot to a bank using the special power of attorney to obtain a loan of P8,500.00. On the same day, both the special power of attorney and the mortgage contract were duly registered in the Registry of Deeds. Because of B's failure to pay, the bank foreclosed the mortgage and the lot was sold to X in whose name a new title was issued. In March, 1974, A discovered that the property was already registered in the name of X because of an ejectment case filed against him by X. 1) If you were the lawyer of A, with what crime or crimes would you charge B? Explain. 2)
If you were the counsel of B, what would be your defense? Discuss.
Answer; 1) The crime committed is estafa thru falsification of public document. 2) My defense will be prescription ... Art 315; Estafa vs illegal exaction 1977 No. VIII-b
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A teller of the provincial treasurer's office told the landowner that his real estate tax due is P500.00 when actually it is only P400. The landowner paid as told. In order that the landowner will not discover the excess, the teller made it appear in the original of the official receipt to be given to the landowner that P500.00 was paid but in the duplicate left with him, the true amount of P400.00 was stated. Thereafter, the teller misappropriated the entire amount of P500.00. Assuming that you are the investigating fiscal, what crime will you file against the teller? State your reasons. Answer As investigating fiscal, I would file against the teller three crimes, to wit: (1) illegal exaction or estafa, (2) falsification of public document, and (3) malversation. By telling the landowner that his real estate tax due was P500.00 which was paid, when actually it was only P400.00 the teller of the provincial treasurer's office collected an amount bigger than that authorized by law. The teller is a public officer and in view of his duties is entrusted with the collection of taxes. Illegal exaction is committed. The total amount of P500.00 was paid in the concept of tax and forms a part of the public funds. The misappropriation of P500.00 would constitute malversation of public funds since the one prejudiced is the government (People v. Policher, 60 Phil. 771). However, if the teller by means of deceit, collected the sum of P500.00 to misappropriate the excess of P100.00, estafa and not illegal exaction is committed (U.S. Lopez, et al, 10 Phil. 480). The falsification of the original of the official receipt is an independent crime since it was committed in order that the landowner would not discover the excess. The misappropriation of the P400 being paid as a tax is malversation. Art 315; Estafa; defense of ownership 2002 No XII. A sold a washing machine to B on credit, with the understanding that B could return the appliance within two weeks if, after testing the same, B decided not to buy it. Two weeks lapsed without B returning the appliance. A found out that B had sold the washing machine to a third party- Is B liable for estafa? Why? (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, B is not liable for estafa because he is not just an entrustee of the washing machine which he sold; he is the owner thereof by virtue of the sale of the washing machine to him. The sale being on credit, B as buyer is only liable for the unpaid price of the washing machine; his obligation is only a civil obligation. There is no felonious misappropriation that could constitute estafa. Art 315; Estafa; defense of ownership 1996 No. 10; On March 31, 1995, Orpheus Financing Corporation received from Maricar the sum of P500,000 as money market placement for sixty days at fifteen (15) per cent interest, and the President of said Corporation issued a check covering the amount including the interest due thereon, postdated May 30, 1995. On the maturity date, however, Orpheus Financing Corporation failed to deliver back Mari-car's money placement with the corresponding interest earned, notwithstanding repeated demands upon said Corporation to comply with its commitment.
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Did the President of Orpheus Financing Corporation incur any criminal liability for estafa for reason of the nonpayment of the money market placement? Explain. Answer: No, the President of the financing corporation does not incur criminal liability for estafa because a money market transaction partakes of the nature of a loan, such that nonpayment thereof would not give rise to estafa through misappropriation or conversion. In money market placement, there is transfer of ownership of the money to be invested and therefore the liability for Its return is civil in nature (Perez vs. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 636; Sebreno vs. Court of Appeals etal, G.R. 84096, 26 Jan 95). Art 315; Estafa; effect of novation 1984 No. 10 Does novation or compromise affect the criminal liability of a person accused of estafa? Explain. Answer: A.
Furnished by Office of Justice Palma,
Novation or compromise does not affect criminal liability of the offender or accused. So, partial payment or extension of time to pay the amount misappropriated or acceptance of a promissory note for payment of the amount involved does not extinguish criminal liability, because a criminal offense is committed against the people and the offended party may not waive or extinguish the criminal liability that the law imposes for the commission of the offense. But if the compromise is executed before a criminal action is instituted or where the amount misappropriated was converted into a contract of loan and the accused was made to acknowledge the debt, there is novation of contract so as to extinguish any incipient criminal liability of the accused; but the novation must be expressed and must refer only to the incipient criminal liability. B.
Comments and Suggested Answer
Novation or compromise does not affect the criminal liability of a person accused of estafa if it occurs after the filing of the criminal action in court. So, partial payment or extension of time to pay the amount misappropriated does not extinguish criminal liability because a criminal offense is committed against the People and the offended party may not waive or extinguish the criminal liability that the law imposes for the commission of the offense. (People vs. Gervacio L 7705 Dec. 24, 1957). But if the compromise is executed before a criminal action is instituted as where the amount misappropriated was converted into a contract of loan and the accused was made to acknowledge the debt, there is novation of contract so as to extinguish any incipient criminal liability of the accused but the novation must be expressed and must refer only to the incipient criminal liability. It prevents the rise of criminal liability as long as it occurs prior to the filing of the criminal information (Guingona Jr. vs. City Fiscal et al of Manila L-64750, Jan. 30, 1984, 127 SCRA 201). Art 315; Estafa; pre-existing obligation 1976 No. X-b
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X purchased from Y, owner of a grocery store merchandise, worth P600.00. He signed a promissory note for the amount of P500.00 payable on or before October 30, 1976. On the date of the maturity of the promissory note, X gave a check with the bank, the same was dishonored for lack of funds. Is X liable for estafa? Answer X is not liable for estafa. The check was issued off the date of the maturity of a promissory note for P500.00. It was issued therefore in payment of a preexisting obligation, and since X did not obtained anything by the issuance of the said check, even if dishonored for insufficiency of funds, estafa is not committed. (People vs. Canlas, CA 38 O.G. 1032). A bouncing check which is issued in payment of a debt at a pre-existing obligation is still a defense inspite of the amendment of par. 2(d) Art. 315, RPC by R.A. 4885. (People vs. Cua, CA No. 16841-CR, March 2, 1976), To constitute estafa under the law as amended, the check dishonored for lack of funds must be issued at the time of contracting the obligation in payment thereof. (People vs. Teodorico, CA 69 O.G. 4928). The Department of Justice in a July 1976 opinion adheres to this view, in a directive to all prosecuting officers for compliance, unless a different doctrine is established by the Supreme Court. Dissenting Opinion of SEN, PADILLA. — The mere issuance of check without sufficient funds is estafa. Art 315; Estafa; violation of PD 115 1995 No. 8: Julio obtained a letter of credit from a local bank in order to import auto tires from Japan. To secure payment of his letter of credit, Julio executed a trust receipt in favor of the bank. Upon arrival of the tires, Julio sold them but did not deliver the proceeds to the bank. Julio was charged with estafa under P.D. No. 115 which makes the violation of a trust receipt agreement punishable as estafa under Art. 315, par. (1), subpar. (b), of the Revised Penal Code. Julio contended that P.D. No. 115 was unconstitutional because it violated the Bill of Rights provision against imprisonment for non-payment of debt. Rule on the contention of Julio, Discuss fully. Answer: Such contention is invalid. A trust receipt arrangement doesn't involve merely a simple loan transaction but includes likewise a security feature where the creditor bank extends financial assistance to the debtor-importer in return for the collateral or security title as to the goods or merchandise being purchased or imported. The title of the bank to the security is the one sought to be protected and not the loan which is a separate and distinct agreement. What is being penalized under P,D. No. 115 is the misuse or misappropriation of the goods or proceeds realized from the sale of the goods, documents or Instruments which are being held in trust for the entrustee-banks. In other words, the law punishes the dishonesty and abuse of confidence in the handling of money or goods to the prejudice of the other, and hence there is no violation of the right against imprisonment for non-payment of debt. (People vs. Nitafan, 207 SCRA 725) Art 315; Estafa; violation of PD 115 1983 No. 1
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A imported lychees, covering its payment with a letter of credit he obtained from a bank under a trust receipt arrangement. Upon arrival of the goods, he sold all of them but did not turn over the proceeds to the bank, despite demands for him to do so. What crime, if any, did A commits? Why? Answer Estafa thru misappropriation. Presidential Decree No. 115 provides that the misappropriation of the proceeds realized from the sale of goods released under a trust receipt is estafa under par. L(b) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The reason is that the bank who has advanced the payment of the imported lychees under a letter of credit obtained by the importer continues to be vested with the ownership of the goods until the proceeds of the sale have been turned over to the bank. (Samo vs. People L-17603-04, May 31, 1962) Presidential Decree No. 115 provides further that the failure of the importer to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods under a trust receipt arrangement to the extent of the amount owning to the bank is estafa. Art 315; Estafa; violation of PD115 1985 No. 15 Garcia, an importer, succeeded in convincing his bank to release his importation under a trust receipt agreement he signed last January 15, 1985. Upon maturity of the trust receipts on February 5, 1985, Garcia paid the bank in check which was however dishonored. Informed of the said dishonor, Garcia paid only 60% of the amount of his check and refused to pay the balance despite demands. (A) On the basis of the foregoing facts, what may Garcia be prosecuted for? Reasons. (B) What is the effect of the 50% payment made by Garcia on his criminal liability? Discuss. Answer: (A) Garcia should be prosecuted for the violation of the terms of a trust receipt which is punished in P.D. No. 115 as estafa through misappropriation or conversion. Under the trust receipt agreement, Garcia was under obligation upon, maturity thereof to turn over to the bank the proceeds of the sale of the imported goods, document or instrument or to return the said goods, documents or instrument if not sold. Failure to comply with this obligation shall constitute estafa under Art. 315, Par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code. Since Garcia paid only 50% of the amount, he will be liable for estafa regarding the balance of 50%. Art 319; Removal, sale or pledge of mortgaged property 1981 No. 11 "O" is the owner of a car. He mortgaged it to "B" under the Chattel Mortgage Law to secure a loan of P2,000.00 that he had obtained from "B". The lawyer of "B" who had prepared the document for him forgot to register it in the office of the Register of Deeds. "O" sold the car to "C" as free from liens and encumbrances but failed to pay to "B" the loan of P2,000.00 on its date of maturity. Prosecuted for violation of paragraph two of Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code (Removal, sale or pledge of mortgaged property), is "O" criminally liable for this offense? Why?
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Answer "O" cannot be criminally liable under Art. 319 of the Revised Penal Code, par. 2, which provides: "Any mortgagor who shall sell or pledge personal property already pledged or any part thereof under the terms of the Chattel Mortgage Law, without the consent of the mortgagee written on the back of the mortgage and noted on the record thereof in. the Office of the Register of Deeds of the Province where such property is located." From this provision it is clear that the first mortgage must be recorded in the Register of Deeds because the consent of the first mortgage must be written at the back of the second mortgage and noted on the record thereof, (which refers to the first mortgage) in the Register of Deeds. Selling the thing already mortgaged as free from liens and encumbrances constitutes estafa. (People vs. Alvarez, 45 Phil. 472). Art 320; Arson 1980 No. XIV At about 11:30 A.M., "W" noticed that the nipa roof of their house was on fire. He got up to get water with which to extinguish the fire. While putting out the fire "W" noticed "X" near the house carrying a pole to the end of which was attached a rug soaked with gasoline. "W", shouted "fire! tire" and started to put out the fire. With the help of some neighbors, "W" succeeded in put-ting out the fire but only after a small portion of the roof had been burned. Is "X" liable for frustrated or consummated arson? Answer X will be liable for consummated arson. The mere burning of a portion of the house, which in the problem is the nipa roof, is consummated arson. All the elements of the acts of execution and accomplishment are present (People vs. Hernandez, 54 Phil. 122). It cannot be frustrated arson because in frustrated arson the offender sets on fire gasoline soaked rags to burn a building but the fire is put out by a cause independent of the will of the offender before any portion of the building is burned. (U.S. vs. Valdez, 39 Phil. 240). Art 320; Arson 1987 No. IV: Ricardo secured the services of Atty. Juanito to defend him in an arson case pending in court. Juanito asked his client what actually happened. Ricardo informed his lawyer that Sing Hua, owner of a department store, hired him to burn the store because Sing Hua was losing heavily and wanted to get the insurance on the store. Ricardo said that Sing Hua paid him P5,000.00, and promised an additional 10% of the proceeds of the P10,000,000.00 fire insurance once this was collected from the insurance company. He further said that Sing Hua's claim for payment of the tire insurance was still pending and its approval depended on the outcome of the arson case. This meant that the ABC Insurance Company would pay the claim should Ricardo be acquitted in the arson case. Then he would also get the 10% share of the fire insurance proceeds. He told lawyer Juanito that by depending him in the arson case, the latter would be helping collect the 10% which would amount of P1,000,000.00. After hearing Ricardo's story, Atty. Juanito told him he could not further give him professional advice or services and so Ricardo left. That same day, Juanito went to the NBI Page 314 of 374
and told the NBI what Ricardo narrated him. The NBI alerted ABC Insurance Company which immediately denied the claim for payment of insurance and filed a complaint for attempted estafa through arson against Sing Hua and Ricardo. (a) Did Juanito commit any crime? (b) Would the situation be different if at the time Ricardo secured the professional services of Juanito, ABC Insurance Company had already paid Sing Hua the insurance and the latter had in turn paid Ricardo 10% "thereof? Answer: a) Juanito did not commit any crime. By telling Ricardo that he could not give him professional advice or services, after being informed that the owner of the department store hired him to burn the store because it was losing heavily and wanted to get the insurance on the store, and that he was paid already P5,000 with a promise of an additional 10% of the proceeds of the P10,000,000 fire insurance once collected from the insurance company, Atty. Juanito complied with his obligation as a lawyer to report to the authorities whatever knowledge he has regarding the commission of a crime. b) Juanito will be liable as an accessory because by accepting 10% of the insurance proceeds even in payment of the professional services, he profited or assisted the principal, Ricardo, to profit from the proceeds of the commission of the crime, Art 320; Arson & Murder 1985 No, 17 B set the house of A on fire by way of revenge against the latter. B did not know that A was inside. A died because of the fire, (A) (B) commit?
What crime or crimes did B commit? Suppose B knew that A was inside, what crime or crimes did B
(C) Suppose before setting it on fire, B entered the house and killed A. Then B set the house on fire to hide the body of A. What crime or crimes did B commit? Explain your answers. Answer: (A) B will be liable for the special complex crime of arson with homicide as provided in Presidential Decree No. 1613, because the death resulted from the arson. The case of People v. Paterno (L-2665, March 6, 1960)—that the arson absorbed the death, is no longer controlling. (B) If B knew that A was in the house when it was set on fire, the crime will be murder. The fire is the qualifying circumstance. (C) If B killed A before the house was set on fire, two crimes are committed, murder and arson. The arson was committed to conceal the crime of murder. Art 320; Arson & Murder (through use of fire) & Homicide 1989 No. 14: Diego and Pablo were both farmers residing in Barangay Damayan. On one occasion, Diego called Pablo to come down from his house in order to ask Page 315 of 374
him why he got his (Diego's) plow without permission. One word led to another. Diego, in a fit of anger, unsheathed his bolo and hacked Pablo to death. Pablo's 9-year old son, Mario, who was inside the house, saw the killing of his father. Afraid that he might also be killed by Diego, Mario covered himself with a blanket and hid in a corner of the house. To conceal the killing of Pablo, Diego brought Pablo's body inside the house and burned it, Mario was also burned to death. What crime or crimes did Diego commit? Answer: Diego committed two crimes (1) homicide for the death of Pablo and (2) the special complex crime of arson with homicide as provided in PD 1613 for the burning of the house and the death of Mario. The hacking of Pablo to death is homicide, the killing not being attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder. It was killing in the course of a quarrel. The burning of the house to conceal the killing of Pablo is a separate crime. Were it not for the death of Mario, this separate offense would have been arson. But inside the house was unknown to Diego, the resulting crime is under PD No. 1613, because the death resulted from the arson. If by reason or on the occasion of the arson, death results, the offense is the special complex or arson with homicide (Sec. 5, PD 1613, which expressly repealed Art. 320 and consequently the ruling case therein, People v. Paterno (L-2665, March 6, 1950). If Diego knew that Mario was inside the house when he set it on fire, the crime committed, instead of arson, would be MURDER, with fire as the qualifying circumstance. Art 320; Arson; Robbery; homicide 1995 No. 12: Harry, an overseas contract worker, arrived from Saudi Arabia with considerable savings. Knowing him to be "loaded", his friends Jason, Manuel and Dave invited him to poker session at a rented beach cottage. When he was losing almost all his money which to him was his savings of a lifetime, he discovered that he was being cheated by his friends. Angered by the betrayal he decided to take revenge on the three cheats. Harry ordered several bottles of Tanduay Rhum and gave them to his companions to drink, as they did, until they all fell asleep. When Harry saw his companions already sound asleep he hacked all of them to death. Then he remembered his losses. He rifled through the pockets of his victims and got back all the money he lost. He then ran away but not before burning the cottage to hide his misdeed. The following day police investigators found among the debris the charred bodies of Jason, Manuel, Dave and the caretaker of the resort. After preliminary investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor charged Harry with the complex crime of arson with quadruple homicide and robbery. Was Harry properly charged? Discuss fully. Answer: No, Harry was net properly charged. Harry should have been charged with three (3) separate crimes, namely: murder, theft and arson. Harry killed Jason, Manuel and Dave with evident premeditation, as there was considerable lapse of time before he decided to commit the crime and the Page 316 of 374
actual commission of the crime. In addition, Harry employed means which weakened the defense of Jason, Manuel and Dave. Harry gave them the liquor to drink until they were drunk and fell asleep. This gave Harry the opportunity to carry out his plan of murder with impunity. The taking of the money from the victims was a mere afterthought of the killings. Hence, Harry committed the separate crime of theft and not the complex crime of robbery with homicide. Although theft was committed against dead persons, it is still legally possible as the offended party are the estates of the victims. In burning the cottage to hide his misdeed. Harry became liable for another separate crime, arson. This act of burning was not necessary for the consummation of the two (2) previous offenses he committed. The fact that the caretaker died from the blaze did not qualify Harry's crime into a complex crime of arson with homicide for there is no such crime. Hence, Harry was improperly charged with the complex crime of arson with quadruple homicide and robbery. Harry should have been charged with three (3) separate crimes, murder, theft and arson. Art 320; Destructive arson 1994 No. 6: Tata owns a three-storey building located at No. 3 Herran Street. Paco, Manila. She wanted to construct a new building but had no money to finance the construction. So, she insured the building for P3,000,000.00. She then urged Yoboy and Yongsi, for monetary consideration, to bum her building so she could collect the insurance proceeds. Yoboy and Yongsi burned the said building resulting to its total loss. 1) What crime did Tata, Yoboy and Yongsi commit? 2) What is their respective criminal liability? Answer: 1) Tata, Yoboy and Yongsi committed the crime of destructive arson because they collectively caused the destruction of property by means of fire under the circumstances which exposed to danger the life or property of others (Art, 320, par. 5, RPC. as amended by RA No. 7659). Art 320; Destructive Arson 2000 No XVIII c) One early evening, there was a fight between Eddie Gutierrez and Mario Cortez. Later that evening, at about 11 o'clock, Eddie passed by the house of Mario carrying a plastic bag containing gasoline, threw the bag at the house of Mario who was inside the house watching television, and then lit it. The front wall of the house started blazing and some neighbors yelled and shouted. Forthwith, Mario poured water on the burning portion of the house. Neighbors also rushed in to help put the fire under control before any great damage could be inflicted and before the flames have extensively spread. Only a portion of the house was burned. Discuss Eddie's liability, (3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: c) Eddie is liable for destructive arson in the consummated stage. It is destructive arson because fire was resorted to in destroying the house of Mario
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which is an inhabited house or dwelling. The arson is consummated because the house was in fact already burned although not totally. In arson, it is not required that the premises be totally burned for the crime to be consummated. It is enough that the premises suffer destruction by burning. Art 328; Malicious mischief 1976 No. X-a X is a housemaid in the house of Y. After being scolded several times by the master of the house, she put rat poison on the food of Y's dog, as a result of which the dog died. What crime was committed by X? Reason. Answer X committed special malicious mischief. The death of the dog is due to the administration of rat poison in its food. The poisonous substance was hence used by X to kill a domestic animal of her master. (Art. 328, RPC). The act was done intentionally and deliberately and the means employed is not fire or any means involving destruction, for the sake of killing the dog, as she was actuated by resentment or an evil motive.
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Art 328; Malicious mischief 1989 No. 19: "A" is married to the sister of "B", and the three (3) live together in a house located a Caloocan City. On several occasions, "B's" dog would bark at "A" everytime he arrives at past midnight. One time, after arriving in the house at around 2 o'clock in the morning, "BY" dog barked continuously at "A." In a fit of anger, "A" entered the house, took a bolo and killed the dog. What crime was committed and what is liability of "A?" Explain. Answer: The crime committed by A is malicious mischief. The elements of this are: (1) the offender caused damages to the property of other (2) the damage caused did not constitute arson or any other crime involving destruction and (3) the damage was caused by the offender (Caballes vs. DAR, GR 78214, 5 Dec. 88). A's act of killing the dog is characterized by malice, it being a product of anger and resentment. However, A is exempt from criminal liability for the crime committed by him because he is the brother-in-law of the offended party and they are both living together under the same roof. Under Art. 332 of the RPC, no criminal, but only civil, liability shall result from the commission of the crime of THEFT, SWINDLING or MALICIOUS MISCHIEF committed or caused mutually by among others, brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together. Art 332; Absolutory cause 1980 No. I (a) "A", a stranger, and "B", son of "C", connived with each other in stealing "C's" carabao. May "A" and "B" be held criminally liable for Theft of Large Cattle? Answer (a) Only A is criminally liable, B, being the son of C, the owner of the carabao, is not liable, because of relationship, which in cases of theft, estafa and malicious mischief is an absolutory cause. (Art 332, R.P.C.) The term "theft" includes qualified theft, as it is understood in its generic sense. (People vs. Marciano, CA-G.R. 13818-R, April 21, 1956.) However, under Presidential Decree No. 533 the stealing of a carabao is punished as cattle rustling, in which case A and B will be criminally liable because of conspiracy. Relationship is not an absolutory cause. Art 332; Absolutory cause 1981 No, 7 "A" and "B" are brothers-in-law living together in the same house. "A" committed Estafa through Falsification of a Commercial Document against "B". Prosecuted for this offense. "A" claimed that because of their relationship the liability that he had incurred was only civil, not criminal.
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Decide the case with reasons. Answer A, in spite of his relationship with B cannot claim exemption from criminal responsibility from the crime committed. The absolutory cause provided in Art. 332 of the Revised Penal Code refers to theft, estafa and malicious mischief. Estafa through falsification as A complex crime is not included. If at all, A is still liable for falsification of a commercial document. Art 332; Absolutory cause; applicability to common law spouses 1980 No. I (b) Hilario, common-law husband of Gloria, stole the wrist watch of the latter valued at P2,QOO.OO. May Hilario be held criminally liable for the crime of Theft? Answer (b) Hilario cannot be criminally liable for theft of the wrist watch of his common-law wife. The term "spouse" in Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code embraces common law relationship. (People vs. Constantino, CA 60 O.G. 3603). The properties acquired by common-law spouses are governed by the rules of co-ownership. A co-owner cannot commit theft. (U.S. vs. Canta, 6 Phil. 342.)
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Crimes Against Chastity Art 333; Adultery 1982 No. 10 "H" and "W" were newly married. While "H" was away in a foreign land, "X" courted "W", and they subsequently had successive sexual intercourse. Upon his return and upon learning of the unfaithfulness of his wife, "H" filed an adultery case with the fiscal against "W" and "X". The fiscal's investigation showed beyond doubt that all the while "X" did not know that "W" was a married women. Hence, the fiscal filed an adultery charge against "W" only. If you were the fiscal, how would you justify your action? If you were the lawyer for "H", what arguments would you advance so as to compel the fiscal to include "X" as coaccused? If you were the judge, what would be your decision? Answer If I were the Fiscal I would justify the filing of the adultery charge against W only because from the investigation, X did not know that W was a married woman. Under the law the man who has carnal knowledge of a married woman not knowing her to be married is not liable for adultery. (Art. 333, R.P.C.) If I were the lawyer for H, I would advance the argument that the supreme Court has already established the rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and determine a charge of adultery depends upon the filing of the complaint by the husband and the husband is expressly prohibited from filing the complaint against one of the parties without including the other (U.S. vs. Asuncion 21 Phil. 399). If I were the judge, my decision would foe to sustain the contention of the lawyer for H because without including the paramour in the criminal action the Court will not acquire the jurisdiction to hear and try the charge. As the Supreme Court said, it is for the Court to determine the question of the guilt or innocence of the paramour in the crime of adultery. Art 333; Adultery 1982 No. 17 "A", husband, and "B", wife, are legally married. So are "X", husband, and "Y", wife. "A" and "Y" had sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances. "X" and "B" likewise had sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances. (a) Who are guilty of adultery? And who among them may file the corresponding complaint? (b) Who are guilty of concubinage and who among them may file the complaint? Answer Y, the wife of X, will be guilty of adultery. A, with whom Y had sexual intercourse will be guilty of adultery if A knew that Y was married. X, the husband of Y will file the complaint being the offended party. B, the wife of A will be guilty of adultery. X with whom B had sexual intercourse will be guilty if X knew that B was married. A the husband of B will file the complaint being the offended party. Those liable in adultery are the married woman and the man who has sexual intercourse with her knowing her to be married. A and Y will be liable of concubinage. B, the wife of A will file the complaint as she is the offended party. X and B will be liable for concubinage. Y wife of X being the offended party will file the complaint as she is the offended party. Those liable in concubinage are the husband and the paramour, Page 321 of 374
Art 333; Adultery 1988 No. 7: Pedro Orsal and the wife of accused Juan Santos started having illicit relations while the accused was in Manila reviewing for the 1983 Bar Examinations and his wife was left behind in Davao City. In the morning of July 15, 1984, the accused went to the bus station in Davao City to go to Cagayan de Oro City to fetch his daughter, but after he failed to catch the first trip in the morning, and because the 2:00 o'clock bus had engine trouble and could not leave, the accused, after passing the residence of his father, went home and arrive at his residence at around six o'clock in the afternoon. Upon reaching his home, the accused found his wife Laura, and Pedro Orsal in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and Pedro Orsal noticed the accused, the wife pushed her paramour who got his revolver. The accused, who has then peeping above the built in cabinet in their, room, jumped down and ran away. He went to the house of his PC soldier-friend, and neighbor, got his (soldier's) M-16 rifle and immediately, it was almost 6:30 p.m. then, went back to his house. Not finding his wife there, he went to the hangout of Pedro Orsal and found the latter playing mahjong there. The accused fired at Pedro three times with his rifle, hit him and two bystanders. Pedro died instantaneously of wounds in the head, trunk, and abdomen. The two bystanders were seriously injured but survived. a) Can Juan Santos be held guilty for homicide for the death of Pedro Orsal? Explain. b) What offense did Juan Santos commit with regard to the two bystanders? Explain. c) What offense, did the wife of Juan Santos commit, if any why? Answer c) The wife of Juan Santos committed the crime of adultery. Article 333 of the Revised PenalCode provides that "Who are guilty of adultery.— Adultery is committed by any married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband....". Art 333; Adultery 2002 No X. A. A, a married woman, had sexual intercourse with a man who was not her husband. The man did not know she was married. What crime, if any, did each of them commit? Why? (2%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: A, the married woman, committed the crime of adultery under Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, for having sexual intercourse with a man not her husband while her marriage is still subsisting. But the man who had carnal knowledge of her, not knowing her to be married, shall not be liable for adultery. Art 333; Adultery & concubinage; who must file complaint 1994 No. 12: Abe, married to Liza, contracted another marriage with Connie in Singapore. Thereafter, Abe and Connie returned to the Philippines and lived as husband and wife in the hometown of Abe in Calamba, Laguna.
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1) Can Abe be prosecuted for bigamy? 2) If not, can he be prosecuted for any other crime? Answer: 1) No, Abe may not be prosecuted for bigamy ... 2) Yes, Abe, together with Connie, may be prosecuted for concubinage under Art. 334 of the Revised Penal Code for having cohabited as husband and wife. But concubinage being a private crime requires the sworn complaint of Liza, the offended spouse in accordance with Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Art 333; Adultery; legal standing to file complaint 1991 No. 8: b) In 1980, Socorro Wagas, a Filipino citizen and a resident of Cebu City, and Loven Adenauer, a West German citizen, were married at the Sto. Rosario Catholic Church in Cebu City, In 1983, Loven returned to West Germany where he initiated a divorce proceeding against Socorro before a local court which, in due time, promulgated in July 1985 a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage. In September 1985, Loven returned to the Philippines only to find out that Socorro had filed a case of legal separation against him. In December 1985, Loven, who learned of the cohabitation of Socorro and Efren Reyes, her childhood sweetheart, when he (Loven) was in Germany, filed a sworn complaint for adultery against Socorro and Efren with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu. Socorro's counsel moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn complaint filed by the offended spouse, and Loven, having obtained a divorce in Germany, had ceased to be her offended spouse. Resolve the motion. Answer: In adultery or concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Adulterer being no longer the husband because of the divorce he initiated, he has no legal standing anymore. (Pilapil vs. Somera , 174 SCRA 653) Art 334; Concubinage 1982 No. 17 "A", husband, and "B", wife, are legally married. So are "X", husband, and "Y", wife. "A" and "Y" had sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances. "X" and "B" likewise had sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances. (a) Who are guilty of adultery? And who among them may file the corresponding complaint? (b) Who are guilty of concubinage and who among them may file the complaint? Answer Y, the wife of X, will be guilty of adultery. A, with whom Y had sexual intercourse will be guilty of adultery if A knew that Y was married. X, the husband of Y will file the complaint being the offended party. B, the wife of A will be guilty of adultery. X with whom B had sexual intercourse will be guilty if X knew that B Page 323 of 374
was married. A the husband of B will file the complaint being the offended party. Those liable in adultery are the married woman and the man who has sexual intercourse with her knowing her to be married. A and Y will be liable of concubinage. B, the wife of A will file the complaint as she is the offended party. X and B will be liable for concubinage. Y wife of X being the offended party will file the complaint as she is the offended party. Those liable in concubinage are the husband and the paramour, Art 334; Concubinage 1984 No. 18 While his wife was still living, A married C, single, in Hongkong. After living there for a couple of years, A and C returned to and settled in Manila. (a) Can A be prosecuted for bigamy? Why? (b) In any event, can A be prosecuted for any other crime? If so, what? How about C? Explain. Answer b) When A and C returned to and settled in Manila, it would mean that A cohabited with C, that they lived together as husband and wife. A will be liable for concubinage. C will be liable if he has already knowledge that A is married. Art 334; Concubinage 2002 No X. B. A is married. He has a paramour with whom he has sexual relations on a more or less regular basis. They meet at least once a week in hotels, motels and other places where they can be alone. Is A guilty of any crime? Why? (3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: A Is guilty of the crime of concubinage by having sexual Intercourse under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife. Having sexual relations on a more or less regular basis in hotels, motels and other places may be considered a scandalous circumstance that offends public conscience, giving rise to criticism and general protest such acts being imprudent and wanton and setting a bad example (People vs. Santos, 86 SCRA 705 [1978]). ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: A is not guilty of any crime because a married man does not Incur the crime of concubinage by merely having a paramour, unless under scandalous circumstances, or he keeps her in the conjugal dwelling as a mistress, or cohabits with her in any other place. His weekly meetings with his paramour does not per se constitute scandalous circumstance. Art 336; Acts of lasciviousness 1982 No. 6 "A", a suitor of girl "B", saw the latter at about midnight walking along a dark and deserted alley near her house. "A" sneaked up to her, grabbed her breasts from behind, kissed her, and at the same time raised her dress. At that moment, a noise was heard frightening "A", who immediately ran away.
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If you were the fiscal, for what crime would you prosecute "A"? Would you allege treachery, nighttime, superior strength and uninhabited place as aggravating circumstances? Reasons. Answer The crime committed is acts of lasciviousness. Stealthily kissing, embracing and fondling the breast of complainant and raising her dress constitute lewd or lascivious acts. (People vs. Yabut, CA G.R, No. 2550-R Aug. 5, 1960). More so, as the acts were committed at midnight and in a dark and deserted alley altho near the house of the girl. Treachery is not present because this aggravating circumstance applies only to crimes against persons. Acts of lasciviousness is a crime against chastity. Nighttime is not present because the facts do not show that the accused took advantage of the darkness of the night to facilitate the commission of the crime to insure immunity from capture. Superior strength is not aggravating because mere physical superiority is not taking advantage of superior strength. It is necessary to prove the relative strength of the parties (People vs. Bustos, 51 Phil 385). Uninhabited place is also not present because the place of the commission of the crime was near the house of the offended party and the fact that A heard some noise which frightened him show that the place was not uninhabited. Besides, the facts do not show that the place was purposely chosen for the easy and uninterrupted accomplishment of the crime (People vs. Luneta et at., 45 O.G. 2832). Art 336; Acts of lasciviousness 1993 No. 15 Mick, a gay foreigner, fondled and played with the private part of Egay, an 11 year-old boy, who enjoyed it and gladly received the P100.00 given him by the foreigner. 1) What crime, if any, was committed by the foreigner? Explain. 2) If the act was committed on Citry, an 11 year-old girl; would your answer be the same? Discuss. Answer: 1} Acts of Lasciviousness under the circumstance of rape (Art. 336, RPC and RA. 7610) 2) Yes, acts of lasciviousness is committed irrespective of sex. (Art. 336, RPC) Art 336; Acts of lasciviousness 1996 No. 15: Pia, a bold actress living on top floor of a plush condominium in Makati City sunbathed naked at its penthouse every Sunday morning. She was unaware that the business executives holding office at the adjoining tall buildings reported to office every Sunday morning and, with the use of powerful binoculars, kept on gazing at her while she sunbathed. Eventually, her sunbathing became the talk of the town. 1) What crime, if any, did Pia commit? Explain, 2) What crime, if any, did the business executives commit? Explain. Answer:
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1) Pia did not commit a crime, The felony closest to making Pia criminally liable is Grave Scandal, but then such act is not to be considered as highly scandalous and offensive against decency and good customs. In the first place, it was not done in a public place and within public knowledge or view. As a matter of fact it was discovered by the executives accidentally and they have to use binoculars to have public and full view of Pia sunbathing in the nude. 2) The business executives did not commit any crime. Their acts could not be acts of lasciviousness [as there was no overt lustful act), or slander, as the eventual talk of the town, resulting from her sunbathing, is not directly imputed to the business executives, and besides such topic is not intended to defame or put Pia to ridicule. Art 336; Acts of lasciviousness vs unjust vexation 1994 No. 1; 1) When is embracing, kissing and touching a girl's breast considered only unjust vexation instead of acts of lasciviousness? Answer; 1) The acts of embracing, kissing of a woman arising either out of passion or other motive and the touching of her breast as a mere incident of the embrace without lewd design constitutes merely unjust vexation (People us, Ignacio. CA GRNo. 5119-R, September 30, 1950). However, where the kissing, embracing and the touching of the breast of a woman are done with lewd design, the same constitute acts of lasciviousness (People vs. Percival Gilo, 10 SCRA 753). Art 336; Acts of lasciviousness vs unjust vexation 1994 No. 1; 1) When is embracing, kissing and touching a girl's breast considered only unjust vexation instead of acts of lasciviousness? Answer; 1) The acts of embracing, kissing of a woman arising either out of passion or other motive and the touching of her breast as a mere incident of the embrace without lewd design constitutes merely unjust vexation (People us, Ignacio. CA GRNo. 5119-R, September 30, 1950). However, where the kissing, embracing and the touching of the breast of a woman are done with lewd design, the same constitute acts of lasciviousness (People vs. Percival Gilo, 10 SCRA 753). Art 337; Qualified seduction 1981 No. 13 "A" is a girl of 17 years, single and a fourth year high school student whose teacher is "B". Teaching in the same school is "C". One afternoon, after class, "A" and "C" had sexual intercourse in the storeroom of the school. "A" became pregnant. Prosecuted for qualified seduction. "C" interposed the following defenses: (1) "C" is not the teacher of "A"; {2} "A" is not a virgin; and (3) the sexual relation was with the consent of "A". Are the defenses of "C" meritorious? Reasons. Answer Page 326 of 374
The defenses of C are not meritorious, (a) Qualified seduction may be committed as long as the accused is a teacher in the same school where the student is studying. This is due to the abuse of confidence and the moral influence which the teacher exercises over the victim as a member of the faculty [(Santos vs. People, 40 O.G, {Sup. 6). (b) Virginity is not to be understood in the physical sense. It includes a girl of good reputation, (People vs. Lanot, CA-G.R. #04557-CR, Jan. 18,1964), (c) Consent of the woman is not a defense since it was accomplished by abuse of authority or confidence in view of the position of "C" as a teacher.
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Art 344; Crimes against chastity; effect of pardon after filing of complaint 1991 No. 8: a) A complaint for rape was filed by the victim against her father. When the victim was about to finish her testimony, she and her aunt (her closest relative) executed separate affidavits of desistance wherein they stated that they are forgiving the accused. The judge dismissed the case. Is the dismissal proper? Answer: a) No, the dismissal of the case is not proper. While the affidavit of desistance executed by the victim amounts to a pardon, the same does not extinguish criminal liability. In the crime of rape and other private crimes, pardon by the offended party only bars prosecution if given before the institution of the criminal action. After the criminal action had been instituted, such pardon only waives the civil liability but not the criminal liability of the offender. Art 344; Extinction of criminal liability; marriage in good faith 1975 No. II A seduced B, & woman, and was subsequently convicted. While serving sentence, A married B but immediately after the ceremony, he abandoned her and left for parts unknown. Subsequently arrested, the Fiscal filed a motion in Court for A's recommitment to prison to serve his unexpired term contending that A's marriage to B was in bad faith and only to escape criminal liability. A, however, contended that under the provisions of Art. 344, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, his criminal liability has been extinguished, for under the said article "in cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him." Is A's contention tenable? Why? Answer A's contention is not tenable. The marriage of the offender to the offended party subsequent to his conviction for seduction must be done in good faith in order to extinguish his criminal liability. (People v. Velasco, L-28081, Jan. 21, 1974). The conduct of the offender after the marriage, by abandoning the woman and leaving for parts unknown shows that he did not have any bonafide intention in making her his wife. (People v. Santiago, 51 Phil. 68). Such marriage can not extinguish his criminal liability nor remit the penalty imposed upon him.
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Crimes Against the Civil Status of Persons Art 347; Simulation of birth & Child trafficking under RA 7619 2002 No XI A childless couple, A and B, wanted to have a child they could call their own. C, an unwed mother, sold her newborn baby to them. Thereafter, A and B caused their names to be stated in the birth certificate of the child as his parents. This was done in connivance with the doctor who assisted in the delivery of C. What are the criminal liabilities, if any, of the couple A and B, C and the doctor? SUGGESTED ANSWER: The couple A and B, and the doctor shall be liable for the crime of simulation of birth, penalized under Article 347 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The act of making it appear in the birth certificate of a child that the persons named therein are the parents of the child when they are not really the biological parents of said child constitutes the crime of simulation of birth. C, the unwed mother is criminally liable for "child trafficking", a violation of Article IV, Sec. 7 of Rep. Act No. 7610. The law punishes inter alia the act of buying and selling of a child. ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: The couple A and B, the unwed mother C, and the doctor being all involved in the simulation of birth of the newborn child, violate Rep. Act No. 7610. Their acts constitute child trafficking which are penalized under Article IV of said law. Art 349; Bigamy 1981 No. 14 "A" is a Bureau of Internal Revenue Agent assigned in San Fernando, Pampanga. On January 5, 1955, he married "B" before the Municipal Judge of that town. On December 1, 1960, he was transferred to Cagayan de Oro City and left his wife with her parents in San Fernando On October 5, 1965, he married "C" before a Minister of the Iglesia ni Kristo in Cagayan de Oro City. "B" learned of the second marriage, so she filed a case for Bigamy against "A". During the pendency of the case in the Court of First Instance, "B" died. Convicted by the Court, "A" appealed and assigned two errors: (1) that the Information against him is defective because it did not include "C" as a codefendant; and (2) that the trial Court erred in convicting him after the death of "B", since at that time there was no longer any impediment to his marriage to "C". Are the assigned errors of "A" meritorious? Why? Answer The assigned errors are not meritorious. 1} The information against "A" is not defective because it did not include "C" as co-defendant. Bigamy is not similar to the crimes of adultery and concubinage, wherein. Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code specifically requires that the accused, if both are alive should be included in the information. In bigamy, which is a public crime, both the first and second spouses may be offended parties depending on the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused with' out being aware of his previous marriage. Only if the Page 329 of 374
second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in the information, which the facts of the problem, however, do not show (People vs. Nepomuceno, Jr., 64 SCRA 418). 2) The trial court did not err in convicting the accused after the death of "B" during the pendency of the case. When "A" married for the second time, his first marriage with "B" was still subsisting and, hence, he committed already the crime of bigamy. Such second marriage is not included in the exceptions provided in Article 83 of the Civil Code. There is no law which provides for the extinction of bigamy after the death of the first wife of the accused. (People vs. Reyes, CA 62 O.G. 1525). Art 349; Bigamy 1984 No. 18 While his wife was still living, A married C, single, in Hongkong. After living there for a couple of years, A and C returned to and settled in Manila. (a) Can A be prosecuted for bigamy? Why? (b) In any event, can A be prosecuted for any other crime? If so, what? How about C? Explain. Answer A.
Furnished by Office of Justice Palma
If A and C ceased to have any relation upon their return to the Philippines, they are not criminally liable for bigamy, because the second marriage was celebrated outside the country. On the assumption that upon returning to Manila, A and C lived together as husband and wife. A can be prosecuted for concubinage for cohabiting with a woman who is not his wife. C can also be prosecuted for the same offense, if she knew that A is married. B.
Comments and Suggested Answer
A cannot be prosecuted for bigamy because bigamous marriage was celebrated in Hongkong. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code do not have extra-territorial application to the crime of bigamy. (Art, 2, Revised Penal Code). Art 349; Bigamy 1985 No. 16 While in the United States sometime in 1975, Armand married Amparo. Because of violent repeated quarrels between them, Armand came back to Manila in 1979 and being lonesome, married Corina that same year. Amparo died in 1979, Two years thereafter, Armand got entangled with Delilah whom he married in Baguio in 1981. (A) Can Corina prosecute Armand for bigamy? (B) How about Delilah, can she likewise file a case of bigamy against Armand? Answer: (A) The facts of the problem do not indicate the specific date of the death of Amparo in 1979 nor the marriage of Armand to Corina in 1979. If the marriage with Corina was contracted before the death of Amparo, such marriage would be void for being bigamous. Corina cannot prosecute Armand for bigamy Page 330 of 374
because of his marriage to Delilah in 1981, since the prior subsisting marriage was void. If the marriage with Corina was entered into after the death of Amparo, such marriage would be valid. Corina then can prosecute Armand for bigamy regarding his marriage to Delilah in 1981 as it was contracted during the existence of a prior valid marriage. (B) Delilah cannot file a case of bigamy against Armand regarding his marriage with her in 1981 if the prior marriage with Corina was contracted before the death of Amparo as such marriage is void for being bigamous. If the marriage with Corina was entered into after the death of Amparo, then such marriage will be valid. Delilah then can prosecute Armand for bigamy in connection with his marriage with her in 1981. Art 349; Bigamy 1994 No. 18: Issa and Bobby, who were first cousins, were married in 1975. In 1993, Bobby was told that his marriage to Issa was incestous under the law then in force and therefore void ab initio. He married Caring. Charged with bigamy, Bobby raised the defense that his first marriage is void ab initio and therefore, there is no previous marriage to speak of. Will you sustain Bobby's defense? Answer; No. I will not sustain Bobby's defense, Bobby remarried in 1993, or after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, and therefore his capacity to marry in 1993 shall be governed by said Code. In Art. 40 of the Family Code, it is mandated that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage maybe invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. In short, there Is a need of a judicial declaration of such nullity before Bobby may validly remarry (Dorothy Terre vs. Jordan Terre, 211 SCRA 6). Art 349; Bigamy 1995 No. 2; Joe and Marcy were married in Batanes in 1955. After two years, Joe left Marcy and settled in Mindanao where he later met and married Linda on 12 June 1960. The second marriage was registered in the civil registry of Davao City three days after its celebration. On 10 October 1975 Marcy who remained in Batanes discovered the marriage of Joe to Linda. On 1 March 1976 Marcy filed a complaint for bigamy against Joe. The crime of bigamy prescribed in fifteen years computed from the day the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents. Joe raised the defense of prescription of the crime, more than fifteen years having elapsed from the celebration of the bigamous marriage up to the filing of Marcy's complaint. He contended that the registration of his second marriage in the civil registry of Davao City was constructive notice to the whole world of the celebration thereof thus binding upon Marcy. Has the crime of bigamy charged against Joe already prescribed? Discuss fully, Answer: No. The prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy is computed from the time the crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their Page 331 of 374
agents. The principle of constructive notice which ordinarily applies to land or property disputes should not be applied to the crime of bigamy, as marriage is not property. Thus when Marcy filed a complaint for bigamy on 7 March 1976, it was well within the reglamentary period as It was barely a few months from the time of discovery on 10 October 1975. (Sermonia vs. CA, 233 SCRA 155)
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Art 349; Bigamy 1996 No. 6: 2) Joselito married Ramona in July, 1995, only to learn later on that Ramona was previously married to David, from whom Ramona had been separated for more than ten years. Believing that his marriage to Ramona was an absolute nullity, Joselito contracted a subsequent marriage with Ana-belle. Can Joselito be prosecuted for bigamy? Explain. Answer: 2) Yes, Joselito can be prosecuted for bigamy for his subsequent marriage with Anabelle even though his marriage with Ramona was an absolute nullity. Despite the nullity of the first marriage, Joselito should have filed a case of dissolution of such marriage under Art. 40, Family Code, before contracting a second marriage with Anabelle. Art 350; Marriage contracted against the provisions of the marriage law 1993 No. 9: Tong and Theresa got married before a judge, Theresa is below 18 years old. Their marriage was effected because Theresa and her mother, Petra, at the instigation of Tong, assured the judge who solemnized the marriage ceremony, that Theresa was 19 years old and that her father was already dead. Upon Tong's prodding too, Petra gave her consent. The father of Theresa, who was actually not dead, heard of what took place. Not being content in only instituting an action for annulment of their marriage, he desired to prosecute Tong. The father consulted you for the purpose of filing a criminal action against Tong. With what crime would you charge Tong? Explain. Answer; Violation of Art. 350, RPC. Marriage contracted against the provisions of the marriage law. Art 350; Marriage contracted against the provisions of the marriage law 1985 No. 8 While his marriage to Sylvia was subsisting, Rollie took Cynthia, who had been legally separated from her husband, to Ramon Abad, who, in priestly attire and posing as Fr. Chavez of the Aglipayan Church, solemnized their marriage. After the marriage, Rollie took Cynthia to Baguio on a week-long honeymoon. As a fiscal and based on the foregoing facts, what charge or charges will you file and against whom? Discuss. Answer: As a fiscal, I will file a charge of Usurpation of Official Functions against Ramon Abad. He merely posed as a priest of the Aglipayan Church and was not therefore authorized to solemnize a marriage. Solemnization of a marriage is an official function. (U.S. v. Hernandez, 29 Phil. 109). Against Rollie, the charge will be a marriage contracted in contravention of law which is penalized in Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code as an Illegal Marriage, It cannot be bigamy as the marriage with Cynthia did not have all the essential requisites of a valid marriage, (People v. Peralta CA-GR No. 13130-R, June 30, 1955).
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Art 351; Premature marriages 1987 No. XIII: At the time Josefa's husband, Pedro Corpuz, died, she was eight months pregnant. As she was afraid she could not support her child with Pedro, Josefa accepted Pablo's proposal for marriage. One week after the marriage, Josefa gave birth to a boy whom they named, Pedro Corpuz, Jr. Prosecuted for contracting premature marriage under Act. 351 of the Revised Penal Code. She has engaged your services as a lawyer. How would you argue for her acquittal? Answer: I would argue for the acquittal of Josefa. She is not liable for contracting premature marriage under Article 351 of the Revised Penal Code. This article does not apply as Josefa knew she was pregnant (eight months) when Pedro Corpuz, her husband, died. When she married Pablo, and as a matter of fact, one week after the marriage, she gave birth to a boy the paternity of the child was not in doubt Article 351 punishes premature marriage in order to prevent doubtful paternity (People vs. Rosal 49 Phil. 539).
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Crimes Against Honor Art 353; Libel 1980 No XVIII "Z", a reporter of a certain daily newspaper known as "Bulalakaw", published an article concerning an account of a successful raid by two P.C. officers upon a gambling den and the arrest of several people. The article also stated that a certain Madame "X", the complainant, was among the persons arrested and that her name was stricken from the information. It turned out that the complainant was neither caught, arrested, nor prosecuted, hence, she instituted an action for libel against "Z". Will the charge against him prosper? Answer The charge of libel will not prosper. As long as the publicists of the news item was not prompted by ill-will or spite as there was intention to do harm, libel will not prosper because of the absence of malice. In Quisumbing vs. Lopez et al., 96 Phil. 510, the Supreme Court held that "newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance so as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and editors usually have to race with their deadlines, and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point for suppression for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of words." The ruling in the case of U.S. vs. Bostos et al., 37 Phil. 731 is more to the point, where it was held that "even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual". As long as good faith exists, libel cannot prosper. Art 353; Libel 1982 No. 4 "A" caused the publication in a newspaper of a news item wherein "A" stated that "B" had cheated him in a business deal and that the public was being warned against entering into any transaction with "B". The latter countered with a subsequent press release in the same newspaper to the effect that "A"'s allegations were not true and that "A" was a liar because it was "A" himself who cheated "B". The fiscal charged both "A" and "B" in separate informations for libel upon the complaint of "B" and the counter-charge of "A". Decide with reasons. Answer B's complaint should be sustained. His press release stating that the allegation of A that B cheated him in a business deal is not true and that A was a liar as it was A who cheated him altho defamatory is a fair and adequate answer to the libel uttered by A and is necessarily related to the imputation made by A. B only made an explanation and in doing so, uttered it in the same language that A did. This is self-defense in libel as the utterance is not excessive but adequate to repel the sting of the aspersion cast upon him by A. (People vs. Chua Hong, CA 61 O.G. 1932). On the other hand, A having initiated the libelous publication against B cannot escape criminal responsibility. All the elements of libel as to A are present, to wit: 1) defamation 2) malice
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3) publication 4) the person libeled is identifiable Art 353; Libel 1984 No. 16 A, the husband of B, informed & TV commentator, C, that his wife had complained that their youngest child who was allegedly extremely ill and on the verge of death was denied admission at the RX Hospital because B, his wife, could not put up the cash deposit required by the hospital. Without verifying said report, C, in his TV program, urged the closure by the authorities of RX Hospital for denying medical assistance to a dying child simply because the mother could not give a cash deposit. He added that the said hospital even refused to accept a check. It turned out however that the story was wrong. The sick child of A and B was never in critical condition, and there was no check involved in the incident. Subsequently, C was charged with libel. Decide the case with reasons. Answer A.
Furnished by Office of Justice Palma
C, is liable for libel because the imputation tend to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt on the hospital. It is not true that the conditions of the child was in a dying condition at the time. There was no check offered by way of deposit so the statement of C that the hospital refused to accept the check was false. The fact that C did not even verify the report makes his liability clear. B.
Comments and Suggested Answer
C is liable for libel. The imputation is defamatory as it tended to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt on the hospital. Malice in law, is therefore, presumed. It is not true that the child was extremely ill and on the verge of death nor is it true that the hospital refused to accept a check for the admission of the child. Without verifying the facts and urging the closure of the hospital by the authorities for denying medical admission to a dying child, the intent to cast aspersion and injury to reputation and standing of the hospital becomes manifest as it was done with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. Alternative Answer C is not liable for libel. In the TV program of C, what he did was to convey to the public what substantially was imparted to him by A that his wife told him that their child was denied admission to the hospital because B the wife of A could not put up a cash deposit. The facts of the problem do not show that such are false. And it cannot be assumed that C was motivated by spite, ill will or evil design against the hospital when he made the charge as the business of a hospital is coupled with public interest. As long as there is probable belief in the truth of the matter charged and the charge is made in good faith, the author cannot be liable for libel. (U.S. vs. Bustos et al 37 Phil. 737). Art 353; Libel 1985 No 20:
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What is LIBEL and what pertinence has malice in law and malice in fact in incurring criminal liability therefor? Discuss. Answer: Libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or a juridical person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. Malice in law is presumed from every defamatory imputation. When the imputation is defamatory, the prosecution need not prove malice. The law presumes that the defamation is malicious. This is malice in law. In a conditionally privileged communication, malice is not presumed. The prosecution must prove malice in fact for the conviction of the accused of libel involving qualifiedly privileged communication. This means that the accused was prompted by personal ill-will or spite and not in response to the performance of a duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed. Malice in fact is inconsistent with good motives and justifiable ends. Art 353; Libel 1988 No. 15: (a) Romeo Cunanan, publisher of the Baguio Daily, was sued by Pedro Aguas for libel for the public publication of his picture with the notice that; "This is to inform the public that Mr. Pedro Aguas whose picture appears above has ceased to be connected with the Sincere Insurance Company as underwriter as of December 31, 1987. Any transaction entered into by him after said date will not be honored." Is the publication defamatory? Explain briefly. Answer: (a) The publication is not defamatory because the element of intent to defame is absent. This is a mere announcement and does not carry any implication. Art 353; Libel 1986 No, 13: Atty. Roberto de Guzman is the Municipal Attorney of Taytay, Rizal. He was ordered by the mayor to investigate Soledad Rodriguez, an employee of the Treasurer's Office. The Mayor had received reports that Rodriguez was unable to account for P20,000 out of her total collections of P450,000 of certain municipal taxes. The mayor instructed de Guzman to report directly to him for the Mayor's evaluation of the investigation results. De Guzman conducted his investigation, interviewed Soledad Rodriguez and examined her books. De Guzman submitted his report, as instructed, to the Mayor. Asked by a news reporter of the Town Daily News on the contents of his report, de Guzman stated that upon the facts uncovered by him, he has found that Soledad Rodriguez had malversed public funds and that he has recommended the prosecution of Soledad Rodriguez for malversation. He admitted, however, that his findings were still being evaluated by the Mayor. Soledad Rodriguez filed a complaint against de Guzman for libel De Guzman, by way of defense, argued
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that his pronouncement was no more than a fair and true report without comments, by an official investigator, after an investigation conducted in the exercise of official functions. Is Atty. de Guzman liable for libel? Explain. Answer: Atty. de Guzman is not liable for libel. He divulged the contents of his report to the news reporter without malice. Such affected the conduct of a public officer which are related to the discharge of her duties. These are matters of public interest. The report was fair and true without any comments (People vs. Rico 3 CA Report 205). Art 353; Libel 2003 No XI. During a seminar workshop attended by government employees from the Bureau of Customs and the Bureau of Internal Revenue, A, the speaker, in the course of his lecture, lamented the fact that a great majority of those serving in said agencies were utterly dishonest and corrupt. The following morning, the whole group of employees in the two bureaus who attended the seminar, as complainants, filed a criminal complaint against A for uttering what the group claimed to be defamatory statements of the lecturer. in court, A filed a motion to quash the information, reciting fully the above facts, on the ground that no crime were committed. If you were the judge, how would you resolve the motion? 8% Suggested Answer: I would grant the motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, since there is no definite person or persons dishonored. The crime of libel or slander, is a crime against honor such that the person or persons dishonored must be identifiable even by innuendoes: otherwise the crime against honor is not committed. Moreover, A was not making a malicious imputation, but merely stating an opinion; he was delivering a lecture with no malice at all during a seminar workshop. Malice being inherently absent in the utterance, the statement is not actionable as defamatory. Art 353; Libel 2002 No XVII. A. A was nominated Secretary of a Department in the Executive Branch of the government. His nomination was thereafter submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. While the Commission was considering the nomination, a group of concerned citizens caused to be published in the newspapers a full-page statement objecting to A's appointment They alleged that A was a drug dependent, that he had several mistresses, and that he was corrupt, having accepted bribes or favors from parties transacting business in his previous office, and therefore he was unfit for the position to which he had been nominated. As a result of the publication, the nomination was not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The official sued the concerned citizens and the newspapers for libel and damages on account of his non-confirmation. How will you decide the case? (3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: I will acquit the concerned citizens and the newspapers involved, from the crime of libel, because obviously they made the denunciation out of a moral or social duty and thus there is absence of malice.
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Since A was a candidate for a very important public position of a Department Secretary, his moral, mental and physical fitness for the public trust in such position becomes a public concern as the interest of the public is at stake. It is pursuant to such concern that the denunciation was made; hence, bereft of malice. B. If defamatory imputations are made not by publication in the newspapers but by broadcast over the radio, do they constitute libel? Why? (2%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes, because libel may be committed by radio broadcast Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code punishes libel committed by means, among others, of radio broadcast, inasmuch as the broadcast made by radio is public and may be defamatory. Art 355; Libel by theatrical exhibition 1988 No. 9: b) In the course of proceeding during a so-called "public hearing held before a crowd in a place open to the public, the leaders of the meeting "tried" certain public officials and thereafter "sentenced" them to "death by assassination or ambuscades." Are the leaders criminally liable? Decide the case. Answer: b) The leaders are criminally liable for the crime of libel by theatrical exhibition. Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code provides: "libel by means of writing or similar means.— A libel committed by means of writing, printing lithography, engraving, radio, phornographs, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by prision correctional..". Art 358; Grave Oral defamation vs slander 1990 No. 6: a] Lando and Marco are candidates in the local elections. In his speeches Lando attacked his opponent Marco alleging that he is the son of Nanding. a robber and a thief who amassed his wealth through shady deals. May Marco file a case against Lando for grave oral defamation? State your reasons. b) Suppose Marco also delivered a speech stating therein that he had charged Lando of estafa through falsification in the Tanodbayan so much so that since his (Lando's) integrity is doubtful he should not be elected. May Marco also be held liable for grave oral defamation? State your reasons. Answer: a] Marco cannot file a case for grave oral defamation. If at all, he may file a case for light slander. In the case of People v. Laroga (40 O.G. 123), it was held that defamation in a political meeting, when feelings are running high and people could not think clearly, only amount to light slander. b) No, Marco cannot be held liable for grave oral defamation considering that Lando was merely stating what appears in a public record, referring to the exercise of a legal right to file suit. Moreover, his statement against Marco pertains to a person who is running for public office wherein a wider latitude is given. Page 339 of 374
Art 358; Oral defamation 1976 No. IV-b In the course of an angry demonstration by a group of some 20 to 30 persons led by X, who had been laid off allegedly by Y, several threats were hurled against the latter. Among the charges Y filed against X, one for oral defamation because of Y's alleged utterance of the words: Y, putano ina mo. Was X guilty of oral defamation? Reason. Answer X is not guilty of oral defamation. The utterance of “y, putang ina mo” is proof of the threats to make the same more emphatic and should not be taken in its literal sense and cannot constitute an independent offense from the several threats which the 20 to 30 persons led by X hurled against Y who allegedly laid them off, in the course of the angry demonstration. (Reyes v. People, L-2152829, March 28, 1969). Art 358; Oral defamation/slander 1993 No. 7: Because of a pendency of a labor dispute, two (2) belligerent labor unions had a confrontation in a picket line during which the President and the Secretary of one union shouted to the members and officers of the rival union composed of men and women, the following: "Mga supot, mga walang bayag, mga kabit ng Intsik, mga tuta, mga segunda mano." Are the President and the Secretary of said union liable for oral defamation/slander? Explain. Answer: No. The President and the Secretary of the Union are not liable for oral defamation or slander because there is no identity of the offended party. The individual defamed or slandered was not singled out (People us. Uy Tioco. 32 Phil. 624). Art 358; Slander 1996 No. 15: Pia, a bold actress living on top floor of a plush condominium in Makati City sunbathed naked at its penthouse every Sunday morning. She was unaware that the business executives holding office at the adjoining tall buildings reported to office every Sunday morning and, with the use of powerful binoculars, kept on gazing at her while she sunbathed. Eventually, her sunbathing became the talk of the town. 1) What crime, if any, did Pia commit? Explain, 2) What crime, if any, did the business executives commit? Explain. Answer: 1) Pia did not commit a crime, The felony closest to making Pia criminally liable is Grave Scandal, but then such act is not to be considered as highly scandalous and offensive against decency and good customs. In the first place, it was not done in a public place and within public knowledge or view. As a matter
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of fact it was discovered by the executives accidentally and they have to use binoculars to have public and full view of Pia sunbathing in the nude. 2) The business executives did not commit any crime. Their acts could not be acts of lasciviousness [as there was no overt lustful act), or slander, as the eventual talk of the town, resulting from her sunbathing, is not directly imputed to the business executives, and besides such topic is not intended to defame or put Pia to ridicule. Art 358; Slander 1988 No. 15: (b) For some time, bad blood had existed between the two families of Maria Razon and Judge Gadioma who were neighbors. First, there was a boundary dispute between them which was still pending in court. Maria's mother also filed an administrative complaint against the judge which was however dismissed. The Razons also felt intimidated by the position and alleged influence of their neighbor. Fanning fire to the situation was the practice of the Gadiomas of throwing garbage and animal excrement into the Razon's premises. In an explosion of anger, Maria called Judge Gadioma "land grabber", "shameless", and "hypocrite," What crime was committed by Maria, if any? Explain briefly. Answer: (b) Maria committed the crime of slander or slight defamation only because she was under the influence of anger. When Maria called Judge Gadioma a hypocrite and land grabber she imputed to him the commission of crimes. Art 359; Slander by deed vs maltreatment 1994 No. 2; 2) Distinguish slander by deed from maltreatment. Answer: 2) Slander by deed is a crime committed when a person publicly subjects another to an act intended or calculated to cast dishonor, discredit or contempt upon the latter. Absent the intent to cast dishonor, discredit, contempt, or insult to the offended party, the crime is only maltreatment under Art, 266. par. 3, where, by deed, an offender ill-treats another without causing injury. Art 363; Incriminatory machination 1977 No. III-b A police officer surreptitiously placed a marijuana cigarette in the breast pocket of the polo shirt of a student and then arrested the student for illegal possession of marijuana cigarette. For what crime or crimes will the police officer be liable? Reason fully. Answer The police officer will be liable for the complex crime of incriminatory machination with unlawful arrest. (People v. Alagao, et al., L-20721, April 30, 1966). The placing of marijuana cigarette in the breast pocket of the polo shirt of the student is incriminatory machination, which is "planting evidence". The arrest of the student for illegal possession of the marijuana cigarette is unlawful arrest.
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The two acts followed closely each other. Incriminatory machination is the means to commit unlawful arrest and is, therefore, a complex crime.
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Quasi-Offenses Art 365; imprudence & negligence 1983 No. 9 A jeep recklessly driven by A went out of control and hit the wall of a house and a bystander, wrecking the wall and injuring the person hit. In two separate informations, the driver was charged with damage to property thru reckless imprudence and slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. Was the charge proper? If you were the Fiscal, for what crimes would you prosecute A? Explain. Answer The charge is not proper. If I were the Fiscal I would prosecute A in a single information for the crimes of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and slight physical injuries. The essence of the quasi-offense of criminal negligence or imprudence lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that if intentionally done would be punishable as a felony. For the law punishes the negligent or imprudent act and not the result thereof. In other words, negligence or imprudence is the crime itself. So if two informations are filed, one for damage to property thru reckless imprudence and the other for slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence, and the offender is acquitted or convicted of the crime of slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence, such conviction or acquittal will constitute double jeopardy in the prosecution for damage to property thru reckless imprudence as such refers to the same act of reckless imprudence. (People vs. Buan (1968) 22 SCRA 1383 Buerano vs. Court of Appeals (1982) 115 SCRA 82) Alternative Answer — The charge is proper. A should be prosecuted for two informations, one for damage to property thru reckless imprudence and another for slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. A single information cannot be filed because the slight physical injuries had it been intentional would be a light felony. There is, therefore, no complex crime. The reckless imprudence is not the crime itself but only a means or modality to commit the crime. (People vs. Fallar 39 O.G. 1369; Lontoc, Jr. vs. Judge Gorgonio, L37396, April 30, 1979) Art 365; imprudence & negligence 1977 No. X-b In a children's party, G left his loaded and cocked pistol on a chair amidst children playing around to meet visitors. All of a sudden, the chair was bumped by a child being chased by his playmates, causing the pistol to fall on. the ground and fired. This created considerate shock and fear among the persons present thereat, especially the children, who scampered for safety. What crime, if any, was committed by G? State your reasons. Answer No crime is committed by G. Reckless negligence is present since G left his pistol loaded and cocked on a chair where there were children playing as there was a children's party (II Viada p. 629). G could have foreseen that any child might bump the chair while playing with others which was what actually happened. G failed to exercise the necessary precaution taking into consideration the place and the children present. But such reckless negligence is
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not punished because there is no material damage which is an element of the quasi-offense of reckless negligence. (Art 365, R.P.C.).
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Miscellaneous Corpus delicti 2000 No XVIII a)
Define "corpus delicti". (2%)
b)
What are the elements of "corpus delicti"? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: a) Corpus Delicti literally means "the body or substance of the crime" or the fact that a crime has been committed, but does not include the identity of the person who committed it. (People vs. Pascual 44 OG 2789). b)
Elements of corpus delicti:
The actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged. It is a compound fact made up of two things: 1) the existence of a certain act or result forming the basis of the criminal charge; and 2) the existence of a criminal agency as the cause of the act or result The identity of the offender is not a necessary element of corpus delicti Corpus delicti 2001 No XI At a birthday party in Bogo. Cebu, A got intoxicated and started quarrelling with B and C. At the height of their arguments, A left and took a bolo from his house, after which he returned to the party and threatened to stab everybody. B got scared and ran towards the seashore, with A chasing him, B ran up a steep incline along the shore and was cornered on top of a cliff. Out of fear, B jumped from the cliff into the sea, A returned to the scene of their confrontation and seeing that nobody was there, went home to sleep. The next day, B's wife reported to the police station that her husband had not yet come home. A search was conducted by the residents of the barangay but after almost two days, B or his body could not be located and his disappearance continued for the next few days. Based on the testimony of C and other guests, who had seen A and B on top of the cliff, A was arrested and charged with Murder. In his defense, he claimed that since B's body has not been found, there was no evidence of "corpus delicti' and therefore, he should be acquitted. Is the defense of A tenable or not? State the reason(s) for your answer. (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: The defense of A is not tenable. "Corpus delicti" does not refer to the body of the purported victim which had not been found. Even without the body of the purported victim being found, the offender can be convicted when the facts and circumstances of a crime, the body of the crime or "corpus delicti" is established. In other words, the non-recovery of the body of the victim is not a bar to the prosecution of A for Murder, but the fact of death and identity of the victim must be established beyond reasonable doubt. Entrapment 1990 No. 14:
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Rodolfo is an informer who told the police authorities that Aldo is a drug pusher. Policeman Taba then posed as a buyer and persuaded Aldo to sell marijuana worth P10.00 to the former. Aldo agreed. He delivered the goods and so was apprehended with the marked money. He is now prosecuted for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. a) Aldo's defense is that he was the victim of an instigation of the police who persuaded him to sell the goods to him. Decide the case with reasons. Answer: a) Aldo's defense in untenable as what happened here was entrapment. With or without the act of Policemen Taba, Aldo would have went on selling the marijuana to another buyer. The finding, it must be noted, was that Aldo was continuously engaged in the act of pushing drugs. (People v. Tia, 51 O.G. 1863). Alternative Answer: This is a case of instigation because Aldo was persuaded by Policeman Taba, who was posing as buyer, to sell marijuana. Entrapment vs instigation 1978 No. II-d Distinguish entrapment from instigation. Give an example of each. Do they constitute defenses to criminal prosecutions? Explain. Answer In instigation, the instigator practically induces an innocent person who is the would-be accused into the commission of the crime and himself becomes a principal. In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and arresting the law-breaker in the execution of his criminal plan (People vs. Galicia, 40 O.G. 4476). Example of Instigation — A policeman, representing himself to be a private person engaged in gambling, approached the accused and induced him to look for a place where they could smoke opium. The policeman saw the accused three times to convince him of his desire to smoke opium. Because of his insistence, the accused after some efforts, was able to look for such a place, where both of them went. The policeman received from the owner of the place the opium pipe to be used by him and the accused. After a while, upon some pretext, the policeman left the place, then returned, and arrested the accused for smoking opium. The accused cannot be criminally held liable as he was instigated to commit the crime (U.S. vs. Phelps, 16 440). Example of entrapment — The accused had a shipment of opium to be landed in Cebu which he imported from Hongkong. He informed the Chief of the Customs Secret Service in Cebu about the shipment, who pretended to remove all difficulties for the landing of the contraband. When the accused started landing the opium, he was arrested by the Customs authorities. The accused is criminally liable. When the Secret Service Chief pretended to smooth the way for the land of the opium, the accused had already made the importation of the opium, which is an indictable offense. He was not induced to import the said opium. What the Secret Service Chief did was merely to resort to a means to facilitate the arrest of the accused. Instigation is exempting because it is against public policy. The crime would not have been committed were it not for the instigation. On the other hand,
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entrapment is not an absolutory cause and is not a bar to the prosecution and conviction of the offender. In entrapment, a crime has already been committed, and ways and means are merely resorted to trap and arrest the offender. Entrapment vs instigation 1995 No. 9: 1. Distinguished entrapment from Instigation. Discuss fully, 2. Suspecting that Juan was a drug pusher, SPO2 Mercado, leader of the Narcom team, gave Juan a Pl00-bill and asked him to buy some marijuana cigarettes. Desirous of pleasing SPO2 Mercado, Juan went inside the shopping mall while the officer waited at the corner of the mall. After fifteen minutes, Juan returned with ten sticks of marijuana cigarettes which he gave to SPO2 Mercado who thereupon placed Juan under arrest and charged him with violation of The Dangerous Drugs Law by selling marijuana cigarettes. Is Juan guilty of any offense punishable under The Dangerous Drugs Act? Discuss fully. Answer; 1. In instigation, the Instigator practically induces the prospective accused into commission of the offense and himself becomes co-principal. In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker while executing his criminal plan. 2, Juan cannot be charged of any offense punishable under The Dangerous Drugs Act Although Juan is a suspected drug pusher, he cannot be charged on the basis of a mere suspicion. By providing the money with which to buy marijuana cigarettes, SPO2 Mercado practically induced and prodded Juan to commit the offense of illegal possession of marijuana. Set against the facts instigation is a valid defense available to Juan. Entrapment vs instigation 2003 No VII. Distinguish fully between entrapment and instigation in Criminal Law, Exemplify each. 4% SUGGESTED ANSWER: In entrapment 1) the criminal design originates from and is already in the mind of the lawbreaker even before entrapment; 2} the law enforcers resort to ways and means for the purpose of capturing the lawbreaker in flagrante delicto- and 3) this circumstance is no bar to prosecution and conviction of the lawbreaker. In instigation1) the idea and design to bring about the commission of the crime originated and developed in the mind of the law enforcers; 2) the law enforcers induce, lure, or incite a person who is not minded to commit a crime and would not otherwise commit it, into committing the crime; and
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3) this circumstance absolves the accused from criminal liability (People v. Dante Marcos, 185 SCRA 154. [1990]). Example of entrapment: A, an anti-narcotic agent of the Government acted as a poseur buyer of shabu and negotiated with B, a suspected drug pusher who is unaware that A is a police officer. A then issued marked money to B who handed a sachet of shabu to B. Thereupon, A signaled his anti-narcotic team to close-in and arrest B. This is a case of entrapment because the criminal mind is in B already when A transacted with him. Example of Instigation: Because the members of an anti-narcotic team are already known to drug pushers. A, the team leader, approached and persuaded B to act as a buyer of shabu and transact with C, the suspected drug pusher. For the purpose, A gave B marked money to be used in buying shabu from C. After C handed the sachet of shabu to B and the latter handed the marked money to C, the team closed-in and placed B and C under arrest. Under the facts, B is not criminally liable for his participation in the transaction because he was acting only under instigation by the law enforcers. Entrapment vs instigation 1984 No. 3 From the viewpoint of the accused, is it essential to make a distinction between instigation and entrapment? Explain its legal significance. Answer: A.
Furnished by Office of Justice Palma
Yes. In entrapment, ways and means are effected to trap the offender, while in instigation, the instigator induces another to commit a crime; thus he himself becomes a co-principal. Entrapment is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the offender, while instigation is. B.
Comments and Suggested Answer
From the viewpoint of the accused, it is essential to make a distinction between instigation and entrapment. The reason it that instigation is exempting whereas entrapment is not exempting nor mitigating. Instigation takes place when a peace officer induces a person to commit a crime. Without the inducement, the crime would not be committed. For reason of public policy, it is exempting; otherwise, the peace officer would be a co-principal. The instigator must not be a private person. In the case of entrapment, ways and means are devised by a peace officer to trap or capture a person who has committed a crime. With or without the entrapment, the crime has been committed already. Hence, it is not a bar to the prosecution of the offender. (People vs. Valmores et al L 58635, June 24, 1983 122 SCRA 922) Entrapment vs instigation 1985 No. 3 DD, a member of the National Bureau of Investigation, was approached by his compadre, EE, regarding the latter's plan to hold-up a nearby bank. DD agreed to lend his car as the get-away car; he also asked his driver, FF, to drive Page 348 of 374
the car for EE. On the day the crime was to take place, DD tipped off the local police. EE was arrested as he pointed a gun at the bank teller demanding cash: (A)
Can EE raise the defense of instigation by DD? Discuss.
(B)
Did DD incur any liability? Discuss. Answer:
(A) EE cannot raise the defense of instigation by DD. Instigation takes place when a peace officer in the performance of duties induces a person to commit a crime. The reason why the crime is committed is because of the inducement. The facts of the problem are clear that DD did not induce nor instigate EE to plan the hold up of the bank. The plan was already conceived by EE when he approached DD. When DD agreed to the plan by lending EE his car. as a get-away vehicle and his driver to drive it for EE, he devised a way to facilitate the apprehension of EE, as when DD in fact tipped off the local police on the day the crime was to take place. This is not a case when an innocent person is induced to commit a crime merely to prosecute him. It is simply a trap to catch a criminal. (People v Valmores et al 122 SCRA 922 1983), (B) DD is not criminally liable. His agreeing to the plan of EE to hold up the bank is merely a way to trap or facilitate the arrest of EE. This is evident when DD tipped off the police on the day when the crime is to be committed. DD acted in the performance of his duties as an officer of the law to entrap EE. Entrapment; Warrantless arrest; right against self-incrimination; presentation of informer 1992 No. 8: Members of the Narcotics Command, upon learning from an informer that Tee Moy, notorious drug lord was plying his trade and selling methamphetamine hydrocholide (popularly known as shabu) in a motel at Bambang St., planned a buy-bust operation to capture him. Camotes was to enter the lobby of the motel where Tee Moy hangs around and pose as buyer. The moment the drug vendor hands the drug to him, Camotes would scratch his ear as a signal to his companions deployed near the motel entrance. So Camotes, upon espying Tee Moy near the registration desk, approached the latter. When asked if he would like a "score", he answered in the affirmative. He was then handed a matchbox with the assurance that it contained the drug, for which he gave a P100.00 marked bill. Upon giving the pre-arranged signal, the NARCOM agents rushed inside and arrested Tee Moy. In the course of time, Tee Moy was prosecuted for the crimes of possession and sale of prohibited drugs under the Dangerous Drugs Act. During the trial, his counsel interposed the following defenses: a) The arrest, having been effected without a warrant of arrest, was violative of Tee Moy's constitutional rights. b) Accused was the victim of a frame-up instigated by the law enforcement officers, such that he was practically forced to sell his goods to a total stranger which was abnormal and unrealistic for one in the kind of business he is in. c) The prosecution deliberately failed to present the informer as a witness so that he could have been subjected to cross-examination by the counsel for the accused.
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d) Tee Moy cannot be prosecuted for the separate offenses of possession and sale of prohibited drugs but of only one criminal offense. e) Tee Moy was made to sign a Confiscation Receipt at NARCOM headquarters which has been admitted as evidence against him, thus violating his constitutional right against self-incrimination. If you were the prosecutor, how would you traverse the above arguments of counsel for the accused? Take up each number separately. Suggested Answer: a) There is no need for a warrant of arrest, as this falls under the instances of warrantless arrest sanctioned by law, where a public officer or private individual may arrest a person if, in his personal presence, the person arrested is actually committing, is about to commit, or has just committed a crime. b) This is a pure case of entrapment as Tee Moy has already decided to commit a crime and the agents of persons in authority merely devised ways and means to entrap him. There was no inducement of Tee Moy as the latter precisely decided to make a "score" or sale. No pressure or investigation was applied on him. c) Failure to present the informer is not fatal to the cause of the prosecution as the testimony of the latter will be merely corroborative to the testimony of the other witnesses who were eye-witnesses to the commission of the crime. There are sufficient evidence to convict the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Judgments; Finality of judgments; effect thereof 1987 No XV: Jose, Pedro and Juan, robbed ABC Bank of P200,000 and using a stolen car, immediately proceeded to Quezon City. The police recovered the money and the car. After the trial, during which the bank lawyer intervened as private prosecutor, the court convicted Jose, Pedro and Juan of robbery and ordered the forfeiture of the money (P200,000.00) and the car in favor of the government as proceeds and instrument of the crime, respectively. The bank lawyer received copy of the judgment, but did not do anything. Jose, Pedro and Juan did not appeal the judgment, and began service of sentence. Two months later, realizing that the court did not order the return of the money to the bank, the bank lawyer filed a motion for modification of the judgment and prayed that the money be ordered returned to the bank. Two months later, Armando, the owner of the stolen car, learned of the judgment even much later. He comes to you seeking your well considered opinion on whether it is still possible to recover his car. (a) As legal counsel, what will you tell him? Explain briefly. (b) Under the facts given, would the bank be entitled to the return of the money? Why? Answer: b) The motion of the bank lawyer for the modification of the judgment with the prayer that the money be ordered returned to the bank must be denied. The judgment is already final and so the court has no more "jurisdiction" over the case (People vs. Velez 15, SCRA 26). Judgments; Modification of judgment as to damages after finality Page 350 of 374
1991 No. 13: b) Jose Lopez was convicted for the crime of serious physical injuries and, taking Into account two (2) mitigating circumstances, was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four (4) months and twenty (20) days, and to indemnify the victim in the amount of P25,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages. He applied for probation, which was granted by the court; however, the order of probation directed him to pay in installment, at the rate of P1,000.00 a month, the damages awarded to the offended party. Jose was able to pay only three (3) monthly installments. Because of such failure, the offended party filed a motion for the execution of the civil aspect of the decision. a) Is the order directing the payment of the damages in installment valid? Did it not modify the decision after it had become final? b)
Should the motion for execution be granted?
Answer: a) Yes, the order directing payment in installment is proper. It did not modify the final decision but only in the manner of its execution. (Similarly situated in the case of Agustin vs. Court of Appeals). b) Execution should be granted as the decision is final and executory, following the dissenting opinion of Justice I. Cruz in said case.
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Special Penal Laws Anti-wire tapping act 1993 No. 16: C told his lawyer, Atty. T, to settle the criminal case he filed against L, and so Atty. T called up through telephone L, and informed him that C is willing to have the case dismissed provided that L pays P8,000.00 and makes a public apology. L told Atty. T to call him up the following day as he would consult his lawyer. The following day when Atty. T called up L, the latter requested his lawyer Atty. X, who was in his (L's) office at that time, to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension. When the P8,000.00 agreed upon on the telephone was delivered to Atty. T at the appointed place and time, he (Atty, T) was arrested by the police for Robbery/Extortion on complaint of L who was accompanied by his lawyer, Atty. X. Atty. X executed an affidavit stating that he heard Atty. T demanding P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the criminal complaint through a telephone extension. On the basis of this affidavit, Atty, T filed a criminal complaint against Atty. X and L for violation of sec. 1 of RA. No. 4200, otherwise known as the AntiWire Tapping Act. which says: "It shall be unlawful for any person not being authorized by all the parties to any private conversation or spoken word to tap any wire or cable or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as dictaphone or dictograph or detectaphone, walkie talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described." If you were the Judge, would you convict or acquit L and his lawyer, Atty. X? Support your decision with reasons. Answer: No, because it is a telephone extension and those enumerated by law means an extension with permanent recording of which a telephone extension is not. (Gaanan vs. IAC, 145 SCRA 112) Carnapping 1993 No. 19: Dodoy, possessing only a student driver's permit, found a parked car with the key left in the ignition, he proceeded to drive it away, intending to sell it. Just then Ting, the owner of the car, arrived. Failing to make Dodoy stop. Ting boarded a taxi and pursued Dodoy, who In his haste to escape, and because of his inexperience, violently collided with a jeepney full of passengers. The jeepney overturned and was wrecked. One passenger was killed; the leg of the other passenger was crushed and had to be amputated. The car of Ting was damaged to the tune of P20,000.00. What offense or offenses may Dodoy be charged with? Discuss. Answer: Consummated carnapping. Homicide, Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property resulting from reckless imprudence.
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Please take note that with respect to Espiritu Case, taking hold of the object is enough to consummate the crime; although in the Dirio case, it is still frustrated because there is inability to dispose freely the object.
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Carnapping 1998 No VI Samuel, a tricycle driver, plied his usual route using a Honda motorcycle with a sidecar. One evening. Raul rode on the sidecar, poked a knife at Samuel and instructed him to go near the bridge. Upon reaching the bridge, Raul alighted from the motorcycle and suddenly stabbed Samuel several times until he was dead. Raul fled from the scene taking the motorcycle with him. What crime or crimes did Raul commit? |5%] Answer: Raul committed the composite crime of Carnapping with homicide under Sec. 14 of Rep. Act No. 6539, as amended, considering that the killing "in the course or "on the occasion of a carnapping (People vs. De la Cruz, et al. 183 SCRA 763). A motorcycle is included in the definition of a "motor vehicle" in said Rep. Act, also known as the 'Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972'. There is no apparent motive for the killing of the tricycle driver but for Raul to be able to take the motorcycle. The fact that the tricycle driver was killed brings about the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Alternative Answer: The crime committed by Raul is carnapping, punished by Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 6539. The killing of Samuel is not a separate crime but only an aggravating circumstance. Child abuse; RA 7610 1993 No. 5: Sometime in December, 1992, retired Lt. Col. Agaton, celebrating the first year of his compulsory retirement from the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had in his company a fourteen (14) year-old girl whose parents were killed by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and being totally orphaned has been living or fending for herself in the streets in Manila, They were alone in one room in a beach resort and stayed there for two (2) nights. No sexual intercourse took place between them. Before they parted, retired Lt. Col. Agaton gave the girl P1,000.00 for her services. She gladly accepted it. 1) What crime may the retired colonel be charged with, if any? Discuss. 2) What possible defenses can he interpose? Explain. Answer: 1) The retired colonel may be charged with child abuse, in violation of Rep. Act 7610, a law providing special protection against child abuse, exploitation, and discrimination. One of the acts of child abuse or exploitation penalized under Article VI of RA 7610 is that of keeping company of a minor who is ten (10) years or more younger than the offender in a hotel, motel, beer house, disco joint, pension house, cabaret, sauna or massage parlor, beach resort, and similar places. Considering that Lt. Col. Agaton is a retiree pursuant to a compulsory retirement, while the child he kept company within a private room in the beach resort, is only 14 years old, there must be an age difference of more than 10 years between them. This fact plus the circumstance that Lt. Col. Agaton stayed with the child, a girl, in one room at such beach resort for two nights, and thereafter he gave her P1,000.00 "for her services", constitutes the very evil punished, among other acts, in said law. Page 354 of 374
2) The possible defenses Lt. Col. Agaton may Interpose are that the child is related to him by affinity, or by consanguinity within the fourth degree, or by a bond recognized in law, or local customs and traditions, or that he was only acting in pursuance of a moral, social, or legal duty (Sec. 10(b), Art. VI, RA 7610), Dangerous Drugs Act 1990 No. 14: Rodolfo is an informer who told the police authorities that Aldo is a drug pusher. Policeman Taba then posed as a buyer and persuaded Aldo to sell marijuana worth P10.00 to the former. Aldo agreed. He delivered the goods and so was apprehended with the marked money. He is now prosecuted for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. a) Aldo's defense is that he was the victim of an instigation of the police who persuaded him to sell the goods to him. Decide the case with reasons. b) Suppose policeman Taba told Aldo that he (Taba) has a supply of marijuana and he persuaded Aldo to sell it to him because he (Taba) needed the money badly. Aldo succeeded in selling P20.00 worth of marijuana to Moye, What is the criminal liability of Aldo if apprehended in the act? Explain. Answer: b) Aldo is liable for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act (RA No, 6425, as amended) in performing the act of selling narcotics. Dangerous Drugs Act 1993 No. 13: Manny was apprehended In a buy-bust operation during which one (1) deck of shabu (methamphetamine hydro-chloride) was delivered by him to the policeman posing as buyer and another deck of shabu was taken from his pocket after his body was frisked before he was actually brought to the police precinct. Convicted of violating sections 15 (sale and distribution of regulated drugs] and 16 (possession or use of regulated drugs] of the Dangerous Drugs Law, he was sentenced to thirty (30) years of life Imprisonment and payment of a fine of P20,000.00 (for violating sec. 15) and to imprisonment of eight (8) years and payment of fine of P6,000.00 (for violating sec. 16). He then sought the reversal of the decision, on the following grounds: First, he could not be convicted of having violated sec. 15 because he has not yet received the money from the buyer and the sale is not yet consummated; Second, his conviction under sec. 16 is erroneous because his possession of shabu Is absorbed in the charge of illegal sale or delivery; and Third, it is unbelievable that he would sell the confiscated shabu in a sarisari store near the national road open to the public view and to a stranger. 1) If you were the Solicitor General, how would you rebut the arguments of the accused? Discuss fully. 2)
Give your comment with regard to the penalties imposed.
Answer: 1) Manny is liable. transport or distribute".
The law provides, "shall sell, dispense, deliver,
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2) Yes. he is also liable because the shabu taken from his possession or pocket is different from the shabu he was to deliver to the seller. 3) As to the third reason, it is not unbelievable because although it is a public place, this kind of sale can always be clandestinely be made. [People vs. Rey Bernardino, Jan. 28, 1991) With respect to the penalty imposed, life imprisonment should not be limited to 30 years; and 8 years is wrong, it should be indeterminate. (People us. Angeles, because of Eliginio vs. Alvarez (1992) Dangerous Drugs Act 1998 No IX. Superintendent Al Santiago, Chief of the Narcotics Division, Western Police District, received information that a certain Lee Lay of-No. 8 Tindalo Street, Tondo, Manila is a member of the 14K Gang selling shabu and marijuana. SPOl Lorenzo and SPO3 Peralta were instructed to conduct surveillance and buy-bust operations against Lay. Their informant contacted Lay and a meeting was arranged at T. Pinpin Restaurant at 2:00 in the afternoon on February 14, 1993. SPO1 Lorenzo and SPO3 Peralta, acting as poseur-buyers, purchased from Lay 10 sticks of marijuana and paid P500. Later, Lay agreed to sell to them one kilo of dried marijuana fruiting tops which he gave them at his residence. The policemen arrested Lay and a search was conducted. Found were 356 grams of marijuana seeds, 932 grams of marijuana fruiting tops and 50 sticks of marijuana cigarettes. What offense or offenses did Lay commit? [5%] Answer: Lay committed the offenses of illegal selling of dangerous drugs and illegal possession of dangerous drugs which should be made subject of separate informations. The crime of illegal selling of dangerous drugs is committed as regards the 10 sticks of marijuana and as regards the one (1) kilo of dried marijuana fruiting tops, which should be subject of two (2) separate informations because the acts were committed at different times and in different places. The crime of Illegal possession of dangerous drugs is committed as regards the marijuana seeds, marijuana fruiting tops and marijuana cigarettes which are not the subject of the sale. Another Information shall be filed for this. Dangerous Drugs Act 2000 No XIII b) At about 9 o'clock in the morning, a Narcom Group laid a plan to entrap and apprehend A, a long suspected drug dealer, through a "buy-bust" operation. At the appointed time, the poseur-buyer approached A who was then with B. A marked P100 bill was handed over to A who in turn, gave the poseur-buyer one (1) tea bag of marijuana leaves. The members of the team, who were then positioned behind thick leaves, closed in but evidently were not swift enough since A and B were able to run away. Two days later, A was arrested in connection with another incident. It appears that during the operations, the police officers were not able to seize the marked money but were able to get possession of the marijuana tea bag. A was subsequently prosecuted for violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the
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Dangerous Drugs Act, During the trial, the marked money was not presented. Can A be held liable? Explain. (2%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: b) Yes. A can be held liable. The absence of the marked money will not create a hiatus in the prosecution's evidence as long as the sale of the dangerous drugs is adequately proven and the drug subject of the transaction is presented before the court. There was a perfected contract of sale of the drug (People vs. Ong Co, 245 SCRA 733; People vs. Zervoulakos, 241 SCRA 625). Dangerous Drugs Act; availability of plea bargaining 1998 No XIII. 2. Edgardo was charged with importation of prohibited drugs in an information filed with the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City on June 4, 1994. The offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Can Edgardo avail of plea-bargaining? [2%] Answer: 2. No, Edgardo cannot avail of plea-bargaining because the imposable penalty for his violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No. 6425. as amended) is reclusion perpetua to death. Section 20-A expressly provides that plea-bargaining shall not be allowed where the imposable penalty for the violation of said law is reclusion perpetua to death. (Sec. 20-A, R.A. No. 6425, as amended). Dangerous Drugs Act; consummation of sale 1996 No. 3 2) Pat. Buensuceso, posing as a buyer, approached Ronnie, a suspected drug pusher, and offered to buy P300 worth of shabu. Ronnie then left, came back five minutes later and handed Pat, Buensuceso an aluminum foil containing the shabu. However, before Pat, Buensuceso was able to deliver the marked money to Ronnie, the latter spotted a policeman at a distance, whom Ronnie knew to be connected with the Narcotics Command of the Police. Upon seeing the latter, Ronnie ran away but was arrested thirty minutes later by other policemen who pursued him. Under the circumstances, would you consider the crime of sale of a prohibited drug already consummated? Explain. Answer: 2) Yes, the sale of prohibited drug is already consummated although the marked money was not yet delivered. When Ronnie handed the aluminum foil containing the shabu to Pat. Buensuceso pursuant to their agreed sale, the crime was consummated. Payment of the consideration is not an element of requisite of the crime. If ever, the marked money is only evidentiary to strengthen the case of the prosecution. Dangerous Drugs Act; criminal intent to posses 2002 No XX. A and his fiancee B were walking in the plaza when they met a group of policemen who had earlier been tipped off that A was in possession of prohibited drugs. Upon seeing the policemen and sensing that they were after him, A handed a sachet containing shabu to his fiancee B, telling her to hide it in her Page 357 of 374
handbag. The policemen saw B placing the sachet inside her handbag. If B was unaware that A was a drug user or pusher or that what was inside the sachet given to her was shabu, is she nonetheless liable under the Dangerous Drugs Act? (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: No. B will not be criminally liable because she is unaware that A was a drug user or pusher or of the content of the sachet handed to her by A, and therefore the criminal intent to possess the drug in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act is absent. There would be no basis to impute criminal liability to her in the absence of animus possidendi. Hazing 2002 No XVIII. A.
What is hazing as defined by law? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: Hazing, as defined by law, is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit, neophyte or applicant in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury. B.
What does the law require before initiation rites may be performed?
(3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 8049 (Anti-Hazing Law) requires that before hazing or initiation rites may be performed, notice to the school authorities or head of organizations shall be given seven (7) days before the conduct of such rites. The written notice shall indicate (a) the period of the initiation activities, not exceeding three (3) days; (b) the names of those to be subjected to such activities, and (c) an undertaking that no physical violence shall be employed by anybody during such initiation rites. Highway Robbery 2001 No VIII Police Sgt. Diego Chan, being a member of the Theft and Robbery Division of the Western Police District and assigned to the South Harbor, Manila, was privy to and more or less familiar with the schedules, routes and hours of the movements of container vans, as well as the mobile police patrols, from the pier area to the different export processing zones outside Metro Manila. From time to time, he gave valuable and detailed information on these matters to a group interested in those shipments in said container vans. On several instances, using the said information as their basis, the gang hijacked and pilfered the contents of the vans. Prior to their sale to "fences" in Banawe, Quezon City and Bangkal, Makati City, the gang Informs Sgt, Chan who then inspects the pilfered goods, makes his choice of the valuable items and disposes of them through his own sources or "fences". When the highjackers were traced on one occasion and arrested, upon custodial investigation, they implicated Sgt. Chan and the fiscal charged them all, including Sgt. Chan as co-principals. Sgt. Chan, in his defense, claimed that he should not be charged as a principal but only as an accessory
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after the fact under P.D. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and AntiHighway Robbery Act of 1972. Is the contention of Sgt. Chan valid and tenable? Explain, (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, the contention of Sgt. Chan is not valid or tenable because by express provision of P.O. 532, Section 4, a person who knowingly and in any manner, aids or protects highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them information about the movement of police officers or acquires or receives property taken by brigands, or who directly or indirectly abets the commission of highway robbery/brigandage, shall be considered as accomplice of the principal offenders and punished in accordance with the rules in the Revised Penal Code. ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: No, the contention of Sgt. Chan that he should be charged only as accessory after the fact is not tenable because he was a principal participant in the commission of the crime and in pursuing the criminal design. An accessory after the fact involves himself in the commission of a crime only after the crime had already been consummated, not before, For his criminal participation in the execution of the highjacking of the container vans, Sgt. Chan is a co-principal by indispensable cooperation. Hijacking 1975 No. XVII The accused hijacked an airplane and at gunpoint ordered the pilot to fly to Peking instead of to Davao, which was the plane's destination. Since the pilot refused, the accused shot him to death. Afterwards, the accused was overpowered by the crew and the co-pilot was able to fly the plane safely to Davao. What crime or crimes did the accused commit? Why? Answer The accused is liable for the offense of hijacking which is an act inimical to civil aviation, since he compelled unlawfully a change in the course of the plane to Davao, which was its destination, to Peking, while the plane was in flight. Under the law, it is not essential that the hijacker should succeed in his purpose. The offense is punishable by death since the accused fired upon the pilot causing his death, and therefore the offense is accompanied by murder as the pilot did not have any chance to defend himself. It is assumed that the plane is an aircraft of Philippine registry. (Secs, 1 and 2, Rep. Act No. 6235). Hijacking/ murder/ frustrated coercion 1978 No. VII-a A boarded a plane at the Manila Domestic Airport bound for Davao City. While the plane was still on the tarmac, its doors still open and waiting for the last passenger to board, A ordered the pilot P at gunpoint, to take the plane to Singapore. When P refused, A shot him to death. What offense/offenses did A commit? Discuss with reasons. Answer Frustrated coercion and murder. When the crimes were committed, the plane was not "in flight" as the doors were still open for embarkation. So, hijacking was not committed (Rep. Act No. 6235, Sec. 1). The facts are almost Page 359 of 374
similar to the facts of the case of People vs. Ang Chio Kio, 95 Phil. 475, where the accused was convicted of frustrated coercion because of the refusal of the pilot to comply with the order of the accused to take the plane to Amoy, China instead of to Aparri and murder, because the accused shot the pilot to death. Alternative Answer Murder because when the pilot was shot the plane was still in the tarmac and the engine had not yet started. Coercion could not be committed, or if all, would be incidental to the killing.
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Illegal possession of firearms 1975 No. I A shot and killed D with an unlicensed firearm. The Fiscal filed charges against A — one for Homicide and another for Illegal Possession of Firearm. The defense counsel contended that only one charge should have been filed —the complex crime of Homicide with Illegal Possession of Firearm as the use of the unlicensed firearm was a necessary means to commit the homicide. Is the contention meritorious? Why? Answer a) The contention of defense counsel is not meritorious, A complex crime refers only to felonies. (Art. 48, Revised Penal Code, People vs. Araneta, 48 Phil. 650). The offender will be liable for two crimes. One for homicide, which is a felony punished in the Revised Penal Code, and another for illegal possession of firearm, which is an offense punished in a special law. b) People vs. Alger, 92 Phil 227. Illegal possession of firearms 1998 No V. 1.
How is the crime of coup d'etat committed? [3%]
2. Supposing a public school teacher participated in a coup d'etat using an unlicensed firearm. What crime or crimes did he commit? [2%] Answer: 1.
The crime of coup d'etat is committed by ...
2. The public school teacher committed only coup d'etat for his participation therein. His use of an unlicensed firearm is absorbed in the coup d'etat under the new firearms law (Rep. Act No. 8294). A prosecution for illegal possession of firearm under the new law is allowed only if the unlicensed firearm was not used in the commission of another crime. Illegal possession of firearms 2000 No XIII a) A has long been wanted by the police authorities for various crimes committed by him. Acting on an information by a tipster, the police proceeded to an apartment where A was often seen. The tipster also warned the policemen that A was always armed. At the given address, a lady who introduced herself as the elder sister of A, opened the door and let the policemen in inside, the team found A sleeping on the floor. Immediately beside him was a clutch bag which, when opened, contained a .38 caliber paltik revolver and a hand grenade. After verification, the authorities discovered that A was not a licensed holder of the .38 caliber paltik revolver. As for the hand grenade, it was established that only military personnel are authorized to carry hand grenades. Subsequently, A was charged with the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. During trial, A maintained that the bag containing the unlicensed firearm and hand grenade belonged to A, his friend, and that he was not in actual possession thereof at the time he was arrested. Are the allegations meritorious? Explain. (3%) SUGGESTED ANSWER:
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a) A's allegations are not meritorious. Ownership is not an essential element of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession, which includes not only actual physical possession but also constructive possession where the firearm and explosive are subject to one's control and management. (People us. De Grecia, 233 SCRA 716; U.S. vs. Juan, 23 Phil. 105: People vs. Soyag, 110 Phil. 565). PD 46 1994 No. 19: Gino was appointed Collector of Customs and was assigned at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Gerry, an importer, hosted a dinner for 100 persons at the Westin Philippine Plaza in honor of Gino. What are the offense or offenses committed by Gino and Gerry? Answer; Both Gino and Gerry are liable for violation of Presidential Decree No. 46, which punishes any public official or employee who receives, directly or indirectly, and for private persons who give, offer any gift, present or valuable thing on any occasion, including Christmas, when such gift or valuable thing is given by reason of his official position, regardless of whether or not the same is for past favor or favors, or the giver hopes or expects to receive a favor or better treatment in the future. Being an importer, Gerry reasonably expects future favor from Gino. Included within the prohibition is the throwing of parties or entertainment in honor of the official or employee or of his immediate relatives. PD 46 1997 No. 16: A, who is the private complainant in a murder case pending before a Regional Trial Court Judge, gave a judge a Christmas gift, consisting of big basket of assorted canned goods and bottles of expensive wines, easily worth P10.000.00. The judge accepted the gift knowing it came from A. What crime or crimes, if any, were committed? Answer: The Judge committed the crime of Indirect bribery under Art. 211 of the Revised Penal Code. The gift was offered to the Judge by reason of his office. In addition, the Judge will be liable for the violation of P.D. 46 which punishes the receiving of gifts by pubic officials and employees on occasions like Christmas. PD 534; illegal fishing 1991 No 4: Two [2] Philippine National Police (PNP) officers. X and Y, on board on motorboat with Z, a civilian as motor-man, arrested A and B who were in a banca, for dynamite fishing. The latter's banca was towed towards the municipality. On the way, the PNP motorboat was intercepted by a third banca whose occupants, C, D, and E, tried to negotiate for the release of A and B and their banca. The PNP officers refused and instead shouted at C, D. and E that they are all under arrest. Thereupon, C, D, and E simultaneously threw dynamite sticks at the PNP motorboats. The first explosion killed X. A and B also reacted by throwing dynamite at the PNP motorboat: its explosion killed Y and Z. What crime or crimes did A, B, C, D and E commit? Page 362 of 374
Suggested Answer: C, D and E are liable for the complex crime of Murder, qualified by explosion, with direct assault for the death of X. A and B are liable for the complex crime of Murder Qualified by explosion as to death "of Y, and simple Murder qualified by explosion for the death of Z. No crime of direct assault can be filed insofar as the death of Z is concerned, he being a civilian. This, of course, assumes that there is no conspiracy among A, B, C, D and E, otherwise all would have the same criminal liability as the act of one becomes the act of all. Additional Answer: Firstly, A and B committed a violation of Pres. Decree No. 534 (on illegal fishing] as amended by Pres. Decree Nos. 704 and 1058. Fishing with the use of explosives is punishable under said Decree. PD 704 1996 No. 11 Upon a laboratory examination of the fish seized by the police and agents of the Fisheries Commission, it was Indubitably determined that the fish they were selling were caught with the use of explosives. Accordingly, the three vendors were criminally charged with the violation of Section 33 of P.D. 704 which makes it unlawful for any person to knowingly possess, deal in, or sell for profit any fish which have been illegally caught. During the trial, the three vendors claimed that they bought the fish from a fishing boat which they duly identified. The prosecution however claimed that the three vendors should nevertheless be held liable for the offense as they were the ones caught in possession of the fish illegally caught. On the basis of the above facts, if you were the judge, would you convict the three fish vendors? Explain. Answer: No, I would not convict the three fish vendors if I were the judge. Mere possession of such fish without knowledge of the fact that the same were caught with the use of explosives does not by itself render the seller-possessor criminally liable under P.D. 704. Although the act penalized in said Decree may be a malum prohibitum, the law punishes the possession, dealing in or selling of such fish only when "knowingly" done that the fish were caught with the use of explosives; hence criminal intent is essential. The claim by the fish vendors that they only bought the fish from fishing boats which they "duly identified", renders their possession of such fish innocent unless the prosecution could prove that they have knowledge that explosives were used in catching such fish, and the accused had knowledge thereof. PD 9; Illegal possession of bladed weapons 1980 No. XIII While "U", a 60-year-old barber, was sweeping the yard of his shop in a barrio, his cousin dropped by and left his bolo (cousin's) for safekeeping. "U" put the same behind a mirror in his barber shop. Later, "V" came around and threatened him by saying "come out old man and I'll kill you." It appears that they had a prior altercation relative to a grandson of "U". Page 363 of 374
Incensed, "U" got the bolo from behind the mirror and chased "V" for about 20 meters. At this point, a policeman intercepted "U", told the latter to put down his bolo and arrested him.. "U" was subsequently charged with Illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon under Presidential Decree No. 9 which makes it unlawful to carry outside of one's residence any bladed weapon except where such article is being used as a necessary implement to earn a livelihood. If you were the trial Judge, would you find "U" guilty of said crime? Answer If I were the judge, I would not find U guilty of illegal possession of deadly weapon under Presidential Decree No. 9. U got the bolo from behind the mirror in his barber shop to chase V who threatened him that he will kill" him. Presidential Decree No. 9, punishes the offense of carrying a bladed weapon outside of one's residence if not being used as a necessary implement to earn a livelihood either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos or public disorder. (People vs. Purisima,, 87 SCRA 542). The offense punished in Presidential Decree No. 9 is primarily linked with the political purposes with which martial law was declared. (Bermudez vs. Court of Appeals, L-417121, July 30, 1979) Plunder; prescription of crimes; prescription of right to recover properties 1993 No. 4 Through kickbacks, percentages or commissions and other fraudulent schemes /conveyances and taking advantage of his position, Andy, a former mayor of a suburban town, acquired assets amounting to P10 billion which is grossly disproportionate to his lawful income. Due to his influence and connections and despite knowledge by the authorities of his Ill-gotten wealth, he was charged with the crime of plunder only after twenty (20) years from his defeat in the last elections he participated in. 1) May Andy still be held criminally liable? Why? 2) Can the State still recover the properties and assets that he illegally acquired, the bulk of which is in the name of his wife and children? Reason out. Answer; 1) Andy will not be criminally liable because Section 6 of RA 7080 provides that the crime punishable under this Act shall prescribe in twenty years and the problem asked whether Andy can still be charged with the crime of plunder after 20 years, 2) Can the State still recover? Yes, because Section 6 provides that recovery of properties unlawfully acquired by public officers from them or their nominees or transferees shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel. RA 1379; prescriptive period for forfeiture 1990 No. 13 Maloling is a public official who resigned from the service on February 1, 1984. On February 15, 1990, the Solicitor General filed a petition in court for the forfeiture of the property of Maloling which was allegedly unlawfully acquired. a] If you were the counsel of Maloling, what defense or defenses would you interpose? Explain your answer. Page 364 of 374
b) Besides property unlawfully acquired found to be in the name of Maloling, what are the other properties not in his name which may nevertheless be considered unlawfully acquired? Explain your answer. Answer; a) I would interpose the defense of prescription as the right to file a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 Section 2 prescribes in four (4) years from the date of resignation. b) Property which may still be considered as unlawfully acquired, though not in the name of Maloling at the time of filing of the petition for forfeiture, shall include: 1) Property unlawfully acquired by the respondent but its ownership concealed by being recorded in the name of, or held by, the respondent's spouse, ascendants, descendants, relatives or any other person; and 2) Property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but transferred by him to another person/s. (RA. 1379 Section l(b)). RA 3019 1997 No. 20: A is charged with the crime defined in Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in an Information that reads: That from 01 to 30 January 1995, in the City of Pasig and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, being then employed in the Office of the District Engineer, Department of Public Works and Highways and in the discharge of his official administrative functions, did then and there willfully and unlawfully work for and facilitate the approval of B's claim for the payment of the price of his land which the government had expropriated, and after the claim was approved, the accused gave B only P1,000.00 of the approved claim of P5,000 and willfully and unlawfully appropriated for himself the balance of P4,000, thus causing undue injury to B and the Government." A has filed a motion to quash the information, contending that it does not charge an offense. Is he correct? Answer: Yes, the contention of A is correct. The information failed to allege that the undue injury to B and the government was caused by the accused's manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross Inexcusable negligence, which are necessary elements of the offense charged, ie., violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The accused is employed in the Office of the District Engineer of the DPWH. which has nothing to do with the determination and fixing of the price of the land expropriated, and for which expropriated land the Government is legally obligated to pay. There is no allegation In the information that the land was overpriced or that the payment of the amount was disadvantageous to the Government. It appears that the charge was solely based on the accused having followed up the payment for B's land which the Government has already appropriated, and that the accused eventually withheld for himself from the price of the said land, the amount of P4,000 for his services. No violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Act appears. At most, the accused should be merely charged administratively Alternative Answers:
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1. Yes, A is correct in filing a motion to quash the information because Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 applies only to officers and employees of government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions, and not to DPWH, which is not a government corporation. 2. A is not correct. In the case of Meforda vs. Sandiganbayan. 151 SCRA 399, which involves a substantially identical information as the Information quoted in the question, the Supreme Court held that the Information was valid. While it is true that the information quoted In the question, failed to allege evident bad faith, gross inexcusable negligence or manifest partiality, said Information Is nevertheless adequate because it averred the three (3) elements for the violation of Section 3(c) of RA. 3012 when it stated (1) that the accused is a public officer at the time of the commission of the crime, being employed in the Office of the District Engineer, DPWH; (2) that the accused caused undue Injury to B and the Government, with the statement that BT the owner of the land, received only P1,000.00 instead of the full value of P5,000.00; and (3) that in the discharge of A's official administrative functions, he "did then and there willfully and unlawfully work for and facilitate the approval of his claim xxx and "willfully and unlawfully appropriate for himself the balance of P4,000.00 x x x". An information need not employ or use the very words or language of the statute. It may also use words or language of similar import. RA 3019 1986 No. 15: Kabilugan, in January 1985, was appointed director of a bureau in one of the ministries of the government. In accordance with the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he filed his statement of assets and liabilities within thirty days after assuming office. In March, 1986, after the February political upheaval, Kabilugan fled the country, fearing that he would be investigated for a number of irregularities in his bureau. For his failure to file his statement of assets and liabilities on or before April 15, 1986, he was charged with violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. Kabilugan pleads that he. being abroad, it was impossible for him to prepare and file his statement of assets and liabilities. Is the charge against Kabilugan proper? Explain. Answer: The charge against Kabilugan is proper. The fact that he was abroad when he should file the statement of his assets and liabilities as required by law is not a valid excuse. Being a director of a bureau, under the Anti-Graft Law, the statement should have been filed with the Department Head by mail or thru the Office of the Philippine Ambassador abroad. RA 3019 1983 No. 14 A building contractor offered a bribe to an engineer employed in the Ministry of public Works and Highways. The latter refused the offer, not because of moral scruples but because he thought he was being entrapped. (a) What crime or crimes, if any, under the Revised Penal Code were committed and by whom? Give the basis of the liability or non-liability of both the building contractor and the engineer. (b) Did either or both offerer and offeree commit any offense under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act [Republic Act No. 3019}? Why?
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Answer b) Neither the offerer and the offeree can be held liable for any offense under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Act 3019), Sec. 4 (b) of the said law which punishes any person who knowingly induces or causes any public officer to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 of the law, will not apply. The problem does not specifically state that the contractor induced on caused the engineer to commit any of the acts enumerated in Section 3 of the law. RA 3019 1984 No. 17 A, a BIR examiner, was undertaking an examination of the tax liability of X under his 1983 income tax returns. When X learned that A's son who had just returned from the United States was going to be married, he sent through A a nofrost refrigerator as his wedding gift. What crime or crimes, if any, did A and/or X commit? Explain. Answer A. Furnished by Office of Justice Palma A and X are both guilty of violation of R.A. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act) which provided among others: "Sec. 3: Corrupt practice of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public office already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: "x xxxx "(b) directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift present, share, percentage, or benefit for himself or for any other party, wherein the public officer in his capacity has to intervene under the law. "x x x -x x "The person giving the gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit referred to in paragraphs (b) and (c) or offering or giving to the public officer the employment mentioned in paragraph (d) of this section, shall together with the offending public officer, be punished under Section nine (9) of this Act----" "Section 2 (c) of said law also provides that: "Receiving any gift" includes the act of accepting directly or indirectly a gift from a person other than a member of the public officer's immediate family, in behalf of himself or any member of his family or relative within the fourth civil degree, either by consanguinity or affinity even on the occasion of a family celebration or national festivity like Christmas, if the value of the gift is under the circumstances manifestly excessive." B. Comments and Suggested Answer A and X are both guilty under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. A, the BIR examiner is liable for "receiving the no-frost refrigerator as & wedding gift for his son, while he was undertaking an examination of the tax liability of X, the gift giver, under his 1983 income tax return. The Anti-graft law punishes the public officer for directly or indirectly receiving- a gift for himself or for any other party wherein the public officer in his capacity has to intervene under the law. (Sec. 3 b Art. 3019). The person giving the gift to the public officer is punished together with the public officer (Sec. 9 Art. 3019). Receiving any gift under the Anti-Graft Law includes the act of accepting a gift directly or indirectly from a person other than a member of the public officer's immediate family, in behalf of Page 367 of 374
himself or any member of his family x x even on the occasion of a family celebration or national festivity like Christmas, if the value of the gift is under the circumstances manifestly excessive. The no-frost refrigerator is certainly a very expensive item and if A was not a BIR examiner undertaking the examination of the income tax return of X at the time the wedding gift was given, certainly a gift that expensive would not have been given. RA 3019 1985 No. 13 Cris Vera, an influential member of the Sangguniang Panlunsod of Butuan City and a well-known radio commentator of the said place, addressed a written communication to Director Jose of Butuan City LTC, asking for the issuance of a "temporary permit" for a special trip to Ozamis City of a TPU jeepney belonging to Vera's relative which got involved in a vehicular collision with a private car in the latter's place. The purpose of the said request is to make it appear that the trip although not within the authorized route of the TPU jeepney's certificate of public convenience, was nevertheless authorized so as to enable the owner to recover on the insurance policy. Director Jose refused, fearful of the disastrous consequences. Thereafter, he was the subject of unsavory comments and furious attack by Cris Vera in his program. Director Jose then countered with a criminal complaint for violation of the Anti-Graft Law with the Tanodbayan against Cris Vera. Will the complaint prosper? Discuss with reasons. Answer: The criminal complaint against Cris Vera for violation of the Anti-Graft Law which was filed with the Tanodbayan will not prosper. The mere act of Cris Vera, an influential member of the Sangguniang Panlunsod of Butuan City and a wellknown radio commentator of addressing a letter to Director Jose of Butuan City LTC, asking for the issuance of a "temporary permit" for a special trip to Ozamis City of a TPU jeepney belonging to Vera's relative which got involved in a vehicular collision with a private car, is not "persuading, inducing or influencing" another public officer to perform an act in violation of the rules and regulations of the office. (Sec. 3 (a) Act. 3019), Generally to induce, persuade or influence is to give a price, reward or promise. It is essential that the accused should have acted for a consideration, payment or enumeration (People vs, Bornales 13 SCRA 972, 67 O.G. 8316). The fact that Director Jose was the subject of unsavory comments and furious attacks by Cris Vera in his radio program after the denial of the request, as its purpose was to enable the owner of the TPU to recover on the insurance policy, do not also constitute ''persuading or influencing" as there is no mention that the attacks were uttered due to the denial of such request for the issuance of the "temporary permit". RA 3019 1990 No. 9; a) Melda, who is the private secretary of Judge Tolits Naya. was persuaded by a litigant. Jumbo, to have his case calendared as early as possible for a consideration of P500. May she be held criminally liable for this accommodation? Explain your answer.
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b) What will be the criminal liability of Melda if she volunteered to persuade Judge Tolits Naya to rule in Jumbo's favor without asking any consideration? Explain your answer. Answer: a) The answer would depend/be qualified by the implication of the phrase "to have his case calendared as early as possible". If the phrase is interrupted as an unjust act and in violation of the rule to give priority to the older cases, then she would be liable under direct bribery for an act which does not constitute a crime but is unjust. He may also be held liable under Section 3(e) of RA. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended: "x x x giving any private party any unwarranted benefits". If you interpret the phrase as a non-violation of the rules and regulations then he can only be held liable for direct bribery. b) Melda is not criminally liable because the act of volunteering to persuade is not a criminal act. It is the act of persuading that is considered a criminal act. The act does not fall under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code on Direct Bribery nor does it fall under Article 211 of the RPC on Indirect Bribery. Neither does it fall under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 3(a) of RA. 3019 refers to acts of persuading another public official to violate rules and regulations. RA 3019 1991 No. 17: A, the Director of the Southern Islands Hospital in Cebu City, a government training hospital, instructed the withholding of the salaries of Y, one of the Medical Specialists of the hospital, for the months of January, February and March 1989 due to Vs failure to submit his daily time records, and his salary for the period 1 to 15 April 1989 which was the period covered by his application for sick leave which A disapproved when he found out that Y was not actually sick. A likewise ordered the removal of T's name from the plantilla because of the former's dissatisfaction with the services of the latter who continued teaching, even during office hours, In a medical college in Cebu City. Nevertheless, after Y submitted his daily time records in May 1989, his salaries were released. Also, his name was later re-included in the final plantilla. A was charged before the City Prosecutor's Office of Cebu City for violation of Section 3, paragraph (c) of RA No. 3019, as amended, which considers as among the corrupt practices of any public officer and declares unlawful the following: "causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving 'any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, x x x" If you were the Investigating prosecutor, how would you resolve the case? Answer: Liable, I will file the information as one of the corrupt practices is causing undue injury to any party, including the government due to evident bad faith, Sec. 3fe), RA No. 3019. Alternative Answer:
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The Director is not liable under Sec.3(e), RA 3019, because there was no "undue injury" suffered by Y. RA 3019; effect of reelection 1980 No. XIX On June 10, 1974, a Provincial Governor of a certain province bought a bulldozer valued at P200,000 out of provincial funds for the use and repair of provincial roads, when actually one could be bought for P100,000.00, which transaction was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to his province. In the last local elections, he ran for reelection. During the height of his political campaign, his opponents raised said questionable transaction as an issue before the electorate, but nonetheless, he was elected by a comfortable margin. Would his reelection be a bar to a prosecution for the crime committed prior to his reelection, for violating the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act? Answer The reelection of the Provincial Governor is not a bar to his prosecution for violating the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed prior to his reelection. Reelection cannot condone previous criminal acts of an elective official, punishable under the Anti-Graft law prior to his reelection. The doctrine established in the case of Pascual vs. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil. 466 and Lizares vs. Hechanova, 17 SCRA 58 that a reelected public officer is no longer answerable to administrative sanctions for acts committed by him during his former tenure does not apply to criminal prosecution under a special statute like the Anti-Graft Law. If after the reelection of a public officer, no crime committed by him prior thereto becomes punishable, even if it has not yet prescribed, will be patently offensive to the objectives and letter of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, (Luciano vs. Provincial Governor, 28 SCRA 617). RA 3019; meaning of public officer 2003 No XV. The Central Bank (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas}, by a resolution of the monetary board, hires Theof Sto Tomas, a retired manager of a leading bank as a consultant. Theof later receives a valuable gift from a bank under investigation by the Central Bank. May Theof be prosecuted under Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for accepting such a gift? Explain. 8% SUGGESTED ANSWER: No, Theof may not be prosecuted under Rep. Act 3019, but may be prosecuted for violation of Pres, Decree No. 46, under which such act of receiving a valuable gift is punished. Although Theof is a "public officer" within the application of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), yet his act of receiving such gift does not appear to be included among the punishable acts under Rep. Act 3019 since he is not to intervene in his official capacity in the investigation of the bank which gave the gift. Penal laws must be strictly construed against the State. In any case, Theof is administratively liable. Alternative Answer
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Yes, Theof may be prosecuted under Rep. Act 3019 because he is a "public officer" within the purview of said law, and Theof received the valuable gift from a bank which is under investigation by the Central Bank where he is employed as a "public officer". Receiving gift, directly or indirectly by a public officer from a party who has a transaction with the Government is wrong, more so when the gift-giver is under investigation by the government office to which the public officer is connected. RA 3019; penalties thereof 1986 No. 4: Alpha company owns hardware store. Because of financial difficulties, it filed a petition for suspension of payments with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Pollux, 17 years of age. is the youngest brother of one of the SEC Commissioners. Without the knowledge of his brother. Pollux approached the president of Alpha and asked for a gift of 50 bags of cement. Prosecuted for violation of Section 4 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Pollux pleaded guilty. During the trial of Pollux, his counsel argued that his client was entitled to mitigating circumstances. If you were the fiscal, would you have a legal basis for opposing the request for a mitigation of the penalty? Explain. Answer: There is no legal basis for approving the request for a mitigation of the penalty. The reason is the penalty provided in the Anti-Graft Law, whether the offender is a public officer or a private person, is indeterminate, which means it is not divisible, that is, it cannot be divided into periods of fixed duration, in order to appreciate any attending mitigating circumstance. The penalty is imprisonment of not less than one year or more than ten years. RA 3019; preventive suspension 2000 No XII A month after the arraignment of Brad Kit Commissioner of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, who was charged with violation of Section 3 (h) of Republic Act 3019 [Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) before the Sandiganbayan, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite pursuant to Section 13 of the Anti-Graft Law. The Court granted the motion and suspended accused Brad Kit for a period of 90 days. Accused assailed the constitutional validity of the suspension order on the ground that it partakes of a penalty before Judgment of conviction is reached and is thus violative of his constitutional right to be presumed innocent. He also claimed that this provision of the law on suspension pendente lite applies only to elective officials and not to appointed ones like him. Rule with reasons. (5%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: The suspension order does not partake of a penalty and is thus not violative of Brad Kit's constitutional right to be presumed innocent. Under the law, the accused public officers shall be suspended from office while the criminal prosecution is pending in court (Sec. 13, RA. 3019). Such preventive suspension is mandatory to prevent the accused from hampering the normal course of the investigation (Rios vs. Sandiganbayan,279 SCRA 581 (1997); Bunye vs. Escareal 226 SCRA 332 (1993)).
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Neither is there merit in Brad Kit's claim that the provision on suspension pendente lite applies only to elective officials and not to appointed ones like him. It applies to all public officials Indicted upon a valid information under RA. No. 3019, whether they be appointive or elective officials; or permanent or temporary employees, or pertaining to the career or non-career service (Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan, 288 SCRA 328 [1998]). RA 3019; preventive suspension 1999 No VII (b) A public officer was accused before the Sandiganbayan of a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Just after arraignment and even before evidence was presented, the Sandiganbayan issued an order for his suspension pendente lite. The accused questioned the said Order contending that it is violative of the constitutional provision against an ex post facto law. Will you sustain the objection of the accused? Why? [2%] (c) What pre-conditions are necessary to be met or satisfied before preventive suspension may be ordered? (2%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: (b) No, I will not sustain the objection of the accused. Suspension of the accused pendente lite is not violative of the constitutional provision against ex-post facto law. Ex-post facto law means making an innocent act a crime before it is made punishable. (c) The pre-conditions necessary to be met or satisfied before a suspension may be ordered are: (1) there must be proper notice requiring the accused to show cause at a specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered suspended from office pursuant to RA 3019, as amended; and (2) there must be a determination of a valid information against the accused that warrants his suspension. RA 6713; coverage 2001 No XII Robert Sy, a well known businessman and a founding member of the Makati Business Club, aside from being a classmate of the newly-elected President of the Philippines, had Investments consisting of shares of stocks in the Urban Bank, the PNB, the Rural Bank of Caloocan City and his privatelyowned corporation, the RS Builders Corporation and Trans-Pacific Air. After the President had taken his oath and assumed his office, he appointed Robert as Honorary Consul to the Republic of Vietnam. Robert took his oath before the President and after furnishing the Department of Foreign Affairs with his appointment papers, flew to Saigon, now Ho Chi Min City, where he organized his staff, put up an office and stayed there for three months attending to trade opportunities and relations with local businessman. On the fourth month, he returned to the Philippines to make his report to the President. However, the AntiGraft League of the Philippines filed a complaint against Robert for (1) falling to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities within thirty (30) days from assumption of office; (2) failing to resign from his businesses, and (3) falling to divest his shares and investments in the banks and corporations owned by him, as required by the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Will the complaint prosper? Explain. (5%) Page 372 of 374
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The complaint will not prosper because the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (Rep. Act. No. 6713), expressly exempts those who serve the Government in an honorary capacity from filing Statements of Assets and Liabilities, and from resigning and divesting themselves of interest from any private enterprise (Secs. 8A and 9). ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: Yes, the complaint will prosper under Sec. 7 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended], which requires all public officers within 30 days from assuming public office to file a true, detailed sworn statement of assets and liabilities. Violations of this law are mala prohibita which admits of no excuses. RA 7438 1993 No, 20: Upon complaint of Baby, NBI agent Cesar Invited Estafador to the NBI headquarters where Cesar showed to Estafador the sworn complaint of Baby for estafa. He thereafter began questioning Estafador who told him that he (Estafador) is willing to submit to an investigation since he has nothing to hide. Thereupon, Cesar got a typewriter and took down the statement of Estafador without informing the latter that he has a right to remain silent and to secure the services of a lawyer. After the statement was signed by Estafador, his fiancee, Fadora, came and asked Cesar to allow her to confer with Estafador but Cesar refused saying that after all, Fadora is not a lawyer, and that Estafador voluntarily gave his statement. If you were the lawyer of Estafador, with what crime would you charge the NBI agent? Explain. Answer; Violation of RA 7438, defining rights of persons arrested, 1) Failure to inform him of his right to counsel and to remain silent [Sec. 4, par. 1); and 2) Prevent an Immediate member of his family which includes fiancee, to confer with Estafador (Sec. 4(b). Subversion 1991 No. 2: a) May a ranking leader of the NPA who has taken up arms against the government be simultaneously prosecuted for violation of Section 1 of RA. 1700 (the Anti-Subversion Act) and for rebellion under Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended? Answer; Yes, because the two offenses are punished Besides, the elements of the two offenses differ.
under separate laws.
b) What would have been the legal effect of the repeal of P.D. No. 1835 (Codifying The Various Laws on Anti-Subversion and Increasing the Penalties For Membership in Subversive Organizations) as amended by P.D, No. 1975, if
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R.A. No. 1700 (An Act to Outlaw The Communist Party of the Philippines and Similar Associations, Penalizing Membership Therein and For Other Purposes) were not revived? Answer: b) If the repeal of P.D. 1835 as amended by R.A. 1735, is absolute, without reviving R.A. 1700, the original provision on illegal associations under Art. 147 of the Revised Penal Code would be the pertinent provision to be taken into account. Hence, it must be proved that the purpose of the organization is to commit any crime punishable by the code or for some purpose contrary to public morals. Alternative Answer; b) If Rep. Act No. 1700 were not revived by Executive Order No. 167, the repeal of P.D. No. 1835 and P.D. No. 1975 would have created a vacuum in the sense that membership in subversive organizations would no longer be punishable. Subversion 1978 No. X-a (1) What do you understand by the term "subversive associations and organizations" contemplated by Presidential Decree (PD) 885, otherwise known as the "Revised Anti-Subversion Law"? Is membership in such associations and organizations illegal per se? Discuss fully. When does subversion become a qualified offense? Subversive associations or organizations refer to any association, organization, political party or group of persons organized to overthrow the government of the Republic of the Philippines with the open or covert assistance and support of a foreign power by means of violence, force, deceit, or any other illegal means. Membership is not illegal per se because it must be made knowingly, willfully and by overt acts. (People vs. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382). Subversion becomes qualified if a member is an officer or ranking leader or takes up arms against the government.
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