Jean L. Arnault vs Leon Nazareno
October, 1949, the Philippine Government, , through the Rural Progress Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista and respectively. Tambobong for the sums o f P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. Of the first sum, P1,000,000 was paid to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, thru his attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, the Associated Associated Estates, Inc., represented by Jean L. Arnault. The second sum of P500,000 was all paid to the same Ernest H. Burt through his other attorney-in-fact, the North Manila Development Co., Inc., also represented by Jean L. Arnault. Buenavista Estate - originally owned by the San Juan de Dios Hospital. June 29, 1946- the San Juan de Dios Hospital sold the Buenavista Estate Estate for P5,000,000(annual pmt=500T) to Ernest H. Bur who made a down payment of P10,000. Burt has made no other payment. Tambobong Estate - originally owned by the Philippine Trust Company. May 14, 1946- PTC sold estate for P1,200,000 (90T w/in 9mo, 10 installments of 110T) to Ernest H. Burt who paid P10,000 down payment. 9months expired but Burt’s did not pay any other amount then or afterwards. September 4, 1947- the PTC sold, conveyed, and delivered the Tambobong Estate to the Rural Progress Administration for P750,000. February 5, 1948- the Rural Progress Administration made a notarial demand upon Burt for the resolution and cancellation cancellation of his contract of purchase Subsequently the Court of First Instance of Rizal ordered the cancellation of Burt’s cert ificate of title and the issuance of a new one in the name of the Rural Progress Administration, from which ord er he appealed to the Supreme Court. Philippine Government, through the Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Rural Progress Administration and as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Ph ilippine National Bank, from which the money was borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the two estates in the latter part of October, 1949, February 27, 1950 - the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8 , which creates a special committee to investigate the Buenavista and the Tambobong estates deal. The special committee examined examined various witnesses, among the most important of whom was the herein petitioner, Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing question which the committee sought to resolve was that involved in the apparent unnecessariness and irregularity of the Government’s paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the Government. Arnault testified that : two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him on the afternoon of October 29, 1949; on the same date he opened a new account in the name of Ernest H. Burt with th e PNB in which he d eposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000; he draw two checks; one for P 500,000, which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., and another for P440,000 payable which he himself cashed. Arnault resisted to name the recipient of the P440,000 ( he could not remember the name and his answer will be self-incriminatingcontradictory: if he cannot give a name, how could his answer be self-incriminating? ). The senate then approved a resolution that cited him for contempt. It is this resolution whi ch brought him to jail and is b eing contested in this petition.
ISSUE 1: WON the Senate has no power to punish Arnault for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P4 40,000 HELD: Yes, Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of cou rse to his constitutional right against selfincrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, and every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. The power of the Court is limited to determining whether the legislative body has jurisdiction to institute the inquiry or investigation. “This Court cannot control the exercise of th at jurisdiction; and it is insinuated, that the ruling of the Senate on the materiality of the question propounded to the witness is not subject to review by this Court under the principle of the separ ation separ ation of power.” ISSUE 2: WON the Senate lacks authority to commit Arnault for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950 HELD: NO, The Senate of the Philippines is a continuing continuing body. There’s no reason no reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. To deny to such committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which that the power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. The Senate, which is a continuing body, does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or o f the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senat e’s power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case. ISSUE 3: WON the privilege against self incrimination protects the petitioner from being questioned HELD: NO, The Court is satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, which is the name of that person to whom witness gave the P440,000, were obviously false. His insistent claim before the bar of the Senate that if he should reveal the name he would incriminate himself, himself, necessarily implied that he knew the name. Mor eover, eover, it is unbelievable that he gave P440,000 to a person to him unknown. “Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as con tempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable.” Sinc e according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal i nstruction, Court found no basis upon which to sustain sustain his claim that to reveal the the name of that person might incriminate incriminate him.
III. THE RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus filed by Arnault.]
1. Yes , the Senate had the power to punis h the petitioner for contempt for refus ing to reveal the name of the pers on to whom he g ave the Php440,000. 00. Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to effect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. xxx
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[W]e find that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner, requires the Special Committee, among other things, to determine the parties responsible for the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that the name of the person to whom the witness gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to that determination — it is in fact the very thing sought to be determined. The contention is not that the question is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation or materiality to any proposed legislation. We have already indicated that it is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry. xxx
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If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject , obedience, to its process may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment.
2. s es s ion.
Y E S , the S enate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of leg is lative
We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish f or contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which that the power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but logical to say that the power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to b e preserved. But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress . . . There is no limit as to time to the Senate’s power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.
3.
NO, the petitioner may NOT r ig htfully invoke his rig ht ag ainst s elf-incr imination.
Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the [P440,000.00] to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, we fin d no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him. There is no conflict of authorities on the applicable rule, to wit: Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of the Court. At least, it is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate him as he is not the sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his general conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the province of the court to determine whether a direct answer to a question may criminate or not. . . The fact that the testimony of a witness may tend to show that he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution and punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for p rotection against an imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person. It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances of the case whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer. A witness is not relieved from answering merely on his own declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial judge to decide that question.
