G.R. No. 183233
December 23, 2009
VIRGILIO G. ANABE, Petitioner, vs. ASIAN CONSTRUCTION (ASIAKONSTRUKT), (ASIAKONSTRUKT), ZENAIDA P. ANGELES AND N.O. GARCIA, Respondents.
DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Virgilio G. Anabe (petitioner) was hired by respondent Asian Construction (Asiakonstrukt) a s radio technician/operator on April 15, 1993. By notice dated September 8, 1999, he was advised that his services would be, as he was in fact, terminated 1 effective October 8, 1999 on the ground of retrenchment. Petitioner thus filed on February 10, 2000 a complain t for illegal dismissal and illegal deduction and payment of overtime pay, premium pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, and 13th month pay. Asiakonstrukt, attributing petitioner’s retrenchment to sudden business reversal in the construction industry, averred, however, that petitioner’s money claims have been offset a gains t his outstanding accountabilities. 2
By Decision Decision of June 29, 2 001, the Labor Arbiter, finding that Asiakonstrukt failed to submit financial statements to prove losses, ruled that petitioner was not validly dismissed. Thus he disposed: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the respondents liable for illegal dismissal and consequently ordered to reinstate complainant to his former position or its equivalent without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, with full backwages and benefits from date of dismissal up to actual date of reinstatement which is in the amount of P136,277.14 as of this month. Respondent[s] are likewise ordered to pay complainant his 13th month pay in the amount of P4,259.64 and illegal deductions in the amount ofP164,960.24 and overtime pay in the amount of P6.11 [underpayment of overtime pay as computed by the Computation and Examination Unit of the NLRC]. R espondents are further ordered to pay complainant ten percent (10%) of the total award as attorney’s fees. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) , taking into consideration the certified true copies of the Audited 3 Financial Statements from 1998 to 2000 submitted by Asiakonstrukt, pa rtly granted the appeal by Resolution of March 10, 2004. It modified the Labor Arbiter’s Decision by holding that petitioner was not illegally dismissed. While it affirmed the award of the 13th month pay , overtime pay and a ttorney’s fees, it ordered the payment to petitioner of P19,170 as separation pay. Moreover, the NLRC reduced the reimbursable reimbursable amount of illegal deductions from P164,9 60.24 to P88,000.00, ratiocinating that petitioner is only entitled to money claims from 1997-1999, the claims prior thereto having already prescribed. 4
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by Orde r dated August 31, 2005, hence, he appealed to the Court of Appeals, assailing the consideration by the NLRC of the Audited Financial Statements which were submitted only on appeal. 5
By Decision Decision of December 26, 2007, the appellate court held that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC when it considered the financial statements as they "already form part of the records on appeal." 6
Citing Clarion Printing House, Inc. v. NLRC , the appellate court noted that the NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence on appeal as technical rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases. And it affirmed the ruling of the NLRC that petitioner is only entitled to the illegal deductions for the period 1997-1999 in the amount of P88,000.00, as the prescriptive period for money claims is only three years from the time the cause of action accrues. 7
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolutio n of April 2, 2008, he filed the present petition, maintaining that he was illegally dismissed as Asiakonstrukt failed to prove that it was suffering business losses to warrant a valid retrenchment of its employees; and Asiakonstrukt belatedly submitted financial statements were not shown to be newly found evidence and unavailable during the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter to thus cast doubts as to their veracity.
The petition is partly meritorious. Retrenchment is the termination of employment initiated by the employer through no fault of and without prejudice to the employees, it is resorted to during periods of business recession, industrial depression, or seasonal f luctuations or during lulls occasioned by lack of orders, shortage of materials, conversion of the plant for a new production program or the introduction of new methods or more efficient machinery or of automation. It is a management prerogative resorted to, to avoid or 8 minimize business losses , and is recognized by Article 283 of the Labor Code, as amended, viz: Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel . –– ––The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to x x x retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operations of the establishment x x x by serving a written notice on the worker and the [DOLE] at least one month b efore the intended date thereof. x x x I n case of retrenchment to prevent losses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half month pay for every year of service whichever is higher. x x x (Emphasis ours.) To effect a valid retrenchment, the following elements must be present: (1) the retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business losses which, if already incurred, are not merely de minimis, but substantial, serious, and real, or only if expected, are reasonably imminent as perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer; (2) the employer serves written notice both to the employee/s concerned and the Department of Labor and Employment at least a month before the intended date of retrenchment; (3) the employer pays the retrenched employee separation pay in an amount prescribed by the Code; (4) the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench in good faith; and (5 ) the employer uses fair 9 and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be retrenched or retained .
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The losses must be supported by sufficient and convincing evidence , the normal method of discharging which is the 11 submission of financial statements duly audited by independent external auditors . In the present case, Asiakonstrukt failed to submit its audited financial statements within the two years that the case was pending before the Labor Arbiter. It submitted them only after it received the adverse judgment of the Labor Arbiter. Indubitably, the NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence on appeal as technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases. There is, however, a caveat to this policy. The delay in the submission of evidence should be clearly explained 12 and should adequately prov e the employer’s allegation of the cause for termination . In the present case, Asiakonstrukt 13 proffered no explanation behind the belated submission. And the f inancial statement s it submitted covered the period 14 1998-2000. Further, note that the audited financial statemen t covering the period 1998-2000 was prepared in April 2001, which begs the question of how the management knew at such date of the company’s huge losses to justify petitioner’s retrenchment in 1999. 15
Furthermore, from the certificatio n issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), it would appear that Asiakonstrukt failed to submit its financial statements to the SEC, as required under the law, for the period 1998-2000 and 2003-2005, thereby lending credence to petitioner’s theory that the f inancial statements submitted on appeal may have been fabricated. Indeed, Asiakonstrukt could have easily submitted its audited financial statements during the pendency of the proceedings at the labor arbiter’s level, especially considering that it was in late 2001 that the case was decided. 16
For failure then of Asiakonstrukt to clearly and satisfactorily substantiate its financial losses , the dismissal of petitioner on account of retrenchment is unjustified. Petitioner is thus entitled to the twin reliefs of payment of back wages and other benefits from the time of his dismissal up to the finality of this Court’s Decision, and reinstatement without loss of senior ity rights or, in lieu thereof, payment of separation pay. On the reduc tion of petitioner’s money claims on account of prescription, under Article 1139 of the Civil Code, actions prescribe by the mere lapse of the time prescribed by law. That law may either be the Civil Code or special laws as specifically mandated by Article 1148. 1avvphi1In labor cases, the special law on prescription is Article 291 of the Labor Code which provides: Article 291. Money Claims. – All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be barred forever. (emphasis supplied) The Labor Code has no specific provision on when a monetary claim accrues. Thus, again the general law on prescription applies. Article 1150 of the Civil Code provides that – Article 1150. The time for prescription for all kinds of actions, when there is no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought. (emphasis supplied) 17
The day the action may be brought is the day a claim started as a legal possibility . In the present case, the day came when petitioner learned of Asiakonstrukt’s deduction from his salary of the amount of advances he had received but had, by his claim, been settled, the same having been reflected in his payslips, hence, it is assumed that he learned of it at the time he received his monthly paychecks.
As thus correctly ruled by both the NLRC and the appellate court, only those illegal deductions made from 1997 to 1999 when he was dismissed can be claimed, he having filed his complaint only in February 2000. Per his own computation and as properly adopted by the NLRC in its assailed Resolution dated March 10, 2004, petitioner is thus entitled to reimbursement of P88,000.00. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated December 26, 2007 and Resolution dated April 2, 2008 are SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated June 29, 2001 is REINSTATED, with the MODIFICATION that petitioner, Virgilio G. Anabe, is entitled to P88,00 0.00 representing reimbursement of the illegal deductions from his salary.
The case is REMANDED to the National Labor Relations Commission which is DIRECTED to recompute WITH DISPATCH the monetary awards due petitioner. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 79106 April 10, 1989 CHRISTIAN LITERATURE CRUSADE, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and LOIDA DEL ROSARIO, respondents. Agustin S. Sundiam for petitioner. The Solicitor General for public respondent. Domingo V. del Rosario for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction seeking to nullify the writ of execution dated June 2, 19 87, issued by the Labor Arbiter in NLRC-NCR-Case No. RBIV-9706-77, entitled "Loida del Rosario vs. Christian Literature Crusade." The antecedent facts are as follows:
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Sometime in January, 1975, private respondent Loida del Rosario (hereinafter referred to as del Rosario) was hired by petitioner Christian Literature Crusade (hereinafter referred to as Crusade) as a bookkeeper. Later, on October 4, 1976, an application for clearance to terminate the services of del Rosario on the gro und of incompetence was filed by Crusade with the Ministry of Labor and E mployment. The application was opposed by del Rosario. On November 20, 1976, del Rosario was placed under preventive suspension. On March 31, 1982, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads (pp. 31-32, Rollo): WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered denying the application for clearance filed by Christian literature Crusade and it (applicant) is ordered to reinstate Loida del Rosario to her former position/or substantially equivalent position, with backwages for a period of three (3) years without deductions from possible earnings elsewhere, and without loss of seniority rights and other privileges formerly appertaining to her. SO ORDERED. On August 9, 1982, a writ of execution was issued by the Labor Arbiter upon motion of del Rosario, there being no appeal (pp. 33-34, Rollo). On August 27, 1982, the award of backwages in the amount of THIRTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY PESOS (P 13,680.00) computed on the basis of del Rosario's P 380.00 monthly salary was satisfied. However, on the issue of reinstatement, the Sheriff stated in his return that del Rosario was not reinstated in view of the "Manifestation and Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Execution of the Decision Per Reinstatement of the Complainant Loida del Rosario,' filed by Crusade on August 31, 1982. On February 2, 1983, del Rosario filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution" praying therein for reinstatement with payment of allowances and 13th month pay from 1976, the date of her dismissal, up to January, 1983, amounting to P 20,072.00. On February 28, 1983, an Alias Writ of Execution wa s issued by the Labor Arbiter for del Rosario's reinstatement. On April 13, 1983, a Manifestation and Motion was again filed by del Rosario alleging that the computation of her backwages should include the allowances and 13th month pay. On June 7, 1 983, the Labor Arbiter resolved the question in this wise ( p. 37, Rollo): It might be noted that the Decision of Hon. Lacandola S. Leano states that complainant should be paid backwages for a period of three (3) years without deductions from possible earnings elsewhere and without loss of seniority rights and other privileges formerly appertaining to her. The basis of the computation of the backwages of the complainant is the amount appearing in the complaint which is P 380.00 a month that was in 1976 which is her latest salary. It might be noted that the prevailing minimum wage during this time is P 260.00 plus P 110.00 monthly allowance, and without loss of seniority rights and other privileges formerly appertaining to her. The computation, we believe is correct and the Motion f or Recomputation of the Backwages filed by the complainant is hereby denied and let an Alias Writ of Execution for the reinstatement of the complainant be issued. On June 9, 1983, the Labor Arbiter issued a second Alias Writ of Execution for the purpose of reinstatement of del Rosario, which was not satisfied. The motions for recomputation of her backwages having been denied, del Rosario appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (hereinafter referred to as NLRC) regarding the interpretation of the March 31, 1982 decision of the Labor Arbiter. On August 29, 1986, the NLRC rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads (pp. 38-39, Rollo): WHEREFORE, with the above modification, the appealed Order is Affirmed. Accordingly, let this case be remanded to the Labor Arbiter of origin for execution of the reinstatement aspect of the 31 March 1982 Decision and likewise of the award hereto indicated after proper computation. SO ORDERED. The modification referred to states (p. 38, Rollo): The term 'without loss of other privileges formerly appertaining to her' refers to other benefits that may have accrued to her had she n ot been dismissed. Obviously, this includes the decretal allo wances, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay as sought for in the motion. It appearing, however, that the amount of P 380.00 set forth in the complaint and taken as the basis in the determination of complainant's backwages already covers her monthly allowance, the same should therefore be excluded in this award. And for purposes of quantifying the other two ( 2) remaining claims, the computation must be reckoned from 20 November 1976, the date of her termination, until 20 November 1979, or for a period of three (3) years as directed in the subject decision. On February 9, 1987, del Rosario filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration before the NLRC arguing that the la tter erred in "holding that the amount of P 380.00 covers the allowance and that her monthly rate was P 260.00 and prayed for payment of additional backwages based on a computation of P 3 80.00 monthly rate with corresponding privileges and benefits on the basis of said monthly rate. Later, a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution was filed anew by del Rosario, alleging that based on her computation, she is entitled to backwages including living allowance a nd 13th month pay in the total amount P 80,329.15 from September 1, 1982 to March 15, 198 7 and prayed for the payment of the same and reinstatement.
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On June 2, 1987, the Labor Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution, the dispositive portion of which reads (p. 44, Rollo): NOW, THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to go to respondent Christian Literature Crusade's premises at 104 Karuhatan, Valenzuela, Bulacan and reinstate Loida del Rosario to her former position or a substantially equivalent position, without loss of seniority rights and other privileges formerly appertaining to her and collect the amount of EIGHTY FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED EIGH TY ONE PESOS and NINETY SIX CENTAVOS (P 84,681.96) representing her backwages and other benefits aside from the 3 years deductible backwages as originally ordered and already satisfied, commencing from the period when the Sheriff was unable to effect reinstatement per decision dated August 29, 1986, as per official computation of the Research and Information Unit (attached as Annex "A" of this Writ) and thereafter turn over said amount to this office for further disposition. In case you fail to collect said amount in cash, you are directed to cause the satisfaction of the same from the movable goods and immovable properties of respondent not exempt from execution. You are further directed to return this Writ within fifteen (1 5) days f rom compliance thereof together with your corresponding report. You may collect legal fees f rom the respondent. On July 16, 1987, the Motion to Quash Writ of Execution was denied. Hence, the present petition. Crusade alleged that on June 17, 1987, the Deputy Sheriff garnished its bank deposits amounting to more than P 8,000.00. On August 3, 1987, We issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the NLRC, thru Labor Arbiter Edgardo M. Madriaga, from releasing the garnished amounts of money to del Rosario. H owever, in her comment, del Rosario alleged that the amount of P 7,771.88 has been released to her before the issuance of the temporary restraining order. The main issue is whether or not del Rosario is entitled to additional backwages from September 1, 1982 to March 15, 1987. Crusade alleges that the questioned writ of execution is null and void for the following reasons: (1) it does not conform to, but is even violative of the decisions dated March 31, 1982 and August 29, 1986 which decisions merely award ed del Rosario "backwages for a period of th ree (3) years without deductions from possible earnings elsewhere, without loss of s eniority rights and other privileges formerly appertaining to her; (2) del Rosario's backwages totalling P l3,680. 00 had already been fully paid in 1982; and (3) it commands collection from Crusade of P 84, 681.96 representing del Rosario's backwages from September 1, 1982 until March 15, 1987. Unless the subject writ of execution is declared null and void, NLRC would be allowed to award backwages to del Rosario for more than the three (3) years maximum, or seven (7) years and nine (9) months to be more precise, or without any limit for that matter. On the other hand, del Rosario argues that the challenged writ of execution is based on the obstinate refusal of Crusade to reinstate her and not on the decisions dated March 31, 1982 and August 29, 1986. The power of the NLRC and/or the Labor Arbiter to grant or extend backwages for refusal of the employer enjoined to reinstate terminated workers is recognized in this jurisdiction in the case of TUPAS Local Chapter No. 979 vs. NLRC (G.R. Nos. 60532 -33, November 5, 1985,139 SCRA 478). The petition is impressed with merit. It is a well-settled rule that the execution of judgment must conform to that which is ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision Laingo vs. Camilo, G.R. No. L-35833, June 29, 1984, 130 SCRA 144; National Steel Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission and Pelagio Remolado, G.R. No. 74711, September 19, 1988). Where the writ of execution is not in harmony with and exceeds the judgment which gives it life, the writ has pro tanto no validity (Mutual Security Insurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-47018, September 11, 1987,153 SCRA 678). This is so because once a judgment has become final a nd executory or partially executed as in this case, it may no longer be amended, modified or altered. What remains to be done is purely the ministerial enforcement or execution of the judgment. In case of defiance or non-compliance with the writ of execution, as in this case, where Crusade paid del Rosario three (3) years backwages but failed and refused and still fails and refuses to reinstate her despite several writs of execution, the remedy is not for the grant in another writ of execution of continuing backwages up to the time of actual reinstatement. The grant of additional backwages to serve a s damages or as penalty to Crusade for persistently refusing to reinstate del Rosario has no basis in the decision so ught to be enforced and hence, it may not be resorted to in order to compel reinstatement. The remedy is provided in the case of D.M. Consunji, Inc. vs. Pucan, et al., G.R. No. 71413, March 21, 1988, 159 SCRA 107, wherein an alias writ of execution was likewise issued directing payment of additional backwages after the prior award of backwages equivalent to five (5) years and seven (7) months had been fully satisfied. The Court, i n nullifying the order for payment of additional sums, therein held: To ensure compliance with the court's order, and realizing the stubborn refusal to reinstate him, petitioner (sic) should have resorted to more drastic remedies such a s the filing of a motion to cite petitioner in contempt. In this way, prompt compliance could have r esulted. Thus, del Rosario should have filed a motion to cite Crusade in contempt for refusing to reinstate her despite several writs of execution issued by the Labor Arbiter. The case of TUPAS Local Chapter No. 979 vs. NLRC, supra, relied upon by del Rosario in support of her claim for continuing backwages, is inapplicable to the ca se at bar. It should be noted that the Court's departure therein from the usual equivalen t of the three years backwages generally awarded by this Court was still within its power to do, the reinstatement of the workers therein being by virtue of a return-to-work order, not by virtue of a final and executory judgment. In Davao Free Workers Front vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-29356, October 31,1974, 60 SCRA 408, this Court, in departing from the general rule, merely
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