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Power of Adjudication
1) SANTIAGO JR. vs. BAUTISTA 32 SCRA 188, GR No. L-25024, March 30, 1970 2) ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY vs. CA 169 SCRA 27, G.R. No. 76761, January 9, 1989 3) BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS & MORTGAGE BANK vs. MONETARY BOARD 204 SCRA 767, G.R. No. 70054 December 11, 1991 4) CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. LUCAS 301 SCRA 560, Gr. No. 127838, January 21, 1999 5) DESIERTO vs. SILVESTRE Gr. No. 145389, July 31, 2001 6) MABUHAY TEXTILE MILLS CORP. vs. ONGPIN 141 SCRA 437, G.R. No. L-67784 February 28, 1986 7) REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE CORP. vs. SENDINO 233 SCRA 665, G.R. No. 109703 July 5, 1994 8) REPUBLIC vs MIGRINO 189 SCRA 289, G.R. No. 89483, August 30, 1990
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SANTIAGO JR. vs. BAUTISTA 32 SCRA 188, GR No. L-25024, March 30, 1970 Facts: Teodoro Santiago, a grade 6 pupil, was adjudged 3rd honor. 2 days before his graduation, Ted and his parents sought the invalidation of the ranking of the honor students. They filed a Certiorari case against the principal and teachers who composed the committee on rating honors.. Respondents filed a MTD claiming that the action was improper, and even assuming it was proper, the question has become academic (bc the graduation already proceeded. They also argue that there was no GADALEJ on the part of the teachers since the Committee on Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board, exercising judicial functions, under Rule 65, certiorari is a remedy against judicial function Issue: Whether or not the a committee’s act of determining who among the batch of graduating pupils should be ranked first, second and third honors involves the exercise of a quasi-judicial power. Or Whether or not the committee’s decision is subject to judicial review by petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Held: No. The court ruled that there could be no doubt that he miserably failed to comply with the requirement of Rule 65. The stubborn fact remains, however, that appellant had known of such decision of the said committee of teachers much earlier, as shown by the circumstance that according to him, even before the filing of his petition with the lower court on the 19th of May, 1965, he had personally appealed the said committee's decision with various higher authorities of the above-named school, who merely passed the buck to each other. Moreover, appellant mentions in his petition various other documents or papers — as the Service Manual for Teachers allegedly violated by appellees in the constitution of their committee; altered grading sheets; and erasures in his Grade I certificate — which appellant never bothered to attach to his petition. A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise of judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. In order for an action for certiorari to exist, Test to determine whether a tribunal or board exercises judicial functions: 1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought before a tribunal for hearing and determination. 2) that the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision. 3) the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the judiciary (or at least the not the legislative nor the executive) It may be said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy. Judicial power is defined: as authority to determine the rights of persons or property; authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear and determine when the rights of persons or
property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of adjudication. The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before them. The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights. The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial bodies in the performance of its assigned task. It is necessary that there be a LAW that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuring there from is brought in turn, to the tribunal or board clothed with power and authority to determine. As pointed out by appellees, however, there is nothing on record about any rule of law that provides that when teachers sit down to assess the individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors, such function involves the determination of what the law is and that they are therefore automatically vested with judicial or quasi judicial functions. WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI JUDICIAL ACTS. It is difficult, if not impossible, precisely to define what are judicial or quasi judicial acts, and there is considerable conflict in the decisions in regard thereto, in connection with the law as to the right to the writ of certiorari. It is clear, however, that it is the nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the office, board, or body which performs it, that determines whether or not it is the discharge of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. It is not essential that the proceedings should be strictly and technically judicial, in the sense in which that word is used when applied to the courts of justice, but it is sufficient if they are quasi judicial. It is enough if the officers act judicially in making their decision, whatever may be their public character. ...' "In State ex rel. Board of Commrs. vs. Dunn (86 Minn. 301, 304), the following statements were made: 'The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and what are administrative or ministerial functions is often difficult to determine. The exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative or administrative duties, and the performance of administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.
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ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY vs. CA 169 SCRA 27, G.R. No. 76761, January 9, 1989 Facts: Larrabaster applied with the National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA) for a home lot at the Marbel Settlement District, Cotabato and was granted. He leased the lot to private respondent, Basilio MENDOZA, and tolerated Jorge Geller to squat on the portion thereof. Land Settlement and Development Corporation (LASEDECO) took over the functions of the NLSA. Larrabaster and his wife assigned their rights and interests over the Disputed Property to Jose B. PEÑA. Notwithstanding the transfer, PEÑA allowed Mendoza and Geller to stay on the lot. Republic Act No. 1160 transferred the custody and administration of the Marbel Townsite to the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA). PEÑA requested NARRA to approve the transfer of rights but the latter did not act thereon in view of Proclamation No. 336, series of 1956, returning to the Bureau of Lands the disposition of the lots which remained unallocated by the LASEDECO at the time of its abolition. The Bureau of Lands did not act on PEÑA's request either, prompting him to bring up the matter to the Board of Liquidators (BOL).The BOL denied the request. PEÑA moved for reconsideration but the BOL again denied the same under its Resolution No. 439, series of 1967. PEÑA appealed to the Office of the President. Upon PEÑA's motion for reconsideration, it was granted and BOL approved his request. Private respondent MENDOZA addressed a letter-protest to the BOL and responded by advising MENDOZA to direct its protest to the Office of the President. He did and while his protest with the Office of the President was still pending, MENDOZA resorted to Civil Case for certiorari before the then Court of First Instance of Cotabato against the petitioners-public officials and PEÑA. MENDOZA followed up with a Supplemental Petition to annul the administrative Decision denying his protest. TC dismissed his petition. CA reversed.
absence of notice and opportunity to be present in the administrative proceedings prior to the rendition of the 10 February 1969 and 13 May 1969 Decisions by the Office of the President, such procedural defect was cured when MENDOZA elevated his letter protest to the Office of the President, which subjected the controversy to appellate review but eventually denied reconsideration. Having thus been given a chance to be heard with respect to his protest there is sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process. Substantial factual evidence support the questioned administrative rulings. The Office of the President relied on the factfinding report of the BOL made sometime in 1969 with respect to the Disputed Property to the effect that although the area of Lot No. 355 awarded to Larrabaster was 1,500 sq. ms., it was found situated along a creek and that "it had increased in area to 3,616.93 square meters by accretion." Finally, invariable is the rule that in reviewing administrative decisions of the Executive Branch of the government, "the findings of fact made therein must be respected, as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant (Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 [1940]); that it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of the witnesses, or otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of the evidence (Lao Tang Bun, et al. vs. Fabre, 81 Phil. 682 [1948]); that the administrative decision in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law (Lovina vs. Moreno L-17821, November 29, 1963, 9 SCRA 557; Timbancaya vs. Vicente, L-19100, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 852), which we find absent herein.
Issue: Whether or not the CAgravely erred in holding that private respondent basilio mendoza has been denied due process of law. Held: No. In ruling that the Decisions of the Office of the President were vitiated by failure to accord due process of law to MENDOZA, respondent Appellate Court relied on its observations that MENDOZA was: (1) not made a party to the administrative case; (2) not served with a copy of the 10 February 1969 Decision; and (3) not notified of proceedings before the 13 May 1969 Decision nor served a copy thereof. The foregoing observations do not justify the conclusion arrived at. After the Office of the President had rendered its Decision dated 13 May 1969, MENDOZA filed a letter-protest on 1 August 1969 with the BOL. The latter office directed him to file his protest with the Office of the President, which he did. On 28 September 1971, MENDOZA's request for reconsideration was denied by said Office. So that, even assuming that there was
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS & MORTGAGE BANK vs. MONETARY BOARD 204 SCRA 767, G.R. No. 70054 December 11, 1991 Facts: On different occasions, Top Man agement Program Corporatio n, Pilar Development Corpor atio n, El Grande Development Corporation obtained a loan from Banco Filipino and Savings and Mortgage Bank secured by Real Estate Mortgages. When the bank suffered serious financial pro blems, the Monetary Board issued resolution finding the bank insolvent and placed it under receivership.-Banco Filipino filed a complaint to set aside the said action of MB.-Subsequently, MB issued another resolution placing the bank under liquidation and designating a liquidator. Banco Filipino filed another petition questioning the validity of the said resolution. A temporary restrainin g order was issued, meikimouse
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however, acts pertainin g to normal operations of a bank are not enjoined. A resolution was also issued ordering the conduct of hearings. In the meantime, Top Management Program Corporation, Pilar Development Corporation, El Grande Development Corporation failed to pay their obligations. The liquidator extra judicially foreclosed the Real Estate Mortgages. Each filed separately a petition for injunction and prohibition seeking to enjoin the sheriff from proceeding with the foreclosure sale. Petitions were dismissed. Hence, petitions were filed by Top Management Program Corporation, Pilar Development Corporation, El Grande Development Corporation alleging that the liquidator has no authority to proceed with the foreclosure sale pending the resolution of the issue on the validity of the closure and liquidation of Banco Filipino. The petitioner also filed with the SC the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the resolution of the Board as made without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, to order respondents to furnish petitioner with the reports of examination which led to its closure and to afford petitioner BF a hearing prior to any resolution that may be used under Section 29 of RA 265 (Central Bank Act).
subject to judicial scrutiny as provided for under the same law (Rural Bank of Bato v. IAC, G.R. No. 65642, October 15, 1984, Rural Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 61689, June 20, 1988,162 SCRA 288). Notwithstanding the foregoing, administrative due process does not mean that the other important principles may be dispensed with, namely: the decision of the administrative body must have something to support itself and the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion (Ang Tibay vs. CIR, supra). Hence, where the decision is merely based upon pieces of documentary evidence that are not sufficiently substantial and probative for the purpose and conclusion they are presented, the standard of fairness mandated in the due process clause is not met. In the case at bar, the conclusion arrived at by the respondent Board that the petitioner bank is in an illiquid financial position on January 23, 1985, as to justify its closure on January 25, 1985 cannot be given weight and finality as the report itself admits the inadequacy of its basis to support its conclusion.
Issue: Whether or not the closure and receivership of petitioner bank which was ordered by respondent MB is valid. Held: No. It is null and void. The Central bank is vested with the authority to take charge and administer the monetary and banking systems of the country and this authority includes the power to examine and determine the financial condition of banks for the purpose of closure ion the ground of insolvency. Even if the bank is questioning the validity of its closure, during the pendency of the case, the liquidator can continue prosecution suits for collection and foreclosure of mortgages, as they are acts done In the usual course of administration of the banks. While the high tribunal recognized the actual closure of Banco Filipino and the consequent legal effects thereof on its operations, We cannot uphold the legality of its closure and thus ruled that the closure and receivership of petitioner bank, which was ordered by respondent Monetary Board on January 25, 1985, is null and void. Despite the existence of the partial list of findings in the examination of the bank, there were still highly significant items to be weighed and determined such as the matter of valuation reserves, before these can be considered in the financial condition of the bank. It would be a drastic move to conclude prematurely that a bank is insolvent if the basis for such conclusion is lacking and insufficient, especially if doubt exists as to whether such bases or findings faithfully represent the real financial status of the bank. The actuation of the Monetary Board in closing petitioner bank on January 25, 1985 barely four days after a conference with the latter on the examiners' partial findings on its financial position is also violative of what was provided in the CB Manual of Examination Procedures. The basic standards of substantial due process were not observed. However, as to the requirement of notice and hearing, Sec. 29 of RA 265 does not require a previous hearing before the Monetary Board implements the closure of a bank, since its action is
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. LUCAS 301 SCRA 560, Gr. No. 127838, January 21, 1999 Facts: Raquel P. Linatok, an assistant information officer at the Agricultural Information Division, Department of Agriculture (DA for brevity), filed with the office of the Secretary, DA, an affidavitcomplaint against respondent Jose J. Lucas, a photographer of the same agency, for misconduct, consisting of touching her thigh with lascivious thought. Respondent denied the charges, he alleged that he did not touch the thigh of complainant Linatok, that what transpired was that he accidentally brushed Linatok's leg when he reached for his shoes and that the same was merely accidental and he did not intend nor was there malice when his hand got in contact with Linatok's leg. After a formal investigation by the Board of Personnel Inquiry-BOPI, DA, the board issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of simple misconduct and recommending a penalty of suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day. The Secretary of Agriculture approved the recommendation. Respondent appealed the decision to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). CSC issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of grave misconduct and imposing on him the penalty of dismissal from the service. Respondent moved for reconsideration but the CSC denied the motion. Then, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals promulgated its decision setting aside the resolution of the CSC and reinstating the resolution of the BOPI, DA. The Court of Appeals further ruled that "a basic requirement of due process on the other hand is that a person must meikimouse
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be duly informed of the charges against him (Felicito Sajonas vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 183 SCRA 182). In the instant case however, Lucas came to know of the modification of the charge against him only when he received notice of the resolution dismissing him from the service. Issue: Whether or not respondent Lucas was denied due process when the CSC found him guilty of grave misconduct on a charge of simple misconduct. Held: No. Petitioner anchors its position on the view that "the formal charge against a respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of an information in a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of the charge against him; what is controlling is the allegation of the acts complained of, and not the designation of the offense. The court denied the petition. As well stated by the Court of Appeals, there is an existing guideline of the CSC distinguishing simple and grave misconduct. In the case of Landrito vs. Civil Service Commission, we held that "in grave misconduct as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest, which is obviously lacking in respondent's case. Respondent maintains that as he was charged with simple misconduct, the CSC deprived him of his right to due process by convicting him of grave misconduct. The court sustained the ruling of the Court of Appeals that: (a) a basic requirement of due process is that a person must be duly informed of the charges against him and that (b) a person can not be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged. Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings. The right to substantive and procedural due process is applicable in administrative proceedings.
DESIERTO vs. SILVESTRE Gr. No. 145389, July 31, 2001 Facts: On January 26, 2000, elements of Task Force "Aduana" headed by petitioner Doctor conducted an entrapment operation in a case of bribery involving Atty. Redempto C. Somera, Hearing Officer, Law Division, Bureau of Customs, Manila, and Indian nationals who had pending cases of seizure with the former. After the pay-off materialized, petitioner Doctor announced the entrapment and then arrested Atty. Somera and two (2) Indian nationals, namely, Murli Tejoomal Mohrani and Kumar Rupchand Khiatani, for violation of Article 210 of the Revised Penal
Code. As a consequence, the Task Force filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila, charges of bribery, violation of R. A. No. 3019, and corruption of public officials against them. Likewise, the Task Force filed with the Ombudsman administrative charges for grave misconduct, dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service against respondent Ronnie C. Silvestre and Atty. Somera. Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman has authority to suspend from office respondent Ronnie C. Silvestre indefinitely on the basis of the administrative complaint filed with his office showing that evidence of guilt is strong. Held: We need not resolve the issue presented. We dismiss the petition. It has become moot. On February 14, 2001, the Ombudsman dismissed the administrative charges against respondent. In dismissing the charges, the Ombudsman categorically ruled as follows: "It is another story, however, as regards respondent SILVESTRE. In implicating respondent SILVESTRE in the instant case, Atty. DOCTOR stated in his AFFIDAVIT OF ARREST AND COMPLAINT, the following: '6. That after the hearing of the case (S.I. No. 00-005) on January 20, 2000, ATTY. SOMERA approached me and invited me to the room of ATTY. RONNIE SILVESTRE (herein petitioner), Head of the Law Department of the Port of Manila wherein the duo convinced me to cooperate with them in the withdrawal of the complaint and its eventual dismissal; '7. That I did not commit myself to their proposition to drop the case but I just continued talking with them with the plan in mind to report the same to LT. GEN. JOSE T. CALIMLIM, Task Force Commander of Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force ADUANA;' "Except this bare allegation of the complainant, however, practically no other evidence was ever presented to substantiate the charge against respondent SILVESTRE. At this point, it may be noted that well settled is the rule that within the field of administrative law, while strict rules of evidence are not applicable to quasi-judicial proceedings, nevertheless, in adducing evidence constitutive of substantial evidence, the basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence cannot be disregarded. "We are, therefore inclined to believe the defense of respondent SILVESTRE, that what was discussed between him, respondent SOMERA and Atty. DOCTOR on January 20, 2000, was the legal issue on the continued detention of some kitchen wares which were not covered by the Warrant of Seizure and Detention (WSD). This, in light of subsequent Order of the District Collector of the Port of Manila dated March 2, 2000, releasing the said kitchen wares which were indeed, not covered by the Warrant of Seizure and Detention (WSD) x x x "Worthy of note also is the DECISION of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 58958 dated August 14, 2000 entitled RONNIE C. SILVESTRE vs. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO A. DESIERTO, (pages 253 to 254, Records) where in granting the petition for certiorari and prohibition involving the preventive suspension order on respondent SILVESTRE, the said appellate court stated, thus: meikimouse
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"xxx xxx xxx "While the above DECISION may not necessarily be controlling in the resolution of the merits of the instant case insofar as it pertains to respondent SILVESTRE, we cannot help but note its relevancy inasmuch as practically no other evidence was presented by the complainant, other than his AFFIDAVIT OF ARREST AND COMPLAINT to support the charge against respondent SILVESTRE. Needless to state, this is also the very same and only evidence presented before the Court of Appeals which rendered the aforequoted DECISION." WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DISMISSED the petition for mootness.
petitioner was denied due process by the Board when it cancelled the export quota allocations. However, the appellate court ordered the Board to give the petitioner and its officers due hearing to determine whether or not any of its rules and regulations had been violated as to warrant the imposition of any penalty against them. Until such hearings were held, the petitioner's export quota allocations were to remain cancelled and its officers suspended. This modification is now the subject of this petition. The petitioner contended that the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered a new hearing to be conducted unnecessarily since even without controverting evidence, the evidence on record relied upon by the Board failed miserably to measure up to the requisite of "substantial evidence." Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s contention is correct.
MABUHAY TEXTILE MILLS CORP. vs. ONGPIN 141 SCRA 437, G.R. No. L-67784 February 28, 1986 Facts: Petitioner Mabuhay Textile Mills Corporation (Mabuhay) is a corporation engaged in the garments and textile import business for the last twenty-seven years. Among the government requirements for engaging in this type of business are the export quota allocations issued by the respondent Garments and Textile Export Board. The Board granted export quota allocations for 1983 to the petitioner. The petitioner received a letter from the Board informing it that its 1983 export quota allocations were revoked. Furthermore, its major stockholders and officers were also distinguished from engaging in business activities involving garment and textile exports. The Bureau of Customs conducted an investigation pursuant to the above initial findings. The petitioner moved to reconsider the revocation of its export quota allocations and the disqualification of its officers from the export business. Commissioner of Customs responded through a lettercomment addressed to the Board. Petitioner filed an action for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction and restraining order against the Board. The trial court issued a restraining order directing the Board and its officials to desist and to stop from implementing the decision revoking the petitioner's export quota allocations and from disqualifying its principal stockholder and officers from engaging in the textile and garment export business. The Board moved to reconsider but the same was denied. The lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, and among others directed the Board to issue to the petitioner within two days from service of the writ. The Board appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court. The appellate court modified the trial court's decision. It affirmed all the findings of fact of the court and held that the
Held: No. The court ruled that the contention has no merit. Executive Order No. 823 provides, among others: The GTEB shall have the following powers and functions: h. In case of violations of its rules and regulations, cancel or suspend quota allocations, export authorizations and licences for the operation of bonded garment manufacturing warehouses. (Sec. 2[h] Exec. Order No. 823 amended Sec. 3[h] of Exec. Order No. 537). Likewise, under its Rules and Regulations, said Executive Order provides: Rules and Regulations: Section III. Penalties.- Any act or misrepresentation or violation of these Rules and Regulations shall, after due hearing, constitute sufficient ground for the imposition of a fine of not more than ten per cent (10%) of the gross FOB value of the goods exported or for a total or partial forfeiture of the offender's Export Quota, Export Authorization and Export License and permit or temporary disqualification from enjoying the privilege to export under all Agreements on textiles, without prejudice to any liabilities under other applicable laws. (Sec. III, Part 111, Rules and Regulations). It is clear from the above provisions that the respondent Board is the body charged with the function of granting export quota allocations, issuing licenses to operate bonded warehouses and revoking or cancelling the same. Correspondingly, it is also authorized to conduct hearings to determine whether or not violations have been committed by the grantee . The Board acted arbitrarily when, after acting solely upon the initial findings of the Bureau of Customs, it issued the questioned order but once the basis for its action proved nonexistent, it refused to lift its erroneous and unfounded order. However, since the Board has reason to believe that the petitioner might have violated its rules and regulations in connection with the importation of materials for the petitioner's garment industry then it has the discretion to conduct a proper hearing to determine the petitioner's culpability or non-culpability. It does not have to rely on the findings of other agencies to discharge this function.
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In the case at bar, the petitioner was never given the chance to present its side before its export quota allocations were revoked and its officers suspended. While it is true that such allocations as alleged by the Board are mere privileges which it can revoke and cancel as it may deem fit, these privileges have been accorded to petitioner for so long that they have become impressed with property rights especially since not only do these privileges determine the continued existence of the petitioner with assets of over P80,000,000.00 but also the livelihood of some 700 workers who are employed by the petitioner and their families.
REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE CORP. vs. SENDINO 233 SCRA 665, G.R. No. 109703 July 5, 1994 Facts: Private respondent Lucina C. Sendino entered into a reservation agreement with Realty Exchange Venture, Inc. (REVI) for a 120-square meter lot in Raymondville Subdivision in Sucat, Paranaque. He paid the full downpayment on the purchase price. However, she was advised by REVI to change her co-maker, which she agreed, asking for an extension of one month to do so. For alleged non-compliance with the requirement of submission of the appropriate documents under the terms of the original agreement, REVI, informed respondent of the cancellation of the contract. Private respondent filed a complaint for Specific Performance against REVI with the office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) The HLURB rendered its judgment in favor of private respondent and ordered petitioners to continue with the sale of the house and lot and to pay private respondent P5,000 as moral damages, P5,000 as exemplary damages and P6,000 as attorney's fees and costs of the suit. An appeal from this decision was taken to the HLURB OAALA Arbiter, which affirmed the Board's decision. The decision of the OAALA Arbiter was appealed to the Office of the President (OP). The OP rendered its decision dismissing the petitioners' appeal. The Motion for reconsideration of the decision was likewise denied.
In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the agency's enabling act. In view of the Court's pronouncement in United Housing Corporation vs. Hon. Dayrit, supra, recognizing the HLURB as the successor agency of the HSRC's powers and functions, it therefore follows that the transfer of such functions from the NHA to the HRSC effected by Section 8 of E.O. 648, series of 1981, thereby resulted in the acquisition by the HLURB of adjudicatory powers which included the power to "(h)ear and decide cases of unsound real estate business practices . . . and cases of specific performance." Obviously, in the exercise of its powers and functions, the HLURB must interpret and apply contracts, determine the rights of the parties under these contracts, and award damages whenever appropriate. Going to petitioners' contention that the decision of the OAALA should have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners sitting en banc, we find ample authority — both in the statutes and in jurisprudence-justifying the Board's act of dividing itself into divisions of three. Under Section 5 of E.O. 648 which defines the powers and duties of the Commission, the Board is specifically mandated to "(a)dopt rules of procedure for the conduct of its business" and perform such functions necessary for the effective accomplishment of (its) above mentioned functions." The practical necessity of establishing a procedure whereby cases are decided by three (3) Commissioners furthermore assumes greater significance when one notes that the HLURB, as constituted, only has four (4) full time commissioners and five (5) part time commissioners to deal with all the functions, administrative, adjudicatory, or otherwise, entrusted to it. It is settled that rules of procedure are as a matter of course construed liberally in proceedings before administrative bodies. In the instant case, the original suit for specific performance and damages was filed by the private respondent with the HLURBOAALA, an administrative body not hamstrung by the strict procedural technicalities of the Rules of Court. Under the circumstances, it was certainly appropriate for the HLURB-OAALA to have acted on the substantive questions relating to the validity of petitioners' unilateral rescission of the contract without unduly concerning itself with a mere procedural slip, the non-joinder of private petitioner's husband in the original complaint before the HLURB. Moreover, since petitioners participated in the administrative proceedings without objecting to or raising the procedural infirmity, they were certainly estopped from raising it on appeal before the Office of the President and before this Court.
Issue: Whether or not the HLURB has quasi-judicial functions. Held: Yes. The HLURB properly exercised its jurisdiction over the case filed by the petitioners with its adjudicative body, the OAALA, in ordering petitioners to comply with their obligations arising from the Reservation Agreement.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT & ELECTION LAW
REPUBLIC vs MIGRINO 189 SCRA 289, G.R. No. 89483, August 30, 1990 Facts: Acting on information received by the New AFP Anti-Graft Board, which indicated the acquisition of wealth beyond his lawful income, private respondent Ret. Lt.Tecson was required by the Board to submit his explanation/comment together with his supporting evidence. Private respondent was unable to produce his supporting evidence because they were allegedly in the custody of his bookkeeper who had gone abroad. The Board proceeded with its investigation and submitted its resolution, recommending that private respondent be prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, and Rep. Act No. 1379, as amended. The case was set for preliminary investigation by the PCGG. Private respondent moved to dismiss the case on the following grounds: (1) that the PCGG has no jurisdiction over his person; (2) that the action against him under Rep. Act No. 1379 has already prescribed; (3) that E.O. No. 14, insofar as it suspended the provisions of Rep. Act No. 1379 on prescription of actions, was inapplicable to his case; and (4) that having retired from the AFP, he was now beyond the reach of Rep. Act No. 3019. The Board opposed the motion to dismiss. The PCGG denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Private respondent moved for reconsideration but was denied by the PCGG. Private respondent was directed to submit his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidence. Private respondent filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with the RTC. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and opposed the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on the principal ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the Board, citing the case of PCGG v. Pena. Private respondent opposed the motion to dismiss. Petitioner replied to the opposition. The court judge denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss. The respondent judge granted the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining petitioners from investigating or prosecuting private respondent under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 upon the filing of a bond in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos. Petitioner strongly argues that the private respondent’s case falls within the jurisdiction of the PCGG. Hence, this petition. Issues: Whether or not Presidential Commission on Good Government- PCGG has jurisdiction over the case of private respondent Held: No. It will not do to cite the order of the PCGG Chairman, creating the Board and authorizing it to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both retired and in active service, to support the contention that PCGG has jurisdiction over the case of private respondent Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, the term “subordinate” as used in E.O. Nos. 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation with
former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in E.O. No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in E.O. No. 2. Clearly, this alleged unlawful accumulation of wealth is not that contemplated in E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or employee during the administration of former Pres. Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. This is so because otherwise the respondent’s case will fall under existing general laws and procedures on the matter. Rep. Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, penalizes the corrupt practices of any public officer. Under Rep. Act No. 1379 (An Act Declaring Forfeited in Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Procedure Therefor), whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired [Sec. 2]. The Solicitor General shall file the petition and prosecute the case in behalf of the Republic, after preliminary investigation by the provincial or city prosecutor. The resolution alleges that private respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by taking advantage of his office as Finance Officer of the Philippine Constabulary. No attempt is made in the Board’s resolution to link him or his accumulation of wealth to former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. It will not do to cite the order of the PCGG Chairman, dated May 13, 1986, creating the Board and authorizing it to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both retired and in active service, to support the contention that PCGG has jurisdiction over the case of private Respondent. The PCGG cannot do more than what it was empowered to do. Its powers are limited. Its task is limited to the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies. The PCGG cannot, through an order of its chairman, grant itself additional powers — powers not contemplated in its enabling law. But in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and cause the prosecution of private respondent for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must also be enjoined from proceeding with the case, without prejudice to any action that may be taken by the proper prosecutory agency. The rule of law mandates that an agency of government be allowed to exercise only the powers granted it.
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