81. People v JIMENEZ 71 SCRA 186 Facts: The Chief of Police admitted that prior to the police interrogation of appellant, the latter was not warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney-either retained or appointed. The appellant not only repudiated the alleged extra judicial confession (Exhibit "A") as one procured thru coercion but also claimed that he was threatened by the police that if he would not affirm his signature in Exhibit "A" before the City Judge, they will further maltreat him. Issue: Is the affidavit of appellant (Exhibit "A") admissible? Held: No. Without proper safeguards the process of in custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. In order to combat these pressures pr essures and to permit a full f ull opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise exercise of those rights must be be fully honored. Appellant was acquitted.
82. PEOPLE V CAMALOG 109 SCRA 816 Facts: The accused were charged with the crime of Robbery with Hom icide. The accused stated that they were never informed about their constitutional rights and that the police investigators never conducted an investigation as regards their alleged participation in the crime. The two accused further testified that during the period covering their custodial interrogation, they never had the chance to confer with a lawyer. Issue: Is the extrajudicial confession admissible? Hled: No. It appears that the appellants appe llants were not informed of their constitutional rights and, even assuming that they were so informed, there is no indication that they understood those rights. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid, whether exculpatory or inculpatory in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence With the inadmissibility of the extra-judicial confessions of appellants, their conviction becomes baseless. They are entitled to an acquittal.
83. REYES V QUIZON 142 SCRA 362 Facts:
The trial court convicted Nenita Quizon y Katipunan for the violation of Section 4, Article 11, in relation to Section 21, Article IV of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 primarily on the basis of her alleged extra-judicial confessions. Appellant and the Solicitor General contend that the said extra-judicial confessions are inadmissible in evidence because appellant was not fully apprised of her constitutional right to counsel. Issue: Is the extrajudicial confession admissible? Held: While the appellant was informed of her right to remain silent and to hire a lawyer to assist her, she was not, however, informed that if she could not secure a lawyer, the State will provide her with one, to assist her in the custodial investigation. The omission is a fatal defect rendering the extra-judicial confession inadmissible in evidence as ruled by this Honorable Tribunal in People vs. Pascual, Jr.
84. PEOPLE V TRINIDAD 162 SCRA 714 Facts: Sgt. Casio and Cpl. Dominador Barwel apprehended the accused. On the way to Umingan, Pangasinan, Romeo Condaya was verbally interrogated inside the jeep. Here, Condaya admitted the shooting as Isabelo Trinidad prom ised to pay him the amount of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) and pointed where the gun used in the killing was hidden. After their apprehension, Condaya, Trinidad, Palding, and Mitrado were made to execute sworn statements which, however, they refused to affirm before the Municipal Judge of Umingan, Pangasinan. Issue: Is the extrajudicial confession admissible? Held: No. Since there is no proof that when they made their confessions they were informed of their right to remain silent and to counsel and that they knowingly an d intelligently waived these rights, such confessions are inadmissible in evidence. It is not only the oral confessions made to the apprehending officers, Sgt. Casio and Cpl. Barwel, that are tainted but also the written confessions made and signed a few days after their arrest. Thus, the testimonies of the police officers on the matters allegedly confessed to them by accused-appellants and the written extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible in evidence.
85. PEOPLE V GALIT 135 SCRA 965 Facts: During trial, Galit denied participation in the commission of the crime and also assailed the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession extracted from him through torture, force and
intimidation. Against his will, he posed for pictures as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a re-enactment. This notwithstanding, the trial court found Galit guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Issue: Is the accused extrajudicial confession inadmissible? Held: YES. A long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two weeks after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations of his rights. The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as evidence because they were obtained in a manner contrary to law. Galit acquitted.
86. PEOPLE V POLICARPIO 121 SCRA 538 Facts: What the records show is that appellant was informed of his constitutional right to be silent and that he may refuse to give a statement which may be used against him, that is why he refused to give such a written statement unless it is made in the presence of his lawyer as shown by the paper he signed to this effect. However, he was made to acknowledge that the six (6) small plastic bags of dried marijuana leaves were confiscated from him by signing a receipt and to sign a receipt for the P20.00 bill as purchase price of the dried marijuana leaves he sold to Pat. Mangila. Issue: Is the extrajudicial confession obtained admissible? Held: No. Obviously the appellant was the victim of a clever ruse to make him sign these alleged receipts which in effect are extra-judicial confessions of the commission of the offense. Indeed it is unusual for appellant to be made to sign receipts for what were taken from him. It is the police officers who confiscated the same who should have signed such receipts. No doubt this is a violation of the constitutional right of appellant to remain silent whereby he was made to admit the commission of the offense without informing him of his right. Such a confession obtained in violation of the Constitution is inadm issible in evidence.
87. MORALES V PONCE ENRILE 158 SCRA 85 Facts: Petitioners were convicted of violation of Section 4 Art. II of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended. Petitioners allege that they were arrested without any warrant of arrest; that their constitutional rights were violated, among them the right to counsel, the right to remain silent, the right to a speedy and public trial, and the right to bail. They also air the charge that they were subjected to maltreatment and torture. Issue: Is the evidence admissible? Held: No. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means-by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
88. PEOPLE V BARLIS 231 SCRA 426 Facts: Jonathan Barlis was found guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in giving credence to his sworn statement or "salaysay" (Exhibit "B") which was taken without the assistance of a lawyer. He alleges that he surrendered to the police only to help them find the real culprits, that Pfc. Rivera misled him into signing the sworn statement by telling him not to worry, and that he was brought to the Office of the IBP-Quezon City Chapter where Atty. Sansano signed the document without conferring with him. Issue: Is the contention of appellant tenable? Held: We are not persuaded. It was the appellant's uncle who surrendered him to Pfc. Rivera, his uncle's colleague. Before he was questioned, he was duly informed and advised in Tagalog, a language he speaks and understands, of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to 28 have a competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice. He voluntarily agreed to be assisted by no less than the Chairman of the Legal Aid Assistance Office of
the IBP-Quezon City Chapter, Atty. Confesor Sansano. The latter affirmed in court that he assisted the appellant during the investigation. A la wyer is an officer of the court and upon his shoulders lies the responsibility to see to it that protection has been accorded the rights 29 of the accused and that no injustice to him has been committed. He has in his favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties. This presumption was not rebutted in this case. With the presence of Atty. Sansano, we believe that the r ights of the appellant were duly protected.
89. PEOPLE V MOLEDA 86 SCRA 667 Facts: The accused Molleda, Baluyot and Nicolas were found guilty by the trial court of the crime of murder. On appeal, Molleda claims that his extra-judicial confession is not admissible because he was not afforded the right to counsel during the interrogation; and, that, having been allegedly illegally arrested, his statement is inadmissible in evidence. Baluyot and Nicolas also claims that their extra-judicial confession (Exhibits "H" and "I", respectively) were obtained thru maltreatment, torture and intimidation and should have been rejected Issue: Are the extra-judicial confessions admissible? Held: Yes. Molleda's claim that he is entitled to counsel is without merit. The right to be represented by counsel at custodial investigation became effective and enforceable only 2 after the enactment of the Constitution on January 17, 1973. The investigations of the accused-appellants having taken place much earlier or in April 1971, the right to counsel was not applicable in their case Appellants Nicolas' and Baluyot's claim is bereft of any evidentiary support apart from their own testimonies to this effect. The records show that t hey never complained to anyone that they were maltreated or tortured in the course of their investigations. The trial court, therefore — as maintained by the Solicitor General in his reply briefs — correctly concluded that the same were voluntarily given and consequently are admissible in evidence.
90. PEOPLE V AYSON 203 SCRA 750 Facts: Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos’ written admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Issue: Is the evidence admissible?
Held: Yes. The judge should admit the evidence in court as the accused was not under custodial investigation when his statements were taken. One cannot invoke violation of the right to counsel in administrative proceeding. The right to self incrimination and custodial investigation are accorded only when the accused is subjected to custodial inquest which involves the questioning initiated by police authorities after a person is taken in custody or deprived of his freedom in any way. Because the statements were obtained beyond the purview of custodial investigation the evidence should be admitted in court. 91.
ARROYO, JR. v. COURT OF APPEALS
203 SCRA 750 Facts: A criminal complaint for adultery was filed by the husband against his wife and petitioner. After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted the petitioner and the wife, based, among others on the wife's admission to her husband, of her infidelity. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The wife later filed a motion for reconsideration or new trial contending that a pardon had been extended by her husband. The husband filed a manifestation praying for the dismissal of the case as he had "tacitly consented" to his wife's infidelity. Issue: Whether the admission of adulterous conduct by the wife to her husband is admissible in evidence. Held: YES. The husband's testimony relating to the a dmission of adulterous conduct made by the wife to her husband is admissible in evidence. The husband was neither a peace officer nor an investigating officer conducting a custodial investigation. Neither was said testimony rendered inadmissible by the constitutional provision on the right to remain silent and the right to counsel of a "person under investigation for the commission of an offense." 92.
PEOPLE V BENNY DY
158 SCRA 111 Facts: Accused is the owner of Benny’s Bar at Boracay Island and was sentenced with murder before the trial court for shooting a Swiss national in his bar. The accused contends the court erred in admitting the presentation of the prosecution of evidence that he came to a police officer and made a confession on the crime and informed said officer where to find the gun he used, a statement the accused denied to have done. They assail its admissibility to the court on the grounds that such statement was not made in writing and is in violation of the due process required in custodial investigation. Issue: Whether or not the evidence presented by the prosecution be admissible to warrant guilt of the accused.
Held: An oral confession made by the accused to the officer and telling him the gun is in his bar which he wants to surrender can be held admissible in court as evidence against him. This is because such confession was made unsolicited by the p olice officer and the accused was not under investigation when he made the oral confession. Therefore there is no need to invoke compliance of the proper procedure in a custodial investigation at the case at bar. The rule on RES GESTAE is applicable where a witness who heard the confession is competent to satisfy the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such a case it must be given in substance. Thus the oral confession made by the accused outside the ambit of custodial investigation can be admissible in court and was given due credence to warrant the judgment of the accused being guilty of the crime. 93.
MAGTOTO V MANGUERA
63 SCRA 4 Facts: (no preliminary facts available in the body of the case) Respondent judge declared the extra-judicial confession which had incorporated an uncounseled waiver by the confessant of his constitutional rights during custodial investigation as admissible in evidence. Issue: Is the right to counsel and to be informed of such right prospective or retroactive? Held: We hold that this specific portion of this constitutional mandate has and should be given a prospective and not a retrospective effect. Consequently, a confession obtained f rom a person under investigation for the commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution on January 17, 1973. Conversely, such confession is admissible in evidence against the accused, if the same had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented after January 17, 1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel, since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that date. 94.
MONCADO V PEOPLE'S COURT
80 PHIL 1 (spanish text) 95.
PEOPLE V VIZCARRA
115 SCRA 743 Facts: Appellants were found guilty of the crime of rape with homicide. On appeal, appellants Salamatin, Delos Reyes and Fernando assail th e admissibility of their respective
extrajudicial statements on the ground that they were extracted by the CIS agents through force and intimidation. Issue: Are the extra-judicial confessions admissible? Held: As heretofore pointed out, appellants admitted in their respective statements that they took turns in ravishing Erlinda. Their responses to the questions of the investigators were so candid and informative as to indicate the lack of any extraneous pressure on their mind In Exhibit H, Salamatin further attested to the fact that, immediately after he and his companions were taken into custody, i.e., before they had given their statements to the CIS officers, a televised interview was held in the office of Lt. Col. Pelagio Perez, then chief of the CIS, and that in the presence of the latter and of several press reporters, he and his coappellants spontaneously admitted that they were the ones who raped Erlinda Manzano. Thus, the written confessions they gave on July 18, 1969 merely reaffirmed their prior public admissions of culpability. It further appears that appellants, at the request of the city mayor of Quezon City, were physically examined by Dr. Ernesto Baylon, medico-legal officer of the Quezon City Police Department. The latter's findings that he "did not find any visible and palpable sign of injury" on the persons of the appellants 9 belie their claim of maltreatment and torture. 96.
PEOPLE V BERNARDO
220 SCRA 31 Facts: Bernardo, one of the appellants, admitted the crime to the police and made statement to the media regarding the commission of the crime. The accused-appellants were found guilty of the crime of kidnapping for ransom by the RTC of the National Capital Judicial Region. Issue: Is Bernardo's admission to the media admissible? Held: Yes. Bernardo's culpability is shown by his spontaneous statement given to GMA 7 reporter Jessica Sojo, to wit: "Siguro, naisip ko nga ring sabihin to sa kanya (Paul Cruz) na may konti ka ring kasalanan, Paul, siguro kasalanan 'in quotation' dahil parang inispoil mo ako, inispoil ako." This was made not as part of the custodial interrogation but as Bernardo's voluntary accommodation to media questioning and is thus adm issible in evidence especially so because the statement tries to justify his ungratefulness to his em ployer. The fact that the GMA 7 tape was edited with commentaries does not erase the reality that such declaration came out freely from Bernardo's own lips.
97.
PEOPLE V MAQUEDA
242 SCRA 565 Facts: Maqueda was arrested and taken to Calauag, Quezon where he signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein he narrated his participation in the crime. Afterwards, he was brought to the Benguet Provincial Jail. While under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail. He stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be a State witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case." Maqueda also admitted his involvement in the commission of the robbery to Prosecutor Zarate and to Salvosa. Issue: Are the extra-judicial admissions admissible in evidence? Held: Such uncounselled Sinumpaang Salaysay is wholly inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 3, Section 12, Article III of the Constitution However, the extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and to Ray Dean Salvosa stand on a different footing. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness; and as to the other admission, it was given to a private person. Accordingly, Maqueda’s admissions to Ray Dean Salvosa, a private party, are admissible in evidence against the former under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
PEOPLE V DOMANTAY
98.
307 SCRA 1 Facts: The accused was convicted of the crime of rape with homicide for the death of a 6 year old girl. The accused admitted the killing to SPO1 Espinoza and Celso Manuel, a radio reporter who interviewed him 6 days after he confessed the killing to the police. On cross-examination, Espinoza admitted that at no time during the course of his questioning was accused-appellant assisted by counsel. Neither was accused-appellant's confession reduced in writing. Espinoza's testimony was admitted by the trial court over the objection of the defense. Issue: Are the extrajudicial admissions to SPO1 Espinoza and Celso Manuel admissible? Held:
But though he waived the assistance of counsel, the waiver was neither put in writing nor made in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the waiver is invalid and his confession is inadmissible. However, that accused-appellant’s confession to the radio reporter, Celso Manuel is admissible. [A]ppellant’s [oral] confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State.
PEOPLE V ORDOÑO
99.
334 SCRA 673 Facts: The accused Ordoño and Medina voluntarily went to the Santol Police Station to confess. Due to the non-availability of practicing lawyers in Santol, La Union, and the remoteness of the town, the confession was not assisted by counsel b ut by the presence of the Parish Priest and the Municipal Mayor of Santol as well as the relatives of the accused to obviate the possibility of coercion, and to witness the voluntary e xecution by the accused of their statements before the police. Issue: Are the extra-judicial admissions by the accused admissible? Held: No. It is explicitly stated therein that before the above-mentioned persons can appear two (2) conditions must be met: (a) counsel of the accused must be absent, and, ( b) a valid waiver must be executed. Hence, in the absence of such valid waiver, the Parish Priest of Santol, the Municipal Mayor, the relatives of the accused, the Chief of Police and other police officers of the municipality could not stand in lieu of counsel's presence. The apparent consent of the two (2) accused in continuing with the investigation was of no moment as a waiver to be effective must be made in writing and with the assistance of counsel. Consequently, any admission obtained from the two (2) accused emanating from such uncounselled interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding. 100.
PEOPLE V TABOGA
376 SCRA 500 Facts: Accused-appellant claimed that he was maltreated by the policemen and forced to admit the crime. Regarding his admission to radio announcer Mario Contaoi, he narrated that the interview was held inside the investigation room of the police station where policemen were present. Thus, he had to admit the crimes because he was afraid of the policemen.
Issue: Is the tape confession to the reporter admissible? Held: Yes. The court a quo did not err in admitting in evidence accused-appellant’s taped confession. Such confession did not form part of custodial investigation. It was not given to police officers but to a media man in an apparent attempt to elicit sympathy. 101.
PEOPLE V ENDINO
352 SCRA 307 Facts: Accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin was arrested by the police officers. On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television station where accused Galgarin was interviewed by reporters. Video footages of the interview were taken showing Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing to his nephew Edward Endino as the gunman. His interview was shown over the ABS-CBN evening news program TV Patrol. Issue: Is the videotaped confession admissible? Held: the Supreme Court ruled that the admission of the videotaped confession is proper. The interview was recorded on video and it showed accused unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to poli ce officers but to media men in an attempt to solicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. There was no showing that the interview was coerced or against his will. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for admitting one’s guilt, courts are rem inded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar confessions. 102.
PEOPLE V MORADA
307 SCRA 362 Facts: Manimbao testified that, after coming from the hospital to see the victim, he returned to the police station and there was told by SPO3 Gomez that accused-appellant wanted to talk to him. Accordingly, he said, he went to see accused-appellant who was then in jail. Accusedappellant allegedly admitted that he had killed the victim. Apparently, the purpose is to show that accused-appellant spontaneously made the confession, that is, not in the course of interrogation by the police. In fact, Manimbao claimed accused-appellant sought him out for a meeting Issue: Is the alleged confession to Manimbao admissible in evidence? Held:
No. It would thus appear that Manimbao’s conversation with accused-appellant was part of the then ongoing police investigation. In fact, he said it was SPO3 Gomez who told him about the alleged desire of accused-appellant to see him (Manimbao). Since the confession was admittedly given without the safeguards in Art. III, §12 and the additional ones provided in R.A. No. 7438, particularly the requirement that the confession be in writing and duly signed by the suspect in the presence of counsel, we hold that accused-appellant’s confession is inadmissible, and it was error for the trial court to use it in convicting accused-appellant 103.
PEOPLE V SAMUS
389 SCRA 93 Facts: After being illegally arrested, appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel. The trial court found him guilty of the crime of murder. Issue: Is the admission elicited from him by the law enforcers during custodial investigation admissible? Held: Even if the uncounselled admission per se may be inadmissible, under the present circumstances we cannot rule it out because of appellant’s failure to make timely objections. “Indeed, the admission is inadmissible in evidence under Article III, Section 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution, because it was given under custodial investigation and was made without the assistance of counsel. However, the defense failed to object to its presentation during the trial, with the result that the defense is deemed to have waived objection to its admissibility 104.
PEOPLE V ANDAN
269 SCRA 95 Facts: In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and appellant's own wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt. During the confession, the mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and media representatives witness the confession. The mayor first asked for a lawyer to assist appellant but since no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings photographed and videotaped. Issue: Is the videotaped confession admissible? Held: Yes. Appellant's confession to the mayor was not m ade in response to any interrogation by the latter. Accused talked with the Mayor as a confidant, not as a law enforcement officer.
Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not appl y to the spontaneous statements not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admitted having committed the crime. 105.
PEOPLE V DENIEGA
251 SCRA 626 Facts: The accused-appellants were convicted of rape and homicide. The prosecution was based solely on the alleged extrajudicial confessions taken by the police officers without the presence of a counsel during custodial investigation. It was also notable that the prosecution did not present any witness to the actual commission of the crime and the basis of the lower court’s conviction to the accused was based on their alleged extrajudicial confessions. Issue: Are the alleged extra-judicial confessions admissible? Held: The court held that under rules laid down by the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy all of four fundamental requirements: 1) the confession must be voluntary 2) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; 3) the confession must be express and 4) the confession must be in writing. The court noted that the assistance of a counsel provided for the accused was inadequate to meet the standard requirements of the constitution for custodial investigation. It seems that the lawyers were not around throughout the custodial investigation. 106.
PEOPLE V TALIMAN
342 SCRA 534 Facts: Attorney Nicolas V. Pardo was mayor of Labo, Camarines Norte. He went to the police station upon invitation of police corporal Cereno to “assist” accused during their custodial investigation. Accused executed extra-judicial statements, confessing to the commission of the crime. Issue: Can the mayor be considered as an independent counsel? Held: No. Mayor Pardo cannot be considered as an independent counsel for accused during their custodial investigation because as Mayor his duties were inconsistent with his
responsibilities to the suspect. It is seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the defense of the accused without running into conflict of interests. 107. 108. 109.
US v EVANGELISTA
24 PHIL 453 Facts: The accused was convicted of arson after the trial court admitted evidence that he had earlier attempted to set fire to the same premises. Issue: Is the evidence admissible? Held: While it was not the fire charged in the information, and does not by any means amount to direct evidence against the accused, it was competent to prove the intent of the accused in setting the fire which was charged in the information. Where a person is charged with the commission of a specific crime, testimony may be received of other similar acts, committed about the same time, for the purpose only of establishing the criminal intent of the accused. 110.
PEOPLE V VALENCIA
59 Phil 42 Facts: Appellants Valencia and Socorro stopped their car in front of a store belonging to Morales and bought some cigarettes and corn beef, and gave the seller a ten-peso bill which was found to be a counterfeit. After receiving the change in the sum of P9.55, they hurriedly left the store. Appellants went to another store belonging to Eustaquia Suñga and bought cigars and some cans of salmon, giving, in payment, another ten-peso counterfeit bill. Upon receiving the change, they again hurriedly departed. They were, however, overtaken by Pedro Morales and, at his instance, were detained by the authorities. They were guilty of the crime charged against them. Issue: Is the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction of Socorro? Held: Counsel contends that Socorro did not know anything about the counterfeit bills, but an examination of the evidence in this case convinces us to the contrary, and so we are not disposed to interfere with the finding of the trial court on this point. 111.
PEOPLE V IRANG
64 Phil 285 (1937)
Facts: After barging into her home, a man ordered Maximiniana Vicente to bring out her money and jewelry. As she turned over the items, she looked at the man's face and saw that he had pockmarks and a scar on his left eyelid. Irang was identified by Maximiana from a police line-up and was charged. During the trial, Maximiana’s neighbor, Juana de la Cruz, testified that on the night in question, her house was assaulted by malefactors. De la Cruz noticed that one of them had pockmarks and a scar on the left eyelid. She identified that man to be Irang. Issue: Is the evidence of another crime admissible? Held: The testimony of Juana de la Cruz indirectly corroborates Maximiniana’s testimony that the man of the same description was the one who went to her house and demanded delivery of her money and jewelry. While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to show his presence at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time charged, or when it is evidence of a circumstance connected with the crime. 112.
US v. PINEDA
37 Phil 457 Facts: A druggist filled a prescription for protassium chlorate with barium chlorate, a poison, causing the death of two horses. After analyzing the packages, two chemists went to the drug store of the defendant and bought potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was found to be barium chlorate. Issue: Is the testimony of the chemist admissible? Held: The testimony of the chemist was admissible in order to demonstrate defendant's motive and negligence. It is permissible to ascertain defendant's knowledge and intent and to fix his negligence. If the defendant has on more than one occasion performed similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly excluded, negligence is intensified, and fraudulent intent may even be established. There is no better evidence of negligence than the frequency of accidents. Evidence is admissible in a criminal action which tends to show motive, although it tends to prove the commission of another offense by the defendant. 113.
CORNEJO, JR. V SANDIGANBAYAN
152 SCRA 559 Facts:
Petitioner Cornejo falsely presented himself as duly authorized to inspect and investigate privately-owned buildings by which he was able to inveigle complainant to agree to have the floor area of her house and store measured and to have a plan thereof drawn for a fee less than that supposedly officially charged for said service. During trial, Exhibit B was presented as part of the testimony of-the complainant that such certification was issued in her presence and the declaration of Assistant Pasay City Engineer Ceasar Contreras that the signature appearing thereon was that of Engineer Reyna. Issue: Is the certification, Exhibit B, issued by the City Engineer to the effect that petitioner was not authorized to inspect and investigate privately-owned buildings admissible in evidence? Held: Where the statement or writings attributed to a person who is not on the witness stand are being offered not to prove the truth of the facts stated therein but only to prove that such statements were actually made or such writings were executed, such evidence is not covered by the hearsay rule. 114.
PIONEER CERAMICS V SAMIA
12 PHIL 64 Facts: On the motion for reconsideration, the petitioner objects to the consideration of the physician’s report as a basis for the award on the ground that it is hearsay evidence, the physician himself not having been presented as witness. Issue: Is the petitioner's contention correct? Held: while such a report may be hearsay under the common law rules of evidence, it is nevertheless admissible under Section 49 of the Act, and may be considered in addition to the sworn testimony at open hearing. In the present case, aside from the physician’s report there is the testimony of the claimant himself concerning the nature of his work, which testimony constitutes substantial evidence to support the award. It can hardly be doubted that the disease (pulmonary tuberculosis) which the claimant contracted, if not directly caused by his employment was at the least agg ravated by it. 115.
PEOPLE V BRIOSO
37 SCRA 336 Facts: Appellants were found guilty of the crime of murder. The two accused appealed the conviction and assigned the following error, among others, that the lower court erred in disregarding the affidavit (Exhibit 2) of Antonio Daria, son of the deceased, clearing the
accused Mariano Taeza, which affidavit had been identified in court by the fiscal before whom the same was executed. Issue: Is the affidavits admissible in evidence? Held: No. Exhibit "2," the alleged affidavit of Antonio Daria, was presented in court to corroborate Mariano Taeza's testimony. But while the said aff idavit was identified by the Provincial Fiscal as having been subscribed and sworn to before him, he also stated that he did not know Antonio Daria personally and that was the only time he appeared before him. Exhibit "2" does not have the seal of the Fiscal's Office. Moreover, the said e xhibit was never identified by the supposed affiant and there was no opportunity for the prosecution to crossexamine him. Affidavits are generally rejected in a judicial proceeding as hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. 116.
NGO SENG V FERNANDEZ
98 Phil 197 Facts: The most important issue raised in the appeal is the failure of the Respondent Court of Appeals to take into account the report of a certified public accountant, Exhibit O, in which it appears that the balance of collections for which Quisumbing is responsible is P63.69. Petitioners contend that the said report Exhibit O was not objected to by the respondent Paz Fernandez, the same should be admitted even though the referee did not attach the exhibits supporting said report. Issue: Is the Exhibit O admissible in evidence? Held: We presume that the papers examined were statements prepared by Quisumbing himself. The authenticity and correctness of said documents were never before the court. The same were not presented to support the report and no opportunity was afforded the adverse party to question them. Admitting for the sake of argument that the documents were in the handwriting of Quisumbing, the same are incompetent against Paz Fernandez and Darjuan, because books of account, as regards other persons, are hearsay or res inter alios acta, except when circumstances are shown to justify their admission as an exception to the above rule 117
ROBLES V LIZARRAGA
42 PHIL 584 Facts:
Lizarraga filed a case of unlawful detainer against spouses Robles. Evarista Robles contends that she is a possessor in good faith and is the owner of the improvements of the building in question and has the right to demand payment of their value from Lizarraga. One of the proofs establishing the fact that Evarista Robles’ possession was in good faith is found in Exhibit A, a statement of account. Issue: Can a document not signed be admissible in evidence? Held: When a document, which is a statement of accounts, is offered in evidence not to prove such accounts, but for the only purpose of showing the possessor’s good faith, section 335 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable, and such a document i8 admissible in evidence although it is not signed 118.
PEOPLE V DE JOYA
203 SCRA 343 Facts: The prosecution relied heavily on the circumstances surrounding the death of the victim as testified to by the witnesses and the dying statement of the victim when her grandson Alvin asked her ‘Apo, Apo, what happened?’ and she answered, ‘Si Paki’, then she expired. When Alvin was asked during his testimony who is this Paki, he identified the accused. The accused during his testimony never denied that he is called Paki. Issue: Is the dying statement admissible in evidence? Held: No. A dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. To be complete in itself does not mean that the declarant must recite everything that constituted the res gestae of the subject of his statement, but that his statement of any given fact should be a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning in respect of such fact. It is clear to the Court that the dying declaration of the deceased victim here was incomplete. In other words, the deceased was cut off by death before she could convey a complete or sensible communication to Alvin. The trial court simply assumed that by uttering the words "Si Paqui", the deceased had intended to name the person who had thrust some sharp instrument through and through her neck just below her ears. But Eulalia herself did not say so and we cannot speculate what the rest of her communication might have been had death not interrupted her. We are unable to regard the dying statement as a dying declaration naming the appellant as the doer of the bloddy deed. 119.
PEOPLE V MORENO
220 SCRA 292 Facts:
Immediately after the three accused left the house where the crime was committed, and the threatening presence of the accused was gone, both Mary Ann Galedo and Narcisa Sumayo told their employers, the Mohnani spouses, that they were raped. The latter later testified in court as to these statements. Counsel for appellant claims that in the absence of Galedo’s testimony in court, her affidavit is hearsay evidence and was thus inadmissible for the purpose of proving the allegation of rape. Issue: Is Galedo's affidavit a hearsay evidence? Held: No. Admittedly, Galedo’s affidavit would be hearsay evidence if she did not testify as to its contents at the trial. The accused was not given the opportunity to face and cross-examine her on her accusations, a right guaranteed to him by the Constitution. However, there are exceptions to the rule on inadmissibility of hearsay evidence, and one of these is when it is part of the res gestae as provided in Section 42 of Rule 130, Rules of Court. This exception is based on the belief that such statements are trustworthy because made instinctively, "while the declarant’s mental powers for deliberation are controlled and stilled by the shocking influence of a startling occurrence, so that all his utterances at the time are the reflex products of immediate sensual impressions, unaided by retrospective m ental action." Said natural and spontaneous utterances are perceived to be more convincing than the testimony of the same person on the witness stand. 120.
ENCARNACION V CA
