Admin Law A2015 Finals Reviewer

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEWER Dean Salvador Carlota Second Semester, AY 2012-2013

“Ganyan ang kahalagahan ng batas – bawat kataga ay mahalaga. Kaya dapat lagi kayong cutting edge – dapat nakakasugat!” (Carlota, 2012)

I. HISTORICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS1 A. DEVELOPMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS A DISTINCT FIELD OF PUBLIC LAW (Jamie) 1.

2.

Factors why administrative laws have emerged in the government a. Lack of time - The trichotomy can no longer cope with the complexities of modern society. There were so many problems that the government is unable to respond to these. The solution the trichotomy came up with is to create administrative agencies to provide for delegation of authority b. Lack of expertise – Due to the complexities of modern society, new and highly technical or very specific problems have emerged that require expertise or specialization for its solution. c. Lack of organizational aptitude for effective and continuing regulation of new developments in society – The trichotomy is too unwieldy to be able to concentrate on specialized areas. This fostered an environment for administrative agency proliferation rather than stagnation/decline The doctrine of separation of powers and the constitutional position of administrative agencies

Doctrine of separation of powers delves into the concept of the three branches of government do not encroach on the powers of each other. With the creation of administrative agencies, it has been observed that there is no absolute separation between these entities and the trichotomy because administrative agencies have a hybrid of powers and functions. Some of them are quasi-judicial, quasi1

Please pardon any error (grammatical, spelling, doctrinal etc) that you may find in the Reviewer. Also, please secure the permission of the authors before sharing to others. Thanks and enjoy! -Ed

ADMIN LAW - Carlota Cielo Marjorie A. Goño | Jamie Katrina F. Chan

legislative, etc. However, this does not endanger the separation of powers that the trichotomy possesses Again, due to the complexities of modern life, these administrative agencies have served as the catch basin for the residual powers of the trichotomy. According to some scholars, without the agencies, the system will collapse, and there would be chaos, confusion and anarchy B. DEFINITION OF TERMS – ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY; TYPES OF AGENCIES ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – the law concerning the powers and procedures of administrative agencies including specially the law governing judicial review of administrative actions Powers correspond to executive, legislative and judicial Procedures are those that are adjudication, licensing, rule making ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY – any governmental authority other than the court and other than a legislative body, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule making (Davis) Administrative agencies can assume many labels such as commission, board, authority, office. Therefore it is not always labeled as an agency. Types of administrative agency: a. Statutory agencies – created by law b. Constitutional agencies – created by the Constitution. Since they are created by the Congress, they are considered as independent and can only be abolished or modified through a constitutional amendment Public officials in these administrative agencies are provided with protective devices such as security of tenure, impeachment as method of removal, fiscal autonomy, prohibited from holding other office standards Administrative procedure as a mode of control There are certain factors to be considered in prescribing rules: (a) Admin agencies are not bound by the same technical rules of procedure and evidence followed in regular courts; (b) Agencies are created to deal with specific problems.

Page 1 of 56

Basic principle when it comes to the power of administrative agencies to prescribe rules:  The legislature should only provide minimum procedural guidelines and general principles to be observed by all agencies in the performance of their rule making and adjudicative functions.  Ratio: This will assure sufficient room for the agencies to come up with supplementary rules that may be needed from time to time, while at the same time, it will provide adequate protection to the individual’s constitutional right to due process. Judicial review of administrative decision making:  The purpose of judicial review is to keep the admin agency within its jurisdiction and protect substantial rights of parties affected by its decisions. It is part of the system of checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestall arbitrary and unjust adjudications.  Judicial review is the most effective form of control because it provides an immediate relief to complainant  If you will apply judicial review of the rules or decisions made by administrative agencies, we will see that it becomes a channel for those complainants who feel that administrative rules have affected their constitutional rights. However, the court chooses not to interfere unless there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the administrative agency C. CASES Pangasinan Transportation Co v. PSC Pursuant to Sec 1 of Commonwealth Act, PSC can issue a "certificate of public convenience," or "certificate of convenience and public necessity" to operators of buses and trucks. However, the conditions were that government may acquire the vehicle and the certificate will be for a limited period only. Held: CONSTITUTIONAL because all that has been delegated to the PSC is an administrative function, involving the use discretion, to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion of "public interests in a proper and suitable manner." In general, In fact the conditions can be found in the constitution re: just compensation for acquisition of public vehicles and the period was limited. Moreover, Congress may delegate administrative functions such as the use of discretion to carry out the will of Congress. The ratio behind Congress now being allowed to delegate is due to the growing complexities of modern life wherein


Manila Electric Company v. Pasay Transportation Company Pursuant to Act No 1466, Sec 11 states that whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any other person or corporation (such as MERALCO) the terms and compensation shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final. Held: UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions. Just think, if anyone brings the case and it reaches the SC, the justices who will review the case were the ones who prescribed those terms and compensation. Noblejas v. Teehankee Pursuant to RA 1151 which states that he is "entitled to the same compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance", Noblejas should be investigated by the SC like a CFI Judge. Held: NO. There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislature to charge the judiciary with administrative functions such as control and supervision of administrative agencies except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties. Control and supervision of administrative agencies fall under the control and supervision of the President. Garcia v. Macaraig Garcia was appointed as a judge but never assumed office as judge so he accepted the job under the DOJ Secretary. Held: FROWNED UPON. According to the concurring opinion: detailing justices has pernicious effects on the independence and undermine interest of judiciary. In Re: Rodolfo Manzano Judge Manzano wrote to the SC if he can accept appointment as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice (E.O. 326) that perform administrative functions Held: DISAPPROVED. Under the Constitution, the members of the SC and other Courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Art. VIII (12)). Puyat v. De Guzman

Page 2 of 56

Justice Estaislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the interim Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel in a case on corporate elections. Pursuant to Section 11m Art 8 of the 1973 Constitution, “No member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without appellate jurisdiction…or before any administrative body”. Held: UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any administrative body via Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.

“This is elementary! Only Pepe and Pilar. If after this, tinanong ka sa Bar at di mo nasagot, what should you do? Go to the nearest Meralco post and hang yourself!” (Carlota, 2013) II. CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION Notes: The different ways how administrative powers may be checked A. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE EXECUTIVE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT Art. 7, Section 1. Executive Power The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines. Art. 7, Section 17. Control over admin agencies The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. Class notes on Art 7, Sec 17: Last sentence is part of the powers of the executive; according to Sir, take time to reflect on how Art 7, Sec 17 can be connected to the definition of administrative agencies Executive power: To promulgate or execute laws The two ways in which the President exercises his disciplinary powers: a. Control: Power to alter, modify or overturn the judgment of the subordinates [in other words, how to substitute]  See to it that subordinates are doing their jobs  Limited to executive departments, bureaus, offices  This is the greater power


b. Supervision: Ensure that laws are faithfully executed  More encompassing than control – no qualification Can the President control ALL admin agencies? It depends on whether the enabling statute has given power of review to the President  Under Sec. 17, Art 7, the President has control over agencies created by statutes o Power of legislature over agencies must be subordinate to Sec. 17, unless the law expressly says otherwise  If the law is silent as to who is silent, then there is a presumption that the Congress did not intend for the President to have control over the administrative agency  Constitutional agencies (i.e. Comelec and CoA) are not controlled by the President because they are independent constitutional creations o Note: go back to definition of constitutional agencies in Part I

B. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT POWER  It is a tool for controlling/checking the exercise of power/acts of administrative agencies  Seeing to it that the agencies follow legislative intention  Part of Congress’ prerogative in delegating powers of Congress to agencies  Scrutiny, investigation, legislative supervision  This is to show that the Congress is being proactive What is the purpose of oversight? a. To monitor the laws created by administrative agencies b. To look at the application by an administrative agency of a statute Macalintal v. Comelec (Dissenting/Concurring Opinion of Puno)  The power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted  Oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives; (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered; (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty; (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority; and (e) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest.

Page 3 of 56



Categories of congressional oversight functions: a. Scrutiny – primary purpose is to determine economy and efficiency of the operation of government activities. Based primarily on the power of appropriation and power of confirmation b. Investigation – recognized under Sec 21, Art. 6 of 1987 Constitution a. This power has to be in aid of legislation and in accordance with duly published rules of procedure c. Supervision – connotes a continuing and informed awareness regarding executive operations in a given administrative area. Exercised thru the veto power.

C. ARTICLE: LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONMAKING (CARLOTA) Class note: The Ombudsman goes hand in hand with judicial review in order to become a wide and powerful range of control mechanisms of administrative agencies Legislative control over Admin agencies: 1.

Power of creation, appropriation and investigation) a. Creation – congress creates rather than abolishes as society becomes more complex. State is compelled to create admin agencies to deal with problems brought by social and economic change. a. Also carries with it the power to abolish as it is similar to the power to create. b. In reality, this power to abolish is an empty threat because without administrative agencies, the trichotomy will not be able to function properly for they do not have the time, specialization and appropriate organization structure b. Appropriation – Congress has the power to withhold funds for the agencies but at the end of the day it is reluctant in wielding such power because is recognizes that is it does, it will affect public interest. c. Investigation – limited tool to provide as effective regular control of improper exercise of admin power.


2.

Non-delegation doctrine and the requirement of legislative standards which is ancillary to the principle of separation of powers  The more specific the standards are, the greater are the chances of confining administrative discretion within proper limits. If the standards are too broad or vague, the administrator is virtually left to his own devices, thereby allowing him to exercise discretion in the performance of his functions. o This also refers to the unbridled/unfettered discretion that could lead to grave abuse of discretion  A review of the cases decided by the SC shows that in many instances of delegation, the legislature is unable to provide definite of specific standards. o The power to make laws should be exercised/performed by Congress  Congress does not abdicate its responsibility by delegating this power to administrative agencies o Dean Carlota opines that the legislation of the Administrative Code of 1987 has led to a better lay down of what standards should be recognized. The Admin Code statutorily recognizes the minimum standards that administrative agencies should follow when promulgating rules, etc. In fact, administrative agencies through this Code may make their own house rules which uniquely conform to and are required in their specific area of concern.  Administrative procedure as a mode of control o This is the most promising checking mechanism o There are certain factors to be considered in prescribing rules: (a) admin agencies are not bound by the same technical rules of procedure and evidence followed in regular courts; (b) agencies are created to deal with specific problems. o Even if it is possible, which is not, to impose uniform rules of procedure in all levels of all

Page 4 of 56

o

agency operations, such a move is clearly unsound  The effect of this is to curb abuses Legislature should only provide minimum procedural guidelines and general principles to be observed by all agencies in the performance of their rule making and adjudicative functions. This will assure sufficient room for the agencies to come up with supplementary rules that may be needed from time to time, while at the same time, it will provide adequate protection to the individual’s constitutional right to due process.

Judicial review of Admin decision making:  The purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect substantial rights of parties affected by its decisions. It is part of the system of checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestall arbitrary and unjust adjudications. Judicial review is the most effective form of control – provides immediate relief to complainant  Part of police power  Channel for adversely affected parties to vindicate constitutional rights Judicial review is limited or restrained:  For policy choices: court does not interfere with agencies  Discretion: no interference  UNLESS there is grave abuse of discretion

D. ARTICLE: THE OMBUDSMAN: ITS EFFECTIVITY AND VISIBILITY AMIDST BUREAUCRATIC ABUSE AND IRREGULARITY (CARLOTA)  Essential characteristics of an Ombudsman: a. Political independence – fiscal autonomy, prohibition to practice profession, removable only by impeachment, can appoint all officers and employees of his office He should promote the cause of good governance He is the protector of the people therefore given broad investigatory powers


b.

c.

d.

Accessibility and expedition – within the reach of ordinary citizens; as opposed to the courts which are not easily within reach of poor This is why the Ombudsman should have as many officer as possible Investigatory power – the Ombudsman not only has the power to investigate but also the power to prosecute on his own initiative or upon complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient Absence of revisory jurisdiction – Ombudsman cannot modify or overturn decisions of admin agencies performing rule making or adjudicative functions. He may not exercise the function for an appellate or reviewing court It is not an appellate tribunal

Is the Ombudsman institution workable in the Philippines? – NO  The perception that the Ombudsman’s role as Protector of the People has not been satisfactorily performed can be reversed by adopting measures designed to correct perceived shortcomings. E. CASES Concerned Officials of MWSS v. Vasquez The ombudsman assumed jurisdiction over the complaint of illegal bidding in the MWSS even if apparently it is outside his jurisdiction under the Ombudsman Act. Held: NO JURISDICTION. The Ombudsman Act makes says that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses 'all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office. He also has no veto or revisory power over an exercise of judgment or discretion by an administrative agency or its officer upon whom that judgment or discretion is lawfully vested. Note: The powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman have generally been categorized into: Investigatory Power; Prosecutory Power; Public Assistance Functions; Authority to Inquire and Obtain Information; and Function to Adopt, Institute and Implement; the issue in controversy is technical in nature which means that it requires the specialization of agencies so the agencies should handle it

Page 5 of 56

Lastimoza v. Vasquez An administrative complaint was filed against the Municipal Mayor for immoral acts, abuse of authority and grave misconduct. Held: Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute crimes committed by public officials even if they are not related to his public office.

is directed to. Under Section 13(3) of Article XI of the constitution, the ombudsman has the power to recommend the sanction which is binding. This means that when the Ombudsman “recommends” the action to be taken against an erring officer/employee, the implementation of the action should be complied with or, simply, is mandatory.

BIR v. Office of the Ombudsman Ombudsman investigated anomalous tax refunds of a company. Held: The Ombudsman can validly exercise its power to investigate even when there exist an appropriate case. The power to investigate and to prosecute all officers granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified; the 1987 Constitution provides that it shall have the power to investigate encompasses all kinds of acts and omissions committed by any public official

Estarija v. Ranada Respondent was adjudged guilty of dishonesty by the ombudsman and was thereafter dismissed. Held: INVALID. The powers/reports of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. In fact, the Ombudsman is given the authority to enforce its decisions thru dismissals because the intention of the constitution, and consequently, the congress thru the Ombudsman Act, is to give the Ombudsman powers that are not only persuasive or recommendatory in character.

Class notes: The Ombudsman may even investigate the president and then submit his/her report to Congress to be studied as grounds for impeachment

Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing A principal and an officer clerk were administratively charged before the Office of the Ombudsman for allegedly collecting unauthorized fees, failing to remit authorized fees, and to account for public funds. It was contended that DECS has jurisdiction over the case and not the Ombudsman. HELD: INVALID CONTENTION. The law gives the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority over erring officials.

Office of the Ombudsman v. ENOC Employees of office of the southern cultural communities were charged with 11 counts of malversation through falsification. It was investigated by the ombudsman. It was claimed by the accused that the ombudsman has no authority to prosecute graft cases falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts. HELD: The office of the Ombudsman has powers to prosecute not only graft cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable by the regular courts. Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman – Mindanao A judge, was charged by the Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan. HELD: INVALID. The ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint against a judge and must indorse the case to the supreme court, for appropriate action. Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the supreme court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the presiding justice of the court of appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk Ledesma v. CA The fact finding and intelligence bureau (FIIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman conducted an investigation on anomalies regarding visa transactions. These reports were used by the FIIB to file a case against the public officials involved. Held: VALID. The Ombudsman’s administrative investigations’ results are not merely advisory but has a binding effect upon the officer to which the decision


“This could be asked in the bar! The bar can be about the rule, or the exceptions, or it can be about anything!” (Carlota, 2013)

III. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES A. LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS (cielo) 1. Non-delegation doctrine Potestas delegata non delegare potest. – What has been delegated cannot be delegated. Requisites for a valid delegation: 1. The law must be complete in itself; it must set forth the policy to be executed. 2. The law must fix a standard, the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable, to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions CASES:

Page 6 of 56

Compania General de Tobaco v. Board of Public Utility Commission Power delegated: Pursuant to Act No. 2307, the Board of Public Utility can require every public utility to furnish annual detail report of finances and operations Held: INVALID delegation. The law is very general and comprehensive as to the kind and content of the reports. The Legislature should have specified the policy and rules that the Board will follow. The standard requirement was strictly interpreted. U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho Power delegated: Based on Act No. 2868, the Governor General is authorized to prescribe the standard price of rice for any cause. Violation of the price ceiling would result to criminal liability Held: INVALID delegation. Decision is left to the governor general’s discretion and the law does not specify the conditions under which the price can be increased. There is also strict interpretation of standard. Note also that power to define a criminal act is essentially legislative and cannot be delegated People v. Vera Power delegated: Based on Act 4221 or the Probation Law, the provincial boards can determine whether funds should be appropriated for the salary of a probation officer Held: INVALID delegation. The provincial boards have the full discretion to determine whether the probation law, a general legislation, can apply to their jurisdiction. Note also the exceptions to non-delegation doctrine: a. Local legislation b. Delegation of emergency powers in times of national emergency c. Permissible delegation (with ascertainment of facts only) Pelaez v. Auditor General Power delegated: Based on Section 68 of the old Revised Admin Code, the President issed Eos to create 33 municipalities Held: INVALID Delegation. The power to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. The power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction, may partake of an administrative nature, the authority to create municipal corporations is a power of Congress. Note that this case enunciates the Test for valid delegation: a. The law must be complete in itself and sets forth the policy b. The law fixes the standard and limits Edu v. Ericta


Power delegated: Based on the Reflector Law, Land Transportation Commissioner issued Administrative Order 2 requiring the use of early warning device by vehicles Held: VALID Delegation. There is a standard here, albeit implied, which makes the delegation valid. The policy of the state to ensure public safety is the objective of the law. Agustin v. Edu Power delegated: Based on the Marcos-issued Letter of Instruction 229, the Land Transpo Commissioner imposed the Early Warning Device as a registration requirement for vehicles Held: VALID delegation. Public safety is also upheld as a valid standard, even if not expressed in the law. Sir also noted that Vienna Convention on Road Safety and Signs, to which the Philippines is a signatory, must also be followed considering the doctrine of incorporation. Free Telephone Workers Union Power delegated: Based on BP 130, amending Article 264 of the Labor Code, the Ministry of Labor can assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for voluntary arbitration to the NLRC Held: VALID delegation. Although the power to assume jurisdiction was originally given to the President, by virtue of the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency (Villena v. Exec. Sec.), the Minister is the alter ego of the President, hence, he can exercise his power. Philcomsat v. Alcuaz Power delegated: Based on EO 546, NTC ordered Philcomsat to impose a reduced rated Held: VALID delegation. There is an implied standard here, that is public safety and interest, that empowers NTC to reduce rates being charged by telecom companies. BUT! NTC lost the case on due process grounds for failure to give Philcomsat notice and hearing. Sir discussed the Vigan Electric case: two types of rate fixing: quasi legislative and quasi judicial. If it applies to all, that is quasi legislative. But if it calls for the determination of certain facts and applies only to one specific entity, it is quasi-judicial and the body affected is entitled to notice and hearing Chiongbian v. Orbos Power delegated: Based on RA 6734, the President merged territories in administrative regions Held: VALID delegation. The power delegated to the President is administrative. Administrative regions are not political subdivisions but mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, not for political representation. The standard is found in another law: RA 5435 Promote simplicity, economy, efficiency in the government.

Page 7 of 56

Santiago v. Comelec Power delegated: Comelec claims that RA 6735 gives it the power to formulate rules in conducting initiatives to amend the constitution. It issued Resolution 2300 to give way to the Delfin petition Held: INVALID delegation. The law is not sufficient to enable the constitutional provision on initiatives, hence, the Comelec has no power. The recognized exceptions to the rule of non delegation are as follows: a. Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution; b. Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution; c. Delegation to the people at large; d. Delegation to local governments; and e. Delegation to administrative bodies. J. Puno, concurring and dissenting: 1.) There is sufficient standard expressed in the law 2.) Law should be upheld on the argument that substantive right to initiative trumps nondelegation argument; intent of framers 3.) Liberal policy of the courts in deciding delegation of powers to admin bodies - courts will bend backwards to find a standard

Power delegated: The President issued EO 566 which authorized the CHED to supervise the establishment of review centers. CHED subsequently issued a Memorandum implementing the EO. Held: INVALID exercise of rule-making power. The law creating CHED, RA 7722, does not authorize it to regulate review center which is not an institution of higher education or degree-granting program. A.F.A Schecter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. Power delegated: Sec 3 of NIRA allows trade associations of industries to recommend to the President Codes of Fair Competition that can be applied to their industries. In this case, the Live Poultry Code was adopted in New York. Held: INVALID delegation. There are no standards or policy in the law that allows private entities to make the recommendation. Says Cardozo, this is delegation running riot. FEA v. Algonquin Power delegated: Based on Sec 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Treasury, allows the President to take such action as he deems necessary to adjust the importation the article if their quantities threaten to impair national security. The President adjusted petroleum imports and imposed license fees Held: VALID delegation. The use of a license system to control the quantities of articles may be allowed under the law.

Panama Refining v. Ryan Power delegated: Sec 9c of the NIRA authorized the President to prohibit transportation of hot oil (those in excess of state quota). The President issued EOs to implement this provision Held: INVALID delegation. The law does not provide sufficient standards or policy but left the decision to the discretion of the President.

White v. Roughton Facts: Roughton determined eligibility of welfare recepients based on his and his staff’s unwritten personal standards. Held: INVALID delegation standard must be fair and consistent and based on written standards and regulations.

Cardozo dissent: there is sufficient policy in the law like the conservation of the environment, elimination of unfair competition and fullest utilization of production capacity.

2. Permissible Delegation a. Ascertainment of fact Panama Refining, supra

Abakada Guro Party List v. Executive Secretary Power delegated: RA 9337 gave the President standby authority to increase the VAT rate on account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of Finance Held: VALID delegation. What is involved here is merely ascertainment if the factual conditions exist to enable the President to raise the tax rates. It will be ministerial on the part of the Executive and not discretionary. Review Center Association v. Ermita


Lovina v. Moreno F: Residents of Macabebe petitioned Moreno, Secretary of Public Works to remove the obstructions imposed by the Lovina spouses at Sapang Bulati creek. By the power RA 2056 gave to Moreno, he found the river to be navigable and that the obstructions are public nuisance which should be removed. H: VALID delegation to Moreno. RA 2056 validly delegated the judicial power to the Secretary to remove unauthorized obstructions. It requires only ascertainment of facts and apply the law which is what the Secretary did in this case.

Page 8 of 56

b.

Filing in of details Alegre v. Collector of Customs Power delegated: Act 2380 requires a certificate from the Fiber Standardization Board before an abaca exporter (like Alegre) would be allowed to export. The Administrative Code provides for grading, inspection and certification standards. Held: VALID delegation. The law provides for specific standards that the admin agency should observe in issuing the certificate. c.

Administrative Rule Making

Book VII, Administrative Code of 1987 Section 1. Scope. - This Book shall be applicable to all agencies as defined in the next succeeding section, except the Congress, the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, military establishments in all matters relating exclusively to Armed Forces personnel, the Board of Pardons and Parole, and state universities and colleges. Section 2. Definitions. - As used in this Book: (1) "Agency" includes any department, bureau, office, commission, authority or officer of the National Government authorized by law or executive order to make rules, issue licenses, grant rights or privileges, and adjudicate cases; research institutions with respect to licensing functions; government corporations with respect to functions regulating private right, privileges, occupation or business; and officials in the exercise of disciplinary power as provided by law. (2) "Rule" means any agency statement of general applicability that implements or interprets a law, fixes and describes the procedures in, or practice requirements of, an agency, including its regulations. The term includes memoranda or statements concerning the internal administration or management of an agency not affecting the rights of, or procedure available to, the public. (3) "Rate" means any charge to the public for a service open to all and upon the same terms, including individual or joint rates, tolls, classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as commutation, mileage, kilometerage and other special rates which shall be imposed by law or regulation to be observed and followed by any person. (4) "Rule making" means an agency process


for the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule. (5) "Contested case" means any proceeding, including licensing, in which the legal rights, duties or privileges asserted by specific parties as required by the Constitution or by law are to be determined after hearing. (6) "Person" includes an individual, partnership, corporation, association, public or private organization of any character other than an agency. (7) "Party" includes a person or agency named or admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party, in any agency proceeding; but nothing herein shall be construed to prevent an agency from admitting any person or agency as a party for limited purposes. (8) "Decision" means the whole or any part of the final disposition, not of an interlocutory character, whether affirmative, negative, or injunctive in form, of an agency in any matter, including licensing, rate fixing and granting of rights and privileges. (9) "Adjudication" means an agency process for the formulation of a final order. (10) "License" includes the whole or any part of any agency permit, certificate, passport, clearance, approval, registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or other form of permission, or regulation of the exercise of a right or privilege. (11) "Licensing" includes agency process involving the grant, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal, limitation, amendment, modification or conditioning of a license. (12) "Sanction" includes the whole or part of a prohibition, limitation or other condition affecting the liberty of any person; the withholding of relief; the imposition of penalty or fine; the destruction, taking, seizure or withholding of property; the assessment of damages, reimbursement, restitution, compensation, cost, charges or fees; the revocation or suspension of license; or the taking of other compulsory or restrictive action. (13) "Relief" includes the whole or part of any grant of money, assistance, license, authority, privilege, exemption, exception, or remedy; recognition of any claim, right, immunity, privilege, exemption or exception; or taking of any action upon the application or petition of any person. (14) "Agency proceeding" means any

Page 9 of 56

agency process with respect to rule-making, adjudication and licensing. 1. "Agency action" includes the whole or part of every agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief or its equivalent or denial thereof. CHAPTER 2 RULES AND REGULATIONS Section 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action. (3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection. Section 4. Effectivity. - In addition to other rulemaking requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. Section 5. Publication and Recording. - The University of the Philippines Law Center shall: (1) Publish a quarter bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed with it during the preceding quarter; and (2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published and remaining in effect, together with a complete index and appropriate tables. Section 6. Omission of Some Rules. (1) The University of the Philippines Law Center may omit from the bulletin or the codification any rule if its publication would be unduly cumbersome, expensive or otherwise inexpedient, but copies of that rule shall be made available on application to the agency which adopted it, and the bulletin shall contain a notice stating the general subject matter of the omitted rule


and new copies thereof may be obtained. (2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which, pursuant to law, is punishable as a crime or subject to a penalty shall in all cases be published in full text. Section 7. Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules. - The University of the Philippines Law Center shall furnish one (1) free copy each of every issue of the bulletin and of the codified rules or supplements to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts and the National Library. The bulletin and the codified rules shall be made available free of charge to such public officers or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs. Section 8. Judicial Notice. - The court shall take judicial notice of the certified copy of each rule duly filed or as published in the bulletin or the codified rules. Section 9. Public Participation. (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule. (2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon. (3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed. (1) Limits of Rule Making Power Olsen v Aldanese (1922) Law: Act 2613 empowers the Collector of Internal Revenue to establish rules for the classification of tobacco for domestic sale or export Rule: CIR issued Admin Order 35 which, among others, requires that tobacco must come from Cagayan, Isabela and Nueva Viscaya Held: INVALID provision. There is nothing in the law that requires that tobacco must only come from those provinces. CIR exceeded its authority. Syman v Jacinto (1953) Law: Administrative Code provisions, particularly Sec 1393, only requires assessment cases to be subject to Commissioner’s review even if not appealed.

Page 10 of 56

Rule: BOC issued a Memorandum Order which states that seizure cases, whether appealed or no, are subject to the review of the Commissioner of Customs. Held: INVALID rule. A rule should not amend or revise the law. People v Maceren (1977) Law: Fisheries Law (this is the old one) only punishes the use of toxic or obnoxious substances in fishing. Rule: Fisheries Admin Order 84-01 was issued by the Secretary of the DENR which also penalized electro fishing. Held: INVALID rule. Defining a crime is essentially legislative, admin agencies are not allowed to punish an act as a crime if not defined by law. Toledo v CSC (1991) Law: RA 2260, as amended by PD 807, authorized the Civil Service Commission to prescribe or amend rules and regulations governing the civil service. Rule: Sec 22 of Rule III of the CSC Rules on Personnel Action prohibits the appointment of persons beyond 57 years old. Held: INVALID rule. The rule should be germane to the purpose of the law. Age limit of public servants is not contemplated by the law. GMCR v Bell Telecom (1997) Law: EO 41 (Cory still had legislative powers) allowed for a one-time tax amnesty for unpaid taxes. Rule: CIR issued Revenue Memorandum 4-84 stating that the amnesty applies only after the EO was promulgated. Held: INVALID rule. Admin rules should carry out, not supplant or modify the law. The law here is specific about the exceptions, tax liabilities before the EO was issued was not among those excluded. Land Bank v CA (1995) Law: Section 16e of RA 6557 requires that payment to the landowners as just compensation for their land under the Agrarian Reform should be made in cash or bonds. Rule: DAR issued Admin Order 9 that allowed that payment be earmarked or use of trust accounts instead of cash deposits as payment to the land oweners. Held: INVALID rule. The rule violates the clear mandate of the law under the policy of the state that landowners not only be given payment, but prompt payment. GMRC Inc. v. Bell Telecom (1997) Law: EO 546 was issued by Pres. Marcos to create the National Telecommunications Commission, a collegial body composed of three commissioners. Rule: The Chair of the NTC issued resolutions to the effect that the decision of the Chairperson will bind


Held: INVALID rule. The law created NTC as a collegial body requiring majority vote out of the three members. Ass’n of Phil. Coconut Desiccators v PHILCOA (1998) Law: PD 1468 gave the PCA the authority to adopt a general program for the development of the coconut industry. Rule: PCA issued Resolution 018-93 which allowed operation of DCN plants even in congested areas (previously prohibited) as part of PCA’s thrust to deregulate the coconut industry. Held: INVALID rule. An admin rule cannot dismantle the regulatory scheme imposed by the law to an agency. Ople v Torres (1998) Law: Administrative Code of 1987 gives the President the power to enforce rules for the efficient functioning of administrative agencies. Rule: Ramos issued Admin Order 308 that adopts a national computerized ID system. Held: INVALID rule. The adoption of the ID system creates rights and imposes duties on the people. It also raises issues on basic civil rights of the people, like privacy, resolution of which can also be achieved thru legislation by Congress. Phil. Bank of Communications v. CIR (1999) Law: Sec 230 of the NIRC provides for 2-year prescriptive period for the filing of claims from erroneously collected taxes. Rule: CIR issued RMC 7-85 which allows for a 10-year prescriptive period in filing tax refund claims. Held: INVALID rule. China Banking v Member of the Board of Trustees, Home Development Mutual Fund (1999) Law: Section 19 of PD 1752, as amended, allows employers to avail of exemption from HDMF’s housing and retirement program if the employer offers for a superior housing AND/OR retirement plan over that offered by PAGIBIG. Rule: HDMF Circular 124-B was issued which requires that for a waiver to be allowed, the employer must have superior retirement AND housing plans. Held: INVALID rule. The admin agency is not given the power to interpret the requirement which the law allows to be used interchangeably. Maxima Realty v Parkway Real Estate (2004) Law: PD 1344 provides that NHA decisions will be final and executor 15 days from receipt by the party. Rule: Sec 27 of the HLURB Rules of Procedure provides for 30 days period to appeal NHA decisions to the Office of the President before they become final and executory.

Page 11 of 56

Held: INVALID rule. The special law should govern based on AO 18 that unless a special law is applicable, then the appeal to the OP will be within 30 days. Lokin Jr v. COMELEC (2010) Law: Sec 8 of RA 7941 states that alteration of the order of nominees will only be allowed if the nominee dies, become incapacitated or he withdraws his nomination. Rule: Sec 13 of Resolution 7804 allows the partlist to withdraw the nomination. Held: INVALID rule. Even a constitutional commission’s rule making power is limited by the law. (2) Publication and Effectivity (Jamie) People v. Que Po Lay Statute: Circular No. 20 was allegedly not published in the Official Gazette therefore said circular had no force and effect Held: YES. Circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. Absence a special provision and because it prescribes a penalty therefore should be published before becoming effective, we look at the fifteen days following publication for its date of effectivity. Phil. Blooming Mills v. SSS Statute/s: Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161; Original SSS provision - If an alien is temporarily employed, employers will be entitled to a rebate of a proportionate amount of their contributions once they leave the Phils; Amended SSS provision – requirement of 2 years of employment of aliens Held: AMENDMENT EFFECTIVE AND BINDING. The amendment was to take effect upon approval of the President and not upon publication. According to this case, publication of laws in the OG is material for the purpose of determining their effectivity, only if the statutes themselves do not so provide. The delayed publication of the amended rules in the Official Gazette did not affect the date of their effectivity. These rules and regulations were promulgated to provide guidelines to be observed in the enforcement of the law. These are just general principles and not the implementation of the law. Class notes: The word “unless” in Art 2 of the Civil Code covers the requirement of publication. Tanada v. Tuvera Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general


orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. Held: MANDAMUS GRANTED. All unpublished presidential issuances that are of general application will have no binding force and effect until published. Art 2 should be construed that the phrase “unless otherwise provided” qualifies the fact of date of effectivity, or days of publication, and not whether or not publication is an option. Important textbookish notes:  What should be publishes? o All laws except interpretative and internal rules Note from Sir: Tanada v. Tuvera goes hand in hand with the concept of filing in the ONAR Phil. Association of Service Exporters Inc. v. Torres Statutes: Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1991 - providing guidelines on the Government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers; and POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series of 1991, on the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong. This was allegedly not published and filed with ONAR. Held: NOT LEGALLY VALID. Circulars issued by the admin agency are not legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987. De Jesus v. COA Statute: DBM circular discontinuing without qualification all allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of basic salary. Held: INVALID. Circular has no legal force and effect because of absence of publication Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. This is not a mere interpretative or internal regulation. It tends to deprive government workers of their allowances and additional compensation sorely needed to keep body and soul together. Republic Represented by NTC v. Express Telecom and Bayan Telecom Statute: Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure: “Upon the filing of an application, complaint or petition or at any stage thereafter, the Board may grant on motion of the pleader or on its own initiative, the relief prayed for,...”.

Page 12 of 56

This was only filed with ONAR and not published. Held: INVALID. Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Has to be both published in OG or newspaper of general circulation and filed with ONAR, because the Administrative Code does not say that filing with the ONAR is what makes it effective. Class note: This case reaffirms Tanada. Nasecore v. ERC MERALCO wanted to increase its rates, but instead of being published, it only went through public consultation. Held: INVALID. Publication is a condition sine qua non for effectivity. Consultation does not comply with the publication requirement because publication is mandatory. GMA7 v. MTRCB GMA Network was suspended for not getting a permit from the MTRCB. The suspension was pursuant to Memorandum Circular 98-17 Held: INVALID SUSPENSION. Administrative issuances which are not published or filed with the ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced. (3) Penal Regulations People v. Que Po Lay, supra As a general rule, circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties for their violation should be published before effecivity because of the principle that before a public is bound by the contents of a law, regulation, or circular, it must first be published so that they may be officially informed of its contents and penalties. People v. Maceren, supra Held: Rules and regulations may identify acts which can be penalized, only if they are penalized by the statute the R&R emanates from. It is good to remember that "to declare what shall constitute a crime and how it shall be punished is a power vested exclusively in the legislature, and it may not be delegated to any other body or agency". A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative agency has the right to make rules and regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, that power should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal statute.


(4) Interpretative Rules Interpretative rules are merely advisory in nature as the true interpreter of rules, statutes and laws is the Court. Emilio Hilado v. CIR and CTA Statute: General Circual No. V-123 by the Sec of Finance - revoked and declared void General Circular No. V-123 and declaring that losses of property which occurred during the period of World War II from fires, storms, shipwreck are deductible in the year of actual loss or destruction of said property. Held: VALID REVOCATION. General Circular No. V-123 was issued as an implementation or interpretative regulation of Sec 30 of the National Internal Revenue Code which prescribed that losses sustained are allowable as deduction only within the corresponding taxable year. Because it is an interpretation, it is considered as an opinion of the agency on how a rule/law should be implemented which makes it not binding on the courts because the court is the final interpreter of the law. Lastly, interpretations of the statute that have been erroneous becomes a nullity. Victorias v. Social Security Commission Statute: Circular No. 22 of the following tenor - all Employers in computing the premiums due the System, will take into consideration and include in the Employee's remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. All these will comprise the Employee's remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2-1/2% contributions will be based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one month. Held: It is an interpretative rule. Circular No. 22 in question was issued by the Social Security Commission, in view of the amendment of the provisions of the Social Security Law defining the term "compensation" where bonuses, allowances, and overtime pay given in addition to the regular or base pay were included. A rule that is supposed to advice the people of amendments of the law does not require presidential approval and publication in the OG for its effectivity. Peralta v. Civil Service Commission Statute: Resolution No. 90-497 - an employee who has no more leave credit in his favor is not entitled to the payment of salary on Saturdays, Sundays or holidays unless such non-working days occur within the period of service actually rendered. Held: INVALID. RA 2625 specifically provides that government employees are entitled to 15 days vacation leave of absence with full pay and 15 days sick leave with full pay, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays in both cases. They cannot be or are not considered absent on non-working days; they cannot and should not be deprived of their salary

Page 13 of 56

corresponding to said non-working days just because they were absent without pay on the day immediately prior to, or after said non-working days. Administrative interpretation of the law is not necessarily binding upon the courts. Here, the agency is just interpreting a pre-existing law and is just advisory because the SC is the interpreter of laws. Note from Sir: The purpose of the bill is to exclude from the computation of the leave those days (Saturdays, Sundays as well as Holidays) because actually the employee is entitled not to go to office during those days. And it is unfair and unjust to him that those days should be counted in the computation of leaves. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus. The law does not provide for a distinction between those who have accumulated leave credits and those who have exhausted their leave credits in order to enjoy such right. (5) Examples of Rule-making in Various Agencies Note: The main issue the held is answering WON the rule promulgated/amended rule promulgated is valid. Director of Forestry v. Munoz Piadeco had a private woodland which it had registered with the Bureau of Forestry; this was cancelled by Acting Director of Forestry Apolonio Rivera because Piadeco had been cutting the trees in two Watershed Reservations which was expressly prohibited. Law: Sec 1829 of the RAC. Sec 1817 of the RAC empowers the Bureau of Forestry, with the approval of the department head, to issue regulations deemed expedient or necessary to secure the protection and conservation of the public forests Rule promulgated: AO 12-1, par c, Sec 5 recognized titles by administrative titles, judicial titles and titles from Spanish sovereignty as kinds of titles of woodland that may be registered by the Bureau of Registry. Amended rule promulgated: AO 12-2 omitted titles from Spanish sovereignty from the list. Held: VALID because germane to the purpose of the law. The purpose of the law is that lots should be registered so the government can monitor it as the government wants to preserve forests. This is the most minimum requirement that must be observed in rulemaking by administrative agencies. Notes: 

The rule promulgated is the one being questioned


What should be focused on according to Sir:  Why should a mere rule exclude a category of title which under the law is allowable to be registered?  Is this not amending the law? Sir’s critique of the case:  The reason why the Court ruled this way is probably because Piadeco’s title is most likely bogus.  However, what happens now to Piadeco if his title was really real? o The rule seems to collide with the law o It therefore has the pernicious effect of denial of equal protection of the laws to the holders of Spanish titles which under the law can be registered o The given purpose of the law is not germane. If Spanish titles cannot be registered, owners of these woodlands will go underground and they will no longer be monitored therefore contravenes the purpose of the law.  Court could have just said outright that the title was not genuine and you do not register something that is fake. Therefore arriving at the same conclusion of the Court without doing violence to the well-settled rule that the rule cannot amend the law.  Compare this case to previous cases where the rule changed the law (eg. Changing of prescriptive period). o This case pertains to substantive laws which have been impaired Annie Sand v. Abad Santos Educational Institution Rule promulgated: Art VIII, Rule 69, Sec 5 of the rules and regulation which provides for the periodic inspection of nursing schools because this cannot have a retroactive effect on schools and colleges already duly accredited by the Bureau of Private Schools. Law: Sec 9 RA 877expressly empowers in Sec 9 thereof the petitioner Board, subject to the approval of the President, to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of such Act. Sec 3 of RA 877 specifically empowers petitioner board to inspect nursing colleges and schools and vests it with authority to issue, suspend, revoke, or reissue certificates of registration for practice of nursing.

Page 14 of 56

Held: VALID because germane to the purpose of the law. The rule will be applied retroactively because the Law empowered the Board of Examiners to merely apply the minimum standards required as per the Law. American Tobacco v. Director of Patents Law: RA 165 Sec 3 – Dir of Patents is empowered to obtain assistance of technical, scientific or other qualified officers or employees of other depts., etc. when deemed necessary. Ra 165 Sec 78 – Dir of Patents is empowered to promulgate R&R not inconsistent with the law for conduct of business in the Patent Office Rule promulgated: Rule 168 of the Rules of Practice in Trade-mark cases provides that the Director of Patents shall have original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings. Amended rule promulgated: Hearing of inter partes cases has been delegated to the hearing of inter partes cases to other officers and hearing officers. Petitioners case was delegated to a hearing officer. Held: VALID. The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decision. the ultimate decision on the merits of all the issues and questions involved is left to the Director of Patents. The hearing officers will just make preliminary rulings on questions raised at the hearings; the decision will be made by the Director personally. The power to hear may be delegated to hearing officers through a valid rule but not the power to decide unless stipulated by law – the law does not say so. Hearing officers may not be delegated the power to decide because this will violate due process as the power to decide requires personal judgment which is non-transferrable when the law expressly disallows it (Angtibay v. CIR). Note: You cannot abdicate your power/responsibility by delegating it Rabor v. CSC Rabor was being asked to retire. He had only been in government for 13 years so he could not avail of the retirement plan which required minimum employment of 15 years. Law: Sec 11(b) of PD No. 1146 - the authority to grant the extension (re: retirement) was a discretionary one vested in the head of agency concerned.


Rule: CSC Circular No. 27, par 1 - Request for extension is only for one year Memorandum Circular No. 65 - retention of employees 65 yo and above will be only upon meritotirous reasons and not to exceed 6 months Held: VALID. All that may be reasonably demanded in checking won a rule is valid is a showing that the delegated legislation consisting of administrative regulations are germane to the general purposes projected by the governing or enabling statue. No more need for abstract and high standards. The limitation of permissible extensions of service has a reasonable relationship or is germane to the provisions of the present Civil Service Law. There are physiological and psychological processes associated with ageing in human beings which are related to the efficiency and quality of service that may be expected from individuals. Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies v. POEA Law: Sec 4(a) of EO No. 797 provides that the Governing Board of the POEA shall promulgate necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the POEA. Rule: Governing Resolution No. 01 and Memorandum Circular No. 05 provided for rates affecting death and workmen’s compensation of Filipino seamen working in ocean-going vessels as promulgated by the POEA. Held: VALID. POEA has authority to promulgate both statutes. Specialization in legislation has become necessary. This is called the “power of subordinate legislation.” With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling in” the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. Realty Exchange Venture v. Sendino Sendino filed a complaint for Specific Performance against REVI with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) Law: EO 85 Sec 3 – the final organization of judicial entities shall be subject to the subsequent enactments of the President EO 90 created HLURB EO 648 transferred all fxns of NHA to HLURB Rule promulgated: Sec 1 of PD 957 provides that the NHA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of

Page 15 of 56

subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. Held: VALID. The absence of any provision, express or implied, in E.O. 90, repealing those quasi-judicial powers inherited by the HSRC from the National Housing Authority, furthermore militates against petitioners' position on the question. Unless expressly/impliedly prohibited by statute, the rulemaking authority granted to an administrative agency is sufficient for the administrative agency to promulgate rule/s that will help it function effectively. If we will not allow them to break into divisions, quorums will be hard to get in order to hear the case. Sir’s critique: Is not the fact that the enabling statute created the commission of 9 without expressly saying in the law that they can meet in divisions, is that not to imply that they cannot break into divisions. If this is not to you an implied prohibition, what then is an implied prohibition? GSIS v. Board of Commissioners Only 3 members (instead of the nine man Board of Commissioners) entertained the appeal. Is this contrary to Secs 5 and 6 of EO 648? Law: Sec 5 of EO No. 648 mandates the HLURB Board of Commissioners to adopt rules of procedure for the conduct of its business and perform such functions necessary for the effective discharge thereof. Such grant of power has been held to be an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless, by express provision of the Act or by implication, it has been withheld. Rule promulgated: Allowed the HLURB to break into divisions Held: VALID. The HLURB Board of Commissioners has the power to adopt rules of procedure for the conduct of its business. Such grant of power has been held to be an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless, by express provision of the Act or by implication, it has been withheld. MR should be settled at the level of divisions. Note: Realty Exchange Ventures case was decided in 1994; this case was decided in 2010 – stare decisis. Soriano v. Laguardia Soriano's show was under preventive suspension after he made some foul remarks against INC show host Michael Sandoval.


Law: Section 3(d) of PD No. 1986 (Creating the MTRCB) - “supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel permits for the x x x exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs and materials as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with par (c) hereof shall be x x x exhibited and/or broadcast by television.” Rule promulgated: Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure. Held: VALID. When a general grant of power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. When the statute does not specify the particular method to be followed or used by a government agency in the exercise of the power vested in it by law, said agency has the authority to adopt any reasonable method to carry out its function. Concept of implied authority – something that arises by necessity from an express power. The express power given to the Board is that found in the Law, makes it absurd to say that MTRCB cannot preemptively suspend the program. The IRR merely fleshed out these provisions of law granting these general powers over subjects of regulation. Note: On the suspension of Soriano, the power of the Board is only as to the program and not the people. To suspend Soriano would be illegal ultra vires. Dagan v. Phil. Racing Commission Law: Sec 8 of PD No. 8 – Philracom has the exclusive jurisdiction over and control of the horse-racing industry Administrative Order No. 5 – It is unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to ship, drive, or transport horses from any locality or place except when accompanied by a certificate issued by the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI). Rule: Directive from Philracom that all stables and horse-clubs have to subject horses to a blood test for EIA (disease) Held: VALID. The Philracom directive and the subsequent guidelines addressed to MJCI and PRCI meet all the prescribed requisites of a valid administrative issuance which are: (1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature; (2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; (3) It must be within the scope if the authority given by the legislature; and (4) It must be reasonable. A delegation is valid only if the law (a)

Page 16 of 56

Basis

Quasilegislative

Quasi-judicial

As to procedural standards

The procedure is that normally observed in the making of rules.

The procedure must observe the requirements of due process in the 7 cardinal rules.

As to time

Rule-making is prospective in character, for it only governs future acts.

Adjudication is retrospective in character, for it investigates acts already done and then applies the law on the facts.

As to application

Legislative rules are of general application

Adjudicative rulings apply only to parties

is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard- the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable- to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. PD No. 420 passes the tests of completeness and standards sufficiency. There is no delegation of power to speak of between Philracom, as the delegator and MJCI and PRCI as delegates. The Philracom directive is merely instructive in character. Philracom has every right to issue directives to MJCI and PRCI with respect to the conduct of horse racing, with or without implementing guidelines. d.

Fixing of rates, wages, prices (cielo)

Section 9. Public Participation. – (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule. (2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon. (3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed. Section 2 (3) “Rate” means any charge to the public for a service open to all and upon the same terms, including individual or joint rates, tolls, classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as commutation, mileage, kilometerage and other special rates which shall be imposed by law or regulation to be observed and followed by any


person. CASES: Panay Autobus v. Phil Railway Co (1933) Held: The Public Service Commission was not authorized by law to delegate to a public utility company, like the Philippine Railway Co., the power to alter its freight rates. While a public utility may propose new rates, such is subject to the PUC’s approval. Vigan Electric Co v. PSC (1964) See table supra (comparison) Philcomsat v Alcuaz (1989) Held: Notice and hearing necessary if the rate to be fixed applies to only one entity (quasi-judicial). Note, however, that the Administrative Code now does not differentiate legislative from quasi-judicial ratefixing: notice and hearing is required for both. KMU v Garcia (1994) Held: The power to fix rates cannot be delegated to a common carrier or other public service. The latter may propose new rates, but these will not be effective without the approval of the administrative agency. Ynchausti v Public Utility Commissioner (1922) Held: In fixing the rate, the present valuation of all the property of a public utility, viz, not only of the assets used by the public but also of the fixed assets must be made on that basis so a fair return of investment can be had. On principle, the property is deemed taken and condemned by the public at the time of filing the petition, and the rate should go up and down with the physical valuation of the property. Manila International Airport Authority v. Airspan Corp. (2004) Held: While under the original Charter of the MIAA, it was given authority to adjust its fees, charges, and rates, E.O. 903 limited such authority to a mere recommendatory power. The power to increase its fees, charges, or rates is vested solely in the DOTC Secretary. Also in this case, failure to follow Admin Code procedure in increasing rates, through notice and hearing, makes the new rates invalid. e.

Licensing Function

Section 17. Licensing Procedure. – (1) When the grant, renewal, denial or cancellation of a license is required to be preceded by notice and hearing, the provisions concerning contested cases shall apply insofar as practicable.

Page 17 of 56

(2) Except in cases of willful violation of pertinent laws, rules and regulations or when public security, health, or safety require otherwise, no license may be withdrawn, suspended, revoked or annulled without notice and hearing. Section 18. Non-expiration of License. – Where the licensee has made timely and sufficient application for the renewal of a license with reference to any activity of a continuing nature, the existing license shall not expire until the application shall have been finally determined by the agency, Sec. 2(10), 1987 Admin Code. “License” includes the whole or any party of any agency permit, certificate, passport, clearance, approval, registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or other form of permission, or regulation of the exercise of a right or privilege. Sec. 2(11), 1987 Admin Code. “Licensing” includes agency process involving the grant, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal, limitation, amendment, modification or conditioning or a license. Gonzalo Sy Trading v Central Bank (1976) Held: No expiry date does not mean the license is perpetual. A license permit is a special privilege, a permission or authority to do what is within its terms. It is not vested, permanent or absolute, but is always revocable. Notice and hearing in licensing is only required if it is a contested case. Otherwise, it can be dispensed with, as in the issuance of driver’s licenses.

B. JUDICIAL FUNCTION BOOK VII, CHAPTER 3 Adjudication Sec. 10. Compromise and Arbitration. To expedite administrative proceedings involving conflicting rights or claims and obviate expensive litigations, every agency shall, in the public interest, encourage amicable settlement, comprise and arbitration. Sec. 11. Notice and Hearing in Contested Cases. (1) In any contested case all parties shall be entitled to notice and hearing. The notice shall be served at least five (5) days before the date of the hearing and shall state the date, time and place of the hearing. (2) The parties shall be given opportunity to present evidence and argument on all issues. If not precluded by law, informal disposition may be made of any contested case by stipulation, agreed settlement or default. (3) The agency shall keep an official record of its


proceedings. Sec. 12. Rules of Evidence. — In a contested case: (1) The agency may admit and give probative value to evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs. (2) Documentary evidence may be received in the form of copies or excerpts, if the original is not readily available. Upon request, the parties shall be given opportunity to compare the copy with the original. If the original is in the official custody of a public officer, a certified copy thereof may be accepted. (3) Every party shall have the right to cross-examine witnesses presented against him and to submit rebuttal evidence. (4) The agency may take notice of judicially cognizable facts and of generally cognizable technical or scientific facts within its specialized knowledge. The parties shall be notified and afforded an opportunity to contest the facts so noticed. Sec. 13. Subpoena. — In any contested case, the agency shall have the power to require the attendance of witnesses or the production of books, papers, documents and other pertinent data, upon request of any party before or during the hearing upon showing of general relevance. Unless otherwise provided by law, the agency may, in case of disobedience, invoke the aid of the Regional Trial Court within whose jurisdiction the contested case being heard falls. The Court may punish contumacy or refusal as contempt. Sec. 14. Decision. — Every decision rendered by the agency in a contested case shall be in writing and shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. The agency shall decide each case within thirty (30) days following its submission. The parties shall be notified of the decision personally or by registered mail addressed to their counsel of record, if any, or to them. Sec. 15. Finality of Order. — The decision of the agency shall become final and executory fifteen (15) days after the receipt of a copy thereof by the party adversely affected unless within that period an administrative appeal or judicial review, if proper, has been perfected. One motion for reconsideration may be filed, which shall suspend the running of the said period. a.

Power to Issue subpoena, declare contempt (1) General Statutory Provision, Sec. 13, supra

Page 18 of 56

(2) Special Statutory Grant Example: xxx Sec. 6. In order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the Commission shall possess the following powers (a) To issue preliminary or permanent injunctions, whether prohibitory or mandatory, in all cases in which it has jurisdiction, and in which cases the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court shall apply; (b) To punish for contempt of the Commission, both direct and indirect, in accordance with the pertinent provisions of, and penalties prescribed by, the Rules of Court; xxx Evangelista v. Jarencio F: PARGO is an admin agency tasked to investigate public officials’ acts. Evangelista, a PARGO official, issued a subpoena to Manalastas, a public official, to appear and testify before the PARGO. M filed a Petition for Prohibition with a prayer for WPI before the CFI. H: PARGO, as an AA, has authority to issue a subpoena ad testificandum to aid its power to investigate even if no formal charge has yet been filed. Teehankee: This is a fishing expedition. Sir: Can you invoke RASI here? Not unless the nature of the administrative proceeding is criminal in nature (like in that Cabal case in Consti2). In this case there is no charge yet, what he can do is to appear but raise RASI if asked specific incriminating questions  compromise. (for some reason, nagkwento na si Sir re St. Francis square and porn dvds that you can buy there! At sabi nya: “Even if something arouses you, it doesn’t mean it’s obscene!”) Guevarra v. COMELEC H: It does not follow that if an agency is granted the power to cite in contempt, it can indiscriminately issue contempt citations. The power to cite in contempt is inherently judicial, so it can only be exercised in connection with an exercise of the judicial or quasijudicial powers of an agency. Catura v. CIR F: Members of a union sued their officers before the CIR for alleged illegal disbursement of funds. Said officers went to regular courts to question the CIR’s order (subpoena duces tecum) for the submission to the CIR of the union’s books of accounts. H: CIR has power to order the submit said books in aid of its investigation against the union officials. Tolentino v. Inciong


F: Members of a union brought a case before the CIR (Inciong) against Tolentino (union President) for his failure to order a union election. Tolentino then filed a petition for prohibition in the CFI, which Judge Delos Angeles took cognizance. Inciong issued two citations for contempt against Tolentino and Delos Angeles. H: Inciong has no power to cite a CFI judge for contempt. Although, CIR has the power to cite in contempt parties who fail to comply with its orders, that does not include a CFI judge. What should have been done is that a motion to dismiss be filed on the civil case for lack of jurisdiction, if it really has no jurisdiction. Contempt power cannot be issued to cover the case of a party to a controversy who took the necessary steps to avail himself of a judicial remedy. Most certainly, it cannot be issued as against a judge who took cognizance of a case. b.

Warrant of arrest, Administrative searches

1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 1973 Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 3 Section 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and whatever purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as maybe authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board F: Q was arrested by the Deportation Board pending investigation for alleged economic sabotage (hording dollars without permit). H: Can a WoA (warrant of arrest) be issued pending investigation? The case is under the 1935 constitution (same with the 1987) that only a judge an issue a WoA, so decision is still valid today. The judge only, not an admin agency can issue a WoA pending investigation.

Page 19 of 56

There are two Eos here (from quirino and roxas) providing for the rules pending investigation of undesirable aliens. But the SC upheld that of Roxas’s: a WoA cannot be issued and the remedy to ensure the alien’s appearance is to require a bond from the alien. The ponencia stated that even if the Pres is authorized to issue a WOA for purposes of investigation, that will be against the Consti only the judge can issue Value of the case: GR: Only a judge can issue WoA XPN: WoA can be issued administratively in order to carry out a final deportation order  High profile leading landmark case!!! READ in the ORIGINAL!! Vivo v. Montesa F: WoA issued against Chinese citizens for alleged misrepresentation for admission in the PHL issued by the COmissioner of Immigration H: JBL reaffirmed Qua Chee Gan: only a judge can issue a WoA if the purpose is for investigation (but with exception) Santos v. Commissioner F: Chinese illegal entry H: Even the decision was promulgated after the 1973 constitution, the controversy happened under the 1935 consti so Qua Chee Gan was reaffirmed Harvey v. Defensor  Disturbed the jurisprudence earlier F: This case involved pedophiles arrested by CID as undesirable aliens. Mission orders (WoA) were issued to arrest the aliens on the basis of probable cause determined by commissioner after surveillance for three months. H: The WoA issued are supported by probable cause (Sir: thru photos of young boys in their bday suit ). The SC justified that there is a pending proceeding anyway. The SC made a distinction this is not criminal but administrative (i.e. deportation). Sir: There is a dubious justification: the CID determined the probable cause. The case insists to be consistent with Qua Chee Gan but it was not. Even if there is an investigation (such as in this case), the warrant cannot be issued as held in Qua Chee Gan until a final deportation order. Lucien Tran Van Nghia v. Liwag F: A Frenchman was arrested by CID agents and police charged by landlord as an undesirable alien (not paying rents). He promised to invest in the PHL but was merely tutoring here. H: Issuance of WoA was illegal because there was no probable cause here (unlike in Harvey). Case is moot because Lucien was released and there is a deportation charge against him (same with Harvey ruling).


Sir: Sought to clarify Harvey (to settle with old cases like Qua Chee Gan) but instead paid homage to it. Salazar v. Achacoso F: S was charged before the POEA for illegal recruitment. POEA administrator issued a closure and seizure order against S. Her studio was searched and some of her possessions confiscated. H: Search and seizure illegal. POEA’s legal basis, Article 38 of the Labor Code (which states that the SOLE and his/her legal representative can issue Search Warrants, was declared unconstitutional. The GR is that only a judge can issue WoA and SW. The only exception is with regard to deportation of aliens where the President, as head of state, is also authorized. Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa F: After 28 years from Gatchalian’s entry to the PHL, the BOC issued a warrant of arrest to investigate his citizenship. The WoA was allegedly based on a warrant of exclusion issued a year after his entry (so issued 27 years ago). Gatchalian claims that this exclusion order was already reversed by the BOC so no arrest warrant can be issued anymore. H: The SC held that the WoA was a violation of the Qua Chee Gan doctrine that an arrest order can only be issued to implement a final deportation order. Also, the exclusion order has prescribed so a WoA cannot be issued. Dissent (Feliciano): The exclusion order has not yet prescribed, hence, the arrest warrant to execute is imprescriptible. The dissenting group also reaffirmed the Qua Chee Gan doctrine. Sir: Both the majority and the dissent affirmed Qua Chee Gan that a WoA can only be issued after a final deportation order, although not as clear as Achacoso did. Camara v. Municipal Court F: The inspector asked permission from C to inspect his house pursuant to the city’s Housing Code. C refused without a search warrant. After several attempts on the inspector’s part, C still refused. C was subsequently charged for violating the Housing Code, he was later convicted. H: Although administrative inspections are usually allowed, if a resident refuses the search, the inspector is bound to procure a search warrant. For the warrant procedure, a probable cause that a law or ordinance has been violated is not required (as in criminal cases) but only that the inspection is reasonable. Dissent: The inspection in this case is not reasonable. It is impractical for the inspectors to procure search warrants every time a resident refuses. Sir: This is a divided court (5/4). You view the case as a form of BALANCING: on the one hand is the state

Page 20 of 56

interest for health and safety while on the other, the citizen’s right to privacy very difficult balancing act! Dee: Can this be applied to copyright infringement cases? Sir: The state interest of health and safety is no longer applicable so that is a different issue. This is only in the context of inspection programs. See v. Seattle F: (This is decided with Camara). The inspection to implement the Fire Code involved here is that of See’s LOCKED commercial warehouse. He refused. H: The requirement of a reasonable search also applies to business establishment like in this case. Searches are presumptively reasonable if without probable cause. (same dissent with Camara) Sir: Note that the warehouse is LOCKED and not open to public. What if the establishment is open to public? Roe: The right to privacy is not the same as in a locked establishment it assumed a public character and the state can use police power against the privacy rights. Sir’s example: OZONE disco! c.

Imposition of Fines and Penalties

Oceanic Steam v. Stranaham F: Fines were collected from vessels if they refuse to subject their crew and passengers to medical exams to ensure that they don’t have a “loathsome contagious disease.” H: Fine valid. This is not to penalize the refusal but only to enforce the regulation. Test: for valid imposition of fines and penalties of administrative agencies 1.) subject matter should be within the power of Congress to legislate on/ control of Congress (In this case, the subject is immigration) 2.) penalty is not criminal in nature, that is, it is administrative – (it is administrative when it is merely intended to vindicate the policy of Congress, and is not intended for punishment in the concept of fine or jail time) 3.) agency expressly authorized to impose fines and penalties Sir: all the elements are satisfied! Civil Aeronautics Board v. PAL (1975) F: PAL made a flagstop in Baguio to pick up passengers without informing CAB beforehand. CAB imposed a 5,000 fine (later reduced to 2, 500). H: CAB was expressly authorized to impose civil fines fines in accordance with its supervisory power over airlines. But there was no bad faith on PAL’s part so fine was reduced to 100. Sir: Oceanic’s approach not used but if you apply the test, the same result (Congress is concerned with air transportation; there is a law authorizing CAB; and the fine is civil only not criminal).


Scoty’s Department Store v. Micaller F: M was a saleslady in Scoty’s. But she was subsequently dismissed because of her membership in a union. She was interrogated and was even charged criminally by her former employers. She filed a ULP case before the CIR. CIR adjudged Scoty’s guilty and imposed a P100 penalty. H: The penalty if illegal. The law (RA 875) provides that the court can impose penalty, but that court pertains to a regular court, not CIR. CIR cannot impose the penalty which is criminal in nature when it uses a different quantum of evidence (i.e. substantial evidence) from that which is required of criminal cases (i.e. proof beyond reasonable doubt). US v. Barrias F: B did not use a steam engine when moving his lighter/ motor craft while traversing the Pasig River. He was charged and faces possible penalty from the circular of the Insular Collector. H: While the circular is valid pursuant to the law which authorized the Collector to regulate harbors, the imposition of penalty is invalid. It is a misdemeanor and authority to declare acts as constituting misdemeanor is lodged exclusively to Congress. (IMPORTANT) The ethical basis of the non-delegation doctrine: Such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. RCPI v. Board of Communications F: D and I sued RCPI due to their late receipt of the telegram sent by their families. They alleged that they suffered damages (they were supposedly going to attend funerals). Board of Com fined RCPI. H: Board of Com is not authorized to fine RCPI because its function only involves fixing of rates and issuance of Certificate of Public Convenience. Perez v. LPG Refillers Association F: BP 33 penalized overprizing, hording, underfilling of LPG. DOE issued a circular adding some punishable acts and changing the schedule of penalty. H: The circular is valid –it merely specified the acts and the penalty. For an admin regulation to have the force of a penal law, it must (1) be a crime defined by a law and (2) the penalty must have been provided by the law (both are satisfied in this case). Public Hearing Committee of LLDA v. SM Prime Holdings F: LLDA inspected the wastewater of SM Manila and found that it did not conform to their standards. It imposed a fine on SM and such will accrue daily until corrective measures were undertaken. Despite their immediate compliance, LLDA ordered them to pay 50k.

Page 21 of 56

H: The law authorized LLDA to settle pollution cases but no provision expressly allows it to impose fines. But the Court said that the intendment of the law is to grant LLDA with other powers which are implied but are necessary or essential for the full implementation of its purposes. Sir: The case is subject to criticism—the authority to impose fine is not express but only implied. Oyie: Wouldn’t this lead to abuse? Sir: Possible, but the agency can also argue that they are constrained to impose penalty, otherwise, they will be useless.

C. JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF SUFFICIENCY OF STANDARDS (Jamie)  The attitude of the Court in dealing with sufficiency of standards is one of liberality rather than strict construction/conservative attitude  The following enumeration of standards are broad yet the Courts refuse to strike them down as unconstitutional 1. INTEREST OF LAW AND ORDER Rubi v. Provincial Bd of Mindanao Facts: Mindoro Provincial Board approved a resolution to relocate all Mangyans to Tigbao as per Sec 2145 of Old Admin Code. Held: VALID DELEGATION because interest of law and order is a sufficient standard. Reason behind the resolution was to preserve law and order in Mindoro, and encourage development of resources in the island. Sir: Court approached this case in a very conservative way/literal attitude to decide such a controversial case 2. PUBLIC INTEREST People v. Rosenthal and Osmena Facts: Rosenthal and Osmena were charged and found guilty of violating Act 2581 Blue Sky Law because they were unlicensed sellers of shares of stocks and selling high priced stocks. Held: VALID DELEGATION because public interest is a sufficient standard. The statute with regard to the grant of licenses is to protect the public from speculative schemes and fly-by-night sellers. In the interest of the public, the Secretary could cancel the licenses.  Sir: Court approached this case with a very liberal attitude 3. JUSTICE, EQUITY AND SUBSTANTIAL MERITS OF THE CASE International Hardwood and Veneer Co. v. Pangil Federation Facts: There was an industrial dispute between Hardwood and its employees regarding wage rates so the Sec of Labor through the CIR determined the


minimum wage for them as per Sec 4 CA 103 which allows compulsory arbitration to solve industrial disputes. Held: VALID DELEGATION because justice, equity and substantial merits of the case is a sufficient standard. In the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy and in exercising any duties and power under the law (in this case, fixing of minimum wage), the CIR shall act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case (Sec 20 CA 143). Sir: Court approached this case with a very liberal attitude Court looked through the law to find a standard which was Sec 20 CA 143 Anytime you talk about justice and equity, that virtually gives you no specific guidance if you’re the administrative authority as this varies per person and with regard to the circumstances surrounding the facts. Yet, the court said this is a sufficient standard. This makes you wonder why the Court has been adopting the liberally approach Reason: To adopt a strict attitude would be an obstacle to legislative intention of Congress to delegate Go back to Justice Laurel’s reasons for the creation of administrative agencies suich as lack of time, organization, and specialization 4. WHAT IS MORAL, EDUCATIONAL OR AMUSING Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission Facts: Mutual Film Corp. was asked by the Board of censors to submit for approval the film it wanted to place on exhibit. Held: VALID DELEGATION because the standard of using the sense and experience of the community should be used as useful guides in determining what is educational, moral or amusing. This is where the standard derives its sustainability to become a sufficient standard. Sir: Q: What Constitutional standard comes into your head when reading this case? A: Appealing to prurient/lude interest of the person which is related to the concept of obscenity Guide Q: What made the standard of what is educational, moral or amusing different from the standard of obscenity? (Same as HELD) The standard in the case derived its sustainability from the sense and experience of the community which was used as a guide for the standard. 5. WHAT IS SACRILEGIOUS Joseph Burstyn Inc. v. Wisconsin Facts: “The Miracle”’s license (a movie) was being revoked by the censorship board for being offensive to religious feelings

Page 22 of 56

Held: INVALID DELEGATION. To use “sacrilegious” as a standard is not sufficient because it there is no sense and experience of a national community where one can draw a consensus or some reasonable idea of what is sacrilegious. The sensor will be left with his own device to catch a judgment regarding the material being sacrilegious depending on his background and beliefs. If so, this will not be fair to the religious institutions which are not that dominant and thus this standard becomes discriminatory. Sir: Compare with previous case of Mutual Film Corp. 6. ADEQUATE AND EFFICIENT INSTITUTION PACU v. Secretary Facts: ACT 2706 made it obligatory for Sec of Public Instruction to inspect private schools and colleges to make sure they maintain a general standard of efficiency of instruction which calls for issuing of permits to institutions who pass the inspection Held: VALID DELEGATION because the standard the Sec of Educ to use adequate and efficient instruction is sufficient. Also, there is reliance on the educational experience and training of the employees of DepEd to ascertain and formulate minimum requirements of adequate instruction as the basis of government recognition of any private school. 7. REASONABLENESS AS AN IMPLIED STANDARD Wisconsin Inspection Bureau v. Whitman Facts: Chapter 203 of the Wisconsin Statutes (Ratefixing law) provides that rules and regulations have to be dis/approved by the Commissioner of Insurance (CI) first. Consequently, the Rating Act of 1917 was scrutinized by the CI to determine won these are unreasonable or discriminatory. Held: VALID DELEGATION because the standard of usage of reasonableness in determining which R&R is approved is implied in all laws. Congress wants a uniformity of rules and regulations regarding ratefixing. The CI does this by acting within boundaries of reason in determining what R&R will meet the general purpose already laid down by Congress. Sir: Further discussion of why reasonableness is accepted as a standard in this set of facts – the insurance industry What will happen if you argue that the Congress has specifically delegated the authority of the administrative agent considering the characteristic of the industry being regulated The flexibility in practice necessary in the insurance business world will be destroyed if there are strict qualifications to be followed. The insurance industry is not a very static field or area of activity. The conditions change. The facts change. The flow or influx of new developments is continuous. The market


conditions will change. There are so many variables are at work. Therefore if you come up with very strict guidelines, when those changes come out those guideline swill become obsolete and Congress will end up having to amend the law which is a long and tedious process. Commissioner should have flexibility to act according to the conditions prevailing at that time. 8. TO PROMOTE SIMPLICITY, ECONOMY OR EFFICIENCY Cervantes v. Auditor General Facts: The quarter allowance granted to one of NAFCO's employees was not approved because it was against the charter of NAFCO for being beyond its budget. RA 51 authorizes the Pres of the Phils to make changes and reforms in GOCCs for the purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operations. EO 93 creates a Council that advises the Pres what policies are necessary to be implemented. Held: VALID DELEGATION. RA 51 lays down reorganization guidelines. When it comes to reorganization statutes/R&R, the standard is WON it promotes simplicity, economy and efficiency in GOCC operations. 9. MAINTAIN MONETARY STABILITY, PROMOTE RISING LEVEL OF PRODUCTION AND REAL INCOME People v. Jolliffe Facts: Jolliffe violated Circular 21 of the Central Bank as he tried to export gold without a license. Held: VALID DELEGATION because Secs 2 and 74 or RA 265 conferred upon the Monetary Board and the President the power to take constructive measures in relation to the objectives of RA 265 which is to promote a rising level of production, employment and real income in the Philippines. These are sufficient standards to vest in the delegated authority the character of administrative details in the enforcement of the law. “What is due process – ano ang prosesong SAPAT. What is substantial evidence? Yung may substance, hindi balewalang ebidensya. You make the concepts graspable, not cerebral!” (Carlota, 2013) 



IV. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE A board term which encompasses procedure in rule-making (eg. Publication, effectivity, fixing of rates, public participation, licensing, etc.) And also encompasses procedure in adjudication (eg. Rules on contested cases, notice, hearing, cross-exam, MFR, etc.)

Page 23 of 56



Take note SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE: such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion (MEMORIZE)

A. BOOK VII, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, SEC 1-26, ADMIN CODE OF 1987 B. IN RULE-MAKING, PRICE, WAGE OR RATE FIXING C. IN ADJUDICATION CASES 1.  



Rules of Procedure

2. Due Process Note the importance of procedural DP (Due Process) Statutory guidelines would be Book 7 of the RAC and that provided by jurisprudence (almost similar that they complement each other) Points to remember o While agencies perform adjudicative functions or what literature calls quasi-judicial functions, the fact still remains that they are not regular courts of justice. From that reality emerges the rule that since they are not regular courts of justice, the strict/highly technical rules on evidence and procedure one may find in the ROC are not to be rigidly applied in quasi-judicial proceedings. To apply such will defeat the purpose of creation of admin agencies which is to act with speed and flexibility as they should not be moving like snails which regular courts have been likened to. (PHILOSOPHICAL JUSTIFICATION WHY ROC DOES NOT APPLY TO QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS OF AAS)  That is why quantum of evidence is lower – only substantial evidence for quasi-judicial AAs o AAs may not be handcuffed BUT they are covered by the constitutional right to DP in particular, procedural DP.  The fact that you are just an AA will not excuse you from observing strictly the requirements of procedural DP. But then again you have




to realize the nuance between regular courts DP and quasi-judicial DP  Note: the concept of DP in Administrative Law keeps on evolving. Guide Q: What is the process that will maximize fairness in a given case? a.

Cardinal Primary Rights Ang Tibay v. CIR Facts: Union was appealing their case. CIR used the primary rights for DP. Held: Enumeration of the cardinal primary rights of DP in administrative proceedings (MEMORIZE!) 1. Right to a hearing 2. Tribunal must consider the evidence presented 3. Decision must be supported by evidence 4. Evidence must be substantial (Relevant evidence which a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion.) 5. Transparency: evidence to be considered must be those presented at the hearing or on record 6. Cir must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts You cannot allow hearing officers to decide cases (american tobacco) 7. Decision must be rendered such that the parties know the issues involved and reasons for the decision Sir: Do not equate preponderance evidence with substantial evidence. Preponderance requires the judge to weigh evidence of both parties. Preponderant is necessarily substantial. When you talk about substantial evidence, it is possible that both sides will have substantial evidence (Banco Filipino case). Substantial need not to be preponderant. Important note: In administrative law, when it comes to judicial review, the findings of facts of agencies if supported by substantial evidence will be considered binding by the reviewing board The invocation of procedural DP by petitioner maybe anyone of these 7 cardinal primary rights If there is a violation of any of these elements, that is enough for the aggrieved party to go to Court and invoke his/her constitutional right to DP Asprec v. Itchon Facts: Asprec was found guilty of violating the Code of Ethics for Surveyors so his certificate registration as private land surveyor was revoked. Asprec claims he was not accorded DP (Due Process) as he and his counsel did not attend the hearing despite being notified.

Page 24 of 56

Held: ACCORDED DP because DP only calls for parties to be given notice of the trial and an opportunity to be heard. It is up to the adverse party if he/she wants to show up. The opportunity to be heard can be complied with in many ways for as long as the proceedings is characterized with fairness. It is to be determined on a case-to-case basis what is to be characterized as fair in varying circumstances. Administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers are free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements. Sir: Philex Frankfurter’s DP from the POV of a layman – DP is embodying the idea of fairplay

submitted written explanations, attended meetings/investigations, etc.

Vinta Maritime Co., Inc. v. NLRC Facts: Basconcilo filed a case against Vinta for being illegally dismissed. POEA Administrator asked the parties to just submit their position papers and supporting documents. No trial was held. It was ruled the Basconcilo was illegally dismissed. Held: ACCORDED DP because when the parties were asked to submit position papers this already satisfied DP because DP does not necessarily mean a verbal hearing but only an opportunity to be heard. To hold a trial is discretionary on the administrative authority and is not a matter of right. Administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers are free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements. Sir: Just require position papers having in mind the speedy disposition of labor disputes. If the aggrieved party feels that the decision is erroneous, there are remedies that can be availed of.

Rivera v. CSC Facts: Rivera was found guilty by his company. On appeal to the MPSB, he was only found guilty of acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service. On appeal to the CSC he was found guilty of Grave Misconduct. Gatminde was both part of MSPB and CSC boards which ruled on Rivera's case. Held: DENIED DP because the decision of a subordinate officer should be reviewed by a superior officer who is a different person else there will be no different view or real review of the case. Gatminde should have inhibited herself.

Bachrach Motor Co. v. CIR Facts: In a CIR case to oust a driver, the lone witness after conducting his direct testimony, never appeared for cross-examination. CIR dismissed the case and his testimony was stricken off the record. Held: ACCORDED DP because all parties have the right to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers. Testimonies can only be taken into account when complete – direct and crossexaminations are necessary. UP Board of Regents v. CA Facts: Defendant was found to have committed plagiarism in her dissertation. UP admin formed committees that conducted numerous investigations wherein her side was heard. UP withdrew her degree, she claims she was only allowed to be heard after this point. Held: ACCORDED DP because DP is satisfied once the party is given opportunity to explain one’s side of a controversy or a chance to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. No trial or oral hearing is needed in the context of disciplinary in an institution of higher learning due to academic freedom. Defendant


Zambales Chromite Mining Co. v. CA Facts: Dir. Gozon decided a case as Dir. of Mines. He was appointed Sec. of Agri and Natural Resources wherein he decided the same case on appeal. Held: DENIED DP because the decision of a subordinate officer should be reviewed by a superior officer who is a different person else there will be no different view or real review of the case. Gozon should have inhibited himself.

American inter-Fashion Corp. v. Office of the President Facts: Glorious filed a MFR for having been found guilty of dollar-salting and misdeclaration of importations. This was denied so he filed an appeal to the Office of the Pres which ruled that there was a denial of DP because the evidence used to rule on his case was not disclosed so case was remanded to GTEB Held: DENIED DP because not disclosing evidence used to rule on a case violates the cardinal rights of DP as enumerated in Ang Tibay Pefianco v. Moral Facts: Moral was found guilty by DECS. Moral asked for the DECS Investigation Committee Report but was twice denied. She filed a mandamus that it be released. Held: If there is an investigating committee appointed by the disciplinary authority, that committee report cannot be mandated to furnish a copy thereof. As a matter of right, Moral cannot demand for a copy of the committee report because at that stage it was not a decision of the disciplinary authority but just communication between the two committees. It is only upon a decision when it is mandatory to release a copy which should clearly and distinctly state the reasons for the decision. NAPOLCOM, National Appellate Board and PNP V. Police Chief Inspector Leonardo Bernabe

Page 25 of 56

Facts: Policeman was investigated by NAPOLCOM and there was a summary dismissal hearing which was concluded in policeman’s dismissal. Held: ACCORDED DP because policeman was accorded DP despite holding no hearing/trial as DP in quasijudicial agencies is sufficient as he had submitted his affidavits, memorandum, availed of all the appeals within the administrative process even elevating the case to the CA. These facts show that during the investigation process, he was given opportunity to present his side. Montemayor v. Bundalian Facts: Montemayor was charged with unexplained wealth and was being investigated by the PGAC. Montemayor was not given opportunity to examine the complainant. Held: ACCORDED DP because his active participation in every step of the investigation effectively removed any badge of procedural deficiency, if there was any, and satisfied the due process requirement.; he filed written documents on his behalf (counter-affidavit, submitted documentary evidence), attended the hearings, moved for a reconsideration of the Administrative Order issued by the President and eventually filed his appeal before the CA. The fact that the complaint was unverified is of no matter as complaint involving graft and corruption may come in any manner. There was also substantial evidence against him Sir: Reiteration of the rule - In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided. Shoppes Manila v. NLRC Facts: LA rendered a decision that Shoppes Manila illegally dismissed their employees. Shoppes Manila requested for a formal hearing be conducted, but this was denied. Held: ACCORDED DP because Shoppes Manila did not have a vested right to a formal hearing simply and merely because LA Tumanong granted its motion and set the case for hearing as Rules of procedure of NLRC only make holding of a hearing discretionary upon the NLRC. It is entirely within the LA’s authority to decide a labor case before him, based on the position papers and supporting documents of the parties, without a trial or formal hearing. Sir: Note The two-notice rule in Civil Law which has been adopted in Labor Law One must be notified of the specific charges or cause regarding the complaint which will enable you to prepare your defense


 One must be notified of the reason for dismissal Autencio v. Manara Facts: Autencio was found guilty for misconduct for allowing irregularities in the books of accounts; there was insufficient evidence for the charge of dishonesty. Autencio filed an answer and affdiavits to support her position. She also appealed to the CA. Held: ACCORDED DP as the findings of fact of an administrative agency must be respected, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Samalio v. CA Facts: Samalio was found guilty with robbery and violation of Immigration Law. Samalio had chosen a formal investigation, filed an answer and submitted affidavits. He appealed to Guingona, CSC and CA who denied it. Held: ACCORDED DP. The testimony of the Chinese national in the BID case was also admitted in the Sandiganbayan because the Chinese national was no longer in the country. Since both cases in the BID and Sandiganbayan have the same sets of facts, the same testimony can be used as substantial evidence to pin Samalio. Here, the prior testimony rule was applied because (1) witness is dead or unable to testify – unable to testify because abroad; (2) testimony given in a case of same facts, same parties involved or atleast had same interests; (3) same subject matter but different cause of action – in BID it was misconduct and in SB it was robbery, still same subject matter; (4) same issue; (5) adverse party was able to cross-examine the witness in the previous case. These were all complied with. The technical rules of evidence will not strictly apply to administrative proceedings, this case is an exception as technical rules of evidence may be applied in a suppletory manner in the disposition of an administrative case. Medina v. COA Facts: Medina was charged in the Ombudsman. Held: ACCORDED DP because Rules of Procedure in the Office of the Ombudsman of AO17 gives the Ombudsman authority to dispense with hearing as opposed to the CSC wherein a formal investigation and hearing is required. Sir: It is important to note the difference of rules of procedure with regard to the CSC wherein there is no due process without a formal investigation and hearing How to determine if a party was deprived of DP  If the law applicable to the case already provides for the procedure to be observed (eg. Evidentiary hearing requirement), this is already the DP requirement that has to be observed

Page 26 of 56

 If the law is silent, then this is where you apply what you’ve learned in jurisprudence that DP may be satisfied even without evidentiary hearing if the parties were given an opportunity to be heard (eg. Position papers, memoranda, motion for reconsideration, etc) Domingo v. Rayala Facts: At the level of the committee investigating it, Office of the President and CA so there was substantial evidence. Held: Only second offense would be tantamount to dismissal. A.Z. Arnaiz Inc. v. OP Facts: In a case adjudicated by DAR, there was no trial only submission of pleadings and documentary evidence. Held: ACCORDED DP as per the CARP Law. Petitioner was given all the opportunity to prove and establish its claim that the subject properties were excluded from the coverage of the CARP. Petitioner actively participated in the proceedings by submitting various pleadings and documentary evidence, and filed motions for reconsideration in every unfavorable outcome of its actions in all tiers of the administrative and judicial process Ganapao v. CSC Facts: NAPOLCOM issued a summary hearing on Barien's complaint charging Rimando Gannapao with Grave Misconduct and Moonlighting. Held: ACCORDED DP as he had an opportunity to defend himself. He was adequately apprised of the charges filed against him and he submitted his answer to the complaint while the case was still under a precharge investigation. When the Office of Legal Service conducted a summary hearing, petitioner was again duly notified of the proceedings. Based on the records, Gannapao appeared for hearing without counsel after the subpoena was served. Goss v. Lopez Facts: Students were suspended without a hearing. Held: DENIED DP because students facing suspension and the consequent interference with a protected property interest must be given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing. Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified. Due process requires, in connection with a suspension of 10 days or less, that the student be given oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story.


Sir: Just because high school students are the ones involved does not mean they are not protected by the mantle of due process You may not conduct a formal investigation since this is a minor disciplinary case, however the students need an opportunity to be hears Matthews v. Eldridge Facts: The agency took out Eldrige’s disabled benefits without a hearing and only made their assessment using medical examinations and reports. Held: ACCORDED DP because it does not require evidentiary hearing. The essence of due process is the requirement that "a person in jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it. All that is necessary is that the procedures be tailored, in light of the decision to be made, to "the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard," to insure that they are given a meaningful opportunity to present their case. b. Notice and Hearing (cielo) (1) When Required National Development v. Collector (1963) F: A TV set was confiscated from NDC’s vessel which was unmanifested and in violation of the Customs Law. In a notice to NDC, they claimed that it was a personal property which need not be manifested. Further, NDC requested that in case their explanation is not accepted, that NDC be called for an investigation. But they were fined by the Collector without hearing. H: NDC was deprived of due process. NDC should have given a chance to prove that the TV was not a cargo, as they also requested. Bautista v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission F: Bautista was denied sick and disability benefits by WCC after allegedly failing to attend the hearings. H: B was denied due process. He was entitled to a reasonable notice, but the notice in this case was served several days late. WCC’s bias for the employer was also questioned by the court. Equitable Banking Corp. v. NLRC F: Sadac was a VP for Legal Dept of EPCI bank. After his subordinates filed a complaint against him for being abusive, the bank conducted several consultations and subsequently terminated him pursuant to their attorney-client relationship. The bank allegedly lost confidence on Sadac. H: S was deprived of due process. He was not a retained lawyer but actually a in-house counsel, an employee, of the company. As an employee, his termination should satisfy both substantive (just cause) and procedural (notice and hearing) due process.

Page 27 of 56

Sir: Food for thought The Bank could have raised that NLRC has no jurisdiction because this is an intracorporate dispute involving an officer of the corporation (VP of Legal), jurisdiction was vested with SEC during that time. Uy v. COA F: Gov. Paredes terminated some capitol employees. They were later reinstated, with payment of backwages. COA later on issued a decision that Gov. P should pay the backwages because the dismissal was done in bad faith. H: P was denied due process. He is entitled to notice and hearing in the proceedings before the COA. In any case, there is no proof that the dismissal was in bad faith. (2) When Not Required Suntay v. People F: Suntay was accused of seduction. But before he was formally charged, his passport was approved and he was able to leave for the US. The court ordered DFA to bring him back to the PHL for prosecution. His passport was cancelled. S claimed that there should have been a hearing. H: No hearing required. The reason for cancellation here is valid i.e. pending criminal charge (sir: the undisputed fact!)) and the DFA is authorized to cancel the passport so notice and hearing would be unnecessary. It seems also that Suntay left the country to evade prosecution. Sir: If the admin action is based on an undisputed fact, it would be senseless to hold a notice and hearing procedure to prove that undisputed fact. Bisschop v. Galang F: B’s application for the extension of his stay in the Philippines was denied due to his alleged gambling activities and non-payment of taxes. H: No notice and hearing required here. The Immigration issue is purely executive in nature and is not a matter of right. Sir: When certain practices (i.e. request for extension) are vested with the executive, notice and hearing are not required. In any case, in the case of deportation he should be given notice and hearing. Pollution Adjudication Board v. CA F: PAB issued an ex parte cease and desist order to enjoin Solar from emitting wastewater to the Tullahan river. The CA reversed the order and required that a hearing be conducted first. H: No hearing required here. The law allows PAB to issue ex parte cease and desist orders especially because great and irreparable injury will result if the company is not immediately enjoined.


Sir: BESIDES, after the order is issued, Solar can make a manifestation for a formal investigation this is a HAPPY compromise! Lesson: There may be instances when an agency is authorized to issue a cease and desist order during emergency situations. c.

Form of and Promulgation of Judgment

Indias v. Phil Iron Mines F: Decision issued by the CIR adopted the recommendations and findings of the Hearing Examiner (CIR states that it made a careful perusal of the record). H: Valid decision. CIR merely adopted the examiner’s findings, it will be useless to repeat it all. Sir: Substantial compliance even if no strict discussion of facts and law. Serrano v. PSC F: Application of Serrano in PSC to operate taxicabs was summarily dismissed without stating whether the dismissal was for failure to prosecute or failure to qualify. H: Invalid decision. Although PSC is not covered by rigid rules of technical procedure, it still has to lay basis for its decisions. Solid Homes v. Laserna F: HLURB directed the execution of the contract to sell by S to Laserna. Upon appeal to the Office of the President, the HLURB decision was affirmed in toto and adopted by reference. H: Valid decision. The SC said that the constitutional rule on stating the facts and law of the decision need not be strictly applied, however, due process principles are already to be applied i.e. procedural due process. In this case, the HLURB decision is attached to the OP decision. Sir: dockets of the President are also clogged, so this practice (attaching) has been allowed. Department of Health v. Camposano F: OP issued a decision dismissing one of the respondents then remanded the case to DOH for “proper action.” DOH dismissed the other respondents citing the OP decision. H: Invalid decision. The OP decision is different as its dismissal applies only to one of the respondents. DOH should have conducted another investigation against the other respondents. American Tobacco, supra H: Delegation to a hearing officer is allowed but decision must be made by the head of the agency. Albert v. Gangan

Page 28 of 56

H: COA disallowed the grant of a loan to NHFMC for the Amako project due to alleged fraud. COA also held Albert, head of NHFMC, liable. F: Invalid decision. No reason given by COA as to why Albert should be held liable. Sir: Note also issues here re command responsibility of a head of AA. This is a good ruling in public officer law which provides a protective mantle to them who are not negligent this is off topic. Clear violation of Ang Tibay. Arocha v. Vivo F: Facts are in relation to the entry of the Gatchalians to the Philippines. H: As to the issue of whether the review of the commissioners is antedated to comply with the oneyear prescriptive period to review the BSI decision? No, it is not antedated, but there were merely clerical corrections. As to the practice of commissioners of merely noting the decisions without discussion? The Court said thtat this is not a valid decision because there should first be deliberation among the commissioners. Neria v. Commissioner of Immigration H: Affirmed Arocha ruling (this is penned by Castro who changed his mind in the next case) Go Yu Tak Wai v. Vivo (NB: Please read the original dahil mahalaga ito lalo na yung dissent. Thanks.) H: Affirmed Neria that the reckoning point of the oneyear prescriptive period for review is the date of deliberation of the BSI decision and not the date of promulgation. Dissent (Teehankee): Reckoning point for the prescriptive period should be the date of promulgation for uniformity. Where there has been no appeal and BOC conducts a review motu proprio of which the applicant is likely unaware, both public policy and due process demand that where no adverse decision is promulgated within the one-year period, the decision of BSI shall have become final. Otherwise, such oneyear period would be an elastic period and would have no meaning because the parties can just expand it for their purposes. Sichangco v. Board of Commissioners of Immigration H: notice can come even after the one year period. - Arocha rule still upheld: the decision in extenso will retroact to the date of voting - All that the Immigration Law requires is that the decision of reversal of the Board of Commissioners be promulgated within one year from the rendition of the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. Notice of said decision of reversal may be sent even after the oneyear period has elapsed


3. Jurisdiction - Note that if you file the case in the wrong forum, you will be (as the saying goes) barking at the wrong tree. The consequence is dismissal of the case. Also, take note that the contest of jurisdiction is usually between a regular court and an admin agencies, there may be instances when the dispute is between the admin agencies. - Look also at the provision and amendments of the law to see if jurisdiction is granted to the agency. Determine also from the enabling law whether the jurisdiction is exclusive or concurrent. Go Tek v. Deportation Board F: G was charged for possession of fake dollar checks. During the pendency of the criminal case, the prosecutor recommended that he be deported as an undesirable alien. G contests because the there is a pending criminal case against him. H: The President has power to deport G regardless of a lack of conviction in the criminal case. The President may, by order after investigation, can order the deportation. Guy v. Ignacio F: Sisters Guy were charged as undesirable aliens before the Board so that they may be deported. They sought intervention with the RTC and showed their identification cards issued by the Board itself that they are Filipinos. H: There is substantial evidence in this case to allow court intervention despite the undergoing proceedings in the Board. The rationale is that the person sought to be deported is entitled to live in peace. Sir: General Rule: The claim of citizenship will not divest the Board of jurisdiction to try the case. If you lose the case, the next step is judicial intervention. The exception is that if there is a substantial evidence or conclusive evidence to prove your citizenship as Filipino, the regular courts can intervene despite pendency of the Board proceedings. But this is not automatic, this is based on the discretion of the court. Conditions of Chua Hiong: 1. The person has substantial or absolute evidence 2. If he has the substantial evidence, it now rests to the sound discretion of the court while the case is pending 3. The case before the Board will suspend the issue of citizenship (If the court ruled against the alleged alien, the deportation proceeding will continue) Go v. Ramos

Page 29 of 56

F: Deportation proceedings against Go with evidence that the entry in the birth certificate states that he is actually a Chinese. H: There is no substantial evidence for court intervention during the pendency of the Board proceedings. Sir: Possible evidence for Chua Hiong doctrine: 1. Birth certificate 2. Proof that you have been allowed to vote 3. Proof of appointed/ elected as a government official 4. Proof of ownership of lands 5. Authentic passport Vera v. Cuevas F: Filled milk controversy re lack of inscription in the cans (that the milk is not suitable for infants). CIR and the Fair Trade Board were contesting the jurisdiction over the case. H: Department of Health (i.e. Bureau of Food and Drugs) has jurisdiction in this case because this is related to health and not to taxation. Dela Fuente v. De Veyra F: A vessel containing smuggled cigarettes was seized. The owner filed a case before the RTC to recover the property from the Collector of Customs (seizure and forfeiture proceeding). RTC assumed jurisdiction because the Collector has no jurisdiction because the seizure beyond the territorial limits. H: The jurisdiction of the Collector is exclusive. If the owner contends the territory/ international law issue, it should have been raised before the Collector as a defense. Carino v. CHR F: CHR assumed jurisdiction over a case of striking teachers. DECS already ordered the teachers to return to work but the teachers refused so they were later dismissed. Despite this ruling, the CHR still take cognizance on the case. H: CHR merely has investigative and not adjudicatory powers. Simon Jr v. CHR F: CHR assumed jurisdiction over the case of vendors whose stalls were demolished by the city government of QC. CHR issued an Order to Desist against the QC officials. H: CHR has no jurisdiction. The issuance of the Order to Desist is nullified because it is not a quasi-judicial agency. This does not involve civil and political rights while this case involves business rights. Sir: CHR = Paper Tiger!!! CHR can only investigate but not adjudicate! LLDA v. CA


F: LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order against the city of Caloocan to close down a dumpsite which reeks polluted water to Marilao River. Caloocan claims that it has jurisdiction over the dump site. H: There is a provision of law that LLDA can issue an order in connection with pollution issues especially in the Laguna Lake region. This is even if there is no explicit wording re a cease and desist order. Union Bank v. HLURB F: The developer of the Europa Condos mortgaged the property without the consent of the owner of the unit. Developer contends that the law on HLURB is not applicable because it occurs after the HLURB law was enacted. H: The applicable law is PD 957 which granted jurisdiction over the case before the NHA. The NHA jurisdiction was later transferred to the exclusive jurisdiction of HLURB because this case involves a real estate transaction i.e. sale of subdivision lots, condominium units and real estate practices. Sir: There is no issue on primary jurisdiction (doctrine) if the jurisdiction is exclusive. This doctrine is only applicable if there is a dispute re the jurisdiction of agencies, or an agency and a regular court. Osea v. Ambrosio F: O bought a house and lot unit from A. A month later, there were cracks in the unit. O filed a case before the Office of the Building Official of QC then a case for damages before the RTC. H: HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction in this case and can also grant damages in relation to the case. Mateo v. CA, Sta. Maria F: MOWAD (Water district) employees filed a complaint against the GM. GM was subsequently dismissed. He filed a petition for Quo Warranto before the RTC. H: MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created by special law, PD 198. Appeal on the dismissal should be brought to the CSC not to regular courts. Sir: If it is an illegal dismissal case in the public sector, file in the CSC (cf NLRC jurisdiction). Q: X is an employee of a GOCC. He claims that he was illegally dismissed. X wants to know where he would file his illegal dismissal case? Katz: It depends. If the GOCC has an original charter or created by law, file with the CSC. If created under the Corporation Code, without original charter, file with the NLRC. (In any event, it is not with the RTC.)  cutting edge! (NB ) PAL v. CAB F: Grand Air applied for a Temporary Operating Permit with CAB. PAL opposed this because Grand Air has no legislative franchise. CAB granted the application.

Page 30 of 56

H: CAB has jurisdiction in this case. A legislative franchise is not required for issuance of temporary operating permit. Erstingcol v. CA F: E was fined after allegedly violating the rules of Urdaneta Village Association Inc. She filed a case before the RTC to nullify said rules. H: HLURB has jurisdiction on homeowner’s association (even if considered an intra-corporate dispute within the association as E is deemed a stockholder). Initially, this kind of case is within SEC’s jurisdiction which was transferred to HGIC then to HLURB. Although the complaint on its face is for declaration of nullity which is within RTC’s jurisdiction, it is actually between a homeowner’s assoc and a member thereof. Sir: Jurisdiction issue can be raised anytime. Deltaventures v. Cabato F: NLRC issued a writ of execution on properties of D in relation to a labor case to which D was not a party. D filed a case for recovery in the RTC. H: It falls under NLRC jurisdiction because this is an incident of a labor case. Sir: NLRC and RTC have concurrent (or co-equal siguro ang ibig sabihin ni sir?) jurisdiction so RTC cannot invalidate its order. Arranza v. BF Homes F: BF was under receivership after filing a petition for rehabilitation in SEC. Subsequently, members of the BF association files with the HLURB a class suit for BF to provide their basic needs. H: The jurisdiction of the two agencies are not in conflict. There are two different cases. But the BF homeowners correctly filed the case with the HLURB, this is irrespective with the SEC case. In case this is a monetary claim of CREDITORS, this should fall under SEC jurisdiction, this case is one of specific performance. CDA v. Dolefil Cooperative F: Members of Dolefile filed a complaint in CDA against their officers for illegal disbursement of funds. CDA freezed their account then ordered a suspension and a new election. H: CDA has no jurisdiction in this case. It was only granted an administrative function and not quasijudicial. De Jesus v. COA F: COA ordered a disallowance for benefits received by the officers of Catbalogan Water District. The officers claim that the benefits are valid based on a LWUA (another agency) resolution. Officers also allege that DBM, not COA, has jurisdiction in the case.


H: COA has jurisdiction to conduct an audit. LWUA’s reso contravenes the special law that created CWD which prohibits these benefits. Sir: Compared with COA Chairperson’s recent order for disallowance against PCSO. CSC v. Alfonso F: Teachers filed a complaint against the HR Director of PUP for abuse of authority. Theu directly filed the case with the CSC. A claimed that it is PUP Board of Regents which had jurisdiction. H: CSC has concurrent jurisdiction with the PUP BOR (cf with exclusive jurisdiction of other agencies like HLURB, Bureau of Customs etc.). Sir: CSC itself may not conduct the investigation itself, it can create a task force or order the PUP BOR itself. Shell v. Jalos F: Shell built a pipeline for natural gas from Palawan to Batangas. Fishermen filed a class suit for damages with the RTC. H: The Pollution Adjudication Board has jurisdiction because this will require technical expertise regarding pollutants etc. Sir: Where is the pollutant here?? Maybe the pipes will traverse the path of the fishes. Machado v. Gatdula F: G filed a case in COSLAP for M’s alleged interference of their right of way. COSLAP ruled for G. H: COSLAP has no jurisdiction. This involves a dispute over private property – this is a civil case which should have been filed in the RTC. (see elements of COSLAP jurisdiction, infra) Vda de Herrera v. Bernardo F: B filed a case against H for alleged interference and disturbance in their land with the COSLAP. H: COSLAP has no jurisdiction. The following elements for COSLAP to assume jurisdiction are not present in this case: a. The dispute between the parties is critical and explosive in nature b. It involves a large number of parties c. There is a presence or emergence of social tension or unrest 4. 

Administrative and Judicial Proceedings arising from the same (Jamie) 2 causes of action arising out of the same set of facts wherein 2 cases ensure – (1) administrative case and (2) criminal case, however the quantum of evidence for each is different Galang v. CA

Page 31 of 56

Facts: Tee Hook Chun was charged with an administrative case for violating the Phil Immigration Act Sec 29 (a). He was also charged with a criminal case for violating Sec 45(e). WON Tee Hook Chun, for being charged with a criminal case, may no longer be punished with exclusion which is the necessary penalty of the first case since he has to wait for the rendition of a judgment in the first case and completion of the service of penalty imposed on him if found guilty of the criminal charge. Held: NO. The two proceedings do not nullify one another since their conflict is only physical. If he is convicted in both cases, the penalties will be served successively and there will be no renunciation of either of the penalties. This means that if he is guilty of the criminal case, but the penalty does not include exclusion, he may still be penalized with exclusion if found guilty in the first case. The power of exclusion under section 29(a) (17) is not set aside, waived or lost upon institution of the criminal case. The administrative proceeding for deportation shall be "independent of the criminal action" for violation of said section 45. The acquittal of the accused in said criminal action would not bar his deportation under the same provision, by the Commissioner of Immigration. CO San v. Director of Patents Facts: Bio was issued two patents. Co San filed an administrative case to nullify the patents which was dismissed. Co San filed a case in the regular courts for unfair competition where the CA acquitted Bio. Co San claims that Director of Patents is bound in the cancellation proceedings by the findings arrived at by the Court of Appeals in the Criminal case against petitioner. Held: Director of Patents is not bound by the findings of the CA in the unfair competition case. In the cancellation proceedings the question refers to the validity of the design patents while in the criminal case the inquiry is whether Co San unfairly competed against the luggage of Co San protected by design patent No. 7. The two cases fall under different jurisdictions. The failure of the trial court, in a civil suit, to admit in evidence a former judgment of acquittal in a criminal action against the defendant is not error. A judgment of acquittal in a criminal action for fraudulent registration of a trademark in violation of Section 18 of Act No. 666, cannot be invoked as res judicata in a civil action based on unfair and malicious competition on the ground that the facts of the latter are different and have not been passed upon in the judgment rendered in the former case. Villanes v. Subido


Facts: Two teachers filed a criminal case against Subido for libel and was found guilty. They also filed an administrative case against Subido and she was found guilty. Should admin case take precedence from the criminal case where Subido was found guilty that admin case should be decided in the same manner? Held: CA decision is not enough basis for the Dep Ed to decide on the administrative case. The CA decision was never presented, even informally, as evidence during the investigation. A condemnatory decision in a criminal case, even if final, by itself alone, cannot serve as basis for a decision in an administrative case involving the same facts, for the simple reason that matters that are material in the administrative case are not necessarily relevant in the criminal case. So, notwithstanding that findings in criminal cases must be beyond reasonable doubt, they cannot be conclusive for administrative purposes. There are defenses, excuses and attenuating circumstances of value in administrative proceedings which are not admissible in the trial of the criminal cases. Sir: If the ordinary courts dismiss the criminal case, it does not necessarily mean that the administrative case will also be dismissed PNR v. Domingo Facts: Mafe was charged with qualified theft where he was acquitted. Mafe filed a motion for amendment of the decision alleging that Mafe had already been dismissed from PNR w/ prejudice to reinstatement per PNR’s board of directors’ resolution because of the crime for which he was acquitted. Mafe, was held guilty in the administrative case against him. However, the court handling the criminal case ruled on the wage of Mafe. Held: Court handling the criminal case has no power to do so. Generally, acquittal in the criminal case does not carry with it relief from administrative liability. The administrative case may generally proceed against a respondent independently of a criminal action for the same act or omission and requires only a preponderance of evidence to establish administrative guilt as against proof beyond reasonable doubt of the criminal charge, as in the analogous cases provided by Art. 33 of the Civil Code. Neither the Revised Penal Code nor the Rules of Court on criminal procedure vests a court w/c acquitted a defendant of a criminal charge the power to grant salary to the defendant during his suspension. The latter should be resolved in an appropriate proceedings whether civil or administrative Sir: Consigna ruling – One was found innocent for absolute lack of evidence. If conviction carries with it dismissal, acquittal under these circumstances should carry with it reinstatement. This is the deviant ruling because there was finding that there was an absolute lack of evidence.

Page 32 of 56

Otherwise, the Dallion ruling holds that criminal courts cannot rule on salaries of the defendant.

and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other.

Tan v. COMELEC Facts: Tan was a prosecutor in Davao who was designated by COMELEC as Vice Chair of the City Bd of Canvassers of Davao. Alterado field an electroral protest in HRET which was dismissed. A criminal case for Falsification of Public Documents and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was filed against Tan in the Ombudsman. An administrative case was filed against Tan for Misconduct, Neglect of Duty, Gross Incompetence and Acts Inimical to the Service which was instituted with the COMELEC. Held: Alterado did not resort to forum shopping. The investigation then being conducted by the Ombudsman on the criminal case for falsification and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, on the one hand, and the inquiry into the administrative charges by the COMELEC, on the other hand, are entirely independent proceedings. Neither would the results in one conclude the other. Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution or vice versa. Sir: Additional issue - All the COMELEC can do is recommend to the Sec of Justice who will consider what the imposition of the appropriate disciplinary penalty is

Miralles v. Go Facts: An administrative complaint was filed before the Office of the Hearing Officer of NAPOLCOM against petitioner Manuel Miralles for Grave Misconduct where he was found guilty. A criminal case for homicide was filed against him but he was acquitted. Miralles claims that his dismissal in the criminal case was conclusive of his innocence. Held: NO. An administrative proceeding is different from a criminal case and may proceed independently thereof. Indeed, the quantum of proof in the latter is different, such that the verdict in one need not necessarily be the same as in the other. It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, respondent’s acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively. In the same vein, the trial court’s finding of civil liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the administrative action before this Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative liability of the lawyer. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa.”

Ocampo v. Office of the Ombudsman Facts: NIACONSULT filed an administrative case before Ocampo for serious misconduct and/or fraud or willful breach of trust and was discharged from service. A criminal case was filed against Ocampo for estafa and falsification which was dismissed. Ocampo claims that the admin case can no longer stand on its own as the case was already dismissed. Held: The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action filed against petitioner or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. The Regional Trial Court, in dismissing the criminal complaint, was simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction. The lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which, though insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance of evidence. There is the "substantial evidence" rule in administrative proceedings which merely requires such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings


Ferrer, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan Facts: An admin and criminal complaint against Sec 3(e) RA 3019 was filed against Ferrer in the SB. Admin case was dismissed. Ferrer claims that the Sandiganbayan should have dismissed the criminal case filed against him, since the alleged wrongful acts complained of in the case are the same as those alleged in the administrative case against him which have been dismissed. Held: NO. One act can give rise to administrative and criminal liability. The criminal case against petitioner, already filed and pending with the Sandiganbayan, may proceed despite the dismissal of the administrative case arising out of the same acts. The same rule applies even to those cases that have yet to be filed in court. If the SB would wait for the decision of the criminal case, it would lessen the jurisdiction of the SB and toll the proceedings, and they have different causes of action and quantum of evidence. Absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa. The basis of administrative liability differs from criminal liability. The purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on the timehonored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of the criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime. One of the

Page 33 of 56

grounds for the dismissal of the administrative case against petitioners is the fact that they were re-elected to office. The re-election of a public official extinguishes only the administrative, but not the criminal, liability incurred by him during his previous term of office. Administrative liability is separate and distinct from penal and civil liabilities. The court is duty-bound to exercise its independent judgment. t is not ousted of its jurisdiction by the ruling in the administrative proceeding. It is axiomatic that when the court obtains jurisdiction over a case, it continues to retain it until the case is terminated. Sir: Exception: Larin case – There was a criminal case in the SB where he was found guilty. It was elevated to the SC, the SC ruled that defendant did not commit any illegal or irregular act. The administrative case then pending was dismissed because it had no leg to stand on anymore. As applied in this case – Larin does not apply. The administrative case was filed independently of the criminal case. The administrative case was not filed on the basis of a criminal conviction, as in fact, the administrative case was dismissed without regard for the results of the criminal case. 5. Rules of Evidence Points to remember: Agencies are created with dispatch not like courts therefore they should be free from technical rules of procedure. They should have the freedom to adopt the procedure that will help them to collate evidence in order to decide the facts judiciously and fairly without sacrificing procedural DP or an opportunity to be heard. Sometimes an agency will also make use of technical rules of procedure if it is necessary to resolve the case judiciously or fairly. So do not leave the door completely closed when it comes to the option of the agency to apply rules of procedure to cases from time to time in a suppletory way Acuzar v. Jorolan Facts: Jorolan filed Administrative Case No. 2000-01 against Acuzar before the PLEB for Grave Misconduct where he was found guilty. A criminal case against Acuzar before the Municipal Trial Court of New Corella for Violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act. Acuzar claims that what he filed was a violation of law therefore PLEB can only act on the admin case once he is found guilty for a violation of law. Held: NO. The respondent’s affidavit-complaint against petitioner would show that petitioner was charged with grave misconduct for engaging in an illicit affair with respondent’s minor daughter, he being a married


man, and not for violation of law, as petitioner would like to convince this Court. Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct, motivated by premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. It usually refers to transgression of some established and definite rule of action, where no discretion is left except what necessity may demand; it does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intention but implies wrongful intention and not to mere error of judgment. On the other hand, “violation of law” presupposes final conviction in court of any crime or offense penalized under the Revised Penal Code or any special law or ordinance. Criminal and administrative cases are separate and distinct from each other. In criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed whereas in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence is required. Verily, administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal proceedings. The PLEB, being the administrative disciplinary body tasked to hear complaints against erring members of the PNP, has jurisdiction over the case. While there is flexibility, there is also a limit Estate of Buan v. Pambusco Facts: Buan applied for certificates of public convenience to extend its services. After hearing the parties and their evidence, the Commission ordered its agents to conduct an on the spot survey of the passenger traffic along those lines. The Commission used all of these information as basis to deny the application. Held: A survey may be conducted in order to verify the truth between conflicting claims and but not to supplant actual trial. Rizal Light Co. v. Mun. Of Rizal Facts: The Commission investigated the electric plant and installations of Rizal Light for non-compliance with regulations of the Commission and violations of conditions of its certificate of public convenience. The report said that indeed Rizal light was guilty. Rizal Light now claims that the evidence-consisting of inspection reports upon which the Commission based its decision is insufficient and untrustworthy in that (1) the authors of said reports had not been put to test by way of cross-examination; (2) the reports constitute only one side of the picture as petitioner was not able to present evidence in its defense Held: The Commission based its decision on the inspection reports submitted by its engineers who conducted the inspection of petitioner's electric service upon orders of the Commission.Said inspection reports specify in detail the deficiencies incurred, and violations committed, by the petitioner resulting in the inadequacy of its service. These reports, are not mere documentary proofs presented for the consideration of

Page 34 of 56

the Commission, but are the results of the Commission's own observations and investigations which it can rightfully take into consideration. Petitioner should not complain because it had waived not only its right to cross-examine but also its right to present evidence. Borja v. Moreno Facts: An admin case was filed against Borja et al for demolition of dams and dikes along Macabee river. Department of Public Works and Communications ordered an investigation which found Borja guilty. Borja claims that the investigation constituted a usurpation of judicial power and hence beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Secretary and it was conducted with GAD and in violation of due process. Held: YES. Yonzon, upon a mere oral notice, conducted an ocular inspection of the questioned stream without giving appellee Borja sufficient time to prepare therefor. Yonzon did not limit himself to inspecting the premises but proceeded to conduct a hearing by questioning the witnesses who had testified the day before. Yonzon clearly abused his discretion in riding roughshod over appellee's right to a fair hearing for conducting an ocular inspection motu proprio and interrogating witnesses during the same. This was considered a violation of DP. Maceda v. ERB Facts: Maceda wants to nullify the provisional increase of ERB in price of oil. Maceda wanted to cross-examien witnesses but ERB ruled that witnesses will put down in affidavits first and that Maceda will only have the right to cross-examine after all evidence has been presented. Held: The order of testimony both with respect to the examination of the particular witness and to the general course of the trial is within the discretion of the ERB court and the exercise of this discretion in permitting to be introduced out of the order prescribed by the rules is not improper as per Sec 2 Rule 1 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure for the ERB. This relaxed procedure is especially true in administrative bodies such as the ERB, which in matters of rate-fixing, is considered as exercising quasi-legislative, not quasi-judicial, function. As such administrative agency, it is not bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence governing court proceedings. Bantolino v. Coca-Cola Bottles Phils. Inc. Facts: 62 employees' complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed OTG that during trial, some of the petitioners (Romero, Espina, and Bantolino) were not cross-examined. Petitioners argue that the CA should not have given weight to respondent’s claim of failure to cross-examine them.


Held: The argument that the affidavit is hearsay because the affiants were not presented for crossexamination is not persuasive because the rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC where decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only. Art. 221 of the Labor Code, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law do not control proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. LA and the NLRC are authorized to adopt reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law and procedure, all in the interest of due process. Administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. CSC v. Colangco Facts: CSC conducted an investigation and found out the someone took the teacher's exam for Colangco. Colangco claims that the pieces of evidence against him were inadmissible as they were unauthenticated photocopies of the PBET application form, picture seat plan and PDS. Held: NO, they are admissible. The CSC correctly appreciated the photocopies of PBET application form, picture seat plan and PDS (though not duly authenticated) in determining whether there was sufficient evidence to substantiate the charges against the respondent. Respondent never objected to the veracity of their contents. He merely disputed their admissibility on the ground that they were not authenticated. The CSC carefully evaluated the allegations against respondent and thoroughly examined and weighed the evidence submitted for its consideration. Administrative rules of procedure are construed liberally to promote their objective and to assist parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses. “Do not be lost with the guiding star of Judicial Review!” (Carlota, 2013) V. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS  The exercise of administrative powers can lead to GAD therefore there is this constant need to see to it that the AAs do not abuse their powers and that they stay within the scope of their authority – intra vires. The only way to do this effectively is through judicial review.  The most effective check and balance/control mechanism when dealing with AAs is judicial review

Page 35 of 56

A. FACTORS AFFECTING FINALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS Switchmen’s Union Of North America v. National Mediation Board Facts: The Board directed an election in a yard, designating all yardmen as participants. The organization that lost filed a complaint challenging the Board's authority to determine as to participants in the election. Is there judicial review of the decisions of the Board? Held: No. There can be judicial review of the decisions of administrative agencies only if authorized by the Congress. Where no judicial review was provided by Congress, the Supreme Court has often refused to furnish one even where questions of law might be involved such as in this case. Where Congress has not expressly authorized judicial review, the following become highly relevant in determining whether judicial may nonetheless be supplied: (1) The type of problem involved and (2) The history of the statute in question. The dispute was to reach its last terminal point when the administrative finding was made. There was to be no dragging out of the controversy into other tribunals of law. Sir: FACTOR AFFECTING FINALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS: (1) The nature of the subject matter and legislative intent is a FACTOR that would provide guidance if judicial intervention is proper or not. (2) The nature of the controversy is about a union recognition for purposes of collective bargaining. (3) The nature of the subject matter in this case lends itself for quick resolution such as mediation. Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc Facts: Congress already gave AAs the power to define “statutory source”. Can the judiciary still intervene? Held: A court may not construe or interpret a statutory provision when the Congress expressly delegated the agency to interpret a specific provision of a statute. If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision or a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator or agency. Sir: This is an interpretation that accommodates industry


FACTOR AFFECTING FINALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS: Agency interpretation of a term or action is a policy choice and the court should not intervene in this. General rule: If the agency interpretation is not outrightly unreasonable and the ultimate analysis of the policy choice the Congress does not expressly prohibit it from doing so, then the judiciary should adopt an attitude of restraint in reversing such policy choice of the AA. Exception: Unless the policy choice is inextricably linked to questions of law. Ratio: Policy choice is not judicial business. Making policy choices should be left with the AAs. Fortich v. Corona Facts: LGUs reclassified units, but OP decision held that it was not subject to approval of DAR. OP Decision was declared by the same office as final and executory for having filed MR beyond the 15-day reglementary period, yet OP still opened the case wherein the land was divided between the industrial development of the landowners and farmers. Held: No. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18, dated February 12, 1987, which mandates that "decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof . . ., unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period." There is nothing wrong with referring the decision to the departments concerned for the preparation of the motion for reconsideration, but in doing so, the DAR must not disregard the reglementary period fixed by law, rule or regulation. The rules relating to reglementary period should not be made subservient to the internal office procedure of an administrative body. Sir: FACTOR AFFECTING FINALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS If an administrative decision has already becomes final and executory, judicial review is impossible – no longer available Antique Sawmill, Inc, v, Zayco Facts: A public bidding was conducted for the award of a forest area which was divided equally between Zayco and Antique Sawmills, Inc. Zayco filed MR outside the 30-day reglementary period. Despite this, Zayco still appealed this to OP and OP still issued a decision that the forest area be awarded only to Zayco. Antique Sawmill claims that the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has become final and the OP had no jurisdiction to issue that decision after the 30-day reglementary period had lapsed. Held: NO. Compliance with the period provided by law for the perfection of an appeal is not merely

Page 36 of 56

mandatory by also a jurisdictional requirement. Such failure has the effect of rendering final the judgment of the court, and the certification of the record on appeal thereafter cannot restore the jurisdiction which has been lost. A regulation adopted pursuant to law has the force and effect of law. Administrative regulations be given the same force as rules of court in order to maintain the regularity of administrative proceedings. Proceedings already terminated should not be altered at every step. Judgment of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object for which courts were instituted was to put an end to controversy. Sir: FACTOR AFFECTING FINALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS: If an administrative decision has already becomes final and executory, judicial review is impossible – no longer available Sotto v. Ruiz Facts: The question of law involved in this case is WON the publication was libellous. Held: The decision whether or not this is libellous is to be determined by the Court as it involves an interpretation of the law therefore there is judicial review. No it was not libelous. The propriety of a periodical distributing copies of a confidential telegram sent by one official to another may well be questioned. But to do so is not libelous per se. Even the squib following the copy of the telegram is no more than attempted humor and would not be taken seriously by the reading public. Sir: FACTOR AFFECTING FINALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS: If it involves a question of law, judicial review is available. Ratio: Because the judiciary is the final interpreter of the law and not the AA. Uy v. Palomar Facts: The question of law is WON the Grand Christmas Bonus Draw is gambling. Held: The decision whether or not it is gambling is to be determined by the Court as it involves an interpretation of the law therefore there is judicial review. The Postal Law contains no provision for judicial review of the decision of the Postmaster General, but it does not mean that judicial review is not available. For as long as there is a question of law, it will be subject to judicial review. No it is not gambling because there was no consideration. Sir: FACTOR AFFECTING FINALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS: If it involves a question of law, judicial review is available. Ratio: Because the judiciary is the final interpreter of the law and not the AA. Manuel v. Villena


Facts: Manuel sought annulment of the decision of said public officials rejecting his application for a Tree Farm Permit Held: Administrative proceedings may be reviewed by the courts upon a showing that "the board or official has gone beyond his statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of discretion" or that the decision is vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake. This did not occur in this case. Sir: FACTOR AFFECTING FINALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS: If the matter is one entrusted to the decision of the AA and there was no grave abuse of discretion then there is no judicial review needed. San Miguel Corp. v. Sec of Labor Facts: Yanglay was dismissed by his company for illegal trafficking of medicines. LA and NLRC held Yanglay was illegally dismissed. The company filed MR. Yanglay claims that CA has no jurisdiction over the case as judicial review is not provided for in Presidential Decree No. 21. Held: No. It is generally understood that as to administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative power there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute. The purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect substantial rights of parties affected by its decisions. It is part of the system of checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications. Judicial review is proper in case of lack of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion, error of law, fraud or collusion. Yanglay should not have been dismissed as he should have only been penalized with appropriate disciplinary action. Sir: FACTOR AFFECTING FINALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS: Even though the law is silent, there will still be judicial review in case of lack of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion, error of law, fraud or collusion. UCPB v. E. Guanzon Facts: EGI loaned from UCPB and defaulted. EGI filed with the BSP an administrative complaint for violations of Sec. 368 and 379 of RA 6753 (Article IV of the New Central Bank Act) in relation to RA 8791 (General Banking Law of 2000) and for the commission of irregularities and conducting business in an unsafe or unsound manner. DISMISSED. An appeal in the CA remanded the case. WON CA has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the BSP/Monetary Board

Page 37 of 56

Held: Yes. There is nothing in RA No. 7653 or in RA No. 8791 which explicitly allows an appeal of the decisions of the BSP Monetary Board to the CA. However, this shall not mean that said decisions are beyond judicial review. The CA has appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, orders, resolutions or awards of the BSP Monetary Board on administrative complaints against banks and quasi-banks, which the former acquires through the filing by the aggrieved party of a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Sir: FACTOR AFFECTING FINALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS: CA has jurisdiction over decision of quasi-judicial agencies.

B. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES (cielo) - This is a very basic principle in administrative law. This is relevant in determining whether judicial intervention is necessary. - what is the purpose of this doctrine? This has both practical and legal reasons. Practical: agency can correct its own error. You are spared of unnecessary waste and expense. Legal reason: when the law prescribes certain levels of administrative appeal/remedy, that is a requirement of the law that must be complied with. There is also the principle of comity (i.e. expedient courtesy) as a cogent reason behind the doctrine. Also, this will facilitate unclogging of the dockets of the courts. - what will be the effect of failure to exhaust administrative remedies? Dismissal of complaint (MTD for failure to state cause of action - premature) NB: judge cannot motu proprio dismiss on this ground. If the other party does not file MTD, court will go on with the complaint. This is NOT jurisdictional. It is an affirmative defense which can be waived by the other party. - this rule has many exceptions. It is mandatory that you remember all of the exceptions provided by jurisprudence. Note the framework if GR, the rule was applied, if XPN, then there is an exception applicable Pascual v. Provincial Board - XPN F: P was charged for an offense allegedly committed in a previous term. He went to CFI for Prohibition because he cannot be charged for an offense committed in his previous term. H: The rule (exhaustion) cannot be applied. GR: Where the law has delineated the procedure by which administrative appeal or remedy could be effected, the same should be followed before recourse to judicial action can be initiated XPN: The question in dispute is purely a legal one, and nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be


done. In this case, the legal question is whether he can be held liable for an offense committed in the previous term. NB: also popular for the Condonation doctrine in the law on public officers Alzate v. Aldana – XPN F: The principal wanted to recover his salary increase but pending appeal to the Bureau of Public Schools, he went to CFI for Mandamus. H: This case is under an exception so rule is not applied: XPN: urgency of the action; when exhaustion of administrative remedies would amount to nullification of the claim. The rule will not be applied if application would amount to a nullificiation of the claim because, for example time is of the essence. In this case, the funds will revert to the national treasury. Cipriano v. Marcelino – XPN F: C resigned as record clerk and she seeks to recover P949 equivalent to commutation of her leaves. C went to CFI for Mandamus. H: This is under an exception: XPN: Party need not exhaust administrative remedies if to require him to do so would be patently oppressive or unreasonable. Going all the way to the President, he would spend more than what she is seeking. This is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Corpus v. Cuaderno – XPN F: C was deemed resigned even if no sufficient evidence was found on the charge against him. He filed a Quo warranto petition in the CFI. H: This is under an excpetion: XPN: When the administrative remedy available is merely permissive, then the party can seek judicial relief right away (also apply generalia specialibus non derogate). In this case, the permissive remedy is an appeal to the Civil Service Commission from the Monetary Board. De Lara v. Cloribel – XPN F: PE logging corporation filed a Petition for Injuntion in CFI while its case against De Lara in the DENR re a logging concession was pending. H: The rule does not apply. XPN: the rule is inapplicable if it should appear that an irreparable damage and injury will be suffered by a party if he should await, before taking court action, the final action of the administrative official concerned on the matter. In this case, De Lara is continuously obtaining logs from the concession pending appeal to DENR. - party need not exhaust administrative remedies if by doing so he will suffer irreparable damage or injury

Page 38 of 56

Paredes v. CA - GR F: P filed a Petition for Prohibition in the RTC re the increased fees proposed by the Bureau of Patents. H: The GR applies. GR: Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review, and provides a system of administrative appeal, or reconsideration, the courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum. In this case, since the challenged administrative orders have not yet been submitted to the Cabinet for its consideration and approval, this Court finds it untimely to discuss and resolve the merits of the questions of whether or not the rate increases and charges are just and reasonable... Courts should be reluctant to interfere with administrative action prior to its completion or finality, the reason being that absence of a final order or decision, the power of the administrative agency concerned has not been fully exercised and there can be no irreparable harm. Sir: remember this case, because later on SC will say that the doctrine applies only to quasi-judicial functions of administrative agencies. But here, what is involved is rule-making, a quasi-legislative function. Strictly speaking, the applicable doctrine is "ripeness", not exhaustion. Ripeness pertains to policy or rule making. THIS COULD BE ASKED IN THE BAR. Suspend your curiosities! Quasha v. SEC – XPN F: Q was contesting the conversion of the Manila Polo Club and the sale of proprietary shares for only 12,500. Instead of going to SEC en banc, after the decision of the SEC, it filed a case in the CFI for Injunction. H: The GR does not apply. XPN: When the administrative remedy provided is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. - In view of the limited time, and considering the issuance of the order denying injunctive relief only at the height of the Christmas holidays, petitioner properly filed directly with the Court without going through the prescribed procedure of filing before the SEC en banc within the 30-day reglementary period since such recourse would not be a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. - another case where time is of the essence. Republic v. Sandiganbayan – XPN F: Private respondents filed a petition in the SC (which was forwarded to the Sandiganbayan) against the sequestration orders issued by the PCGG.


XPN: when there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine - PCGG is already barred by laches in filing its MTD seven years after the institution of the petition, when all that is left for it to do is to make a formal offer of evidence. There is an exception to this exception, the Ocampo case, filed the MTD just after the Answer was filed. Paat v. CA – GR F: A truck was confiscated by DENR. While the appeal on the case was pending, the owner filed a replevin suit in the CFI. H: GR was applied. If a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought. - Exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies: (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned (5) when there is irreparable injury, - De Lara v. Cloribel (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, - Cipriano v. Marcelino (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim Alzate v. Aldana (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention Lopez v. City of Manila – GR F: L filed before CFI a declaration of nullity of an Ordinance where his real property is assessed and increased up to 580%. H: GR applies. Where the law provides for the remedies against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer, relief to courts can be sought only after exhausting all remedies provided. The reason rests upon the presumption that the administrative body, if given the chance to correct its mistake or error, may amend its decision on a given matter and decide it properly.

Page 39 of 56

Therefore, where a remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts, not only to give the administrative agency the opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to courts. This rule, however, admits certain exceptions (see lists supra). Remedies he should have availed of before going to court : 1.) The taxpayer may question the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinance on appeal within thirty (30) days from effectivity thereof, to the Secretary of Justice. The petitioner after finding that his assessment is unjust, confiscatory, or excessive, must have brought the case before the Secretary of Justice for question of legality or constitutionality of the city ordinance. 2.) Under Section 226 of R.A. 7160, an owner of real property who in not satisfied with the assessment of his property may, within sixty (60) days from notice of assessment, appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals. 3.) Should the taxpayers question the excessiveness of the amount of tax, he must first pay the amount due, in accordance with Section 252 of R.A. 7160. Then, he must request the annotation of the phrase "paid under protest" and accordingly appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals by filing a petition under oath together with copies of the tax declarations and affidavits or documents to support his appeal. Garcia v. CA – GR F: G was dismissed by PCA due to a charge of irregularity committed by him. Instead of appealing to the CSC, he filed a petition for Injunction in the RTC which the RTC granted. H: GR applied. Remedy he bypassed: appeal the resolution of the PCA to the CSC. - No violation of right to due process because he was given opportunity to be heard. Sir: This case is about the gold mine called Buko Juice! But back to the case, the rule is that failure to exhaust admin remedies is not jurisdictional, if no MTD is filed, the court will go on, it is passive so it will only rule on the issue brought to its attention. What you should do is to immediately file a MTD, otherwise, the court will deem failure to file as a waiver. Dep't. of Agrarian Reform v. Apex Investment – XPN F: A’s lands were subject to compulsory acquisition by DAR municipal office. After appeal to the Provincial office (PARO), the case was only forwarded to DAR after a year. When he learned that his titles had been cancelled. He filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. H: The rule does not apply. XPN: urgency of judicial intervention


- Among others, it is disregarded where, as in this case, (a) there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; and (b) the administrative action is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction. - DAR started distributing the lands of respondent, and Register of Deeds started canceling its titles. Under these circumstances, there is no need for him to wait for the resolution of its Protest in the DAR because DAR would, in the meantime, distribute its land Smart Communications v. NTC – XPN F: NTC issued memoranda re billing and sale of goods. Petitioners filed for a writ of injunction to enjoin NTC from implementing said memo because it was DTI’s function to regulate sale of cellphones etc. H: The rule was not applied. XPN: In cases involving rule-making or quasilegislative powers of an administrative agency - In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rulemaking or quasi-legislative power. - But see Paredes v. CA (which involved rate-fixing subject to approval of the Cabinet or quasi-legislative power), where the doctrine was applied. But Sir said the settled rule is here in smart, doctrine of exhaustion is applicable only in quasi-judicial proceedings. The proper objection in rate fixing is the doctrine of "ripeness." Estrada v. CA – GR F: Petitioners filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages in the RTC against the Private Respondents awarded a contract for development and operation of a cement plant which will allegedly cause pollution and nuisance. H: The rule was applied. Petitioners should have went to the PAB under the DENR, which has jurisdiction and power to issue the remedies they were seeking (injunction) Regino v. Pangasinan College of Science and Technology – XPN F: R was required to pay for dance tickets. Because of his meager means and membership in a religious denomination prohibiting them from joining dances (siguro Jehovah’s Witness), he protested but the teachers would not allow him to take the exam. He file an action for damages. H: XPN is that this is a purely legal question. DEAR does not even apply because the case is one for damages, exclusively within the jurisdiction of regular

Page 40 of 56

courts, and not for administrative relief in overturning the policy of PCST (which should be brought to CHED) Flores v. Sanggunian - GR F: F was accused of malversation before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The Sanggunian recommended to Gov. Lapid that Flores be penalized. Before the Lapid could respond, F filed a case before the CA for certiorari and mandamus. H: F should have waited for the decision of the Governor of Pampanga or the decision of the Sanggunian could be appealed to the OP. CSC v. DBM – XPN F: CSC went to SC for Mandamus for failure of DBM to release its funds. H: The rule does not apply. XPN: There was no obligation on the part of CSC to first go to the DBM for an opinion re: definition of "fiscal autonomy" before going to court. Moreover, the question posed is a pure question of law, which you can bring to the court immediately. Obisca v. Basallote - GR H: CSC decision became final and executory because he did not file an MR within the prescribed period.

C. PRIMARY JURISDICTION OR PRELIMINARY RESORT - courts tend to use primary jurisdiction and exclusive jurisdiction (on the basis of expertise) in the same vein. Sir disagrees. He emphasized that DOPJ developed as a guide to the judge when to yield jurisdiction when the matter involves administrative expertise which you do not have. This is the purpose of the doctrine. If it is applied in this manner, then it is DOPJ in play. But application by some other manner, e.g. cases which requires preliminary determination by administrative agencies (I.e. Philippine Veterans case), is another rule altogether other than doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Sir seems to say that evenif the courts are confused in its application, you shouldn't muddle the concept. Texas Pacific Railway v. Abilene Cotton F: A was using the services of the railway company for the shipment of its cotton oil. A filed a case before the court questioning the reasonableness of the rate. - requirements for applicability of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction: 1.) There is a concurrence of jurisdiction between a court and the agency Sir: primary jurisdiction = exclusive jurisdiction. Technically speaking, doctrine of primary jurisdiction is a guide to the judge when to yield his jurisdiction to the agency, hence it presupposes concurrence. It should


not even find application in case there is an exclusive jurisdiction. 2.) The issue to be resolved requires the expertise of the agency, which the judge does not possess Ratio: To secure uniformity of rulings (uniformity of rulings is desired) Sir: The function of the doctrine is to serve as a guide to the judge. From the POV of the petitioner, you have two choices, either AA or court. If you go to AA, no problem. But if you go to the court, the judge should be guided by the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Also consider the policy of uniformity of ruling, hence, requiring the court to yield jurisdiction to an administrative agency. Phil. Global Communication v. Relova F: PGC wanted to start a station in Cebu so PGC applied before the NTC. Respondents filed a petition for declaratory relief regarding the coverage of the franchise of PGC. PGC’s MTD on the petition was dismissed so PGC filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the SC. H: Petitions of PGC dismissed. The regular court has jurisdiction. Doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not find application, hence, the TC judge should not yield jurisdiction. This is because what is involved is a purely legal question involving the question of whether or not there is such a right to establish branches on the part of the petitioner as granted by its legislative franchise. There is an absence of clarity on the right of petitioner under the statute. Absent such clarity as to the scope and coverage of its franchise a legal question arises which is more appropriate for the judiciary than for an administrative agency to resolve. Sir: the second requirement (re expertise) is absent. It is really a question of law, which does not need agency expertise but instead is within the jurisdiction of regular courts. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction calls for application when there is such competence to act on the part of an administrative body. Vidal v. RTC of Negros F: Public school teachers who staged a demonstration were charged administratively. They, in turn, filed a case for prohibition and damages against the DECS officials conducting the investigation. H: Doctrine of primary jurisdiction invoked; proceedings in RTC were not dismissed but suspended pending determination of the administrative case. While no prejudicial question strictly arises where one is a civil case and the other is an administrative proceeding, in the interest of good order, it behooves the court to suspend its action on the cases before it pending the final outcome of the administrative proceedings. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the

Page 41 of 56

jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Sir: concurrence of jurisdiction is missing here, because it involves two different causes of action (one is the admin charge in relation to the strike, the other is against the officials). So invoking the doctrine is wrong. The SC treated the admin case like a prejudicial question before the court can take cognizance of the civil case. Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. CA F: I applied for a coal-operating contract but the Bureau of Energy Development recommended that a MOA be entered with MMIC. But I later wanted to rescind the MOA between M. H: The SC applied the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. BED has technical expertise to resolve the matter. Note that if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Sir: On the issue of suspension, we must have a broader perspective because it would appear that if the court suspended the case, will it go over the technical facts of the case? Then what’s the point of yielding? It would not be an original jurisdiction but would only touch upon questions of law or other matters that had been decided by the AA in its expertise. Conrad and Company v. CA F: There are two cases: A petition for cancellation of patents before BPTT and a criminal case for unfair competition before the regular court. H: Like in Vidad, the court should suspend before the AA case is resolved. The RTC judge said that for good cause shown, it may suspend the proceedings. But Sir said there is no prejudicial question, so it should not be suspended. This is another case of a practical rather than legal approach undertaken by the court. Sir explained that it is desirable, but not entirely legal. The problem is that the courts drag into the discussion the DOPJ, which is not entirely correct. In DOPJ, it is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the doctrine that there be concurrent jurisdiction between a court and an administrative agency. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction which, simply expressed, merely behooves regular courts, in controversies involving specialized disputes, to defer to the findings of resolutions of administrative tribunals on certain technical matters. It is unlabeled –


the act of suspending the judicial proceeding pending admin act, for good cause shown. What is that good cause? Equitable considerations that the result of admin case may affect the civil case or the parties may “kiss and make up”. But the court should not have used the term doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Philippine Veterans Bank v. CA F: P filed a case for just compensation in the RTC in relation to DAR’s compulsory acquisition of its lands for agrarian reform. H: Doctrine of primary jurisdiction is "applied." The SC harmonized the two conflicting provisions in the same law by dragging into the picture DOPJ. DARAB makes a preliminary administrative determination of just compensation. But if the landowner is unsatisfied, he can go to the RTC. Sir: what is worst is the court said the action brought before RTC is tried in its original jurisdiction. The problem is with poor legislative draftsmanship because both provisions used the term “original and exclusive”. You cannot escape the fact that what the court’s jurisdiction is not original but only review or appeal. The SC instead harmonized the conflict by stating that the proceeding in the DARAB is only a preliminary matter. Robert: Why is the court confused in applying DOPJ even if seems so clear-cut? Sir: Hahaha. Why do you think? You ask them because I cannot speak for them. We might be developing our own doctrine deviating from the original, haha. Seriously though, the court might be using the term in loose manner, based on the term “primary”. But technically, it is a doctrine developed to GUIDE the judge when to YIELD jurisdiction when there is CONCURRENCE in jurisdiction when the issue is technical that an AA can better resolve it. D. STANDING TO CHALLENGE Sir: simplest solution is when the law itself provides for who can bring the suit Kilosbayan v. Morato - question of standing applicable only when the case involves a constitutional question. Exception to question of standing: transcendental importance doctrine, where the SC waives all questions of standing if it determines that the case involves a matter of transcendental importance. Ursal v. CTA F: The city assessor appealed to the CTA after the Cebu Board of Assessment appeals reversed his decision. H: No standing to sue. The law explicitly requires that appeal should be made by adversely affected party. He was not adversely affected. Acting Collector of Customs v. CTA

Page 42 of 56

F: Acting collector appealed to the CTA the decision of the Commissioner re forfeiture of Pageant magazines. H: CTA has jurisdiction only over tax cases, not forfeiture cases. As to standing, only those who can go to CTA are persons, corporations, associations adversely affected by the ruling. ACC has no standing to sue because he is not an injured party, and he is in effect questioning the ruling of his superior (the Commissioner of Customs). Sir: This will give you an idea of the state of morality in the ‘50s. But we’re not really interested in the Kinsey Report! (really sir?) Lozada v. Comelec F: L, as taxpayer and voter, wants to compel the Comelec to conduct a special election pursuant to the 1973 Constitution to fill vancancies. H: As taxpayers, petitioners may not file the petition, for nowhere therein is it alleged that tax money is being illegally spent. In fact, it alleges nonperformance of an allegedly ministerial duty. He also do not have a standing as a voter because he did not suffer a direct injury. Oposa v. Factoran H: This is a class suit based on R3, Sec.12 of the ROC: complaint of general and common interest to parties so numerous, it is impractical to join them all in one suit. The number of petitioners here is sufficiently numerous and representative of the interests of all the parties affected. Hence, class suit is allowed. - Not only is a class suit in representation of other parties allowed, it also allowed the representation of generations yet to be born on the concept of intergenerational responsibility. Joya v. PCGG F: Petitioners, as artists, interested in preserving the ill-gotten wealth (paintings) to be auctioned in New York. H: They have no legal standing to sue. Not only are the artworks not public property, hence there is no COA to enjoin its sale, its sale would also not be prejudicial to them because they are not the owners of the property. Taxpayers' suit also disallowed. Taxpayers' suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Magic wand: Transcendental importance Kilosbayan v. Guingona F: K (Salonga group) challenged the award of the operation of facility for PCSO’s online lottery system.


H: Following the ruling in De Guia, legal standing is equated to a procedural rule. Hence, transcendental importance was sufficient to confer standing. Note Feliciano’s dissent: The issue on locus standi should not be dismissed using merely transcendental importance. Determination of standing must be based on a standard: a. The character of funds/ assets is of major importance b. This is a clear case of constitutional/statutory prohibition c. Lack of any other party with more specific or direct interest d. Wide range of impact of the issue Kilosbayan v. Morato F: A new case based on a new contract entered into between PCSO and the Malaysian firm (continuation of the Guingona case). K claimed that this contract was also unconstitutional. H: On the issue of standing supposedly decided by the Court in Guingona, the Court reconsidered. Court said that legal standing is not merely procedural, but a fundamental requirement of judicial review stemming from the need for an actual case or controversy. It elevated locus standi from the clutches of transcendental importance doctrine, and limited its application in constitutional cases. Court said issue of legal standing is not applicable in this case, because it does not involve a constitutional issue. It involves only the question of validity of a lease coneact. Hence, the test should be real party in interest in civil cases. K, not the real parties in interest, not being party of the contract between PCSO and the PGC Sir: Cf with Guingona where the SC used the magic wand of transcendental importance, in this case, the Court avers that this is merely about real parties in interest in a civil case. And you have to remember that PCSO is a public agency whose public funds go into the government’s coffers, and yet, the SC treated this as an ordinary civil case. Domingo v. Carale F: Retired officials of the COA challenged the restructuring program to be implemented by COA. Their standing was allegedly based on their continuing interest for the commission. H: No locus standi. Petitioners do not have a material, personal, substantial interest in the case such that they stand to suffer or be adversely affected by the reorganization. Association of Data Processing Service v. Camp (landmark) F: A contests the resolution of the Comptroller Agency that allows the national banks to provide data

Page 43 of 56

processing services in competition with A. Lower court ruled that A has no standing. H: SC reversed. This does not involve a constitutional issue but if the resolution is consistent with the banking law. Standing to sue is different from the determination of the existence of legal interest. The latter is a question that goes into the merits of the case, appropriately resolved by trial, while the former is a question of jurisdiction that must be understood within the framework of an actual case or controversy. SC discarded the purely legal interest test of standing in the past. According to it, when resolving a standing issue, court should not go into the merits (the existence of a legal interest, which must be determined according to the allegations of the pleading). The question of standing has to be resolved by using the "injury in fact test." Court: The "legal interest" test goes to the merits. The question of standing is different. It concerns, apart from the "case" or "controversy" test, the question whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.  note that both the constitutional and statutory issues are covered!!! Sir: Cf with Kilosbayan v. Morato, where SC held that standing is a proper question to be considered only when constitutional questions are involved  I think THIS IS NOT CORRECT, not correct... Data Processing did not involve a constitutional question, but it is here from which the prevalent "injury in fact" test originated. As long as a governmental action is being questioned, you can use locus standi principle! But if this is only a private action, then use Mendoza’s approach in Morato. I think Justice Mendoza is merely testing the waters kung anong maging reaction of the public, unfortunately parang ako lang nag-react eh! (ikaw na talaga sir! ) Law on standing in Data Process Servers: - Previously, question of standing was resolved using the "legal interest test," that is, the existence of legal right arising from law, contract, or some other recognized legal source. Court emphasized that this determination goes into the merits, whicin should not be considered when resolving the question of standing only. - For standing to be had, petitioner must prove to the court that the agency action complained of injures you in fact, and you have to show to the court that injury. This injury need not be economic only, it can be aesthetic (Sierra Club). But the existence of standing does not necessarily mean that your case is meritorious. - Zone of interests test: This interest sought to be protected by the petitioner is arguably within the zone of interests protected by the constitution or statute.


Two tests are involved: 1. Injury in fact - are they going to suffer an injury (in this case, yes financial losses) 2. Zone of interest – if arguably within the zone of interest protected by consti or law (in this case, yes because the data processing services are not actually consistent with their banking functions) Sir: emphasized his critique of Kilosbayan using Data Processing. He is of the opinion that the limitation of standing in constitutional issues only is incorrect, because standing developed in the context of judicial review cases which did not necessarily involve constitutional questions. Do not peek into the merits of the case when resolving locus standi issue. The perspective is that, either first, while the court agree that you have standing, you may lose at the trial on merits. Second scenario, you may won both on standing nor trial on merits. Third scenario, you lose on standing even without the court going on the merits of the case. Sierra Club v. Morton F: S challenges the planned construction of a highway cutting across a national forest that will lead to a Disney ski resort. H: No standing because the pleading did not specify how the members of the Sierra club will be injured in fact by the development so it did not satisfy the injury in fact test. It is not sufficient to allege the existence of an injury. It is still a fundamental requirement that the petitioner seeking review must himself have suffered an injury. In other words, the pleading must allege specific facts showing to the court actual injury suffered by the petitioner as a result of the adinistrative action complained of. But the "injury in fact" test requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review be himself among the injured. Sir: If you are the lawyer, allege in the pleading how the members will be directly injured e.g. bird watching activities will be affected. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Club F: Respondents are organizations of low-income individuals challenging the resolution of the Secretary of Treasury giving favorable tax treatment on hospitals which do not grant services to indigents. H: No standing because petitioners failed to allege how the administrative action complained of will cause specific injury to their members in relation to a relevant statute. Federal plaintiffs must allege some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action before a federal court may assume jurisdiction.". More importantly, he injury alleged and the relief prayed for is, in a sense, speculative.

Page 44 of 56

- Sir: bottom-line is that they were not able to establish injury in fact and their position is actually speculative. This case highlights the flip side of the coin. If the socalled injury of the petitioner is merely sepcuflatie or conjectural, it does not satisfy the injury in fact test. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation F: Respondents are contesting the Bureau of Land Management’s land withdrawal review program. H: No standing because what is being questioned is not a final agency action. What is being questioned here is not a final agency action as defined jurisprudentially, but rather a series of actions by the BLM in compliance with a statute evidencing a general, broad policy consideration. Sir: Until there is a concrete program and the plaintiff will be able to show injury to the members, then plaintiff may be granted standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife F: Respondents challenge the orders to implement the Endangered Species Act in relation to crocodiles in the Nile river, tigers in Bengali etc. H: No standing because the injury in fact test was not met. Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements: first, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" -- an invasion of a legallyprotected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized (Sierra Club), and (b) "actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural' or ‘hypothetical." Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of (Simon v. Eastern Kentucky). Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision." They were not able to prove injury redressibility. Their allegation of injury is speculative. Sierra Club is cited as authority for the proposition that it has to be more than a cognizable interest, but an injury which the plaintiff himself suffers. The court also was not persuaded by the several theories of standing propounded by the respondents. As to redressibility, the respondents failed to prove that granting the remedy prayed for would redress the injury alleged. Despite the respondents’ radical proposition re use of nexus etc, the Court ruled against them. E. RIPENESS Note that Exhaustion doctrine applies only to exercise of quasi-judicial functions or adjudicative functions. If the question involved is the exercise of quasilegislative or policy/rule-making powers of an administrative agency, the proper doctrine to be used is "ripeness." If you are using exhaustion, it means that


you are party in an admin case and then you go to court for review, the question will Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner F: This involves the Everytime Rule  use the established name of the drug every time the manufacturing company uses the proprietary name. This involves a pre-enforcement controversy which the court determined is ripe for judicial adjudication. The injunctive relief prayed for is a discretionary remedy that can be issued only in the context of a controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. H: The ripeness doctrine’s basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from: a. entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also b. to protect the agencies from premature judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties (triple highlight daw!) The problem is best seen in a twofold aspect:  both were complied with a.) the fitness of the issues for judicial decision, and (is it a legal issue?)  yes, w/n the commission exceeded its authority in issuing the resolution b.) the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration (if court review is withheld, will the petitioners suffer hardships?)  yes, financial losses and they will be exposed to penal sanctions NALCP v. Shultz F: Petitioner is an organization composed of owners of coin-operated laundry machines. They seek clarification of a law regarding exemption from coverage of the minimum wage and overtime rules. H: The case is ripe for adjudication. A person seeking judicial review of an agency action which has adversely affected or aggrieved him will not be frustrated unless there is persuasive reason to believe that judicial review of the agency action was not the purpose or intention of the legislature or that full discretion on the matter was granted to the admin agency. General Ripeness Considerations a.) WON there is a congressional intent negative to judicial review (in this case, there is no such intention) b.) The possibility of the courts entangling themselves in abstract disagreement over administrative policies due to premature adjudication c.) The fitness of issues for judicial determination and hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration (yes, because the petitioner members

Page 45 of 56

will suffer financial losses and possible face civil and criminal sanctions)

VI. MODES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW Requirements for Judicial Review: 1. The AA exercises quasi-judicial function 2. There is grave abuse of jurisdiction 3. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law

Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of the fourth paragraph od Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. The court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or Appeals must be continuous and must be completed within three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice. (as amended by R.A. No. 7902.)

A. PROVISIONS 1987 Constitution, Article IX - A Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members, any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. BP 129, Section 9. Jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals shall Exercise: 1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction; 2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgements of Regional Trial Courts; and 3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgements, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasijudicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commission, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, Except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under


EO 292, Section 25. Judicial Review. – (1) Agency decisions shall be subject to judicial review in accordance with this chapter and applicable laws. (2) Any party aggrieved or adversely affected by an agency decision may seek judicial review. (3) The action for judicial review may be brought against the agency, or its officers, and all indispensable and necessary parties as defined in the Rules of Court. (4) Appeal from an agency decision shall be perfected by filing with the agency within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof a notice of appeal, and with the reviewing court a petition for review of the order. Copies of the petition shall be served upon the agency and all parties of record. The petition shall contain a concise statement of the issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review, and shall be accompanied with a true copy of the order appealed from, together with copies of such material portions of the records as are referred to therein and other supporting papers. The petition shall be under oath and shall how, by stating the specific material dates, that it was filed within the period fixed in this chapter. (5) The petition for review shall be perfected within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the final administrative decision. One (1) motion for reconsideration may be allowed. If the motion is denied, the movant shall perfect his appeal during the remaining period for appeal reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial. If the decision is reversed on reconsideration, the appellant shall have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution to perfect his appeal. (6) The review proceeding shall be filed in the court

Page 46 of 56

specified by statute or, in the absence thereof, in any court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the Rules of Court. (7) Review shall be made on the basis of the record taken as a whole. The findings of fact of the agency when supported by substantial evidence shall be final except when specifically provided otherwise by law.

B. CERTIORARI (Jamie) St. Martin’s Funeral Home v. NLRC Facts: An employee was illegally dismissed. Held: NLRC decisions are appealed to the CA under Rule 65. The special civil action of certiorari is and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The special civil action of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals. Sir: Rule 65 is available in CA as per the hierarchy of courts doctrine Police Commission v. Bello Facts: An administrative complaint was filed against Ferrer and Bonifacio before the Police Commission. The two filed a PFC claiming that Police Commission had no jurisdiction to render a decision in the administrative case and that the Police Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing them from the service Held: There is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of certiorari when there is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction as where the power is exercised in an arbitrarily or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty, or to virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law. Trial court has jurisdiction to try the case because of the allegation of GAD amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. While it has been shown that the lower court exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the writs of preliminary mandatory injunction, it has not likewise been shown in the present petition — nor has it been alleged therein — that the entire proceedings in the court below are without or in excess of the lower court's jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Purefoods Corporation v. NLRC


Facts: Respondents were dismissed. Petitioner contends that respondent commission committed a grave abuse of discretion in totally reversing the findings of facts of the labor arbiter. Held: Certiorari was not proper in this case. (1) The party may seasonably avail of the special civil action for certiorari, where the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings, as the law requires, of such tribunal, board or officer (2) Certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the acts of respondent. In the present case, the plain and adequate remedy expressly provided by law was a motion for reconsideration. The party had an available remedy to him – MR, therefore he shouldn’t have gone up to SC for certiorari just yet. Party didn’t avail of MR therefore certiorari petition will not prosper. Azores v. SEC Facts: Party was assailing his membership and fees due of him in a gentleman’s club. Held: Certiorari was not proper in this case. The alleged errors of the SEC En Banc assigned by petitioner are mere errors of judgment, further appeal should be taken to the Court of Appeals as the SC in petitions for certiorari only try issues regarding certiorari. Villaruel v. NLRC Held: In a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, does not include a correction of its evaluation of the evidence but is confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Neither does the mere variance in the evidentiary assessment of the NLRC and that of the labor arbiter warrant another full review of the facts. The NLRC’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence, is entitled to great respect and even finality, unless petitioner is able to show that it simply and arbitrarily disregarded evidence before it or had misapprehended evidence to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion if such evidence had been properly appreciated. Grave abuse of discretion is committed when the judgment is rendered in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner. An abuse of discretion does not necessarily follow just

Page 47 of 56

because there is a reversal by the NLRC of the decision of the labor arbiter, such as the case at bench. CIR v. General Foods (cielo) F: GF is claiming for a tax deduction from media advertisement. H: The SC respects the finding of quasi-judicial agencies, in this case of the CTA (although note that CTA is now part of the judiciary). The element of grave abuse of discretion is not missing here. The CTA affirmed the ruling of the CIR that this is a capital expense not an ordinary/necessary expense. Sir: The certiorari remedy shall not be given due course if there is another remedy available to the parties. In answering, cite the all the requirements. Cruz v. Gangan F: Cruz, an employee of TESDA, lost her cellphone. COA ruled that she is negligent and should still pay for the cellphone issued by the government. H: COA committed GAD in ruling that extraordinary diligence is necessary, only ordinary diligence is needed which Cruz was found to have exercised. Hadji-Sirad v. CSC F: H was accused of having somebody else take the CESO exam for him. CSC dismissed him from his employment in COA. H filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. H: The plain and speedy remedy is Rule 43 appeal from CSC to CA so certiorari is not available. Sir: Note the instances when R65 will not lie: if there is MR, Rule 43, or exhaustion of admin remedy will apply.

C. PROHIBITION Cf with Certiorari: 1. both need GAD amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction 2. no other speedy, plain and adequate remedy (de kahon requirement with certiorari, prohibition and mandamus) Differences: 1. as to the functions: in certiorari the function is to set aside while prohibition is to put a stop to a proceeding (or prevent it from starting) if there is nothing to stop anymore, then prohibition will not be available 2. as to scope: prohibition covers both ministerial and discretionary functions; certiorari applies only to adjudicative/discretionary functions Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board F: C went to the court for prohibition against the proceeding in the Deportation Board because of the jurisdictional fact of alienage.


H:Judicial review allowed. GR: claim of citizenship does not deprive the Deportation Board of their jurisdiction Chua Hiong XPN: if there is absolute evidence of citizenship or at the very least substantial, evidence that the person is a Filipino citizen, he can directly go to court (by prohibition or habeas corpus] to litigate the question of citizenship to vindicate his right not to be subject to such [harassment]. But taking cognizance of such petition rests on the sound discretion of the court Evidence of citizenship: a. Filipino mother even if the father is an alien (and the parents are not married) b. Exercise of right to vote, hold a public office (either elective or appointive) c. Passport d. Ownership of land e. Testimonies of other government officials that you avail various privileges f. Other documentary evidence like your birth certificate Co v. Deportation Board H: Chua Hiong was invoked and affirmed. Sir: Ngayon, meron pa ba kayong talahib sa prohibition? (kelangan talaga sir talahib??) D. MANDAMUS Requirements for Mandamus: 1. Directed against a tribunal exercising ministerial duty (not discretionary) 2. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy Note: There is no timeframe in bringing the mandamus, just a reasonable/seasonable time (3 months?) Framework: Is the power invoked ministerial or discretionary? Sir: Why does the courts use “mandamus will not lie”? Hindi ko maintindihan, bakit daw hindi hihiga ang mandamus?? Dapat mandamus will not stand up. Kung ayaw mo ng Freudian, gamitin mo mandamus will not prosper. Blanco v. Board of Medical Examiners F: An irregularity/leakage was being investigated so the passers were not allowed to take the oath. H: NOT ministerial duty of PRC. Sir: “Ang cheating sa Pilipinas is a national pastime. But remember that cheating is the antithesis of the concept of justice, and justice is what you are here for.” PRC v. De Guzman (432 SCRA 505) F: Leakage incident in the Fatima school of medicine. Pending investigation of NBI, the Board of Examiners refuse to let the passers take the Hippocratic oath

Page 48 of 56

H: NOT ministerial. Ng Goc Liu v. Sec of Foreign Affairs F: DFA refuses to release the visa of N’s son despite the approval by the Immigration commissioner. N filed an action for mandamus against DFA. H: NOT ministerial. Issuance of the visa is not ministerial, DFA should first evaluate whether the person will not be a threat to public safety. Policarpio v. Philippine Veterans Board F: P was claiming for her pension as wife of the soldier. Pending the investigation of the Board, the secretary already issued the treasury warrants. H: NOT ministerial. The Board has still not acted so it will not be compelled to issue or what to decide, it can only be invoked insofar as to require the agency to act (if being delayed). Then even if the AA acts and there is GAD then certiorari. Tan v. Veterans Backpay Commission F: Tan was claiming for backpay benefits for her husband who was recognized to be a member of guerilla forces (by the USAFFE). H: Ministerial. The fact of being a guerilla was already established so the Commission no longer has to exercise any discretion. Province of Pangasinan v. Reparations Commission F: P filed a case of mandamus to compel the Commission to release equipments which according to P was non-revenue producing. H: SC differentiated between specific performance and mandamus. Mandamus: imperative duty of the agency. In specific performance: available to the contracting party who believe that the other renege on its obligation. This case involves the latter  this is a contractual controversy appropriate for specific performance.

H: If you believe the CIR committed an error, you pay under protest then file an action. You cannot enjoin the collection of taxes of the state thru injunction or declaratory relief. Mirando v. Wellington Ty F: The issue is w/n Mirando respected the title of Wellington over the property which the latter bought from the government. H: The requirements are not complied with. Elements: a. there must be a justifiable controversy; b. the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; c. the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and d. the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination Sir: This case also affirms the indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of a TORRENS title. F. HABEAS CORPUS Mejoff v. Director of Prisons F/H: M, a Russian spy, was to be deported but no ship wants to accept him. He entered the PHL legally but he had to be deported because he was a spy. In the meantime he was in jail so he filed for a writ of habeas corpus. His first petition was denied because the court needed a reasonable time to hear his case. His second petition was granted after several years of investigation of his case but subject to condition: reasonable surveillance. G. INJUNCTION AS PROVISIONAL REMEDY -

Meralco v. Savellano H: The function to determine M’s tax deficiency is NOT ministerial. E. DECLARATORY RELIEF Requirements for the invocation of declaratory relief: 1. The party has an interest to a law, a written instrument or a will legal interest not mere interest 2. File the case before you breach the law (see De Borja v. Villadolid) National Dental Supply v. Meer F: NDS files a declaratory relief for the use of gold alloys in dentistry  w/n they should be taxed under the Internal Revenue Code.


-

It is in the beginning an ancillary remedy for the preservation of rights, but once the principal action, but once the principal action is decided then: (1) you can lose the injunction case and the principal action will be decided on the merits Here, the court reviews evidence on hand to determine WON the agency’s action was proper. If not, then court will issue TRO or WPI

Collector v. Reyes F: CIR issued a warrant of distraint and levy against Reyes for his tax deficiency. The 3-year prescriptive period limiting the government to collect has already lapsed. H: CTA can issue an injunctive order even without the filing of a bond when what is being sought to enjoined

Page 49 of 56

is patently illegal. Here, the levy on distraint is illegal because the prescriptive period has already lapsed. Pineda v. Lantin (Jamie) Facts: CFI issued an injunction against the SEC from proceedings with its trials on the legitimacy of a corporation Held: Injunction cannot be issued by CFI against the SEC because they are courts of co-equal rank. He has to get the injunction from the CA. Lemi v. Valencia Facts: Lemi was running a radio station. Lemi’s radio transmitter was seized because it was not authorized. Lemi filed a writ of mandamus with PMI. Held: PMI should be issued because Lemi will suffer great injury therefore the transmitter should be returned to him. Generally, PMI should only be issued in extreme emergency cases and where petitioner’s right is clear and there are conditions of inconvenience in his favour and continuous effect of injury. Because PMI compels one of them to perform a positive act and not just to preserve the status quo. Sir: Preliminary mandatory injunction – to do something The attitude of the courts should be one of care in issuing PMI unlike the general impression that so many courts now issue TROs Honda v. San Diego Facts: Hahn and Honda were both claiming that they held the patent to Honda. The case was brought to the Patent Office. CFI issued an injunction to enjoin the Patent Office. Held: Injunction cannot be issued by CFI against the SEC because they are courts of co-equal rank. He has to get the injunction from the CA. Sir: CF Pineda v. Lantin – same doctrine o Prohibition – remedy to set aside proceedings already started o TRO – has limited lifespan o It is in the beginning an ancillary remedy for the rpeservation of rights, but once the principal action Nocnoc v. Vera Facts: A WPI was issued to enjoin Workman’s Compensation Commission. Held: CFI has no authority to issue injunction against this agency because it is a court of general description only like civil law and criminal law. This doesn’t mean that the law creating the WCC granted it exclusive


original jurisdiction over workman’s compensation cases.

“With all due respect to his memory (O’Keefe’s), medyo katangahan yung ginawa nya.” (Carlota, 2013) –Sorry nauubusan na ako ng quotes, haha

VII. EXTENT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW Three major issues in judicial review Availability – is judicial review available? Is administrative action still possible? Doctrines: If intention of Congress is to withhold judicial intervention and final resolution of the case should be at the level of the agency; no locus standi means judicial review isn’t available for you; exhaustion of administrative remedies unless your case is part of the exceptions; ripeness when it comes to rule-making functions of the agency  1.

2. Mode of review Certiorari; prohibition; mandamus; statutory relief; habeas corpus; injunction; provisional remedies 3. Scope of review – extent of judicial review Substantial evidence rule – findings of facts of agencies if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole the rule is that the findings of facts are no longer reviewable by the courts unless the law provides otherwise

A. THE LAW-FACT DISTINCTIONS Dauan v. Sec Facts: Two parties were in dispute as to the owner of the homestead patent. Held: Under the Public Land Law, within a five year period you cannot alienate or sell it. From a series of facts, you can draw a conclusion. Reyes vda. De Santiago v. Reyes Facts: The victim was instructed to operate his jeep only in Manila, but his dead body and his jeep was found in Tayabas. Is his wife entitled to workman’s compensation in a sense that he was killed why working? Held: The respondent employer has not provided any contrary proof, and Santiago when he was last seen doing his regular work of driving.

Page 50 of 56

Aboitiz Shipping Corp. v. Pepeto Facts: Husband was part of a ship who boarded in Surigao but could no longer be found. Is wife entitled to workman’s compensation? Held: The mere failure to controvert the statement that Demetrio Pepito is believed to be "dead" or "deceased" because he "was lost" or was "reported missing", does not import an admission that the man is actually dead, but that he was just lost or missing. Aboitiz Shipping's non-controversion of the fact that Demetrio Pepito is lost or missing is an admission of that fact, but not of the fact of actual death, which is a conclusion of law. B. QUESTION OF LAW Ortua v. Vicente Singson Encarnacion Facts: Ortua’s application for land was denied because Ortua wasn’t a Filipino citizen – he is a Chinese citizen. Held: Question of law – WON Ortua is Chinese? Ortua is Chinese. Sir: Not a model for substantial evidence rule There is no discussion of substantial evidence rule Here, Malcolm said “SOME evidence” as opposed to substantial evidence. Substantial evidence isn’t just some evidence. Mejia v. Mapa Facts: Parties were disputing over a parcel of lot. It was shown that parties entered into contracts of sale of the land. Held: Question of law – WON the land without dispute was part of the forest zone when the contract was entered into. It was therefore the contracts entered into by the parties was void. Sir: Here, they adopted the equitable approach to resolve the question of law by saying that this was a contract entered into in good faith at that time and one party cannot take advantage of anyone of the parties Japanese War Notes Claimants v. Sec Facts: Corp advertised to the public that when you surrender Japanese War Notes, they were going to be redeemed for a fee. Held: Question of law - Is the corp authorized to do that? The court looked at the articles and by-laws of the corporation which showed that the corp was not entitled to solicit from the public and that they could only redeem war notes of their members. Ysmael v. CIR


Facts: Employer-employee dispute on selection of the sole and exclusive bargaining agent among the salesmen. Held: Question of law – are the salesmen employees of Ysmael? Court employed the control test wherein it involves control and supervision of the employees. The salesmen are not employees of Ysmael. O’leary v. Brown Pacivic-maxon Inc. Facts: John Valak died when he rescued two men who were drowning while he was just outside the recreational center provided by the employer. Is his mother entitled to a claim? Held: Question of law - WON the accident arose out of Valak's employment. Yes. Sir: ZONE OF SPECIAL DANGER TEST – if the obligations or conditions of employment create a zone of special danger out of which the injury arose, such is deemed as arising out of employment, and therefore, compensable O’Keefe v. Smith Associates Facts: Ecker drowned during a Saturday outing while boating on a South Korean lake. At the time of his death, he was employed at a defense base. Held: Question of law – WON the death arose out of and in the course of employment. Still within the zone of special danger. Sir: Sir feels that it is too broad. C. 

QUESTION OF FACT Black and white

Gonzales v. Victory Labor Union Facts: Employees of a fishing boat were dismissed because they were part of a union. Employer claims they were fired because of pilferage. Held: This is a question of fact – WON they stole the fish. Yes. Facts clearly show that it was not because of the union activities. There were discrepancies in the testimonies of the members of the fishing boat who said that they were part of the union. There was substantial evidence to show this. Sir: CF Suarnaba v. WCC and MERALCO V. NLRC. Suarnaba v. WCC Facts: Ireneo died and his wife Rosita filed a claim however WCC ruled that the claim was compensable but the proof that Rosita was the widow of Ireneo was insufficient (the certification of the Assistant Parish Priest of the Parish of Sta. Barbara Iloilo City presented by Rosita did not prove filiation but only the

Page 51 of 56

solemnization of the marriage sacrament) and barred her from receiving the benefits thus the sum of money was awarded to the employer. Held: Question of fact - WON Ireneo and Rosita were legally married. Yes. The quantum of proof needed since this was an admin proceeding was substantial evidence. WCC was in effect at err insisting on the presentation of conclusive evidence of marriage since this is violative of the rule that for claims under the Act, only substantial evidence is necessary. Sir: CF MERALCO V. NLRC Acting Commission of Customs v. Manila Electric Company Facts: Acting Commissioner of Customs ruled that the Manila Electric Company was not exempt from the payment of the special import tax under RA1394 for shipment to it of insulating oil. CTA reversed and ordered refund. Held: Question of fact - WON insulating oils come within the meaning of the term “insulators”, thus expressly exempted from special import tax. YES. The Court cannot disturb findings of fact made by the CTA because only errors of law, and not rulings on the weight of the evidence, are reviewable by the SC. Sir: The basis for accdg respect to the findings of facts of AAs is because of the expertise it possesses This becomes more pronounced when the findings of facts becomes more technical in nature Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Monetary Board, Central Bank of the Philippines Facts: Banco Filipino (BF) was placed under conservatorship of Gilberto Teodoro who then sublitted a report to the Monetary Board (MB) on the conservatorship. Subsequently, Special Assistant to the Governor and Head, SES Dept of the Central Bank (CB), Ramon Tiaoqui submitted a report finding BF insolvent and illiquid. Based on these reports, MB issued resolutions finding BF insolvent and appointed a receiver and thereafter placed it under liquidation. Held: Question of fact - WON the report is sufficient to hold BF insolvent. NO. MB based its resolution on the Teodoro and Tiaoqui Reports whose examination was not yet complete. Where the decision is merely based upon pieces of documentary evidence that are not sufficiently substantial and probative for the purpose and conclusion they are presented, the standard of fairness mandated in the due process clause is not met.


Dissenting: The appropriate formula of determining insolvency is capability to pay when assets fall due Sir: It is possible that both sides may be supported by substantial evidence unlike when the quantum of evidence is preponderant or requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the latter two, only one side will prevail. Sir believes the dissenting opinion should prevail. Note that what is adequate to you may not be adequate to me. Therefore it is possible that both sides may be appreciated in different ways. Importance of substantial evidence rule – the SC will no longer review questions of facts as has been held by the AAs if questions of fact in the level of the AA has been decided using the substantial evidence rule PAL, Inc. v. Confessor Facts: PALEA upon expiration of the CBA wanted to renegotiate with PAL. SOLE assumed jurisdiction and SOLE ordered a wage increase. Held: WON SOLE properly examined financial status of PAL. NO because there was no trial and it was not based on any exmination. SC finds no basis on the evidence adduced before SOLE. MERALCO v. NLRC Facts: It was found that Masaya, an EE of MERALCO, set up an illegal connection of electricity for Sanchez. After a formal investigation, LA and NLRC held he was innocent using the quantum of evidence which is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Held: The NLRC erred in ruling that the quantum of proof required to dismiss Masaya is proof beyond reasonable doubt because accdg to them this was qualified theft. However, in administrative or quasijudicial proceedings, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required as basis for a judgment of the legality of an employer's dismissal of an employee, nor even preponderance of evidence, substantial evidence being sufficient. The evidence sufficient to prove the commission of Masaya of acts of dishonesty against his employer which merits his dismissal. Lameyra v. Pangilinan Facts: Lameyra was a janitor/messenger who received a letter from the newly elected mayor that he was being dropped from the rolls of EEs because Personal

Page 52 of 56

Officer certified that he was not logging in. CSC affirmed his dismissal. Held: Question of fact - WON Lameyra was AWOL. No, he was reporting to the Vice Mayor. The SC is not convinced that the certification of the Personnel Officer constitutes substantial evidence. Vice Mayor Fernandez was one of the affiants and he enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties as a public official. Findings of fact of an administrative agency must be respected and the Court should not be tasked to weigh once more the evidence submitted before the administrative body, it is axiomatic that such findings of fact should be supported by substantial evidence. German Marine Agencies, Inc. v. NLRC Facts: De Lara was employed by German Marine and Lubeca Marine Mgt. He got sick while aboard the company's vessel. He was confined in Manila Doctors hospital. After being discharged, De Lara demanded payment of his disability benefits and his unpaid sickness wages. After a year, he was told by the company that no other benefits were forthcoming. Held: Question of fact – WON there was still a balance of sickness wages. Yes. The SC agrees with the finding by the LA undisturbed by the NLRC and the CA that a balance of $1,137 was still due to the EE as sickness wages and that the quitclaim was insufficient to prove payment. Supreme Court has always accorded respect and finality to the findings of fact of the NLRC, particularly if they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter, when supported by substantial evidence Velasquez v. Hernandez Facts: An admin case was filed against Velasquez. CSC dismissed her. This was reversed because a case of direct bribery was filed against her in the Ombudsman. Held: WON she is guilty for soliciting, accepting, and receiving sums of money, in exchange for transfer or promotion of complainant teachers. The cases before the CSC and the Ombudsman are distinct. A finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial evidence that the respondent has committed the acts stated in the complaint or formal charge. Ombudsman’s withdrawal of the criminal case, does not foreclose an administrative action because they require different quanta of proof. CSC v. Cayobit


Facts: Cayobit was an EE of NHA who was found to have falsified her service card. Cayobit was charged with dishonesty and misconduct. CSC found her guilty. However, CA reversed this and held that there was no substantial evidence to support the CSC decision and nullified the same. Held: Question of fact - WON he used fake and spurious documents for his service card. YES. The masterlist of eligible employees were used and cross referenced with the certification that Cayobit submitted. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied where there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent is responsible for the misconduct, even if the evidence might not be overwhelming because the masterlist is an official record. An official record and the entries made therein whose duty it is to enter such data perform their duties regularly in accordance with law Office of the Ombudsman v. Santos Facts: Florentina Santos was charged of falsifying the former’s own daily time record because her entries did not match that of the security guard’s and for being an owner/incorporator and President of Golden Child Montessori. She was found guilty by the Office of the Ombudsman. CA reversed the Ombudsman and said that the decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Held: Questions of fact – WON she falsified her time records. WON she committed pilferage. WON she was oppressive to her co-teachers and rude to the parents of the students. The evidence on record constitutes more than substantial evidence to establish administrative guilt of the respondent. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRC Facts: An employee was dismissed by petitioner Universal Camera. The evidence as to the reason of the dismissal was conflicting. NLRB’s Examiner recommended dismissal of the labor case, but NLRB held that he be reinstated. CA granted the enforcement of the NLRB order holding that the Board’s findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence. Held: Courts must now assume more responsibility for the reasonableness and fairness of Labor Board decisions. A reviewing court is not barred from setting aside a Board decision when evidence supporting that decision is not substantial, viewed in the light of the entire record, including the body of evidence contrary to the Board's view. Sir: CF Sec 25 par 7 of Admin Code

Page 53 of 56

D. QUESTIONS OF DISCRETION  If the AA are vested with discretionary power by law, the rule is that the judiciary will not usually intervene in the exercise of this sound discretion o Exception: GAD = Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. PSC Facts: Eastern Bus is applying for issuance of plates in the LTC. Batangas Bus claims that any order of this sort from the LTC is beyond the jurisdiction of the PSC, since the Court had earlier ruled in an earlier case that PSC can’t hear the case pending resolution in an arbitration proceeding in CFI Laguna and the Court itself earlier issued a TRO to that effect. Held: NO GAD. PSC has jurisdiction to issue the Order. Where the matter would involve the public interest or public aspect it is the Public Service Commission that has jurisdiction. Manila Trading v. Zulueta Facts: Filomeno Remollo was suspended for breach of duty. He was found guilty of the same by the CIR. However, the CIR still ordered his reinstatement and considered the time he was suspended as sufficient punishment. Held: GAD. CIR has no “right” to order the readmission because dismissal was based on just cause. The right of an employer to freely select or discharge his employees, is subject to regulation by the State, but an employer cannot legally be compelled to continue with the employment of a person who admittedly was guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance, and whose continuance in the service of the latter is patently inimical to his interest. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa La SuertePOITAF v. NORIEL Facts: FFW filed a petition for certification election. Granted by the Med Arbiter. Director Noriel granted this. Held: NO GAD. Director Noriel is possessed of discretionary power whether or not a certification election should be held. In such a case, there is no such 30% requirement.” The matter of 30% requirement, and the evidences showing figures of signatories and total number of employees being offered by both sides,


“is essentially factual in character, and the determination thereof by Director Noriel is entitled respect.” Such 30% requirement of all the employees in the bargaining unit is relevant only when it becomes mandatory for Director Noriel to conduct a certification election according to Art. 285 of the Labor Code. FFW v. Noriel Facts: FFW filed a petition for certification election. Denied by Med Arbiter. Noriel reversed for the reception of evidence regarding the 30% requirement of FFW’s petition. Since the FFW attained 30%, the Med-Arbiter called for certification election. However, Noriel then recognized the agreement between management and respondent union ALU for the first year of the supplemental contract therefore no more certification election. Held: GAD in not ordering the certification election. Art. 285 of the Labor Code is clear. Once it has been verified that the petition for certification election has the support of at least 30% of the employees in the bargaining unit, it must be granted. It becomes mandatory for BLR Director Noriel to order such certification election precisely to ascertain which labor organization should be the exclusive bargaining representative. PLDT v. NTC Facts: NTC granted Eastern Telecom a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) to construct, maintain, operate an International Gateway Facility (IGF). PLDT contends that an IGF is inherently part of a telephone system. And since Eastern does not have a franchise to establish a telephone system, it cannot also be given CPCN. Held: NO GAD. NTC, as the governmental agency charged with passing upon applications for Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCNs) in the field of telecommunications, is authorized to determine what the specific operating and technical requirements of “public convenience and necessity” are in the field of telecommunications. Courts should not intervene in that administrative process, save upon a very clear showing of serious violation of law or of fraud, personal malice or wanton oppression

Page 54 of 56

“We’ve went through this from north, south, east, west, side by side. Dapat alam nyo na ito! Kung hindi pa rin…(hingang malalim then fade to black)” (Carlota, 2012) VIII. ENFORCEMENT OF AGENCY ACTION A. RES JUDICATA; FINALITY OF JUDGMENT (cielo) Ipekdijian Merchandising v. CTA 1st case: BTA affirmed CIR that I is liable to pay compensation tax. I appealed to BTA which affirmed CIR. Upon appeal to CTA, CTA dismissed because of failure to appeal either to CFI or to CTA within 30 days. 2nd: CTA denied claim for refund of I from its payment of compensation tax. H: There is res judicata. Elements: a. Former judgment is final b. The decision is rendered by a court having competent jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties c. It must be judgment on themerits d. There must be between the parties: (1) Identity of parties (2) Identity of subject matter (3) Identity of Cause of action Even if BTA’s decision is administrative in nature, when it was not brought to CFI or timely elevated to CTA, BTA’s decision was judicially confirmed thru RA 1125. Nasipit Lumber v. NLRC 1st case: DOLE Reg’l Office approved NALCO’s application for clearance to dismiss its security guard, Collado, who was accused of pilferage. 2nd case: In an illegal dismissal case filed by Collado, the LA ruled in C’s favor and ordered his reinstatement. H: No Res Judicata. This doctrine applies only to judicial or quasi judicial, not exercise of administrative, powers. The application for clearance is merely administrative and may push through with or without the opposition of the employee. The way through which a dismissed employee can be heard is thru an illegal dismissal case. Dulay v. Minister of Natural Resources 1st case: Two DANR cases: one is with respect to a fishpond application while the other is a free patent application on the same property. The dispute is between Dico (private respondent) and Quibete (Dulay’s predecessor-in-interest). Both cases reached the Office of the President who ruled for Quibete.


2nd case: Dico filed a petition in DANR to reopen the case (re fishpond) on the ground of newly-discovered evidence. DANR gave due course. Dulay protests. Held: There is Res Judicata. The DANR cases which reached the OP were not appealed to the courts, hence, they become final and executory. The cases are in the exercise of DANR’s quasi-judicial power. Phil. American General Insurance v. CA BG of the case: Philamgen is the insurer of Davao Union. D engaged the services of M/V Crazy Horse (owned by Transpacific Towage) to deliver construction materials to CamSur. The materials were not immediately unloaded until a typhoon lashed at the port causing the ship to partially sink. There was also a widespread looting causing the remaining materials to be lost. Philamgen paid D, now P claims that T should be held liable. 1st case: A case in the Board of Marine Inquiry determined the liability of the captain and the crew. 2nd case: P demanded reimbursement from T. Held: No res judicata. The causes of action in the two cases were different. (In any case, the court ruled that T was not liable.) Meralco v. Phil. Consumers Foundation 1st case: PCFI filed a Petition for Specific Performance before the Board of Energy against Meralco. PD551 reduced the franchise tax to be paid by Meralco. PCFI claims that the consumers should be entitled to the savings resulting from this lowering of franchise tax. BOE ruled against PCFI. 2nd case: PCFI and one Edgardo Isip filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief before the RTC against Meralco raising the question of who should be entitled to the savings of Meralco. Held: There is Res Judicata (see elements supra). The SC already informed the ruling of the BOE. BOE has jurisdiction to hear the first case and it has already ruled on the merits. Heirs of Maximo Derla v. Heirs of Catalina Derla v. De Hipolito 1st case: In 1991, Executive Secretary Drilon ruled approved the fishpond application of Catalina. Petitioners’ MR was denied. Titles were issued in Catalina’s name. 2nd case: In 1997, petitioners filed a complaint for Annulment and Cancellation of OCTs of the subject area. Held: There is Res Judicata. Despite the previous rulings that res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi judicial proceedings and not to exercise of administrative powers, the court ruled that if an admin

Page 55 of 56

proceeding take on an adversary character, the doctrine of res judicata will apply. In this case, the fishpond application, while admin in character, was adversarial in nature because it was contested by Maximo.

and is distinct from the award for loss earnings under Act 3428. RA 610 is given in appreciation of employee’s past services while the latter is a social legislation awarded to the family in case of disability or death of the employee.

Facura v. CA 1st case: A complaint for violation of RA 3019 was filed by Facura against De Jesus and Parungao before the Ombudsman. When the Sandiganbayan refused to dismiss the case, De Jesus went up to the SC which ruled that there was no reasonable ground to believe that criminal intent was present when De Jesus made the appointment papers. 2nd case: Facura filed an Admin case on the ground of dishonesty, gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct.

Ambrosio v. Salvador F: 39 taxi drivers filed a case in NLRC against Extraco Taxi due to illegal deductions on their salary. NLRC ruled in their favor and issued a writ of execution against the property of Lim Pa, supposedly the owner of Extraco. Lim Pa filed an injunction complaint in CFI. CFI issued a TRO. H: CFI cannot enjoin NLRC which is of same rank as the CFI. Lim Pa is not bound by the judgment because he was not given an opportunity to beheard as he was not impleaded.

Held: There is Res Judicata i.e. Conclusiveness of judgment (remember Civpro). The admin case and the determination of probable cause require the same quantum of evidence – substantial evidence. The SC already found that De Jesus did not falsify the appointment papers, hence, this is binding as to the falsification charge. In any case, the SC also found De Jesus was not guilty on the other charges.

Merano v. Tutaaan F: In a case, NLRC ruled in favor of Merano and ordered his reinstatement. But due to M’s illness, he can no longer be reinstated so NLRC ruled that he be given his separation pay. But even before the NLRC’s resolution, M filed in the CFI a petition for mandamus to require SMC and the LA to execute the judgment. H: CFI has no jurisdiction to interfere with NLRC’s decision especially because they are of the same rank. Moreover, if M wants to execute the LA decision, the remedy is to call the NLRC’s attention –either for NLRC to review the LA or to compel the latter to execute its decision.

B. WRIT OF EXECUTION; MANDAMUS Apolega v. Hizon F: H filed a notice of claim before the DOLE Regl Office against his employer A for injury he sustained in the course of employment. He died due to the injury so his heirs filed a claim for death benefits. Workmen’s Compensation Commission ruled that he is entitled to the award and the case was remanded to RO for execution. RO issued a writ of execution based on RA 4119. A challenges the constitutionality of RA 4110 alleging that RO has no authority to issue a writ of execution. H: RO has power to issue a writ of execution and this grant of power does not contravene the constitution. The RA transferred the power to enforce final award from the regular courts to WCC and DOLE. The Congress may validly legislate the transfer of power to enforce awards. Vda de Corpuz v. Commanding General F: Petitioner, heir of a deceased member of the Army, was awarded 6k death benefit (under Act 3428). But respondent deducted from the award the amount of gratuity pay based on RA 610. Petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus to compel respondent to pay the full death benefits. H: Writ of Mandamus lies because petitioner is entitled to the whole 6k award. The gratuity pay given under RA 610 is peculiar to members of the Armed forces


GSIS v. CSC F: GSIS dismissed 6 employees. The Merit System Board and the CSC ruled that they were illegally dismissed and ordered the payment of back salaries. The heirs of some employees filed a motion for execution from CSC which the CSC granted. H: CSC has authority to execute its decisions. The authority to decide cases will be inutile unless accompanied by authority to see to it that its decision is carried out. Clavano v. HLURB F: Clavano and Sps. Tenazas entered into a Contract to Sell. Alleging that there was default, C wanted to rescind the contract. T filed a case against C before the HLURB to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale upon payment of the purchase price. HLURB ruled in T’s favor. Subsequently, HLURB issued orders directing C to pay T for expenses incurred by it for the transfer of the title over the property. H: Orders were void. An execution order should conform with the dispositive portion of the decision, otherwise, the order is void. Nowhere in the decision is C required to pay for the notarization of the deed etc.

Page 56 of 56

Admin Law A2015 Finals Reviewer

Recommend Documents