A CRITIQUE ON ADVAITA VEDANTA

A CRITIQUE ON ADVAITA VEDANTA

Dr. M.PRABHAKARA RAO, Ph.D 9C, BLUE BEACH ROAD NEELANGARAI CHENNAI – 600 041

A CRITIQUE ON ADVAITA VEDANTA

TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter

Page

1.

Introduction

3

2.

A Critique on Brahman-Realization Brahman-Realization

9

3.

A Critique on the Concept of  Jiva  Jiva

21

4.

Brahman-World Illusion in Advaita Vedanta: A Critique

40

5.

Eliot Deutsch on Levels of Being: A Critique

57

6.

Inconsistencies in the Brahmasutra the Brahmasutra and Sankarabhasya: With Special Reference to the Competence of Sudra of  Sudra

71

7.

Moral Imagination and Character Development in Ancient India

84

8.

Concluding Remarks

108

9.

Notes and References

114

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CHAPTER - I Introduction

Advaita Vedanta has been explained in two major methods, namely, 1)  Drsti srsti vada and 2) Srsti drsti vada. vada. We will not deal with the first method in this research project. The second can be found in the Vedanta sutras of Badarayana vyasa. Sankara, the great commentator on the Vedanta sutras, sutras, opines that Vyasa has established in the Vedanta sutras that the unqualified non-dual Brahman alone is the ultimate reality. The world that appears is only illusion and the consciousness that is conditioned by ignorance, namely,  jiva,  jiva, who is responsible for the life in the physical body, is none other than the unqualified non-dual Brahman. The author of the Vedanta sutras had to bring out the concepts, such as, Brahman,  Isvara,  Isvara, kutastha, kutastha,  jiva,  jiva, maya, maya, avidya, avidya, caitanya, caitanya,  jada,  jada, srsti, srsti, karma, karma, etc., while explaining the srist drsti vada. vada. Though the ways of  explanations given by Vyasa and Sankara seem to be convincing, some of  the basic elucidations of the fundamental concepts appear to be questionable. We will make an attempt in this research project to expose some of those concepts which seem to be disputable. The whole analysis of  srsti drsti vada seems to be standing on the concepts of  jada  jada and consciousness. Sankara holds the view that all that is seen inclusive of our body is inert ( jada ( jada)) by its very nature. For him, the  Jada is exact opposite to the nature of consciousness. It is the visaya). consciousness by which the inert body is able to act on the things ( visaya). When the consciousness leaves the body then the body is declared dead. Again when the consciousness enters another body then it is acknowledged as getting birth. While the consciousness enters the body at the time of  birth or leaving the body at the time of death, the consciousness is conceived by Sankara as a bit of consciousness conditioned by individual ignorance (avidhya (avidhya). ). Such individual consciousness ( jiva ( jiva)) is addressed as located in the space of the heart. Then Sankara explains the illusoriness of  the inert body separately and declares that the inert body cannot be determined either as existing or non-existing.

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Vyasa and Sankara had to maintain the two categories, namely, the inert and the Consciousness, till the end of the inquiry and finally denounce the inert world and body. The birth or creation of the inert body has been explained in order to sustain the inertness of the world and body. When the inertness of the world is maintained then its creation, development and dependence needed to be organized. Since the pure Consciousness alone is accepted as the only reality, the Advaitins had to explain how the inertness, which has opposite nature to the Consciousness, is created in the Consciousness. The creation of the inert in the Consciousness by itself sounds like creation of darkness within light by itself. Such contradictions in the explanation of  srsti drsti vada are possible because the entire analysis of srsti of  srsti drsti vada mostly depends on the human perceptual limitations. If man cannot perceive consciousness in anything then it is declared to be inert by the Advaitins. Non-perceptibility of  something should be addressed as unknowable but not as non-existence of  the same. Like wise many concepts in the srsti drsti vada had to face many complications and ultimately left the inquirer ( jignasu ( jignasu)) in utter confusion, for the truth of the Appearance (drsya ( drsya)) is dismissed as different from that of Consciousness. We will make an attempt in this research project to analyse and examine some of the major concepts of Advaita Vedanta in order to expose the disputable concepts. This research project is organized in eight chapters. The first is ‘Introduction’. The second chapter is: ‘A critique on Brahman-realization’. Considering that the Upanisadic statements relating to Brahman- Atman can only be taken as hypotheses, an attempt is made in the second chapter to examine whether Brahman-Realization Brahman-Realization is possible or not. It is argued that the existence of Brahman lies in the possibility of experience of  Brahman. As the Sruti text limits the possibility of Brahman-knowledge only ‘Through Mind’, an inquiry is directed to evaluate the Epistemological Analytic. Since the experience of  Nityajnana( of  Nityajnana(atman atman)) as such without adjuncts adjuncts is not possible in common common human experience, it is shown that the revelation of  atman is possible only in the form of  advaitns argue for for the falsity of   Antahkarana akhandakara vrttijnana. vrttijnana. As advaitns the objects of all vrttis in three states of experience, it is argued that the object of the antahkarana akhandakara vrtti, that is, atman is also false. The falsity of the atman is maintained through several arguments such as: The Metaphysical Analytic, The Experiential Analytic, and The Analysis of knower. Further, it is argued that Advaita Advaita Vedanta begins with with a

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hypothesis and and ends with the same unconfirmed. unconfirmed. On the basis of the arguments, it is concluded that Brahman – Realization is not possible. The third chapter is: ‘A Critique on the Concept of  Jiva’.  Jiva’. In the third chapter, I have attempted to bring to light the inherent contradictions in the Advaitic concept of  jiva.  jiva. Sankara’s concept of  jiva  jiva is grounded on the following assumptions: a)  Jiva is a result of  Isvaracaitanya of  Isvaracaitanya’s ’s identifying Itself with the antahkarana. antahkarana. b) The reason for such identification is aviveka. aviveka. c) Isvaracaitany c) Isvaracaitanya a directly presents Itself in the living being as hence jiva is anadi.  jiva and hence jiva anadi. d) At the time of  srsti, Brahman transformed Itself partly into the world and also entered into the living being as jiva. as  jiva.

In this chapter I have argued against the above mentioned assumptions and thereby established the untenability of the advaitic  jiva. In particular I have tried to establish that the antahkarana concept of  jiva. is by itself sufficient to explain the conscious nature of the living body. Thereby I have also indirectly disproved the so called essential identity of  Brahman. I have substantiated my arguments by the relevant relevant  jiva and Brahman. scriptural texts. The fourth chapter is: ‘Brahman-World Illusion in Advaita Vedanta: A Critique’. Critique’. This chapter aims at evaluating the position of the Advaita on the three levels levels of reality. reality. It attempts to prove that world cannot be an illusion on non-duality and world of duality cannot be sublated by the knowledge of Brahman. In the same place, place, it will be shown that non-dual experience can be an illusion on duality of the world and the waking experience can sublate the non-dual experience.

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The evaluation evaluation is done in the following manner. manner. It will be shown against Advaita, that world is not an illusion on Brahman from the following arguments, namely, (i) there is no proper illustration to explain the world as an illusion, and (ii) world cannot be sublated by non-dual experience. Later, it will will be argued that non-dual experience can be an illusion on dual world and the same can be sublated by the knowledge of  waking experience. Further it will will be shown shown that the cause of  duhkha is subject illusions. Then, it will be established that that an ontological ontological sublation of the world by non-dual experience, which implies physical disappearance of the world, is not required to attain moksa. Finally, it will be argued that none of the four varieties of experience stands for the  paramarthika  paramarthika satta and therefore, the ultimate reality cannot be determined in Advaita Vedanta. The fifth chapter is: ‘Eliot Deutsch on Levels of Being: A Critique’. An attempt is made in this chapter to show that the Advaita ‘Reality’ admitted by Eliot Deutsch Deutsch cannot be the ultimate reality. In order to establish the same, three arguments have been raised against the concept of  three levels of being, advocated by Eliot Deutsch, namely, (1) Reality cannot subrate Appearance, (2) Appearance subrates non-dual mental experience, and (3) Unreality cannot be a level of o f reality. An examination of the criteria of the ultimate reality is conducted in the first argument. argument. It is shown that the concept of subration cannot be applied to ‘Reality’ as long as one believes that ‘Reality’ is a trans-mental experience. This point of view is also supported supported by the argument argument that if  if  non-duality is a trans-mental reality then the same cannot be communicated to the other states of experience due to lack of  communicating instruments within within non-duality. non-duality. Further it is pointed out that if non-duality is a trans-mental experience then the requirements of  subration namely, (i) the subrating judgment, and (ii) the subrated  judgment cannot be formed while one is in the trans-mental non-dual experience. All these these arguments go to prove that Reality cannot subrate Appearance. Secondly, it is argued that the Reality explained by Eliot Deutsch, does not stand for the definition of the ultimate reality and the same is suitable for the definition of Unreality. Then the opinion opinion of Eliot Deutsch on the unsubratability of ‘Reality’ has been dismissed. Later, it is established that application of the concept of subration is possible only to 6

the memory of non-dual mental experience while one is in the state of  Appearance. It is shown that the memory memory of non-dual mental experience cannot subrate Appearance either while one is in non-duality or in Appearance. In the same place, it is argued that appearance can subrate the memory of non-duality while one is in the state of Appearance because of  the possibility of the formation of the subrating and subrated judgments in the Appearance. Also, it has been established that the concept of three levels of being and the concept of subration in Advaita Vedanta cannot determine ‘Reality’ as the ultimate reality. Lastly, the significance of the classification of three levels of reality in Advaita Vedanta has been explained in order to show that unreality cannot be a kind of reality and the same cannot be included in the concept of three levels of reality. The sixth chapter is: ‘Inconsistencies in the  Brahmasutra  Brahmasutra and of  Sudra’. ’. An Sankara Bhasya: Bhasya: With Special Reference to the Competence of Sudra attempt is made in this chapter to expose some inconsistencies in the formulation of  Brahmasutr of  Brahmasutras as and Sankara’s Commentary in relation with the competence of Sudra of  Sudra to acquire Brahman knowledge through the Veda. Veda. This chapter is organized in the following parts: 1. Introduction 2. Sankara's Opinion On Sudra's Competence 3. A critique on the criterion of the caste and Upanayana 4. A critique on the incompetence of born Sudra for knowledge through the Veda. Veda. 5. A Critique on the Authorship of  Sutras  Apasudradhikaranam  Apasudradhikaranam

and  Bhasya on

In the second part Sankara’s arguments against the competence of  Sudra are briefly analyzed. In the third part, Sankara’s view on caste determination, namely, caste is determined by birth is encountered. Referring to the Sruti texts, it is shown that the view adopted by Sankara is untenable. It is established that caste is not determined by birth but only by 7

upanayana. one’s qualities. It is revealed that a Sudra may be eligible for upanayana. The fourth part shows that all human beings along with Sudras and women  Brahmajnana through the study of the Vedanta. Vedanta. may also be qualified for  Brahmajnana In the last part it is exposed that Vyasa and Sankara may not have authored hikaranam and bhasya on the same respectively. the Apasudrad the Apasudradhikaranam The seventh chapter is: ‘Moral Imagination and Character Development in Ancient Ancient India’. This chapter is divided into into three parts: 1. Introduction, 2. Moral Imagination and 3. Character Development. The concepts of changeable and unchangeable morality are explained in the Introduction. In the second part it is established that liberation is the highest human goal and the practice of the unchangeable morality forms the foundation for liberation. Definitions of good and bad actions are also explained in the same place. In the third part the process of achieving the stable happiness has been elucidated. The influencing factors of both good and bad actions are exposed. Later the methods of moral practice are classified. In the method of moral practice for individuals, the practice of  sila, sila, truth speaking, non-violence, non-expectation of other’s property, non-stealing, non-adultery or complete restraint from sex with other women and refraining from consuming liquor have been explained. The practical aspects of the same are also discussed here. In the method of  moral practice for individuals getting educated, the traditional moral practice, the targets and achievements in the four quarters of life are explained. Finally the methods of moral practice for elderly or uneducated individuals and the same for individuals after retirement are also explained. Finally in the last chapter, that is, ‘Concluding Remarks’, we have mentioned about our views on the duality. Among the chapters mentioned th th above the 2,3,4,5 and 6 are published in the  JICPR,  JICPR, India and the 7 is published by RVP, the Catholic University of America, USA.

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CHAPTER - II A Critique on Brahman-Realization

INTRODUCTION

The philosophical pursuit in ancient India can broadly be categorized as follows: (i) Pursuit based on the belief in the existence existence of self (atman (atman)) or Reality; (ii) Pursuit based on disbelief in the existence of self; and (iii) Pursuit that disagrees with both belief and disbelief in the existence of  self. Almost all orthodox Indian philosophical systems and some of the heterodox systems systems share the view of the first category. However, each 1 system disagrees with the other in defining self ( atman). atman). Among these systems, some (for instance the Carvaka school) define the self as physical matter, some as vital breath ( prana ( prana), ), some as mind (manas ( manas), ), some as buddhi and some (for instance Advaita Vedanta) as Pure Consciousness. They also differ among themselves in the identification of the number of  realities. For instance, Gotama in his  Nyayasutras says that there are sixteen categories while Vyasa in his  Brahmasutras  Brahmasutras maintains that there is only one Reality called Brahman. Sri Sankaracharya clearly defines Brahman as unqualified Pure Consciousness- the one and only non-dual Reality without a second. According to him, Brahman can be experienced. experienced. He reiterates reiterates that personal experience is the only valid means apart from verbal testimony (sruti) attempt is made made in sruti) to realize the existence of Brahman. Hence an attempt this paper to examine whether Brahman-realization is possible through personal experience or not.

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 ATMAN  ARE STATEMENTS RELATING TO BRAHMANBRAHMAN- ATMAN  HYPOTHESES? Most of the Upanisad s begin with an inquiry into the Reality from the unknown Brahman to the known world, in order to establish the one and only non-dual Reality called Brahman. Brahman. It is also stated stated in the 2 Upanisad s that Brahman- Atman can be experienced. Brahman- Atman  Atman and statements related to the same may be considered in three ways in Advaita Vedanta. They are: (i) as logical propositions, (ii) as objects of of faith and (iii) as hypotheses. If ‘Brahman- Atman…’  Atman…’ is a logical proposition, then the whole of Advaita Vedanta becomes a logical exercise to establish Brahman- Atman.  Atman. Logical establishment of Brahman- Atman does not lead one to Brahman Brahman experience. experience. Therefore, the logical method method to establish Brahman- Atman  Atman is not discussed in this paper. If Brahman- Atman is an object of faith and if it remains as an object of faith then one cannot have Brahman-experience because one requires having faith only in such a thing thing which cannot cannot be experienced. experienced. Thus, the only method left to establish Brahman- Atman Brahman- Atman within the fold of human experience is to consider the statements related to Brahman- Atman Brahman- Atman as hypotheses. Sankara seems to accept BrahmanBrahman- Atman,  Atman, that is, non-duality 3 4 as hypothesis. Vidyaranya also appears to hold the same view. Thus, there is ground to consider Brahman- Atman Brahman- Atman and its related statements as hypotheses. Brahman,  Atman and the statement, namely, ‘This atman is Brahman’, are basically conceived as hypotheses in Advaita Vedanta. These hypotheses are based on three important premises, namely: 5

(i) There is ‘Brahman’ from which everything comes forth; 6 

(ii) There is atman by which everything is known; and (iii) This atman is Brahman.

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Some of the hypotheses as set out in the Vedanta texts may be presented as follows: (i) ‘In the beginning there was Brahman alone, one 8 9 only, without a second’. (ii) ‘All this is Brahman’. Based on such hypotheses, Sankara opines that, ‘from the Realization of Brahman follows

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the highest human objective objective (namely, (namely, liberation). Therefore, one should 10 undertake a deliberation on Brahman’. It may be stated that any hypothesis gains credibility if sufficient evidence is produced in its its favor. For instance, one may may not believe in the statement: ‘There is a ghost in the room’, even if it has been made by a genius or a pious person who hails from a great tradition until it is established with an experiential proof. Similarly, the hypothesis, ‘There is Brahman from which everything comes forth’, etc., needs to be established with practical realization. Thus one should examine whether such Brahman-Realization is possible or not. The question ‘Is Brahman-Realization possible?’ arises in the following contexts: (i) When one treats the statements related to Brahman as hypotheses; (ii) When one questions the Sruti texts after a thorough investigation regarding the possibility of Brahman experience; (iii) When one finds oneself in  Anubhavagata sandehah regarding Brahman after overcoming Pramanagata sandehah, Prameyagata 11 sandehah, and Viparitabhavana by attaining the eight-fold practices; and (iv) When one does does not find experiential experiential proof of Brahman. In other words, if Brahman is to be Real, then one should experience the same. THE STAND OF ADVAITA A DVAITA VEDANTA REGARDING BRAHMAN-REALIZATION Sankara holds that, since knowledge of Brahman culminates in experience and it relates to an existing entity, the Vedic texts, personal experience, etc., are taken as possible valid means for Brahman12 knowledge. He is also of the opinion that, ‘the knowledge of Brahman must be determined by the thing (that is, Brahman) itself, since it is 13 concerned with an existing reality’. The Sruti text also states that 14 ‘Through mind alone the self is known’ and not by any other means. Brahman-knowledge is possible only through mind and personal 11

experience is accepted accepted as valid means to it. it. Therefore, one must trace the possibility of Brahman-Realization within the fold of Epistemological 15 Analytic. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ANALYTIC According to Advaita Vedanta, human knowledge is broadly divided into two kinds, namely, Nityajnana namely,  Nityajnana and Vrttijnana. Nityajnana is atman. It is Pure Pure Consciousness. It is Bliss Infinite. It should should be known through 16 mind alone. Since Advaitins argue that  Nityajnana is the basis for all varieties of knowledge, it is the th e objective of the hypothesis. If the existence of   Nityajnana is proved through Vrttijnana, Vrttijnana , then it becomes Real; otherwise, it is only an unproved presupposition. In order to examine whether realization of  Nityajnana of  Nityajnana is possible through Vrttijnana, one must analyse all kinds of  Vrttijnana to find a suitable vrtti for the revelation of   Nityajnana.  Nityajnana. Analysis of Vrttijnana of Vrttijnana Vrttijnana may be divided into two categories: (i)  Avidya vrttijnana and (ii)  Antahkarana vrttijnana. Avidya vrttijnana is further subdivided into (i)  Avidya khandakara vrttijnana and (ii)  Avidya akhandakara vrttijnana. vrttijnana. Examples for  Avidya khandakara vrttijnana are knowledge of  illusory objects such as snake on a rope and dream objects. Example for 17 Since  Avidya  Avidya akhandakara vrttijnana is Bliss in Deep Sleep. akhandakara vrttijnana has some relevance in the forthcoming arguments, is may be necessary to discuss the same in detail at this stage. The  Avidya akhandakara vrtti is formed in Deep Sleep because of the absence of  18 objects of knowledge (known generally in Waking and Dream). The state of Deep Sleep is called Anandamaya called  Anandamaya,, that is, ‘endowed with an abundance of Bliss’, because at the time of Deep Sleep, the mind is free from the miseries of efforts made on account of the states of mind being involved in the relationship of subject and object. Advaitins believe believe that this is not 19 Bliss by itself because it is not Bliss Infinite. Similarly, Antahkarana Similarly,  Antahkarana vrttijnana is of two types: (i)  Antahkarana khandakara vrttijnana and (ii)  Antahkarana akhandakara vrttijnana. vrttijnana. Further,  Antahkarana khandakara vrttijnana may be subdivided into (i)  Antaranga antahkarana vrttijnana and (ii)  Bahirgata antahkarana of  Antaranga antahkarana vrttijnana. vrttijnana. Examples of  Antaranga a ntahkarana vrttijnana are happiness, 12

etc., and of   Bahirgata antahkarana vrttijnana are table, chair, etc. Advaitins believe that atman as such cannot be revealed in all the said 20  Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti. vrtti. Since the varieties of  vrtti except in the  Antahkarana subject matter of the present paper is confined to Brahman-Realization an examination of the object of the  Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti is attempted below. According to the Advaitins, the object of the  Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti is atman itself and it is presupposed as the only Reality. They also believe that atman alone is real and the rest of the objects of any other vrttis are unreal. For them, atman is Bliss Infinite. In order to find an answer to the question ‘Is Brahman-Realization possible?’ one should ask  the Advaitins: How can one believe in only the reality of the object of the  Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti, vrtti, while the other object of all vrttis are rejected as false? This question leads one to inquire into the arguments given by the Advaitins for the falsity of the objects of all other vrtt is. is. One needs to verify whether the same arguments are applicable in the case of  the object of the  Antahkarana  Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti. vrtti. Since Advaitins believe that atman is Bliss Infinite, one should also find out the reasons for the blissful nature of Deep Sleep in order to examine whether the same s ame reasons are applicable in the case of the blissful nature of   Antahkarana akhandakara vrittijnana. vrittijnana.

ADVAITIN’S ARGUMENTS FOR THE FALSITY OF OBJECTS OF WAKING AND DREAM (a) Sankara holds that the objects in the states of Waking and Dream are ‘perceived’. He argues that as the objects perceived to exist in Dream are illusory, so also are the objects perceived in the Waking state. Since the common feature of the objects of both Waking and Dream experience is 21 ‘being perceived’, they are said to be illusory. (b) It is argued that the objects of both waking and Dream experience are illusory because they are associated with the subject-object 22 relationship. (c) It is said that all objects in Waking, as in Dream, are imagined. It is pointed out that the internal mental vrttis, vrttis, whether in Dream or in Waking, are thought thought to be unreal. Gaudapada in his  Mandukyakarika  Mandukyakarika 13

reiterates the unreality of the objects of waking and Dream which the self  23 merely imagines. EXPERIENCE OF ATMAN  OF ATMAN IS IS FALSE (a) If ‘being seen’ is the common factor, based based on which the the objects of Waking and Dream are proved to be illusory, then the question that arises is: Is the object of the  Antahkarana akhandakara akhandakara vrtti ‘seen’ or not? akhandakara vrtti is ‘seen’, then the logic If the object of the Antahkarana the  Antahkarana akhandakara applied for the falsity of objects of both Waking and Dream also applies to the object of the  Antahkarana  Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti and consequently the atman becomes illusory. If the object of the  Antahkarana  Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti is ‘not seen’, then how can one determine that the object of the  Antahkarana akhandakara akhandakara vrtti is atman? atman? (b) One should realize that, since the object of the  Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti is seen, there exists a subject-object relationship between the seer and the object of the  Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti. vrtti. If  one argues that there is no subject-object relationship between the two, then the question arises: If the object of the Antahkarana the  Antahkarana akhandakara akhandakara vrtti vrtti itself is the seer, then how can the seer see himself being separated in the  Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti by himself? In case it is argued that the seer is different from the object of the  Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti, vrtti, then one cannot say that the object of the  Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti is atman, atman, which is supposed to be the basis of knowledge. Since the subject-object relationship has to be accepted in the case vrttijnana, the object of the  Antahkarana of  Antahkarana of  Antahkarana akhandakara vrttijnana, akhandakara vrttijnana, vrttijnana, that is, atman, atman, becomes illusory on the basis of  the argument given by the Advaitins to falsify the objects of Waking and Dream. (c) It is said that all objects of mental vrttis are imagined and, therefore, are illusory. illusory. Similarly, it can be argued argued that, since the  Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti is also a mental vrtti, the object of the object  Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti must be imagined. Therefore, the object of the Antahkarana the Antahkarana akhandakara akhandakara vrtti vrtti is said to be illusory. Thus, it can be ascertained that the realization of the atman is not possible.

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BLISS IN DEEP SLEEP AND ANTAHKARANA AND ANTAHKARANA AKHANDAKARA VRTTIJNANA It is said that the akhandakara vrtti in Deep Sleep is formed by avidya whereas in the case of  Antahkar ana akhandakara vrttijnana, vrttijnana, the of  Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti is formed by the antahkarana itself. The Bliss in Deep Sleep is the result of the absence of objects and for the same reason Bliss can be experienced even in Antahkarana in  Antahkarana akhandakara akhandakara vrttijnana. vrttijnana. It has to be reiterated that the Bliss in both cases is experienced by ‘non-duality caused by the absence of the objects and not by the presence of the nondual object’. Therefore, confirmation confirmation of the experience of atman of  atman based on the experience of Bliss can be ruled out. Thus the reality of  atman still remains a doubtful proposition. The idea that the object of the  Antahkarana akhandakara akhandakara vrtti is false may be supported by the following arguments. THE METAPHYSICAL ANALYTIC According to Advaita Vedanta, avidya has two innate powers: (i) the concealing power power and (ii) the projecting power. In other words, words, avidya necessarily conceals reality at its causal level and when it comes to the effect level, that is, antahkarana level, it not only conceals reality but also projects falsity. That means the specific characteristic of the antahkarana is to project falsity after concealing reality. reality. Now it can be argued that, if  atman is revealed in the  Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti, vrtti, then atman antahkarana, because the antahkarana becomes a false projection of the antahkarana, necessarily conceals conceals reality and projects projects unreality. unreality. In other words, the antahkarana always projects false objects, and since atman is revealed by the Antahkarana the Antahkarana akhandakara akhandakara vrtti, vrtti, it is said that atman also can be a false projection and, and, therefore, therefore, necessarily unreal. Advaita Vedanta does not offer any reason to accept the reality of the only projection of the antahkarana, antahkarana, namely, atman in the  Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti. vrtti. It may be a case of the ‘logic of convenience’ because when the Advaitins found non-duality in  Antahkarana akhandakara vrttijnana, vrttijnana, they tried to account for the object of the  Antahkarana akhandakara akhandakara vrtti as atman, atman, that is, the objective of their proposed hypothesis. hypothesis. On the other hand, when the same logic is put forth in a different way, it can be said that Deep Sleep is conditioned by cause alone - a state of non-apprehension ( agrahanam) agrahanam) of  reality; and Waking and Dream states are conditioned by both cause and 24 effect - states of misapprehension (anyathagrahanam). anyathagrahanam). Deep Sleep is 15

said to be the causal state - the state of avidya of  avidya,, in which one does not know the reality. When avidya gives rise to its effect called the antahkarana in Waking and Dream states, these states become the states of both nonapprehension and mis-apprehension. mis-apprehension. Now it can be argued that, if Waking and Dream are called the states of both non-apprehension and misapprehension of reality because of the function of the antahkarana, antahkarana, then for the same reason the state of  Antahkarana of  Antahkarana akhandakara vrttijnana also can equally be called the state of both non-apprehension and misapprehension of reality. Thus, the mis-apprehended object of the  Antahkarana akhandakara akhandakara vrtti, vrtti, that is, atman, atman, becomes false.

THE EXPERIENTIAL ANALYTIC The whole of human experience in Advaita Vedanta is divided into three states, namely, namely, (i) Waking, Waking, (ii) Dream, Dream, and (iii) Deep Sleep. Sleep. One should know the activity of the antahkarana in the three states of  experience in order to evaluate the reality of the object of the  Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti. vrtti. The activity of the antahkarana can be described as follows: The antahkarana in Waking state functions externally through the senses; it conceals turiya and projects all duality. duality. When it retires retires from Waking state and withdraws itself to the Dream state, it not only conceals mental images. When it turiya but also projects the duality of internal mental withdraws from this activity of projecting duality, it merges into its cause, that is, avidya in Deep Sleep. There it withdraws all its dual projections turiya. Similarly, it can be argued but yet it conceals turiya. argued that when one introverts (antarmukhatva (antarmukhatva)) one’s antahkarana, antahkarana, as its natural course the antahkarana withdraws its projection projection of duality. When one one forces the antahkarana to surpass Deep Sleep to form the  Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti, vrtti, then it naturally projects non-duality due to the absence of objects. The only difference between the Deep Sleep state and the state of   Antahkarana akhandakara vrttijnana is that in Deep Sleep there is only concealment of  turiya whereas in the state of  Antahkaran of  Antahkarana a akhandakara vrttijnana, vrttijnana, there is not only concealment of  turiya but also false projection of non-duality. The reasons for such non-dual projection in the state of  Antahkarana of  Antahkarana akhandakara vrttijnana are as follows: (i) It is natural for avidya to project akhandakara vrtti in Deep Sleep due to the absence of objects. Any state beyond Deep Sleep cannot be of duality for the same reason, that is, 16

absence of of objects. objects. (ii) Since Since the antahkarana does not have any object in the introversion beyond Deep Sleep, it naturally projects non-duality, as its cause projects projects in Deep Sleep. Sleep. The projection of non-duality non-duality in the  Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti should necessarily be a case of projection of falsity because of the natural characteristics of the antahkarana to conceal reality and project falsity. If this argument is not acceptable to an Advaitin, then he should submit the reasons for the failure of the antahkarana in projecting falsity only in the case of  Antahkarana  Antahkarana akhandakara vrttijnana. vrttijnana. Such reasons are not found in Advaita Vedanata, because any reason that applies for the reality of the object of the antahkarana akhandakara vrtti also applies for the reality of the objects of the other antahkarana vrttis. vrttis. Consequently, any reason for the reality of the object of the  Antahkarana akhandakara whole world real. If this argument is acceptable, acceptable, then the vrtti makes the whole object revealed in the  Antahkarana  Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti, vrtti, that is, atman, atman, becomes a fase projection as the antahkarana does in both Waking and Dream states. Alternatively, Alternatively, if the atman is held to be a ‘real’ object revealed by the antahkarana, antahkarana, then the objects in Waking and Dream states were also to be regarded as real as such.

ANALYSIS OF KNOWER The knower of Waking, Dream and  Antahkarana akhandakara vrttijnana is defined as follows: (i) In the Waking state the knower is defined by Advaitins as ‘Consciousness conditioned by the antahkarana’. antahkarana’. (ii) In the Dream state the knower is ‘Consciousness conditioned by the antahkarana’. antahkarana’. (iii) In the state of the  Antahkarana akhandakara vrttijnana the knower is ‘Consciousness conditioned by the antahkarana’. antahkarana’. The above definitions reveal that the knower is the same for Waking, Dream and  Antahkarana akhandakara vrttijnana. vrttijnana. Advaitins say that in the three states, namely, Waking, Dream and Deep Sleep, the one and the same object of experience appears in threefold form as the gross, 17

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the subtle and the blissful. It is so because experience of the three states is only different forms forms of thoughts or ideas and and hence unreal. Similarly, the object of the  Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti can also be called a mere unreal. As Bliss in Deep Deep Sleep is equated equated with manaspandanam and hence unreal.  Antahkarana akhandakara an unreal mental vibration, the Bliss in  Antahkarana vrttijnana also can be equated with a mental vibration which is unreal. Since the objects of the knower of Dream and Waking are proved to be false, the object of the Antahkarana the  Antahkarana akhandakara akhandakara vrtti can also be declared as unreal on the same grounds. Thus it may may be argued that since the knower is the same for Waking, Dream and  Antahkarana akhandakara the  Antahkarana vrttijnana, vrttijnana, the object of the Antahkaran a akhandakara vrtti vrtti is also false.

EXPERIENCE OF ATMAN  OF ATMAN IS IS NOT POSSIBLE THROUGH  JAHADAJAHALLAKSANA  Position of Advaita Vedanta Vedanta The Advaitins claim that one attains the revelation of  atman through the  Antahkarana  Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti by contemplating on the great Vedic sentences such as, ‘That thou art’, etc. According to them when one uses the method of  ubhayalaksana to the words ‘That’ and ‘Thou’ in the great Vedic sentence, ‘That thou art,’ one attains  Antahkarana akhandakara vrttijnana. vrttijnana. The antahkarana akhandakara vrtti can destroy one’s ignorance of Brahman-Atman. Critique The object of the Antahkaran the  Antahkarana a akhandakara vrtti cannot be accepted as real when one thoroughly inquires into the process of  ‘tat’ which is in the  jahadajahallaksana  jahadajahallaksana.. When the vacyartha of the word ‘tat’  Maya, the adjunct of  Isvara form of avarana of  avarana,, that is  Maya, of  Isvara and the vacyartha of  the word ‘tvam’ ‘tvam’,, which is in the form of  viksepa, viksepa, that is, the antahkarana, antahkarana, the adjunct of   jiva,  jiva, are destroyed, then there remains only Pure Consciousness. The process of the application of  jahadajahallaksana  jahadajahallaksana may 26 be symbolically presented as in the following flow chart.

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1. [C.A] = a ~A _________

2. [C.M] = I ~M _________

C=a _________

C=I _________

a=I C = Pure Consciousness A = avidya a = atman ~ = annihilation of  M = Maya = Maya I = Isvara = Isvara [.] = conditioned by

Now, one can raise the question, how, once all adjuncts are removed, how can the  Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti, vrtti, which is a product of the adjunct, come into existence? In other words, since the adjunct of   jiva,  jiva, that is, antahkarana is removed, how can the destroyed antahkarana again form the akhandakara vrtti? vrtti? Thus, it is meaningless to say that there  Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti after cessation of the arises the  Antahkarana antahkarana. antahkarana. Another argument may be given by questioning the purpose of the  Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti. vrtti. One cannot cannot say, as Advaitins Advaitins do, that that the purpose of the Antahkarana the  Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti is destruction of ignorance, because ignorance is destroyed already by the annihilation of the antahkarana. According to Advaita Vedanta the destruction of ignorance and Realization of Brahman take place simultaneously. Then how can again the Antahkaran the Antahkarana a akhandakara vrtti vrtti,, a product of ignorance, arise and destroy the ignorance of Brahman? It is not reasonable to say that ignorance is destroyed - once by  jahadajahallaksana  jahadajahallaksana,, once by avarana nirakarana and again by the  Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti. vrtti. Thus, Sankara clearly declares that the scriptures do not seek to establish 27 Brahman as an entity referable objectively. Even Ramakrsnadhvari, the author of the Sikhamani Vyakhya on the Vedanta Paribhasa of  Dharmarajadhvari, is of the opinion that siddhanta cannot be established 19

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ana.. Therefore, the revelation of  through the method of  jahadajahallaks of  jahadajahallaksana atman in the Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti is not possible through  jahadajahallaksana  jahadajahallaksana.. DECLARATION OF MADHUSUDANA SARASVATI In support of the arguments against objectivity of atman in the  Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti, vrtti,  Madhusudana Sarasvati, Sarasvati, in the first chapter of his  Advaitasiddhi says that Brahman revealed in vrtti is 29 sopadikam and cannot be pure. He reiterates that pure atman cannot be 30 the object of vrtti. of  vrtti. BRAHMAN-REALIZATION BRAHMAN-REALIZATION IS NOT POSSIBLE 31

Scriptural statements such as ‘where mind cannot comprehend’, 32 33 ‘where speech returns with mind’, ‘one will not return’, and Smrti 34 statements such as ‘where one goes and never returns’, etc., reveal that Brahman-Realization is possible only after destruction of ignorance. In other words, Brahman-Realization is possible only when the antahkarana is destroyed. Therefore, it can be argued that Brahman cannot be revealed revealed in the  Antahkarana time, it can also be  Antahkarana akhandakara vrtti. vrtti. At the same time, argued that, since Brahman is realized after the annihilation of the antahkarana, antahkarana, its validity purely depends on the Sruti, Sruti, that is, on the proposed hypothesis hypothesis and not on personal experience. experience. It can be said so because the verification of Brahman-Realization is not possible since the Sruti text states that ‘One will not return’, etc., to explain the process of  Brahman-Realization. Thus, it is clearly clearly established that Advaita Vedanta begins with a hypothesis, and ends with the same unconfirmed.

CONCLUDING REMARKS On the strength of the above arguments and analysis it is concluded that Brahman-Realization is not possible.

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CHAPTER – III  Jiva A Critique on the Concept of  Jiva 1. INTRODUCTION Based on their conceptions of  jiva of   jiva (individual self), 36 philosophical systems can be categorized as follows:

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the Indian

(i) The systems which believe in the existence of the individual self distinct from the body. (ii) The system which believes that there is no individual self  distinct from the body. (iii) The system that believes in the non-existence of permanent and unchanging Individual self. Almost all orthodox Indian philosophical systems share the view of  the first category. However, each each system disagrees with the other in defining the individual self. The systems systems of the first category can be classified into two: (a) The system that believes in the identity of the individual self  with the Supreme Self. (b) The systems which believe that the individual self is not 37 identical with the Supreme Self or God. Advaita Vedanta holds the first of the above views and the rest of  the orthodox systems share the view of the second category with some differences among among themselves. themselves. The present paper confines confines itself to a criticism of the Advaita Advaita Vedanta view view of the individual individual self. My criticism ultimately aims to establish the thesis that neither  Brhamacaitanya  Brhamacaitanya nor  Isvaracaitanya can be the source of   Jivacaitanya and that the antahakarana is itself sufficient to explain the conscious nature of the living being.

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 Jiva in Advaita Vedanta 1.1 Importance of the Concept of  Jiva  Jiva is one of the most important concepts in Advaita The concept of  Jiva Vedanta, because, it is the foundation for the other Vedic concepts such as karma, karma, rebirth, moksa, moksa, etc. Without  Jiva the Vedic injunctions and 38 prohibitions become useless. In other world, if the concept of  Jiva of  Jiva as conceived by the advaitins is proved wrong, then the other Vedic concepts mentioned above, at least in their advaitic interpretation, will have to be dismissed. 2 SANKARA ON BRAHMAN AND JIVA According to Sankara, the essential nature of Brahman is 39 40 Consciousness having potentiality to wish ( kama), (eksata), ), and kama), to will (eksata 41 to think ( Iksata).  Iksata). Before the first creation there was Brahman alone and the above texts under reference state that Brahman wished to become many and created the multitude. The Chandogya Upanisad  states: There was Existence alone alone before creation. It willed to become become many and created all 42 the elements. Here the word ‘willed’ implied that such thinking was not there earlier in the the Existence. Existence. According to Sankara, Sankara, Brahman Brahman while while becoming many has not not transformed entirely. For, he says: says: ‘The Upanisads prove both the facts for Brahman - the non-transformation of  43 Brahman as a whole and partlessenss.’ The Upanisad states that after transforming into the bodies, He entered into the living beings as the 44  Jiva.  Jiva. It is to be noted that the upanisadic verses do not explicitly mention whether Brahman transformed transformed Itself into the bodies partly partly or wholly. wholly. But Brahman’s entering into the living beings would not have been possible if  It had transformed Itself entirely into the the bodies. Hence we have to conclude that a part of Brahman transformed Itself into the bodies and it was only the remaining untransformed part of Brahman which entered into 45 the hearts of the living beings. Sankara is of the conviction that the individual self is in its essence Brahman Itself. Brahman, says Sankara, somehow gets Itself entangled with the adjuncts such as intellect etc., and as a consequence falsely assumes individuality. individuality. According to to Sankara, ‘…the Supreme Supreme Brahman Brahman Itself, which while remaining immutable, appears to exist as an individual 46 soul owing to association with limiting adjuncts.’ This view is supported by the text, ‘The Self is indeed Brahman, as well as identified with the 47 intellect, the manas (mind), and the vital force, with the eyes and ears.’ 22

For Sankara the text ‘Assuming the likeness (of the intellect), it moves between the two worlds (this and the next),’ shows that even while going 48 to another world, there is no dissociation for the Self from the intellect. According to him, the soul assumes the likeness of the intellect itself, for 49 anyaka Upanisad states: Upanisad  states: ‘Desire, only that is near at hand. The Brahadar The  Brahadaranyaka resolve, doubt, faith, want of faith, steadiness, unsteadiness, shame, 50 intelligence and fear all these are but the mind.’ Badarayana also says, ‘But the soul comes to have such appellations because of the dominance of  51 the modes of that intellect. For Sankara also, desire, dislike, happiness, sorrow, etc., are the modes of intellect. intellect. These modes modes constitute constitute the essence or chief factors in the attainment of the state of transmigratoriness 52 by soul. Explaining further the relationship between the antahkarana and Brahman which results in the assumption of individuality by Brahman, Sankara says: ‘This internal organ, constituting a conditioning factor for 53 the Self is variously spoken of in different differ ent places as the manas (faculty of  54 55 thinking), buddhi (faculty of knowing), vijnana (cognition or egoism), 56 57 citta (feeling or memory).’ In spite of being a non-dualist, Sankara paradoxically admits of the existence of a second entity, namely, the addition to Brahman. Brahman. He says ‘…it ‘…it must of necessity be antahkarana in addition admitted, that an internal organ of this kind does exist , for unless that organ is admitted, there will be the contingency of either constant perception or 58 59 non-perception.’ The text, ‘It thinks as it were, and shakes as it were’ implies according to Sankara that the consciousness does not think by itself, nor does it move; but when the intellect thinks it seems to think, and 60 when the intellect moves, it seems to move. Sankara is of the view that the connection of the soul with the intellect has but false ignorance at its 61 root. He says: ‘This connection with such limiting adjuncts as the intellect does not cease so long as the identity of the Self with Brahman is 62 not realized.’ Later in this paper, I will be exposing the inherent contradictions in such views of Sankara regarding Brahman’s assumption of individuality. individuality.

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3. THE RATIONALE BEHIND SANKARA’S CONCEPT OF  JIVA According to Sankara, the absolute Reality, namely, Brahman, is 63 one without a second. Brahman is non-dual, attributeless, unfragmented, homogeneous and unconditioned unconditioned Reality. Sankara felt that the existence existence of  64 Brahman can be established by the actual realization of It by man. Sankara could not find any method or reason for the direct revelation of   jiva,, which Brahman to Itself. Therefore, he brought out out the concept of  of  jiva according to him, is Brahman conditioned by adjuncts such as 65 intellect. He tried to establish the identity between Brahman and  jiva by using the formulae such as ‘I am Brahman’, ‘That thou art’ and ‘This atman is Brahman.’ 66

Sankara identifies Consciousness in the living body with Brahman. Br ahman. Brahman-consciousness when individuated becomes  jiva and is distinct 67 from the body. This position led Sankara to establish the finiteness of the infinite, conditioning of the unconditioned, parts of the partless and 68 69 individuation of the universal Brahman. Advaitins put forward theories such as (i) Kalpana vada, (ii)  Abhasa vada, (iii) Pratibimba vada, vada, (ii) Abhasa vada, and (iv)  Avaccheda vada as valid explanations to justify the identity of the individual consciousness consciousness with Brahman. Brahman. In spite of their rigorous rational arguments, the Advaitins could not establish these theories without seeking the role of birth. Sankara suggests one to have faith in the beginninglessness of the ‘individuality of Consciousness’ and ‘creation of  70 the universe’. The proof of the existence of Brahman being only ‘realization of Brahman’, Sankara recognized the need for faculties of  realization like intellect, physical body, etc., without which Brahman71 realization is impossible. According to him, it is not possible for Brahman to have all these faculties faculties by Itself. Therefore, there is a need to conceive of Brahman which is unconditioned to be conditioned as the individual self possessed of the faculties of realization so that it can realize itself as identical with Brahman. The advaitins must necessarily maintain that Brahman individuates itself into the jivas the  jivas.. Advaita Vedanta Vedanta requires this in order to establish the existence of Brahman. For, Brahman cannot cannot reveal Itself to Itself and and as a matter of fact, it may not be necessary for Brahman to reveal Itself to Itself. Without the the individual self, the idea idea of the existence existence of Brahman Brahman

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becomes only a matter of faith which can never be known by man by any means such as realization, save through the Upanisads. Upanisads. Now, in the light of the foregoing, it is necessary for one o ne to examine whether the advaitic concept of individual self could stand the test of both reason and experience. Especially so, due to the vulnerability of the concept of the beginninglessness of the contact between Consciousness and intellect which is based on mere faith. That the concept of  jiva of  jiva in Advaita Vedanta is riddled with contradictions can be shown in the following arguments. 4. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE CONCEPT OF JIVA IN ADVAITA VEDANTA Avivekatva . 4.1. Sarvajnatva of Isvara Vis a vis Avivekatva. According to Sankara,  jiva is a complex of both the Identifier and 72 the Identified. The Identifier is  Isvaracaitanya  Isvaracaitanya and the Identified is the internal organ (antahkarana (antahkarana). ). Sankara neither calls Isvaracait calls  Isvaracaitanya anya per p er se as  jiva nor the antahkarana by itself as  jiva.  jiva. Jiva comes into existence only when  Isvaracaitanya  Isvaracaitanya identifies itself with the antahkarana. antahkarana. This 73 identity is caused by ignorance (avidya ( avidya). ).  Avidya is in the form of nondiscrimination (aviveka) (aviveka) between the real nature of the Identifier and that of the Identified. Sankara is of the view that  jiva gets liberated from such ignorance only when it realizes its original nature as identical with that of  Brahman. 74

It is stated that avivekatva is the cause of  jivatva. of  jivatva. If this be so, 75 whose aviveka is this? Does it belong to  Isvaracaitanya  Isvaracaitanya or the 76 antahkarana? antahkarana? It cannot belong to the antahkarana because the itself a product of avidya. of avidya. It is material antahkarana is the Identified. It is itself by its very nature and therefore, not capable of possessing aviveka. Alternatively, one should accept that aviveka belongs to the Identifier, that is,  Isvaracaitanya.  Isvaracaitanya. One may now ask the question, ‘Is it possible for ( sarvajna)) and self luminous (svayamprakasa ( svayamprakasa), ),  Isvara,  Isvara, who is omniscient (sarvajna to possess such avidya which is in the form of aviveka? of  aviveka?’’ It appears that it is 77 not possible. For, even though the Upanisads state that after creating the bodies and the antahkaranas, Isvaracaitanya Isvaracaitanya enters into the cavities of the 78 hearts of living being, we could still ask, ‘When did  Isvaracaitanya get entangled with avidya?’ Did Isvaracaitanya possess avidya before entering avidya?’ Did Isvaracaitanya 25

the cavities of the hearts of living beings? It cannot be so. For if nondiscrimination existed in  Isvaracaitanya  Isvaracaitanya before It entered into the hearts sarvajna) and of living beings then  Isvara cannot be called omniscient ( sarvajna) ever liberated (nityamukta) (nityamukta) since He would not have been able to discriminate Himself Himself from His own creation. It would not have been possible for Him to enter deliberately and specifically into the cavities of  the hearts of living living beings. beings. Further, Isvara Further,  Isvara should have identified Himself  with His creation indiscriminately and become attached to the created baddha, that is, a limited agent universe. Thus,  Isvara would become a baddha, and as a consequence, would have lost His nityamuktatva. nityamuktatva. Furthermore, if   Isvara had aviveka before entering into the living beings, then He cannot be all knowing (sarvajana ( sarvajana). ). For, aviveka refers to lack of discriminatory knowledge, and it would be contradictory to say that sarvajna Isvara does not have, ‘knowledge’ of discrimination. Due to the above mentioned reasons, the advaitin will have to take recourse to the alternative view, namely, that  Isvaracaitanya  Isvaracaitanya could possess entering into living living beings. This view too is beset with with avidya only after entering problems. For, one may ask: ‘How will sarvajna Isvaracaitanya Isvaracaitanya suddenly get possessed of  avidya on entering in to living beings?’ Upanisads speak  of the association of the intellect and  Isvaracaitanya while  jiva goes  Isvaracaitanya even while jiva 79 to the other world. They do not expressly mention that  Isvaracaitanya  Isvaracaitanya gets entangled with avidya only after entering into the bodies. It implies implies that such association of  avidya with Consciousness existed even before into the bodies of the living living beings. However, I  Isvaracaitanya entered into  Isvaracaitanya to have already proved above that it is impossible for  Isvaracaitanya possess avidya before entering entering into the bodies bodies of the living living beings. beings. If  avidya cannot exist either in the  Isvaracaitanya  Isvaracaitanya or antahkarana, antahkarana, then where does this aviveka come from? According to Sankara, avidya cannot also exist exist on its own. Therefore, the very existence of  avidya is impossible. Further, without aviveka it is not possible for  Isvaracaitanya  Isvaracaitanya to identify itself with the antahkarana and without such identity,  jivatva of  impossible. Alternatively, setting aside aside the concept of  of   Isvaracaitanya is impossible. aviveka, aviveka, if one wants to believe in the Advaita view that  jivacaitnaya is identical with Isvaracaitany with  Isvaracaitanya a and is distinct from the body, then one has to accept that  Isvaracaitanya  Isvaracaitanya deliberately identifies Itself with the If  jivatva is due to  Isvara’s deliberate antahkarana and becomes  jiva. If  jivatva assumption then liberation (moksa ( moksa)) for jiva for jiva cannot be left to its own choice and efforts. It will will have to depend depend on Isvara. on  Isvara. Such a position will not be

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acceptable to Sankara. Sankara. All these arguments arguments go to prove that that the advaitin’s advaitin’s concepts of  jiva  jiva and avidya are unsustainable. 4.2. Anaditva 4.2. Anaditva of Srsti of Srsti and Jivatva and Jivatva According to Sankara,  Isvara makes use of the merit and demerit of  80  jivas in order to achieve variety in creation. But, it is only after the first creation, depending on the diversification into bodies, etc., that merit and demerit arising out of work (karmaphala ( karmaphala)) could be possible. For, one can perform karma only in this world and it is possible only after the first diversified creation. However, Sankara takes karmaphala as the cause of  the diversified creation. This position position leads leads to the fallacy of mutual dependence, namely, it is only after creation that results of work, depending on the diversification into bodies, etc., could be possible, and the diversification into bodies could be possible only due to the results of  work. Sankara, tries to resolve this problem by saying that, the defect, namely, the fallacy of mutual dependence, arises only if transmigration has a beginning. He explains that the transmigratory state has no beginning and therefore, there is nothing contradictory for the fruits of work and the variety in creation to act as cause and effect to each other on the analogy of  81 the seed and the sprout. Sankara gives the reasons for the beginninglessness of the transmigratory existence. One such reason reason is, had it emerged capriciously capriciously all of a sudden, then there would have been the predicament of freed souls also being reborn here, and also the contingency of results accruing from non-existing causes, for the differences in happiness and misery would 82 have no logical explanation. Sankara argues that if creation is conceived as beginningless, then, the fallacy of mutual dependence does not arise even as in the case of the seed and the sprout, and hence there will be no 83 defect. In other words, Sankara cannot offer a logical explanation for causality between karma and srsti without seeking recourse to faith in the beginninglessness of   jiva and srsti. Faith, because Sankara cannot rationally prove the anaditva of   jiva and srsti. srsti. That the state of  transmigration has no beginning is only an assumption made by Sankara. Perhaps Sankara was forced into the assumption of the anaditva of  transmigratory existence for filling up up a gap in his arguments. arguments. Unless the concept of anaditva of  anaditva could be rationally proved, other concepts in Advaita Vedanta cannot be explained.

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Now one may raise the question as to what Sankara means by saying that the transmigratory existence is anadi? anadi? Does he mean that  jiva and srsti do not have a beginning at all? Or does he mean that the beginning of the first creation is not known because of innumerable past cycles of creation? Sankara appears to believe that  jiva and srsti do not have a 84 beginning at all. But, it is contradictory to say that  jiva and srsti do not have a beginning. For, according according to Sankara, everything everything other than  jiva 85 has origination . But the whole of creation, namely, srsti, srsti, originated from Brahman. Logically speaking, whatever is created should have a beginning. Therefore, srsti also must must have had a beginning. As for the Sankara holds the view that it it has not been created. For, he thinks  jiva,  jiva, Sankara that jiva that  jiva is nothing nothing other other than Brahman. For Sankara, Sankara,  jiva’s non-creation must also imply its beginninglessness. beginninglessness. Even if one one were to accept this view of Sankara on  jiva’s anaditva, anaditva, one cannot, yet, accept his view on srsti. For creation necessarily implies a beginning. If anaditva If  anaditva can be denied of  srsti, then one is also compelled to reexamine its tenability in respect of  jiva of  jiva.. According, to Sankara,  jiva is a 86 complex of the unoriginated Brahman and the originated adjunct, that is, intellect.  Jiva, while in transmigratory existence cannot be identical with Brahman. If  jiva If   jiva is identical with Brahman always in all levels of  existence, only then  jiva can be accepted as beginningless. But once this view is accepted, then one cannot differentiate  jiva from Brahman. There will then be  jivatva for Brahman which, according to advaitins cannot be. Therefore, the advaitin needs to separate  jiva from Brahman. Beginningless Brahman cannot become  jiva unless there is an adjunct and any adjunct adjunct must must have a beginning. beginning. Since, an an originated originated adjunct adjunct is involved in jiva, in  jiva, and un-originated Brahman cannot become Himself a  jiva without adjunct ,  , jiva must have a beginning. If Sankara still argues that jiva that  jiva has no beginning because texts speak  87 of its eternality, then he has to accept that Brahman has been eternally in the form of  jivas. of  jivas. It implies that it is only the universe which undergoes the process of creation, sustenance and destruction. destruction. This position appears similar to the Samkhya philosophy and, therefore, it cannot be acceptable for Advaitins. Also, it is illogical to say that there exists an un-originated soul which has as its ingredient an originated adjunct, namely, intellect. Thus, one must accept that jiva that  jiva must have a beginning. 28

The other view, namely, that  jiva and srsti are anadi because the beginning of the first creation is not known due to innumerable past cycles of creation, is also not not convincing. convincing. For, the Upanisads clearly describe the Upanisad that details of the the first creation. creation. It is stated in the Chandogya Upanisad  that in the beginning, before creation, there was only Existence, one without a 88 second. This statement implies that there was at least one instant, namely, before creation, when Brahman existed as It was without any  jivas. Another statement, qualities such as the merit and demerit of the  jivas. 89 namely, ‘It thought why can’t I be many and created-,’ shows that there was a state of Brahman without creation and then creation began with even according to the Upanisads, creation must have had akasa, etc. Thus, even a beginning. beginning. It follows follows from this that that  jiva,  jiva, whose coming into existence depends on the created antahkarana, antahkarana, must also have a beginning. The advaitin’s argument for anaditva of creation and  jiva is thus proved to stand on flimsy grounds.  4.3. Partless Non-dual Brahman Brahman and Partial Creation Creation According to Sankara, at the time of first creation Brahman had 90 transformed partly into the universe. For he says, ‘The Upanisads prove both the facts for Brahman –the non-transformation of Brahman as a whole 91 and partlessness’ . But, this position of Sankara Sankara is fallible. For, if  Brahman is one, non-dual and  partless and It wished to become many, then It must have transformed Itself completely into this universe. Against the arguments for a total transformation of Brahman in creation, Sankara contends: ‘Do not bring those things within the range of  argumentation which which are beyond beyond thought. The nature of a thing beyond 92 thought consists in its being other than the thing within Nature.’ But while Sankara thus criticizes the other philosophical systems for rationalizing the existence of metaphysical entities, he conveniently ignores his own prohibitive injunction and brings all metaphysical concepts into the fold of reasoning. If any philosophical philosophical stand is irrational irrational then one should reject reject the same. Sankara claims that all the other systems systems maintain irrational philosophical positions, and so, he rejects them all. Similarly Sankara’s own philosophical position, namely, ‘partless Brahman gets partly transformed into universe’ is also irrational and therefore, should be rejected outright.

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Just because Sankara states that is possible for Brahman to have partial transformation while while being partless, one need not accept it. For it is an open contradiction. contradiction. If an advaitin advaitin insists on the power of Brahman to have partial transformation, then, he should accept the fact that Brahman is not partless. To say both that Brahman Brahman has partial transformation and is also partless is, again, a blatant contradiction.  4.3.1. Entry of Untransformed Untransformed Brahman into the Bodies If an advaitin says that Brahman had completely transformed Itself  into the world, then nothing would remain of It and hence Its entering into the cavities of the hearts of living beings as  jiva would be rendered impossible. With this, this, all the identity formulae formulae such as, ‘I ‘I am Brahman’ would also become absurd. Alternatively, if it is contended by the advaitin that only one part of  Brahman got transformed into the world and that remaining part, in its 93 entirety, became the jivas the  jivas,, he can yet be questioned. For, this position position as such implies that the whole creation stands divided into two basic categories, namely, (i) World; and (ii) Consciousness in the body ( jiva ( jiva). ). This categorization appears similar to the well-known dualism of Kapila in his Samkhyasutra. However, to be in the same group with Kapila must be portion of  Vedantasutra devotes anathema to the advaitin. For, a major portion itself to refuting Samkhya view by making Samkhya philosophy as the prime wrestler (pradhana malla). The above arguments have proved that Sankara’s faith in the partial transformation of partless Brahman is unreasonable and, therefore, to be rejected. There will not arise any question regarding the untransformed Brahman after creation, because, such a view is nonsensical and impossible. Further, since the the concept concept of  jiva  jiva in Advaita Vedanta is based on such an impossible untransformed Brahman, one can reject the same.  4.4. Brahmacaitanya Brahmacaitanya is Not the Source of Jivacaitanya. In Advaita Vedanta, jiva Vedanta,  jiva,, could be understood in two ways: (i) Nonfunctional; and (ii) Functional. As non-functional,  jiva is defined as Consciousness conditioned by avidya ( Avidya  Avidya avacchinnacaitanyam avacchinnacaitanyam  jivah).  jivah). As the functional,  jiva is defined as Consciousness conditioned by the antahkarana ( Antahkarana  Antahkarana avacchinnacaitanayam jivah). jivah). One can 30

understand from the advaitin’s definitions of  jiva of  jiva as non-functional and functional that there are three principles in it: (i) Caitanya, (ii) Avidya (ii)  Avidya and 94 a. (iii) Antahkaran (iii) Antahkarana Advaitins believe that  Jivacaitanya is identical with  Brahmacaitanya. For, in the process of creation  Brahmacaitanya  Brahmacaitanya directly 95  Jivacaitanya. enters into the bodies as  Jivacaitanya. The advaitin’s view that  Brahmacaitanya is the source of  Jivacaitanya  Jivacaitanya can be criticized as follows.  4.4.1. Thinking Capability Capability and Caitanya: Caitanya: An Argument Consciousness (caitanya (caitanya)) in Advaita Vedanta needs to be understood from two perspectives: (i)  Jivacaitanya;  Jivacaitanya; and (ii) Competency for thinking is very essential for  Brahmacaitanya. Consciousness in Advaita Vedanta. For, as the pure Brahman, Consciousness cannot create the universe and become many without thinking. As  jiva, Consciousness cannot enjoy  jivatva without thinking. The argument here is: Since, according to Sankara,  Jivacaitanya and  Brahmacaitanya are identical; their thinking modalities should also be the same. If there is any difference between the thinking thinking capabilities capabilities of   Jivacaitanya and  Brahmacaitanya  Brahmacaitanya,, then  jiva and Brahman cannot be identical. Further, if the difference in the thinking capabilities of  jiva of  jiva and Brahman can be established, then it will strengthen my later argument (referred to in the section: Is the Direct Presence of Brahman Necessary to Make a Human-body Conscious?) that the conscious antahkarana obviates the necessity of Brahman’s entering into the bodies to make them conscious. Let us now now examine whether the thinking capabilities of  jiva of  jiva and Brahman are the same. The thinking potentiality of  jiva of   jiva is proved by the fact that it is revealed in one’s personal experience. The Upanisads also speak about 96 (Prajna) can be identified with the it. The non-functional  Jivacaitanya (Prajna) state of deep sleep (susupti) ( susupti),, whereas the functional state of the same is identified with the states of waking ( jagrat) and dream (svapna) (svapna).. It is said in Advaita Vedanta that susupti is the cause and the functional states are 97 the effects. As pure Jivacaitanya pure  Jivacaitanya,,  jiva cannot think or act in his non-functional state (susupti (susupti). ). This state state is defined as as Consciousness Consciousness conditioned conditioned by avidya. avidya. When avidya gives rise to its effect, that is, the antahkarana, antahkarana,  jiva 31

starts thinking thinking and acting. This shows that  jiva in its pure state, being devoid of the antahkarana cannot think or act.  Avidya in susupti is said to conceal the real nature of  Jivacaitanya of  Jivacaitanya and in the functional state, it not only conceals the real nature of  Jivacaitanya of  Jivacaitanya but also projects the false multitude to the jiva. the  jiva. ya in Now, let us examine the thinking potentiality of  Brahmacaitan of  Brahmacaitanya order to see whether it is identical i dentical with that of  Jivacaitanya.  Jivacaitanya. As in the case nya:: (i)  Brahmacaitanya  Brahmacaitanya after of  jiva of  jiva,, there are two states of  Brahmacaita of  Brahmacaitanya (ii)  Brahmacaitanya  pralaya or before creation; and (ii) Brahmacaitany a at the time of creation. The first state is a state of non-function and the second a state of function. In other words, the first one is a state of non-thinking and the second, a state of thinking. The advaitins say that even as  Jivacaitanya has avidya,  Brahmacaitanya too has its inherent power called maya. According to the advaitins, maya cannot conceal from  Isvara His true nature as 98  Brahmacaitanya. It is accepted by the advaitins that maya is a common factor to both Brahmacaitany both  Brahmacaitanya and Isvaracaitanya. a and Isvaracaitan ya. But, unlike in the case of the Jivacaitanya the Jivacaitanya,, a material product like antahkarana is not spoken of in the case of  Isvara of  Isvara to explain His thought to create. We can now now raise the question: What is it that makes  Isvaracaitanya  Isvaracaitanya to think and create? The answer cannot be that it is maya. For, maya was associated with the pure Brahman, even before creation. One should observe that in the case of  Jivacaitanya, of  Jivacaitanya, avidya is the cause and antahkarana, the effect of  avidya is instrumental for thinking. antahkarana, for ,  , avidya is There is difference in form between avidya and antahkarana, the inherent power of  Caitanya and antahkarana is the product of subtle 99  Brahmacaitanya, for It to become many, elements. In the case of   Brahmacaitanya, thinking is a sine qua non. non. But in spite of  maya being accepted as Its inherent power the production of an instrument to think like the of  jiva, is not mentioned in the Upanisadic texts. antahkarana in the case of  jiva, Brahman should, therefore, remain the same in both the thinking and nonthinking states. That is Brahmacaitanya in Its non-functional state had unchanging Consciousness with unchanging maya and in Its functional state also has the same unchanging Consciousness with unchanging maya. maya. In other words, both the states of  Brahmacaita of  Brahmacaitanya nya are not different from each other.

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It follows that, in Advaita Vedanta, one can only maintain: Either  Brahmacaitanya is in constant non-function which leads to the anya is in constant function impossibility of creation (srsti ( srsti)) or Brahmacait or  Brahmacaitanya which leads to the impossibility of dissolution ( pralaya) ( pralaya).. In the case of the  jiva,  jiva, avidya gives rise to antahkarana, antahkarana, resulting resulting in thinking. But in the case of Brahman, maya does not give rise to any such instrument. instrument. Yet  Isvara) thinks and creates. This proves the fact that Brahman (as  Isvara) from  Jivacaitanya. Such a position may also  Brahmacaitanya is different from Jivacaitanya. lead to a further conclusion, unpalatable though it may be to the advaitins, that Brahmacait that Brahmacaitanya anya is not the source of  Jivacaitanya.  Jivacaitanya.  4.4.2. Argument from the the Inherent Power of Caitanya Caitanya The advaitins argue that  Brahmacaitanya  Brahmacaitanya is identical with  Jivacaitanya.  Jivacaitanya. But, whereas maya, maya, the power of Brahman only projects the universe in the case of Brahman, with  jiva,  jiva, the corresponding power of  well as projects the apparent apparent world. If  avidya, avidya, both conceals the reality as well Brahman and  jiva are identical this should not be so. The question to be answered now is why does the concealing power of  maya not operate in the case of Brahman? If advaitins accept the influence of the concealing power of  maya on Brahman, then Brahman becomes ignorant like  jiva and loses His omniscient power. If they say that the concealing power of maya of  maya does not exist at all, then jiva then  jiva must always be considered to be on par with Brahman and to possess omniscient power.  Jiva loses his alpajnatva and becomes ever liberated. If they say that the concealing power power of maya of  maya emerges due  Brahmacaitanya’s to the  Brahmacaitanya ’s wish to enter into the cavities of the hearts of  living beings, then it becomes a deliberate move to become  jiva and therefore, there will not not be any need for for liberation. The position, namely, namely, emergence of the avaranasakti of  maya only in  jiva is untenable because an advaitin should explain the reason for its suppression in the case of  not found in Advaita Vedanta. Therefore, maya  Isvara.  Isvara. Such reasons are not and avidya, avidya, the inherent powers of   Brahmacaitanya  Brahmacaitanya and  Jivacaitanya respectively, must be construed to be different. If an advaitin claims that maya and avidya are different from each other, then  Brahmacaitanya  Brahmacaitanya and  jivacaitanya become different and therefore, cannot be identical. For, Caitanya is non-dual, and maya as its inherent power can also be only non-dual. non-dual. Hence it cannot be accepted 33

that It acquires acquires a different inherent inherent power all of a sudden. sudden. If avidya If  avidya,, which cannot have existence apart from  Jivacaitanya,  Jivacaitanya, is different from maya, maya,  Brahmacaitanya, then which cannot have existence apart from  Brahmacaitanya, from  Brahmacaitanya.. Therefore, it has to  Jivacaitanya must be different from Brahmacaitanya a cannot be the source of  Jivacaitanya.  Jivacaitanya. be accepted that Brahmacaitany that Brahmacaitanya  4.4.3. Isvaracaitanya is Not Not the Source of Jivacaitanya. Jivacaitanya. 100

Brahman is defined as Consciousness ( Drk ) associated with maya. 101 Similarly, Isvara Similarly,  Isvara is defined in Advaita Vedanta as Consciousness ( Drk  ( Drk ) conditioned by maya. maya. These definitions imply that the difference between the two lies only in the conditioning by maya. Before entering into the main question of whether Isvaracaitanya I svaracaitanya is the source of  Jivacaitanya,  Jivacaitanya, it is necessary for us to get a proper perspective of the nature of  maya and how it conditions Brahmacait conditions  Brahmacaitanya. anya. Is maya a separate entity? According to the advaitins maya is not an independent and separate entity.  Maya is said to be the inherent power of  Caitanya. Caitanya. It is said by the advaitins that maya is indefinable either as sat  or as asat. Since maya is perceived in the form of the universe, it cannot be asat and asat  and since it is sublated by the knowledge of Reality, it cannot be sat. Therefore, maya is said to be sadasadanirvacaniya. Now, if we can establish that the role of maya of  maya when it is with Isvara with  Isvara is different from its role in the case of the  jiva,  jiva, then the fundamental difference between  Isvara and  Jiva would stand proved. We can, then extend the argument to prove that  Isvaracaitanya  Isvaracaitanya is not the source of   Jivacaitanya. What was the ontological status of  maya when Brahman got transformed into  Isvara?  Isvara? Was maya asat , sat  or sadasadanirvacaniya? sadasadanirvacaniya? Since there was nothing apart from  Brahmacaitanya before the advent of   Isvara or before the creation of the universe, maya could not have been there. This position position may lead one to infer infer the non-existence of  maya because of the non-appearance non-appearance of the multitude. But one has to infer the existence of  maya from the above position, for the reasons such as: (i) Brahman becoming  Isvara implies the existence of  maya in Brahman; and (ii) Creation of the universe from Isvara from Isvara also implies the existence of maya of  maya in  Isvara. Even when  Brahmacaitanya  Brahmacaitanya exists in the form of   Isvaracaitanya, maya continues to exist, even though  Isvara,  Isvara, as 34

sarvajnatman, is not affected by it. Thus maya cannot be asat, but can only be sat . If it is sat, then it cannot be sadasadanirvacaniya. When maya is accepted as sat , then a problem arises. If  maya is sat apart from Brahmacaitany a, then the non-duality accepted as a separate sat apart from Brahmacaitanya of Brahman suffers. Hence, maya cannot be accepted as a separate entity by the advaitins. Then, what is the ontological status of  of  maya when Brahman got transformed into Isvara? into  Isvara? At the best one can say that maya is Caitanya. Thus, when this power of  Caitanya is in a static the power of  Caitanya. condition then Caitanya is called Brahman and when it is dynamic, then called Isvara. Caitanya is called Isvara. In the light of the foregoing discussion about Brahman’s transformation into  Isvara through the conditioning by maya, let us now enquire into the advaitin’s version of the process of creation, namely, the coming into being of the world and  jivas. I shall be showing that the advaitin’s account is riddled with contradictions. According to the advaitins, Isvaracaitan advaitins,  Isvaracaitanya ya first got transformed into the universe and later entered into the living beings as  jivas. This implies that a ‘part’ of  Isvaracait of   Isvaracaitanya anya became the world when another ‘part’ remained untransformed untransformed and that that this untransformed ‘part’ later became the jivas. the  jivas. But to talk of Isvara Isvara in terms of parts, should, in the first place be blasphemous to the basic advaitic tenet of a partless Isvara. partless  Isvara. The advaitin, in order to avoid the above difficulty, must accept that there was simultaneous creation of universe and  jivas. This position goes against the upanisadic statement, according to which  Isvara entered into the bodies ‘after’ creating them. The advaitic interpretation of the Upanisads implies that the untransformed  Isvaracaitanya would remain static for some time, because, until there was creation of bodies, the  Isvaracaitanya’s gaining entry into the bodies would not arise. question of  Isvaracaitanya’s Such untransformed  Isvaracaitanya must be viewed as Brahman with static maya. This position leads to the conclusion that Brahman is not nondual. Further, since Brahman with static maya could be associated only with the state prior to creation, the advaitins view leads to the absurd and contradicting position of accepting creation and non-creation at the same time in one and the same same Reality. A total transformation transformation of  Isvaracaitanya  Isvaracaitanya is also not possible. possible. For that would leave the world world and the  jivas without an  Isvara. The above arguments, by disproving the advaitin’s version of  35

creation, have, in effect also established the fallacious nature of their theory that Isvaracait that Isvaracaitanya anya is the source of  Jivacaitanya.  Jivacaitanya.  4.5. Is the Direct Presence of Brahman Necessary to Make a Human body Conscious? The advaitic view regarding the presence of Brahman in a living being could be proved erroneous through through a more more radical argument. argument. We shall now argue that for explaining the consciousness in a living being, the positing of the direct presence of Brahman in it, is redundant. The advaitin supposes that, that which is created is insentient and is 102 not conscious. But in the case of a living being, inspite of its being constituted by a body, which is insentient, we find that it has awareness. This strange combination of sentience and insentience in one being is rather puzzling. Yet, to explain this by the direct presence of Brahman in the living being, as the the advaitin does, is not acceptable. An examination of  the process of creation would reveal to us why this is so. According to Sankara, Brahman, in the beginning created ether Itself. Brahman, as consciousness, consciousness, having the (akasa) (akasa) from out of Itself. potentiality to wish, had ‘wished  ‘ wished ’ to create ether in in the beginning. beginning. For Sankara, Brahman Brahman had not completely completely transformed into ether. There remained a portion of Brahman untransformed. untransformed. This makes ether as not 103 all-pervasive. Then, the subsequent process of creation, namely, creation of air, etc., could not have been out of the untransformed portion of  Brahman after creation of ether, because, as per Sankara’s view, that  Brahmacaitanya was required to make  jiva after creation. And portion of  Brahmacaitanya there was no other portion of Brahman left behind to create air, etc. Hence, the further process of creation could not have been effected by 104 Brahman. The Upanisad  too states that the further process of creation occurs from ether itself. In the Chandogyopanisad , it is stated that fire ‘willed .’ .’ Similarly in the Taittiriopanisad it Taittiriopanisad it is mentioned that from ether, air is produced. Such upanisadic statements reveal that the subtle elements such as ether or fire had capacity to ‘ wish’ ‘create’. ’. If sentience is wish’ and ‘create attributed to Brahman only because of Its having the potentiality to ‘ wish’ wish’ 105 and ‘create ‘create’’ then, for the same reason, such sentience should be attributed to the elements such as ether, etc., also.

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An advaitin may object to the above and say that the words, namely, ether, etc., do not denote the elements but refer only to the deities. But we can still ask him to explain whether these deities are ‘ created ’ or not. Even if they are deities, the above argument argument for the conscious conscious nature of the products of Brahman holds good because, these so called deities are also ‘created  ‘created ’ from Brahman and have competence for ‘willing ‘ willing’’ and 106 creating’. ‘creating’. The advaitin must, therefore, concede that the role of  Brahman in creation begins begins and ends with the creation creation of ether. Further, in Upanisad  and Chandogyopanisad it Chandogyopanisad it is mentioned that ether the Taittiriya Upanisad and 107 created air, air created fire, fire wished to create water, water wished to 108 create earth. These verses clearly show that all the subtle elements were conscious because they had potentiality to ‘wish ‘ wish’’ and ‘create’ ‘create’.. Sankara opines that the senses and mind are created by the 109 elements. Since the internal organ is created by the conscious elements 110 (food) it must also be of the nature of consciousness having the potentiality to ‘wish ‘ wish’’ and ‘create ‘create’. ’. In other other words, words, any product in the process of creation, at least at its subtle level, should be conscious in nature. This, in its turn leads to the the necessity of accepting accepting the following: (i) Some kind of conscious materialism; and (ii) The conscious internal organ itself is sufficient suf ficient to make a living body conscious and conduct all activities. Let us now examine the first of the above above positions. As we have have seen already, in the process of creation all subtle elements ought to be conscious. The Advaitin’s Advaitin’s account of further creation after after the creation of  five elements is not much different from that of the Carvaka system, because advaitins believe in the theory of  pancikarana of   pancikarana which advocates the combination of the five elements. Carvakas also believe in the idea of  combination of elements elements in the process process of creation. But, the more more important point is that the advaitin who always swear by the Srut i, i, must, as already shown above, accept that there is no need of Brahman in the process of creation after after the coming into into being of ether. But, by such an acceptance, the advaitns almost fall in line with the Carvakas who do not have any place for Brahman at any stage in creation.

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Conscious nature of elements necessitates the acceptance of the view that the conscious internal organ itself is sufficient to make a living body conscious and conduct all activities. Since the internal organ is the product of conscious elements, it also has to be conscious with the potentiality to create and wish, it itself is sufficient to make a living body conscious. If this position position is accepted, then, the advaitin’s advaitin’s notion of the direct presence of Brahman in the living l iving body can be discarded.

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The arguments in the foregoing section have established the following conclusions which go to prove that Sankara’s concept of  jiva of  jiva is untenable:  Aviveka as the cause of the coming into being of the  jiva has no locus. It cannot cannot exist exist either either in Isvaracaitany in  Isvaracaitanya a or in the antahkarana. antahkarana. Nor can it exist on its own. It cannot also be accepted that that  Isvaracaitanya  Isvaracaitanya deliberately identifies Itself with the antahkarana and becomes  jiva.  jiva. For, this makes the concept of moksa of  moksa in Advaita Vedanta absurd. The anaditva of  jiva of  jiva and srsti advocated by Sankara is also not acceptable. Sankara’s account of  srsti speaks of Brahman’s transforming Itself  partially into the world and also entering into the hearts of living beings. This view has been refuted on the grounds of impossibility of partial transformation of Brahman. Neither  Brahmacaitanya  Brahmacaitanya nor  Isvaracaitanya  Isvaracaitanya can be the source of   jivacaitanya.  jivacaitanya. This is due to an essential difference in the nature of  jiva  jiva and  Isvara. There is no need to assume the presence of  Brahmacaita of  Brahmacaitanya nya in the account for the latter’s latter’s conscious conscious nature. The antahkarana itself   jiva to account could be the ground for consciousness in  jiva. For, the antahkarana is not insentient as held held by Sankara. Rather it is conscious by itself. itself.

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ABBREVIATIONS Text

Abbreviation

(1) Sri Sankaragranthavalih, Brahmasutra Bhasya SSBB Samata Books, Madras, 1983. (2) Sri Sankaragranthavalih, Bhagavadgita Bhasya  BGSB Samata Books, Madras, 1983. (3) Isadidasopanisadah, (3) Isadidasopanisadah, (Ten principal Upanisads with Sankarabhasya) Sri Sankaracaryagranthavalih, Sankaracaryagranthavalih, Prathamo Bhagah Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi, Reprinted, 1992 Chandogyopanisad  Brhadaranyakopanisad  Brhadaranyakopanisad Kathopanisad Taittiriyopanisad  Mundakopanisad Prasnopanisad  Mandukyopanisad  Mandukyopanisad Gaudapadakarika Gaudapadakarika  Aitareyopanisad  Aitareyopanisad (4) Bellamkonda Ramaraya kavi, Sri Sankarasankarabhasyavimarsah Sankarasankarabhasyavimarsah , Published by Kavita Venkatasubrahmanyasastri, Venkatasubrahmanyasastri, Sri Ramakavitagranthamalasam Ramakavitagranthamalasampadakah, padakah, Narasaraopet, Guntur District, Andhra Pradesh, India, 1953 (5) Bellamkonda Ramaraya kavi, Vedantasangrahah Published by Kavita Venkatasubrahmanyasastri, Venkatasubrahmanyasastri, Narasaraopet, Guntur District, Andhra Pradesh, India, (Sadharananama ( Sadharananama samvatsaram).

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CUP BUP KUP TUP MUP PUP MGK  AUP  BV 

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CHAPTER - IV Brahman-World Illusion in Advaita Vedanta: A Critique

1. INTRODUCTION The inquiry into the three levels of reality ( sattatraya vicara) vicara) is one of the methods in Advaita Vedanta to establish nirguna Brahman as one 111 and only non-dual reality. reality. Depending on the concept of sublation, sublation, 112 Advaitins categorize reality into three levels, namely, (i) Empirical 113 reality (Vyavaharika (Vyavaharika satta) ( Pratibhasika satta) , (ii) Phenomenal reality (Pratibhasika 114 115 ( Paramarthika satta) satta), satta), and (iii) Absolute reality (Paramarthika satta) . Advaitins also 116 refer to another category, namely, Absolute non-existence ( tuccha), tuccha), only to show that none of the three levels of reality is absolute non-existent. But tuccha is neither accepted as a kind of reality nor as one of the three levels of reality in Advaita Vedanta. Advaitins describe the appearance of the empirical reality as an illusion on the absolute reality. For, the empirical reality, reality, according to them, can be be sublated by the knowledge knowledge of Brahman. Advaitins try to illustrate the same in terms terms of dreams dreams and illusions. There is an incompatibility between the explanation of the illustration and that of the world illusion in in Advaita Vedanta. Vedanta. While knowledge knowledge of the gross objects sublates the knowledge of the dream objects, the falsity of the lesser reality of the dream objects is determined in waking experience, that is, in higher reality. Also the dream objects disappear when when sublation takes takes place. Contrary to the dream sublation, in the case of Brahman-world illusion, the falsity of the lesser reality of the empirical world has to be determined while one is in lesser lesser reality itself. When world gets gets sublated by non-dual experience, the world will not disappear and it continues to exist. That is to say that, that, according to Advaitins, Advaitins, world has to be realized as an illusion while while one is in world illusion illusion itself. How can an illusion be realized as an illusion while one is in the same illusion? It cannot cannot be. Thus the position of Advaita on three levels of reality needs to be examined. This paper aims at evaluating the position of the Advaita on the three levels of reality. It attempts to prove that that world cannot be an illusion on non-duality and world of duality cannot be sublated by the knowledge 40

of Brahman. In the same place, it will be shown shown that non-dual experience can be an illusion on duality of the world and the waking experience can sublate the non-dual experience. The evaluation evaluation is done in the following manner. manner. It will be shown against Advaita, that world is not an illusion on Brahman from the following arguments, namely, (i) there is no proper illustration to explain the world as an illusion, and (ii) world cannot be sublated by non-dual experience. Later, it will will be argued that non-dual experience can be an illusion on dual world and the same can be sublated by the knowledge of  waking experience. Further it will will be shown shown that the cause of  duhkha is subject illusions. Then, it will be established that that an ontological ontological sublation of the world by non-dual experience, which implies physical disappearance of the world, is not required to attain moksa. Finally, it will be argued that none of the four varieties of experience stands for the  paramarthika  paramarthika satta and therefore, the ultimate reality cannot be determined in Advaita Vedanta.

2. WORLD CANNOT BE AN ILLUSION ON BRAHMAN 2.1 There is No Proper Illustration to Explain World as an Illusion Advaitins hold the view that the appearance of the world is an illusion on Brahman. Brahman. They try to substantiate their view by saying saying that world can be sublated by the knowledge of Brahman, just like dream gets sublated by waking waking experience. Sublation is taken taken by the Advaitins as a criterion to determine the absolute reality of Brahman and the falsity of the world of duality. duality. In order to explain explain the process of sublaition between between the world and Brahman, Advaitins take the cases of illusions and dreams to apply the same same to the Brahman-world Brahman-world illusion. Can the the process process of  sublation in ‘dream and waking’ be applicable to the case of Brahmanworld illusion? It necessitates one to analyze the application of sublation in different cases of illusions. Let us explain, first, the Brahman-world illusion in order to find whether there is any any similar illusion. illusion. If a similar illusion illusion is not available available then the sublation of world by brahmajnana will be regarded only as faith of the Advaitins Advaitins and not a reality. reality. It will be shown in the following following

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arguments that none of the processes of sublation, not only of dream but also of the other illusions, can be applicable to Brahman-world illusion. 2.1.1 Brahman-world Illusion Explained Sankara admits that before the realization of the identity of the 117 individual self with Brahman, the world exists as it is. So long as one does not attain brahmajnana, brahmajnana, one believes that the duality of the world is real. Thus the conviction conviction of any person person before Brahman-realization Brahman-realization will be that ‘this duality is real’. Once one gets brahmajnana then the previous conviction regarding the reality of the world changes. There is confusion in Advaita philosophy regarding the change of  conviction in the realized persons. According to  Drsti srsti vada, vada, a 118 realized person always maintains non-dual experience, lives like an 119 insensible object, and sustains oneself only on the food available by 120 chance. On the contrary, according to Srsti drsti vada, vada, a realized person, Sankara says, necessarily undertakes the work for the welfare of the 121 world. Since this paper does not deal with the drsti srsti vada, only the change of conviction in the realized persons from the standpoint of  Srsti drsti vada will be discussed here. Sankara’s statement, namely, ‘a brahmajnani necessarily undertakes the work for the welfare of the world, ‘implies that the duality physically appears to a  jivanmukta even after Brahman-realization. Thus according to Sankara, the the falsity of the world must be determined while one is in waking experience, for it cannot be done so in Turiya and other states states of experience. In other other words, one realizes the illusoriness of the world while one is in world illusion itself. Let us inquire whether there is any illusion in which, the falsity of  illusory object is is determined while while one is in in illusory experience experience itself. It necessitates one to analyze the application of sublation in different cases of  illusions. 2.1.2 Classification of Illusions Illusions can be broadly classified into two categories, namely, (I) Object Illusions, and (II) Subject Illusions. The object illusions can be divided into two, namely, namely, (1)Private Illusions, and (2) Public Illusions. The Private illusions again can be subdivided into two, namely, (i) Mind Dependent Illusions, and (ii) Mind – Sense Dependent Illusions. The mind42

sense dependent illusion can be divided further into two, namely, (a) Positive Illusions, and (b) Negative Illusions.The public illusions can be divided into three, namely, (i) Object Dependent Illusions, (ii) Natural Illusions, and (iii) Artificial Illusions. The natural illusions can be subdivided into two, namely, (a) Individually Sublatable Illusions, and (b) Continuous Illusions. The subject illusions can be divided into two, namely, (1) Identity Illusions, and (2) Possession Illusions. 2.1.3 Application of Sublation in Illusions Sublation can be of two kinds, namely, (i) ontological sublation, and (ii) practical sublation. Sublation in all object illusions corresponds only to ontological determination of falsity of a lesser real entity and the same in all subject illusions corresponds only to practical determination of falsity. The practical sublation cannot have ontological concern and the ontological sublation cannot have practical concern. The scheme of three levels of reality implies the utility of only ontological sublation by Advaitins. It is necessary now to find how the process of ontological sublation takes place in different kinds of illusions in order to determine what kind of sublation process is suitable for Brahman-world illusion. If  one of these kinds of process of sublation is proved to be suitable for Brahman-world illusion then the Advaitin’s definition of  vyavaharika satta will be accepted. Otherwise, the world will not be accepted as empirical reality. It will be shown in the following arguments that none of the processes of sublation is compatible with Brahman-world illusion. 2.1.4 Sublation in Object Illusions and Verification with Brahmanworld Illusion (a) PRIVATE ILLUSIONS Individuals create all private illusions for themselves. An example for mind dependent illusion is dream. In dream illusion the sublated knowledge (badhitajnana (badhitajnana), ), for instance, can be that, ‘I am riding a flying horse.’ The sublating knowledge (badhakajnana ( badhakajnana)) of the same is ‘I am not riding a flying horse but I am lying on my bed.’ The dream objects physically disappear by the ontological determination of their falsity. The falsity of lower reality of the disappeared dream objects is realized while one is in a higher reality that is, waking experience.

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This kind of sublation between dream and waking world is not compatible with the case of Brahman-world illusion. For, in the case of  Brahman-world illusion, the falsity of world cannot be determined while one is in the higher reality that is Brahman. Because, the instrument for determination of falsity, that is, mind does not exist in non-dual experience. Also when the falsity of the world is realized while one is in waking experience, the world will not disappear like dream objects. An example for positive illusions is shell-silver and the same for negative illusions is rope-snake illusion. Both belong to mind-sense depend illusions. In both the cases the sublated sublated knowledge ( badhitajnana) badhitajnana) is ‘This is silver’ and ‘This ‘This is a snake’ snake’ respectively. respectively. The sublating sublating knowledge (badhakajnana (badhakajnana)) is ‘This is not silver but only shell’ and ‘This is not a snake but only a rope’ respectively. The illusory objects physically disappear with an ontological determination of their falsity. The falsity of  the lower reality of the disappeared illusory objects is realized while one is in a higher reality. This kind of sublation sublation is also not compatible compatible with the Brahman-world illusion for the reasons given in the case of dream sublation. (b) PUBLIC ILLUSIIONS: Public illusions are experienced commonly commonly by all. Examples for for object dependent dependent illusions illusions are: (i) roseness of the clear clear crystal, and (ii) movie picture on a theatre screen. When a rose and crystal are kept kept close to each other then the crystal appears to be rose in colour. The roseness of  the crystal is caused by the proximity of the rose and it depends on the rose itself. Similarly, a movie on the theatre screen depends on the projecting process. The badhitajnana in the first first case is: ‘This is a rose crystal.’ The badhakajnana would be: ‘This is not a rose crystal but only only a clear crystal.’ The roseness of the crystal crystal exists as long long as the proximity proximity of the rose lasts. It is possible to verify and realize the real nature of the crystal by removing the rose. The movie on the the theatre screen may be understood in the same manner. In the above above two cases of object-dependent object-dependent public illusions, the illusory objects, namely, roseness and movie on theatre screen, vanish only when the respective objects are physically removed.

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This type of sublation depending on the physical removal of the object is not compatible compatible with the case of Brahman-world Brahman-world illusion. Because the proximity of world to Brahman is not possible, for, Advaitins do not accept world as a second reality besides Brahman. An example for individually sublatable natural illusions is water in a mirage. All can experience the the water illusion in in a mirage. But those those who go in search of water in a mirage only can realize that there is no water but only sand. While such realization takes takes place individually individually the others still can see water for they they have not realized realized that there there is no water. Thus the water appears for those who have not realized and the same disappears for those who have realized realized the sand simultaneously. simultaneously. When the the realized person of sand comes back physically and joins with other unrealized persons, water still appears for the realized one. Thus the illusory illusory object disappears as long as one is in its substratum that is sand and appears when one physically comes out from sand experience. This type of sublation between water and sand appears similar to the case of Brahman-world illusion. illusion. For, Advaitins believe believe that when one is in non-duality the duality disappears and non-dual experience disappears when one is in the the experience of duality. That means while while one is in Turiya, Turiya, the duality of world disappears and when one is in waking experience the the non-dual non-dual experience experience disappears. disappears. But still still this type of  of  sublation is not compatible compatible with with Brahman-world illusion. Because, nondual Turiya disappears in the state of experience where one determines the falsity of duality. duality. The determination of the falsity of the the world cannot be done in Turiya, Turiya, for; mind does not exist in Turiya to determine the falsity of the world. Whereas in the the case of water-mirage, water-mirage, one can determine the falsity of water instantly while one realizes the sand in mirage. That means, one determines the falsity of an illusory object while one is in higher reality, namely, sand, but it is not the case with Brahman-world illusion. An example of continuous illusions illusions is blue sky. Unlike in the other cases of illusions, blueness of the sky will not disappear when sublation takes place, for, the ontology of blueness of the sky never changes even if  one knows that the sky is not not blue. This is to say that whether or not one knows the reality of sky, blue-sky continues to be seen. An example of  artificial illusions is live sports on the television television screen. In this case one can realize that what one is seeing is only the television screen but the 45

knowledge of the illusory objects objects that one gets is real. Since the physical object under perception is only the television screen and not lives sports, it is still an illusion. The two cases, namely, (i) blue-sky, and (ii) live sports on television screen, are also not not compatible compatible with Brahman-world illusion. Because while one is in non-duality, that is, sublating reality, the duality, that is, sublated reality disappears unlike blueness of the sky. The knowledge of  the world cannot be true when one is in non-duality unlike live sports on a television screen. Thus it can be ascertained that none of the types of object illusions stand as an example example for Brahman-world illusion. Therefore, it can be said that world cannot be an object illusion illusion on Brahman. Brahman. For, the other reason reason also, it can be said that Brahman-world illusion cannot be an object illusion, that is, an object illusion necessarily requires two independent entities but, world is not accepted as an independent entity in Advaita Vedanta. 2.2 Duality Cannot Get Sublated by Non-Dual Experience. Everyone will agree with the contention that dream objects are false 122 because there are many convincing reasons and the falsity of dream objects is realized in relation to or in comparison with gross physical objects while one is in waking experience. experience. In other words, words, since, waking waking world has higher reality than dream world, the falsity of the latter can be determined while one is in higher reality that is, waking experience. Contrary to the dream illusion, according to Advaitins, in the case of  Brahman-world illusion, the falsity of the duality of the world has to be realized while one is in lower reality, reality, that is, world itself. How is it possible that the determination of the falsity of the lower reality can be made while one is in lower reality itself? In other words, words, how can an illusion be realized realized as an illusion illusion while one is in the same illusion? This position of Advaita leads one to inquire whether sublation is possible between Brahman and world. world. It will be shown shown in the following following argument that non-dual experience cannot sublate the world of duality.

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2.2.1 Advaita Application of the Concept of Sublation According to Advaita, Sublation requires a minimum of two cognitions, namely, (i) sublating cognition ( badhakajnana), badhakajnana), and (ii) sublated cognition (badhitajnana ( badhitajnana). ). When sublation takes place between the two, the object of the latter cognition is said to be of lesser reality than that of the former. former. Among the three levels of reality, the cognition cognition of the objects of vyavaharika of  vyavaharika satta in waking experience becomes badhakajnana for the cognition of the objects of  pratibhasika of  pratibhasika satta in dream experience and it cannot be vice versa. versa. Similarly the Consciousness, that is, the Paramarthika satta becomes badhakajnana for the cognition of the objects of vyavaharika of  vyavaharika satta in waking experience but it cannot be vice versa. versa. In other words, the cognition of the objects of  pratibhasik of  pratibhasika a satta in dream experience becomes badhitajnana to the cognition of the objects of  vyavaharika satta in waking experience and the cognition of the objects of  vyavaharika satta in waking experience becomes badhitajnana to the Paramarthika satta, satta, that is, Consciousness. 2.2.2 A Critique Sublation can be of two kinds, namely, (i) ontological sublation, and (ii) practical sublation. sublation. The former ontologically ontologically determines the falsity of  the objects whereas the latter so does practically, namely, falsity of  possessions and identities of the person. The first type cannot cannot have have practical concern and the second cannot have ontological concern. Advaitin’s classification of three levels of reality implies the application of  only ontological sublation. Now let us inquire inquire whether whether world gets ontologically sublated by Brahman. Generally the process of sublation sublation involves in the following: following: (i) the cognition of the false object, (ii) the knowledge of the substratum, (iii) the sublating knowledge in the form of negation of the knowledge of the false object and substituting the same with the knowledge of the substratum, and (iv) The state of experience where the falsity is realized. The requirements for Brahman-world sublation are as follows: (i) The knowledge of the false object is ‘This world of duality is real.’ (ii) The 123 knowledge of substratum is the  jivabrahmaikyajnana in the form, that  jivabrahmaikyajnana,, is, ‘I am Brahman’. (iii) The badhakajnana is ‘This duality is false but “I am Brahman”. (iv) The state of experience where the falsity of the duality 47

is realized is waking waking experience. It will be argued argued here that the Advaitin’s position is defective. It is a fact that all the cases of determination of either falsity or reality of anything are done only in the waking state and not in any other state of experience. For instance, the falsity of the world cannot cannot be Turiya, for, Turiya is expounded as non-dual pure realized in Turiya, consciousness without any instrument, such as the antahkarana. antahkarana. Since, the determination of the falsity of the duality is an act of mind and mind does not exist in Turiya, Turiya, the falsity of the world cannot be determined in Turiya. Turiya. The falsity of the duality cannot be determined even in the Susupti, Susupti, for; it is not possible to determine anything in susupti because antahkarana does not exist in Susupti. cannot be determined even in dream for all Susupti. It cannot determinations in dream are false. Therefore, the only alternative alternative state of  experience where the falsity of the duality is realized is waking state. Thus an Advaitin should concede that the determination of the falsity of duality has to be done in waking state of duality itself. According to the Advaitins, the sublated knowledge ( badhitajnana) badhitajnana) in the Brahman-world illusion is is ‘This world world of duality is is real.’ The knowledge of the substratum is ‘I am Brahman’. Now it can be argued against an Advaitin that, how can the knowledge, that is, ‘I am Brahman’ be the sublating knowledge (badhakajnana ( badhakajnana)) to the knowledge, that is, ‘This world of duality is real?’ Any isolated knowledge of the substratum cannot sublate the false false knowledge. For instance, in the case of rope-snake illusion, the simple perception of rope, that is, ‘This is a rope’ cannot sublate the cognition, cognition, that is, ‘This is a snake.’ If it can, then the cognition cognition of any rope should sublate the false cognition of snake on any other rope. But it is not the case with the concept concept of sublation. The sublation requires requires knowledge of the particular rope on which the false snake is cognized and such knowledge of rope alone is capable of sublating the snake cognition. In other worlds, it is only when one gets the knowledge in the form, that is, ‘It is not a snake but only a rope,’ the false knowledge, that is, ‘This is a snake’ gets sublated. That means when sublation takes place the sublating sublating cognition substitutes the sublated cognition after negating the same. When the same principle is applied to the case of Brahman-world illusion, the knowledge of the substratum, that is, ‘I am Brahman’ cannot sublate the cognition, that is, ‘This world of duality is real.’ For, the knowledge ‘I am Brahman’ implies only that ‘I am not this world but only 48

Brahman.’ This knowledge knowledge cannot cannot ontologically sublate the the world of  duality. For, it cannot cannot convey the sense, that that is, ‘I am not the world, therefore, world is false.’ Also it does not convey the sense, that is, ‘Whatever is different from “I” is false. But, it only can convey the meaning, that is, ‘The world is different from “I”. An Advaintin may argue that since the Upanisads prove of Brahman as one and only non-dual reality, the knowledge of identity, namely, ‘I am Brahman’ may mean that, ‘Whatever ‘Whatever is different different from “I” “I” is unreal’. An Advaitin should accept two alternative positions in this situation, namely, (i) ‘World is different from “I”, which approves the possibility of  vyavaharika satta, satta, and (ii) ‘I’ which is identical with Brahman alone exists and nothing else exists apart from Brahman. For the first position: if  badhakajnana is, ‘This world is false because it is different from “I” who is identical with Brahman, ‘then, we say that such knowledge cannot ontologically sublate the world. Rather it implies the coexistence coexistence of  duality with ‘I’, which is non-dual non-dual Brahman. Brahman. This position is not not acceptable for an Advaitin, for it sounds like Kapila’s dualism in Samkhya philosophy. For the second second position: it is contradictory contradictory to say that the instrument for such determination, that is, the antahkarana does not exist. For, the determination of the falsity of the duality is made only in the waking state and it necessarily involves involves with the existence of of mind. In other words, since such determination is done only in waking state, it cannot be said that the antahkarana along with all duality does not exist in waking state. For without mind such realization is not possible. Even 124 Sankara admits the existence of the antahkarana apart from the self. Thus it is proved that the badhakajnana cannot occur in the form, namely, ‘This duality is false and “I am Brahman”.’ An Advaitin may argue that the sublating knowledge may occur in the form, that is, ‘This is not duality but only non-dual Brahman.’ This position leads one to inquire into the problem, namely, whether such knowledge of the so called substratum, that is, ‘I am Brahman’ or ‘all this is indeed Brahman’ is 125 possible. We hold the view that such knowledge is not possible. Even if  one wants to agree with Advaitin then, it is still contradictory to say that it is only Brahman that exists while such determination is made by mind, which is not Brahman. Brahman. What remains now now is that if an an Advaitin wants wants to differentiate ‘I’ from the world of duality then, it means only that ‘I’ is different from the world of duality. Such knowledge does not confirm any ontological sublation of world by Brahman but only implies the 49

coexistence of ‘I’ with the world. Thus it is proved proved that the duality cannot be ontologically sublated by non-dual experience. The foregoing argument leads one to inquire into the alternative position, namely, if non-duality cannot sublate the duality then, is it possible for duality to sublate the non-duality? It will be proved in the following argument that the waking experience can sublate the non-dual experience. 3. NON-DUAL EXPERIENCE CAN BE AN ILLUSION ON DUALITY As stated above, the requirements for the ontological sublation in the case of non-duality getting sublated by duality are as follows: (i) The non-duality’. (ii) The knowledge of substratum is badhitajnana is ‘I am non-duality’. ‘This world of duality duality is real’. (iii) The sublating sublating knowledge is ‘I am not non-duality but but duality consisting of body-sense-mind complex.’ complex.’ (iv)The state of experience where the ontological falsity of non-duality is realized is waking experience. It is a fact that any determination is possible only in waking state for the reasons mentioned above. above. Since the falsity of non-duality non-duality is realized in waking state based on the knowledge, that is, ‘This world is real’ the contents of the world can be the substratum for the knowledge of non126 duality. As far as the false cognition, that is, ‘I am non-dual Brahman’, is concerned, we have already proved that such knowledge is false and 127 impossible. The badhakajnana, badhakajnana, namely, ‘The non-duality is false but world of duality is real,’ is possible possible in waking state. While the determination of the falsity of non-dual experience occurs in waking state, it is not possible to have have the existence of the non-dual experience. For, it is the Advaintin’s own rule that where there is no duality there is non-duality 128 and where there is duality there is no non-duality. Therefore, when the determination of falsity of non-duality is made, there cannot exist nonduality even according to Advaitins. For the other reason also, that is, this ontological sublation looks similar to that of dream, it can be ascertained that non-duality gets sublated by duality. As long as one is is in dream one thinks that dream objects are real so also one thinks that non-duality is real as long as one is in Turiya. Turiya. But when one wakes up either from dream or from Turiya, Turiya, both dream and 50

Turiya disappear and become false, for, what exists there in the waking state is only the world of duality. duality. If an Advaitin says says that Turiya according to the Upanisads is the substratum for the world then, we say that this conviction is only a mark of an Advaitin’s faith in the Upanisads but not a reality. Thus it is proved that the knowledge of the non-duality can ontologically be sublated by the knowledge of duality in waking state. The foregoing arguments go to prove that non-duality cannot sublate duality duality and duality duality can sublate non-duality. This implies implies that world cannot be an illusion on non-duality but non-duality can be regarded as an illusion on duality. It will be shown shown in the following following argument that that the subject illusions cause duhkha. duhkha. 4. DUHKHA 4. DUHKHA IS CAUSED BY SUBJECT ILLUSIONS The basic purpose of Advaita Vedanta is to redeem one from suffering (duhkha). (duhkha). Advaitins believe that man suffers from duality. Pain and pleasure are experienced only when one is in duality and no one experiences the same in dreamless sleep, for, there is no duality in Susupti. Susupti. When man comes back to waking state from deep sleep he realizes that he had peaceful peaceful and blissful sleep. It implies implies that that the world causes 129 suffering in man. There are two two ways of looking at the fact, that is, world causes suffering: (i) Since the absence of the world in deep sleep results in peaceful and blissful experience, the appearance of the world by itself causes duhkha, duhkha, and (ii) Since suffering man is also a part of the appearance of the world, it cannot be said that the very existence of man is the cause of his own suffering. It can be said that man man experiences suffering not because of the appearance of world, but because of his desire to possess the objects of the world. Advaitins support the first view and try to argue that non-dual knowledge knowledge sublates the world. Contrary to the Advaita view we uphold the second view for, it is unreasonable to say that man has to get rid of his own existence along with the existence of the world in order to destroy his duhkha. sounds like saying that that the best duhkha. It sounds cure for the disease is i s to destroy the patient. Thus one needs to understand that the very existence of the world cannot be the cause of  duhkha. duhkha. Therefore, the Advaitin’s argument, namely, the world disappears when non-dual experience ontologically sublates the world becomes becomes unwarranted. It is a fact that world always always exists without concerning the existence or non-existence of the enjoyer of  51

the world. World exists all all the time and it never intends intends to cause suffering in human beings, for, for, it cannot think like man. Rather it can be stated that all the worldly objects are there to sustain the life of all living beings. How then does man suffer from the world? It is not a fact that the existence of the world causes suffering in man by itself. But it is man man who causes suffering for him by developing subject illusions on the worldly objects, such as, identities identities and possessions. It is by the influence of the vasanas that man volunteers himself to fall into the craving for the possession of  the objects. Whether, man desires an object or not, the objects remain the same. When man desires he suffers and when he he does not desire he does not suffer. All the the desires are caused by man’s false ideas, such as, possessions and identifications with the the objects. objects. The whole process of  suffering happens naturally because man deliberately falls into the problem of suffering with his wrong ideas by engrossing himself in thinking to possess the objects. It is apt now to cite an example for such an illusion where man volunteers to fall himself into the illusion and deliberately takes all illusory objects as real.  Bharata in his  Natyasastra  Natyasastra states that the dance drama is the best example for the illusion where man knowingly forgets himself by absorbing himself himself in the characters characters of the drama. drama. We are are so much engrossed with the characters that even when we wake up from dance drama illusion during the interval we willfully go back again to it after the intermission and even when the curtain finally falls we return home discussing and remembering it for quite some time. Similarly man always falls into the subject illusions voluntarily by vasanas, desires, likes and the influence of his past vasanas, and dislikes. Thus one should understand that the man is naturally falling himself into the subject illusions with the influence influence of his own false ideas. Again when when man desires or does not desire an object, the object stands untouched by the feelings of the enjoyer enjoyer and it cannot by itself cause suffering in man. man. Thus one needs to understand that the cause of human suffering is only one’s subject illusions and not the object illusions. illusions. Therefore, one has to remove remove one’s subject illusions in order to get liberation, rather than working on understanding the Advaitin’s Brahman-world illusion. We are going to show in the following argument that an ontological sublation of the world is not required for liberation and what is required for liberation is the practical sublation of one’s subject illusions. 52

5. SUBLATION OF THE WORLD IS I S NOT REQUIRED FOR  MOKSA All human beings aspire of removal of sorrow and attainment of  moksa, which is the supreme human goal happiness. For Advaitins, moksa, ( paramapurusartha ), is of the nature of cessation of suffering and  paramapurusartha), 130 attainment of bliss. Advaita philosophy believes that man is having goal. According to duhkha and release of man from such suffering is its goal. Advaitins, there are only two categories, namely, (i) the seer ( Drk  ( Drk ), ), and (ii) the seen ( Drsya). Brahman, which is blissful blissful and only  Drsya). For them, the seer is Brahman, existent; therefore,  Drk  cannot be the cause of suffering. So only  Drsya must have caused suffering, for, it is the only other category.  Drsya according to the Advaitins Advaitins is is world of duality. duality. In order to remove remove suffering there are two alternative methods, namely, (i) to hold the view that world of duality does not exist at all, and (ii) world appears but it is not ultimate reality. Surprisingly, Advaitins adopt both the views in different methods of  establishing their philosophy. The first view is adopted in their  Drsti srsti vada according to which the duality, which never exists, is only imagination of the individual. Man suffers suffers from his own imagination (kalpana) imagination kalpana) of duality in the place of non-duality. If one stops imagination then one will will be released from suffering. Since this method method of Advaita Advaita does not believe in the reality of anything other than non-duality, it does not involve the concept of sublation. The second view is adopted in the Srsti drsti vada. vada . This method, unlike the other, advocates the view that  Isvara creates the duality.  Anadi  jiva thinks that this duality belongs to him and suffers from such ideas of  possession of the worldly objects, objects, etc. According to Advaitins Advaitins one should realize that the world is an illusion on Brahman in order to attain liberation. The world illusion on on Brahman Brahman will be removed removed only only by knowledge of Brahman because Advaitins believe that Brahman is the substratum of the world. Since Brahman is non-dual non-dual in nature, the attainment of the same sublates sublates the world illusion on it. it. Thus Advaitins argue that Brahman knowledge alone liberates man from world illusion. But we hold the view that the cause of human suffering is not the appearance of the world but man’s desires for the objects and therefore, there is no need for Brahman-knowledge and sublation of the world by 53

non-dual experience in order to attain attain liberation. One should learn to see things as they really are, that is, things do not belong to one, in order to get release from suffering. Is it necessary to remove whole duality duality outright in order to get release from such suffering caused by mere wrong thinking? It seems not necessary. necessary. If one thinks properly then one does not not suffer from the objects of the world. world. One suffers only from the identity and and the idea of  possessing the objects. This we call subject illusions. The subject illusions get practically sublated by the knowledge, that is, nothing is permanent and unchangeable; there is nothing that belongs to oneself; and nothing can be possessed possessed in this world. Such knowledge sublates the idea of one’s identity identity and possession of the world. This sublation sublation we call practical sublation, which alone can release man from suffering. Thus Advaitin’s argument for the possibility of the ontological sublation of the world by Brahman is repudiated. In the same same place a practical sublation of the delusion in the form of identity and possessions of the world, which does not involve in physical disappearance of the world is accepted. It can be stated now that, whether whether or not one realizes the real nature of the world, world, the world world remains the the same. That means, world continues to exist not only when man is in the state of suffering, but also, when he is is liberated. The presence of the the world is nothing nothing to do with with man’s suffering. Man suffers only from his own cravings and from such subject illusions, illusions, as, possessions and identities. He gets liberated from such suffering only when he stops craving for the things of the world by realizing the falsity of his subject illusions. 6. PARAMARTHIKA 6. PARAMARTHIKA SATTA CANNOT BE DETERMINED The Advaitins define Paramarthika satta as that which does not get sublated in three-fold time. time. Let us evaluate evaluate which one among the four types of experience, namely, Turiya, Turiya, deep sleep, dream waking stands for the scrutiny of the criterion, that is, unsublatability in three-fold time. Dream knowledge ontologically gets sublated in waking state in the form, that is, ‘The dream is false but only the gross objects are real.’ The same sublation of the gross objects is not possible in dream. Deep sleep also gets sublated in waking state, in the form, that is, ‘I did not know anything in deep sleep but now I know this world world is real.’ Gross objects cannot cannot get sublated in deep sleep for there is no possibility for such determination in deep sleep, that is, ‘This world is not real and I know nothing in deep sleep.’ Similarly, non-dual Turiya gets sublated in waking experience in 54

the form, that is, ‘It is not non-duality non-duality but only only duality is real.’ Such sublation of duality in non-duality is not possible for there cannot arise a badhakajnana in Turiya, Turiya, that is, ‘This is not duality but only non-duality,’ because of the reasons mentioned above. Now it can be said that duality never gets sublated by any other experience but waking experience sublates knowledge of the other states of  experience. Thus the world world of duality is proved as higher reality than the reality of the other states of experience. experience. For the other reasons that the awareness of real time is possible only in waking experience and the existence of the objects of the same is verifiable in three-fold time, the objects of waking experience are said to be of higher reality in comparison with the reality of the other states st ates of experience. If an Advaitin, by leaving away unsublatability as a criterion of the ultimate reality, wants to hold the view that, which exists continuously without any change is the highest reality then we say that none of the four varieties of experience, namely, waking, dream, deep sleep and non-dual experience stands for the  paramarthika satta. satta. For all the varieties of  experience are not constant and they do not not exist continuously. continuously. Instead of  ascribing the highest reality to one of the levels of experience, we rather hold the view that none of the levels of experience is worth calling as the highest reality. It is not important for a mumuksu to know what is gaining the highest reality; but what is necessary for him is to discover the cause of his suffering in order to get rid of  duhkha. that the very duhkha. If an Advaitin says that existence of the world is the cause of human suffering then we say that it is unreasonable. For it is not reasonable to say that headache headache is caused because of the existence of the head. Thus we admit admit that let the the world be as it is and man has to discover that the cause of suffering is his craving for the possession of worldly worldly objects. objects. When one successfully successfully gets rid of one’s desires, one gets liberated. What a man needs to do in the name of  attaining liberation is that he should alter his false views on the worldly objects by realizing that he cannot possess any object.

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7. CONCLUDING REMARKS The position of Advaita, namely, the world is an illusion on Brahman is proved wrong by showing that (i) there is no proper illusion to explain the Brahman-world illusion, and (ii) world cannot get sublated by non-dual experience. experience. It is established that the non-duality can be an illusion on duality. It is also proved that that the non-dual experience experience gets sublated by waking experience. experience. Then it is shown that the cause of  of  suffering (duhkha (duhkha)) is subject illusions. illusions. Further, it is established that the ontological sublation of the world, which implies the disappearance of the world, is not required for the attainment of liberation ( moksa). moksa). Lastly, it is held that if one has to determine the Paramarthika satta by applying the unsublatability as a criterion of reality then the duality must be ascribed as the higher reality, that is, Paramarthika satta, satta, in comparison with the reality of the other states of experience, else, nothing is worth calling as the highest reality.

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CHAPTER – V Eliot Deutsch on Levels of Being: A Critique

1. INTRODUCTION Professor Eliot Deutsch elicits appreciation for his brilliant analysis on the levels of being, especially on the concept of ‘subration‘in his ).Though he makes this  Advaita Vedanta (A Philosophical Reconstruction Reconstruction).Though analysis within the fold of Advaita Vedanta, he divides existence (Reality) into three levels in his own way, that is, different from the traditional Advaita. The three levels of being for him are: (i) Reality, (ii) Appearance, and (iii) Unreality. Reality is that which cannot be subrated by any other experience. Appearance is that which can be subrated by other experience. Unreality is that which neither can nor cannot be subrated by other experience. Advaitins also do the same but they do not accept Unreality as a level of reality. The concept of levels of being depends on the characteristics of ‘Reality’, namely, (i) its ability to subrate Appearance, and (ii) it being unsubratable by other experience. In other words, the validity of the whole analysis of levels of being is accepted only when it is established that the ‘Reality’ subrates other experience and the same cannot be subrated by any other experience. If it can be proved that other experience subrates ’Reality’ and ‘Reality’ cannot subrate other experience, then the so-called ‘Reality’ fails to be ‘Reality’ and thereby the whole edifice of the concept of three levels of Reality crumbles down. An attempt is made in this paper to establish that the Advaita Advaita ‘Reality’ admitted by Eliot Deutsch cannot be the ultimate reality from the following arguments against the concept of levels of being, namely, (i) ‘Reality’ cannot subrate Appearance, (ii) Appearance subrates non-dual mental experience, and (iii) Unreality cannot be a level of Reality.

2. REALITY CANNOT SUBRATE APPEARANCE ‘Reality’ becomes ultimate reality only when it is not subrated by other experience and also when it could subrate the other experience. It means to say that recognizing something as ultimate reality is based on the criteria, namely, its ability to subrate Appearance and the same being unsubratable by any other experience. If any experience is not subrated by 57

any other experience then the ontological referent of that experience is called the ultimate reality. It is now necessary to understand the concept of  subration and its application in order to examine the criteria of the ultimate reality. 2.1 Concept of Subration According to Eliot Deutsch, ‘subration’ is a distinctive mental  process whose distinguishing feature is is a revision of judgment judgment about something so that the former judgment is radically denied by a new 131  judgment that is based on fresh insight of experience. Subration involves: (1) a judgment judgment about some object object or content of consciousness consciousness (a material thing, thing, a person, an idea), (2) the recognition recognition in the light of  another kind of judgment that is incompatible with the initial judgment and the initial judgment is faulty, and (3) the acceptance of a new judgment as 132 valid. ‘Reality’ 2.2 Nature 2.2 Nature of ‘Reality’ Eliot Deutsch holds the view that, by the criterion of subration, the ‘Reality’ is, that which is when the subject/object situation is transcended. The Real is that which which is the content content of non-dual spiritual spiritual experience. It is the timeless, timeless, unconditioned unconditioned oneness of being. being. The Real Real is ( nirguna) nirguna) 133 Brahman. Application of Subration 2.3. Impossibility 2.3. Impossibility of Application Eliot Deutsch opines that, subration is a distinctive mental process whose distinguishing feature is a revision of judgment about something so that the former judgment is radically denied by a new judgment that is based on fresh insight insight or experience. He admits the the ‘Reality’ is a non-dual and trans-mental experience and Appearance is a mental experience. Subration between any two mental experiences is possible and acceptable, for, one can be aware of accepting a new judgment and denying former  judgment passed on the same object. Since subration is a mental process it should happen happen only in the realm of mental experience. But subration subration between a trans-mental experience and a mental experience, for instance, subration of Appearance by ‘Reality’, is a unique case unlike other cases of  subration. If Eliot Deutsch argues argues that ‘Reality’ is not a trans-mental experience but only a mental experience, then, his admission, namely, 58

‘Reality’ is a non-dual spiritual experience, experience, becomes becomes invalid. For, nonduality cannot be non-dual when the existence of the mind is admitted along with it. Thus one needs to accept ‘Reality’ as an experience experience beyond mind. If subration is necessarily a mental process, process, then, one may suspect whether such a mental process is possible with regard to a trans-mental experience. It is important important now to examine whether subration is possible possible 134 between ‘Reality’ and Appearance (real existent ). We hold the view that ‘Reality’ which is a trans-mental experience cannot subrate Appearance, that is, mental experience and the same is established in the following arguments. 2.4  Experience of ‘Reality’ cannot be communicated to the Level of   Appearance If Eliot Deutsch argues that non-duality is a trans-mental experience then, he should explain how this experience, which subrates Appearance, is communicated to the mind. mind. It can can be said that that non-duality cannot communicate itself to the mind for such communication is not explained in the Advaita Vedanta. It is important now to examine examine whether the subration subration of Appearance takes place while one is in a non-dual experience, that is, ‘Reality’ or in Appearance Appearance itself. If Eliot Deutsch thinks that the the non-dual experience is somehow communicated to the mind in the state of  Appearance then, it implies that subration of Appearance cannot take place while one is in non-duality. For, the requirements of subration; subration; namely, namely, (i)  judgment about some object or content of consciousness, (ii) the recognition in the light of another kind of judgment, that the initial  judgment is faulty, and (iii) the acceptance of the new judgment as valid; are all mental activities and since there is no mind in non-dual experience, it can be said that subration of Appearance cannot take place while one is in non-duality. If ‘reality cannot subrate Appearance when one is in non-duality, due to the absence of the requirements of subration then, alternatively, Eliot Deutsch should accept that subration of Appearance takes place while one is in the experience experience of Appearance. Appearance. The position, namely, Appearance gets subrated by ‘Reality’ while one is in Appearance, requires a transfer of the experience experience of non-duality non-duality to the level of Appearance. Appearance. If non-dual wisdom is not communicated to the mental level then the same cannot subrate the Appearance Appearance even while while one is in the state of Appearance. If  non-dual experience is communicated to the mental level then the 59

subration of Appearance Appearance by ‘Reality’ may may be possible. But if such communication is accepted then one ought to admit the existence of mind in non-duality. non-duality. However, the existence of mind in non-duality non-duality is not accepted by Advaitins, for, according to Advaita Vedanta, non-duality is pure consciousness which always exists (nitya ( nitya)) and mind, which is different from non-dual atman, exist continuously. continuously. If non-duality is atman, fails to exist said to have communicated itself to the mind then there must be a special way for the transfer of non-dual experience to to the other states. Since Advaita Vedanta does not admit any specific communication of non-dual experience to the mind in other states of experience, it can be said that nonduality cannot reveal itself to the mind in other states. Also the problem here is that if non-duality can communicate itself to the mind by itself then there is no need for any effort for liberation. Alternatively, if one thinks that the mind obtains non-dual experience by being conscious of the absence of objects, and that such non-dual experience may subrate Appearance in the state of Appearance itself then, we say that the non-dual mental experience caused by an awareness of the absence of the objects cannot cannot subrate Appearance. Appearance. For, if  one accepts the position, namely, non-dual mental experience subrates Appearance then, the content of the non-dual mental experience, that is, 135 the conscious mind, alone will be regarded, as ‘Reality’ and therefore, the Advaitin’s non-dual atman cannot be treated as the ultimate reality. The Advaitins do not accept the position, namely, that non-dual atman is not the ultimate reality and therefore, they cannot recognize non-dual mental experience caused by an awareness of the absence of the objects such as ‘Reality’. Thus Eliot Deutsch must concede, for the foregoing reasons, that non-dual experience cannot be communicated to the mind in the state of Appearance and therefore, his ‘Reality’ ‘Reality’ cannot subrate subrate Appearance either while one is in non-duality or in the state of  Appearance. 2.5 Formation 2.5 Formation of Judgments Judgments is not Possible It can be said that ’Reality cannot subrate Appearance for the other reason also, that is, the subrating judgment which is essential for subration, cannot be formed either in the non-duality or in the Appearance. Advaitins hold the view that two judgments are required for any subration, namely, (i) subrating judgment which denies the former judgment and upholds the latter judgment based on a new experience of the same object, and (ii) 60

subrated judgment which is an initial faulty judgment passed on the same object. We argue here that since, all judgments are made only by mind and the mind is absent in non-duality, it is impossible to form a subrating  judgment that is, ‘this is not Appearance but only non-duality,’ n on-duality,’ while one is in non-dual experience. Also, since non-duality cannot be communicated to the mind in other states of experience, it is impossible to form a subrating subrating judgment judgment even at the level of Appearance. Thus the foregoing arguments go to prove that the Advaitin’s non-duality is neither a mental nor a trans-mental trans-mental experience. An experience which is neither mental nor trans-mental cannot exist. Therefore, such non-existent ‘Reality,’ which is neither mental nor trans-mental, advocated by Eliot Deutsch, cannot subrate Appearance. Alternatively, if Eliot Deutsch accepts that the mind exists during the non-dual experience then we agree with him by exposing our view, namely, non-dual atman is not required for attaining the non-dual experience. For, it is a fact when the mind mind is conscious of the the absence of  objects there arises non-dual experience which is of the nature of bliss and peace and sufficient for liberating one from suffering (duhkha ( duhkha nivrtti). nivrtti). We will try to establish in the following argument that Appearance can subrate ‘Reality’. 3. APPEARANCE SUBRATES NON-DUAL MENTAL EXPERIENCE The Advaitins believe that the presence of the Appearance causes duhkha, duhkha, because the state of Appearance is understood as an illusion of   Nirguna Brahman) Brahman) and therefore, one ought to subrate ‘Reality’ ( Nirguna Appearance, in other other to get rid of suffering. According to them, them, ‘Reality’ subrates Appearance. But we have proved proved in the foregoing arguments that ‘Reality’ cannot subrate Appearance. Thus ‘Reality’ loses its status, as the the ultimate reality for it could not subrate Appearance as Eliot Deutsch thinks. It implies implies that even even Appearance also fails to be empirical reality (vyavaharika satta). arguments that if  satta). It will be shown in the following arguments ‘Reality’ is not ‘Reality,’ ‘Appearance’ is not ‘Appearance’ and ‘Reality’ cannot subrate Appearance then the so-called ‘Appearance’ can subrate the so-called ‘Reality’, that is, non-dual mental experience.

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‘Unreality’ Applies to Advaitin’s Advaitin’s ‘Reality’ 3.1 Definition 3.1 Definition of ‘Unreality’ Subration needs to happen within the realm of the mind for all  judgments, recognitions and valuations, which are essential for the operation of the concept of subration, is possible only when the mind is in a functional state. Any assumed assumed non-dual experience beyond mind mind cannot subrate any other experience for it is not possible to have judgments, valuation, etc., within within such a trans-mental experience. Nor can such transtransmental non-dual experience be subrated by any other experience, for the following reasons: (i) the absence of the mind in trans-mental ‘Reality’, (ii) no other experience is present either directly or by way of memory in the trans-mental non-dual experience, and (iii) since trans-mental experience cannot exist directly or by way of memory in the other states of experience it cannot be subrated by other experience. Thus, it can be said that the definition of ‘Unreality’, namely, that which neither can nor cannot be subrated by other experience, is applicable for the trans-mental non-dual experience and therefore, the same becomes non-existent. However, the Advaitins attempt to prove that such non-existent, assumed, trans-mental, non-dual experience is the highest reality. In support of the same, Eliot Deutsch admits that subration requires the presence of an object or content of consciousness that can be contradicted by other experience; Reality as non-dual, in terms of a phenomenology of  experience as well as by definition, denies the possibility of there being 136 some other ‘Object’ that could replace it. In other words, it can be said that since it is not possible to have any other object or experience in the non-dual experience, the non-dual experience cannot be subrated by any other experience and therefore, the non-duality is the ultimate reality. Thus, Eliot Deutsch tries to declare that the non-dual experience is the highest reality because it cannot be subrated by any other experience due to the absence of any other object or experience within the non-dual experience. 3.2 Absence 3.2  Absence of Objects in Non-duality does not mean Unsubratability of   Advaitin’s ‘Reality’ A question may be raised against the opinion of Eliot Deutsch, namely, does the absence of objects in a given experience mean that, that particular experience is unsubratable? According to Eliot Deutsch, subration requires the presence of an object or content of consciousness 62

that can be contradicted by other experience. If there is an absence of  other objects in a given experience then it does not mean that, that particular experience experience is unsubratable. unsubratable. Rather, it can be said that that the concept of subration is not operational within such experience without the presence of any other object. Inapplicability of subration does not mean unsubratability of the given given experience. If it is accepted that an absence absence of  the other experience is the mark of unsubratability of non-dual experience then it can be argued that Appearance (real existent) also is unsubratable by non-dual non-dual ‘Reality’. ‘Reality’. For, when one is in the state of Appearance (duality), the experience of non-duality is absent and therefore, Appearance is not subratable by non-dual experience because the same is absent. But Eliot Deutsch defines Appearance (Real existent) as that which can be subrated subrated only by ‘Reality’ (non-duality). We have already proved in the foregoing arguments that ‘Reality’, cannot subrate Appearance. Thus it can be said that the absence of objects in non-dual experience does not mean that the non-dual non-dual experience is unsubratable. Rather it can be said that the Advaitin’s ‘Reality’ is not suitable for the application of the concept of subration. Thus one need to deny the concept of Advaita ‘Reality’ and accept the position, namely, non-dual experience arises when the mind becomes aware of the absence of the objects. Mental Experience can be memorized memorized in Appearance 3.3 Non-Dual 3.3 Non-Dual Mental What happens to non-dual mental experience when one comes back  to the state of Appearance from non-dual experience? It cannot be argued that it is not possible for one to come back from non-dual experience for, there will not be proof of the existence of non-dual experience unless one comes back from it and communicates the same to others. others. Thus it must be be accepted that one can come back from non-dual experience to the state of  Appearance and communicate the same to others. If non-dual experience is trans-mental experience then it cannot be memorized in the state of Appearance for, there is no way of  communicating it to the the mind. As long as one perceives duality duality in the state of Appearance, the non-duality cannot directly exist for it is contradictory to say that one has knowledge of both duality and n0on-duality in the same place at the same same time. But if non-dual experience is accepted accepted as a mental experience, then the same can be memorized in the state of Appearance. 63

Thus it can be said that a direct experience of duality and a memory of  non-duality are available in the state of Appearance, when one comes back  from non-duality to the state of Appearance. Appearance. Since it has been established in the foregoing arguments that, non-dual ‘Reality’ cannot subrate the duality of Appearance, a question may be raised that, is it possible for Appearance to subrate non-dual experience? We hold the view that Appearance can subrate the memory of the non-dual mental experience while one is in the state of Appearance. 3.4 Formation 3.4 Formation of Judgments Judgments is Possible Subration requires two judgments, namely, (i) subrated judgment, and (ii) subrating judgment. judgment. If ‘Reality’ ‘Reality’ subrates Appearance then the subrated judgment is: ‘this is Appearance’ and subrating judgment is: ‘this is not Appearance but but only Reality’. Reality’. Where does this subration subration take place? It cannot takes place either while one is in the state of Appearance or in the non-dual experience itself. For, we have already proved that: (i) if nondual experience is trans-mental then the same cannot be brought to the state of Appearance for want of communicating instruments within transmental non-dual ‘Reality’; (ii) if non-dual experience is mental experience then the existence of non-dual atman cannot be maintained for, the existence of mind within non-dual reality implies duality within ‘Reality’. However, we concede that the memory of non-dual mental experience can be brought to the state of Appearance. An Advaitin may argue that the memory of mental non-dual experience may subrate Appearance while one is in Appearance. Appearance. But we hold the view that that the memory of non-dual experience in Appearance cannot subrate Appearance. For, the memory of non-dual experience, that is, the memory of the awareness that there are no objects whatsoever in non-dual experience, cannot subrate the duality of Appearance while one is in the state of  Appearance. Because one is conscious of the objects in Appearance and the memory of non-dual experience cannot replace the objects for, it is contradictory to say that the duality duality is not duality duality but only non-duality. In other words, it cannot be said that the presence of the objects is not real but only the absence of the objects objects is real while one perceives duality. duality. For, it is a fact that there are only objects of duality in Appearance but not the absence of the objects. objects. This in turn leads to the possibility of subration of  the memory of the non-duality by Appearance.

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If Appearance subrates the memory of non-dual experience then the subrated judgment is: ‘I remember that this is non-dual experience caused by the absence of the objects’ and the subrating judgment is: ‘this is not the non-duality caused by the absence of the objects but only the presence of  the duality of objects.’ It can be said with regard to the subrated judgment that, such subrated judgment as, ‘I remember that this is non-dual experience caused by the absence of the object,’ can be formed by using one’s memory of non-dual experience caused by the absence of the objects when one gets confused by the teachings of Advaita Advaita Vedanta. The subrating judgment, namely, ‘This is not non-duality but only duality’ is also possible for one perceives duality while one is in the state of  Appearance. It is contradictory to say that the duality, which is under perception in the present moment, is negated by the memory of the past mental nondual experience caused by the absence of the objects. objects. Rather it can be said said that the past memory of non-dual mental experience is false for one perceives the objects objects at the moment. It is just as in the case, case, when one wakes up from deep sleep, one realizes and accepts the duality of the Appearance and negates his state of deep sleep, so also when one comes back from non-duality one realizes and accepts the multiplicity of the world and negates his non-dual non-dual experience. Thus it can be said that Appearance can subrate the memory of non-duality. 3.5 None 3.5 None of the Four Levels Levels of Experience is Ultimate Ultimate Reality If an Advaitin takes the definition of ultimate reality as ‘that which is permanent and unchanging is the ultimate reality’, then, we say that neither the states of non-dual experience, namely, dreamless sleep and conscious non-dual experience, that is, absence of the objects, nor the states of duality, namely, waking and dream, that is, presence of the objects, stand for the ultimate ultimate reality. For all these states are changeable changeable and do not exist exist continuously. continuously. The distinction distinction among among the levels of  experience is made either by the presence of the objects or by the absence of the objects. Neither the states of presence of the objects nor the states of  absence of the objects are constant constant and permanent. But, since all  judgments and evaluations are confined only to the waking state, one may tend to think that the world of duality stands always as real. Since, the waking state is changeable and impermanent; the world of duality cannot be the ultimate reality. Just because man, some how, is not aware of the 65

presence of the objects in such states as, deep sleep and non-dual experience, these states cannot be said to be permanent states for, they are impermanent and therefore, therefore, they cannot be be the ultimate reality. Dreamless sleep and non-dual experience may be blissful and peaceful in nature but being blissful and peaceful cannot make these states the ultimate reality. The attainment of bliss and peace may be the highest human goal but it does not mean that the states of bliss and peace are the ultimate reality. Being blissful and peaceful is different from f rom being the ultimate reality. It has been established in the foregoing arguments that non-duality cannot subrate Appearance and Appearance can subrate the memory of  non-duality. This implies implies that Appearance Appearance subrates not only non-duality but also other states of experience, such as, dream and deep sleep. If one accepts the definition of ultimate ‘Reality’ given by Eliot Deutsch, that is, ‘Reality’ is that which cannot be subrated by any other experience, then Appearance has to be treated as the ultimate ultimate reality. For, it is proved that Appearance is not subrated by any other experience and the same subrates all other states states of experience. But, since the state of Appearance also also is impermanent and changeable along with the other states, the same cannot be taken as the the ultimate reality. Thus it can be said that the the concept of  subration cannot determine the ultimate reality and therefore, the same cannot be helpful in the pursuit of liberation. 4. UNREALITY CANNOT BE A LEVEL OF REALITY Eliot Deutsch introduces Unreality as one of the levels in his classification of three levels of being. He thinks thinks that Samkara Samkara implicitly accepts Unreality (tuccha ( tuccha)) as a level of reality. We will refute the view of  Eliot Deutsch on the Unreality in the following explanation. 4.1 Position 4.1 Position of Advaita on Levels of Being The inquiry into the three levels of reality ( sattatraya vicara) vicara) is one of the methods in Advaita Vedanta to establish nirguna Brahman as the 137 one and only non-dual reality. Depending on the the concept of sublation, sublation, 138 the Advaitins categorize reality into three levels namely, (i) Empirical 139 reality (Vyavaharika (Vyavaharika satta) ( Pratibhasika satta) , (ii) Phenomenal reality (Pratibhasika 140 141 ( Paramarthika satta) satta) satta) , and (iii) Absolute reality (Paramarthika satta) . The Advaitins 142 also refer to another category, namely, Absolute non-existence ( tuccha), tuccha), only to show that none of the three levels of reality is absolute non66

existence. But tuccha is neither accepted as a kind of reality nor as one of  the three levels of reality in Advaita Vedanta. 4.2 Eliot 4.2 Eliot Deutsch on Levels of Being Contrary to the Advaitic position, Eliot Deutsch, while reconstructing Advaita Vedanta, introduces absolute non-existence as one of the realities in his classification classification of three levels levels of reality. Eliot Deutsch, though, aware of the Advaitic classification of three levels of reality, thinks 143 that Sankara implicitly accepts the level of ‘unreality’. He tries to give his own classification of ‘levels of being’ and includes ‘Unreality’ as one of the ‘Three Levels of Reality’ which for him are (i) Reality, (ii) Appearance, and (iii) unreality. According to Eliot Deutsch ‘Reality’ is that which cannot be 144 145 subrated by any other experience. Appearance is that which can be 146 subrated by other experience. He divides ‘appearance’ into three sublevels, namely, (i) real existent, (ii) existent, and (iii) illusory existent. The first one comprises those contents of experience that can be subrated only by ‘Reality’. ‘Reality’. He thinks that that the sublevel sublevel of the ‘real ‘real existent’ is not 147 clearly formulated in Advaita literature. The second comprises those contents of experience that can be subrated by ‘Reality’ or by the ‘real 148 existent’. The third one comprises those contents of experience that can 149 be subrated by all other types of experience. The ‘Unreality’ for him is 150 that which neither can nor cannot be subrated by other experience. 4.3 A 4.3 A Critique Eliot Deutsch seems to have been more enthusiastic in reconstructing the Advaita notion of three levels of reality, rather than understanding and adhering to the Advaitic purpose of such an inquiry, while he introduces introduces ‘Unreality’ ‘Unreality’ as one of the three levels of being. being. It is necessary for one to realize the reason for Advaita to speak of three levels of reality while it accepts only one reality, r eality, that is, nirguna Brahman. The Advaitins have three methods of explaining their philosophy, namely, (i)  Ekasattaka Drsti Srsti Vada, Vada, (ii)  Dvisattaka Drsti Srsti Vada, Vada, and (iii) Srsti Drsti Vada. explanations are offered in in accordance accordance Vada. These explanations with the qualification of the persons. According to the Advaitins, the mumuksus are classified into three, namely, (i) Uttamadhikarai, Uttamadhikarai, (ii) 67

 Madhyamadhikari  Madhyamadhikari, and (iii) Adhamadhika ri.. The first of the above method (iii) Adhamadhikari method is meant for the Uttamadhikari. Uttamadhikari. According to the  Ekasattaka  Ekasattaka drsti srsti vada, vada, the non-dual Brahman- Atman,  Atman, alone exists always and nothing else. If at all anything other than Brahman seems to exist then, it is one’s own imagination. Thus the individual’s imagination becomes responsible for the appearance of duality in non-duality. According to the Advaitins Advaitins this is the most difficult way to understanding Advaita philosophy. It is hard to understand the position that there exists only non-duality while one is seeing the duality. In order to make make it easy for the sake of  madhyamadhikari, madhyamadhikari, the Advaitins introduce the second method, namely, method upholds the view that duality  Dvisattaka drsti srsti vada. vada. This method exists only as long as one perceives it, but in fact duality never exists. Thus, the pratibhasika satta is ascribed to the appearance of the duality of  the world world in this method. The pratibhasik The  pratibhasika a satta is mentioned only to say the mumuksu that the duality never exists and appearance of it is caused by one’s imagination. This duality disappears when one realizes and keeps oneself in non-duality. non-duality. Thus this system admits of two levels of reality, reality, namely, (i) paramarthika satta, satta, that is, Brahman- Atman,  Atman, and (ii) Pratibhasika satta, satta, that is, world of duality. It is also difficult for most of the people to understand the theory, which advocates the existence of the world as long as one perceives it, for people always keep using the things of the world for their needs, such as, to satisfy hunger, etc. In order to make the adhamadhikari understand Advaita, the third method, namely, Srsti drsti vada is established. This theory, unlike Drsti unlike Drsti srsti vada vada,, advocates three levels of reality. According maya. The people to it, Isvara it,  Isvara (Brahman) causes duality by His power of  maya. mistake this this illusory creation of duality for non-duality. non-duality. The question question arises that, if the world is an illusion then, is this world an illusion like other illusions such as dream? If the Advaitin says yes, then the difficulty, such as, that which, has been raised in the case of the Dvisattaka drsti srsti only pratibhasika satta, vada, vada, where the world is only pratibhasika satta, occurs. The Advaitin, therefore, distinguishes dreams and such illusory objects as snake on rope, etc., from the worldly physical objects in Srsti drsti vada. vada. Since the empirical objects are used as real entities for worldly needs and are not sublated by any other objects, they are ascribed of a reality called vyavaharika satta, from  pratibhasika satta. satta, which is distinct from pratibhasika satta.

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But there arises another question that if world is an illusion on Brahman then the world becomes ontologically non-existent when one realizes the substratum, substratum, that is, Brahman. This leads to further problems, such as, if the world becomes non-existent then what happens to the daily jivanmukta? Advaitins in order to solve this problem and also to needs of a jivanmukta? strengthen their philosophy of world illusion on Brahman, distinguish all illusory objects both of  pratibhasika of  pratibhasika satta and vyavaharika satta from the absolute non-existence, what they call tuccha which is defined as that which can never exist exist and can never become an object object of cognition. All illusory objects including the world cannot be called tuccha for they can be objects of cognition. Thus the Advaitins make a distinction distinction between Paramarthika satta and the ‘illusory objects and world,’ between tuccha and ‘illusory objects and world’ and between worldly physical objects and illusory objects. The purpose of introducing the ‘Unreality’ is only to say that the ‘objects of illusions and the world’ are not tuccha but they have some level of reality. This being the position of Advaita, Eliot Deutsch Deutsch introduces ‘Unreality’ (tuccha (tuccha)) as one of the three levels of being. being. The acceptance of  ‘Unreality’ as a kind of reality by Eliot Deutsch appears as a demonstration of his ignorance of Advaita. Gaudapada is of the opinion opinion that, childish childish persons fail to know Brahman by predicating it with such attributes as existence, non-existence, existence and non-existence and absolute non151 existence. Sankara also exclaims that, if these (so-called) learned men act as veritable children on account of their ignorance of Ultimate Reality, 152 what is to be said regarding those who are, by nature, unenlightened. Since the reconstruction of the levels of being by Eliot Deutsch appears only as a childish act, as admitted by Sankara and Gaudapada, one can imagine how Eliot Deutsch commits a grave mistake in accepting tuccha as a kind of reality and introducing it as one of the three levels of reality. 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS An attempt is made in this paper to show that the Advaita ‘Reality’ admitted by Eliot Deutsch Deutsch cannot be the ultimate reality. In order to establish the same, three arguments have been raised against the concept of  three levels of being, advocated by Eliot Deutsch, namely, (1) Reality cannot subrate Appearance, (2) Appearance subrates non-dual mental experience, and (3) Unreality cannot be a level of o f reality.

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An examination of the criteria of the ultimate reality is conducted in the first argument. argument. It is shown that the concept of subration cannot be applied to ‘Reality’ as long as one believes that ‘Reality’ is a trans-mental experience. This point of view is also supported supported by the argument argument that if  if  non-duality is a trans-mental reality then the same cannot be communicated to the other states of experience due to lack of  communicating instruments within within non-duality. non-duality. Further it is pointed out that if non-duality is a trans-mental experience then the requirements of  subration namely, (i) the subrating judgment, and (ii) the subrated  judgment cannot be formed while one is in the trans-mental non-dual experience. All these these arguments go to prove that Reality cannot subrate Appearance. Secondly, it is argued that the Reality explained by Eliot Deutsch, does not stand for the definition of the ultimate reality and the same is suitable for the definition of Unreality. Then the opinion opinion of Eliot Deutsch on the unsubratability of ‘Reality’ has been dismissed. Later, it is established that application of the concept of subration is possible only to the memory of non-dual mental experience while one is in the state of  Appearance. It is shown that the memory memory of non-dual mental experience cannot subrate Appearance either while one is in non-duality or in Appearance. In the same place, it is argued that appearance can subrate the memory of non-duality while one is in the state of Appearance because of  the possibility of the formation of the subrating and subrated judgments in the Appearance. Also, it has been established that the concept of three levels of being and the concept of subration in Advaita Vedanta cannot determine ‘Reality’ as the ultimate reality. Lastly, the significance of the classification of three levels of reality in Advaita Vedanta has been explained in order to show that unreality cannot be a kind of reality and the same cannot be included in the concept of three levels of reality.

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CHAPTER - VI Inconsistencies in the Brahmasutra the Brahmasutra and Sankarabhasya: With Special Reference to the Competence of Sudra of Sudra 1. INTRODUCTION

Human beings can broadly be classified into two, from the point of  view of  Brahmajnana of   Brahmajnana (Brahman-knowledge), namely, 1)  Brahmajnani (those who have realized Brahman) and 2)  Ajnani (those who have not realized Brahman). Depending on their qualifications for Brahmanrealization (adhikaritva) (adhikaritva) the latter can be further classified into three, namely, i) Uttamadhikari, ii) Madhyamadh ii) Madhyamadhikdri iii) Adhamadhikari. ikdri and iii) Adhamadhik ari. 153

Advaita Vedanta is taught in three different ways , namely, a)  Ekasattaka Drsti Srsti Vada, b)  Dvisattaka Drsti Srsti Vada and c) Srsti  Drsti Vada corresponding to the three kinds of adhikaris of  adhikaris respectively. This paper does not deal with the first two, for the context of incompetence of  Sudra arises only in the third, that is, Srsti Drsti Vada of Badarayana Vyasa. From the point of view of  Srsti Drsti Vada, Vada, human beings can be classified into two, namely, Qualified human beings (those who have 154 attained sadhanacatustaya or four fold qualifications) and ii) Unqualified human beings (those who have not attained four fold qualifications). According to Sankara  Brahmajnana through the  Brahmasutra,  Brahmasutra, which represents the Srsti Drsti Vada, should be deliberated only to those 155 who haveattained the four fold qualifications. The second group, that is Unqualified human beings needs to get training to attain the sadhanacatustaya in order to receive the teachings of Vedanta. Sankara in his Prakaranagranthas such as Vivekacudamani, has attempted to motivate those who have not attained the four fold qualifications by illustrating the glory of human life and the ways in which a human being attains the four fold qualifications. Nowhere has he mentioned that there are human beings who cannot attain Sadhanacatustaya.

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Contrary to this view, Sankara in his commentary on the 156 in the  Brahmasutra  Apasudradhikaranam  Apasudradhikaranam  Brahmasutra has explicitly attempted to introduce one more group of human beings, namely, Disqualified human beings - consisting of  Sudras (and women) apart from the Qualified and Unqualified human beings. The reason for such disqualification of some human beings (Sudra) ( Sudra) for Brahmaj for  Brahmajnana nana through the teachings of Vedanta, according to Sankara, is that some Smrtis prohibit them from Upanayana (the ceremony of investiture with sacred thread). This reason sounds strange and suspicious for, if one accepts such disqualification of  Sudras for Brahman-realization, then it not only keeps a large number of human beings away from Brahmajnana from Brahmajnana but also goes against the secular nature of  Vedanta teachings. Therefore, an attempt is made in this paper to repudiate the reasons given by Sankara for the incompetence of  Sudras for  Brahmajnana through the study of the Vedanta by exposing some inconsistencies in the formulation of  Apasudradhi of  Apasudradhikaranam in Brahmasutra karanam in Brahmas utra and Sankara's commentary on the same. 2. SANKARA'S OPINION ON SUDRA'S COMPETENCE Sankara's intention in the commentary on the  Apasudradhikarana  Apasudradhikarana is to remove the assumption that the Sudra also may be accepted as qualified for knowledge through the Veda (after denying any monopoly of  Ksatriya qualification bythe three castes of o f twice-born, namely, Brahmana, namely,  Brahmana, Ksatriya 157 and Vaisya) Vaisya). Logical Stand of Sankara Sankara takes the stand of the Sruti text, that is, `The Sudra is unfit 158 for performing a sacrifice,' and argues that since Sudra is not qualified for performing sacrifice he is also not qualified for acquiring knowledge throughthe Veda. Why? Because 'it is based on a logic having common application, it suggests that the Sudra has no right to knowledge as well, 159 for the logic applies both the ways.' The logical arguments underlying the above quotations can be summarized as follows:

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1. Vedic study presupposes the investiture with the sacred thread 160 upanayana). upanayana). 2. The ceremony of the investiture with the sacred thread is confined 161 only to the three castes, namely. Brahmana, namely.  Brahmana, Ksatriya Ksatriya and Vaisya. 3. Therefore, a born sudra cannot have investiture with the sacred thread. 4. Since, a born Sudra cannot have the investiture with the sacred 162 thread, he is not allowed to study the Veda. Veda. 5. A born Sudra cannot study the Veda, and without studying the 163 Veda, Veda, he cannot become competent for things spoken in the Veda. Veda. The above arguments of Sankara depend on two assumptions, namely, i) Caste is determined by birth and ii) upanayana cannot be given to a Sudra by birth. The complete arguments of Sankara against the competence of  Sudra for  Brahmajnana through the study of the Vedanta stand only on the above assumptions. If they are proved to be wrong assumptions then the whole edifice of Sankara's arguments against Sudra’s competence will crumble. We will make an attempt in the following arguments to show that i) caste is not determined by birth, ii ) a Sudra may be eligible for upanayana and iii) all human beings along with Sudras and women may also be qualified for  Brahmajnana through the study of the Vedanta. 3. A CRITIQUE ON THE CRITERION OF THE CASTE AND UPANAYANA 3.1 Criterion of the Caste

There are two versions of the criterion of the caste, namely, 1) caste should be determined by birth and 2) caste is determined by one's own qualities. The first view is supported by the scriptures (Smrtis ( Smrtis)) such as, the  Manusmrti, the Gautamadharmasutra. The scriptures such as, the  Mahabharata, the Visnubhagavata, uphold the second. The Yajnavalkyasmrti states that 'by husbands belonging to a particular class upon wives belonging to the same class - the husbands and wives having been united in unblemished marriages are begotten sons who belong to the same caste as that of the father and the mother and who are capable of  164 continuing the line. On the contrary, the  Mahabharata states that, ‘Not

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birth, nor samskaras, nor study of the Veda, nor ancestry, is the cause of  165 being twice born. Conduct alone is verily the cause there of.’ In confirmation of this view, it is further stated that, ‘Truth, charity, forgiveness, good conduct, gentleness, austerity and mercy where these are seen O! King of Serpents, he is called a  Brahmana. If these marks exist in a Sudra and not in one twice-born, the Sudra is not a Sudra and not the  Brahmana a  Brahmana.’  Brahmana.’ ‘Where this conduct is shown’, O! Serpent, he is called a Brahmana a Brahmana where this is not O! Serpent, he should be regarded as a 166  Almost parallel to this view, the Visnubhagavata states that, Sudra. ‘what is said as to the marks of conduct indicative of man's caste, if those marks are found in another, let him be designated by the caste of his marks 167 and not of his birth.’ The two versions of caste, namely, 1) caste by birth and 2) caste by qualities contradict each other. If the first view were accepted, then the born Sudras would be prohibited from the study of the Veda as Sankara argues in his commentary on the  Apasudradhikaranam.  Apasudradhikaranam. On the other hand if one accepts the second version, then the arguments given by Sankara in the same place, which are purely based on the former view, stand for scrutiny. The controversy between the two criteria of caste demands one to seek a method to settle such controversies between two Smrti texts. When such context arises, Sankara himself suggests a method that, 'in the event of Smrti of Smrti opposing another Smrti, its authority is decided by the criterion of  its being in harmony with the Sruti from which alone it derives its own 168 validity. Thus, one needs to look out for the Sruti reference regarding the criterion of caste determination in order to decide which view of the caste should be accepted. The Chandogyopanisad, states an incident in the story of Satyakama Jabala, in order to make one understand how one's caste is 169 determined. Even Badarayana Vyasa has formulated one of the Sutras in the Apasudrad the Apasudradhikaranam, hikaranam, that is, 1.3.37, referring to the same story. Satyakama Jabala, in this story, goes to Gautama and asks him to 170 teach the Veda. Then, ‘He (Gautama, the son of Haridrumat) said to him (Satyakama), “Of what family are you, my dear?" He (Satyakama) replied, "1 do not know this, Sir, of what family 1 am. 1 asked my mother. She answered me, ‘in my youth, when 1 went about a great deal as a maidservant, got you. So I do not know of what family you are. I am 74

Jabala by name and you are Satyakama by name.’ So I am Satyakama 171 Jabala, Sir.” He (Gautama) then said to him (Satyakama) “None but a 172  Brahmana could thus explain.” When owing to the utterance of truth (by Satyakama Jabala), Gautama proceeded to initiate and instruct (Satyakama 173 Jabala).’ The controversy between two views of caste determination demands an inquiry into questions such as what was the reason for Gautama to  Brahmanatva on Satyakama. Was it Satyakama’s birth as a confer  Brahmanatva  Brahmana? Or was it Satyakama's quality, namely, speaking truth? If one considers the view, that is, one’s caste is determined by birth then Satyakama should have had his father and mother belonging to  Brahmana caste in order to be a  Brahmana by birth. But as a matter of fact, Satyakama’s father is not known and his mother was a servant maid who was supposed to be a Sudra or at least a non-brahmana a  non-brahmana.. According to the 174 Yajnavalkyasmrti since Satyakama’s parents (at least his mother) did not belong to  Brahmana caste and his mother was not married to his father (who is unknown) one can understand that Satyakama could not have been a born Brahmana. born Brahmana. ?

Then to which caste does Satyakama belong to by birth Since Satyakama’s mother was a Sudra or a  non-brahmana and his father was not known, he cannot even be called a Sudra according to the 175 Yajnavalkyasmrti. Thus in the case of Satyakama, the view that ‘caste is determined by birth,’ is untenable. Therefore, one need to take the alternative stand, namely, that caste is determined by one’s qualities. One can understand that  Brahmanatva of Satyakama was declared by Gautama by his quality, namely, ‘Speaking the truth.’ With this elucidation one can finally put down the view of the Sruti regarding caste determination, that ‘caste is determined by one's qualities and it is not determined by birth.’ After knowing the Sruti’s viewpoint regarding caste determination, one can reject the opinion that caste is determined by birth. Thus the version of  the Mahabharata the  Mahabharata and the Visnubhagavata regarding caste determination is accepted on the basis of their harmony with the Sruti, namely, the Chandogyopanisad.

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3.2 Criterion of Upanayana of Upanayana There are two mutually contradictory views of  Smrtis regarding the eligibility of  Sudra for upanayana. They are i) Sudra is not eligible for upanayana and ii) Sudra is eligible for upanayana. The first view is 176  177  upheld by the  Manusmrti and the second by Parasaragrhyasutra The contradiction between the two Smrtis regarding the eligibility of  Sudra for upanayana can be settled in the same way as it is done in the case of  criterion of caste. One needs to find out the Sruti text, which refers to the eligibility of  Sudra or a or  a non-traivanika by birth for upanayana in order to settle such controversy. We can refer to the story of Satyakama Jabala in the Chandogyopanisad in Chandogyopanisad in order to decide which one of the above Smrtis is in harmony with the Sruti. For Gautama, in the story, gives upanayana to Satyakama Jabala after determining his caste by his quality, namely, speaking thetruth. It is established above in the case of ‘criterion of caste’ that Satyakama Jabala does not know what family he belongs to and he does not belong to traivarnikas by birth and yet, Gautama, initiated him to Vedic study by giving upanayana. It can be understood that, according to the Sruti, that is, the Chandogyopanisad, one need not belong to traivarnika by birth to get upanayana and any one possessing good qualities, such as speaking the truth, can be given upanayana. The Sruti view stating eligibility of a Sudra or a non-traivarnika non-traivarnika for upanayana is in conformity with the view of  Parasaaragrhyasutra, namely, a Sudra with good qualities and without bad activities may get upanayana. Thus the two basic assumptions behind Sankara’s logic to argue for Sudra’s Sudra’s incompetence for Vedic study, namely, 1) Caste is determined by birth and 2) a born-Sudra is not eligible for upanayana are proved not to be in harmony with the Sruti, that is, the Chandogyopanisad. Hence Sahkara’s views relating to the eligibility for Vedic study may be rejected on the basis of their inconformity with the Sruti. 4. A CRITIQUE ON THE INCOMPETENCE OF A BORN SUDRA FOR KNOWLEDGE THROUGH THE VEDA In his commentary on the  Apasudradhikaranam,  Apasudradhikaranam, Sankara uncontextually quotes the Sruti text relating to sacrifice that “The Sudra is 178 unfit for performing a sacrifice,” to prove Sudra’s incompetence for acquiring Brahmajna acquiring Brahmajnana na through the Veda. According to him, Sudra cannot perform a sacrifice because he is not taught the sacrificial part of the Veda. 76

Sudra is not taught the sacrificial part because he is not permitted to have investiture with the sacred thread. Since Sudra does not have upanayana, he lacks the competence not only for the sacrificial part but also for the knowledge part of the Veda. Sankara maintains in his introduction to the commentary on the  Brahmasutra, namely, Adhyasabhasya namely, Adhyasabhasya that caste, stage of life, age etc., are mere superimpositions. He holds: ‘- such scriptural injunction as “A  Brahmana shall perform a sacrifice,” can become effective only by taking for granted various kinds of superimpositions of caste, stage of life, age, ’179 condition, etc. The above statement implies that the scriptural injunction such as, “A  Brahmana shall perform a sacrifice” and the scriptural prohibition such as, “Sudra “ Sudra is unfit for performing a sacrifice” are ineffective because they are based on the superimpositions such as caste, stage of life, age, condition, etc. Now the question that arises is that, while Sankara clearly states in the very beginning of his commentary on the  Brahmasutra that caste is a case of superimposition, how he could adopt an entirely different posture that a born Sudra is incompetent for acquiring knowledge through the Veda in his commentary on the  Apasudradhikaranam.  Apasudradhikaranam. This question provokes one to inquire further into Sankara’s commentary on the other topics in the  Brahmasutra  Brahmasutra in order to find his original stand on the competence of  Sudra for Vedic knowledge. The inquiry should be focused on the specified area, namely, ‘competence for Veda,’ rather than on the competence for studying knowledge part of the Veda,’ Karmakanda or the Veda in general. It has to be done so because the given context is only about the competence for having deliberation on Brahman and not on the competence for ‘performing a sacrifice.’ s acrifice.’ In his commentary on the  Brahmasutra,  Brahmasutra, .1.1.1, Sankara rejects the opponent’s view that the study of the sacrificial part of the Veda is a 180 prerequisite to studying the knowledge part of the Veda. Veda. He establishes the four fold qualifications as a prerequisite to studying the knowledge part of the Veda. He holds: “-- discrimination between the eternal and the noneternal; dispassion for the enjoyment of the fruits (of work) here and hereafter; a perfection of such practices as control of mind, control of the senses and organs, etc.; and a hankering for liberation. Granted the 181 existence of these, Brahman can be deliberated on --.” He never mentioned anywhere in his writings that a Sudra is prohibited from the 77

attainment of four fold qualifications in order to get deliberation on Brahman. Nor did he mention that Sudra couldn't attain the four-fold 182  Brahmasutra that qualification. Vyasa directly makes a statement in his  Brahmasutra all human beings are competent for Vedic knowledge. The reasons for such an integrated human competence for the study of the Veda are: The Kathopanisad  states that, “The Being ( purusa)  purusa) of the size of a 183 thumb, resides (in the heart) within the body.” It also states, that “The  purusa,  purusa, who is of the size of a thumb, is light without smoke. He is the ruler of the past and the future. He exists today and He will exist 184 tomorrow. This is that.” It can be reasoned from the statement of the Kathopanisad that Kathopanisad  that since heart exists in all human beings including women, all of them have Brahman in their heart in the size of the thumb. Therefore, it can be understood that any living human being is competent for Brahmanknowledge. Sankara adopts the characteristics of a competent human being 185 from the  Jaiminisutra in his commentary on the  Brahmasutra,  Brahmasutra, 1.3.25. Referring to the same, Sankara holds: “Though the scripture (Kathopanisad ) speaks impersonally, still it postulates the competence of  human being only, because human beings are able, desirous (of result), and not debarred, and because there are texts about initiation with the sacred 186 thread. It can be argued that since the said characteristics are adopted from the  Jaiminisutra, which has its purport as deliberation on  Dharma, they are meant only for the competence for  Dharma (performing sacrifice) and not for the competence for the sastra which has its purport deliberation on Brahman.  Brahmasutra, 1.3.25 and the Now it can be reasoned that while the  Brahmasutra, Kathopanisad, 2.1.12 and 13, directly establish the competence of all human beings for Brahman-knowledge, Sankara's quote from the  Jaiminisutra,  Jaiminisutra, which contradicts the view of Vyasa and his own view expressed in the commentary on the  Brahmasutra, I.I.I seems to be unwarranted. Did Sankara at least adhere to the view of Jaimini regarding the competence for Vedic knowledge all through his commentary? Though the  Jaiminisutra rejects the competence of animals, gods, rsis and Sudras and establishes the competence of only  Brahmana, Ksatriva and Vaisya, Vyasa and Sankara did not maintain this view in 78

relation to the gods and rsis. It is argued against Jaimini’s view in the commentary on the  Brahmasutra,  Brahmasutra, 1.3.26: (Devatadhikaranam} “Though the competence for rites is denied in, “There is no competence for the gods, since they have no gods (to sacrifice to),” “the rsis have no competence for the performance of rites, since they have no rsis (to 187 perform to),” still that non-competence does not apply to knowledge (of  ”188 Brahman). The above statement clearly shows that those who are not competent for performing a sacrifice (among gods, rsis and Sudras) may be competent for attaining knowledge of Brahman. Now the question that stands is that did Vyasa and Sankara adopt the same view, that is, noncompetence for performing a sacrifice does not apply to knowledge of  Brahman in the case of Sudra of  Sudra?? On the contrary, by applying the characteristics of a competent person (to perform a sacrifice) mentioned in the  Jaiminisutra it is argued by Sankara (and Vyasa) in his commentary on the  Brahmasutra,  Brahmasutra, 1.3.34: “As for the text, ‘The Sudra is unfit for performing a sacrifice’ (Tattiriyasamhita, 7.1.1.6), Since it is based on a logic having common application, it suggests that the Sudra has no right to knowledge as well, for the logic applies both ways.’ The logic that Sankara adheres to is that there can be no reading of the Vedas by a Sudra, for Vedic study presupposes the investiture with the sacred thread, which ceremony is confined to the three castes. It is reasoned by Sankara that, since Sudra does not quality for perfor ming a sacrifice, but also upanayana, he is not qualified, not only for performing for attaining knowledge of Brahman through the Veda. Here, the whole argument is based on the assumption that Sudra is not qualified for upanayana and thereby not fit for acquiring Vedic knowledge. Sankara seems to have relied on the customary type of  upanayana ceremony for three castes as mentioned in the  Manusmrti, X.4, and rejects the possibility of  upanayana for a Sudra and thereby incompetence for studying the knowledge part of the Veda is attributed to Sudra. If one goes by the Vedic sense of upanayana of  upanayana as it is to be sanctioned on examining the potentiality and conduct of the student and not by birth, then the whole argument given by Sankara and Vyasa against Sudra’s Sudra’s incompetence becomes redundant. It is not the case that there are no texts declaring the

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Sudra’s eligibility for upanayana and Vedic study. In support of Sudra’s eligibility the Parasaragrhyasutra, 2.6 declare that ‘Sudra ‘Sudra with good 189 qualities without bad activities may get upanayana. The Vrddhagautama 190 ‘Sudra also can practice the religious act. It appears Smrti, states that ‘Sudra that Sankara deliberately ignored the texts in support of  Sudra’s competence. The foregoing arguments prove that Sudra is qualified for upanayana and therefore, the above arguments of Sankara for the incompetence of Sudra of  Sudra for Vedic knowledge can be rejected. 5. A CRITIQUE ON THE AUTHORSHIP OF SUTRAS AND  BHASYA ON APASUDRADHIKARANAM  ON APASUDRADHIKARANAM  The question that arises now is that, can Sankara, after having a great exercise of logic and interpretation in order to prove the competence of gods and rsis, afford to argue only against competence of  Sudras? Sudras? We believe that Sankara could not have argued against the competence of  attaining  Brahmajnana through the Vedic study. The following Sudras for attaining Brahmajnana arguments will prove the same. 1. A question may be raised as to who initiated Sankara to write the commentary on  Brahmasutra. According to Madhava Vdhyaranya, it is Chandala, that is, an outcaste man (Lord Siva) in Varanasi, who initiated 191 Sankara to write a new commentary on the  Brahmasutra. The  Brahmasutra. Sankaradigvijayam clearly states that Sankara has realized the falsity of  caste and outcaste and such knowledge is given to him by a Chandala  Brahmasutra. How can Sankara, before writing the commentary on the  Brahmasutra. who has realized the falsity of caste and outcaste and having been initiated  Brahmasutra, by a Chandala (Lord Siva) to write a commentary on the  Brahmasutra, write such a commentary on the  Apasudradhikaranam  Apasudradhikaranam to prevent Sudras from having access to the Veda? 2. When Sankara says in his commentary on the  Brahmasutra,  Brahmasutra, I.I.I, that the competence for the Purvamimamsa is different from that of the Vedanta on the basis of mutual difference in their subject matter and goals then how can he directly adopt the characteristics of a competent person (for the Purvamimamsa) from the  Jaiminisutra and apply it to Sudra to show that Sudra is not eligible to study the Vedanta in his commentary on 192 the Apasudrad the Apasudradhikaranam hikaranam??

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3. When Sankara says in his  Adhyasabhasya  Adhyasabhasya that, caste is a case of  superimposition, which should be discarded by a mumuksu, how could he adopt Purvamimamsa view of caste in his commentary on the  Apasudradhikaranam,  Apasudradhikaranam, which directly opposes the view of the Vedanta? 4. How can Sankara eliminate only Sudras from the study of the Veda relying on the  Manusmrti by ignoring the texts, which declare that even Sudra can receive upanayana and study the Veda? 5. Sankara admits in his commentary on the  Brahmasutra,  Brahmasutra, 1.3.38, 193 that Sudra can attain knowledge through the smrtis. The Brahmasutra smrtis . The Brahmasu tra is a smrti which has its purport on the deliberation on Brahman. Hence a Sudra can attain Brahman-knowledge through the study of the  Brahmasutra. How then can Vyasa write such sutras in his text against the competence of Sudra? 6. Sankara in his commentary on the  Brahmasutra,  Brahmasutra, 1.3.37 opines that the Chandogyopanisad (4.4.5) Chandogyopanisad (4.4.5) statement, namely, ‘No one who is not a  Brahmana can speak thus. Dear boy, bring the sacrificial fuel, I shall initiate you’ you ’ (Tam hovaca naitadabrahmano vivaktumarhati samidham somyaharopa tva nesye na satyadaga iti tamupaniya) establishes the absence of Sudrahood in Satyakama Jabala. Sankara seems to have taken the meaning of the word, that is, abrahmana, as Sudra. Does abrahmana mean only Sudra? It cannot be. For the word abrahmana means other than  Brahmana caste, namely, Ksatriya, Vaisya and Sudra in the given context. If the word abrahmana indicates the ineligibility for upanayana and Vedic study as Sankara has taken, then all the abrahmanas, namely, Ksatriya, Vaisya and Sudra would be ineligible for Vedic study. But Sankara accepts eligibility of  Ksatriya and Vaisya for upanayana and Vedic study in his commentary on the Pramitadhikaranam,  Devatadhikaranam and  Apasudradhikaranam  Apasudradhikaranam and therefore, Sankara’s opinion, that is, abrahmana indicates ineligibility for Vedic study becomes a contradiction. Hence, Hence, the following questions may be raised: Does the Chandogyopanisad statement Chandogyopanisad statement mean to establish the absence of  abrahmana caste in Satyakama Jabala? Or does it mean to glorify and recognize the character of SatyakamaJabala, namely, speaking the truth, as the significant character of a Brahmana a  Brahmana?? It can be understand from the above 81

argument that the Upanisadic statement cannot mean to establish the absence of  abrahmana caste in Satyakama Jabala. Rather it means to signify the characteristic of a  Brahmana in Satyakama Jabala, namely, speaking the truth, thati s, Satyakama Jabala does not know his father and gotra. This being the position, how then can Sankara writes such a commentary, which is self-contradictory? 7. According to Sankara, Satyakama Jabala is not a  Brahmana by a in Satyakama Jabala because of his birth. Gautama conferred Brahmanatv conferred  Brahmanatva quality of speaking the truth, namely, that he does not know his father and gotra. This being the position, how can the other sutras in the  Apasudradhikaranam  Apasudradhikaranam maintain an entirely opposite view to this sutra? sutra? Sankara should either stand on the view of  Brahmasut of   Brahmasutra ra on Satyakama Jabala, that is, anybody irrespective of absence of knowledge of one’s caste and gotra, just by having qualities such as, speaking truth, etc., can get initiated (upanayana (upanayana)) to Brahmajnan to Brahmajnana a or stand on the view of the other  Brahmasutras  Brahmasutras in  Apasudradhikaranam,  Apasudradhikaranam, namely, caste is designated by birth and a Sudra by birth is not competent for Brahman-knowledge through the Veda. If a born Sudra recites the Veda his tongue should be cut 194 off and if he hears the same then melted led should be filled in his ears. But how can Sankara and Vyasa maintain both views in the same context? 8. It can be shown that Sankara cannot afford to maintain his views  Apasudradhikaranam and also Vyasa on caste that he presented in the  Apasudradhikaranam cannot afford to author such sutras in the same place confirming Sankara’s views on caste. Sankara clearly maintains that caste is determined by birth in his commentary on the  Apasudradhikaranam,  Apasudradhikaranam, Devatadhikaranam and  Pramitadhikaranam. According to his view only Traivarnikas by birth are eligible for the Vedic study. The Yajnavalkyasmrti states that. “- by husbands belonging to a particular class upon wives belonging to the same class – the husbands and wives having been united in unblemished marriages are begotten sons who belong to the same caste as that of the 195 father and the mother and who are capable of continuing the line.” If  Sankara’s views on caste as stated in the Yajnavalkyasmrti were true then we argue that the same should apply for the author of the  Brahmasutra.  Brahmasutra. But according to the above smrti, Vyasa the author of the  Brahmasutra  Brahmasutra cannot be a born Traivarnika for, his father was a  Brahmana and his mother was a non-Traivarnika non- Traivarnika and both of them were not married. Thus when one applies the criterion of caste being determined by birth, which is adapted in the commentary on the Apasudrad the  Apasudradhikaranam hikaranam by Sankara, to the 82

 Brahmasutra, becomes birth of Vyasa, then Vyasa, the author of the  Brahmasutra, ineligible to study the Veda. Then how can Sankara adopt such a contradictory and meaningless view of caste in his commentary on the  Brahmasutra?  Brahmasutra? 6. CONCLUSION It can be concluded by the strength of the foregoing arguments that i) caste is not determined by birth, ii) a Sudra may be eligible for upanayana, iii) all human beings along with Sudras and women may also  Brahmajnana through the study of the Vedanta and iv) be qualified for  Brahmajnana Vyasa and Sankara may not have authored the  Apasudradhikaranam  Apasudradhikaranam and bhasya on the same respectively. res pectively.

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CHAPTER - VII Moral Imagination and Character Development in Ancient India I. Introduction Morality may be classified into two categories, namely, 1) 196 197 changeable morality and 2) unchangeable morality. The former depends upon the objects, such as, the objects of senses, Gods, etc., and the latter stands on the universal truth of human life. In other words, it can be said that the former is object-based morality and the latter subject-based. The changeable morality can be classified further. These sub-categories are based on i) gender, ii) power, iii) physical strength, iv) psychological and sensuous enjoyment, v) personal Gods, vi) religious Gods, vii) patriotism and so on. The practice of any object-based morality rests on different beliefs, faiths and human weaknesses, such as, i) fear of God, man, punishment in unseen worlds, etc., ii) desire for happiness in the unseen worlds iii) expectation of gifts from Gods, iv) aspiration for extraordinary powers or supernatural powers, etc. The practice of subject-based morality is purely individualistic and grounded in the direct experience of man unlike the practice of changeable morality. Thus different people have viewed morality divergently in various places. Diversity in understanding 198 morality results in conflict among human beings. The achievement of  stable society could only be an illusion as long as man thinks that morality is changeable and alterable according to one’s convenience. The achievement of stable, peaceful, cheerful and unexploited society is possible only when man discovers and practices the unchangeable morality. Discovery of morality depends on the maturity of moral imagination. Any moral practice is expected to convince man why should he be moral at all. Morality must have universally acceptable reason and experience as its backdrop and suit the interests of all human beings without prejudice. Man will not follow any moral practice until he knows the benefit of the same. If somebody forces someone to do good actions then it cannot be called the practice of unchangeable morality. Moral practice is that which man deliberately accepts to conduct his actions in a particular way for the universal benefit. In other wards, the unchangeable moral practice is a discipline by which man directs all his actions towards

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universal peace and harmony of all human beings. The practice of morality should help man to realize the truth behind his existence and quest in life. 199

The ancient Indians have uncovered the universal facts of human 200 life, for instance; man wants always to be free and happy; his actions are always directed to achieve happiness; his actions sometimes fail to give happiness, etc. Man might pose that his actions are aimed at keeping others, such as, wife, children, friends, etc., happy. But, as a matter of fact, all his actions are done only for the sake of himself and his own 201 happiness. The ancient Indians also found the reasons for the failure in stabilizing the human happiness, such as; man seeks happiness only in the world of objects, etc. Each object becomes an individual goal of man and requires a specific direction of action to achieve the same in the pursuit of  happiness in the objective world. Thus man performs his actions in many directions depending on the number of desired objects. The achievement of  any object necessarily involves confrontation for, in the name of  achievement, man takes control over the object either from the object itself  or from the possessor of the same. Controlling the objects involves resistance either from the object or from its possessor and causes confrontation and disgust. Confrontation leads to loss of freedom. For, desires and objects are innumerable therefore man acts in multiple directions in order to accomplish the same and eventually lands up in so many confrontations, which lead to choicelessness. Multidirectional activities of man cannot serve as the ultimate goal of human beings for they change often. Practice of changeable morality is based on the multidimensional goals and actions. It cannot have universal applicability and its acceptability is always limited to those who have similar targets. But the practice of the unchangeable morality is supported by the universal facts and core existence of human beings and it has a direction towards a universal goal of all human beings. Thus one has to understand that the simple and fragmented directions of man’s actions, which, always change, do not stand for scrutiny in the practice of unchangeable morality. Also the character development of man is grounded in the practice of unchangeable morality and inappropriate moral practice topples the character of man. We will make an attempt in this paper to elucidate the practice of the unchangeable morality and its role in character development as advocated by the ancient Indians.

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II MORAL IMAGINATION IN ANCIENT INDIA If man is always happy and his existence does not cause pain to others then there is no need for any control over his actions. But it is a fact that neither man is able to make himself happy nor his living does not cause pain in others. Therefore, there is a need for some kind of discipline over man’s actions so that he will be happy without causing pain in others. Ancient human beings have imagined and formulated methods in many ways to control human actions in order to attain peace, happiness and harmony in the society. The practice of these methods of control of human actions is called the practice of morality. Imagination of the methods of  moral discipline can be known as moral imagination. The goal of moral imagination is to secure the welfare of all beings and man achieves the same by learning to live in harmony with others and his surroundings. Man generally tends to act selfishly for his own happiness and does not consider other’s feelings. When all people act in a similar way without concerning the influence of their actions on others then everybody has to live in fear for, others might disturb one’s attachment with the things at any time. Fear causes disharmony with others. The moral imagination therefore, should be aimed at suppressing the selfishness of man and elevate him to altruism. The ancient Indians therefore, have constructed their moral imagination in the direction of the ultimate goal of human life, that is, 202 liberation (moksa (moksa), ), which is freedom from suffering and attainment of  the highest happiness. The discovery of the ultimate goal of man does not depend on blind faith. Man can directly experience liberation within himself. Since, everyone knowingly or unknowingly aspires for liberation no one can contradict the fact that the liberation is the highest goal of  human beings. The practice of the unchangeable morality forms the foundation for the attainment of liberation.

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II.1 Moksa II.1 Moksa Is the Ideal Direction of Human Life People generally live by working with or without specific targets of  life. But those who work with target always keep them for very limited purpose. The strength of misery in life depends on how small the targets are. In other words, the smaller the target is the higher the misery will be. However, human beings generally tend to work only with small targets and find themselves in misery. Some may claim that their targets are higher because they work for achieving greater objects, such as, discoveries, inventions, political liberations, attaining supernatural powers, etc. Whether one is genius or dull headed and whether achieving so called greater aims or petty small objects, one finds f inds oneself in misery. The ancient Indians have observed that man always tends to deal only with things of the world and while doing so he finds him in the misery. There cannot be any solution for misery in life unless man discovers his fundamental expectation behind all his activity and routes all his actions towards the same. It is in this context that the ancient Indians have contributed the discovery of liberation ( moksa) moksa) as the highest goal of  human life towards which all actions of human beings should be directed for the peace and happiness of the people. In other wards, man should realize that the underlying fact of his unknown quest of life is liberation and strongly determine that his ultimate goal of life must be moksa. moksa. Thus the ideal, namely, liberation, stands as the direction of human life towards which all activity must be routed. II.2 Moral Domain Morality, which can be understood in simple terms as being good or bad or being right or wrong, is generally viewed as associated with and operational only among actions of human beings, for, man believes that none other than human being has the capacity of discrimination between good and bad. The ancient Indians have clearly demarcated the domain of  morality only to the volitional actions of human being performed in 203 waking experience. According to them, morality must begin with one’s own self and further shared with the whole nature. In other words, man should be good not only for himself but also for other living beings. Being 87

good to nature is good for all. It is now necessary to know the definitions of good and bad actions given by the ancient Indians. II.3 Definitions of Good and Bad Actions The definitions of good and bad actions 204 given by the ancient Indians can be consolidated in the following manner. Those volitional actions of man, which do not result in pain immediately or eventually in one’s own self or in the object of action (a person, a living being towards which the action is being done) or in others, are called good actions. Those willful actions of man, which result in pain immediately or eventually in one’s own self or in the object of action (a person, a living being towards which the action is being done) or in others, are called bad actions. II.4 Tools of Human Actions Man performs moral actions by his physical body, mind and speech. Each of these three instruments acts on its respective objects. Thus moral actions are classified into three, depending on the tools of actions, namely, a) physical actions, b) mental actions and c) actions of speech. Similarly the objects of moral actions are also classified in three ways; 1) the whole of worldly gross objects are divided physically into five, namely, i) objects of sight, ii) objects of sound, iii) objects of smell, s mell, iv) objects of taste and v) objects of touch; 2) the objects again mentally divided into two, namely, i) objects of likes (raga (raga)) and ii) objects of dislikes (dvesa ( dvesa); ); 3) the objects of  speech are classified into two, namely, i) words of gentle speech and ii) words of harsh speech.

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II.5 Need for Unchangeable Morality Man when perceives any physical object forms the impression of the same in mind. These impressions are instantly categorized either as objects of likes or that of dislikes. The impressions of the physical objects, when converted into sets of objects of likes and dislikes become the mental 205 objects (vasana (vasana). ). Man creates vasanas as long as he is in mental states. The vasanas form the ground for human desires. Human desires are endless and every desire takes some time to yield the results. The already desired desires which are yet to yield the results (working desires) form the foundation for continuation of future existence of man. The existence of  life continues through different physical bodies depending on the working desires. Life existing through different bodies based on the desires is called 206  the cycle of births and deaths (samsara ( samsara ). The samsara is based on desires and their results, the desires are grounded in the vasanas and the vasanas are formed by likes and dislikes. Man always wants to be happy by attaining the objects of likes. But he does not have control over the objects of dislikes. Therefore, man always struggles in life to get away from the objects of dislikes and to attain the objects of likes. Man lands up always either in happiness or in pain in the struggle and such experience of life through fickle happiness and pain is called duhkha. duhkha. In other words, living the very ordinary and ignorant life is duhkha. duhkha. It is not the purpose of human life to continue to live in duhkha. duhkha. For ancient Indians, human life is the only life form in which duhkha can be eradicated for he contains all necessary capabilities to get rid not only of  duhkha but also of  samsara. samsara . Thus the main purpose of human life, discovered by the ancient Indians, is the attainment of  liberation (moksa (moksa), ), that is, termination of duhkha of  duhkha and the attainment of the highest happiness. Man in order to attain liberation needs to understand the causal chain of duhkha of duhkha and samsara. samsara. Samsara is caused by the desires; desires are based on the vasanas; vasanas; vasanas are created by likes and dislikes and ‘likes and dislikes’ are dependent on the physical objects. Man does not have control on the appearance of the divergent objects in waking experience. The appearance of the objects cannot be the cause of suffering ( duhkha). duhkha). Man, therefore, need not work on the appearance or disappearance of the 89

natural objects to attain liberation. But man can control the things that happen within him, such as, his creation of  vasanas and desires. He can even destroy the influence of his past vasanas, actions (karma (karma)) and their 207 results. Man goes through the cycle of births and deaths and does not attempt to destroy samsara though he has potentiality to come out of  208 samsara. samsara . Why? Because, he does not know how he creates the vasanas and gets influenced by them. If man discovers how he is yielding to the vasanas then he can understand how stupidly he has been living aspiring for the capricious happiness through the objects, which cannot last for more than a moment. The ephemeral nature of the objects of desire can be realized when one learns to have a vision of the formation of the desires and vasanas within oneself. Man needs to know that he is drawn away from knowing what is happening within himself by the present and past vasanas involving him always in the craving for the objects of desires. He should begin to be aware of what he is doing inside and outside himself in order to get rid of  the influence of vasanas of vasanas and desires. The awareness within is possible only when man can concentrate his mind within himself. The ancient Indians have found that one ought to practice the unchangeable morality ( sila) sila) in order to attain concentration within one’s own self. It is in the context of  attaining concentration (samadhi ( samadhi)) that the unchangeable moral practice gains importance. According to the ancient Indians, it is impossible to achieve concentration, which is useful for attaining liberation, without the practice of unchangeable morality (sila ( sila). ). If one does not practice unchangeable morality then one keeps acting only on the objects to attain happiness and always fails to be happy because of the ephemeral nature of  the objects. Thus man should always remember the purpose and goal of  life, that is, the attainment of liberation, as declared by the ancient Indians and keeps going ahead of life in the pursuit of the same. III CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT It is obvious that man has potential to do both good and bad actions. But man has choice of performing actions, such as, doing i) only good actions, ii) only bad actions and iii) both good and bad actions. The second and third options always lead to misery and therefore, should be avoided. Man has to choose to do only good actions in order to attain the highest 90

happiness (moksa (moksa). ). But Man, having caught in the natural setup of  suffering, ignores his choice of performing actions and keeps doing both 209 good and bad actions. Thus there is a need for a discipline by which man gets out of doing bad actions. The unchangeable moral practice is such a discipline, which gradually transfers man from doing bad actions and stabilizes him in doing only good actions. The transition of man from doing both good and bad actions to doing only good actions involves gradual change in the character of man. The character of doing both good and bad actions should be converted into the character of doing only good 210 actions in order to attain liberation. Thus man’s character gains development when one begins to do only good actions and avoid bad actions. Man in the process of character development learns to have direct vision or knowledge of the total operation of actions. The awareness of the process of actions gives freedom to man to do only good actions. Thus man, in order to develop his character, needs to know the backdrop of all his actions. III.1 Background of Human Actions The conflict among human beings arises out of divergent opinions on the given subject matter. It may be observed that neither all people seem to like any given object, nor those who appear to like a thing at the moment stand on the same in the course of time. Opinions change and likes and dislikes also keep changing. Every mind reacts distinctly on the given object. In spite of having innumerable changing opinions among human beings, there are certain points on which there cannot be any difference of  opinions. In other words, there are at least a few common points that every human being shares uniformly without any contradiction. To cite some: 1) All human beings always want to be happy; 2) Any action, either good or bad, is always aimed at attaining personal happiness and 3) All people enjoy bliss in dreamless sleep and no one claims that one suffers while one is in dreamless sleep.

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The common points mentioned above reveal that all men are naturally happy while mind does not function on the objects in dreamless sleep and there is no sufficient and consistent happiness when mind functions on the objects in waking and dream. The natural situation for man is that he cannot be aware of his happiness while consistent happiness is available in dreamless sleep and when he is able to be aware of his happiness in waking and dream, the happiness cannot be consistent and stable. Thus man’s life is said to be full of  duhkha. duhkha. However, man always wants to be happy and works for his happiness by doing both good and bad actions in waking state though the chances of expected happiness are bleak. How does man settle this problem? The only remedy is to stabilize his happiness so that man gets contented with such unchanging happiness. III.1.1 Process of Achieving the Stable Happiness The necessity of practice of unchangeable morality stands on the dissatisfaction of man with the happiness attained through the objects for, the object-based happiness is instable and changeable. When man attains liberation, he enjoys the highest happiness without a trace of misery and the same we call stable happiness. But man, instead of aspiring for liberation, seeks happiness through the objects of his likes. He adopts different means to achieve the objects of his desires and to get rid of the objects of dislikes. Certain natural devices inside man instigate him to do both good and bad actions and they are identified as follows. III.1.2 Influencing Factors for Bad Actions The following are the factors that are identified as the influencing 211 agents of bad actions inside man. They are: 1) Lust (kama ( kama), ), 2) Anger (krodha), (lobha), ), 4) Passion (moha ( moha), ), 5) Arrogance (mada (mada)) and krodha), 3) Greed (lobha 212 6) Jealousy (mascarya (mascarya), ), 7) selfishness, 8) hypocrisy, 9) conceit, 10) harshness, 11) non-wisdom, 12) craving, 13) non-discrimination, 14) error, 15) indolence and 16) sleepiness.

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III.1.3 Influencing Factors for Good Actions The following are the factors that are identified as the influencing 213 agents of good actions inside man. They are: 1) fearlessness, 2) cleanness of life, 3) steadfastness in attaining wisdom, 4) alms-giving, 5) self-restraint, 6) sacrifice, 7) knowledge of the sastras, sastras, 8) austerity, 9) straightforwardness, 10) harmlessness, 11) truthfulness, 12) absence of  wrath, 13) renunciation, 14) peacefulness, 15) absence of crookedness, 16) compassion to living beings, 17) un-covetousness, 18) mildness, 19) modesty, 20) absence of fickleness, 21) vigor, 22) forgiveness, 23) fortitude, 24) purity, 25) absence of envy and pride. The influencing factors for good or bad actions mentioned above are sometimes present naturally, sometimes attained or subjugated by effort. When good factors dominate, man tends to do good actions and when bad 214 factors influence he does bad actions. Doing good or bad actions depend upon what factor is affecting man at the given moment of action. Either of  the factors dominates in all volitional actions. Thus all willful actions would be either good or bad. Bad actions always lead to disturbance. Good actions would eventually help in achieving the stable happiness. Therefore, man ought to start doing only good actions and always avoid bad actions in order to achieve peace and happiness. But it is a problematic to do the same, because, man does not know how to get rid of the influence of bad factors. The ancient Indians have discovered certain methods of moral practice to get command over the influence of bad factors. III.2 Classification of Methods of Moral Practice At the surface level, methods of moral practice can be divided into two, namely, 1) method of moral practice by force for society at large and 2) the method of moral practice for an individual. The former exists in the name of social laws. Social laws always must have a direction, that is, harmony and universal happiness. Since social laws are changeable and alterable in course of time, they may not be useful in complete eradication of the influence of the bad factors. But the same could be a helping factor for an individual who attempts to attain complete control on bad. Law is something, which does not give choice to individuals. In other words, 93

whether man likes or not, he ought to follow law for otherwise, he would lose what little freedom he enjoys, in the name of punishment. Thus law works as a controller of bad at nation level. While man is somehow compelled to be good by law, he requires understanding his life, quest and struggle in this world, in order to attain liberation. The latter method of  moral practice given for an individual completes the task of training individuals for the attainment of the complete control on the influence of  bad factors. This paper does not discuss about the social laws but explains 215 only the methods of moral practice for individuals. i ndividuals. III. 3 Method of Moral Practice for Individuals III.3.1 Purpose of Method of Moral Practice The training for individuals to attain moksa consists of two stages, namely, i) cleansing the three instruments of action ( trikaranasuddhi) trikaranasuddhi) and ii) silencing the three instruments (trikaranamouna ( trikaranamouna). ). The former forms the core result of the unchangeable moral practice and the latter is the out come of the advanced training for an individual to attain liberation. The first requisite of man who aspires for the highest happiness is to learn to keep his instruments of moral actions, namely, body, mind and speech, clean. Secondly, man needs to adopt the methods of keeping his three instruments of action in silence after attaining the cleanness of the same in order to achieve liberation. Man should remember that he cannot attain liberation without trikaranasuddhi and therefore, the same is a necessary requirement for attaining moksa. moksa. Purity of the three instruments means maintenance of uniformity among the three instruments. In other words, trikaranasuddhi is nothing but performing any action by either physical body or mind or speech in accordance with the other instruments; for instance, doing physical action as one thinks and speaks; speaking as one physically does and thinks and thinking as one actually speaks and physically acts. Purity of the three 216 instruments involves austerity (tapas ( tapas). ). Body attains cleanliness by doing tapas of the body, that is, by honoring the teacher, the wise, etc., by maintaining celibacy and harmlessness. Upholding the speech that does not cause disturbance, that is study, true, sweet, wholesome, and diligent 94

refines the speech. Mind is purified by keeping up peace of mind, gentleness, silence, self-suppression and purity of purpose. The control of  the three instruments of action, namely, body, speech and mind, results in righteousness, in right character expressing itself in right conduct. Man after cleansing his three instruments must learn the methods of keeping the same in silence in order to stabilize his happiness. The ancient Indians sila) to be followed in order have recommended certain moral principles ( sila) to achieve trikaranasuddhi and we present the same in the following. III.3.2 Practice of Sila of Sila Sila comprises of speaking truth, non-violence, non-expectation of  other’s properties or material things, non-steeling, non-adultery or complete restraint from sex with other women and refraining from consumption of liquors. Man requires a strict practice of  sila whatever circumstances the man lives in for according to the ancient Indians the practice of  sila is a necessary condition for the attainment of  moksa. moksa. We will try to show certain practical difficulties and solutions while man practices sila in the following presentation. Practice of Speaking Truth It is very difficult to speak only truth in real life because we are already tuned to the flexibility of speaking both truth and falsehood. Sometimes speaking pure truth also causes problems. The ancient Indian tradition has given some clues on how to maintain strict practice of  speaking truth. According to it, man should always speak only truth and nothing other than the truth. If man speaks all truth then he would land up in practical difficulties. It is said, in order to avoid problems that man should speak the truth that interests the other man with whom he is speaking. In other words, one should speak the truth that is liked by the person in conversation. It is also said that just because the other person in conversation likes falsity, man should not speak lies. Also man should never speak lies. To put it in a simple way: If man speaks then he should speak only truth that is liked by the other person in conversation, otherwise, never speak anything and maintain silence. Thus the practice of  speaking truth helps man to maintain silence of the instrument of speech. 95

The silence of speech and speaking truth gives man a tremendous will power and great confidence. Practice of Non-Violence Practice of non-violence is yet another troublesome one. There are so many extreme understandings and practices of non-violence. We will try to give a practical approach to non-violence in the following. Safety of  human life is the basic necessity for any moral practice. It cannot be said in any method of moral practice that man should kill himself by starvation in order to maintain non-violence. It is a fact that since man is a dependent animal, needs to eat some organic life forms in order to sustain his basic life and growth for man cannot survive on inorganic materials. Eating life forms involves killing of other life and it amounts to violence. It sounds like a contradiction to say that man ought to practice non-violence in order to attain the highest happiness and that eating life forms for survival is violence. Thus there is a need for deeper understanding of the practice of  non-violence. Since man is capable of digesting both vegetarian (herbal food) and 217 non-vegetarian (meat) food he does not have natural limitation of food. It does not mean that man can eat anything as he likes. This only means a natural choice for man to eat any food for his survival. But a man without practice of non-violence eats anything as he likes. It is out of compassion and understanding the value of other’s life that man chooses to eat the vegetarian food. When man begins to practice non-violence he needs to choose the food from plants for the reasons; i) plants got quick  propagation, ii) relatively plants are more primitive life forms than the animals and they occupy most of the earth, iii) in many cases eating of  fruits, etc., helps in propagation of the same plant, iv) man can do agriculture and reproduce plants sufficiently for his survival. It means that the destruction of life forms of plants caused by eating can be remedied by reproducing the same. But the same logic does not apply in the case of  eating animals.

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Choice of vegetarian food helps man to restrain his desire for different tastes and longing for non-vegetarian food. However, man is allowed to eat non-vegetarian food in the following cases. a) Man can eat non-vegetarian food only when sufficient vegetarian food is not available. b) When doctor asks man to take meat as a medicine. c) In health emergencies, that is, in such cases that man will die if he does not eat meat, etc. Protection from the life forms, such as, bacteria, viruses, other microorganisms and disease-propagating animals like mosquitoes, etc., should be allowed when they threaten man’s life. It does not mean that man can kill anything for his comforts and fantasies. f antasies. Man should eat only vegetarian food. He is allowed to take food from any other primitive life forms in health emergencies. He should never cause pain or problem to other life forms. Since man kills plants for his food it becomes a binding obligation on man to protect and reproduce all the plants and also be thankful to them. Man may survive on nonvegetarian food in health emergencies and it does not mean that he has right to cause pain to other plants or animal life forms. Non-violence is basically a change of tendency in man to avoid the fancy of causing pain in others for his enjoyment. The practice of nonviolence helps man in attaining self-restraint and takes him away from the unwanted troubles from others. Non-violence also means tolerance of pain caused by others. A man of non-violence will not react on others who cause pain in him. This restraint is followed till life is threatened and it should be abandoned when man’s life is in danger caused by others. But 218 man may volunteer to sacrifice his life for the benefit of others. Practice of Non-Expectation of Other’s Property A man in practice of non-expectation of other’s property or material things should never imagine the ownership of anybody’s property under any circumstances. This practice helps man to get rid of attachment with material things, greed and jealousy.

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Practice of Non-Stealing Non-Stealing Under no circumstances man should steel other’s belongings. Stealing causes pain in the loser and it amounts to violence and therefore, should be avoided. Practice of Non-Adultery or Complete Restraint from Sex with Other Women Man should never attempt to cheat others. Cheating implies greed and other bad elements in man. Restraint from adultery helps man to control domination of bad elements. Man is expected to be faithful to his wife and family. He needs to restrict himself from the desire of sex with other women because it eventually causes all varieties of troubles, such as, social, economical, health, etc. The practice of non-adultery helps man to come out from lifetime suffering, which will be caused by sex with other women. Women also should follow the same. Practice of Refraining from Consuming Liquors Man needs to abandon the consumption of liquors strictly for he cannot be conscious of him and his surroundings while he is in the influence of intoxication. The liberation is awareness and consumption of  liquor is against it, therefore, one should avoid taking liquor in order to attain liberation. III.4 Methods of Moral Practice The unchangeable moral practice controls human actions and direct the same towards the attainment of liberation. The main task of the methods of moral practice is to avoid bad actions and promote good actions. The methods of moral practice cannot be applied universally in the 98

society, for society consists of divergent people of different ages and sex. In other words, different methods of moral practice need to be used for various people in the society depending upon their qualifications. People of  any society can be classified into two, namely, 1) people seeking liberation and 2) people aspiring for only mundane entities. According to the ancient Indians, all people, whether they may be people seeking for liberation or physical and psychological objects, need to practice morality. People of the first kind do practice of morality by themselves and the latter requires a direction. People who require direction of moral practice can be classified into two, namely, i) individuals getting educated and ii) elderly or uneducated individuals. The people of first category are given a method of moral practice, which is taught through schools. The second type of people who could not get the method of moral practice in the schools or those who are uneducated are given a different method of moral practice. III.4.1 Method of Moral Practice for Individuals Getting Educated Any moral practice will be futile unless it has a goal to reach. The goal should be understandable and worth aspiring for, to an individual. i ndividual. The ancient Indians, in order to demarcate the target of life, have classified asrama) into four, namely, 1) human life on the basis of growth ( asrama) studentship (brahmacharya (brahmacharya), ), 2) householder (grhastha (grhastha), ), 3) retirement (vanaprastha) ( sanyasa). ). These four are the four vanaprastha) and 4) renunciation (sanyasa 219 quarters of life span of human being. Similarly, the whole human aspirations ( purusartha)  purusartha) are divided into four, namely, 1) righteousness (dharma), (artha), ), 3) sensuous desire (kama ( kama)) and 4) liberation dharma), 2) wealth (artha (moksa). moksa). The second and third aspirations are natural to man. The righteousness and liberation need to be acquired by man through education or self-inquiry. It is natural for any man to desire for mundane wealth in the form of  knowledge or education, properties, wife, children, name and fame, etc. In the same way he also desires for the gratification of his psychological needs.  Artha and kama comprise the said natural desires. The problem is kama, the that, though all human beings universally desire artha and kama, 99

struggle begins in the achievement of the same for, the process of  achievement causes pain in others. Pain is caused because of the influence 220 of the arisadvarga and aspiration for frequently changeable petty goals. It instigates the factors of bad influence and eventually the six enemies within (arisadvarga (arisadvarga)) rule the society and thereby, there will not be any peace and happiness in the society. Ancient Indians have discovered the direction of human actions and the ultimate goal of human life in order to avoid such disaster, namely, the dominance of bad influences. The direction of human actions towards the purpose of life, that is, attaining liberation, is righteousness (dharma ( dharma). ). The highest human goal is liberation (moksa). moksa). We will try to explain how the ancient Indians have taught righteousness and liberation in the following presentation. III.4.1.1 Allocation of Targets and Achievements in Four Quarters of  Life III.4.1.2 The First Quarter Of Life According to the ancient Indian tradition, man needs to spend his first quarter of life in education. The target of studentship is the achievement of knowledge in a good way to stand in higher ranks. According to the ancient Indians, all good potentialities should be exploited at maximum level. The ancient Indians always encourage man to 221 be the best in whatever he is doing. This may sound like competition among people, but for Indians, it is not taught as competition but as selfexploration. If man is affected by any of the bad influences, then he cannot achieve the real progress in understanding the subjects that are taught. Therefore, man in order to achieve his target of education, that is, to keep him as the best, begins b egins to learn self-exploration to destroy the impediments of his progress (arisadvarga (arisadvarga)) within himself. Thus man attains self-control while dealing with his internal enemies.  Artha and Kama in the first quarter represent the achievement of the best knowledge.  Dharma is the training for getting the knowledge towards the goal of life in a good and harmless way. Everybody achieves artha and kama someway or the other but learning to achieve the same in a harmless way is the method of moral practice. Thus, in the first quarter of life, moksa becomes the main target and ‘artha ‘artha and kama’ kama’ form the subsidiary targets.

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III.4.1.3 Practical Applications Applications According to the ancient Indian tradition, the students stay with the teacher in his residence. The teacher educates the students basically at free 222 of cost and he is supported by his earnings or by kings or by alms collected by the students. The students, whether they hail from royal house or a poor hut, are sent everyday for alms collection to the nearby town as a 223 part of the course. Also they are sent every day to collect firewood to support kitchen and fire sacrificial activity. This simple practice of alms collection and helping in getting firewood for kitchen and fire sacrifice allows one to get the knowledge of the following: 1) Exposure to the different paths of life, styles of life and to the pleasure and pains in the adulthood. 2) Develops humility and self-restraint, which can destroy arrogance when people scold or insult the student when asked for alms. 3) Habituates helping nature by understanding the difficulties of making food and fire sacrifice. 4) Comes to know the real use and value of food, money and other material things. 5) Learns to feel the seriousness of human life, goal and achievement of the highest happiness because students live as dependents on the teacher and without luxuries. All students participate in the fire sacrifice everyday in the school. The same helps students to achieve self-discipline, because the teacher strictly maintains the time of waking, taking bath in the early morning, and fire sacrifice. In every aspect the teacher stands first to demonstrate and practice the same discipline. Since the teacher does not expect any monitory benefits from the students and he himself is the supporter of the students, the students can taste the quality of sacrifice and the utmost love of the teacher in only giving without any expectations. Most of the subjects useful not only o nly for future livelihood but also for the attainment of liberation are taught in the classes. The other forms of  arts are also taught to make every human being happy. It is in this quarter of life that man learns most of the virtues, such as, speaking truth, modesty, meditations, memorizing, celibacy, concentration, sharing, nonstealing, absence of ‘wrath, jealously and violence,’ etc., in the school. Similarly one may understand how other virtues are taught practically in

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the school itself. It is in the school that the student’s character is molded; therefore, parents take care of children’s education by putting them in a promising school where he is taught righteousness (dharma ( dharma), ), the direction of life towards liberation and necessary knowledge for sustenance of life. The students after completing their education with the teacher are asked to go for travel around the country. After equipped with the necessary knowledge to live in this world, students get prepared in the travel to encounter any practical situation in life in the righteous direction. Man comes to know the practical difficulties in life to maintain righteousness. The teacher is always ready to guide his students even after the completion of education. Life becomes a celebration and a chance to enjoy oneself by demonstrating one’s skills and knowledge and making divergent earnings in the direction of liberation. After learning the p ractical knowledge of the world and gaining confidence to commence his social life, the student rejoins the parents. III.4.1.4 The Second Quarter of Life The second quarter begins when man returns to the family after successful completion of the education. Since man in this quarter is physically ready for marital life he gets married in a righteous way.  Dharmic way of marriage is nothing but taking practical responsibility of a women, to satisfy, maintain and help her in getting continuation of lineage of family. Similarly woman also has same responsibility to help her husband in feeding, material progress, and sexual gratification. Of all the asramas the second quarter is the most important, for it supports all the 224 others. The welfare alike of the family and of the nation depends on the householder, and their happiness and prosperity are in his hand. A good husband, a good father, a good master, a good citizen, is the noblest of  men. The home is the school of unselfishness, compassion, tenderness, temperance, purity, helpfulness, prudence, industry, right judgment and charity. The qualities that make the good householder, when shown to his own circle in house and State, are the qualities that make the sage or the saint when shown to all.

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The goal of the second quarter is the attainment of  artha and kama in the highest order in a righteous way as taught in the school. The strength of the human character is tested in this quarter of life. Man stabilizes his main goal of life as liberation and strongly prepare for directing all his actions towards achieving the same s ame without violating the morality. III.4.1.5 Practical Applications Applications Man gets married in this quarter and breaks celibacy maintained through his first quarter. His desires for sex with other women than his own wife are restrained. He controls the bad influences, such as, cheating, harshness, and other internal enemies ( arisadvarga). arisadvarga). It is in this quarter that man learns to live with anti-sexual stranger. Every event of life in this quarter is a strong war between the bad elements and the good elements in oneself. It is here that man learns to develop the virtues such as alms giving, etc. Man using this world as platform tries to win the bad elements. Losing the fight is losing the whole life effort. Man tries to earn money, property, wife, children, fame, name, and knowledge of renunciation and liberation in a righteous way. If man fails to be righteous in this quarter of  life then his life is for sure be the most miserable. III.4.1.6 The Third Quarter of Life Man gets children in the second quarter. The children are given proper education and parents get them married after they complete their education. The third quarter of life begins when children get married. Wife and husband leave their children and grand children in this quarter by handing over all their material possessions earned through second quarter to their children. People of third quarter of life, retire to forests or go away from their family and give up complete responsibility of family. It is in this quarter that human beings completely give up selfish artha and kama and turn themselves altruistically towards renunciation and liberation. All efforts are fully directed dir ected to achieve liberation, that is, the highest happiness within oneself.

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III.4.1.7 Practical Applications Applications It is in this quarter that man stabilizes his knowledge of the ephemeral nature of the objects by discrimination; after attaining the discriminatory knowledge man gives up his fantasies of desire for enjoyment of happiness both in this world and in the other worlds; attains six spiritual virtues, namely, control of mind ( sama), sama), control of the senses (dama), dama), complete internalization of the mind ( uparati), uparati), tolerance to all sufferings (titiksa (titiksa), ), faith in the words of texts and the teacher ( sraddha), sraddha), and stabilization of the intellect on the truth ( samadhana); samadhana); develops strong and consistent desire for liberation; achieves the quality of renunciation and conquers all his bad elements. Once he achieves the above he enters his fourth quarter of life. III.4.1.8 The Fourth Quarter of Life Man even leaves his wife and leads a mendicant life in this quarter of life. His wife is taken care of by his son if she wants to do so. In case she acquires maturity of knowledge to attain liberation then she would also lead a separate life. It is in this quarter of life that man does not have any responsibility, bad elements, desires, doubts in life and knowledge. Man becomes compassionate, attains choice either to keep him in deep concentration or to come out to share his knowledge and happiness of  liberation with others. Man discovers the secret of life, death and rebirth. This discovery makes him liberated. This is the the goal that one should achieve in this life. III.4.2 Method of Moral Practice for Elderly or Uneducated Individuals If one fails to learn the foregoing method of moral practice through education then we advance the following method of moral practice, which gives the same result, namely, the attainment of the highest happiness and freedom from suffering (duhkha ( duhkha). ). The prerequisite to this method is selfawareness. Life of man is divided into two parts, namely, 1) life till retirement and 2) life after retirement.

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III.4.2.1 Method of Moral Practice before Retirement Man while strictly practices sila needs to understand the nature of  mental functions, which drive him to do bad actions. The most dangerous functions of mind are to think either by way of comparison or contrast or equality. These three ways of thinking generally cause bad effects and pain. Thinking by way of comparison or contrast or equality is always a limited thinking. As a matter of fact, there is nothing in this world, which can be compared with or contrasted with or equated with the other. Comparison or contrast or equality is nothing but evaluating something with partial knowledge and prejudice by ignoring the complete facts about the thing. It is a fact that man’s life means experience or knowledge. Experience of any person is unique to the same person and can never be compared or contrasted or equated with any other person. But almost every time man thinks either by way of comparison or equality etc. It depends mainly on the mental tendency of complex (superiority or inferiority) based on the social values attributed to the fragments of experience. Such acts of comparison etc., leads to disharmony among people and cause pain at large. As a matter fact it is due to this way of thinking, that is, comparing etc., that man suffers mostly.

Thus man needs to learn to live by thinking without comparison or contrast or equality with others. This practice solves most of the problems and helps man to live happily. It is not so easy to practice thinking without comparison etc. Man should stop evaluating the knowledge or material possessions of others in any manner. He may observe and know what is happening with others and help them. But man should never remember or recognize the good that he has done to others. The remembrance of the good that man has done to others might cause the expectation of the same from the others and such expectation causes suffering in man. Man should always remember the bad that he has done to the others for it helps him not to repeat the same. The words good and bad appear to be words of  comparison. But the ancient Indians have defined the same by taking the occurrence of pain, as a standard and therefore, comparison, etc., do not involve in defining good and bad.

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Man often tries to hide his real nature, for instance, hiding his knowledge and material possessions, and projects what he really is not while conducting his actions. Pretending to be different is nothing but an act of self-deceit and fraudulence to others. Man tries to pretend because; i) he always try to mind other’s business or frequently attempts to know what the other man is doing or possessing, ii) of his thinking with comparison, contrast, etc. Therefore, man has to stop pretending and doing prejudicial evaluation of other’s material possessions and knowledge, for pretending is falsehood. Thinking without comparison, etc., requires awareness of mental activity. The same can be achieved by practicing concentration. The practice of sila of  sila helps to get concentration. When man learns to concentrate on his mental activity he gains freedom of thinking and he needs to choose not to think in the way of comparison or contrast or equality. If man could conquer the way of thinking without comparison, pretension, etc., then he attains almost complete control on the bad influences ( arisadvarga). arisadvarga). This method of practice does not require any qualifications, such as special birth, education, specific sex, age, etc. Anybody can practice it under any circumstances. It helps man to control his mental patterns, habitual patterns and facilitates to keep mental silence. It eventually helps man to attain the knowledge of the formation of vasanas of  vasanas and desires and leads to liberation. III.4.2.2 Method of Moral Practice after Retirement Man after the retirement should divert himself from all the mundane activities that he has done till then and get into the practices of  sila and control of mental activity as explained above. He should select any approved painless posture, close his eyes and withdraw all his senses and mind from their respective objects. He should learn to practice 225 vipasyana meditation with noble silence. He requires to spending all his time only for vipasyana meditation. If past vasanas, vasanas, results of actions and working actions of man were limited then he would be able to eradicate all of them and attain liberation in this life itself. Otherwise, at least his efforts in this life will definitely help him eradicating some amount of his past actions and desires. Thereby he can get the benefit of the moral practice in the next birth to attain liberation.

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The practicality of the moral practice stands on the silence of three instruments of action, namely, speech, mind and body. Maintaining noble silence covers the silence of speech. But man is exempted from the noble silence in the cases of health, food and clearing the doubts regarding the moral practice from a teacher, etc. Selecting a physical posture for meditation helps man to maintain physical silence. Mental silence can be maintained by practicing vipasyana meditation, which means observation of process of knowledge – First stage: perceiving the external objects, observing the formation of the impressions of the same and instantly categorizing them either as objects of likes or dislikes; Second stage: observing the process of creating vasanas and influence of  vasanas every moment; Third stage: observing the formation of desires every moment. The desires that arise at each moment of observation do not influence man. It is the secret of mind that man does not get affected by the thought of the moment as long as he is in observation. Observation of any influence means getting rid of the same in that particular moment. The practice of observation should continue till death and it gives a great stable s table happiness. Man in order to achieve mental silence needs to control the mind to live only in the present. Man should learn to observe that the thinking process of mind always gets support either from the past or from the future imaginations. Thinking about past and future is the main source of  duhkha. Thus man should observe his mind every moment and prevent past and future imaginations in the thinking process. Man gets rid of his fantasies, imaginations and influence of ‘good and bad’ impressions of the past that haunt him even in the present, by keeping his mind always in the present. One should always remember the practical foundations of the said methods of moral practice, that is, strict practice of  sila forms the foundation for the attainment of concentration. Concentration helps to observe the process of knowledge and formation of desires. The observation and abstinence of the creation of desires liberates man and keeps him and others around him in peace.

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CHAPTER – VIII CONCLUDING REMARKS

The purpose of the Indian philosophical inquiry is liberation moksa). Generally, for all the systems of Indian philosophy, it is liberation (moksa). from the cycle of births and deaths ( samsara) samsara) with the exception of  systems like Carvaka. For Sankara, the samsara is in the forms of: i) the individual self ( jiva)  jiva) leaving the body at the time of death and entering into another at the time of birth; ii) going through the cycle of three levels of  experience, namely, waking, dream and dreamless sleep;  Jiva’s  Jiva’s thinking as he is the doer (karta ( karta)) and enjoyer (bhokta ( bhokta). ). Whatever is the explanation, the existence in the samsara is accepted as suffering (dhukha ( dhukha). ). It may be suffering from thinking of oneself from moment to moment as the doer and enjoyer; or from day to day experience passing through waking, dream and dreamless sleep; or from traveling from one body to another; liberation is accepted as annihilation of suffering (duhkha ( duhkha)) by getting out of  samsara. samsara. Liberation is living in the unconditional Bliss without suffering. In the way of presenting the methods to realize liberation, the Indian philosophical systems have put forward many concepts and discovered realities ( padarthas).  padarthas). Though each system of Indian philosophy uses some of the same concepts, the explanations and definitions of the same vary from one school to the other. It appears that the development of Indian philosophy has gone through an evolutionary criticism of one system by the other and also one interpretation by the other within the same system and thereby, the definitions and explanations of philosophical concepts in each system differ from one another. The difference in definitions of the concepts depends on the discovered reality. One of the Indian 226 philosophical systems holds that there are sixteen  padarthas ; another 227 228 one says six or seven ; someone else says there are four  padarthas ; 229 some other says only two ; Vyasa and Sankara hold the view that there is only one non-dual reality called Brahman. Realizing the reality liberates one from Samsara duhkha. duhkha. The problematic for Sankara is that if there is only one non-dual reality without a second then how the duality of the world appears and to whom. In a way of explaining advaita Vedanta, the ancient method ( Drsti ( Drsti srsti vada) vada) upholds the view that the person who sees and the duality of the 108

world never exists. It is only non-dual Brahman that always exists without a second. Later in the process of evolutionary criticism, the ancient method has accepted a kind of reality for the appearance of the world. According to the altered ancient method, the world of appearance exists as long as one o ne satta). The phenomenolity of the duality is perceives it ( pratibhasika satta). accepted in order to make the explanation of advaita Vedanta easily understandable. Vyasa in his method of explanation of advaita Vedanta (Srsti Drsti vada) vada) adopts entirely different view in comparison with the ancient method. Vyasa strengthens the concept of   Isvara who is responsible for the creation of duality and the individual person who perceives the same. In order to maintain the concept of  Isvara of  Isvara,, Vyasa and Sankara have to bring out the supporting concepts, such as,  jiva,  jiva, illusoriness of the world, creation, destruction, maya, maya, avidya, avidya, anadi bondage, identity of  Isvara and jiva,, and liberation.  Isvara and jiva It is not the question whether the method of Vyasa is right or wrong but one has to see that how easy the method of Vyasa is and are there any compromises in the way of explanation. The method of Vyasa is definitely easier than the earlier ones. However, it is obvious that, even Vyasa’s method could not have brought liberation in many whether in the past or now. Thus there is a requirement for much easier method of explaining advaita relaity than that of Vyasa in order to make people understand the reality and get liberation liberation easily. easily. In the way of discovering an easier method, where all people become qualified for liberation, we have exposed many compromises and some of the inconsistencies in Sankara’s commentary on the  Brahmasutra as a part of the process of the evolutionary criticism in the previous chapters. We are attempting in this chapter to illustrate the major conclusions that are made in the previous chapters. In the second chapter we have attempted to show that Brahman, the vrttijnana. only one reality without a second cannot be realized through the vrttijnana. Knowing is different from realizing. Knowing non-duality through the unfragmented mental modification ( akhandakaravrttijnana akhandakaravrttijnana)) is not sufficient to become conscious of liberation. Liberation can be experienced in different ways. 1. Experienceing perpetual conscious awareness of nonduality without any break and 2. Perpetual conscious awareness of the illusariness of the duality including the apparent existence of the person himself. The first case of liberation indicates a permanent non-return of so called person from non-dual experience. In the second case, though the 109

person is aware of the duality and his own existence one does not get affected by the duality for he has realized the illusoriness of the duality. Thus liberation can be realized either by way of not getting affected by the duality as in the second case or by way of maintaing total unawareness of  the duality as in the first instance. Now the question that arises is that, who is it that maintains total unawareness of the duality and not getting affected by the duality. For  jiva) who is part of  Isvara sankara, it is the individual self ( jiva) of  Isvara the creator of  the duality. We have attempted in the second chapter that such an individual self who is  Isvara is impossible and unnecessary. For us, the whole process of duhkha of  duhkha is psycho epistemological process which depends basically on imagination (kalpana ( kalpana)) influenced by many factors such as likes (raga (raga), ), dislikes (dvesa ( dvesa)) and arisadvarga, of  duhkha arisadvarga, etc. The process of duhkha does not require the presence of a fragment of indivisible consciousness as Sankara thinks. The imaginaray instruments, such as, the internal organ, the sense organs and the organs of action and the channels of the organs and the objects of senses guided by the individual memory packs such as likes (raga (raga)) and dislikes (dvesa (dvesa)) and the past memories supplied to the internal organ are sufficient to explain samsara. samsara . The imagination of the configuration of the organs does not belong to the individual. All the duality is the imagination that arises from the universal memory. The individual’s imagination has reference only to likes (raga) ( dvesa)) which are instantly stored in the universal raga) and dislikes (dvesa duhkha. memory and the same is the cause of samsara of  samsara duhkha. In order to operate the desires stored individually in the universal memory in the form of likes and dislikes, the unviesal memory imagines the organs of both subtle and gross and supplies back the individual memory packs to the relevant set of organs instantly. The duality, that is, imagination of the universal memory, appears to be gross and subtle to the individual set of organs. Thus samsara continues because of the formation of likes (raga (raga)) and dislikes (dvesa (dvesa)) individually. The likes (raga ( raga)) and dislikes (dvesa (dvesa)) are produced because of unawareness of the source of the supply of past memory and the process of the strorage of the present memory. The reason for such unawareness of the sourse of supply of the past memory is ignorance. The ignorance is in the form of dreamless sleep which acts as a filter preventing to know the process of action within the individual set of organs. 110

The ignorance is situated by the universal memory for it organizes all individual desires individualistically in the time frame. The longevity of  the set of individual organs and the time to enjoy the desired objects does not match, for the desires require longer time to enjoy than the longevity of  the set of individual organs. Again fresh desires of the individual set of  organs are stored and called back from the universal memory. The choice of scrutiny of desires from the memory has been removed in order to allow one to enjoy as many as one desired. Thus the universal memory naturally does not reveal itself to the individual set of organs and makes the process of supply of the past memory mechanically controlled by organized time frame. The individual set of organs loses the coice of selection of desires because the memory of past desires is supplied by the universal memory automatically. Thus the cycle of  samsara continues and individual set of  organs suffer duhkha during the process. There is no creation, nor destruction, no maintenance of the real gross and subtle objects. All this duality is in the form of universal memory and therefore, the individual sets of organs are also nothing other than the universal memory. Thus so called our own existence can be recognized as the part of universal memory. In other wards, the set of  organs which we think our own existence does not belong to us. All the organs belong to the universal memory. What we really are is mere likes raga) and dislikes (dvesa (raga) ( dvesa)) that are imagined individually and stored instantly in the universal memory. The universal memory provides its imaginary organs and establishes a link between the set of organs and the relevant set of likes and dislikes. Thus our existence can be reduced only to the likes and dislikes and therefore, the so called creations of the subtle and the gross can be recognized as mere embodiments of the imagination of the universal memory. The memory, whether it is universal or individual, does not have any material content. Since everyting is nothing other than memory and does not have any material content it is meaningless to think  that there is matter which one likes or dislikes and get deluded by it. The creation, maintenance and destruction are none other than memory seeds in the universal memory. For instance, the banian tree exists in its seed as the memory of the banian tree.When the memory in the banian seed is awakened it acquires the other required memory forms from its surroundings and tries to appear as a banian tree and this process goes on momemt to moment and therefore, the change is inivitable every 111

moment in the process of imagination and embodiment of memory. Each process of imagination and development is instantly stored as memory and the same becomes the seed of memory in the universal memory. Similarly, all that appears to exist are nothing other than the universal memory. Thus all this duality including our own existence is nothing but memory. The embodied memory appears to be gross and subtle to the other individually embodied momery. One memory perceives the other as gross and the subtle whereas all this is materially contentless. The beginning of  samsara is the wrong recognition of the perceived memories as consisting of the gross and the subtle matter. The conviction in the perceived gross and subtle matter leads one to form for m the memories of likes and dislikes. The likes and dislikes form the foundation of creating desires. The desires cause the samsara duhkha. duhkha. From the foregoing backdrop we have attempted in the third chapter to show that the concepts, such as creation, orination and non-orgination,  jiva,  jiva, avidya, avidya, etc., which are organized by Sankara in order to sustain his explanation of advaita Vedanta, are redundant and needless. In the fourth chapter we have attempted to show that Sankara’s way of explaing the illusoriness of the world on Brahman is misleading and impossible. For Sankara, the duality consisting of both gross and subtle matter which he calls vyvaharika satta and pratibhasika and pratibhasika satta is perceived in the place of Brahman. In other wards, for Sankara, the knowable world is superimposed on the unknowable Brahman. For us matter whether it is gross or subtle does not exist at all and the same is nothing but forms of  matterless memory. In his explanation, Sankara appears to have presumed some kind of existence for the matter in the Sattatrya vicara and in order to maintain the same he has to put forward the supporting concepts like the non-originated creation (anadi ( anadi srsti), ( anadi srsti), non-originated individual self (anadi  jiva),  jiva), etc. These concepts inturn required many concepts and thus the explanation of  srsti drsti vada became complicated. In order to remove such unnecessary complications, we have projected above the real nature of the so called appearance of matter as just materialless memory. While we are attempting to reject Sankara’s explanation of  sattatraya vicara, vicara, Eliot Deutsch’s effort to complicate the same futher by treating non-existence (tuccha ( tuccha)) as a kind of existence, has been dismissed in the fifth chapter. 112

In the sixth chapter inconsistencies in Vyasa’s Vedantasutras and Sankarabhasya on the same have been exoposed while the views of  Sankara and Vyasa on the incompetence of  Sudra for brahmajnana through the study of the Vedanta are mentioned. Later it is shown that the views of Sankara and Vyasa regarding Sudra’s Sudra’s incompetence are unwarranted. In the seventh Chapter we have explained the importance of  morality. We also attempted to elucidate the practice of uncheangeable morality which includes the methods of internal perception in order to know the psyco epistemological process which is responsible for samsara duhkha. duhkha. One needs to discover the process of memory primarily till the packs of likes (raga ( raga)) and dislikes (devesa (devesa)) and ultimately the source of the supply of past memory in order to realize liberation ( moksa). moksa). Liberation is the highest goal and every experience from moment to moment requires to be used for the same.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1

Sri Kakaraparti Krishna Sastri, Sadamuktisudharnavamu Sadamuktisudharnavamu,, translated into Telugu by Somanadha Sastri, Vavilla Ramaswami Sastrulu & Sons, Vavilla Press, Madras, 1935, pp. 41-66.

According to K.Krishna Sastri, the atman is defined by the Carvaka indriyas), by school as physical matter, by the Lokayata school as senses ( indriyas), the Hiranyagarbha school as vital breath ( prana),  prana), by the Naradapancaratra school as mind (manas ( manas), ), by the Yogacara school as buddhi and by the Bhatta school of Purvamimamsa as sheet of Bliss (Anandamaya Kosa). Kosa). 2

The Mandukya Upanisad with Gaudapada Karika and Sankara’s Commentary, Commentary, 1.7. 1.7. p.46.Translated by Swami Nikhilananda, Sri Ramakrishna Ashram, ysore, sixth edition, 1974. Sa atma sa vijneyah 3

 Brhadaranyaka  Brhadaranyaka Upanisad Sankara Sankara Bhasya, 2.1.20: 2.1.20:

Sarvasu hy upanisatsu purvam ekatvam pratijnaya drstantair hetubhisca  paramatmano vikaramsaditvam jagatah pratipadya punar ekatvam upasamharati. 4

Vidyaranaya, Pancadasi, Pancadasi, XI.25, p.442. Translated by Swami Swahananda, R.K. Muth, Madras, third edition, 1980. While answering the objection: ‘I do not admit non-duality but only accept it is a hypothesis to be refuted.’  Nabhyupaimyahamadvaitam  Nabhyupaimyahamadvaitam tadvaco’nudhya tadvaco’nudhya dusanam. dusanam.

5

The Taittiriya Upanisad, 3.1: Yato va imani bhutani jayante, Yena jatani  jivanti. Yatprayantyabhisamvisanti. Tadvijinasasva. Tadbrahmeti  And The Brahmasutra Brahmasutra Sankara Bhasya, Bhasya, 1.1.2, pp, 17-18. 17-18. Translated by Gambhirananda Swami, 114

6 

7

 Advaita Asram, Asram, Calcutta, fourth fourth edition. 1983. The Mandukya The Mandukya Upanisad,1.2 Upanisad,1.2 pp.10-11: Ayamatma. Ibid.: Ayamatma Ibid.: Ayamatma brahma brahma..

8

The Chandogya Upanisad, 6.2.2: Satveva somyedamagra asidekamevadvitiyam. asidekamevadvitiyam. 9

The Mandukya The Mandukya Upanisad, Upanisad, 1.2, pp. 10-11: 10-11: Sarvam hyetadbrahma hyetadbrahma

10

The Brahmasutr The Brahmasutra a Sankara Bhasya Bhasya,, 1.1.1., p.9.

11

Eight-fold practices: (1) Viveka (2) Vairagya (3) Samadi sampat (4)  Mumuksatva, (5) Tattvam padartha padartha sodanam, (6) (6) Sravana, (7) Manana and (8) Nidhidyasana. Nidhidyasana. 12

The Brahmasutra Sankara Bhasya, 1.1.2.,p.16.

13

Ibid., p.17.

14

The Brhadaranyaka Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, 4.4.19.: manasaivanudrastavyam. manasaivanudrastavyam. Also see The Kathopanisad, Kathopanisad, 1.3.12. Drsyate tvagryaya tvagryaya buddhya suksmaya suksmaya suksmadarsibhih. suksmadarsibhih. 15

The epistemological analytic describes an abridged analysis of the classification of the maximum possible varieties of knowledge in  Advaita Vedanta. 16 

The Brhadaranyaka Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, 4.4.19; manasaivanudrastavyam. manasaivanudrastavyam. Also see the Kathopanisad, Kathopanisad, 1.3.12. Drsyate tvagryaya buddhya suksmaya suksmadarsibhih. 17 

Sankarasankara Byhasyavimarsah Byhasyavimarsah,, Bellamkonda Ramaraya Kavi, Sri Sankarasankara pp. 37-38. Published by Kavitha Venkatasubrahmanya Venkatasubrahmanya Sastri, Sri Ramakavita grantha malasampadakah, Narasaravupeta, Gunturu District, Andra Pradesh, India 1953. nanu samadhau bhavatvecam sabdadbrahmakarantahkarana sabdadbrahmakarantahkarana vrttih; Katham punassusuptau tada’ ntahkaranasyaivabhavaditi ntahkaranasyaivabhavaditi cenmaivam… 115

avidhyayassatvena avidhyayassatvena tada Brahmakara avidhya vrttisattvanna vrttisattvanna nirvikalpaka  jnanasya kapi ksatih… ksatih… Tasmat susuptavavidhya susuptavavidhya vrttibhissaksyanandajnananubhuvasya jayamanatvanna nirvikalpakajnanasttvamiti. 18

The Madukya The Madukya Upanisad  Upanisad , 1.5,p.21.

19

Ibid.

20

a Upanisad, 4.4.19; 4.4.19; The Kathopanisad , 1.3.12. The Brhadaranyak The Brhadaranyaka

According to the Advaita the  Advaita classification of knowledge, there is at least one among the three possible sources, for the revelation of   Nityajnana,  Nityajnana,  Nityajnana itself, (ii) in the fragmented modification of mind namely, (i)  Nityajnana and Avidya (khandakara vrtti) vrtti) and (iii) in the unfragmented mental modification (antahkarana (antahkarana akhandakara vrtti ). It can be argued: (i) Brahman-Atman ( Nityajnana)  Nityajnana) as such is experienced only when the antahkarana is destroyed and in turn its validity depends only on verbal testimony and not not on personal experience. Therefore, realization realization of   Nityajanana requires some other means in order to be established through personal experience; (ii) Though Nityajnana Though  Nityajnana is presupposed as the basis for all kinds of  Vrttijnana, Vrttijnana, it cannot be experienced in knowledge obtained through fragmented modifications of mind and  Avidya.  Avidya. It is said so because  Nityajnana is described as non-dual in  Advaita Vedanta and it is not possible to realize non-duality while one is in duality; (iii) Therefore, it can be said that the unfragmented mental modification is the only source for the revelation of  Nityajnana of  Nityajnana.. Thus an examination of the object object of the antahkarana akhandakara vrtti is conducted here. 21

The Mandukya The Mandukya Upanisad  Upanisad , 2.4,p.88.

22

Ibid., 2.5,p.89.

23

Ibid., 2.9-15,pp.95-103.

24

Ibid., 1.7 (11), p.57.

25

Ibid., 1.6 (5) pp. 34-35.

116

26

(i) Consciousness conditioned by Avidya by Avidya is atman; when Avidya is atman; when Avidya annihilated Consciousness is atman. atman. (ii) Consciousness conditioned by Maya by  Maya is Isvara; when Maya is Isvara; when Maya removed Consciousness is Isvara. Isvara. Therefore, atman is Isvara is Isvara.. The inference here is that atman gets identified with  Isvara only when  Avidya is destroyed. When  Avidya (cause) is destroyed completely then the existence of the antahkarana with its modifications (effect) is not possible.

27

The Brahmasutr The Brahmasutra a Sankarabhasya Sankarabhasya,, 1.1.4., p.31.

28

Ramakrsnadhvari, The Advaita The Advaita Vedanta Paribhasa Sikhamani Vyakhya, Vyakhya, 123.21. Siddhante Jahadajahallaksanaya evasiddeh. 29

Madhusudana Sarasvati ,  , Advaita Siddhi, Siddhi, Chapter I,239.2. I,239.2. Suddham hi  Brahma na drsyam drsyam ‘yattadadresya’ miti srutehkimtu srutehkimtu upahitameva. Tacca mithyaiva. Na hi hi urttidasaya manupahitam tadbhavati. 30

Ibid., Chapter I, 242-4. Vrttikale vrttirupena dharmena suddhatvasambhavat. suddhatvasambhavat. Suddhasya vrttivisayatvam na sambhavati. 31

The Kenopanisad, I.6. Yanmanasa na manute yenahurmano matam.

32

The Taittirya Upanisad, 2.9.1. 2.9.1. Yatovaco Yatovaco nivartante. Aprapya manasasah. manasasah. 33

The Chandogyopanisad, 8.15.1. 8.15.1. Naca punaravartate. punaravartate.

34

The Bhagavadgita, The Bhagavadgita, 15.6. 15.6. Yadgatva na nivartante.

35

 jiva’’ interchangeably with Henceforth I will be using the term ‘‘ jiva ‘individual self’.

117

36

 Iha dehavyatiriktasya dehavyatiriktasya atmanah sadbhavah samarthyate, samarthyate, (SSBB,, 3.3.53, p.698) bandhamoksadhikarasiddhaye;; (SSBB bandhamoksadhikarasiddhaye -dehavyatiriktasya (SSBB,, 3.3.53, p.699) dehavyatiriktasya atmano astitvamucyate – (SSBB  Dehamatram Caitanyavisistamatmeti Caitanyavisistamatmeti prakrta jana laukayatikasca  pratipannah| Indriyanyeva cetananyatmetyapare| cetananyatmetyapare| Mana ityante| Vijnanamatram ksanikamityeke| Sunyamityapare| Asti dehadivyatiriktah samsari karta bhoktetyapare| Bhoktaiva kevalam na kartetyeke| Asti tadvyatirikta Isvarah sarvajnah sarvasaktiriti kecit| Atma sa bhokturityapare| Evam bahavo vipratipanna yuktivakyatadabhasa samasrayah santah (SSBB, SSBB, 1.1.1, p.9)

37

Even among these systems, while theistic schools like Visistadvaita,  Dvaita,  Dvaita, etc., make the  jiva dependent on God, other systems like the Samkhya consider the individual self to be independent. independent. For, the Samkhya system, at least as it existed before Isvarakrs before  Isvarakrsna na,, did not recognize God. 38

Sastraphalasambandhopapatteh| Sariranuvinasini hi jivo sarirantaragatestanistaprapti parihararthau vidhipratisedhavanarthakau syatam (SSBB, SSBB, 2.3.16, p.445)  Iha dehavyatiriktasya dehavyatiriktasya atmanah sadbhavah samarthyate, bandhamoksadhikarasiddhaye; na hi asati dehavyatirikta atmani  paralokaphalascodana  paralokaphalascodana upapadyeran; kasya va brahmatmatvamupadisyeta brahmatmatvamupadisyeta (SSBB, 3.3.53, p.698) 39

So akamayata (TUP, TUP, 2.6, p.296) (Bhasya): Kamayitrtvat| Na hi Kamayitracetanamasti loke| Sarvajne hi brahmetyavocama| Atah kamayitrtvopapattih kamayitrtvopapattih (p.298)

40

Tadaiksata (CUP, CUP, 6.2.3, p.509) (Bhasya): Tatsadaiksateksam darsanam krtavat| Atasca na pradhanam Samkhyaparikalpitam Samkhyaparikalpitam jagatkaranam| Pradhanasya Pradhanasya acetanatvabhyupagamat| acetanatvabhyupagamat| Idam tu saccetanamiksitr saccetanamiksitrtvat tvat (Ibid) 41

Sa iksata ( AUP,  AUP, 1.1.1, p.329) (Bhasya): Sa sarvajnasvabhavyat atma ekah eva sanniksata lokannusrja iti (Ibid., p.330)

118

42

Sattveva somyedamagra asidekamevadvitiyam asidekamevadvitiyam (CUP, CUP, 6.2.2, p.508) Tadaiksata bahu syam prajayeyeti tattejo asrjata tatteja eksata bahu syam prajayeyeti tadapo asrjata| Tasmadyatra kvaca socati svedate va purusastejasa eva tadadhyapo  jayante (CUP, CUP, 6.2.3, p.509) Ta apa eksanta bahvyah syama prajayemahiti ta annamasrjanta tasmadhyatra kva ca varsati tadeva bhuyistamannam bhavatyadbhya eva tadadhyannadyam jayate| (CUP, CUP, 6.2.4, p.510) 43

Sabdascobhayamapi brahmanah pratipadayati – akrtsnaprasaktim niravayavatvam ca (SSBB, SSBB, 2.1.27, p.335) 44

Seyam devataiksata hantahamimastistro devata anena  jivenatmananupravisya  jivenatmananupravisya namarupe vyakaravaniti | (CUP (CUP,, 6.3.2, p.512) 45

Kathavallisveva pathyate – ‘Rtam pibantau sukrtasya loke guham  pravistau parame parardhe | Chayatapau brahmavido vadanti pancajnayo  ye ca trinaciketah’ iti| Tatra samsayah – kimiha buddhijivau nirdistau, uta jiva paramatmanaviti paramatmanaviti (SSBB, SSBB, 1.2.11, p.106) -Brumah- Vijnanatmaparamatmanavihocyeyatam | Kasmat? Atmanau hi ., p.108) tavubhavapi cetanau samanasvabhavau (Ibid .,  Angusthamatrah  Angusthamatrah puruso antaratma sada jananam hydaye sannivistah| (KUP,2.3.17,p.104) KUP,2.3.17,p.104) (Bhasya): Idanim sarvavallyarthopasamharathamaha – angusthamatrah  puruso antaratma sada jananam sambandhini hrdaye sannivisto yatha vyakhyatah (Ibid) 46

--  parameva brahma avikrtamupadhisamparkajjivabh avikrtamupadhisamparkajjivabhavenavatisthate avenavatisthate;; (SSBB, SSBB, 2.3.18, p.451)

47

Sa va ayamatma brahma vijnanamayo manomayah  pranamayascaksurmayah  pranamayascaksurmayah srotramayah srotramayah – ( BUP,  BUP, 4.4.5, p.913) -Brhamana evavikrtasya sato asyaikasya anekabuddhyadimayatvam darsayati – (SSBB, 2.3.17, p.449) 48

-- ‘sa ‘sa samanah sannubhau lokavanusamcarati’lokavanusamcarati’- iti ca lokantaragamane lokantaragamane apyaviyogam buddhya darsayati (SSBB, SSBB, 2.3.30, p.463)

119

49

(SSBB,, Kena samanah Tadaiva buddhayeti gamyate, samnidhanat ; (SSBB 2.3.30, p.463) 50

-kamah sankalpo vicikitsa sraddha asraddha dhrtiradhrtirhrirdhirbhi dhrtiradhrtirhrirdhirbhirityetatsarvam rityetatsarvam mana eva – ( – ( BUP,  BUP, 1.5.3, p.697) 51

Tadgunasaratvattu Tadgunasaratvattu tadvyapadesah prajnavat ( prajnavat (SSBB, SSBB, 2.3.29, p.459)

52

Tasya buddheh gunastadgunah – Iccha dvesah sukham duhkhamityevamadayah – Tadgunah sarah pradhanam yasyatmanah (SSBB,, 2.3.29, p.460) samsaritve sambhavati, sa tadgunasarah, tadgunasarah, - (SSBB

53

Trinyatmane akuruteti mano vacam pranam tanyatmane akurutanyatramana abhuvam nadarsamanyatra mana abhuvam nasrausamiti manasa hyeva pasyati manasa srnoti ( BUP,  BUP, 1.5.3, p.697)

54

-avatisthante saha manasa yadanugatani, tena sankalpadivyavrttenantahkaranena| Buddhiscadhyavasayalaksana na vicestati svavyaparesu na vicestate na vyapriyate – ( – (KUP, KUP, 2.3.10, p.101)

55

Yasmadvijnanakartrkam sarvam tasmadyuktam vijnanamaya atma brahmeti| tasminvijnanamaye brahmanyabhimanam krtvopasata ityarthah (TUP, TUP, 2.5, pp.293-4)

56

-- pranaih sahendriyaiscittam sarvamantahkaranam prajanamotam vyaptam yena ksiramiva snehena, kasthamivagnina ( MUP,  MUP, 3.1.9, p.170) Citta ca centanavadantahkaranam | Cetayitavyam ca tadvisayah| (PUP, PUP, 4.8, p.127) 57

 Antahkaranam mano buddhirvijnanam buddhirvijnanam cittamiti ca anekadha tatra tatrabhilapyate; Kvacicca vrttivibhagena-samsayadivrttikam mana (SSBB,, 2.3.32, p.465) ityucyate, niscayadivrttikam buddhiriti; buddhiriti; -- (SSBB

58

Taccaivam bhutamantahkaranamavasyamas bhutamantahkaranamavasyamastityabhyupagant tityabhyupagantavyam, avyam, anyatha hyanabhyupagamyamane tasminnityopalabdhyanupalabdhi  prasangah svat| svat| (SSBB, 2.3.32, pp.465) 59

-- dhyayativa lelayativa sa hi| hi| ( BUP,  BUP, 4.3.7,p.867)

120

(Bhasya):- yato dhyayativa dhyanavyaparam karotiva, cintayativa, dhyanavyaparavatim buddhim sa tatsthena citsvachavajyotirupenavabhasayan tatsadrsastatsamanah sandhyayativa, alokavadeva| Ato bhavati cintayatiti bhrantirlokasya| Na tu paramarthato dhyayati| Tatha lelayativa attyartham calativa| Tesveva karanesu buddhyadisu vayusu ca calatsu tadavabhasakatvat tatsadrsam taditi ., lelayativa| Na tu paramarthatascalanadharmakam tadatmajyotih (Ibid ., p.870) 60

-- Etaduktam --  Etaduktam bhavati – nayam svato dhyayati, napi calati, dhyayantyam buddhau dhyayativa, calantyam buddhau calativeti (SSBB, SSBB, 2.3.30, p.463)

61

 Api ca mithyajnanapurah mithyajnanapurah saro ayamatmano a yamatmano buddhyupadhisambandhah| buddhyupadhisambandhah| (SSBB, 2.3.30, p.463) 62

 Na ca midhyajnanasya midhyajnanasya samyagjnanadanyatra samyagjnanadanyatra nivrttirastityato nivrttirastityato yavad  brahmatmatanavabodhah, tavadayam buddhyupadhisambandho na (SSBB,, 2.3.30, pp.463-4) samyati;-samyati;-- (SSBB 63

Sattveva somyedamagra asidekamevadvitiyam asidekamevadvitiyam (CUP, CUP, 6.2.2, p.508)

64

-- avagatiparyantam avagatiparyantam jnanamj nanam- jnanena hi pramanenavagantumistam pramanenavagantumistam  Brahma | (SSBB, 1.1.1, p.8) -srutyadayo anubhavadayasca yathasambhvamiha pramanam, anubhavavasanatvadbhuta vastuvisayatvacca brahmajnanasya (SSBB, SSBB, 1.1.2, p.11) 65

-- parameva  parameva brahma brahma avikrtamupadhisamparkajjiv avikrtamupadhisamparkajjivabhavenavatisth abhavenavatisthate ate – (SSBB, SSBB, 2.3.18, p.451)

66

tadeva cetparam brahma jivah, tasmajjivasyapi -nityacaitanyasvarupatvamagnyausnya prakasavaditi gamyate| (SSBB, SSBB, 2.3.18, p.451) 67

dehavyatiriktasya atmano astitvamucyate astitvamucyate – (SSBB -- dehavyatiriktasya (SSBB,, 3.3.53, p.699)

68

 yathagnivisuphulingayorausnyam| am| Ato bhedabhedavagamabhyam bhedabhedavagamabhyam --  yathagnivisuphulingayorausny amsatvavagamah| (SSBB, SSBB, 2.3.43, p.479)

121

69

Mainly there are four theories of  jiva, of   jiva, namely, (i) Kalpanavada of  Gaudapada, (ii)  Abhasavada of Suresvara , (iii) Pratibimbavada Pratibimbavada of  Sarvajnatman and Padmapada (Vivaranakara), (Vivaranakara), and (iv) Avacchedavada of  Vacaspati (i) Gaudapada establishes his Kalpanavada in his Mandukyopa his  Mandukyopanisad  nisad  Karika, Karika, 2.16.  Jivam kalpayate purvam tato bhavan prthagvidhan|  Bhahyanadhyatmikamscaiva  Bhahyanadhyatmikamscaiva yathavidhyastathasmr yathavidhyastathasmrtih| tih| (ii) Suresvara in his  Brhadaranyaka  Brhadaranyaka Varthika presents  Abhasavada through the example of Vyadharajaputra. of  Vyadharajaputra. This theory is also supported by  Nrsimha Uttaratapini Uttaratapini Upanisad. Jivesavabhasena Jivesavabhasena karoti mayacavihyaca svayameva bhavati. The  Brahmasutra  Brahmasutra Sankarabhasya, Sankarabhasya, 2.3.50,  Abhasa eva ca, also represents this theory. (iii) Pratibimbavada can be found in  Brahmasutra  Brahmasutra Sankarabhasya, Sankarabhasya, 3.2.18,  Ata eva copama suryakadivat , and in 2.3.46, Prakasadivannaivam Prakasadivannaivam parah | (iv)  Avacchedavada can be traced from the Sruti text: --  yatha sudiptatpavakadvispulingah sudiptatpavakadvispulingah – (Mundakopanisad, (Mundakopanisad, 2.1.1), Smrti text, Mamaivamsojivaloko jivabhutah sanatanah (Bhagavadgita, 15.7), and Brahmasut and Brahmasutra ra Sankarabhasya, Sankarabhasya, 2.3.43. Amso Amso nanavyapadesatnanavyapadesatThis theory can also be found in the Sankarabhasya on  Brahmasutra  Brahmasutra from the examples such as, ghatakasa, etc., Note: Criticism of these theories is not dealt in this paper. 70

- anaditvatsamsarasya – (SSBB (SSBB,, 2.1.35, p.343)

71

 Manasaivanudrastavyam  Manasaivanudrastavyam ( BUP,  BUP, 4.4.19, p.927)  Drsyate tvagryaya buddhya suksmaya suksmadarsibhih suksmadarsibhih (KUP, KUP, 1.3.12, p.82) 72

Here the terms ‘ Isvaracaitanya’ and ‘ Isvara’  Isvara’ are used interchangeably.

73

 Api ca mithyajnanapurah mithyajnanapurah saro saro ayamatmano buddhyupadhisamband buddhyupadhisambandhah| hah| SSBB, 2.3.30, p.463) (SSBB,

74

 Idam hi kartrtvam bhoktratvam ca sattvaksetrajnayoritaretarasv sattvaksetrajnayoritaretarasvabhavavekakrtamka abhavavekakrtamkalpyate lpyate (SSBB, SSBB, 1.2.12, p.111) 122

75

Sankara in his Bhagavadgitab his  Bhagavadgitabhasya hasya,, 13.2 holds the view that  jiva is the locus of avidya of  avidya.. In the same place, he raises the opponent’s question, that is, whose is this avidya? answering this this avidya? (Sa avidya kasya iti). iti). By way of answering question he says that ‘by whomsoever it is seen, and eventually confirms that  jiva is the locus of  avidya ( Janasi  Janasi tarhi avidyam tadvantam ca atmanam). atmanam). All the arguments of  Sankara, Sankara, in the above text, for the locus of avidya of  avidya completely depend on his assumption that there is  jiva which is of  avidya independently without anadi. Sankara never argues for the locus of avidya relying on the above above presupposition. But what I am attempting here in this paper is to reject Sankara’s presupposition itself, namely, that there is  jiva which is anadi, rather than refuting his arguments, based on his own assumption in the existence of  jiva of  jiva,, for the locus of avidya of  avidya.. I am am going to repudiate the advaitic concepts, such as, avidya, anaditva of  jiva of  jiva and creation, etc., in the following Sections in order to prove that there cannot exist a jiva a jiva as explained by Sankara. 76

Paramarthatastu nanyatarasyapi sambhavati, acetanatvatsattvasya, avikriyatvacca ksetrajnasya ksetrajnasya | Avidyapratyupasthapitasva Avidyapratyupasthapitasvabhavatvacca bhavatvacca sattvasya sutaram na sambhavati| (SSBB, SSBB, 1.2.12, p.111) 77

 Ibid.

78

Kathavallisveva pathyate – ‘Rtam pibantau sukrtasya loke guham  pravistau parame parardhe| Chayatapau brahmavido vadanti pancajnayo  ye ca trinaciketah’ iti| Tatra samsayah samsayah -- kimiha buddhijivau buddhijivau nirdistau, uta  jiva paramatmanaviti| paramatmanaviti| (SSBB, SSBB, 1.2.11, p.106) –  Brumah –  Vijnanatmaparamat Vijnanatmaparamat manavihocyeyatam| Kasmat? Atmanau hi tavubhavapi cetanau samanasvabhavau| samanasvabhavau| (SSBB,1.2.11, SSBB,1.2.11, p.108)  Angusthamatrah  Angusthamatrah puruso antaratma sada jananam hrdaye sannivistah| (Bhasya): Idanim sarvavallyarthopasamhararthamaha – angusthamatrah  puruso antaratma sada jananam sambandhini hrdaye sannivisto yatha vyakhyatah | (KUP (KUP,, 2.3.17,p.104) 79

-‘sa -‘sa samanah sannubhau lokavanusamcarati’ – iti ca lokantaragamane apyaviyogam buddhya darsayati (SSBB, SSBB, 2.3.30, p.463)

80

‘Sadeva somyedamagra asidekamevadvitiyam’ iti  praksrsteravibhagavadharana  praksrsteravibhagavadharanannasti nnasti karma, yadapeksya visama srstih 123

syat; srstyuttarakalam hi sariradivibhagapeksam karma, karmapeksasca sariradivibhagah sariradivibhagah -itiaretarasrayatvam itiaretarasrayatvam prasajyeta; ato vibhagadurdhvam karmapeksa Isvarah pravartam nama;  pragvibhagadvaicitryanimittasy  pragvibhagadvaicitryanimittasya a karmano abhavattulyaivadya abhavattulyaivadya srstih  prapnotiti cet, naisa dosah; anaditvatsamsarasya; anaditvatsamsarasya; bhavedesa dosah,  yadyadimanayam samsarah syat; anadau tu samsare bijankuravaddhetuhetumadbhavena karmanah sargavaisamyasya ca  pravrttirna virudhyate virudhyate (SSBB, SSBB, 2.1.35, p.343) 81

anadau tu samsare bijankuravaddhetuhetumadbhavena karmanah sargavaisamyasya sargavaisamyasya ca pravrttirna virudhyate (SSBB, SSBB, 2.1.35,p.343) 82

Upapadyate ca samsarasyanaditvam – adimattve hi samsarasyakasmadudbhutermuktanamapi punah samsarodbhutiprasangah, akrtabhyagamakrtavipranasaprasangasca, sukhaduhkhadivaisayasya sukhaduhkhadivaisayasya nirnimittatvat ; (SSBB (SSBB,, 2.1.36, p.344) 83

-na ca karma antarena sariram sambhavati, na ca sariramantarena karma sambhavati – ititaretaarasrayatvaprasangah; anaditve tu bijankuranyayenopapatterna bijankuranyayenopapatterna kasciddoso bhavati| (SSBB, SSBB, 2.1.36, p.344) 84

[ Jivah]:  Jivah]: Tasmadutpadyate jiva iti|| evam prapte, brumah – natma jiva utpadyata iti; kasmat? Asuteh; na hyasyotpattiprakarane sravanamasti bhuyahsu  pradesesu| (SSBB, SSBB, 2.3.17, p.448) -- ityevamadya nityatvavadinyah satyah  jivasyotpattim pratibaghnanti pratibaghnanti (Ibid., (Ibid., p.449) [Srstih]: Upalabhyate ca samsarasyanaditvam srutismrtyoh| srutau tavat –‘anena  jivenatmana’ iti sargapramukhe sargapramukhe sariramatmanam sariramatmanam jivasabdena  pranadharananimittenabhilapan  pranadharananimittenabhilapannanadih nanadih samsara iti darsayati; darsayati; (SSBB, SSBB, 2.1.36, p.344) 85

Here the word ‘origination’ is used interchangeably with ‘creation’.

86

Tadahi sastram darsayati –‘yoayam vijnanamayah pranesu hrdyantarjyotih purusah sa samanah sannubhau lokavanusamcarati dhyayativa lelayativa’ ityadi; tatra vijnanamaya iti buddhimaya ityetaduktam bhavati, -- (SSBB, SSBB, 2.3.30, p.463)

124

 Idam hi kartrivam bhoktrtvam ca sattvaksetrajnayoritaretarasv sattvaksetrajnayoritaretarasva a bhavavivekakrtam kalpyate| (SSBB, SSBB, 1.1.12, p.111)  Bhavati ca bhautikatve lingam karananam – ‘annamayam hi somya mana apomayah pranastejomayi vak’ ityevamjatiyakam; (SSBB, SSBB, 2.3.15, p.444) 87

Tah kah srutayah? – ityevamadya nityatvavadinyah  jivasyotpattim pratibaghnanti pratibaghnanti (SSBB,2.3.17, SSBB,2.3.17, pp.448-9) anaditvatsamsarasya (SSBB, SSBB, 2.1.35, p.343) 88

satyah

Sattveva somyedamagra asidekamevadvitiyam asidekamevadvitiyam (CUP, CUP, 6.2.2, p.508)

89

Tadaiksata bahu syam prajayeyeti tattejo asrjata tatteja eksata bahu syam prajayeyeti prajayeyeti tadapo asrjata | Tasmadyatra kvaca socati svedate va  purusastejasa  purusastejasa eva tadadhyapo jayante jayante | (CUP (CUP,, 6.2.3, p.509) Ta apa eksanta bhahvyah syama prajayemahiti ta annamsrjanta tasmadhyatra kva ca varsati tadeva bhuyistamannam bhavatyadbhya eva tadadhyannadyam jayante| (CUP, CUP, 6.2.4, p.510) 90

Contrary to this view, Sankara advocates beginninglessness of creation : Upapadyatecasamsarasyanaditvam -adimatve hi samsarasya akasmadudbhutermuktanamapi punah samsarodbhutiprasangah, akrtabhyagamakrtavipranasaprasangasca, sukhaduhkhadivaisamyasya nirnimittatvat; (SSBB, SSBB, 2.1.36, p.344) anaditvatsamsarasya (SSBB, SSBB, 2.1.35, p.343) 91

Sabdascobhayamapi brahmanah pratipadayati – akrtsnaprasaktim niravayavatvam ca (SSBB, SSBB, 2.1.27, p.335) Against his own view, Sankara says :-- te sarve brahmaiva – iti hinajantudaharanena sarvesameva namarupakrtakaryakaranasam namarupakrtakaryakaranasamghatapravista ghatapravistanam nam jivanam brahmatvamaha ; (SSBB (SSBB,, 2.3.43, p.479) ).  Ato bhedabhedavagamabhyamamsa bhedabhedavagamabhyamamsatvavagamah tvavagamah ( Ibid   Ibid ). 92

Tatha cahuh pauranikah –‘acintyah khalu ye bhave na tamstarkena  yojayet| prakrtibhyah param yacca tadacintyasya laksanam’ iti| (SSBB, SSBB, 2.1.27, p.335)

125

93

 Isvaragitasvapi  Isvaragitasvapi ca Isvaramsatvam jivasya smaryate –‘mamaivamso –‘mamaivamso  jivaloke jivabhutah sanatanah’ iti; tasmadapyamsatvagamah tasmadapyamsatvagamah (SSBB, SSBB, 2.3.45, p.480) 94

Any theory of  jiva of  jiva in Advaita Vedanta requires these three principles. This paper examines only  jivacaitanya among these three concepts, because individual Consciousness is the key factor to decide the validity or invalidity of the concept of  jiva of  jiva in Advaita Vedanta. It does not deal with the criticism of different theories of  jiva advaitins .  jiva upheld by advaitins.

95

Sankara in his Taittiriyopanisadbhasya holds the view that Brahman after creating the world entered Itself directly into the living bodies as  jiva. Tasmadva etasmadatmana iti brahmanyevatmasabdaprayogadvedituratmaiva brahma| etamanandamayamatmanamupasankramattiti ca atmatam darsayanti| tatpravesacca, tatsrstva tadevanupravisaditi ca tasyaiva jivarupena sarirapravesam darsayati| ato vedituh svarupam brahma| (TUP, TUP, 2.1, p.284). In the same place Sankara Sankara speaks speaks against against the the reflection reflection theory. theory. He presents possible meanings of the textual statement, that is, tatsrstva tadevanupravisat , and rejects them. One of the meanings that he rejected is that Brahman enters into the living bodies as a relection. - jalasuryakadipratibimbavatpr  jalasuryakadipratibimbavatpravesah avesah syaditi cenna| aparicchinnatvadanurtatvacca| paricchinnasya murtasyanyasyanyatra  prasadasvabhavake  prasadasvabhavake jaladau suryakadipratibimbodayah suryakadipratibimbodayah syat| na tvatmanah, amurtatvat akasadikaranasyatmanah vyapakatvat| tadviprakrstadesapratibimbad tadviprakrstadesapratibimbadharavastvantar haravastvantarabhavacca abhavacca ., p.300)  pratibimbavatpraveso  pratibimbavatpraveso na yuktah ( Ibid   Ibid ., Sankara after rejecting the reflection theory says that there is a different meaning for the above said statement.  Anyarthatvat| kimarthamastane kimarthamastane carca? Prakrto hyanyo vivaksito asya vakyasartho asti, sa smartavyah, --Taddhrttisthaniye tviha punastatsrstva tadevanupravisadityucyate (Ibid., 2.6, pp.300-301) It is important to note that Sankara contradicts his own theory presented in the Taittiriyopanisadbhasya. This contradiction is evident when Sankara approves the reflection theory in his Chandogyopanisadbhasa. See –  Anena jivenatmananupravisyeti jivenatmananupravisyeti vacanat| Jivo hi nama devataya abhasamatram| buddhyadibhutamatrasamsargajanitah, adarse iva 126

 pravistah purusapratibimbo purusapratibimbo jaladisviva ca suryadinam| acintyanantasaktimatya devataya buddhyadisambandhascaitanyabhaso devatasvarupavivekagrahnaimittah sukhi duhkhi mudha ityadyanekavikalpapratyayahetuh| (CUP, CUP, 2.3.2, p.513). Such contradictions are possible in Sankara’s theory of  jiva of  jiva because he tries to maintain the essential identity between the individual self and Brahman. One has to resort to such contradictions contradictions only in order to sustain the identity formulae, such as, ‘I am a m Brahman’. 96

kamah sankalpo vicikitsa sraddha asraddha -dhrtiradhrtirhrirdhirbhi dhrtiradhrtirhrirdhirbhirityetatsarvam rityetatsarvam mana eva -- ( BUP,  BUP, 1.5.3, p.697) 97

(Brasya on sixth mantra ): Ata eva yathoktam sabhedam jagat   prasuyata ityesa yonih sarvasya yata evam, prabhavascapyayasca prabhavascapyayasca  prabhavapyayau hi bhutanamesa eva (MGK,  Agamaprakaranam  Agamaprakaranam,, Sixth mantra, mantra, p.181) (Bhasya on eleventh karika): karyam kriyata iti phalabhavah| karanam karotiti bijabhavah| tattvagrahananyathagrahanabhyam bijaphalabhavabhyam tau yathoktau visvataijasau baddhau sangrhitavisyete| prajnastu bijabhavenaiva baddhah| tattvapratibhodhamatrameva hi bijam prajnatve nimittam (MGK,  Agamaprakaranam,  Agamaprakaranam, Eleventh karika, karika, p.188) 98

Tasmannityajivanmuktasya Isvarasya ajnanavaranabhavepi ajnanaviksepa sattvadajnanadipratibhasostyeva -- yatha jivanmuktasya  jivasya| – Isvarasya hi najnanavaranam, najnanavaranam, kimtu | tatkrtaviksepadarsanameva| Ataevesvarasyajnanasaksitvamuktam ( BV  ,p.302)  BV ,p.302) 99

 Bhavati ca bhautikatve lingam karananam –‘annamyam –‘annamyam hi somya mana apomayah pranastejomayi vak’ ityevamjatiyakam; (SSBB, SSBB, 2.3.15, p.444) -- annamayam hi somya mana -(CUP,, 6.5.4, p.518) -- (CUP

100

Svaprakasatve sati svetarasarvavabhasakatvam svetarasarvavabhasakatvam drso laksanam|  Mayopahita drk Brahma| Brahma| (VS , p.1) 101

tvisvarah -- ( Ibid   Ibid ) -- Mayavacchinna -- Mayavacchinna tvisvarah

102

-- acetanatvatsattvasya – (SSBB (SSBB,, 1.2.12, p.11) 127

– 

103

Utpattyanumanasya ca darsitattvat; anityamakasam, anityagunasrayatvat, ghatadivadityadiprayogasambhavacca; atmanyanaikantikamiti cet, na; tasyaupanisadam  pratyanityagunasrayatvasiddhe  pratyanityagunasrayatvasiddheh; h; vibhutvadinam ca akasasyotpattivadinam akasasyotpattivadinam pratyasiddhatvat| pratyasiddhatvat| (SSBB, SSBB, 2.3.7, p.434) 104

-- tasmadva etasmadatmana akasah sambhutah| akasadvayuh| (TUP,2.1, ,2.1, p.280-1) vayoragnih| agnerapah| adbhyah prthivi| adbhyah prthivi| – (TUP (Bhasya):- tasmadetasmadbrahmana atmasvarupadakasah sambhutah samutpannah| akaso nama sabdaguno avakasakaro murtadravyanam| tasmadakasatsvena sparsagunena purvena ca akasagunena sabdena dvignuo vayuh| sambhuta ityanuvartate| vayosca svena rupagunena  purvabhyam ca triguno agnih sambhutah| agnesca svena rasgunena  purvaisca tribhiscaturguna tribhiscaturguna apah sambhutah| adbyah svena gandhagunena  purvaiscaturbhih  purvaiscaturbhih pancaguna prthivi prthivi sambhuta (p.287). 105

So akamayata (TUP, TUP, 2.6, p.296)  Na hi Kamayitracetanamasti Kamayitracetanamasti loke| Sarvajne hi brahmetyavocama| Atah ., p.298) kamayitrtvopapattih| ( Ibid   Ibid ., Tadaiksata (CUP, CUP, 6.2.3, p.509) (Bhasya): Tatsadaiksateksam darsanam krtavat| Atasca na pradhanam Samkhyaparikalpitam jagatkaranam| Pradhanasya .) acetanatvabhyupagamat| acetanatvabhyupagamat| Idam tu saccetanamiksitrtvat  saccetanamiksitrtvat || ( Ibid   Ibid .) 106

Tadiaiksata bahu syam prajayeyeti tattejo asrjata tatteja eksata bahu syam prajayeyeti tadapo asrjata Tasmadyatra kvaca socati svedate va  purusastejsa eva eva tadadhyapo jayante| jayante| (CUP, 6.2.3, p.509) Ta apa eksanta bhahvyah syama prajayemahiti ta annamasrjanta tasmadyatra kva ca varsati tadeva bhuyistamannam bhavatyadbhya eva tadadhyannadyam jayante| (CUP, CUP, 6.2.4, p.510) 107

-- tasmadva etasmadatmana akasah sambhutah| akasadvayuh| (TUP,, 2.1, pp.280-1) vayoragnih| agnerapah| adbhyah prthivi| ----- (TUP (Bhasya):- tasmadetasmadbrahmana atmasvarupadakasah sambhutah samutpannah| akaso nama sabdaguno avakasakaro murtadravyanam| tasmadakasatsvena sparsagunena purvena ca akasagunena sabdena dviguno vayuh| sambhuta ityanuvartate| vayosca svena rupagunena  purvabhyam ca triguno agnih sambhutah| agnesca svena rasagunena 128

 purvaisca tribhiscaturguna tribhiscaturguna apah sambhutah| adbyah svena gandhagunena  purvaiscaturbhih  purvaiscaturbhih pancaguna prthivi prthivi sambhuta| (p.287) 108

Tadaiksata bahu syam prajayeyeti tattejo asrjata tatteja eksata bahu syam prajayeyeti tadapo asrjata Tasmadyatra kvaca socati svedate va  purusastejasa  purusastejasa eva tadadhyapo jayante| jayante| (CUP, (CUP, 6.2.3, p.509) Ta apa eksanta bhahvyah syama prajayemahiti ta annamasrjanta tasmadyatra kva ca varsati tadeva bhuyistamannam bhvatyadbhya eva tadadhyannadyam jayante| (CUP, 6.2.4, p.510) 109

 Bhavati ca bhautikatve lingam karananam –‘annamayam hi somya mana apomayah pranastejomayi vak’ ityevamjatiyakam; (SSBB, SSBB, 2.3.15, p.444) 110

-- annamayam hi somya mana -(CUP,, 6.5.4, p.518) -- (CUP Parasuramapantula Lingamurty Gurumurty, pp.260-1 Sitaramanjaneyasamvadamu,, Sitaramanjaneyasamvadamu Telugu Tikatatparyavivaranasahitamu,, Vavilla Ramaswami Satrulu and Sons, Tikatatparyavivaranasahitamu Madras, 1934. Sublation is known as destruction destruction in a technical sense. Destruction is mainly of two kinds, namely, (i) dhvamsa, dhvamsa, and (ii) badha. badha.  Dhavamsa is the destruction of physical objects generally found when such methods of  destruction as breaking, burning the objects, etc., are used. Badha is also a kind of destruction generally applied when illusory objects are destroyed by the dawn of the right knowledge of their substratum (adhistana). (adhistana). Niscaladas, Vicarasagaram, Vicarasagaram, p.145, translated into Sanskrit by Vasudeva Brahmendra Saraswati Swamigal, The Vasudeva Brahmendra Saraswati Swamigal Library Committee, Tanjore, India, 1986.  Badho nama aparokksa mithyatvaniscayah mithyatvaniscayah..  Brahmasutrasankarabhasya  Brahmasutrasankarabhasya,, 3.2.4, p.346, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1998. Vaitathyam badhyamanatvat . S.S. Suryanarayana Sastry, Philosophies and Philosophical Works, Works, ‘On the Nature of Sublation’, pp.191-6. For Suryanarayana Sastry, sublation is sublimation. Eliot Deutsch, Advaita Vedanta (A Philosophical Reconstruction), p.15, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu. 1988 According to Eliot Deutsch ‘sublation’, which he tried to reconstruct as ‘subration’, is the mental process whereby one disvalues some previously 111

129

apprised object or content of consciousness because of its being contradicted by a new experience. 112

 Brahmasutrasankarabhasya  Brahmasutrasankarabhasya,, 3.2.4, pp,346-7, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1998. Paramarthikastu Paramarthikastu nayam samdhyasrayah samdhyasrayah sargo viyadadisargavadityetavat viyadadisargavadityetavat pratipadhyate| Na ca viyadadisargasyapyatyantikam viyadadisargasyapyatyantikam satyatvamasti| satyatvamasti| Praktu brahmatmatvadarsanadviyadadi brahmatmatvadarsanadviyadadi prapanco vyavasthitarupo vyavasthitarupo bhavati| Samdhyasrayastu Samdhyasrayastu prapancah pratidinam badhyata it|. 113

Vicarasagaram , p. 145, translated into Sanskrit by Niscaladas, Vicarasagaram, Vasudeva Brahmendra Saraswati Swamigal, The Vasudeva Brahmendra Br ahmendra Saraswati Swamigal Library Committee, Tanjore, India, 1986. Yasya padarthasya brahmajnanamantara na badhah, kimtu brahmajnanenaiva badho bhavati tasya vyavaharikasattavatvena vyapadesah| Brahmajnanetarabadhyatva sati brahmajnanamatra badhyatvam vyavaharikasatvamiti yavat| Sa ca sattesvara srstapadarthesvasti| Yato dehendriyadi prapanca rupesvarasrsterbrahmajnanamantara na badho bhavati, kimtu brahmajnanenaiva bhavati| Tasmadisvarasrstapadartha vyavaharikasattaka vyavaharikasattaka iti jneyam| 114

., p.146.  Ibid .,  Brahmajnanetara  Brahmajnanetara badhyatvam pratibhasikatvam pratibhasikatvam Tadrsam| satvam  yatraste sa pratibhasikapadartha pratibhasikapadartha ityucyate| -- Pratibhasikah Pratibhasikah = Pratitikalamatrasattakah| -- Pratitikalamatrabhavinah padarthasya  pratibhasika sattocyate| sattocyate| 115

 Ibid , Kalatrayabadhyatavm Kalatrayabadhyatavm = Paramarthikasatvam| Paramarthikasatvam| Caitanyamekameva na kadapi badhyata iti paramarthika satta caitanyasyaiva| 116

Tuccha is used only to show that any content of our experience can never be absolutely non-existent and whether such content deserves some kind of reality depends upon its scrutiny by applying the concept of  sublation.

130

117

 Brahmasutrasankarabhasy  Brahmasutrasankarabhasya a, 3.2.4, p. 347, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1998. Praktu brahmatmatvadarsanadviyadad brahmatmatvadarsanadviyadadii prapanco vyavasthitarupo vyavasthitarupo bhavati| 118

., 2.38.  Mandukhyopanisad  Mandukhyopanisad Gaudapadakarika Gaudapadakarika Sankarabhasya Sankarabhasya.,

119

., 2.36.  Ibid ., ., 2.37.  Ibid ., 121 ankarabhasya., The Bhagavadgitas The Bhagavadgitasankarabhasya ., 3.25, p.54, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1988. Yadi punarahmaiva tvam krtarthabuddiratmavidanyo krtarthabuddiratmavidanyo va tasyapyatmanah kartavyabhave pi paranugraha eva kartavya ityaha. 122  Brahmasutrasankarabhasy  Brahmasutrasankarabhasya, a, 3.2.1 - 6; also also see  Mandukhyopanisad Gaudapadakarika Gaudapadakarika Sankarabhasya., Sankarabhasya., Chapter 2. 123 Brahmasutrasankarabhasya, 3.2.4, p.347, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1998. 1998. Praktu brahmatmatvadarsanadviyadadi prapanco vyavasthitarupo bhavati| 124 ., 2.3.32, p.289. Ibid ., Taccaivam butamantahkaranamavasyamasti butamantahkaranamavasyamastityabhyupagantavyam tyabhyupagantavyam.. 125  Journal of Indian Indian Council of Philosophical Philosophical Research Research,, Vol.XIV, No.2, January-April, 1997. ‘A Critique on Brahman-realization’, pp. 71-82. We have proved in the above article that Brahman-realization is not possible. Also see the same Journal, Vol.XVII, No.2, ‘A Critique Cr itique on the Concept of  Jiva’,  Jiva’, pp. 117-42. We have proved in the above article that ‘ jiva’ which is indicated by ‘I’ is not Brahman. The Brahmacaita The Brahmacaitanya nya cannot be the source of the  jivacaitanya.  jivacaitanya. 126  Ibid . 127  Ibid . 128 ., 2.4.14; 4.5,15.  Brhadaranyaka Upanisad  Upanisad ., Yatra hi dvaitamiva bhavati Also see  Brhadaranyaka Upanisad., Upanisad., 4.4.19. ., 2.4.11. Kathopanisad .,  Neha nanasti kimcana kimcana.. 120

131

129

A detailed discussion on duhkha is not presented here. The relationship of the world with duhkha is very briefly admitted here with all limitations such as the scope and the context of paper. 130 Dharmaraja Adhvarin, Vedantaparibhasa, Vedantaparibhasa, p. 153, The Adyar Library and Research Centre, Madras, India, 1984.  Anandatmikabrahmapraptisca  Anandatmikabrahmapraptisca moksah, moksah, sokanivrttisca sokanivrttisca:: Also see Niscaladas , Vicarasagaram Vicarasagaram,, p.21, translated into Sanskrit by Vasudeva Brahmendra Saraswati Swamigal, The Vasudeva Brahmendra Br ahmendra Saraswati Swamigal Library Committee, Tanjore, India, 1986. Sakalajananam ca duhkhanivrttau sukhavaptau cedrsiccha samjayate. Idrsanarthanivrttih Idrsanarthanivrttih paramanandavaptisca paramanandavaptisca moksa ityucyate. 131  A philosophical Reconstruction Reconstruction), Eliot Deutsch,  Advaita Vedanta ( A University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, Paperback, 1988, pp.16-17. 132  Ibid , p. 16. 133 ., p.19.  Ibid ., 134  Ibid ., ., p. 20. According to Eliot Deutsch, The Real Existent is a kind of  Appearance, which comprises those contents of experience that can be subrated only by ‘Reality’. 135

 Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Research, A Critique on the Concept of  Jiva of  Jiva.. Volume XVII, Number 2, January- April 2000, pp.117141. We hold the view that there is no need for a non-dual atman distinct from body-mind-sense complex in order to explain the conscious nature of the body and the conscious mind is sufficient for explaining the same. 136

Eliot Deutsch, Advaita Deutsch, Advaita Vedanta ), Vedanta ( A  A Philosophical Philosophical Reconstruction Reconstruction), University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, Paperback, 1988, p.19

137

Parasuramapantula Lingamurty Gurumurthy, Sitaramanjaneyasamvadamu,, Sitaramanjaneyasamvadamu Telugu pp, 201-1 Tikatatparyavivaranasahitamu,, Vavilla Ramaswami Sastrulu and Sons, Tikatatparyavivaranasahitamu Chennai, 1934. Sublation is known as destruction in a technical sense. Destruction is mainly of two kinds, namely, (i)  Dhvamsa, and (ii) Badha. (ii) Badha.  Dhvamsa is the destruction of physical objects generally found when such methods of  destruction as breaking, burning the objects, etc., are used.  Badha is also a kind of destruction generally applied when illusory objects are destroyed (adhistana). by the dawn of the right r ight knowledge of their substratum (adhistana ). 132

Niscaladas, Vicarasagaram, Vicarasagaram, p.145, Translated into Sanskrit by Vasudeva Brahmendra Saraswati Swamigal. The Vasudeve Brahmenda Saraswati Swamigal Liberary committee, Tanjore, India, 1986.  Badho nama aparoksa aparoksa mithyatvaniscayah mithyatvaniscayah  Brahmasutrasnakrabhasya  Brahmasutrasnakrabhasya,, 3.2.4, p.346, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1988 Vaitathyam badhyamanatvat . S.S. Suryanarayana Sastry, Philosophies and Philosophical Works, Works, ‘On the Nature of Sublation,’ pp. 191-6. For Suryanarayana Sastry, sublation is sublimation.  A Philosophical Reconstruction Reconstruction), Eliot Deutsch,  Advaita Vedanta ( A ), University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1988, p.15. According to Eliot Deutsch ‘sublation’, which he tried to reconstruct as ‘subration’, is the mental process whereby one disvalues some previously apprised object or content of consciousness because of its being contradicted by a new experience. 138

Brahmasutrasankarabhasya , 3.2.4, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1998, pp. 346-7. Paramarthikastu nayam samdhyasrayah sargo viyadadisargavadityetavat viyadadisargavadityetavat Pratipadhyate| Na ca viyadadisargasyapyatyantikam satyatvamasti| Praktu  Brahmatmatvadarsanadviyadad  Brahmatmatvadarsanadviyadadii prapanco vyavasthitarupo vyavasthitarupo bhavati| Samdhyastrayastu Samdhyastrayastu prapancah pratidinam badhyata iti| 139

Niscaladas, Vicarasagaram, Vicarasagaram, p. 145, Translated into Sanskrit by Vasudeva Brahmendra Saraswati Swamigal, The Vasudeva Brahmendra Saraswati Swamigal Library Committee, Tanjore, India, 1986. Yasya padarthasya brahmajnanamantara na badhah, kimtu brahmajnanenaiva Badho bhavati tasya vyavaharikasattavatvena vyapadesah|Brahmajnanetarabadhyatve sati brahmajnanamatra badhyatvamVyavaharikasatvamiti yavat| Sa ca sattesvara srstapadarthesvasti| Yato Dehendriyadi prapanca rupesvarasrsterbrahmajnanamantara na badho bhavati, Kimtu brahmajnanenaiva bhavati| Tasmadisvarasrstapadartha Vyavaharikasattaka Vyavaharikasattaka iti jneyam| jneyam| 140

., p.146. Ibid .,

133

brahmajnanetara badhyatvam pratibhasikatvam |Tadrsam satvam  yatraste sa pratibhasikapadartha pratibhasikapadartha ityucyate -- pratibhasikah| -- pratiti kalamatrasattakah| -- pratitikalamatrabhavinah padarthasya pratibhsika sattocyate| 141

 Ibid . kalatrayabadhyatvam = Paramarthikasatvam| Paramarthikasatvam| Caitanyamekameva na kadapi badhyata iti paramarthika satta caitanyasyaiva| 142

Tuccha is used only to show that any content of our experience can never be absolute non-existent and such content deserves some kind of  reality depends upon its scrutiny by applying the concept of sublation.

143

Vedanta (A Philosophical Philosophical Reconstruction), Reconstruction), Eliot Deutsch, Advaita Deutsch, Advaita Vedanta Note No.10, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, Paperback, 1988, p.26. 144

., p. 15.  Ibid ., Eliot Deutsch tries to reconstruct ‘sublation’ in Advaita Vedanta as ‘subration’ and prefers to use use the same for ‘sublation’. 145

., p.18.  Ibid .,

146

., p.20.  Ibid .,

147

., p.26, Note No.10  Ibid .,

148

., p.21.  Ibid .,

149

., p.23.  Ibid .,

150

., p.24.  Ibid .,

151

Mandukhyopanisad Mandukhyopanisad Gaudapadakarika Gaudapadakarika Sankarabhasya., 4.83.,  Astinastyasti nastiti nasti nastiti nastiti va punah calasthirophayabhavirarnotyena Balisah.

152

.,  Ibid .,

134

Yadhyapi pandito balisa eva paramarthatattvanavabhodhat, paramarthatattvanavabhodhat, kimu svabhavamudho jana ityabhiprayah. 153

The Advaitins have three methods of explaining their philosophy, namely, (i)  Ekasattaka  Drsti Srsti Vada , (ii)  Dvisattaka Drst i Srsti Vada, and (iii) Srsti Drsti Vada. These explanations are offered in accordance with the qualif ication of the persons. According to the Advaitins, the mumuksus are classif ied into three, namely, (i) Uttamadhikari, (ii)  Madhyamadhikar  Madhyamadhikari, i, and (iii)  Adhamadhikar  Adhamadhikarii. The f irst of the above method is meant for the Uttamadhikari. According to the  Ekasattaka  Drsti Srsti Vada, Vada, Brahman- Atman,  Atman, which is non-dual, alone exists always and nothing else. If at all anything other than Brahman seems to exist then, it is one’s own imagination. Thus the individual’s imagination becomes responsible for the appearance of  duality in non-duality. According to the Advaitins this is the most diff icult way to understanding Advaita philosophy. It is hard to understand the position that there exists only nonduality while one is seeing the duality. In order to make it easy for the sake of  madhyamadhikari,, the Advaitins introduce the second method, namely, madhyamadhikari  Dvisattaka Drsti Srsti Vada. This method upholds the view that duality exists only as long as one perceives it, but in fact duality never exists. Thus, the pratibhasik the  pratibhasika a satta is ascribed to the appearance of the duality of the world in this method. The  pratibhasika satta is mentioned only to say the mumuksu that the duality never exists and appearance of it is caused by one’s imagination. This duality disappears when one realizes and keeps oneself in non-duality. Thus this system admits of two levels of reality, namely, (i) Paramarthika satta, satta, that is,  Brahman-Atm  Brahman-Atman, an, and (ii) Pratibhasika satta, satta, that is, world of duality.  Drsti Srsti Vada can be found in the texts such as  Astavakragita  Astavakragita,,  Avadutagita and  Mandukyakarika.  Mandukyakarika. According to this theory there is nothing to practice on. In other words, liberation is attained without any sadhana. sadhana.

135

It is also difficult for most of the people to understand the theory, which advocates the existence of the world as long as one perceives it, for people always keep using the things of the world for their needs, such as to satisfy hunger, etc. In order to make the adhamadhikari understand Advaita, the third method, namely, Srsti Drsti Vada Vada is established. This theory, unlike  Drsti Srsti Vada, advocates three levels of reality. According to it, Isvara it,  Isvara (Brahman) causes duality by His power of  maya maya.. The people mistake this illusory creation of duality for non-duality. The question arises that, if the world is an illusion then, is this world an illusion like other illusions such as dream? If the Advaitin says yes then the diff iculty such as that which has been raised in the case of the  Dvisattaka  Drsti srstiVada srstiVada where the world is only pratibhasika satta occurs. only  pratibhasika satta The The Advaitin, therefore, distinguishes dreams and such illusory objects as snake on rope, etc., from the worldly physical objects in Srsti  DrstiVada.  DrstiVada. Since the empirical objects are used as real entities for the worldly needs and are not sublated by any other objects, they are ascribed of a reality called vyavaharika satta, satta, which is distinct from  pratibhasika satta. satta. This theory is found in  Brahmasutra  Brahmasutra. According to Sankara, one should attain the four fold qualifications in order to get the teachings of  Srsti DrstiVada. DrstiVada. Sankara generally states in the beginning of his commentary on the  Brahmasutra,  Brahmasutra, that one should attain the sadhanacatustaya and Vyasa mentions explicitly in his sutra 1.3.25 ( Hrdhyapeksayatu  Hrdhyapeksayatu manusyadhikaratvat) manusyadhikaratvat) that all human beings are qualified for brahmajnana. brahmajnana. Contrary to this view, it is maintained in the  Apasudradhikaranam  Apasudradhikaranam that only Sudras and women are not qualified for brahmajnana through the Vedanta. It is obviously a contradiction in the  Brahmasutra and therefore, we are attempting here an examination of  the same in this paper. 154

Sadhanacatustaya or four fold qualifications according to Sankara

are as follows: 1) Discrimination between the eternal and the non -etern eternal; al; 2) Dispassion for the enjoyment of the fruits (of work) here and hereafter; 3) A 136

perfection of such practices as control of the mind, control of senses and organs, etc.; and 4) A hankering for liberation. 155 Please refer to the meaning of the word  Atha in the first  Brahmasutra given by Sankara 156

the  Apasudradhikaranam  Brahmasutra,  Brahmasutra, 1.3.34 to 38 consist of the Apasudrad hikaranam  Brahmasutra S ankarabhasya, ankarabhasya, 1.3.34, pp.135-136, Motilal Banrsidass, New Delhi, 1998 Yatha manusyadhikaraniyamamapodhya devadinamapi vidhyasvadhikara uktastathaiva dvijatyadhikaraniyamapavadena sudrasyapyadhikarah syadityetamasankam nitvartayitumidamadhikaranamarabhyate.

157

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Taittriyasamhita,7.1.1.6 Taittriyasamhita,7.1.1.6 ‘tasmacchudro yajne anavakluptah’ anavakluptah’ 159 Brahmasutra Brahmasutra Sankarabhasya, Sankarabhasya, 1.3.34, p.136 Yaccedam ‘Sudro yajne anavakluptah’ iti, tat  nyayapurvakatvadvidhyayamapyanavakluptatvam dhyotayati; nyayasya sadharanatvat . 160  Ibid ., ., Upanayanapurvakatvadvedadhyayanasya 161  Ibid ., ., Upanayanasya ca varnatrayavisayatvat  varnatrayavisayatvat  162  Ibid.,  Na ca Sudrasya Sudrasya vedadhyayanamasti vedadhyayanamasti 163 lbid ., ., Sastriyasya ca samarthyasyadhyayananirakaranena nirakrtatvat  164 Yajnavalkyasmrti., 1.90 165  Mahabharata, Vanaparva, CCCXIII,108 166  I bid. bid. ,  , C   L XXX,21,25,26  XXX,21,25,26 167 Visnubhagavata, VII.IX.35 168 Brahmasutra Sankarabhasy Sankarabhasya a., 2.1.1, p.181 Vipratipattau ca smrtinamavasyakartavyo an yataraparigr  yataraparigrahe ahe anyataraparityage ca srutyanusarinyah smrtayah pramanamanapeksya

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itarah| Taduktam itarah| Taduktam pramanalaksane  pramanalaksane - ‘Virodhe tvanapeksam syadasati hyanumanam.’ hyanumanam Sutra., 1.3.3). .’ (Jaimini Sutra., 169 Ibid ., ., 1.3.37, p.138 Tadabhavanirdharaneca pravrtteh Tadabhavanirdharaneca  pravrtteh 170 Works of  Sankaracarya in Original Sanskrit, Volume - 1 , Ten Principa PrincipalUpanisads with Sankarabhasya p. 450,  Motilal  Banarsida  Banarsidas. s.  Delhi. 1992 Chandogyopanisad , 4.4.3 Sa ha haridrumatam gautamametyovaca brahmacaryam bhagavati vatsyamyupeyam bhagav bhagavantam tamiti| iti| 171 ., 4.4.4  Ibid ., Tam Tam hovaca kimgotro nu somyasiti sa hovaca nahametadveda bho  yadgotro ahamasmyaprccham mataram sa ma  pratyabravibd  pratyabravibdahvaham ahvaham caranti  paricarini  yauvane tvamalabhe sahametanna veda  yadgotrastvamasi  yadgotrastvama si jabala  jabala tu namahamasmi satyakamo nama tvamasiti so aham satyakamo jabalo satyakamo jabalo asmi bho iti| iti| 172  Ibid ., ., 4.4.5 Tarn Tarn hovaca naitadabrahmano vivaktumarhati 173 .,  Ibid ., samidham somyaharopa tva nesye na satyadaga iti tamupaniya 174 Yajnavalkyasmrti,, 1.90 Yajnavalkyasmrti ‘By husbands belonging to a particular class upon wives belonging to the same class — the husbands and wives having been united in unblemished marriages are begotten sons who belong to the same caste as that of the father and the mother and who are capable of  continuing the line.’ 175  Ibid ., ., 1.91 Also see 1.90 to 96 176

 M anusmrti, anusmrti , X.4

Sudrascaturdhovarnaekajatih. Sudrascaturdhovarnaekajatih. .,1.3.34, 1.3.34, p. p .136  Brahmasutra  Brahmasutr a Sankarabhasya Sankarabhasya., Upanayanasya ca varnatrayavisayatvat  Parasaragrhyasutra,, 2.6 Parasaragrhyasutra Sudranam adustakarmanam upanayanam 178 Taittiriyasamhita,, 7.1.1.6 Taittiriyasamhita tasmacchudro yajne  yajne anavakluptah anavakluptah’’ ‘tasmacchudro 177

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 Also

see

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Brahmasutra Sankarabhasya, Adhyasabhasya, Brahmasutra Adhyasabhasya, p.3 Tathahi  yajeta’’  yajeta ityadini sastranyatmani – ‘brahmano varnasramavayovasthadi varnasramavay ovasthadi visesadhyasam visesadhyasamasritya asritya pr avar tante tante|| 180 ., I.I.I, p. 4  Ibid .,  Nanviha karmavabhodhanantaryam vises visesa ah|  N a| a|  Dharmajijna  Dharmajijnasayah sayah  pragapyadhitavedantasya  pragapyadhitaved antasya br ahm ahmajijna ajijnasopapat  sopapat t  te  h| --kramasya vivaksitattvanna tatheha kramo vivaksitah, sesasesitve adhikrtadhikare va pramanabhavat, dharmabrahmajijnasayoh dharmabrahmajijnasayoh phalajijnasya  phalajijnasya bhed acca|  Abhyudayaphalam  Abhyudayaphalam dharma  jnanam taccanustanapeksam|| taccanustanapeksam  N ihsreyasaphalam tu brahmavijnanam na can anust  ust ana anantarapek  tarapek sam am|| 181

 Ibid., p.5 --nityanityavastuvivekah, ihamutrartha bhogaviragah, samadamadisadhanasampat, mumuksutvam ca| Tesu hi satsu  pragapi dharmajijnasaya urdhvam ca sakyate brahmajijnasitum jnatum ca na viparya viparya ye\  Tasmadathasabdena  yathokta sadhanasampatyanantaryamupadisyate| 182 ., 1.3.25, p.l 19  Ibid .,  Hrdhyapeksayatu  Hrdhyapeksayatu manusyadhikaratvat| manusyadhikaratvat| 183

Works of  Sankaracarya in Orig Original inal Sanskrit  Sanskrit . Volume - 1 , Ten Principal Upanisads with Sankarabhasya Sankarabhasya,, p.89, Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi, 1992 Kathopanisad, 2.4.12  Angustamatrah purusomadhya  Angustamatrah  purusomadhya atmani tis tistat i| i|  Isanam bhutabhavyasya na tato vijugupsate vijugupsate|| || Etadvai  Etadvai tat| 184 ., 2.4.13, p.90  Ibid .,  Angustamatrah  Angustamatrah  puruso  jyotirivadhumakah  jyotirivadhuma kah||  Isano bhutabhavyasya sa evadhya sa u sv sva ah| Etadvai tat|| 185  Jaiminisutra, 6.1.25-28 186  Brahmasutra  Brahmasutr a Sankarabhasya, Sankarabhasya, 1.3.25 , p.119 Sastram hyavisesapravrttamapi manusyanevadhikaroti, saktatvadarthitvadaparyudastatv saktatvadarthi tvadaparyudastatvadupanayanadis adupanayanadisastracceti astracceti varni varnita tam metadad hik ar  ar alak  alak sane| ane| 187  Jaiminisutra,, 6.1.6-7  Jaiminisutra 188  Brahmasutra  Brahmasutra Sankarabhasya Sankarabhasya,, 1.3.26, p.12 na tadvidhyasvasti 189 Parasaragrhyasutra,, 2.6 Parasaragrhyasutra 139

Sudranam adustakarmanam upanayanam 190 Vrddhagautamasmrti, Chapter-16 Sudro va caritavratah 191

Madhava Vidhyaranya, Sankaradigvijayam, pp.60-61, Translated by Swami Tapasyananada, Canto - 6, Sri Ramakrishna Math, Madras, 1980 “On one of such noon, the great  Acharya, desirous of doing his midday rites, walked with his disciples to the Ganga, whose surface looked discolored by the pollen of lotus flowers. On their way, the party came across a hunter (Chandala), an outcaste, approaching them with his pack of four dogs. They there upon ordered him to move away to some distance and give them way. But the hunter raised an issue. He asked: “--- you asked me to move aside and make way for you. To whom were your words addressed, O learned Sir? To the body which comes from the same source and performs the same functions in the case of both a  Brahmana and an outcaste? Or to the  Atman the witnessing consciousness, which too is the same in all unaffected by anything that is of the body? How does such differences as ‘This is a  Brahmana, this is an outcaste’ outcaste’ arise in non-dual experience. --- When he said thus f i f inished his submissions, the great sannyasin (Sankara) noted for his truthfulness and unblemished life spoke to that outcaste with a mind struck with astonishment but nonetheless full of cordiality towards him. He said: “All that you have said is true. You are, indeed, one of the noblest of men. Your words of wisdom make me abandon the idea that you are an outcaste ---. ---. A person who sees the whole world as  Atman only, whose mind is unshakably established in that conviction is worthy of worship, irrespective of whether he is a  Brahmana or an outcaste by birth. ‘I am the same pure consciousness which shines alike in Mahavisnu as also in flies. All objective phenomena are false’ false ’ --- he who is ever established in this consciousness is my Guru worthy of respect, be he an outcaste by birth --- scarcely had he f inished speaking when the outcaste disappeared from sight, and in his place appeared Lord Siva --- To that great sannyasin who fell at His feet with tears of devotion in his eyes, the

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great God Siva said thus: --- Vyasa edited the Vedas, he composed the  Brahmasutrass (aphorisms on the subject of Brahman); and therein he  Brahmasutra refuted the doctrines of the Sankhyas , Kanadas and others. --- Therefore, you who have got a real understanding of the purport of the Veda, should write a new commentary on the  Brahmasutra  Brahmasutras, s, wherein the false theories have to be refuted both through reason and scripture.” scripture .” 192

 Brahmasutra Sankarabhasya,1.1.1,  Brahmasutra Sankarabhasya,1.1.1, p.4  Nanviha karmavabhodhanantaryam vises sesa ah|  N a|  Dharmajijna  Dharmajijnasayah sayah  pragapyadhitavedantasya  pragapyadhitaved antasya br ahm hma a ji jna  jnasopapat  sopapat t  te  h| --kramasya vivaksitattvanna tatheha kramo vivaksitah, sesasesitve adhikrtadhikare va  pramanabhava  pramanabhavat, t, dharmabrahmajijnasayoh  phalajijnasya bhedacca  Abhyudayaphalam dharma  jnanam taccanustanapeksam|  Nihsreyasaphalam  Nihsreyasaph alam tu brahmavi jnanam  jnanam na canustanantarapeksam canustanantarapeksam|| 193  Ibid ., ., 1.3.38, p.139 ‘Sravayeccaturo varnan’ iti cetitihasapuranadhigame caturvarnyasyadhikarasmaranat| 194 ., 1.3.38  Ibid ., Sankara in his commentary on the  Brahmasutr  Brahmasutra a, 1.3.38 quotes the that , ‘if a born Sudra hears Gautamadharmasutra,, 12.4, which states that, Gautamadharmasutra theVeda theVeda then melted lead and lac should be f i f illed in his ears,’ ears ,’ in order tosupport his view, namely, a born Sudra is unf it for studying the Veda Veda.. 195

Yajnavalkyasmrti., 1.90 Yajnavalkyasmrti.,

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The morality (concepts of good and bad), that is, changeable or alterable according to man’s convenience or social circumstances is called changeable morality. 197 The morality (concepts of good and bad) that is not changeable or alterable according to man’s convenience or social circumstances is called unchangeable morality. 198 Hereafter, the words, namely, human being, man and student are used interchangeably in the sense of human beings. 199 Ancient Indians in this paper primarily represent an early Vedic ancient Indian tradition, which belongs to pre-epic and pre-sutra pre- sutra period. However, 141

we have also referred to later Vedic tradition and Theravada Buddhist tradition wherever necessary. 200 The Mahabharata, Vanaparva, Vanaparva, xxxiii.42 “But O king, all beings desire happiness and moksa is the highest good for them.” 201  Brhadaranyaka Upanisad , II.iv.5, pp.346-7, Translated by Swami th Madhavananda, Advaita Ashrama, Culcutta, 6 Edition. ‘It is not for the sake s ake of the husband, my dear that he is loved, but for one’s own sake that he is loved. It is not for the sake of the wife, my dear, that she is loved, but for one’s own sake that she is loved. It is not for the sake of the sons, my dear, that they are loved, but for one’s own sake that they are loved. It is not for the sake of wealth, my dear that it is loved, but for one’s own sake that it is loved. It is not for the sake of the  Brahmana,  Brahmana, my dear that he is loved, but for one’s own sake that he is loved. It is not for the sake of the Ksatriya, Ksatriya , my dear that he is loved, but for one’s own sake that he is loved. It is not for the sake of worlds, my dear, that they are loved, but for one’s own sake that they are loved. It is not for the sake of  gods, my dear, that they are loved, but for one’s own sake that they are loved. It is not for the sake of beings, my dear, that they are loved, but for one’s own sake that they are loved. It is not for the sake of all, my dear that all is loved, but for one’s own sake that it is loved.’ 202 Visnubhagavata, Visnubhagavata, IV.xxii.35 ‘--- moksa is the truly ultimate end ---’ 203 According to the ancient Indian wisdom, the human life is divided into three specific experiences, namely, i) waking, ii) dream and iii) dreamless sleep. Waking experience is identified as the ground for moral actions. For, man’s volitional actions in waking experience alone can affect him or the others and therefore, they alone are worth calling either good or bad actions. 204 The Mahabharata, santiparva, santiparva, cclx.20, 21, 23 and cxxiv.67 “To give joy to another is righteousness; to give pain is sin.” “Let not any man do unto another any act that he wishes not done to himself by others, knowing it to be painful to himself. And let him also purpose for another all that he wishes for himself.” “Let not any one do an act that injures another, nor any that he feels shame to do.” Smrti, iii.65 Also see Yajnavalkya Smrti, “Let him not do to another what is not good for himself.”

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Waking and dream experiences are called mental states, for, among three states of experience, mind functions only in waking and dream states. 206 The ancient Indians have explained samsara in three ways. 1) Discarding the existing human physical body and getting into completely different kind of physical body after natural death. See The Bhagavadgita Bhagavadgita, 2.13 and 2.22 “As the dweller in the body passes in one body through childhood, youth and old age, so passes he on to another body. The well balanced grieves not threat.” “As a man, casting off worn-out garments, takes new ones, so the dweller in the body, casting off worn-out bodies, enters into others that are new.” aka Upanisad , IV.iv.4 Also see Brhadarany see Brhadaranyaka “Just as a goldsmith takes apart a little quantity of gold and fashions another – a newer and better form, so does the self throw this body away, or make it senseless, and make another – a newer and better form ---“ 2) Existence of life continuing through three levels of experience, namely, waking, dream and dreamless sleep. Being in waking and dream is called living and getting into dreamless sleep is called death. Again getting into waking state is called rebirth. See Sankara, Upadesasahasri, Upadesasahasri , 2.2.110  Jagratsvapna laksana laksana 3) According to the ancient seers any physical body changes every moment continuously. In other words, change is the truth of physical nature. Since man’s physical body also changes every moment, it is understood that man lives for a moment and gets new life with new physical body. Buddhists explain samsara in this manner and according to them the present existence lasts for a moment and gets destroyed by giving rise to a different diff erent and changed body. It does not matter how one understands the word samsara, samsara, but one should seek liberation, either every moment as per the third explanation, or from the three states of experience as per the second explanation or from the natural death and rebirth as per the first explanation. In depth level liberation in all the explanations mean the same. 207 The Bhagavadgita, V.10 and 11 “He who acts, ascribing all action to Brahman, abandoning attachment, is unpolluted by sin as a lotus leaf by the water.” manas, by buddhi and even by the senses alone, Yogi’s Yogi’s “By the body, by manas, perform action, having abandoned attachment, for the purification of self.” 208  Ibid.,  Ibid., V.12, 18-21and 24-26 143

“The harmonized man, having abandoned the fruit of action, attains to everlasting peace; the non- harmonized, attached by desire to fruit, is bound.” “The sage looks equally on a Brahmana a  Brahmana perfected in learning and humility, and on a cow, an elephant, and even a dog and svapaka.” svapaka.” “They have won heaven even here on earth whose manas is established in equilibrium. Brahman is faultless equilibrium; therefore, they establish in Brahman.” “One should neither rejoice in obtaining what is pleasant, nor sorrow in obtaining what is unpleasant; with buddhi firm, unperplexed, the Brahman knower is established in Brahman.” “ He whose self is unattached to external contacts finds joy in the self; and he having the self harmonized with Brahman by yoga, enjoys happiness exempt from decay.” “That Yogi whose happiness is within, whose enjoyment is within and whose light is within attains to the nirvana of Brahman, himself becoming Brahman.” “The  Risis obtain the nirvana of Brahman, their sins destroyed, their doubts removed, their selves controlled, intent upon the welfare of all beings.” “Near is the nirvana of Brahman to those yati those  yatiss who know themselves, who are freed from desire and passion and controlled in mind.” 209  Brhadaranyaka Upanisad  Upanisad , IV.iv.5 “As it does and acts, so it becomes; by doing good it becomes good, and by doing evil it becomes evil – it becomes virtuous through good acts and vicious through evil acts. Others, however, say, ‘the self is identified with desire alone. What it desires, it resolves; what it resolves, it works out; and what it works out, it attains’.” 210 The Mahabharata, Anusasanaparva Anusasanaparva, civ “The mark of  dharma is acara (good conduct), acara is the mark of the acara. From acara is dharma born, and good. Higher than all teachings is acara. dharma enhances life. By acara man attains life. By acara he attains fair fame, here and hereafter.” Also see Manusmr see Manusmrti ti,, I.110 acara, the sages embraced “Thus beholding the path of dharma of  dharma issue from acara, acara as the root of all tapas.” tapas.” 211  Ibid., Santiparva Santiparva,, xxxiii “Anger, lust, dejection, delusion, cynicism, wrongful activity, greed, emulations, envy, jealousy, irritated worry, sullen hate or o r malice, scorn and 144

fear – these thirteen (vices and forms of untruth) O king, are the powerful enemies of living creatures.” Also see The Bhagavadgita, Bhagavadgita, 14.1-18 Please read Sankara’s commentary for the details of each. 212 These six are technically called arisadvarga. arisadvarga. 213 The Mahabharata, Anusasanaparva Anusasanaparva, clxii “Truthfulness, equality (impartiality), self-control, absence of envious emulation, forgiveness, modesty, endurance, absence of jealousy, charity, thoughtfulness, disinterested philanthropy, self-possession, and unceasing and compassionate harmlessness --- these are the thirteen forms of Truth.” Also see The Bhagavadgita, Bhagavadgita, 14.1-18 Please read Sankara’s commentary for the details of each. 214 The Bhagavadgita, Bhagavadgita, 14.17 and 18; 9-13  Rajas; negligence and “From Sattva wisdom is born, and greed from  Rajas; delusion are of Tamas of Tamas,, and also unwisdom.” sattva; the rajasic dwell in the midmost “They rise upwards who settle in sattva; place. The tamasic go downwards, enveloped in the vilest qualities.” “Sattva attaches to bliss, rajas to action, O Bharata. Tamas, Tamas, verily, having shrouded wisdom, attaches on the contrary, to negligence.” “(Now) Sattva arises, overcoming rajas and tamas, tamas, O Bharata; (now) Tamas, Tamas, (overcoming) rajas and sattva; sattva; and (again) rajas (prevailing over) tamas and sattva.” sattva.” “When the wisdom-light streams forth from all the gates of the body, then it may be known that sattva is increasing.” “Greed, outgoing energy, undertaking of actions, restlessness, desire – these are born of the increase of rajas of  rajas,, O best of the Bharatas.” “Darkness, stagnation and negligence, and also delusion – these are born of  the increase of tamas of tamas,, O joy of the Kurus. Kurus.” 215 We will try to present some salient features of the moral practice in ancient India in a generalized way. This presentation includes our own o wn observations of practical aspects of moral practice in the ancient Indian tradition. Though this paper refers only to the ancient Vedic tradition, we have also attempted here to explain the moral practices of the Theravada Buddhism wherever necessary for we do not see s ee much difference between the two systems with regard to the moral practice. 216

The Bhagavadgita, Bhagavadgita, xvii. 14, 15 and 16 “The honoring of the Deity, of the twice-born, the preceptor, the wise, and the Devas the Devas,, celibacy and harmlessness – this is the austerity of the body.”

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“The speech that causes not disturbance, and that is true and sweet and wholesome, diligent and study – this is the austerity of speech.” “Peace of mind and gentleness and silence, self-suppression and purity of  purpose – this is the austerity of the mind.” 217 The words vegetarian and non-vegetarian are used in a general Indian sense and they are not used in a technical and scientific sense. 218 The Mahabharata Mahabharata, Vanaparva, Vanaparva, c 219 The four quarters of life need not be exactly twenty-five years each. They vary depending on the birth and talents of the person. Therefore, this statement about four quarters of life may be understood in approximation. 220 1) Lust (kama (kama), ), 2) Anger (krodha (krodha), ), 3) Greed (lobha ( lobha), ), 4) Passion moha), 5) Arrogance (mada (moha), (mada)) and 6) Jealousy (mascarya (mascarya)) are called arisadvarga, arisadvarga, which means set of six enemies. 221 This statement is true only with regard to the earlier ancient Indians. For in course of time most of the people were exploited and abstained from education and development by misinterpreting the same tradition. There were a number of revolts against exploitation and we ignore all these issues here and consider only the ideas of early Vedic ancient Indian tradition. 222 See Taittiriya Upanisad , Siksavalli and the story of Yajnavalkya's discourse in the court of king Janaka in  Brhadaranyaka  Brhadaranyaka Upanisad . Both imply the self-earnings of the teacher to support students. 223 The practice of going to alms is not clear from the tradition for certain schools having strong financial support may not send certain students for alms collection. However, we are trying to project the purpose of alms collection in the earlier ancient Indian tradition. 224  Manusmrti,  Manusmrti, iii.77, 89 and 90 “As all creatures live supported by the air, so the other orders exist supported by the householder.” “Of all these (asramas (asramas), ), by the declaration of the Veda-scripture, Veda-scripture, the householder is the highest; he verily supports the other three.” “As all streams and rivers flow to rest in the ocean, so all the asramas flow to rest in the householder.” 225 Vipasyana meditation was practiced and perfected by the great Lord Buddha. 226  Nyaya 227 Vaisesika 228 Carvaka 229 Samkhya 146