A special relationship America, Britain and the international order since the Second World War - DAVID REYNOLDS

A 'Special Relationship'? America, Britain and the International Order Since the Second World War Author(s): David Reynolds Reviewed work(s): Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 62, No. 1 (Winter, 1985-1986), pp. 1-20 Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2618063 . Accessed: 19/01/2013 21:13 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

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A 'specialrelationship'? ordersince America,Britainand theinternational the SecondWorldWar DAVID REYNOLDS-

afterPearl Harbor,WinstonChurchillarrivedin theUnited States.For A fortnight muchof his three-weekvisithe stayedin theWhiteHouse itself,engagedin lengthy and informalconversationswiththePresident.On one occasion,so the storygoes, Rooseveltwas wheeled into his guest'sroom only to discoverChurchillemerging fromthebath-wet, glowingand completelynaked.Disconcerted,FDR made as ifto withdraw,but Churchillwaved himback. 'The PrimeMinisterof GreatBritain',he announced,'has nothingto concealfromthePresidentof theUnitedStates.'1 SirWinstondeniedtheanecdote,but,trueor not,it capturessomethingof whatis meant by the concept of an Anglo-American'special relationship':an intimate, harmoniousbond betweenthetwonationscelebratedon stateoccasionswithsuitably hyperbolicprose. Leaders as diverseas Churchilland RichardNixon have used the to talkofa 'closerelationship' whileMargaretThatcher term.Harold Wilsonpreferred the 'extraordinary alliance'. Others,however,have dissented.Max has reaffirmed Beloff,for instance,portrayedthe notion of a special relationshipas an agreeable British'myth'to help cushionthe shock of nationaldecline,while Dean Acheson denouncedit as a dangerousintellectualobstacleto acceptanceof Britain'slargely European role.2 Fortyyearson from1945,whatmeaning,ifany,shouldbe attachedto theconceptof a postwarAnglo-American specialrelationship? 'Special relationship'-towards some definitions Althoughused on both sides of the Atlantic,the termhas been verymuch more prevalentin BritainthanAmerica.Churchillpopularizedand perhapscoineditin the David Reynoldsis a Fellow and Directorof Studiesin Historyat Christ'sCollege, Cambridge.The argumentof this articlewas presentedto the fifthWoodrow Wilson Center/DitchleyFoundation conference on 'The UnitedStates,Britainand Europe' in Washingtonin May 1985.The authoris grateful to membersoftheconferencefortheircommentsand to CambridgecolleaguesZara Steiner, JohnThompson of a draftversion. and Ian Clark forhelpfulcriticisms 1. RobertE. Sherwood,RooseveltandHopkins:an intimatehistory (New York: HarperBrothers,1948), p. 442. 2. For examplesof theseand otherviews see the selectionsin Ian S. McDonald, ed., Anglo-American relationssincetheSecond WorldWar(New York: St Martin's,1974). On the'myth'see Max Beloff,'The special relationship:an Anglo-American myth',in MartinGilbert,ed., A centuryof conflict, 1850-1950: essaysforA. J. P. Taylor(London: HamishHamilton,1966),pp. 151-71.Otherdiscussionsofthe'special relationship'includeCoral Bell, The debatablealliance: an essayin Anglo-American relations(London: and OxfordUniversityPress,1964); Bell, 'The "special relationship"',in MichaelLeifer,ed., Constraints adjustmentsin Britishforeignpolicy(London: Allen & Unwin, 1972),pp. 103-19; and A. E. Campbell, 'The United Statesand Great Britain:uneasyallies', in JohnBraeman,RobertH. Bremnerand David Brody, eds., TwentiethcenturyAmericanforeignpolicy (Columbus: Ohio UniversityPress, 1971), pp. 471-501. Affairs $3.00 (C) 1986 International 0020-5850/86/1/0001-20


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winterof 1945-6,3 but as an objectiveof Britishforeignpolicy it has been in continuousexistencesinceearlyin thecentury.In September1917,forinstance,Lord RobertCecil emphasizedin a memo forhis Cabinetcolleaguesthatthe Americans wereatlast'takinga partininternational and 'theywillsoon beginto Europeanaffairs' realisewhatvastpower theyhave'. He notedthat'thereis undoubtedlya difference betweentheBritishand theContinentalviewin international matters'and arguedthat 'ifAmericaacceptsour pointof view in thesematters, it will meanthedominanceof thatpointofviewin all international affairs.'Cecil was hopefulthiscould be achieved because,'thoughtheAmericanpeople are verylargelyforeign,bothin originand in modes of thought,theirrulersare almostexclusivelyAnglo-Saxons,and shareour politicalideals.'4Laterin thecentury,Harold Macmillan(himselfhalf-American by whenhe spokeofBritainplayingGreece birth)expressedthesameidea moreelegantly to America'sRome-civilizing and guidingtheimmature younggiant-a rolehe tried to act out alongside Kennedy in the early 1960s. Perhaps the most engaging formulationof what British policy-makershave really meant by the 'special is containedin an anonymousverseof 1945,whenBritainwas solicitinga relationship' postwarUS loan: In WashingtonLord Halifax Once whisperedto Lord Keynes: It's truetheyhave themoneybags But we have all thebrains.5 In thissense,thenotionof an Anglo-American has been a device specialrelationship used by a decliningpowerfortryingto harnessa risingpowerto serveitsown ends. seek privateinfluence.Propitiateopenly; manipulate Avoid public confrontation; secretly.These are the tacticsof this form of alliance politics. Not all British policy-makersagreedthatthe game was worththe candle,particularlybeforethe Second World War. Curzon, Hankey and Neville Chamberlainwere among those who doubtedthat'appeasing'Americawould benefitBritainand guaranteereliable support.But thecultivationof an Anglo-Americanspecialrelationship-indeedthe themeof BritishdiplomacyfromJoseph assertionthatit exists-has beena recurrent Chamberlainto MargaretThatcher. Recognizingthat the 'special relationship'has been in part a deliberateBritish creation-a 'tradition'inventedas a toolofdiplomacy-helpsus appreciatetheartifice thathas oftenlain behindfulsomeofficialBritishrhetoricabout America,itsleaders and itstieswithBritain.Nevertheless, explorationofthattraditionis notthepurpose is an ofthisarticle.Insteaditseeksto askwhethertheconceptofa specialrelationship oftheplaceofAnglo-American relationsinworldaffairs sincethe accuratedescription Second World War. Statedmore succinctly:whateverLondon mightsay, was the relationshipreally'special'? 3. RobertRhodesJames,ed., Winston S. Churchill:hiscompletespeeches,1897-1963,Vol. 7 (New York: Chelsea House, 1974), pp. 7248, 7289-addresses of 7 Nov. 1945 to the Commons and 5 March 1946 at Fulton(the so-called'iron curtain'speech). 4. Cab 24/26, GT 2074, Cecil, memo, 18 Sept. 1917 (London: Public Record Office; subsequent referencesto the Foreign Office General Political Correspondence,FO, and the Prime Minister's OperationalPapers,Prem,are also to documentsin thePRO: all quotationsappearby permissionof the Controller,HMSO). 5. RichardN. Gardner, Sterling-dollardiplomacyin currentperspective(New York: Columbia UniversityPress,3rd edn., 1980),p. xiii.


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I will talkin whatfollowsof 'Britain'and 'America'eventhoughthesecan onlybe shorthandtermsforcomplexpoliticalorganisms.Works of theoryand historyby relationshavemadeus well awareof thedangeroftalkingof studentsof international countriesas if they are 'unitary,purposiveactors',withoutattentionto domestic politics,bureaucraticinterplayand the impactof 'opinion makers'and the 'foreign truein thecase ofpluralistdemocracies,of which policypublic'.6This is particularly the United Statesis the supremeexample.In Americathe managementof foreign policyis peculiarlydifficult, giventheextentofcongressional power,theuncontrolled bureaucracy,the influenceof lobbyists,and thefreedomof themedia. US relations with Britain have thereforenever been the exclusive preserveof government insulatedfromthe currentsof largerpublic debate-witness the loan departments, negotiationsof 1945-6. Certainethnicgroupshave exercisedparticularinfluence.In 1945-8,Jewish-American opinionhelpedshapeTruman'spolicytowardsPalestine/ Israel, while the Irish-Americanlobby has helped propagatea generallysceptical AmericanattitudetowardsBritishpolicyin NorthernIrelandin thelastdecadeor so. Britain,by contrast,has a more cohesivepoliticaland administrative systemof theday-but evenhererelations susceptibleto greatercontrolby thegovernment of view. A betweenthe two countrieshave been affectedby internaldifferences of the Labour left-fromthe 'Keep notableexamplehas been theanti-Americanism Left'movementof 1946-7,throughthecriticsoftheVietnamwar,to theunilateralists of thepresent. In internationalrelationsstatesmightthereforebe conceivedof not as billiard balls-solid, clearly-definedentitiescannoningoff each other-but as distinct, swirlingmassesofgas-more diffusebutwithno lesspotentialenergy.This shouldbe rememberedwhen readingthe shorthandexpressions'Britain'and 'America' used forpayingless attentionto domesticfactorsis below. Nevertheless,myIustification to the patternof Anglo-American thatthesehave rarelymade a decisivedifference relations-consider,forexample,thebasic continuityin policybetweenLabour and whateverthe Labour leftmightdemand in 1945-6 or Conservativegovernments, thepostwarrelationshiphas been shaped by thepower and 1964-5. Fundamentally international positionof thetwo countries.This is wherewe mustlook forwhat,if has made it 'special'. anything, Whateverthe termmightmean, it clearlycannot connote perfectionor pure harmony.A seriesof books writtenoverthelastdecade has exposedthefrictionand beneaththesurfaceofAnglo-American controversy cooperationin theSecondWorld sourceofargumentwas Britain'sempire-formal War and after.The mostimportant and informal-and the US challengeto the Britishimperialpositionfromboth an ideological and self-interested standpoint.Decolonization, oil, and the battle to dominatecivilaviationwereamongthespecificissuesat stake.And thedevelopment sincetheSecondWorldWaris partofa largerstoryofthedeclineof oftherelationship Britishpower againstthatof America-with theUnitedStatessometimesgivingthe BritishEmpirea push down theslipperyslope.7 is notuniquelyAnglo-American. theconceptofa specialrelationship Furthermore, 6. e.g. GrahamAllison,Essenceof decision:explainingthe Cuban missilecrisis(Boston: Little,Brown, policy(Boston: Little,Brown,1973); David Vital,The 1971); BernardCohen, Thepublic'simpactonforeign makingofBritishforeignpolicy(London: Allen & Unwin, 1968). 7. See discussionin David Reynolds,'Roosevelt,Churchilland thewartimeAnglo-Americanalliance, 1939-45: towardsa new synthesis',in Hedley Bull and Wm. RogerLouis, eds., The 'specialrelationship': relationssince1945 (Oxford: Clarendon,1986,forthcoming). Anglo-American


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It has also beenappliedto tiesbetweentheUnitedStatesandothersofitsallies(usually, it might be noted, by the ally ratherthan the United States). Israel, Brazil, pre-communist China,and theFederalRepublicof Germanyareamongtheexamples of thisusage.8 These considerationssuggestsome guidelinesfor our thinking.If the AngloAmericanrelationship to some idealized can be termed'special' it is not by reference standardof international amity.We mustbear in mindthe elementsof tensionand thatareevidentinthisas in anyotherdiplomaticrelationship. hostility And we haveto assess its 'specialness'againstthe characterof the relationships betweenthe United Statesand its otherclose allies.Was thecooperation,howeverimperfect and flawed, in degreeand extentfromthatof anyotheralliance? different But qualityis not theonlycriterionforjudgingthespecialnessof therelationship. Importanceprovidesanothertouchstone:is or was thisbilateralrelationship especially important foreachcountryand,indeed,fortheworldatlarge?Thatalso seemsto have beenpartofwhatwas meantby theconceptofa specialrelationship. For Churchillat of 'the safetyand welfare,the freedom Fultonin 1946 it was no less thanguarantor ofall themenandwomenin all thelands. . .' and progressof all thehomesand families ConverselyHarold Wilson,a quarter-century later,recalledan aphorismof Charles Lamb, the nineteenth-century essayist,that'thereis nothingso irrelevant as a poor relation.'9One may stillbe fondof the aged relative,thetiesmay stillbe unusually has diminishedinvalueto oneselfand to thefamilyfortunes close,buttherelationship (thoughit mayhave becomemoreusefulto itsimportunate beneficiary). It maybe helpful,then,to judgethespecialnessoftheAnglo-American relationship in twoways.Was or is itspecialin qualityfromotherbilateralalliances?Was or is itof orderas a whole? specialimportanceforthetwo countriesand fortheinternational These providecriteriaforthegeneralsurveythatfollows. The foundationsof the 'special relationship' the During the 1940s and 1950s,perhapsuntilthe end of Macmillan'spremiership, was specialin bothqualityand importance. Anglo-Americanrelationship Of course,thatcannotbe a blanketgeneralization-asa glanceattheups and downs willshow.'0Broughttogetherbythecrisisof 1940,BritainandAmericaenteredintoa unique alliance,but one in whichtheUnitedStateswas clearlythedominantpartner in many by thelastyearofthewar.In 1945-6,however,thepartnership disintegrated was the most notorious,and relations areas, of which nuclear disentanglement were never again as close or as equal. Nevertheless,the ties were partially from1947in thedeepeningcold war.The Koreanwarand thechallenge reconstructed of Middle Easternnationalismgave the relationshipa global dimension,but thenit crisesin theSuez debacleof 1956. Even the facedone ofitsgravesttwentieth-century 8. e.g. Nadav Safran,Israel: the embattledally (Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversityPress, 1978), p. 571, on the"'special" AmericanconnectionwithIsrael';JohnD. Martz and Lars Schoultz,eds.,Latin America,the UnitedStates,and the inter-American system(Boulder,Colo.: Westview,1980), pp. 80-1; MichaelH. Hunt, The makingofa specialrelationship: the UnitedStatesand China to.1914 (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press,1983); Hans W. Gatzke,Germanyand theUnitedStates:a specialrelationship? (Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversityPress,1980). 9. Quoted in McDonald, ed., Anglo-American relations,pp. 35, 220. 10. Surveysof the postwarperiod includeH. G. Nicholas, Britainand the UnitedStates(London: Chatto& Windus,1963); JohnBaylis,Anglo-American defencerelations,1939-84: thespecialrelationship (London: Macmillan,2nd edn., 1984); and laterchaptersof D. Cameron Watt,SucceedingJohnBull: Americain Britain'splace, 1900-75 (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1984).


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intelligence artery,theclosestlink,was nearlyruptured.Yet withina yearor two the withhis old woundshad healed,as Macmillanrecreateda specialnuclearrelationship wartimeally, Eisenhower,and played a significantpart in effortsto thaw out superpowerrelations.Remarkablyhe achieveda similarpersonalrapportwithIke's of twenty-three successor,despitean age difference years,but the extentof British demonstrated dependencewas dramatically duringtheCuban missilecrisisofOctober 1962. overallit was unusuallyclose. Its Despite the uneventextureof the relationship, Firstofall,thetwo countries specialqualityderivedfromthreesalientcharacteristics. sharedsimilarinterests whichbecameapparentin thesustainedinternational crisisof the1940s.Bothwishedto maintaintheindependenceofWesternEuropein thefaceof intenton continental powersapparently domination,firstHitler'sGermanyand then Stalin'sRussia and Cominform.In a muchmorequalifiedway theyalso discerneda commoninterestin preventing violent,suddenchangein Asia and theMiddle East, and thegeneraldistribution ofpower. whichmightthreatentheireconomicinterests Hence theircooperationagainstJapanduringthewar and,fromthelate1940s,against thespreadofradicalnationalistor communistmovements in Asia and theMiddleEast associatedwithMoscow or Beijing. Similarinterestswere reinforcedby similarideology.Again the point cannotbe pressedtoo faron theAmericanside. The UnitedStateshas alwaysseen itselfas the to manyof thevaluesof theOld, especiallycolonialismand New Worldin antithesis as monarchyand aristocracy. such 'feudal'anachronisms Nevertheless,in the 1940s, betweenBritishand US values seemedmore apparentto Americans the similarities in a world threatenedby 'totalitarianism'. than the differences Both were liberal, capitalistdemocracies,sharingcommonbeliefsin theruleof law and theprincipleof peacefulchange. And for the Britishthe ideological legacy of 1940 was profound.Afterthe Anglo-Frenchententeof thePhoneyWar,whiclhmanyseniorpolicy-makers saw as thebasis of a permanent postwaralliance,theFrenchwerefeltto havebetrayedthem in 1940. Britainthereforeturnedaway fromthe perfidiouscontinentalsto its kin acrosstheseas-the Commonwealthand theUnitedStates.Together,so it was felt, theywon thewar,anditwas onlynaturalto look in thesamedirectionforsupportand cooperationin peacetime.Such deeplyheldbeliefscolouredBritishattitudestowards thecontinentfora generation. These tiesof interestand ideologywereincarnated,thirdly,in a networkof close Thesewereforgedduringthewar,as thetwo setsof personalcontactsand friendships. policy-makersbecame'mixedup together',to borrowChurchill'sfamousphrase." connectionwas themostcelebrated,butmoreimportant in The Roosevelt-Churchill thelongrunwerecontactsbetweenmenlowerdown theirrespectivehierarchies who would rise to positionsof prominencein the 1950s. For themconsultationwith colleaguesin theothercapitalbecameeasy and natural. These personallinkswerefacilitated by thesharedlanguage.Admittedlythiswas not withoutits problems: Churchillalludes in his war memoirsto the confusion caused at one conferenceby thediametrically oppositeBritishand US usagesof the verb 'to table'.'2 And the similaritiesof language and culture can encourage 11. House of CommonsDebates (Hansard), 5thser.,Vol. 364, col. 1171,20 Aug. 1940. 12. WinstonS. Churchill,TheSecondWorldWar(London: Cassell, 1948-54,6 vols.),Vol. 3, p. 609. For the British,'to table' denoted puttinga documentforwardfor discussion; for Americansit meant withdrawing it.


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in theirown imagecounterparts to conceiveof transatlantic policy-makers sometimeswith disastrousresults,as duringthe Suez or Skyboltcrises.13 moreextensive and moreintensive thecommonlanguagepermitted Nevertheless, havebeenpossible,since,in principle, any thanwouldotherwise communication onlyto skilled at a depthusuallypermitted couldparticipate Britonor American in this Kingdomrelationship UnitedStates-United Comparethewartime linguists. to thatofBritain andFranceorAmericaandChina. respect ofinterests, close-thecommunity especially Herewaswhatmadetherelationship valuesand personaltiesin thefaceof commonthreat.But thiswas not of itself That dependedon an to make the relationship especiallyimportant. sufficient continued roleas a worldpower. factor-Britain's additional in 1940wasa senseofmutualneed. thetwocountries Whathadbrought together letalone AfterFrancefell,Britainand itsempireneededUS supportforsurvival, anddisorganized at thattime,also needed ButtheUnitedStates,disarmed victory. Britain.The RoyalNavy was regardedas America's'frontline' againstGerman and Britain'sempirewas acknowledged, albeitmore expansionintotheAtlantic, and a bulwarkagainstJapanese as a sourceof key raw materials ambivalently, inAsia.From1942theBritish Islesbecametheessential baseforbombing aggression Hitler'sEurope. andtheninvading hadcostperhaps Theconflict inpowerandresources. endedthewarreduced Britain never intheIndiansubcontinent andBritain's ofitsnational position a quarter wealth, the of Asian Fora and humiliation victories. from wartime Japan's recovered protests wealth of much of its of source the India had been cornerstone empire-the century and armedmanpower-andthedefenceof Indiawas theoriginalraisond'etrefor WhenIndiabecameindependent in otherterritorial acquisitions. manyofBritain's ofCurzon'swarning at the August1947itmusthaveseemedlikea grimrealization 'As longas we ruleIndiawe arethegreatest ofthecentury: powerin the beginning power.'Andtherestof awaytoa third-rate world.Ifweloseitweshalldropstraight wouldbecomeredundant-inhis picturesque Britain'scoloniesand protectorates ofan Empirethathasvanished."14 andbarbicans phrase,'thetoll-gates seemsall theendoftheSecondWorldWar,Curzon'sprediction Fortyyearsafter thecentral jewelhadgone. crownlostmuchofitsvalueafter Theimperial tooaccurate. of the1940sand 1950sweremore governments Yet theLabourand Conservative inthesameleagueas theUnitedStatesandthe wasnolonger ClearlyBritain sanguine. to quoteone seniordiplomat, it seemedto be in 'the SovietUnion-sometimes, andAugustus.'15 ButBevin withMarkAntony positionofLepidusinthetriumvirate thatBritain deniedin 1947'thatwe haveceasedto be a greatPower',insisting firmly nowwasto 'wasoneofthePowersmostvitaltothepeaceoftheworld'.16 Thestrategy theMiddleEast,intoitsnewkeepandstronghold, ofempire, thebarbican transform ofthe andsouth-east Asiaforthebenefit Africa ofBritish andtodeveloptheresources not was to be negotiated area.The formof therelationship partnership, sterling replaced Empire-but, behind the imperial subordination-Commonwealth

13. RichardE. Neustadt,Alliancepolitics(New York: Columbia UniversityPress,1970). thedilemmaofBritishdefencepolicyin commitment: 14. Quoted in MichaelHoward, The continental theera of two worldwars(Harmondsworth:Penguin,1974),p. 14. Sir Orme Sargent,minute,1 Oct. 1945. 15. FO 371/44557,AN 2560/22/45, 16. Hansard (Commons),Vol. 437, 16 May 1947.


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to maintainBritain'sworld role remained enlightenedrhetoric,the determination positivelyChurchillian.17 The persistenceof thisglobaloutlookneedsto be stressed,in viewofthetendency (bothpopularand scholarly)to writeBritainoffas a worldpowerafter1945.Nor was theoutlookunreasonableevenifit did breedsome illusions.For Britainwas stillthe world's thirdmajor statein the 1940s and 1950s-economically,militarilyand in nuclearcapability.As suchitremaineda valuableallyfortheUnitedStates.Although thewartimealliancewas unique,themutualneed thathad cementedit continuedto hold thetwo countriesclose in thelate1940sand 1950s.And theirroleas theprincipal worldpowersgavetheirrelationship non-communist a specialimportancein shaping orderas it evolvedfromworldwar to cold war. thepost-1945international The special relationship'sspecial importance,1945-63 The importanceof the relationship-for the two allies and for international relations-can be seen by glancingat fourof its aspectsin the period from1945 to about 1963: theworldeconomicorder,Europeansecurity,cold war diplomacy,and global containment. First of all the economic connection.Here the ties were least close because of fundamental Since theOttawa Conferenceof 1932,theBritish policydisagreement. had inclined towards a protectionistpolicy, seekingto consolidatetheirtrading area.Butfrom1934, positionwithincountriesoftheempireand especiallythesterling successiveUS governments soughtto dismantletradingbarriers, especiallythoseof a was at the top of theirlist. discriminatory nature,and Britain'sImperialPreference Britisheconomicpolicywas thenaturalresponseof a decliningtradingpower to the depressionand to the 'imperialism'of Americanfreetrade. It was also an ironic reversalof thetwo countries'policiesin thelatenineteenth century,when emerging Americawas stillvehementlyprotectionistand dominantBritainpreachedlaissez faire.The basic divisionof outlookwas also apparentduringtheSecond WorldWar, and in the postwar era the Britishresistedas prematureUS attemptsto restore and did theirbestto buildup thedollar-earning currencyconvertibility powerof the sterlingarea. Adherenceto the European Free Trade Associationand finallythe European Economic Communitywas partof the same pattern-Britaincould not surviveeconomicallywithoutmaximizing trade,butitcouldno longeraffordthecosts of open competitionwithina multilateral economydominatedby theUnitedStates. Hence theBritishpredilectionforextensivebut protectedfreetradeareas. This basic divergencein policy precludedspecial cooperationbetweenthe two thedifferences countriesin economicmatters. werenotunbridgeable:in Nevertheless, favoureda multilateral worldeconomy,ifBritish principlemostBritishpolicy-makers interests wereprotectedandiftheUnitedStatesassumedtheresponsibilities forworld stabilityincumbentupon itas themajorexporterand creditornation.And US leaders in theSecondWorldWardid seemreadyto acceptthoseresponsibilities. This was the associatedwiththeBrettonWoods conferenceof basis of thehard-wonagreements 17. As recentstudieshaveemphasized:John Gallagher(ed. AnilSeal), The decline,revivalandfall ofthe BritishEmpire(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1982); Wm. RogerLouis, The BritishEmpirein theMiddleEast, 1945-51(Oxford:Clarendon,1984); and theessaysby R. F. Holland, 'The imperialfactor in BritishstrategiesfromAttleeto Macmillan,1945-63',and JohnDarwin, 'Britishdecolonizationsince 1945: a patternor a puzzle?', in theJournalofImperialand Commonwealth History, Jan.1984,Vol. 12,No. 2, pp. 165-86 and 187-209.


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July1944,fromwhichoriginatedtheInternational MonetaryFund, theWorldBank and theGeneralAgreement on TariffsandTrade.Theywereachievedbya smallgroup of Britishand US economistsand civilservants-mensuch as Keynes,HarryWhite, James Meade and Harry Hawkins-against extensiveopposition within their respectivepoliticalsystems(an exampleofhow theAnglo-American relationship has been partiallyinsulatedfromtheselargerpoliticalcurrents).And, althoughthetwo nationsincreasingly divergedin theirbasicpolicies,theseagreements constitutedthe forthepostwareconomicorderfora quarter-century.18 framework Even in economicaffairs, then,wheretherelationship was hardlyspecialin quality, it was of specialimportanceat a crucialpointin the shapingof the postwarworld. Turningto cooperationin European securityin the 1940s and 1950s, we find a relationshipthatwas special in both qualityand importance.As recentwork has shown,thedevelopmentof theMarshallPlan and thecreationof NATO werevery much a joint enterprise,with Bevin playinga major role alongsideMarshall and Acheson.'9 Later, in 1954, the ForeignOfficemade a significant contributionto solvingthecrisisoverGermanrearmament. WesternEuropeanUnion,latelyenjoying somethingofa renaissance, and theBritishcommitment to Germandefencedatefrom this time. The Atlantic alliance as we know it today was in many ways an Anglo-Americancreation. US economic and militaryhelp in Europe was, of course, vital for the British is thedegreeto whichBritainmattered to theUnitedStates. Less familiar government. in the 1940s,Trumanfacedsustained At everystageof his European commitment to congressionalopposition-to MarshallAid, to theMilitaryAssistanceprogramme, In it a each case desire for substantial rearmament. his US by 1950 required major international crisis(theCzech coup,theSovietatomictestand theonsetoftheKorean war) to mobilize the necessary support on Capitol Hill. Consequently, the did not intendto assumeunlimitedobligations.Even the US troop administration commitmentto NATO was expected to be a short-termventure.The general Paul Hoffman,was 'to get philosophy,as expressedby MarshallAid administrator Europe on its feetand offour backs'.20 AndBritainwas invaluableto sharetheburdensofcontainment. Alliesweretherefore stillAmerica'sprincipalally. In the early1950s Britain'sarmsproductionexceeded thatof all theotherEuropeanpartnerscombined,and itmanufactured thirty percent of theindustrialproductionofnon-communist Europe.21 Britain'sfourdivisionsand tacticalairforcewereessentialcomponentsof NATO's CentralFrontat a timewhen Germanywas disarmedand FrancepreoccupiedfirstwithIndochinaandthenAlgeria. Western In thelate 1940stheUnitedStatesalso wantedBritainto lead an integrated Europe-a hope soon dashedbutlaterrevivedwiththeadventofde Gaulle. And from July1948 Britainprovidedessentialbases forStrategicAir Command'sB-29s. These in whatwas stillthepre-missile era.Use becamea vitalelementofUS nuclearstrategy of thesebases (and othersin the BritishMiddle East) enabled the United Statesto threatenthe SovietUnion in a way thatwas not possible in return(hence,in part, Khrushchev'slaterCuban gamble). 18. The classicstudyremainsGardner,Sterling-dollar diplomacy. 19. e.g. Alan Bullock, ErnestBevin: ForeignSecretary,1945-51 (London: Heinemann, 1983); Avi Shlaim,'Britain,theBerlinblockadeand thecold war',InternationalAffairs, Winter1983/4,Vol. 60,No. 1, pp. 1-14. 20. See David Reynolds,'The originsof the cold war: the European dimension,1944-51',Historical Journal,June1985,Vol. 28, No. 2, p. 512. 21. Baylis,Anglo-American defencerelations,p. 43.


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Britainalso playeda partin tryingto thawout thecold war. Churchill'sattemptsin 1953-4 to arrangea summitmeetingafterStalin'sdeathlaid thegroundworkforthe Geneva Conferenceof 1955. This failed,however,and in themid-1950sthestrained relationships betweenEden and Eisenhower,and Dulles's close tieswithAdenauer, of the Anglo-Americandiplomaticaxis. But Macmillan, limitedthe effectiveness Eden's successorfromJanuary1957, was an old friendof Eisenhower.They had workedcloselytogetherin 1943-4 whenMacmillanwas Britishministerattachedto Ike's AlliedForceHeadquartersinNorthAfricaand Italy.And,althoughEisenhower was always in ultimatecommandof US policy,the vacuum createdin 1959-60 by Dulles's death and the President'sill healthpermittedthe Britishto play a more influentialinternationalrole. Macmillan's visit to Moscow in February-March 1959-the firstby a Westernhead of government sincethe end of thewar-helped modifythe Soviet position on Berlin and paved the way for the EisenhowerKhrushchevmeetingin September.Despite the failureof the Paris summitof May 1960,Macmillanmaintainedhis peace-makingefforts througha cordialifsurprising withKennedy,and theBritishwereactiveparticipants in thenegotiations friendship leading to the Partial Test Ban Treaty of August 1963. In these years Britain's as a brokeror intermediary, self-image helpingto bringthetwosuperpowerstogether, was not mereself-delusion. In thecold war,as in theSecondWorldWar,theconvergenceof Anglo-American was generallycloserin Europe thanin Asia. The British,pressedby securityinterests India and the Commonwealth,refusedto take the extremeUS line over China in 1949-50.Theyalso fearedUS escalationoftheKoreanwar,includingthepossibleuse of atomic weapons, and in the winterof 1950-1 these issues led to considerable friction.For theUnitedStates,Britishcolonialismand economicrivalrycontinuedto straintherelationship. But the British,whatevertheirdoubts,supportedUS intervention in Korea with forcesoftheirown,andtheAmericanviewoftheBritishEmpireremainedambivalent. For theBritishprovideda valuednetworkofbases,intelligence and indigenousclients whichwould assistin the global containment of communism.Here postwarBritish to retainits world role was of particularimportanceto the alliance, determination especiallygivenIndianindependenceand Britain'ssubsequentwillingnessto talkthe languageof partnershipratherthan domination.Afterthe Korean war therewas periodic US prodding over decolonization (for example, Central Africa under Macmillan)andoccasionalBritishobjectionsto Americancold warextremism (suchas abstinencefromthe totaltradeembargoon Castro's Cuba). But freedomto differ occasionallywas built into the relationship,and it rarelyimperilledthe general cooperation in the 1940s and 1950s between the two world powers in global containment. The one greatexceptionto thatgeneralizationis of course the Middle East. In 1945-8 relationshas been strainedover Palestine,and in Iran in 1951-4 the United Statesexploitedthe oil nationalizationcrisisto establishAnglo-Americanparityin what had been Britain'slast oil stronghold.Then in 1956 came Suez-perhaps the worstcrisisbetweenthetwo countriessince 1916.The militaryoperationseemedto theAmericansliketheworstkindof gunboatdiplomacy-all themorecontemptible becauseitwas ineptas wellas imperialist. Eisenhowerrefusedto supporttheembattled theshockcaused by the pound untilBritainwithdrew,and one cannotunderestimate whole episode to Britishillusionsabout theirindependenceand about American friendship.


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NeverthelesstheUS objectionsweremainlyabout means(militaryintervention in defianceof international law) and timing(thesimultaneouspresidentialelectionand the Russian invasionof Hungary).Both governments agreedthatNasserismwas a in theMiddle East. When theirmajorally,theNuri threatto theircommoninterests Said regimein Iraq,was toppledinJuly1958,BritainandAmericamounteda carefully planned,combinedoperationto shoreup clientstatesinJordanand Lebanon. Coming as itdid less thantwo yearsafterSuez, thisis a reminder thatthecrisisofautumn1956 should not be exaggerated. Specialit6s-the diplomatic,intelligenceand nuclear relationships From the late 1940s to the early 1960s the Anglo-Americanrelationshipwas not but it was nevertheless withoutits frictions, uniquelyclose and uniquelyimportant and to theshapingof thepostwarworld.Threespecificareasof to bothgovernments nuclearweapons functionalcooperationare worthyof closerattention:intelligence, Thesemightbe termedthespecialitesoftherelationship. and diplomaticconsultation. The habit of diplomaticand bureaucraticconsultationis the most fundamental. Officialsin each governmenttended naturallyand readilyto consult with their transatlantic oppositenumbers.Some of thiscontactwas institutionalized-through committees-but much of it was informal,buildingon the networkof personal contactsand thefacilityof thecommonlanguage.The pointwas to keep abreastof what one's opposite numbersin London or Washingtonwere thinking-to have a sense not just of officialpolicy but of the backgrounddebates and the alternative options. in Washingtongiventhefragmented natureof the This was particularly important US policy-makingprocess.Lord Halifax,Britishambassadorin Americaduringthe lineofbeatersout shooting;theydo puttherabbitsout war,likeneditto 'a disorderly ofthebracken,buttheydon'tcomeout whereyou expect.'22Washingtonwas (and is) unusual in the limitedcontroland coordinationexercisedby diplomats-the State Department-overthevariousstrandsofAmerica'sexternalrelations.It was therefore essentialto keeptabson a wholevarietyof governmental agenciesand,becauseof the independenceand powerof Congress,to 'worktheHill' assiduously.This theBritish generallydid with subtletyand skill: the failuresof consultation,such as Suez or Skybolt,usually came in situationswhen normal.diplomaticchannelshad been bypassed. Consultationdid not guaranteeconsensus,of course.Policy towardsChina in the 1950sor overtheIndo-Pakistanidisputesincethe 1960sare cases in point.But these could accommodateunresolveddifferences. are also instancesofhow therelationship in A memberof theForeignOffice'sNorthAmericanDepartmentwrotepresciently 1944 thattheAnglo-American partnership 'impliesfullconsultationon all majorand manyminorissues,butitis perfectly compatiblewiththeviewthatifconsultationfails to producean agreedpolicy,eachpartnershouldbe freeto followthatpolicywhichit thinksbest,takingdue accountof the other'sspecial interestsor susceptibilities.'23 sometimesagreementto differ. Consultationsometimesproducedagreement, From thispracticeof priordiscussioneach side derivedsubstantialbenefits.The Britishwerefrequently able to feedtheirviewsintotheUS decision-making processat 22. Halifax to Lord Simon, 21 Mar. 1941, Hickleton papers, A4.410.4.14 (Churchill College, Cambridge). P. Mason, minute,16 May 1944. 23. FO 371/38508,AN 1886/6/45,


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thatmakeup American and politicaltrade-offs an earlystagebeforethebureaucratic policy had set firm.By thatlatterpoint-the momentat which a policy mightbe offeredforformaldiplomaticnegotiationwithallies-it is oftentoo lateto effectany changes.In returnthe United Stateshad a naturalally-whose support significant of interestsand values and the could generallybe assumedbecause of thesimilarity habitof advanceconsultation. In a sense the intelligencerelationshipis only one instanceof this 'consultative relationship'.But it is also at the heartof what makes the Anglo-Americantie so fromotheralliances.In theSecondWorldWarthetwocountriespooled their different scale,and thecollaboration,in attenuatedand secret resourceson an unprecedented form,survivedthegeneralseveringoflinksin 1945-6.Withtheonsetofthecold war, networkon a mutualneed dictatedrenewedcooperation.Britainhad an intelligence scale thatit could no longerafford;the United Stateshad dismantledthe wartime Office of StrategicServices and was beginningagain in 1947 with the Central use Britishexpertise,staffand IntelligenceAgency(CIA). Americacould therefore installations;BritainneededUS financialsupport. whichcreateda global divisionof The outcomewas the 1947 UKUSA agreement (plus labourin communications intelligence (Comint) betweenthetwo governments Canada,Australiaand New Zealand). Liaisonofficeswereestablishedin bothcapitals installations (GovernmentCommunications and in thecentralintelligence-gathering Headquarters(GCHQ) nearCheltenhamand theNational SecurityAgency(NSA) headquartersat Fort Meade, Maryland). GCHQ and other Britishintelligence US fundingfromtheNSA budget.In due course operationsalso receivedsignificant NSA set up its own gatheringand relay stations in Britain,at Chicksands, Bedfordshire (from1950),MenwithHill nearHarrogate(from1956),and,inScotland, Kirknewton(1952-66) and Edzell nearMontrose(since1960).And duringthe1950s, of fromtheoutbreakof theKoreanwar,thetwo airforcescooperatedin overflights SovietEurope usingcombinedcrewsflyingfromBritishand continentalbases. This evenaftertheshootingdown ofGaryPowers allowedNATO to maintainsurveillance in May 1960obligedEisenhowerto end US-mannedU-2 flightsover Russia.24 The intelligencerelationshiphas experiencedfrequentfriction,forexampleCIA Serviceafterthedefection ofBurgessand Macleanin mistrust oftheSecretIntelligence May 1951. Nevertheless,its evolutionhas been relativelysmoothcomparedto the advancedthan nuclearrelationship.In 1939-40 Britishatomicresearchwas further American,and the sharingof informationand personnelin 1940-1 significantly acceleratedthepace of theUS 'Manhattan'project.In September1944Rooseveltand that'fullcollaboration'inatomicdevelopment Churchillconcludeda secretagreement and commercialpurposesshouldcontinueafterthedefeatofJapanunless 'formilitary But many in Washington,including and until terminatedby joint agreement.'25 Truman, were unaware of the agreementand in August 1946 a nationalistic, Congress,anxiousthattheUnitedStatesalone shouldcontrolthe secrecy-conscious of any atomic 'superbomb',passed theMcMahon Act whichprohibitedthetransfer information to a foreigngovernment.SubsequentAnglo-Americanagreementsin 1948 and 1955 did littleto change the basic position. Britainhad been virtually excluded fromnuclearcollaboration-a source of deep and abidingbitternessin power in Britain(London: 24. Duncan Campbell,The unsinkableaircraftcarrier:Americanmilitary MichaelJoseph,1984),ch. 5; ChristopherAndrew,Secretservice(London: Heinemann,1985),pp. 491-9. 25. Prem3, 139/9,Aide-memoire,18 Sept. 1944.


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fromthegeneralcloseAnglo-American inthe Whitehalland an aberration relationship late 1940s and 1950s. The shiftcame in October 1957. Sputnikdemonstrated thattheSovietUnion now had a missilecapable of intercontinental rangewhich could thereforethreatenthe ballisticmissile at a timewhenAmerica'sown intercontinental UnitedStatesdirectly, programmewas behindthatof the SovietUnion. Americawas shakenand nervy -Macmillan judged the impact of Sputnikto be 'somethingequivalentto Pearl Harbour'26-and feltin need of all thehelpit could get.Britainwas theobvious ally. The Britishhad developedtheirown nuclearweaponsprogrammeovertheprevious decade, testinga hydrogenbomb in May 1957. Withinthreeweeks of Sputnik, whereEisenhowercommittedhimselfto Macmillanhad beeninvitedto Washington, oftheMcMahonAct,andinJuly1958andMay 1959newagreements seekamendment were signedto permita muchfullerexchangeof information, technologyand fissile materials. In March1960collaborationwas extendedto weaponssystems.At Camp David the BritishwereofferedtheUS Skyboltair-to-ground missileon advantageousterms,and MacmillanagreedthattheUnited Statescould establisha Polaris submarinebase at Holy Loch on theClyde. Therewas no explicit'deal', butitwas generallyunderstood that the two agreementswere implicitlyrelated.There were echoes here of the deal of August1940. Indeed one mightcall thisthe'Missiles'Destroyers-for-Bases' for-Bases'deal. Nearly twentyyearshad elapsed and the militarytechnologyhad Butonceagaineachcountryrequiredtheother'shelpat changedout ofall recognition. Mutualneed,morethanEisenhower'sgenuinefeelingthat a timeof globalinsecurity. the Britishhad been badly treated,was at the root of the revivednuclearspecial relationship. In one sense,thePolarisagreementat Nassau on 21 December 1962 was only an Once DefenseSecretary extensionof thisrelationship. McNamarahad decidedto cut Macmillancould justifiably Skybolton groundsof cost-effectiveness, arguethatthe 1960 'deal' obligedKennedyto providePolarisinstead.The defusingof thecrisisand thecontinuanceofBritain'suniquelyprivilegedaccessto US nucleartechnologywere furtherinstancesof the specialnessof the Anglo-Americanrelationship.Macmillan talkedon hisreturnofhow Nassau had preserved'boththeconceptsofindependence and interdependence'that lay at the heart of what he meant by the special relationship.27

theNassau agreement alteredthatrelationship. But,moreprofoundly, permanently devicethatwould be carriedby Britain's Skyboltwas a stopgap-an air-to-ground V-bomber force. It was alreadyobsolescentin the impendingera of long-range missilessuch as Minutemanand Polaris.But neithertheRAF nor theAdmiraltyhad been seriouslyinterestedin Polaris duringthe late 1950s,forit would destroythe rationaleof both theV-bombersand the blue-waternavy.And withinMacmillan's Cabinetthereweresomewho doubtedwhetherBritainshouldremaina nuclearpower in thenew and massivelymorecostlymissileage. Othersfeltthat,ifitdid,an 'entente nucleaire'withFrancemightbe a betteroptionin viewof Britain'scurrentinterestin theEEC. These debateswereterminated by theSkyboltcrisis,thesuddenswitchby 26. Harold Macmillan,Ridingthestorm,1955-9 (London: Macmillan,1971),p. 320, quotingdiaryfor 23 Oct. 1957. 27. AndrewJ.Pierre,Nuclearpolitics:theBritishexperience withan independent strategicforce 1939-70 the basic study (London: Oxford UniversityPress, 1972), p. 314. On the Macmillan-JFKrelationship, remainsDavid Nunnerley,PresidentKennedyand Britain(London: Bodley Head, 1972).


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Macmillanto Polaris,andhisdeal withKennedyat Nassau-which theCabinetcould only rubber-stamp.Britainwould now remainin the nuclear game, but using Americantechnology.The nuclearrelationship re-established between1957and 1962 was specialin moreways thanone: Britainenjoyeduniquelyprivilegedaccess to US nuclearsecretsand weapons,butwas to be theonlynuclearpowerwithouta delivery systemof itsown. Importantor importunate?Britain'sdeclineand readjustment,1963-73 Distinguishinghistoricalperiods is an agreeableacademic exercise,but it rarely fairto say thatthe correspondsto theconfusionsof therealworld.It is nevertheless decade afterMacmillan'sresignationin October 1963 saw a pronounceddeclinein Britain'sspecial importanceto the United States. In part, this was a matterof personalities:Wilsonand Heath neverestablishedrapportswithJohnsonand Nixon comparableto Macmillan'srelationswithEisenhowerand Kennedy.But thedecline had set in duringthelastchaoticmonthsof theMacmillanpremiership-deGaulle's veto, Profumo, Philby and a general sense that Edwardian nonchalance was in the swingingsixties.The last Macmillan-Kennedymeetingin June anachronistic 1963 was a sad anticlimax. The underlying reasonwas notpersonalities butpower.DuringthisdecadeBritain's residualcapabilityas a greatpowerwas eroded,andwithitBritain'sspecialvalueto the UnitedStates.The declinewas apparentin Europeitself,whereBritishairand ground contributionsto NATO's CentralFronthad been of particularsignificancein the 1950s.But theFederalRepublicofGermany(FRG) joinedNATO inMay 1955andin April1957 theSandysDefenceWhitePaper announcedtheend of conscriptionafter 1960-a belatedreversionto normalBritishpeacetimepolicy.In 1964forthefirsttime West Germany'sarmed forcesexceeded those of Britainat 430,000 to 425,000. Moreover,the Britisharmy (like the French) was still spread around the globe, whereasGermany'swas completelyassignedto NATO's CentralFront.The disparity in that crucial theatrewas thereforemuch greater-274,000 Germans to 53,000 British-and theFRG's troopcontribution evensurpassedthatof theUnitedStates, whose 7th Armyin CentralEurope had been reducedfrom275,000 to 237,000 in 1964.28Manpowerfiguresare onlya crudemeasureof militarystrength, buttheydo indicatethatduringMacmillan'spremiershipthe FRG had replacedBritainas the Europeanpillarof NATO. This declineinmilitary fundamental economicweakness.In the capabilityreflected late 1950sand the1960sBritainwas unableto keepup notonlywiththesuperpowers butwithitsEuropeanneighbours.In 1951Britainhadbeentheworld'sthirdeconomic power, measuredin GNP. Ten yearslaterit had been overtakenby the FRG, and Francewas close behind.By 1971Japanwas inthirdplace,followedbyWestGermany and theFrench,whileBritain'sGNP was roughlyhalfJapan's.29 The Germaneconomic'miracle'and thelaterFrenchmodernization werereflected in thesuccessof theEEC. Britain'sdisdainfortheCommunityin the institutionally mid-1950shad been understandable.Britisheconomicstrategywas to develop the or predictedthe sterlingarea,and fewanticipatedtheEEC's successinreducingtariffs extentand pace of theGerman-ledcontinentalboom. By 1961 a penitentMacmillan Studies,1964),pp. 17-18, InstituteforStrategic 28. The military balance,1964-5(London: International 21-4. 29. The militarybalance,1972-3 (London: IISS, 1972),p. 73.


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governmenthad opted for entry,havingbeen assured by Kennedy'that relations betweentheUnitedStatesandtheUK would be strengthened notweakened,iftheUK moved towards membership'.30 The intensityof subsequentUS pressureon the negotiatorsshowedhow strongly theadministration feltaboutthis,butthede Gaulle vetoes of 1963 and 1967 meantthatBritainwas in limbo fora decade untilHeath's successfulnegotiations aftertheGeneralresignedin 1969.DuringthattimeBritainwas increasingly bypassedin tJS-Europeanrelations,withmuchof America'sdiplomacy directedtowardsthe EEC and, afterthe Frenchwithdrawalfromthe integrated militarycommandof NATO in 1966-7,towardstheFRG. DuringthisdecadeBritainalso provedmuchlesssuccessfulas a brokerbetweenthe twosuperpowers.Macmillanhad playeda significant partinachievingthe1963Partial Test Ban Treaty. The Britishwere naturallyinvolved in these discussions as a nuclear-testing power. But the nuclearissue of the later 1960s, leadingup to the SALT I agreements of May 1972,was thequestionof controllingweapons systems. Here thesuperpowerswerein a leagueoftheirown,andtheBritishhad littleinfluence on thecentralarmscontrolnegotiations. The othergreatsuperpowerdiplomaticissue of the 1960swas Vietnam.Again the Britishplayed only a minorrole,despiteWilson's bestendeavours.Under the 1954 accords,Britainand theSovietUnion wereco-chairmen oftheGenevaConferenceon Indochina-another example of how Britain'sprevious status as a great power providedresidualleverage.But Wilson's repeatedefforts to bringthebelligerents to the negotiatingtable,most notablyduringKosygin'svisitto London in February 1967,earnedhimonlyLBJ'sgrowingdistrust.'I won't tellyou how to runMalaysia and you don't tell us how to runVietnam',the Presidentrespondedsharplywhen Wilsontriedto temperUS policyafterthebombingofNorthVietnamcommencedin February1965.31 LBJ's referenceto Malaysia is a reminderthatthe Britishwere also embattledin south-eastAsia duringtheseyears,and theyprovedevenless able thantheAmericans to sustaintheirexposedposition.Sukarno'schallengeto theMalaysianfederation tied down some 30,000Britishtroopsin 1963-4--morethanin anyotherconflictsincethe end ofthewar.AlthoughSukarno'sregimecollapsedin 1966,thesustainedoperation, at a timeof acutefinancialcrisis,forcedtheCabinetto reassessBritain'sglobal role. Whenhe cameto powerWilsonhad declaredthat'We area worldpower,and a world or we arenothing.'32 influence, Butrecurrent balance-of-payments crisesandthedrain on Britain'sreservesnecessitated retrenchment, and finallyrapidretreatin reductions, thewake ofthedevaluationofNovember1967.The Cabinetthendecidedto abandon thePersianGulfand Singaporeby theend of 1971 and to giveup any capabilityfor operationeastofSuez. The Heathgovernment modifiedthatpolicy,butdidnotalterit fundamentally. Thisprecipitate ofBritain'sworldrolecameas a shockto theUnited relinquishment States.In December 1964 Denis Healey, the Ministerof Defence,just back from Washington,toldtheCabinetthatwhattheAmericanswantedBritainto do 'was not to maintainhugebasesbutto keepa footholdinHong Kong,Malaya,thePersianGulf, to enableus to do thingsforthealliancewhichtheycan'tdo.' Healey added that'they 30. McGeorgeBundyto President,7 Apr. 1961,NationalSecurityFiles 170 (JohnF. KennedyLibrary, Boston,Mass.). 31. Harold Wilson, The Labour government,1964-70: a personal record(London: Weidenfeld& Nicolson and MichaelJoseph,1971),p. 80. 32. The Times,17 Nov. 1964,p. 6, reportinghis Guildhallspeechthepreviousday.


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thinkthatour forcesare much more usefulto the allianceoutside Europe thanin keenly Germany.'33The abandonmentof thismajorout-of-arearole was therefore opposed in Washington.When Foreign SecretaryGeorge Brown reportedthe decisionto withdrawforcesin Washington,Dean Rusk Cabinet's post-devaluation 'Be British,George,be British-how can and the StateDepartmentwere horrified. The mainUS complaintwas not abouttheFar you betrayus?' pleadedone official.34 East but the Gulf. It was therethat the Britishposition was deemed especially important. lostmuchof itsspecialimportanceforthe By theearly1970sBritainhad therefore United States. Germanyhad replacedBritainas the principalEuropean pillar of NATO, the EEC was a major focusforAmerica'salliancediplomacy,the United Kingdomhad littleinfluenceon superpowerrelations,and Britain'seconomicdecline morerapidlythanit intendedor the had forceditto abandonitsglobalcommitments rather Americansdesired.DuringthisperiodBritainhad oftenseemedimportunate forIMF loansto shoreup thepound,beggingforentryinto thanimportant-begging stage.But thiswas a theEEC, beggingstillto be takenseriouslyon theinternational change,managedbymenbroughtup on theidea ofBritainas periodofunprecedented rulerof a quarterof the world. By 1973 Britainwas adjustingto the statusof a And itremainedto globalinterests. Europeanpower,albeitwithcontinuing primarily be seen how the Anglo-Americanrelationshipwould be affectedby Britain'snew Europeanidentity. Since 1973-a less importantrelationship,stillspecialin quality Despite the contractionof British power in the 1960s, the Anglo-American relationshipover the last decade or so has remainedspecial in quality.In certain order. fortheUnitedStatesand theinternational respectsitcontinuesto be important in is the role of the second NATO-in value largest Navy-the Of particular Royal guardingtheChanneland theeasternAtlantic,backedbytheRoyalAirForce(RAF). Here narrowBritishnationalinterestsdovetailwithbroaderallianceneeds,forthe is essentialifNATO is to reinforce communications the securityofthesetransatlantic as in the event of America war. from European Front North Central planned itselftheBritishArmyoftheRhine(BAOR) andRAF contingents On thecontinent (57,000 and 10,000 in 1984) remain much less than the German or American But theirsymbolicimportanceis enormous.Were a futureBritish contributions.35 or to extricateitselffrom to renegeon this continentalcommitment government NATO, theshockinWashingtonwould be immense,probablyshakingtheallianceto Whenthatpossibilityappearedon thehorizon,as intherun-upto the itsfoundations. becamemoreconsciousoftheimportanceof 1983generalelection,US policy-makers the Anglo-Americanrelationshipto their European policy. The fact that the relationshipcan generallybe takenforgrantedin Washingtonis, paradoxically,an earnestof itsfundamental importance. Britainand FranceremaintheonlyWestEuropeanpowers Beyond thecontinent, with a genuineout-of-areamilitarycapability.Here both score heavilyover the continent-boundGermans,but the convolutedFrench relationshipwith NATO The Diego Garciabasing makesliaisonwithBritainfareasierfortheUS government. 33. RichardCrossman,The diariesof a Cabinet Minister(London: Hamish Hamiltonand Jonathan Cape, 1975-7,3 vols.), Vol. 1, p. 95, entryfor11 Dec. 1964. 34. Crossman,Diaries,Vol. 2, p. 646. 35. The militarvbalance,1984-5 (London: IISS, 1984),pp. 35, 40.


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and thecontinuedcommitment inBelize areexamplesofBritishsupport arrangements forUS global deployments. Likewisethespecialitesremaininvaluable.The 1947UKUSA agreement is stillthe foundationof the intelligencealliance,and the developmentfromthe mid-1970sof satellitesas theprincipalformofinternational telecommunications has giventheNSA stationsin Britaina furthertask as major trackingcentres.Also importantto the United Statesis the British-basedcomponentof the SOSUS underwaterlistening systemwhose passive acoustic arrays follow the movementsof Soviet nuclear submarinesacrossmuchof theNorthAtlantic. Afterwhat some see as a hiatusin the later1960s and early1970s,36 the nuclear relationshiphas been renewedby the agreementsof 1980. Tridentis scheduledto replacePolaris as Britain's'independentstrategicnuclearforce'in the 1990s,while cruiseis the contemporaryanalogue of the US Polaris submarinesthatMacmillan agreedto have based on theClyde. The consultativerelationshipalso continuesto flourish.37 Despite criticism,all Britishministries maintaina substantialWashingtonpresencein themini-Whitehall on MassachusettsAvenue. At theverytop thelinkshave been strengthened by the rapportbetweenPresidentReaganand Mrs Thatcher,buttheysubsistindependently of theebb and flowof highpolitics.This was dramatically illustrated by eventsin the South Atlanticin the springof 1982. Close personalties betweenthe two naval backedby Secretaries establishments, Weinbergerand Haig, ensuredvitalUS logistic Britishforces.38 supportfortheover-extended In these various ways the Anglo-Americanrelationshipstill displays a special it fromotherAmericandiplomaticlilnks.And althoughno qualitythatdistinguishes to theUnitedStatesandtheinternational longerofspecialimportance order,itremains one of the most importantof America'smanybilateralties. Nevertheless,much of Britain'sutilitynow stemsnotfromitsintrinsic poweras an independentactor(as in the 1940s and 1950s), but fromits role as a linch-pinwithinNATO. The naval out-of-areacapability,the specialites-all connection,the continentalcommitment, these are significant withinthe frameworkof the Atlanticalliance ratherthan as of globalpower. separatefactorsin thearithmetic A changed internationalorder The point,then,is thatalthoughtheAnglo-American remainsin certain relationship realitieshave changedfundamentally. respectsspecial,thelargerinternational 36. JohnSimpson,The independentnuclearstate: the UnitedStates,Britainand the militaryatom (London: Macmillan,1983),pp. 219-20. 37. An intriguingexample of the extentof this diplomaticconsultationis the role of Sir Thomas Brimelow,then Deputy Under-Secretaryat the Foreign Office,in draftingthe 'Agreementon the preventionofnuclearwar' in 1972-3.Thatthisis now virtuallyforgotten is testimony to thesuccessof the 'specialrelationship', claimsHenryKissinger.For theSovietUnionhad proposedinMay 1972a drafttreaty underwhichtheUnitedStatesand theUSSR would renouncetheuse ofnuclearweaponsagainsteachother. In Washington'sview thisimperilledthe impendingNixon-Brezhnevsummitand threatenedto divide Americafromits allies.Accordingto Kissinger,Brimelowwas secretlybroughtintoUS discussionsand givenaccessto all relevantdocumentation. He playedan invaluablerolein determining anddrafting strategy the eventualbanal statement of dedicationto peace, therebydefusingwhathad been initiallyregardedin Washingtonas a dangerousSovietdemarche.See HenryKissinger,Yearsofupheaval(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson and MichaelJoseph,1982),pp. 274-86. ElsewhereKissinger,who sees close consultationas centralto thespecialnessof therelationship, has gone so faras to claimthatduringhis yearsas National SecurityAdviser,'I kepttheBritishForeignOfficebetterinformed and morecloselyengagedthanI did the StateDepartment'.HenryKissinger,'The specialrelationship',The Listener,13 May 1982,p. 16. 38. See The Economist,3 Mar. 1984,pp. 23-5.


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Basic is thecontraction ofBritishpower.In theperiodfromtheSecondWorldWar to perhapstheearly1960s,therelationship remainedone of partnership. The United Stateswas clearlysenior partner,Britainincreasinglythe junior, but it was a tie characterized bymutualneedderivedfromBritain'sindependent capabilityas a world power.Over thelasttwentyyears,however,Britainhas becomeprimarily (thoughby no meansexclusively)a regionalpower.Although,as we haveseen,theUnitedStates stillderivesevidentbenefitsfromthe specialBritishconnection,Britain'slinkwith Americais now one of dependenceratherthanpartnership. And,as a regionalpower, Britain'srole is mainlyplayedout withinthe dominantinstitutions of the regiontheEuropeanCommunity. NATO and, graduallyand painfully, Not onlyhas Britainchanged,so too has WesternEurope.The distinctive influence of theBritishon thecontinentin the 1940sand 1950swas largelyattributable to the postwarvacuum. Once Germanyhad been revived(albeit in truncatedform)and intoNATO, Britain'scontribution integrated was inevitablyless important.At that point,theearlyto mid-1960s,France'swithdrawalfromthealliancegaveBritaina new lease of lifeas a significant continental actor.In recentyears,however,thegradualde of France into NATO and the developmentof Franco-German facto reintegration on theperiphery cooperationhaveleftBritainincreasingly ofUS-European relations. thisisolationis thefactthatoverthelastdecadeBritainhas alloweditself Aggravating to be perceivedas GaullistFrance'ssuccessorin therole of the'bad European'. Britainhas changed.WesternEuropehas changed.So too hastheUnitedStates.The wartimeallianceand the Europeancrisisof thelater1940s nurtureda generationof American policy-makerson the doctrinesof 'Atlanticism':the convictionthat America'srelationswithEurope werefundamental and thatBritainwas a particularly Those are no longerunquestionedaxiomsof US policy. In importantintermediary. partthisis because the 'Atlanticists'-mensuch as Acheson,Rusk and Harrimanhavepassedfromthestage,to be replacedbyleaderswhoseformative were experiences oftenVietnamratherthan the 1940s. But the 'successorgeneration'is a matterof backgroundas well as age. For the United Statesis a verydifferent countrytoday from fortyyears ago. Wealth and power have shiftedfrom the north-eastand Midwest-the powerhouseofAmericaas itassumeditsworldrole-to thestatesofthe west and south. To take the extremeexample,the gross productof the state of Californiais greaterthanthatof all but sevenof theworld'sindustrialnations. The 'natural'orientationof these'sunbelt'statesis not towardsthe Atlanticbut towardsCentralAmericaand the Pacific.And thisgeographicalshiftin America's powercentrecoincideswithchangesin theethniccompositionof itspopulation.The quotasofthe1920sbroughtto an endthemasstransatlantic thathad shaped migrations Americaand sustainedthelivingtieswithEurope. Gradually earlytwentieth-century were assimilated,but, havingdeclinedsteadilysince the 1910s,the the immigrants intheUnitedStatesroseagaininthe1970s(to 6.2 percent). percentageofforeign-born This time,however,the flow was froma different direction.Of some 4.3 million immigrants officiallyadmittedin thatdecade, only 13 per centcame fromEurope, whereas41 percentmigrated fromAsia and42 percententeredfromLatinAmerica.In now calculatedas 6.5 percentoftheUS population(a particularHispanic-Americans, marked underestimategiven the unpoliceable Mexican border), are the fastestgrowingminoritygroup.39Their numericalincrease,coupled withtheirsuccessful 39. AndrewHacker, ed., UIS: a statistical portraitof theAmericanpeople (New York: Viking,1983), pp. 35-7, 44, 47, based on data fromtheUS censusof 1980.


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insistencein manycitieson theuse ofSpanishas thebasicteachingmedium,willhave profoundconsequencesforAmerica'sethnicbalance,sense of identityand focusof attention international by thetwenty-first century.For theEnglishlanguagehas been a decisive influencenot only on Americanlinks with Britainbut in ensuringan Atlanticistorientationto US foreignpolicyduringmuchof thiscentury. The gradualbutperceptibleshiftin theeconomicand ethnicbalanceof theUnited States away fromEurope has coincidedwith parallelchangesin the international ofpower.In the1940sand 1950sEuropeseemedthemostdangerousand distribution unstable region of the world. And, despite their decline relativeto the new 'superpowers',themajornationsofWesternEuroperemainedinfluential worldactors of world trade.By the and, as both producersand consumers,major determinants early1970s,however,Europehad achievedrealstability comparedwiththefirsthalfof thecentury.The superpowerswerelearningto live witheach otheracrossa divided continentand theonce intractable 'Germanproblem'had reacheddefactoresolution. of detenteand Ostpolitik Despite theupheavalsof theearly1980s,theachievements have not been subsequentlynegated. In the1980sthemainareasofinstability, as faras theUnitedStatesis concerned,are in the Middle East, CentralAmericaand partsof Asia. These regions,ratherthan Europe, also seemtheprincipalarenasofsuperpowerconflict.Demands in Congress fora diminishedUS military role in Europe (therecurrent Mansfieldand now Nunn amendments)strikea responsivechordin manyAmericans,particularly at a timeof acutebudgetdeficits.Economically,themostcriticaltiesfortheUnitedStatesareno longerwithWesternEurope butJapan,whose challengeto Americanindustryand constitute parasiticmilitary relationship majorissuesin US politics.Otherdeveloping Pacificnationssuch as South Korea are also industrialrivalsin certainsectors.The long-termtrendseems clear. In 1982, for the firsttime this century,America's tradein value. The Pacificregion,with tradeexceededitstrans-Atlantic trans-Pacific sixtyper centof theworld'spopulation,its two mostadvancedindustrialstatesand mostof itsfastestgrowingeconomiesis likelyin thefutureto provethedynamicpart of the international order as well as a chronicarea of instability.Its consequent importanceforUS policycan only increase.

An incongruous relationshipforBritain? The Anglo-Americanrelationship maystillhave a specialqualityand a continued,if greatlyreduced,international importance.However, it enduresin a fundamentally 4ifferentworld from that of 1945. It is not simply that Britain has changed, inpowerto a largelyregionalrole.WesternEurope,theUnitedStates,and diminishing theinternational orderitselfhavechangedas well.Much ofthatchangehas occurredin thelastdecadeor so-to a degreethatis oftenhardto perceive,letaloneaccommodate. This complex,morepluralistic, lessAtlantic-centred worldhas to be bornein mind as we assess theplace of theAnglo-Americanrelationshipin currentBritishforeign policy. Is it now a somewhatincongruousrelationship,out of step with some of Britain'scurrentneeds and aspirations?The specialites, for instance,are largelya legacy of the 1940s and 1950s when Britainwas stilla world power. Today, does Britainneedthesameglobalintelligence capability,or is thatnow ofgreaterbenefitto the United States?Does the rejuvenatedtransatlantic nuclearrelationshipprevent closer European cooperation?Is it an extravagancetoday, particularlywith an


David Reynolds

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impendingcrisis in the defencebudget? Does Britain'ssubstantialbureaucratic presence in Washingtonstill fulfilan importantrole, or is it overblown?Is the consultativerelationshipitselfincreasinglyin tensionwith Britain'sidentityas a member of the European Community?The contradictorypulls that Britain experiencedover the 'Year of Europe' in 1973 have recurredsince,especiallyover policy towardsIsrael,and theyare likelyto be a featureof debatesovertheStrategic Defence Initiativeand itsEuropeanrival,'Eureka'. In short,can Britainstillhave its cake and eat it? Does Britainenjoy a privileged positionas transatlantic betweentheUnitedStatesand Europe?Or does intermediary it fallbetweentwo stools: an increasingly ifwell-loved,poor relationin irrelevant, Washington,and a 'bad European' in a continentincreasinglydominatedby the Franco-Germanaxis? At roothereis thequestionofwhetherBritain'sreadjustment to therankofa mainly European power impliesa markedreductionin the broad communityof strategic interests thatunderpinnedtheAnglo-American alliancein the1940sand 1950s.Now thatBritainis no longera worldpower,does ithavethesameinterest in US globalism as ithad indayswhencommunist insouth-eastAsia or Nasseriteradicalism insurgents in theMiddleEast could be seenas commonenemies?This is particularly problematic is preoccupiedwithits statusas a superpowerlocked in when a US administration globalideologicalrivalrywiththeSovietUnion. HenryKissingerposed theessential issuein 1973whenhe highlighted thecontrastbetweentheinterests of a globalpower and thoseofitsregionalallies.40The problemforBritainis whetheritsmainly(though not exclusively)regionalinterests mayin thefuturebe betterprotectedthroughfuller to theregionalorganizationit has entered(theEuropeanCommunity), commitment inUS foreignpolicyand theshiftsin theinternational giventheincipientrealignments patternof power. This is a pertinent ofthelastdecadeor question,posed acutelybythedevelopments so. But thechangesmustnotbe exaggerated. Justas theAnglo-American relationship has endured,so too has NATO. In a centuryof incessant,bewilderingchangeit has one 'crisis'afteranother,each of which, proveda remarkablesurvivor,surmounting the pundits assured us, sounded its death-knell.The debate about strengthening WesternEuropean cooperationusually assumes the continuedexistenceof that Atlanticallianceand theAmericannuclearumbrella.For, as long as one of the two 'superpowers'is perceivedas a majorthreat,it will be hardforthediversestatesof of theirsecurity. WesternEurope not to look towardstheotherforthefundamentals bonds of culture,values and trade have UnderpinningNATO, the transatlantic For instance,nearlyhalfthe persisted.In some cases theyhave been strengthened. abroad is in Europe41 -a markedincreasesince the United States'directinvestment immediatepostwarera. A historianof the Anglo-Americanrelationshipcan point,then,to elementsof as well as change.The changesarepronounced,particularly in thelasttwo continuity decades-changes in Britishpower,Europe's internalbalance,America'scharacter, and theoverallpatternofinternational relations.Taken together theysuggesttheneed the diplomatictraditionsBritainhas inheritedfromthe to reassessfundamentally 1940s and 1950s, of which the idea of a pre-eminent, two-wayrelationshipwith 40. See his 'Year of Europe' speechof 23 Apr. 1973,printedin HenryA. Kissinger,Americanforeign policy(New York: Norton, 1974),p. 168. 41. PhilWilliams,'The UnitedStates'commitment to WesternEurope: strategic ambiguityand political disintegration?', InternationalAffairs, Spring1983,Vol. 59, No. 2, p. 200.


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AMERICA,

BRITAIN


ORDER

Americais a notableexample.Yet theelementsof continuity are also apparent.After more thanfortyyearstheAnglo-Americanrelationship, withits undoubtedspecial has been woven intothefabricof Britishforeignpolicy qualityand specialfeatures, and into thetangledtapestrythatis NATO. The conclusionsof thisrapidhistorical survey,therefore,point in somewhatcontradictorydirections,particularlywith regardto futureBritishforeign policy.Arethebondsofthe'specialrelationship' now a on Britain'sdiplomacy?Yet, afterso long,can theyeasilybe untied? restraint


A special relationship America, Britain and the international order since the Second World War - DAVID REYNOLDS

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