The Centre’s proposal to set up a single, permanent tribunal, subsuming all existing ad hoc tribunals, to adjudicate on inter-state river water disputes could be a major step towards streamlining the dispute redressal mechanism. But it alone will not be able to address the different kinds of problemslegal, administrative, constitutional and p oliticalthat plague the overall framework. !t present, a new tribunal is formed ever" time a state government approaches the #nion #n ion government with a re$uest and is able to convince the latter that such a tribunal is needed since all negotiations have failed. %ight such tribunals exist. !fter the" have heard the matter and awarded their decisions, the tribunals are allowed to collapse. This s"stem has had some successes, especiall" with the first generation of tribunals set up soon after independ enceto adjudicate on the &rishna, 'armada and an d (odavari rivers. But in general, it has struggled to bring warring parties on the same page and offer e$uitable solutions. There are three main problems) protracted proceedings and extreme dela"s in dispute resolution* opacit" in the institutional framework and guidelines that define these proceedings* and ensuring compliance. The permanent tribunal is being pushed as a solution to the first problem but unless it is designed to tackle the inter-linked second and third problems, progress will be limited. The dela"s happen for a variet" of reasons at ever" stage of the process. +ometimes, the Centre takes "ears to decide whether a matter needs to be heard b" b " a tribunal in the first placefor example, the (odavari and &rishna disputes started around / but the matter was referred to a tribunal onl" in /. !fter the tribunal has been formed, it again takes man" "ears to pronounce its awardit took nine "ears from reference in the case of the 'armada tribunal. Certainl", these are highl" complicated matters. But there are still steps that can be taken to streamline the process. 0ere, the Centre’s proposal to set up, alongside the tribunal, an agenc " that will collect and process data on river waters has potential. The absence of authoritative water data that is acceptable to all parties currentl" makes it difficult to even set up a baseline for adjudication. !nother reason for dela" is the re$uirement that the Centre notif" the order of the tribunal to bring it into effect* this took three "ears "e ars for the &rishna award. awa rd. 'ow, thankfull", thankfull", the Centre has proposed that the awards will be notified automaticall" b" the tribunal. 1hen it comes to opacit" in the framework, !lan 2ichards and 'irvikar +ingh from the #niversit" of California, +anta Cru3, note in their paper pa per on 4ndia’s inter-state water disputes, 5There are too man" options, o ptions, and there is too much discretion at too man" stages of the process6. This is partl" because of procedural complexities involving multiple stakeholders across governments and agencies. But the inchoate nature of the s"stem is e$uall" the result of factors outside the efficient functioning of the tribunal itself.
Two of those factors are worth mentioning here4ndia’s mess" federal polit" and its colonial legac". These, in turn, set the stage for the third problem of non-compliance wherein state governments have sometimes rejected tribunal awards. 7or example, the 8unjab government pla"ed truant in the case of the 2avi-Beas tribunal. 1ater is a state subject but the 5regulation and development of inter-state rivers and river valle"s9 in the public interest6 is on the #nion list. 0owever, the Centre has generall" taken a back seat, allowing states to dominate. !nd even when it has intervened, it has not alwa"s been successful. The courts have also often been ignored, including the +upreme Court, which importantl" onl" has ver" limited jurisdiction over the tribunals, as per the 4nter-+tate 2iver 1ater :isputes !ct of /. The latter has its roots in the (overnment of 4ndia !ct, ; which mandated separate tribunals and limited the jurisdiction of the federal court. The constituent assembl" had rejected this s"stem, called for a permanent framework and empowered 8arliament to bring out the necessar" legislation. 0owever, 8arliament ignored the constituent assembl"’s suggestion and went ahead with the ad hoc tribunal arrangement, arguing that this would allow for $uick decision making and prevent protracted conflict between states, as +rinivas Chok kakula from the Centre for 8olic" 2esearch notes in The Hindu. 7or a while, it seemed the leaders of the time were correct, with the first generation of tribunals working well. 0owever, as Centre-state relations evolved, with the emergence of strong regional parties in the states and coalition governments at the Centre that depended on regional parties, the s"stem began to fall apart. Toda", inter-state water disputes are no longer just about water allocation. The" have become hugel" politici3edthe recent eruption of the Cauver" dispute, framed as an ethnic identit" issue between Tamilians and &annadigas, which led to widespread civil unrest, is onl" the most recent example. 8ublic opinion is an important factor that cannot be wished awa". The Central government must keep these factors in mind when setting up the proposed tribunal. ! robust institutional frameworkand a transparent one to ease state and pu blic bu"-inis a must. 1ithout that cooperative approach, 4ndia’s water dispute resolution is unlikel" to see much improvement.
