Chapter 21: An Emerging World World Power, 1877-1914 The Roots of Expansion Diplomacy in the Gilded Age I. The US laps lapsed ed into into diplom diplomati aticc isol isolati ation, on, not out of weak weaknes nesss but but for for lack lack of any any clea clearr natio national nal purpos purposee in world affairs. The business of building the nation’s nation’s industrial economy absorbed Americans and turned their attention inward. A. Wide Wide oceans kept kept Americ Americaa isolated isolated and gave gave it a sense of security security.. B. European European power power politics politics did did not seem to to matter matter very very much. much. C. America America also did did not feel feel the need need to expand expand into into Asia Asia and Africa. Africa. II. II. In thes thesee circu circums mstan tances ces,, with with no no exter external nal threat threat to be be seen, seen, what what was was the the point point of main maintai tainin ning g a big big navy? After the CW, CW, the fleet gradually deteriorated. No effort was made to keep up with European advances in weaponry or battleship design. III. III. During During the the admin administ istrat ration ion of of Cheste Chesterr A. A. Arthu Arthur, r, the navy navy bega began n a modes modestt upgra upgradin ding g progra program, m, commissioning new ships, raising standards for the officer corps, and founding a naval war college.
A. But the fleet remained small, lacked a unified naval command, and had little more to do than maintain costal defenses and a modest cruising fleet whose task in wartime was to harass enemy commerce. IV. IV. The cond conduct uct of of diplo diplomacy macy was like likewis wisee of littl littlee accoun account. t. Appo Appoint intme ment nt to the the foreig foreign n servic servicee was mostly made through the spoils system. A. Domestic Domestic politic politicss had made it hard hard to develop develop a coherent coherent foreign foreign policy. policy. B. The senate senate guarded guarded its power to to give advice advice to the preside president nt on treaties treaties and diploma diplomatic tic appointments. C. The state department tended to be inactive, exerting little little control either either over policy or its own missions abroad. Latin American Diplomacy I. In the Caribb Caribbean ean the US rema remaine ined d the the domina dominant nt power power,, but but the the expa expansi nsioni onist st enthus enthusias iasm m of of the the CW era subsided. II. II. Diplom Diplomati aticc acti activity vity quicke quickened ned when when James James Blaine Blaine became became secret secretary ary of stat statee in 188 1881. 1. He He got invol involved ved in a border dispute between Mexico and Guatemala, tried to settle a war Chile was waging against Peru and Bolivia, and called the first Pan-American conference of the Western Hemisphere countries. A. Blaine’s Blaine’s disputes went badly and his successor canceled canceled the Pan-American conference conference after after Blaine left office. B. This was a characteristic instance of Gilded Age diplomacy, diplomacy, driver partly by partisan politics and carried out without any clear sense of national purpose.
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Pan-Americanism—the Pan-Americanism—the notion of a community of American states—took states—took root, and Blaine, upon his return in 1889, took up the plans of the outgoing Cleveland administration for a new Pan-American conference. A. Little came of it, except except for an agency in Washington that was later named the Pan-American Union. B. Any goodwill goodwill won by Blaine’s Blaine’s efforts efforts was soon blasted blasted by the humiliat humiliation ion the US visited visited upon Chile because of a riot against American sailors in the port of Valparaiso Valparaiso in 1891. Threatened with war, Chile was forced to apologize to the US and pay an indemnity of $75,000. Pacific Episodes I. Amer Americ ican an int inter eres estt in the the Paci Pacifi ficc cent center ered ed on on Hawai Hawaii, i, whe where re Amer Americ ican an min minis iste ters rs had had lon long g been been proselytizing among the islanders. Hawaii had also attracted American planters and investors. A. Nominally an independent independent monarchy monarchy,, Hawaii fell increasingly increasingly under American control.
B. In an 1875 treaty, treaty, Hawaiian sugar cane gained duty-free entry to the American market, and the
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islands were declared off-limits to other powers. C. A second second treaty in in 1887 granted granted the US the right to to establish a naval base base at Pearl Harbor. Harbor. When When Hawaii Hawaii’’s favor favored ed acce access ss to to the the Americ American an mark market et was was canc cancele eled d by the the McKi McKinle nley y Tari Tariff ff of 1890 1890,, sugar planters began to plot an American takeover of Hawaii. A. Aided by the the US minister to to Hawaii, the planters planters revolted revolted in Jan 1893 against Queen Queen Liliuokalani Liliuokalani and quickly negotiated a treaty of annexation with the administration of president Harrison. B. Before the the senate could could approve approve annexation, annexation, Clevelan Cleveland d returned returned to the presidency presidency and withdrew withdrew the treaty. Meanwh Meanwhile ile,, the the Americ American an presen presence ce elsewh elsewhere ere in the Pacifi Pacificc was was growin growing. g. A. The 1867 of Alaska Alaska from imperi imperial al Russia Russia gave the US not only a huge territory territory with vast vast natural natural resources but a vast presence stretching across the northern Pacific. B. The US also became became involved involved in the the Samoan Samoan Island Islands. s. In 1878 1878 the US secu secured red the right right to to a coali coaling ng stat station ion in Pago Pago Pago Pago harb harbor— or—aa key key link link on the the rout routee to Australia—and in exchange promised local Polynesian leaders to assist in Samoa’s relations with other foreign powers. An informal protectorate resulted.
V.
American diplomacy in these years has been characterized as a series of incidents, not the pursuit of a foreign policy. policy. Many things happened but intermittently and without a plan, driven by individuals and pressure groups—not by any well-founded and coherent conception of national objectives. Economic Sources of Expansion I. What What espe especia cially lly demand demanded ed that that Americ Americans ans look look outw outward ard was their their enormo enormously usly expand expanding ing econom economy y. The Search for Foreign Markets I. As the the ind indus ustr tria iall eco econo nomy my expa expand nded ed,, so so did did fact factor ory y exp expor orts ts.. II. II. Major Major Americ American an firm firmss began began to to establ establish ish themse themselve lvess overse overseas. as. The gian giantt among among Americ American an firms firms doing doing business abroad was Standard Oil. A. Starting Starting with the Anglo-Am Anglo-Americ erican an Oil Company in 1888, Rockefell Rockefeller’ er’ss firm created created European affiliates to operate its oil tankers and market its kerosene across the continent. B. In Asia, Standard Oil kerosene kerosene cans, converted converted into into utensils and roofing, became a visible sign sign of American market penetration. III. III. Foreig Foreign n trade trade was was import important ant partl partly y for reaso reasons ns of inter internat nation ional al finan finance. ce. As a develo developin ping g econom economy y, the US attracted a lot of foreign investment capital but sent relatively little abroad. The result was a heavy outflow of dollars from the US in the form of interest and dividend payments to foreign investors. A. To balance balance this account, account, the the US needed to export export more goods goods than than it imported. imported. B. A favorable favorable importimport-expo export rt balance balance was achieved achieved in 1876. But because because of its dependence dependence on foreign capital, America would have to be constantly vigilant about its foreign trade.
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Even more important was the relationship that many Americans perceived between foreign markets and the nation’s social stability. stability. In hard times, farmers took up radical politics, and workers became militant strikers. A. The problem, many thought, was the nation’s nation’s capacity to produce was outrunning outrunning its capacity to to consume. And when the economy slowed and domestic demand fell, the impact on farmers and workers was devastating, driving down farm prices and causing layoffs and farm foreclosures across the country.
B. The answer was to make sure that there would always be enough buyers for American American surplus products, and this meant ensuring access to foreign markets. Overseas Trade and Foreign Policy
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The bulk of American exports in the late 19 th century went to Europe and Canada. In those countries the normal instruments of diplomacy sufficed.
A. In Asia, Asia, Latin America, America, and other regions regions that Americans Americans considere considered d “backward,” “backward,” a tougher brand of American intervention seemed necessary because there the US was competing with other industrial powers. B. The real importance importance of these these non-Western non-Western markets markets was not so much their their current value as their their future promise. China, with its enormous population of potential customers, exerted a powerful hold on the American mercantile imagination. Many felt that the China trade w ould one day be the key to American prosperity. II. II. In the the midmid-188 1880s, 0s, the the pace pace of impe imperia rialis listt activ activity ity picked picked up. In Lati Latin n Amer America ica,, Britai Britain, n, Fran France, ce, and Germany began to challenge US interests more aggressively. aggressively. A. On the European European continent, continent, the free-trade liberalism of earlier earlier years gave way after the 1870s protectionism, threatening established European markets for American goods just as empire building was closing off new markets elsewhere. III. III. On top top of these these came came the the Panic Panic of of 1893, 1893, sett setting ing in in motion motion indu industr strial ial stri strikes kes and and agrari agrarian an prote protests sts that that many Americans took to be “symptoms of revolution.” A. With the nation’s nation’s social stability stability seemingly seemingly at stake, stake, securing the markets of Latin America and Asia took on new urgency, urgency, inspiring the expansion of diplomacy of the 1890s. Creating an Expansionist Foreign Policy I. Captai Captain n Alfred Alfred Mahan Mahan beli believe eved d that that the key to imperi imperial al power power was contro controll of of the the seas. seas. From From this this insight he developed a naval analysis that became the cornerstone of American strategic thinking. A Global Strategy I. Mahan Mahan believ believed ed that that the the US US shou should ld regard regard oceans oceans not as barrie barriers rs but as highwa highways. ys. Trans Transver versin sing g thos thosee highways required a robust merchant marine, a powerful navy to protect American commerce, and strategic overseas bases. A. Here technology played a role because, having converted converted from sails to steam, navies navies required coaling stations far from home. II. II. Mahan Mahan call called ed for for a canal canal acro across ss Cent Central ral Americ Americaa to connec connectt the the Atlant Atlantic ic and and Pacif Pacific ic ocea oceans. ns. Such Such a canal would enable the US to compete with with Europe on equal terms for markets in East Asia. A. The canal’ canal’s approaches approaches would need need to be guarded by bases in the Caribbea Caribbean n Sea. And Hawaii Hawaii would have to be annexed to extend American power in the Pacific, a step that Mahan considered necessary.
B. What Mahan envisioned was a form of colonialism different from Europe’s. Europe’s. Mahan aspired not to US rule over large territories and native populations but to US control over strategic bases for the defense of America’s trading interests.
III.
Mahan was offering the US a coherent foreign policy: first, foreign markets secured for the nation’s nation’s surplus products; second, the nation’s development as a naval power; and third, to sustain both of those goals, an expansionist strategy anchored on an interoceanic canal and bases in the Caribbean and Pacific. IV. IV. Other Other advoc advocate atess of a powe powerfu rfull Amer America ica flocke flocked d to Capt Captain ain Mahan. Mahan. The The infl influen uence ce of of these these men men increased during the 1890s. they pushed for a “large policy.” A. But mainstream mainstream politics politics also accepted Mahan’s Mahan’s underlying logic, and from the inauguration of Benjamin Harrison in 1889 onward, a surprising consistency began to emerge in the conduct of American foreign policy. policy. Rebuilding the Navy I. Mahan Mahan arg argued ued strong strongly ly for for a battle battleshi ship p flee fleett capa capable ble of roam roaming ing the high high seas seas and and stri striking king a decis decisive ive first blow against an enemy. A. In 1890 Congress appropriated funds funds for the first 3 battleships in in the fleet fleet envisioned by Benjamin Tracy. Tracy. The battleship took on a special aura for those who had grand dreams for the US.
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The inco incomi ming ng Cleve Clevelan land d admini administr strati ation on was was less less sprea spread-e d-eagl agled ed and and establ establish ished ed its its anti-e anti-expa xpansi nsioni onist st credentials by canceling Harrison’s Harrison’s scheme for annexing Hawaii. But Cleveland picked up the naval program of his Republican predecessor, pressing Congress just as forcibly for additional battleships and making the same basic argument. A. America’ America’ss commercia commerciall vitality vitality depended depended on its its naval power power.. B. While rejecting rejecting the colonial aspects aspects of Mahan’s Mahan’s thinking, thinking, Cleveland absorbed the the underlying strategic arguments about where America’s vital interests lay. The Venezuela Crisis I. For For year yearss a bord border er dis dispu pute te had had sim simme mere red d betw betwee een n Ven Venez ezue uela la and and Bri Briti tish sh Gui Guian ana. a. Now Now the the US US demanded that it be resolved. II. II. Invoki Invoking ng the the Monr Monroe oe Doct Doctrin rine, e, secr secreta etary ry of of stat statee Olney Olney warned warned that that the the US could could not not tole tolerat ratee any any European attempt to intimidate or overthrow nations in the western hemisphere. A. Olney intende intended d to convey a clear clear message message that that the US would brook brook no challenge challenge to its its vital vital interests in the Caribbean. B. These vital interests interests were strictly strictly America’ America’s, s, not Venezuela’ Venezuela’s; s; Venezuela Venezuela was not consulted consulted during the entire dispute. III. III. Despit Despitee its sudd suddenn enness ess,, the toug tough h stand stand of the the Cleve Clevelan land d admini administr strati ation on was was not an aber aberrat ration ion but but a logical step in the new American foreign policy. Other countries would have to accommodate the American need for access to more and larger markets. The Ideology of Expansionism
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As policy makers hammered out new foreign policy, policy, it was receiving strong ideological support from a variety of sources. One was the Social Darwinist theory that dominated the political thought of the era. A. If, as Darwin had shown, animals animals and plants plants evolved through through the survival survival of the fittest, fittest, so did nations. If the US wanted to survive, it had to expand. Linked Linked to soci social al Darwi Darwinis nism m was was a spre spreadi ading ng beli belief ef in in the the inher inherent ent superi superiori ority ty of of the the Anglo-S Anglo-Sax axon on “race.” John Fiske lectured about the duties of the Anglo-Saxon world in a lecture titled “Manifest Destiny.” A. Roosevelt Roosevelt drew a parallel parallel between between the expansio expansionism nism of his own generatio generation n and the suppression suppression of the Indians. To Roosevelt, what happened to “backward peoples” mattered little because their conquest would better civilization. civilization. In 1890 1890 the the US Cens Census us repor reported ted the the end end of the west westwar ward d movem movement ent on on the the North North Americ American an conti continen nent: t: there was no longer a frontier line beyond which land remained to be conquered. The psychological ps ychological impact of that news on Americans was profound, spawning a new historical interpretation that stressed the importance of the frontier in shaping the nation’s nation’s character. A. Frederick Jackson Jackson Turner Turner suggested suggested a link link between the closing closing of the frontier frontier and overseas expansion. As he predicted, Manifest Destiny did turn outward.
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Thus a strong current of ideas, deeply rooted in American experience and ideology, ideology, justified the new diplomacy of expansionism. expansionism. The US was eager to step onto the world stage. An American Empire
I.
After Spain lost its South American empire in the early 19 th century, century, Cubans yearned to join their mainland brothers and sisters in freedom. Independence movements sprang up repeatedly. repeatedly. A. Under the leadership of Jose Marti, Cuban patriots rebelled rebelled against against Spanish rule. The rebels built built up substantial fighting forces and mounted a guerrilla war against the Spaniards. B. A standoff developed; the the Spaniards controlled most most of the towns, the the insurgents insurgents held the countryside. The Cuban Crisis I. Rebel Rebel lead leaders ers quickl quickly y saw saw that that thei theirr best best hop hopee was was not not milit military ary but politi political cal:: they they had to draw draw the the US US into the struggle.
A. There were already Cubans Cubans in Florida, where cigar makers makers taxed themselves heavily for the cause of independence. However, the nerve center of the US was NYC, and there it was a key group of exiles—the junta—who set up shop to make the case for Cuba Libre. II. II. By itse itself, lf, their their caus causee would would not have have stirr stirred ed much much intere interest. st. The Cuba Cuban n exile exiles, s, howeve howeverr, came came on the the scene at a critical juncture in American sensationalist journalism. III. III. Across Across the the count country ry powerf powerful ul senti sentimen ments ts stirr stirred: ed: huma humanit nitari arian an concer concern n for the the Cubans, Cubans, sympa sympathy thy with with their aspirations for freedom, and a superpatriotism that became known as jingoism. A. Congress Congress began began to to call call for Cuban independe independence. nce. Presidential Politics I. Grover Grover Clevel Cleveland and took took a cooler cooler view view of the situa situatio tion. n. His His concern concernss were were Americ America’ a’ss vital vital intere interests sts,, which, he told Congress, were “by no means of a wholly sentimental or philanthropic character.” character.” A. The Cuban civil civil war was disrupting disrupting the the sizable sizable trade between between the 2 countries countries and destroying destroying profitable American American investments, especially in Cuban sugar plantations. B. The President President also also worried that that Spain’s Spain’s troubles troubles would draw other other European European powers into the the situation. C. A chronically chronically unstable unstable Cuba was not not compatible compatible with America’s America’s increasing strategic interests interests in the region, especially its plans for an interoceanic canal whose approaches would be safeguarded. Cleveland urged the Spanish government to make reforms and resolve the crisis.
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Taking Taking over in March 1897, the McKinley administration adopted much the same line. McKinley considered the US to be the dominant Caribbean power, with vital interests that had to be defended. But McKinley was inclined to be tougher on the Spaniards. A. McKinley had to to contend with with the jingoism jingoism in the the Republican Party Party,, manifest at at the 1986 national convention in a bristling platform calling for Cuban independence and proclaiming a new American imperialism. imperialism. B. He would not proceed proceed unless unless he sensed sensed a broad broad national national consensus consensus for for war. war. He was sensitive sensitive to business interests and fearful of disruption to an economy just recovering from depression. The Road to War I. Americ American an pressu pressure re on Spain Spain at first first seemed seemed to pay off. off. The The cons conserv ervati ative ve regim regimee fell fell,, and and a libe liberal ral government moderated its Cuban policy. policy. Cuban rebels, encouraged by the prospect of American intervention, demanded full independence.
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In Feb 1898, a week after a damaging letter was revealed by Spanish minister to the US Dupuy de Lome, the US battleship Maine blew up sank in Havana harbor. From that moment on, popular passions against Spain became a major factor in the march towards war. McKinl McKinley ey assume assumed d that that the sinki sinking ng was acci acciden dental tal.. An Americ American an board board of inqui inquiry ry,, however however,, submit submitted ted a damaging report. The American board concluded that the sinking ship was caused by a mine. No evidence linked the Spanish to the purported mine. The impre impressi ssion on that that Spanis Spanish h contr control ol over over Cuba Cuba had had broke broken n down down was was reinf reinforc orced ed by a speech speech by Senator Redfield Proctor after his visit to Cuba. The account by this anti-imperialist senior Republican of the devastation in the Cuban countryside convinced even the skeptical that Spain had lost its claim to Cuba. McKinl McKinley ey had had no no enthu enthusia siasm sm for for the the mart martial ial split split engu engulfi lfing ng the the coun country try.. He was was not not swep sweptt along along by by calls to avenge the sinking of the Maine. But he did have to pa y attention to aroused public opinion. A. Business leaders now also became became impatient impatient for the dispute with Spain to end. end. War War was preferable preferable to the unresolved Cuban crisis. B. On March 27 McKinley McKinley cabled cabled Madrid Madrid what was in effect effect an ultimatum: ultimatum: an immediat immediatee armistice armistice in 6 months, abandonment of reconcentration, and, with the US as moderator, peace talks with the rebels. Only Cuban independence would be regarded as a satisfactory satisfactory outcome to the the negotiations.
C. Spain rejected these demands. VI.
On April April 11 11 McKinl McKinley ey sent sent a messa message ge to Cong Congres resss asking asking for for autho authorit rity y to inte interve rvene ne to end end the the fighti fighting ng in Cuba. A. The War War Hawks in Congress—a mixture of Republicans and western Democrats—were impatient with McKinley’s cautious progress. B. But the presiden presidentt did not lose lose control, control, and he defeated defeated the War War Hawks on the the crucial crucial issue of recognizing the rebel republican government, which would have greatly reduced the administration’s administration’s freedom of action in dealing with Spain. The Spoils of War I. Host Hostil ilit itie iess form formal ally ly beg began an whe when n Spai Spain n decl declar ared ed war war on on Apr April il 24, 24, 189 1898. 8. Acro Across ss the the US vol volun unte teer er regiments began to form up. A. Raw recruits recruits poured poured into makeshift makeshift bases bases around Tampa Tampa.. Confusion Confusion reigned. reigned. B. No provision had been made for getting the the troops to Cuba. Fortunately, Fortunately, the small small regular army was a disciplined, highly professional force. II. The navy was in much better shape. III. III. On May May 1 Americ American an ships ships corned corned the the Spani Spanish sh fleet fleet in in Manila Manila Bay and and destr destroye oyed d it. it. The victor victory y produced euphoria in the US. A. With Dewey’s naval victory victory,, American American strategic strategic thinking thinking clicked into place. B. An anchorage anchorage in the western western Pacific Pacific had long been coveted coveted by naval strategis strategists. ts. At At this time, time, too, the Great Powers were carving China into spheres spheres of influence. If American commerce wanted a place in that glittering market, the power of the US would have to be projected into Asia. IV. IV. Once Once the decis decision ion for for a Philip Philippin pinee base had had been been made, made, other other deci decisio sions ns follo followed wed almo almost st autom automati atical cally ly.. A. The question question of Hawaii was quickly quickly resolve resolved. d. In July 1898 Hawaiian Hawaiian annexatio annexation n went through through Congress by joint resolution. Hawaii had acquired a crucial strategic value: it was the halfway station to the Philippines. B. The navy pushed pushed for a coaling coaling base in in the central central Pacific. Pacific. There There was need need also for a strategi strategically cally located base in the Caribbean C. In the wake of Dewey’s victory, victory, enthusiasm for colonial colonial annexations annexations swept the country. country. V. The The cam campa paig ign n in in Cub Cubaa was was some someth thin ing g of of an an ant antic icli lima max. x. A. The Spanish fleet fleet was bottled bottled up in Santiago harbor, harbor, and the city city itself became a strategic key to the military campaign. The Spanish fought to maintain their honor but had no stomach for a real war against the Americans. B. The main battle occurred occurred near Santiago on the heights heights of Saint Juan Hill. The Spanish, driven driven from their forward positions, retreated to a well-fortified second line. VI. The 2 nation nationss signed signed an an armist armistice ice in in which which Spain Spain agre agreed ed to give give up Cuba Cuba and and cede cede Puer Puerto to Rico Rico and and Guam to the US. The Imperial Experiment I. The big questi question on was the Philip Philippin pines. es. Not even even the the most most avid avid Americ American an expans expansion ionist istss had had advo advocat cated ed colonial rule over the area—that was European-style imperialism, not the acquisition of strategic bases that Mahan and his followers had in mind. Both Mahan and Lodge initially advocated keeping only Manila. A. It gradually became clear clear that Manila was defensible without without US control of the whole Luzon. Taking the Philippines I. McKinl McKinley ey and his adviso advisors rs survey surveyed ed thei theirr opt option ions. s. Most Most plau plausib sible le was the option option of granti granting ng the Philippines independence, though McKinley ultimately decided against this course of action. The Anti-Imperialists Anti-Imperialists I. The narrow narrownes nesss of the admini administr strati ation’ on’ss victo victory ry sign signale aled d the the revi revival val of an anti anti-e -expa xpansi nsioni onist st tradit tradition ion that had been briefly silenced by the patriotic passions of a nation at war.
A. In the Senate, opponents of the treaty invoked the country’s republican principles. But making 8 million Filipinos eligible for citizenship was equally objectionable to the anti-imperialists. anti-imperialists. II. II. Lead Leadin ing g citi citize zens ns enli enlist sted ed in the the anti anti-i -imp mper eria iali list st cause cause.. A. Andrew Carnegie offered a check for $20 million to purchase the independence independence of the Philippines. Philippines. B. Samuel Samuel Gompers, Gompers, who feared the competit competition ion of cheap Filipin Filipino o labor; and Jane Jane Addams, Addams, who believed that women should stand for peace, both supported the cause for independence. C. They key group group was the the social social elite elite of old-lin old-linee Mugwump Mugwump reformer reformers. s. D. In Nov 1898 a Boston group group formed the first first anti-Impe anti-Imperial rialist ist League, League, from which which blossomed blossomed a national movement over the next year. III. III. Althou Although gh skil skillfu lfull at publi publiciz cizing ing thei theirr cause, cause, the the anti anti-im -imper perial ialist istss never never manag managed ed to buil build d a truly truly popular movement. They shared little but their anti-imperialism and lacked the common touch. A. Nor was anti-imperialis anti-imperialism m easily translated into a viable political political cause, because the Democrats, once the treaty was adopted, waffled on the issue. B. Philippine Philippine annexatio annexation n lost the moral high high ground because because of grim events events that began began to unfold in the Philippines. War in the Philippines I. Figh Fighti ting ng brok brokee out out betw betwee een n Ame Ameri rica can n and and Fili Filipi pino no pat patro rols ls on on the the edge edge of of Mani Manila la.. Confr Confron onte ted d by American annexation, Aguinaldo Aguinaldo asserted his nation’s independence and turned his guns on the occupying American forces. II. II. The US army army resort resorted ed to to tacti tactics cs used used by the the Span Spanish ish forces forces in Cuba Cuba.. Atro Atrocit cities ies became became common commonpla place ce on both sides. The fighting ended in 1902. A. Taft set up a civilian administration. administration. He intended to make the Philippines Philippines a model of American road building and sanitary engineering. III. III. McKinl McKinley’ ey’ss victor victory y over over Bryan Bryan in the the 1900 1900 electio election n suggest suggested ed a popular popular sati satisfa sfacti ction on with with the count country’ ry’ss overseas adventure. Yet Yet a strong undercurrent of misgivings was evident. A. Americans Americans had not anticip anticipated ated the brutal brutal means means used to subdue the the Filipino Filipino guerrillas guerrillas.. IV. IV. There There were were distu disturbi rbing ng const constitu itutio tional nal issu issues es to be be resolv resolved. ed. A speci special al comm commiss ission ion appo appoint inted ed by McKinley recommended independence for the Philippines after an indefinite period of US rule, during which the Filipinos would be prepared for sefl-government. A. In 1916 the Jones Act formally committed the US to granting independence but set no date. V. The ugly ugly busin business ess in the Philip Philippin pines es rubb rubbed ed off off some some of the moral moralizi izing ng glos glosss but but left left und undimm immed ed America’s America’s global aspirations. Onto the World Stage
I.
In Europe the flexing of America’s America’s companies called some consternation. A Power Among Powers I. Roosev Roosevelt elt had no doub doubtt abou aboutt Ameri America’ ca’ss role role in the world. world. It was impor importan tant, t, firs firstt of all, all, to uph uphold old the country’s country’s honor in the community of nations. Nor should the country ever shrink from a righteous battle. A. He sympathize sympathized d with European European imperiali imperialism sm and defended defended Americ American an dominance dominance over the Caribbean states.
B. He had an acute sense of the fragility of world peace. He believed in American responsibility responsibility for helping to maintain the balance of power. Anglo American Amity I. After After the Spanis Spanish-A h-Amer merica ican n war war, the the Euro Europea pean n powe powers rs had been been unce uncerta rtain in about about how to deal deal with with the victor. victor. Germany toyed briefly with the notion of an American alliance, but only GB had a clear view of what it wanted from the US.
A. In the late 19 th century Britain’s Britain’s position in Europe was steadily worsening in the face of industrial and military challenges by a united Germany. Germany. In its growing isolation Britain turned to the US.
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B. This explains why Britain bowed bowed to American demands in the Venezuela dispute of 1895. From that time onward, Britain strove for rapprochement with the US. In the the Hay-P Hay-Paun auncef cefote ote Agreem Agreement ent of 1901 1901 Brit Britain ain gave gave up up its its treat treaty y rights rights to join jointt partic participa ipati tion on in any Central American American canal project clearing the way for a canal exclusively under US control. 2 years later the last of the US-Canadian border disputes—this one involving British Colombia and Alaska—was settled, again to American satisfaction.
A. The lone British member of the US-Canadian tribunal cast the deciding vote, awarding to the US the Pacific inlets and ports that provided the only convenient access to the Klondike goldfields of the Canadian Yukon. III. III. No formal formal alli allianc ancee was forth forthcom coming ing,, but Anglo-A Anglo-Amer merica ican n friend friendshi ship p was so firm firm that that Briti British sh plann planners ers after 1901 based their war plans on the assumption that America and Britain would never have a war. A. In his efforts efforts to maintain a global balance balance of power, power, the cornerstone cornerstone of Roosevelt’s Roosevelt’s policy was the the British relationship. The Big Stick I. Among Among nati nations ons,, howe however ver,, what what counte counted d was was stre strengt ngth, h, not not merely merely goo goodwi dwill. ll. Roosev Roosevelt elt believe believed d that that the US needed a strong naval power. II. II. Unde Underr Roo Roose seve velt lt,, the the batt battle lesh ship ip prog progra ram m wen wentt on on apa apace ce.. A. At the top of Roosevel Roosevelt’ t’ss agenda was was a canal across across Central Central America. America. B. The Spanish-American Spanish-American War War had demonstrated that strategic strategic need in the most graphic graphic way. way. The Panama Canal I. After After Britai Britain’ n’ss surre surrende nderr of its its joint joint rights rights in 190 1901, 1, Roos Rooseve evelt lt proce proceede eded d to the more more trou trouble blesom somee task task of leasing from Colombia the needed strip of land across Panama, which was a Colombian province. To this end, the US had purchased from the New Panama Canal Company the assets of de Lessep’s earlier project. A. The Colombian legislature voted down the proposed treaty, treaty, partly because the company’s company’s rights were about to expire and the lease to the US could then be renegotiated on terms more favorable to Colombia. B. Furious Furious about what seemed seemed to be a breath of faith, faith, Roosevelt Roosevelt contempla contemplated ted outright outright seizure seizure of Panama but settled on a more devious solution.
II.
The key intermediary in the sale of the de Lesseps assets, Philippe Bunau-Varilla, Bunau-Varilla, let Roosevelt know that an independence movement was brewing in Panama. The US then informed Bunau-Varilla Bunau-Varilla that American ships were steaming towards Panama. A. The idea was that the Americans would covertly assist the expected expected uprising. However, the American commander failed to prevent the landing of 400 troops sent by the Colombian government to hold the province. B. On November 7, 1903, the the US recognized recognized Panama. Panama. Less than 2 weeks later, later, with with Bunau-Varilla Bunau-Varilla serving as the representative of the new republic, Panama signed a treaty that granted the US a perpetually renewable lease on a canal zone. victimization of Colombia. C. Roosevelt never regretted the victimization
III.
Building the canal was one of the heroic engineering feats of the 20 th century. century. When the canal opened in 1914, it gave the US a commanding commercial and strategic position in the Western Western Hemisphere. Policeman of the Caribbean I. Next Next came came the the task task of maki making ng the the Cari Caribb bbea ean n basi basin n secu secure re.. II. II. In the the case case of Cuba Cuba,, good good beha behavio viorr was was readi readily ly mana managed ged in the the settl settleme ement nt that that follow followed ed the the Span Spanish ish-American war. Before the US withdrew from Cuba in 1902, it reorganized Cuban finances and concluded a swamp-clearing program that eliminated yellow fever.
A. As a condition for gaining independence, Cuba was required to include in its constitution a
III. III.
IV. IV. V.
provisio called the Platt amendment, which gave the US the right to intervene if Cuban independence was threatened or if Cuba failed to maintain internal order. order. B. Cuba also also granted granted the US a lease on Guantana Guantanamo mo Bay, Bay, where the US Navy built built a large large base. Roosev Roosevelt elt beli believe eved d that inst instabi abilit lity y in the the Caribbe Caribbean an invit invited ed the the interve interventi ntion on of Europ European ean power powers. s. In 1904 Roosevelt announced that the US would act as “policeman” of the region, stepping in during cases of wrongdoing. A. This policy became known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, transforming transforming that that doctrine’s doctrine’s broad principle of opposition to European interference in Latin America into the unrestricted right of the US to regulate Caribbean affairs. B. The Roosevelt Roosevelt Corollary Corollary was not not a treaty with other other states; states; it was a unilateral unilateral declarat declaration ion sanctioned only by American power and national interest. Citing Citing the the Rooseve Roosevelt lt Corol Corollar lary y, the US inter interven vened ed regula regularly rly in in the inter internal nal affai affairs rs of Carib Caribbea bean n states states.. A. When internal internal order order broke broke down, the US did did not hesitate hesitate to send in the the marines. marines. Roosev Roosevelt elt’’s thinki thinking ng was prim primari arily ly strat strategi egic; c; Taft Taft took took a more more comme commerci rcial al view view.. Ameri American can inve investm stment entss in the Caribbean region grew dramatically after 1900.
A. Taft quickly intervened when disorder threatened American property. property. But he also regarded business investment as a force for stability in underdeveloped areas. B. Taft spoke for dollar diplomacy—the diplomacy—the aggressive coupling coupling of American diplomatic diplomatic and economic interests abroad. The Open Door to Asia I. Commer Commercia ciall inte interes rests ts domina dominated ted Americ American an policy policy in East East Asia, Asia, espe especia cially lly the prospe prospect ct of the hug hugee China market. Fearful that the US would be frozen out, Secretary of State John Hay in 1899 sent them an “open-door” note advancing the right of equal trade access for all nations that wanted to do business with China. A. Despite Despite US control of the Philippi Philippines, nes, the US lacked lacked real leverage leverage and received received no better better than ambiguous and noncommittal responses from the occupying powers. B. Hay chose to interp interpret ret them them as accepting accepting the American American open-door open-door positi position. on. II. II. When When a secre secrett socie society ty of of Chine Chinese se nati nationa onali lists sts,, the the Boxer Boxers, s, rebel rebelled led agains againstt the the forei foreigne gners rs in in 1900, 1900, the the US sent 5000 troops from the Philippines and joined the multinational campaign to raise the siege of the diplomatic missions in Beijing. A. America America took this opportu opportunity nity to assert assert a second principle principle of the open open door: that China China would be preserved as a “territorial and administrative entity.” entity.” As long as the legal fiction of an independent China survived, so would American claims to equal access to the China market. III. III. The Euro Europea pean n powers powers had acce acceded ded to to Amer America ican n claims claims of preem preemine inence nce in in the Caribb Caribbean ean.. But many many European powers were strongly entrenched in East Asia and not inclined to defer to American interests. A. The US also faced a powerful powerful Asian Asian nation—Ja nation—Japan—t pan—that hat had its own vital vital interests. interests. B. Although Although the open-doo open-doorr policy was was important important to him, him, Roosevelt Roosevelt quickly quickly saw in the Pacific Pacific a deadlier game that called for American involvement. C. In exchange exchange for Japanese Japanese acceptance acceptance of America American n sovereignty sovereignty over the Philip Philippines pines,, the US approved of Japan’s protectorate over Korea in 1905 and then of its claim of a full sovereignty 6 years later. D. A surge surge of Anti-Asian feeling feeling in CA complicated Roosevelt’s Roosevelt’s efforts. In 1907 1907 a “gentlemen’s “gentlemen’s agreement” in which Japan agreed to restrict immigration to the US smoothed matters over, but periodic resurgences of racism in CA led to continuing tensions with the Japanese. IV. IV. Roosev Roosevelt elt mean meanwhi while le moved moved to to balanc balancee Japan’ Japan’ss milita military ry power power by incre increasi asing ng Ame Americ rican an naval naval stre strengt ngth h in the Pacific. American battleships visited Japan in 1908 and then made a global tour in an impressive display of sea power.
A. Late that year, Roosevelt achieved a formal accommodation with Japan. The Root-Takahira Agreement confirmed the status quo in the Pacific as well as the principles of free oceanic commerce and equal trade opportunity in China. V. Taft entere entered d the the white whitehou house se conv convinc inced ed that that the US had had been been short shortcha change nged. d. He presse pressed d for for a lar larger ger role role for American bankers and investors in East Asia, especially in railroad construction going on in China. A. Taft hoped that American capital capital would counterbalance Japanese power and pave the way for increased commercial opportunities. B. Taft supported supported the Chinese Chinese Nationali Nationalists sts as a counterforce counterforce to the Japanes Japanese. e. The US thus entered entered a long term rivalry with Japan that would end 30 years later. later. VI. The US US had beco become me embro embroile iled d in a dista distant nt strug struggle gle that that prom promise ised d many many future future liab liabili ilitie tiess but few few of the the fabulous profits that had lured Americans to Asia. Woodrow Wilson and Mexico I. When When Wil Wilso son n beca became me pre presi side dent nt in in 1913 1913,, he was was bent bent on on refo reform rm in in Ame Ameri rica can n fore foreig ign n poli policy cy no les lesss than in domestic politics. He opposed dollar diplomacy, diplomacy, which bullied weaker countries into inequitable financial relationships and gave undue advantage to American business. A. American banks joined an international international consortium to provide a loan loan to China. When JP Morgan sought Wilson’s Wilson’s approval, the president refused on the grounds that the terms of the loan threatened the independence of the Chinese government. II. II. The US, Wilson ilson insi insiste sted, d, shou should ld conduc conductt its its fore foreign ign policy policy in confor conformi mity ty wit with h its its democ democrat ratic ic principles. He committed himself to advocating human rights, national integrity, and opportunity. III. III. Mexico Mexico becam becamee the prim primary ary objec objectt of Wils Wilson’ on’ss minist ministrat ration ions. s. A cycle cycle of revol revoluti utions ons bega began n there there in 1911. A. Wilson subjected Mexico Mexico to different pressures, including including the threatened use use of force. IV. IV. But the the consti constitut tution ionali alists sts,, ardent ardent natio national nalist ists, s, had no no desire desire for for Ameri American can inte interve rventi ntion on in Mexic Mexican an affairs.
