4th Exam Article 80 113 Case Digests and Special Laws

4th Exam Coverage (Article 80-113 RPC)

[CRIMINAL LAW 1 CASE DIGESTS+ SPECIAL LAWS] LAWS ]

Art 80. Suspension of Sentence of Minors Rennie Declarador vs Hon. Gubaton et. Al. GR 159208 (August 18, 2006) Facts: Accused was 17 years old when he stabbed his female teacher in high school 15 times which resulted to the latter‘s death. Based on the evidence and his plea of guilt, accused was convicted of murder with qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation but the court considered accused‘s minority as a special mitigating circumstance thus his sentence was lowered. Instead of reclusion perpetua, the maximum term of imprisonment of reclusion temporal was given in view of the mitigating circumstance. Further the sentence was suspended and commitment to youth rehabilitation center was ordered. This is pursuant with PD 603 as amended.

under suspended sentence. Section 40 of Rep. Act No. 9344, however, provides that once the child reaches 18 years of age, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of sentence, or extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of 21 years . Petitioner has already reached 21 years of age or over and thus, could no longer be considered a child for purposes of applying Rep. Act 9344. Thus, the application of Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and academic as far as his case is concerned.

People of the Philippines vs. Richard Sarcia GR 169641 (September 10, 2009) Facts:

Petitioner, however, claimed that under Art. 192 of PD 603 and AM 02-1-18-SC, the sentence should not have been suspended since the juvenile convicted committed an offense punishable by death, life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua.

Accused was 17 years old when he raped the victim who was then a minor. He was convicted of rape with a penalty of death which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in 2005. During the pendency of the appeal in the Supreme Court, RA 9344 took effect. Before the promulgation of SC decision, accused was already 31 years old.

ISSUE

ISSUE

Whether the accused‘s sentence should be suspended since the crime committed is punishable by reclusion perpetua but due to the mitigating circumstance of minority the sentence given was reduced to reclusion temporal given the fact that RA 9344 took effect.

Whether SEC 38 and 40 of RA 9344 to the suspension of sentence apply to the instant case.

HELD

The application of suspension of sentence is now moot and academic. Sec 38 does not distinguish as to which crimes the suspension of sentence is applicable. It applies even to heinous crimes such as in this case even if the child in conflict with the law is already 18 years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his guilt. However, Sec. 40 limits the suspension of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of 21.

No. The basis of the exclusion of suspension of sentence is the imposable penalty for the crime regardless of the actual penalty given. Under the RPC, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. RA 9344 superseded PD 603 but retained the provisions regarding disqualifications in the suspension of sentence such as the case at bar. Thus, the suspension of sentence was improper .

HELD

Though the accused is already 31 years old, he is entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of RA 9344 where in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, he may be ordered to serve in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

Michael Padua vs People of the Philippines

The civil liability remains the same and unaffected.

GR 168546 (July 23, 2008) Facts:

Robert Remiendo vs. People of the Philippines GR 184874 (October 9, 2009)

Petitioner, who was then 17 years old, was involved in selling illegal drugs. Initially in his arraignment he pleaded not guilty but re-entered his plea of guilty to avail the benefits of firs time offenders. Subsequently, he applied for probation but was denied. In his petition for certiorari, the court said that probation and suspension of sentence are different and provisions in PD 603 or RA 9344 cannot be invoked to avail probation. It is specifically stated that in drug trafficking, application for probation should be denied. As a side issue, the court discussed the availment of suspension of sentence under RA 9344.

Facts:

ISSUE

Issues:

Petitioner was a minor whose age is above 15 but below 18 years old when he raped a minor when the latter was left alone in her house. In violating the minor, he threatened to kick the latter if she would shout for help. Petitioner was convicted of rape but on appeal invoked a suspension of sentence pursuant to RA 9344. By the time he was convicted by the trial court and before the case was elevated to the CA, he was already 22 years old.

Whether petitioner is exempt from criminal liability.

Whether suspension of sentence under RA 9344 can still be invoked given the fact that the accused is now 21 years old.

Whether petitioner is entitled to a suspension of sentence under Sec. 38 and 40 of RA

HELD

9344.

NO. The suspension of sentence under Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 could no longer be retroactively applied for petitioner‘s benefit. Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that once a child under 18 years of age is found guilty of the offense charged, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law

Held: No. Since his age is above 15 and below 18, the finding of discernment is necessary to determine if he would be exempt from criminal liability. In this case, his act of waiting for the



victim‘s parents to leave the house before defiling the latter and thr eatening eatening to kick her if she should shout prove that petitioner can differentiate what is right and wrong.

and he boxed the victim to weaken her defense. These are indicative of then 17 year-old appellant‘s mental capacity to fully understand the consequences of his unlawful action.

Furthermore, Sec. 38 and 40, suspension of sentence, can no longer be availed since by the time his sentence was imposed by the trial court, he was already 22 years old. Sec 40 provides that ―If the child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one twenty-one (21) years‖.

To give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the community. The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. HERMIE M. JACINTO, AccusedJACINTO, Accused Appellant. FACTS: Accused-appellant Hermie Jacinto, is charged and convicted in the lower courts of raping a 5-year old child, AAA.

RA No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law notwithstanding that he/she has reached the age of majority at the time the judgment of conviction is pronounced. According to the law, the appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.

Jacinto is neighbors with the family of AAA for a long time and he was friends with the victim‘s father. The victim AAA knew Jacinto well, as she calls him kuya. kuya.

People vs Urban Salcedo et al

On January 2003, the victim‘s father sent his other daughter, CCC, to the store to buy cigarettes and the victim followed her older sister but did not return with the latter. The father thought that she was left behind to watch television at another house. A witness saw Jacinto with the victim later on, at the store where the latter was seated in his lap.

Facts: On June 1, 2001, Shiela Tabuag, Reina Malonzo, and Ediborah Yap, were serving their duty shift as nurses at Jose Maria Torres Memorial Hospital in Lamitan, Basilan. Joel Guillo, the hospital accountant, on the other hand, had just finished his duty and decided to rest in the doctors quarter.

The victim testified that when she left the store with the accused Jacinto, he had carnal knowledge of her. She went home crying after the incident.

At around 12:30 past midnight o f June 2, 2001, the Abu Sayaff Group (ASG for brevity) led by Khadaffy Janjalani and Abu Sabaya, with 30 armed followers entered and took control over said hospital. Previously,however, another group of ASG with 60 followers led by Abu Umran hiked towards Lamitan for the sole purpose of reinforcing the group of Khadaffy Janjalani and Abu Sabaya. However, upon reaching the vicinity of the hospital, a fi refight had already ensued between the military forces and the group of Janjalani and Sabaya. Simultaneously, the band also became entangled in a firefight with a civilian group led by one retired Col. Baet, who was killed during the encounter. Moments later, the band fled to different directions, with its members losing track of one another.

The victim‘s father confronted Jacinto and called the police. AAA underwent a physical check-up which leads to findings that she had been raped. For his defense, Jacinto interposed an alibi, that he attended a birthday party at the time of the incident and that the victim merely followed him when he went to the store. The RTC found Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Thereafter, the defense moved to reopen the trial for reception of newly discovered evidence. It is stated that appellant Jacinto was born on March 1, 1985. This means that at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, he was merely 17 years old. The RTC appreciated the new evidence and reduced the penalty. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. ISSUE: Whether or not accused appellant Jacinto should be convicted of rape. What is the imposable penalty on the appellant? HELD/RATIO: Yes, SC confirms conviction. However due to the retroactive effect of RA 9344, and it being proven that Jacinto was a minor at the time the crime was committed

Pandemonium ensued in the hospital on that early morning, as the people were thrown into a frenzy by the shouting, window glass breaking, and herding of hostages from one room to another by the ASG. The group was also looking for medicine and syringes for their wounded comrades as well as foo d and clothing. The firefight lasted until the a fternoon of June 2, 2001. Finally, at around 6:00 in the evening, the ASG and the hostages, including those from the Dos Palmas Resort, were able to slip out of the hospital through the backdoor, despite the intense gunfire that was ongoing. Hence, the long and arduous hiking towards the mountains began.

The rape that took place has been sufficiently proven in the court. Therefore, the Supreme Court found sufficient ground for conviction.

On June 3, 2001, at about noontime, the group of Janjalani and Sabaya met with the group of Abu Ben in Sinagkapa n, Tuburan. Th e next day, Himsiraji Sali with approximately 60 followers also joined the group. It was only on the third week on July that year that the whole group of Abu Sayaff was completed, when it was joined by the group of Sattar Yacup, a.k.a. Abu Umran.

In 2003, at the time of the commission of the crime, Jacinto was 17 years old. Though the RA 9344 took effect only in 2006, it is given a retroactive effect.

Subsequently, new hostages from the Golden Harvest plantation in Tairan, Lantawan were abducted by the Hamsiraji Sali and Isnilun Hapilon.

Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age from criminal liability, unless the child is found to have acted with discernment, in which case, "the appropriate proceedings" in accordance with the Act shall be observed.

On June 12, 2001, Abu Sabaya informed the hostages that Sobero had been beheaded and was warned of the consequences should said hostages fail to cooperate with the ASG. Hence, the ASG formed a striking force that then proceeded to behead 10 innocent civilians.

In the present case, Jacinto showed discernment in committing the crime as proven by the facts that he choose an isolated and dark place to perpetrate the crime, to prevent detection

On October 1, 2001, Reina Malonzo was separated from the other hostages and taken to Zamboanga City by Abu Arabi with two other ASG members on board a passenger watercraft to stay at a house in Sta. Maria. Later on October 13, 2001, a firefight broke out between the ASG



and the military, giving Joel Guillo and 3 other hostages the opportunity to escape from their captors. On even date, Sheila Tabuag was released together with 2 other hostages from Dos Palmas, allegedly after paying ransom. Reina Malonzo was soon after also released by order of Khaddafy Janjalani on November 1, 2001.

It should be emphasized that at the time the trial court was hearing the case and even at the time it handed down the judgment of conviction against accused-appellants on August 13, 2004,

Finally, after a shootout between the ASG and the military on June 7, 2002, at Siraway, Zamboanga del Norte, Ediborah Yap, died at the hands of her captors. Thereafter, a manhunt by the military was conducted, where the accused-appellants were subsequently captured and held for trial.

R.A. No. 9344 had not yet been enacted into law. The procedures laid down by the law to prove the minority of accused-appellants were not yet in place. Hence, the rule was still that the burden of proving the mino rity of the accused rested solely o n the defense. The trial court, in the

Issue:

absence of any document stating the age of the aforementioned four accused-appellants, or any Ruling: he Court sustains the trial court's and the appellate court's ruling regarding the minority of accused-appellants Iblong, Mandangan, Salcedo and Jaafar. Iblong claimed he was born on August 5, 1987; Mandangan stated h is birth date as July 6, 19 87; Salcedo said he was born on January 10, 1985; and Jaafar claimed he was born on July 13, 1981. If Jaafar's birth date was indeed July 13, 1981, then he was over 18 years of age when the crime was committed in June of 2001 and, thus, he cannot claim minority. It should be noted that the defense absolutely failed to present any document showing accused-appellants' date of birth, neither did they present testimonies of other persons such as parents or teachers to corroborate their claim of minority.

Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that: Sec. 7. Determination of Age. Age. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or older. The age of a child may be determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be based on on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor

corroborating testimony, had to rely on its own observation of the physical appearance of accused-appellants to estimate said accused-appellants ' age. A reading of the afore-quoted Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344 shows that this manner of determining accused-appellants' age is also sanctioned by the law. The accused-appellants appeared to the trial court as no younger than twenty-four years of age, or in their mid-twenties, meaning they could not have been under [13]

eighteen (18) years old when the crime was committed. committed.

As discussed above, such factual

finding of the trial court on the age of the four accused-appellants, affirmed by the CA, must be accorded great respect, even finality by this Court.

Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the four accused-ap pellants were indeed less than eighteen years old at the time the crime was committed, at this point in time, the applicability of R.A. No. 9344 is seriously in doubt. Pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9344 are as follows: Sec. 38. Automatic 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Sentence . - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That the suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

If a case has been filed against the child in conflict with the law and is pending in the appropriate

xxxx

court, the person shall file a motion to determine the age of the child in the same court where the

Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court . Court . -

case is pending. Pending hearing on the said motion, proceedings on the main case shall be

xxxx

suspended.

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period [14] or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. years.

In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other government officials concerned shall exert all efforts at determining the age [12] of the child in conflict with the law. law.



If accused-appellants' claim are true, that they were born in 1985 and 1987, then they have

found a big sa chet of shabu. PO1 Simon also pointed to the barangay officials the marked

already reached 21 years of age, or over by this time and thus, the application of Sections 38

money, two pieces of P100 bill, thrown by the appellant on the ground.

and 40 of R.A. No. 9344 is now moot and academic. academic.

[15]

Issue: However, just for the guidance of the bench and bar, it should be borne in mind that if indeed, an Ruling: accused was under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, then [16]

as held inPeople inPeople v. Sarcia, Sarcia,

The appellant was seventeen (17) years old when the buy-bust operation took place or when the such offenders, even if already over twenty-one (21) years old at said offense was committed, but was no longer a minor at the time of the promulgation of the

the time of conviction, may still avail of the benefits accorded by Section 51 of R.A. No. 9344 RTC's Decision. People vs Mantalaba Facts:

It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its decision on this case on September 14, 2005, when said appellant was no longer a minor. The he Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance with Article 192 of P.D. 603, The Child and

received a report from an informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba, who was seventeen (17) years

[31]

Youth Welfare Cod e old at the time, was selling shabu at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City. Thus, a

and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict

[32]

with the Law ,

the laws that were applicable at the time of the promulgation of

buy-bust team was organized, composed of PO1 Randy Pajo, PO1 Eric Simon and two (2) judgment, because the imposable penalty for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 is life poseur-buyers who were provided with two (2) pieces of P100 marked bills to be used in the imprisonment to death. purchase.

It may be argued that the appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his Around 7 o'clock in the evening of October 1, 2003, the team, armed with the marked sentence under Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344 which provide for its retroactive application, money, proceeded to Puro k 4, Barangay 3 , Agao District, Butuan City for the buy-bust thus: operation. The two poseur-buyers approached Allen who was sitting at a corner and said to be in the act of selling shabu. PO1 Pajo saw the poseur-buyers an d appellant talking to ea ch other. Afterwards, the appellant handed a sachet of shabu to one of the poseur-buyers and the latter gave the marked money to the appellan t. The poseur-buyers went back to the police officers and told them that the transaction has been completed. Police officers Pajo and Simon rushed to the place and handcuffed the appellant as he was leaving the place.

The

police

officers,

still

in

the

area

of

operation

and

in

the

presence

of barangay officials Richard S. Tandoy and Gresilda B. Tumala, searched the appellant and

SEC. 38. Automatic 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided , however , That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court [Rule] on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law. xxxx



Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. Sentence. - Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application o f this Act. x x x

Article 81-85 Death Penalty R.A. 9346

AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES However, this Court has already ruled in People v. Sarci a

[33]

that while Section 38 of

RA 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of 21. The provision states:

SECTION 1. The 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousan d One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repeale d. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly. SEC. 2. In 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed.

SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. Court. - If the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the condition of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.

SEC. 3. Person 3. Person convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.

Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because such is already moot and academic. It is highly noted that this would not have happened if the CA, when this case was under its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant. The records show that the appellant filed his notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective in 2006, appellant was 20 years old, and the case having been elevated to the CA, the latter should have suspended the sentence of the appellant because he was already entitled to the provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the penalty imposed as opposed to the provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603. 603 .

[34]

(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.

SEC. 4. The 4. The Board of Pardons and Parole shall cause the publication at least one a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation of the names of persons convicted of offenses punished withreclusion withreclusion perpetua or perpetua or life imprisonment by reason of this Act who are being considered or recommend for commutation or pardon; Provided, however , That nothing herein shall limit the power of the President to grant executive clemency under Section 19, Article VII of the Constitutions.



Article 89. Modes of Extinguishing Criminal Liability People vs Bayotas Facts: Rogelio Bayotas was charged with rape and eventually co nvicted on June19, 19 91. While the appeal was pending, Bayotas died. The Supreme Court dismissed the criminal aspect

People vs Amistoso Facts: Accused-appellant Anastacio Amistoso y Broca (Amistoso) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate City, Branch 48, in Criminal Case No. 10106, with the rape of his 1 daughter, AAA, alleged to be 12 years old at at the time of the incident. The 2 Information specifically charged Amistoso with statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

of the appeal; however, it required the Solicitor-General Solicitor-General to comment with regard to Bayotas‘ civil Bayotas‘ civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged. In his comment, the SolicitorGeneral expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. This comment was opposed by the

3

After trial, on March 23, 2006, the RTC promulgated its Decision finding Amistoso guilty, not of statutory rape, but of qualified rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(a), in relation to Article 266-B, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The dispositive portion of the RTC judgment reads:

conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both criminal and civil penalties, he cited in support

WHEREFORE, WHEREFORE, accused ANASTACIO AMISTOSO, AMISTOSO , having been convicted of Qualified Rape, Rape, he is hereby sentenced to the capital penalty of DEATH; DEATH ; to pay the victim the sum of Seventy[]Five Thousand Pesos (PhP75,000.00) as indemnity; to pay the said victim the sum of Fifty 4 Thousand Pesos (PhP50,000.00) as for moral damages, and to pay the costs. cralaw

and invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo, which was held that the civil

Issue:

counsel of accused-appellant, arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of the

obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal responsibility and therefore civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered. Issue: Issue: Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes

Ruling: Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto. delicto. Since the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is delicto is ipso 19 facto extinguished, gro unded as it is on the criminal case. cralaw virtualaw library

his civil liability. Ruling:Yes. Ruling:Yes. The death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability because tire liability is based solely on the criminal act committed. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicted as one source of obligation other than delict. Moreover, when a defendant dies before

Undeniably, Amistoso‘s death on December 11, 2012 preceded the promulgation by the Court of its Decision on January 9, 2013. When Amistoso died, his appeal before the Court was still pending and unresolved. The Court ruled upon Amistoso‘s appeal only because it was not immediately informed of his death. Amistoso‘s death on Decemb er 11, 2012 rend ers the Court‘s Decision dated Ja nuary 9, 2013, even though affirming Amistoso‘s Amistoso‘s conviction, irrelevant and ineffectual. Moreover, said Decision has not yet become final, and the Court still has the jurisdiction to set it aside.

judgment becomes executory, ‗there ‗there cannot be any determination by final judgment whether or not the felony upon which the civil action might arise exists,‘ for the simple reason that ‗there is no party defendant.‘ The Rules of Court state that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final final ‗after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal. ‗In

WHEREFORE, WHEREFORE,

the

Court RESOLVES to:cralawlibrary

(1) NOTE PIS Lansangan‘s letter dated June 20, 2013 providing providing the Court with a certified true copy of Amistoso‘s Death Certificate;chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary (2) SET ASIDE ASIDE its Decision dated January 9, 2013 and DISMISS Criminal Case No. 10106 before the RTC of Masbate City, Branch 48 by reason of Amistoso‘s de ath on December 11, 2012; and

addition, where the civil liability does not exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death supervenes before final judgment. As in this case, the right to institute a separate civil action is not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover ‗both the criminal and the civil aspects of the case.‘ The accused died before final judgment was rendered, thus, he is absolved of both his criminal and civil liabilities based solely on delict or the crime committed. Appeal dismissed.

(3) NOTE WITHOUT ACTION the Motion for Reconsideration of the Court‘s Decision dated January 9, 2013 filed by the PAO given the Court‘s actions in the preceding paragraphs.



Article 90. Prescription of Crimes Reodica vs CA

Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, said cases may be commenced only by information." However, this Section cannot be taken to mean that the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information directly with said courts.

Facts:

On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van along Doña Soledad Avenue, Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly because of her recklessness, her van hit the car of complainant Norberto Bonsol. As a result, complainant sustained physical injuries, while the damage to his car amounted to P8,542.00. Three days after the incident, or on 20 October 1987, the complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint against petitioner with the the Fiscal's Office. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge Issue: Whether the quasi offenses offenses in question have already prescribed.

It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails. In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof and the rulings in Francisco and Cuaresma and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive period for the quasi offenses offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the termination of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold petitioner's defense of prescription of the offenses charged in the information in this case.

Ruling: I.

Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, being a light felony, prescribes in two months. On the other hand, reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, being a less grave felony whose penalty is arresto mayor in in its minimum and medium periods, prescribes in five years. To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses offenses have already prescribed, it is necessary to determine whether the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the incident in question tolled the running of the prescriptive period. Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. offenses. — The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint of information, information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped by any reason not imputable to him. (emphasis supplied) Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the prescriptive period "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information," does not distinguish whether the complaint is filed for preliminary examination or investigation only or for an action on the merits. Thus, in Francisco v. Court of Appeals Appeals and People v. Cuaresma, Cuaresma, this Court held that the filing of the complaint even with the fiscal's office suspends the running of the statute of limitations. We cannot apply Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that in cases covered thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in the instant case, "the prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or information directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of a prior preliminary examination or investigation; provided that in

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenge decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14660 is SET ASIDE as the Regiona l Trial Court, whose decision was affirmed therein, had no jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 33919. Art 91. Computation of Prescription of Offenses Cabral vs Puno FACTS: Petitioner Eugenio Cabral was accused of Falsification of Public Documents for allegedly falsifying on August 14, 1948 the signature of private respondent Silvino San Diego in a deed of sale of a parcel of land. Cabral moved to quash the Information on the ground of prescription of the crime charge, since the said document of sale was notarized on August 14, 1948 and registered with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on August 26, 1948. The said notarization caused the cancellation of the original certificate of title and a new transfer certificate of title was then issued. On March 25, 1975, the motion to quash was granted on the ground of prescription. Private prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Resolution. However, according to petitioner Cabral, respondent San Diego can no longer intervene in the criminal case, having filed a civil action against the same accused (Cabral) on the basis of the same factual averments contained in the criminal information. The Fiscal, upon the order of respondent Judge Puno, submitted his comment expressing the view that the crime, has not prescribed as Silvino San Diego stated that he only discovered the crime sometime in October 1970, and that in the interest of justice, arraignment and trial is proper to ventilate the respective evidence of both parties in their total meaning. Two (2) days later, respondent Judge set aside the grant of motion to quash. Petitioner Cabral moved for reconsideration of the Order on the ground that (a) "the judgment of acquittal which became final immediately upon promulgation and could not, therefore, be recalled for correction or amendment"; and (b) by instituting Civil Case No. 120-V-74, respondent San Diego lost his right to intervene in the prosecution of the criminal case. This motion was denied, as well as the second motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: ISSUE: Whether or not the Resolution of March 25, 1975 (granting the motion to quash and dismissing the Information) based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense



HELD: YES. The Resolution of March 25, 1975 dismissing the Information on the ground of prescription of the crime became a bar to another charge of falsification, including the revival of the Information. This is more so, because said Resolution had already become final and executory. When the Fiscal moved to reinstate the case on May 21, 1975, or about two (2) months from receipt of a copy of the order of dismissal, the same had already long been final. The Rules of Court is explicit that an order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code also provides that "prescription of the crime" is one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability." Petitioner was charged with the crime of falsification under Article 172, sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of the Revised Penal Code, which carries an imposable penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00. This crime prescribes ten (10) years. Here, San Diego had actual if not constructive notice of the alleged forgery after the document was registered in the Register of Deeds on August 26, 1948. While it is true that the offended party, San Diego, through the private prosecutor, filed a motion 'for reconsideration within the reglementary fifteen-day period, such move did not stop the running of the period for appeal. He (private prosecutor) did not have the legal personality to appeal or file the motion for reconsideration on his (San Diego‘s) behalf. The prosecution in a criminal case through the private prosecutor is under the direction and control of the Fiscal, and only the motion for reconsideration or appeal filed by the Fiscal could have interrupted the period for appeal. More important, he lost his right to intervene in the criminal case. Prior to the filing of the criminal case on September 24, 1974, the spouses Silvino San Diego and Eugenia Alcantara, on the basis of the same allegations that San Diego's signature on the deed of August 14, 1948 was a forgery, filed on May 2, 1974 an action against Eugenio Cabral and Sabina Silvestre, with the Bulacan Court of First Instance (Civil Case No. 120-V-74) for the recovery of the same property and damages. It appearing, therefore, from the record that at the time the order of dismissal was issued there was a pending civil action arising out of the same alleged forged document filed by the offended party against the same defendant, the offended party has no right to intervene in the prosecution of the criminal case and consequently cannot ask for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal, or appeal from said order. People vs Reyes FACTS: Spouses Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo owned a land. Both are now deceased. Julio died on September 6, 1970 and his wife on August 7, 1977. They were survived by the following children: the accused Mizpah R. Reyes (Petitioner) and the complainants Cristina R. Masikat, Julieta R. Vergara and Aurora Rizare Vda. de Ebueza. In June 1983, the complainants allegedly discovered from the records of the Register of Deeds that the property had already been transferred in the name of Mizpah Reyes, the conveyance was allegedly effected through a notarized deed of sale executed and signed on May 19, 1961 by their parents Julio and Patricia. The deed of sale was registered with the ROD on May 26, 1961. The complainants found out that the signature of their parents were allegedly falsified and that Reyes also made an untruthful statement that she was single although she was married to one Benjamin Reyes on May 2, 1950. The document was examined by the NBI experts, and a report was returned with the finding that the signature of Julio Rizare was genuine but that of Patricia Pampo was forged. Upon complaint by the sisters of the accused and after conducting an investigation, the fiscal filed with the RTC on October 18, 1984 2 informations both for falsification of public document and for making an untruthful statement by stating that accused was single. Before arraignment, Reyes filed a motion to quash both informations on ground that the action has prescribed

The trial court granted the petition, stating that: ...The title, once registered, is a notice to the world. x x x If registration is a notice to the whole world, then registration is in itself a notice and therefore, the prescriptive period of registered document must start to run from the date the same was annotated in the Register of Deeds. Deeds. The CA affirmed the RTC‘s decision, further stating that: The rule on constructive notice has been applied in the interpretation of a provision in the Civil Code on the prescription of actions for annulment of contracts which is parallel to Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code. The Civil Code provision states: Art. 391. The action for annulment shall be brought within four years. This period shall begin: xxx In case of mistake or fraud, from fraud, from the time of the discovery of the same [Emphasis supplied]. In Armentia In Armentia v. Patriarca, Patriarca, x x x the Court, interpreting the phrase "from the time of the discovery" found in the aforequoted provision of the Civil Code, ruled that "in legal contemplation, discovery must be reckoned to have taken place from the time the document was registered in the Register of Deeds, for the familiar rule is that registration is a notice to the whole world . . ." Petitioner contends that Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code which states that "the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day the crime is discovered by by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. . . cannot be cannot be construed in the same manner because the rule on constructive notice is limited in limited in application to land registration cases. cases. ISSUES: (1) W its discovery may be deemed to have taken place from the time the document was registered with the Register of Deeds. YES (2) W the rule on constructive notice may be applied to criminal cases. YES RULING: The crime of falsification of a public document carries with it an imposable penalty of prision of prision correccional in in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00. Being punishable by a correctional penalty, this crime prescribes in ten (10) years. The ten (10) year prescriptive period commences to run "from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents . . ." Citing Cabral vs Puno, x x x This crime prescribes in ten (10) years. Here, San Diego had actual if not constructive notice of the alleged forgery after the document was registered in the Register of Deeds on August 26, 1948. The rule is well-established that registration in a public registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. The Court does not subscribe to the conclusion that the presumptions and rules of interpretation used in the law on prescription of civil suits, including the rule on constructive notice, can not be applied in criminal actions. The considerations in providing for prescription of civil suits are based mainly on practical and equitable grounds. The lapse of a considerably long period of time obscures the surrounding circumstances of a particular claim or right and erodes the integrity of whatever evidence may be presented in support of an action to enforce or contest such claim or right. Moreover, where a particular right has accrued in favor of a party, the enjoyment of such right cannot forever be left on a precarious balance, always susceptible to possible challenge by an adverse party.



In the interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that which is most favorable to the accused is to be adopted. The application of the rule on constructive notice in the construction of Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code would most certainly be favorable to the accused since the prescriptive period of the crime shall have to be reckoned with earlier, i.e., from the time the notarized deed of sale was recorded in the Registry of Deeds. In the instant case, the notarized deed of sale was registered on May 26, 1961. The criminal informations for falsification of a public document having been filed only on October 18, 1984, or more than ten (10) years from May 26, 1961, the crime for which the accused was charged has prescribed. The Court of Appeals, therefore, committed no reversible error in affirming the trial court's order quashing the two informations on the ground of prescription. Sermonia vs CA FACTS: Jose Sermonia entered into a subsequent marriage in 1975 during the subsistence of a previous marriage. Upon the knowledge of a second marriage, his first wife filed an information charging Sermonia with bigamy. Sermonia moved to quash said information contending that his criminal liability for bigamy has been extinguished by prescription, since bigamy is punishable by an afflictive penalty, it prescribes in 15 years. The information had been filed only in 1992, seventeen years after he contracted the said marriage. The RTC denied the motion to quash, as well as the consequent motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the appellate court, however, dismissed his petition for lack of merit, hence the present recourse. Petitioner avers that since the second marriage contract was duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975, such fact of registration makes it a matter of public record and thus constitutes notice to the whole world. The offended party therefore is considered to have had constructive notice of the subsequent marriage as of 1975; hence, prescription commenced to run on the day the marriage contract was registered. For this reason, the corresponding information for bigamy should have been filed on or before 1990 and not only in 1992. ISSUE: whether the prescriptive period is deemed to have taken place from the time the offended party actually knew of the second marriage or from the time the document evidencing the subsequent marriage was registered with the Civil Registry consistent with the rule on constructive notice. RULING: Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. Bigamy carries with it the imposable penalty of prision prision mayor . Being punishable by an afflictive penalty, this crime prescribes in fifteen (15) years. The fifteen-year prescriptive period commences to run from the day on which the crime is discovered discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. Moreover, the Court is of the view that the principle of constructive notice should not be applied in regard to the crime of bigamy as judicial notice may be taken of the fact that a bigamous marriage is generally entered into by the offender in secrecy from the spouse of the previous subsisting marriage. Also, a bigamous marriage is generally entered into in a place where the offender is not known to be still a married person, in order to conceal his legal impediment to contract another marriage. The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of constructive notice is not contrary to the well-entrenched policy that penal laws should be construed liberally in favor of the accused. To compute the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy from registration thereof

would amount to almost absolving the offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the celebration of the bigamous marriage may be said to be open and made of public record by its registration, the offender however is not truthful as he conceals from the officiating authority and those concerned the existence of his previous subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to them that he is still a married person. He likewise conceals from his legitimate spouse his bigamous marriage. And for these, he contracts the bigamous marriage in a place where he is not known to be still a married person. And such a place may be anywhere, under which circumstance, the discovery of the bigamous marriage is rendered quite difficult and would take time. It is therefore reasonable that the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agency (sic). Considering such concealment of the bigamous marriage by the offender, if the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy were to be counted from the date of registration thereof, the prosecution of the violators of the said offense would almost be impossible. The interpretation urged by the petitioner would encourage fearless violations of a social institution cherished and protected by law. People vs Maneja Facts: Accused Facts: Accused is on trial for the offense of false testimony Issue: whether the period of prescription for the offense of false testimony which, in the instant case, is five years (art. 180, No. 4, in relation to art. 90, Revised Penal Code), should commence from the time the appellee, Dionisio A. Maneja, adduced the supposed false testimony in criminal case No. 1872 on December 16, 1933, as the lower court held, or, from the time the decision of the Court of Appeals in the aforesaid basic case became final in December, 1938, as the prosecution contends. Ruling: The theory of the prosecution is the correct one. The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents. (Art. 91, Revised Penal Code.) With regard to the crime of false testimony, considering that the penalties provided therefor in article 180 of the Revised Penal Code are, in every case, made to depend upon the conviction or acquittal of the defendant in the principal case, the act of testifying falsely does not therefore constitute an actionable offense until the principal case is finally decided. (Cf. U. S. v. Opinion, 6 Phil., 662, 663; People v. Marcos Et. Al., G. R. No. 47388, Oct. 22, 1940.) And before an act becomes a punishable offense, it cannot possibly be discovered as such by the offended party, the authorities or their agents.

If the period of prescription is to be computed from the date the supposed false testimony is given, it would be impossible to determine the length of such period in any particular case, depending, as it does depend, on the final outcome of the basic case. For instance, a witness testifies falsely against an accused who is charged with murder. If the accused is found guilty, the penalty prescribed by law for the perjurer is reclusion temporal (art. 180, No. 1, Revised Penal Code), in which case the period of prescription is twenty years (art. 90, idem). On the other hand, if the accused is acquitted, the penalty prescribed for the perjurer is only arresto mayor (art. 180, No. 4, idem), in which case the period of prescription is only five years. Upon these hypotheses, if the perjurer is to be impossible to determine the period of prescription — whether twenty years or five years — as either of these two periods is fixed by law on the basis of conviction or acquittal of the defendant in the main case. The mere fact that, in the present case, the penalty for the offense of false testimony is the name, whether the defendant in criminal case No. 1872 were convicted or acquitted, is of no moment, it being a matter of pure co-incidence. The four cases enumerated in article 180 of the Revised Penal Code — and the instant case falls on one of them — uniformly presuppose a final judgment of conviction or acqu ittal in the basic case as a prerequisite to the action ab ility of the crime of false testimony.


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[CRIMINAL LAW 1 CASE DIGESTS+ SPECIAL LAWS] LAWS ] Sec. 1. How Instituted — For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases, cases, the institution of criminal action shall be as follows:

Act No. 3326

AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE W HEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, acts shall, unless otherwise provided otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) (a) after a year for for offenses punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both; both ; (b) after four years for years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, month , but less than two years; years; (c) after eight years for years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, more , but less than six years; years; and (d) after twelve years for any other offense punished by imprisonment for six years or more, except the crime of treason, which shall prescribe after twenty years. Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months. months. Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, law, and if the same be not known at the tim e, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing violations of the law not included in the Penal Code. Zaldivia vs Reyes Facts: petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal. 1

The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. The referral-complaint of the police 2 was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. The corresponding information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 3 1990. The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed. She then invokes Act. No. 3326. Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the offense, the charge against her should have been dismissed on the ground of prescription Issue: w/n crime has prescribed Ruling: YES The prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of the complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with the respondent judge, the Solicitor General also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, providing as follows:

a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by filing the complaint with the appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation therein; b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint directly with the said courts, or a complaint with the fiscal's office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal. In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected. Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed.

PCGG VS Desierto (2007) Facts: On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee) which was tasked to inventory all behest loans, determine the parties involved and recommend whatever appropriate actions to be pursued thereby. On November 9, 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61 expanding the functions of the Committee to include the inventory and review of all non-performing loans, whether behest or non-behest. The Memorandum set the following criteria to show the earmarks of a "behest loan," to wit: "a) it is undercollaterized; b) the borrower corporation is undercapitalized; c) a direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials like presence of marginal notes; d) the stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies; e) a deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended; f) the use of corporate layering; g) the non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought; and, h) the extraordinary speed in which the loan release was made." Among the accounts referred to the Committee's Technical Wo rking Group (TWG) were the loan transactions between NOCOSII and PNB. After it had examine d and studied al l the documents relative to the said loan transactions, the



Committee classified the loans obtained by NOCOSII from PNB as behest because of NOCOSII's insufficient capital and inadequate collaterals. Specifically, the Committee's investigation revealed that in 1975, NOCOSII obtained loans by way of Stand-By Letters of Credit from the PNB; that NOCOSII was able to get 155% loan value from the offered collateral or an excess of 85% from the required percentage limit; that the plant site offered as one of the collaterals was a public land contrary to the General Banking Act; that by virtue of the marginal note of then President Marcos in the letter of Cajelo, NOCOSII was allowed to use the public land as plant site and to dispense with the mortgage requirement of PNB; that NOCOSII's paidup capital at the time of the approval of the guaranty was only P2,500,000.00 or only about 6% of its obligation. Based on the Sworn Statement of PCGG consultant Orlando Salvador, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman the criminal complaint against respondents. Petitioner alleges that respondents violated the following provisions of Section 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019. The respondents failed to submit any responsive pleading before the Ombudsman, prompting Graft Investigator Officer (GIO) I Melinda S. Diaz-Salcedo to resolve the case based on the available evidence. In a Resolution dated January 12, 1998 in OMB-0-95-0890, GIO DiazSalcedo recommended the dismissal of the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause against the respondents and for prescription of the offense. Ombudsman Desierto approved the recommendation on May 21, 1999. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by GIO Diaz-Salcedo in the Order dated July 9, 1999, which was approved by Ombudsman Desierto on July 23, 1999. Issue: w/n offense has prescribed. Ruling: NO. NO. Records show that the act complained of was discovered in 1992. The complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman on April 5, 1995,1[17] or within three (3) years from the time of discovery. Thus, the filing of the complaint was well within the prescriptive period of 15 years.

showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be 8 Cawili's business associate. associate. 9

In a resolution dated 6 December 1995, 1995, City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed 10 before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997, 1997, after finding that it was possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of merit. On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief 11 State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution, resolution, ACP Sampaga held that the case had already 12 prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, amended, which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years. In this case, the four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were dishonored, or on 20 January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998, more than four (4) years had already elapsed and no information had as yet been filed against Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had already prescribed.

Panaguiton Jr. vs DOJ Facts: Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson), jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of 3 the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail. avail. 4

On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson Tongso n for violating Batas 5 Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) 22) before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the 6 preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit. counter-affidavit. Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Moreover, like petitioner, he had lent various sums to Cawili and in appreciation of his services, he was offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on the said checks had been falsified. To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's 7 signatures, which were purportedly the same as the those appearing on the checks. checks. He also

Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, 16 dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326. 3326 . 17 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. On 3 April 2003, 2003, the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v. 18 Sandiganbayan. Sandiganbayan. Thus, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City was directed to file 19 three (3) separate informations against Tongson for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. 22. On 8 July 2003, 20 the City Prosecutor's Office filed an information informatio n charging petitioner with three (3) counts of 21 violation of B.P. Blg. 22. 22 . 22

However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004, 2004, the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. Ruling: Crime did not YET PRESCRIBE From the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies. . We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner 's filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City



Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner. Article 93. Computation of Prescription of Penalties Jovendo del Castillo vs Rosario Torrecampo Facts: In Barangay Ombao, Camarines Norte the accused unlawfully conducted himself in a disorderly manner, by striking the electric bulb and two (2) kerosene petromax lamps lighting the room where voting center no. 24 is located, during the counting of the votes in said voting center plunging the room in complete darkness, thereby interrupting and disrupting the proceedings of the Board of Election Tellers. He was declared guilty by the RTC. Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court Court of Appeals which eventually affirmed the decision of the trial court. Execution of judgment was scheduled on October 14, 1987. His counsel motioned to reset the execution of judgment which was denied. During the execution petitioner failed to appear. The court was prompted to issue an order for his arrest. He was never apprehended and he remained at large. Ten years later petitioner filed before the trial court a motion to quash the warrant issued for his arrest on the ground of prescription of the penalty imposed upon him. He asserts that that the period of prescription shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence. The Court of Appeals, in its interpretation of the said provision, engaged engaged in judicial legislation when it added the phrase ―by escaping during the term of the sentence‖. Issue: Whether Issue: Whether the penalty imposed upon the petitioner has prescribed? Held: The Court held, that in order for prescription to take place the following elements must concur: 1. That the penalty is imposed by final sentence; 2. That the convict evaded the service of the sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence; 3. That the convict who escaped from prison has not given himself up, or been captured, or gone to a foreign country with which we have no extradition treaty or committed another crime; 4. That the penalty has prescribed, because of the lapse of time form the date of the evasion of the service of the sentence by the convict. From the elements, it is clear that the penalty imposed has not prescribed because the circumstances of the case failed to satisfy the second element, ‗That the convict evaded the service of the sentence by escaping during the service of his sentence.‘ As a matter of fact, the petitioner never served a single minute of his sentence.

1988, affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC. On August 1991, the case was called for promulgation of the decision in the court of origin. Despite due notice, counsel for the petitioner did not appear. Notice to petitioner was returned unserved with the notation that he no longer resided at the given address. As a consequence, he also failed to appear at the scheduled promulgation. The court of origin issued an order of arrest against the petitioner. The petitioner was detained at the Mabalacat Detention Cell. On January 24, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and contended that his arrest was illegal and unjustified on the grounds that: (a) the straight penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor prescribes in five years under No. 3, Article 93 of the RPC (b) having been able to continuously evade service of sentence for almost nine years, his criminal liability has long been totally extinguished under No. 6, Article 89 of the RPC Petitioner claims that: The period for the computation of penalties under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code begins to run from the moment the judgment of conviction becomes final and the convict successfully evades, eludes, and dodges arrest for him to serve sentence. ISSUE Whether or not the crime charged with a penalty of arresto mayor has already prescribed. HELD NO. The Court cannot subscribe to the contention of the petitioner that the penalty imposed on him in the decision adverted to above had already prescribed, hence, his detention is illegal for under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code: Article 93. The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign country with which this Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before the expiration of the period of prescription. The elements of prescription are: 1. That the penalty is imposed by final judgment; 2. That convict evaded the service of the sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence; 3. That the convict who had escaped from prison has not given himself up, or been captured, or gone to a foreign country with which we have no extradition treaty, or committed another crime;

Pangan vs Gatbalite FACTS The petitioner was indicted for simple seduction in a criminal case in Angeles City MTC.During the trial of the case, Atty. Pineda, counsel for petitioner, submitted the case for decision without offering any evidence, due to the petitioner‘s constant absence at hearings. On September 1987, the petitioner was convicted of the offense charged and was sentenced to serve a penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor. On appeal, the RTC on October

4. The penalty has prescribed, because of the lapse of time from the date of the evasion of the service of the sentence by the convict. In this case, the essential element of prescription which is the evasion of the service of sentence is absent. It was cited in the case of Infante v. Warden that ―There was no evasion of the service of the sentence in this case, because such evasion presupposes escaping during the service of the sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty.‖



It appears that the Infante ruling imposes that, as an essential element, the convict must serve at least a few seconds, minutes, days, weeks or years of his jail sentence and then escapes before the computation of prescription of penalties begins to run. The period for prescription of penalties begins only when the convict evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. Since petitioner never suffered deprivation of liberty before his arrest on January 20, 2000 and as a consequence never evaded sentence by escaping during the term of his service, the period for prescription never began. Petitioner, however, has by this time fully served his sentence of two months and one day of arresto mayor and should forthwith be released unless he is being detained for another offense or charge. Article 94. Partial Extinction of Criminal Liability R.A. 10592 

AMENDING ARTICLES 29, 94, 97, 98 AND 99 OF ACT NO. 3815, 3815, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED PENAL CODE

The grant of time allowance of study, teaching and mentoring and of special time allowance for loyalty shall also be prospective in application as these privileges are likewise subject to the management, screening and evaluation of the MSEC. RULE II OBJECTIVE Section 1. O b j e c t i v e s. – The – The credit for preventive imprisonment, as well as the increase in the time allowance granted for good conduct and exemplary services rendered or for loyalty, seek to: a. Redeem and uplift valuable human material toward economic and social usefulness; b. Level the field of opportunity by giving an increased time allowance to motivate prisoner to pursue a productive and law-abiding life; and c. Implement the state policy of restorative and compassionate justice by promoting the reformation and rehabilitation of prisoner, strengthening their moral fiber and facilitating their successful reintegration into the mainstream of society. RULE III DEFINITION OF TERMS

“ART. 94. P a r t i al – Criminal liability is extinguished al e x t i n c t i o n o f c r i m i n a l l i a b i l i t y . – partially:

Section 1. D e f i n i t i o n o f T e r m s . – As – As used herein, the following terms shall means:

“1. By conditional pardon; “2. By commutation of the sentence; and “3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while he is undergoing preventive imprisonment or serving his sentence.” 

IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10592 RULE I GENERALS PROVISIONS

a. “Act” - Shall refer to Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the Revise penal code, as amended; b. “Accused” - An offender who is under detention and against whom a Criminal Complaint or prosecutor‘s information has been filed in a court of law; c. “BJMP” - Bureau of Jail Management and Penology; d. “BUCOR” - Bureau of Corrections; e. “Chief” - Chief of BJMP;

Section 1. Title . – These Rules shall be referred as the ―Implementing ―Implementing Rules and Regulations” of Republic Act No. 10592. 10592 . Section 2. 2. S c o p e a n d A p p l i c a t i o n . – These – These rules shall apply to any prisoners, whether under detention or convicted by final judgment, in a local, rehabilitation or detention center or in a penal institution. Section 3. C o n s t r u c t i o n . – These – These Rules shall be constructed liberally in favor of a detained or convicted prisoner. Section 4. 4. P r o s p e c t i v e A p p l i c a t i o n . – Considering – Considering these Rules provide for new procedures and standards of behavior for the grant of good conduct time allowance as provided in Section 4 of Rule V hereof and require the creation of a Management Screening and Evaluation Committee (MSEC) as provided in Section 3 of the same Rule, the grant of good conduct time allowance under Republic Act No. 10592 shall be prospective in application.

f. “Commitment Order” - A written order of a court of law or any other competent authority committing a person to jail or prison for confinement; g. “Convicted Prisoner” - A person who has undergone trials and who has been convicted by a final judgment by a court of law or tribunal, for the felony or offense he committed; h. “Correctional Facility” - A - A prison or Jail‘ i. “Counsel” - A lawyer tasked or requested to assist a detention prisoner in explaining the provisions of the Article 29 of the Revise Penal Code regarding the benefit of credit for preventive imprisonment; j. “Destierro” - A penalty in which a person shall not be permitted to enter the place or places designated in the sentence, or within radius therein specified, which shall not be more than 250 and not less than 25 kilometer from place designated;



k. “Detainee” - An offender who is accused before a court of law or competent authority who is under preventive imprisonment or temporarily confined in jail or prison while undergoing investigation or trial or awaiting final judgment; l. “Detainee’s Manifestation” - A written declaration of a detained prisoner, with the assistant of a counsel, stating his refusal to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon a convicted prisoner for the purpose of availing the full credit of the period of his preventive imprisonment; m. “Detainee’s Waiver” - A written declaration of a detained prisoner, with the assistant of a counsel, stating his refusal to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon a prisoner convicted by final judgment and thus be entitled to a credit of four-fifths (4/5) of the time during preventive imprisonment; n. “Director” - Director of the BUCOR; o. “Felony” - An act or commission defined and penalized under the provisions of the Revise Penal Code as amended; p. “Good Conduct” - Refers to the conspicuous and satisfactory behaviour of a detention or convicted prisoner consisting of active involvement in rehabilitation programs, productive participation in authorized work activities or accomplishment of exemplary deeds coupled with faithful obedience to all prison/jail rules and regulations; q. “Good Conduct Time Allowance” - A privilege granted to a prisoner, whether detained or convicted by final judgment, entitling him to a reduction of his jail or prison term for every month of actual detention or service of sentence as a reward for good conduct and exemplary behavior; r. “Habitual Delinquent” - A person who, within the period of ten (10) years from the date of release from prison or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robbery, theft, estafa, and falsification, is found guilty of any said crimes a third time of oftener; s. “Jail” - A detention or correctional facility managed by the BJMP or the local government unit mandated by law to safekeep and rehabilitate a prisoner who is under preventive of imprisonment or who is sentenced to not more than three (3) years of imprisonment by order of a court of a law or competent authority; t. “Offense” - A criminal act defined and penalized by special laws; u. “Operations Manual” - Also referred to as ―Manual of Operations‖, a document of all pertinent issuance and laws which deal with the administration and management of jail or prison and the treatment and discipline of prisoner in a detention or correctional facility; v. “Preventive Imprisonment” - Is a temporary confinement in jail or prison while undergoing investigation or trial or awaiting final judgment; w. “Prison” - Any correction facility managed by the BUCOR to safekeep and rehabilitate the prisoner convicted by the final judgment, whose sentence exceeds three (3) years, or who is sentenced to serve two (2) or more prison terms and who aggregated sentences exceed three (3) years;

x. “Proper Authority” - Shall refer either to; a) The Secretary of the Department of Justice (for the BUCOR), or b) The Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (for the BJMP), or c) The Provincial Governor (for Provincial Jails). y. “Recidivist” - A person who, at the time his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of other crime embraced and the same title of the Revise Penal Code, as amended; z. “Special Time Allowance for Loyalty” (STAL) (STAL) - A privilege granted to a prisoner, whether detained or convicted by final judgment, who has evaded preventive imprisonment or service of sentence under the circumstances cited in article 158 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and surrendered to the authorities within forty-eight (48) hours following the proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity and the catastrophe referred to in the said article in the form of the deduction of one fifth (1/5) from his preventive imprisonment or service of sentence or a deduction of two fifth (2/5) if prisoner opted to stay in jail or prison during the calamity; aa. “Time Allowance for Study , Teaching and Mentoring” (TASTM) (TASTM) - A privilege granted to a prisoner, whether detained or convicted by final judgment, as a reward for having earned a post post-graduate degree or collage degree, a certificate of completion of a vocational or technical skills or values development course, a high school or elementary diploma or to one serving his fellow prisoner as a teacher or mentor while incarcerated, equivalent to a deduction of a maximum of fifteen (15) days for every month of study or mentoring services; and bb. “Warden” - The head of the district, municipal and city jails under the BJMP or of the provincial and sub-provincial jails under the office of the Provincial Governor. RULE IV THE BENEFITS OF CREDIT FOR PREVENTIVE IMPRISONMENT (CPI) Section 1. D u t y t o I n f o r m D e t ai – It shall be ai n e e s o f t h e C r e d i t f o r P r e v e n t i v e I m p r i s o n m e n t . – It the duty of the chief of the BJMP, Jail Warden or the Director of the BUCOR having custody the detention prisoner to inform that the period of his preventive imprisonment shall be deducted from the term of his imprisonment in accordance with Article 29 of the Revise Penal Code, as amended. Section 2. 2. Who are Entitled . – An – An accused who has undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited, either full or four-fifths (4/5) term, for his actual detention or service of his sentence, provided he is not disqualified under article 29 of the Revise Penal Code, as amended, and under the following section. Section 3. W h o a r e D i s q u a l i f i ed . – The – The grant of credit of preventive imprisonment shall not ed apply to the following;< a. An accused who is recidivist as defined under Article 14 (9), Chapter 111, Book 1 of the Revise Penal Code; b. An accused who has been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime; and c. An accused who, upon being summoned for the execution of his sentence, has failed to surrender voluntarily before a court of law.



Section 4. 4. Effect of Detaine e’s e’s Manifestation. Manifestation. – An – An accused who has undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited with the full time during time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment if; a. He agrees voluntarily, in writing, to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners; if b. Such undertaking is executed with the assistance of the counsel. Section 5. Effect of Detainee’s Waiver . – An – An accused who has undergone preventive imprisonment and who does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon prisoners convicted by final judgment shall be credited by the service of his sentence with fourfifths (4/5) of the time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment if; a. He shall do in writing b. With the assistance of counsel.

a. A detention prisoner qualified for credit for preventive imprisonment for his good conduct and exemplary behaviour; and b. A prisoner convicted by the final judgment in any penal institution, rehabilitation or detention center or any other local jail for his good conduct and exemplary behaviour. Section 2. 2. D e d u c t i b l e G o o d C o n d u c t T i m e A l l o w a n c e . – A – A qualified prisoner, whether detained or convicted by final judgment, shall be entitled to the following deduction from his sentence for good conduct: a. During the first two years of imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of twenty days for each month of good behavior during detention; b. During the third to fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a reduction of twenty-three days of each month of good behavior during detention; c. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive for his imprisonment he shall be allowed a reduction of twenty-five days for each month of good behavior during detention; and d. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of thirty days of his month of good behavior during detention.

Section 6. P r o v i s i o n a l R e l e a s e w h i l e u n d e r P r e v e n t i v e I m p r i s o n m e n t Section 3. Management, Screening and Evaluatio n Comm ittee (MSEC) . – (MSEC) a. Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to the imposable maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he my be sentenced and his case is not yet decided, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review, except for the following: 1) Recidivist 2) Habitual Delinquent 3) Escapee 4) Person charged with heinous crimes b. If the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of imprisonment. The computation of preventive imprisonment for purposes of immediate release shall be the actual period of detention with good conduct time allowance; provided allowance; provided , however, that if the accused is absent without m o t u p r o p i o order order the re-arrest of the accused. Section 7. 7. G C T A o f a n A c c u s e d Q u a l i f i ed . – An – An accused who is qualified for credit for ed f o r C P I preventive imprisonment shall also be qualified to avail the benefit of good conduct time allowance provided for under Article 97 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and pursuant to the procedures laid down in Rule V hereof. Section 8. 8. D e d u c t i o n f o r C r e d i t f o r P r e v e n t i v e Im Im p r i s o n m e n t w h e n I m p o s s i b l e P e n a l ty ty i s – Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion perpetua R e c l u s i o n P e r p e t u a . – Credit shall be deducted from thirty (30) years. RULE V GOOD CONDUCT TIME ALLOWANCE (GCTA) Section 1. 1. Who are Entitled . – The – The good conduct for the following shall be entitle them to the deductions describe in Section 2 hereunder from their sentence as good conduct time allowance (GCTA) Pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and to Section 2 to 8 hereof:

a. The Director of the BUCOR, Chief of the BJMP and Wardens of various provinces, cities, districts and municipalities are mandated to assess, evaluate and grant time deduction to deserving prisoner, whether detained or convicted by final judgment, in the form of GCTA, STAL and TASTM as prescribed by these Rules through the creation of the MSEC. b. The composition of the MSEC shall be determined by the Director of the BUCOR, Chief of the BJMP or Wardens of Provincial and Sub-Provincial, District, City and Municipal Jails, respectively. Membership shall not be less than five (5) and shall include a Probation and Parole Officer, and if available, a psychologist and a social worker. c. The MSEC shall prepare minutes of every meeting to record each proceeding. Section 4. P r o c e d u r e s f o r t h e G r a n t o f G o o d C o n d u c t T i m e A l l o wa n c e . – The – The following procedures shall be followed in the grant of GCTA; a. The BUCOR, BJMP and Provincial Jail shall give special considerations to satisfactory behaviour of a detention or convicted prisoner consisting of active involvement in rehabilitation programs, productive participation in authorized work activities or accomplishment of exemplary deeds. It is understood that in all instances, the detained or convicted prisoner must faithfully obey all prison/jail rules and regulations; b. The BUCOR, BJMP and Provincial Jails shall each create the MSEC of such appropriate number of MSECs tasked to manage, screen and evaluate the behaviour or conduct of a detention or convicted prisoner; c. After due commendation of the behaviour or conduct shown by a detained or convicted prisoner, the MSEC shall then recommended to the appropriate official the appropriate GCTA that may be credited in favor of said prisoner ranging from the minimum of the allowable credit to the maximum credit thereof; d. Acting on the recommendation of the MSEC, the appropriate official named in Section 1 of Rule VII hereof shall either; 1. Approve the Approve the recommendation and issue a certification granting GCTA to the prisoner for the particular period; 2. Disapprove the Disapprove the recommendation if the prisoner recommended is not qualified to be granted the benefit or that errors or irregularities attended the evaluation of the prisoner; or 3. Return the Return the recommendation, without action, for corrections as regards to the name, prison number or other clerical or inadvertent errors, or the further evaluation of the conduct or behaviour of the prisoner concerned.



e. The appropriate official concerned shall ensure that GCTAs are processed each month and that there is proper recording of a prisoner‘s good behavior in the jail or prison records. Section 5. 5. C o m p u t e r T e m p l a t e a n d M a n u a l . – The – The BUCOR, BJMP and Provincial Jails shall design and use a computer-generated or automated template to monitor the progress of detainee‘s or prisoner‘s convicted by final judgment capable of incorporating time allowances that may be grated to each of them. In addition, a written computation table or manual of preventive imprisonment or service of sentence incorporating time allowances shall be prepared and used as the primary official reference by the BUCOR, BJMP and Provincial Jails. Section 6. 6. T i m e A l l o w a n c e f o r S t u d y , T e a c h i n g a n d M e n t o r i n g ( T S T M ). – At – At any time during the period of imprisonment, an accused or prisoner convicted by final judgment shall be allowed, in addition to the benefits provided for Under Section 2, Rule V, another deduction of Fifteen (15) days, days, for each month of his time rendered for – for – a. Study b. Teaching; or c. Mentoring Services

a. By conditional pardon; b. By commutation of sentence; and c. For good conduct time allowances which the culprit may earn while he is undergoing preventive imprisonment or serving sentence. RULE VIII OFFICIALS AUTHORIZED TO GRANT TIME ALLOWANCES Section 1. 1. W h o G r a n t s T i m e A l l o w a n c e s . – Whenever – Whenever lawfully justified, the following officials shall grant allowances for good conduct: a. Director of the Bureau of Corrections b. Chief of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology; and/or c. Warden of a Provincial, District, City or Municipal Jail

Article 95. Obligations Incurred by Persons granted Conditional Pardon Section 7. 7. P r o c e d u r e s f o r t h e G r a n t o f T A S T M . – a. The BUCOR, BJMP and Provincial Jails shall each keep a master list of detainees or prisoners convicted by final judgment, who have been allowed, subject to their respective jail or prison rules, to study, teach or perform mentoring activities within their respective detention or prison facility; b. The MSEC shall be tasked to monitor and certify whether said prisoner, for the period covered, has actually studied, taught or performed mentoring duties; c. If the prisoner is qualified, the MSEC shall recommend to the concerned officials the grant of TASTM who shall approve the same by issuing a corresponding certification. Section 8. 8. E f f e c t W h e n C a s e o f a n A c c u s e d i s o n A p p e a l . – An – An appeal by the accused shall not deprive him of his entitlement to the time allowances. RULE VI SPECIAL ALLOWANCE FOR LOYALTY (STAL)

Torres vs Gonzales FACTS: In 1979, Torres was convicted of estafa and was pardoned by the president with the condition that if he shall violate any penal law again, his sentence will be carried out. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was released from prison. However, by 1982, the Board of Pardons and Parole recommended to the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to Torres because Torres had been charged with twenty counts of estafa before, and convicted of sedition. His pardon was cancelled. He He appealed the issue before the Supreme Court. He contended that his pardon should not have been cancelled since the judgment on the new estafa cases were still on appeal. Through his wife and children, he petitioned to be released from prison alleging that he was denied due process, and that his constitutional rights to be presumed innocent and to a speedy trial were violated upon his recommitment to prison. ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.

Section 1. 1. S p e c i a l T i m e A l l o w a n c e f o r L o y a l t y . – a. A deduction of one-fifth (1/5) of the period of his sentence shall be granted to any of (1/5) prisoner who, having evaded his preventive imprisonment or the service of his sentence under the circumstances mentioned in Article 158 of Revised Penal Code, gives himself up to the authorities within forty-eight (48) hours following the issuance of the proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe referred to in said article. b. A deduction of two-fifth (2/5) of the period of his sentence shall be granted in case said of (2/5) prisoner chose to stay in the place of his confinement notwithstanding the existence of a calamity or catastrophe enumerated in Article 158 of the Revised Penal Code. Provided that he has not committed other offense or any act in violation of the law or the act. RULE VII PARTIAL EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY Section 1. 1. P a r t i al – Criminal liability is extinguished partially: al E x t i n c t i o n o f C r i m i n a l L i a b i l i t y . – Criminal

RULING: Where a conditional pardonee has allegedly breached a condition of a pardon, the President who opts to proceed against him under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code need not wait for a judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime or for his conviction therefore by final judgment, in order to effectuate the recommitment of the pardonee to prison. It did not matter that Torres was allegedly been acquitted in two of the three criminal cases filed against him subsequent to his conditional pardon, and that the third case remains pending for thirteen (13) years in apparent violation of his right to a speedy trial. Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person's liberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal or unlawful. The incarceration of Torres is legal since he would have served his final sentence for his first conviction until November 2, 2000, had he not violated the conditions of the pardon and had thus had it revoked. Lastly, only the President has the prerogative to reinstate the pardon if in his own judgment.Courts have no authority



to interfere with the grant by the President of a pardon to a convicted criminal.A final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is not a requirement for the President to determine whether or not there has been a breach

Tesoro vs Director of Prisons

Facts: On October 10, 1934, petitioner, Eufemio P. Tesoro, was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime of falsification of a public document and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from two (2) to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days, to pay a fine of one hundred pesos (100), or undergo subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. This penalty was to expire on October 28, 1937. On November 14, 1935, the then Governor-General Frank Murphy granted the petitioner a parole, which the latter accepted, subject to the following conditions: 1. That he will live in the City of Manila and will not change his residence without first obtaining the consent of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence; 2. That he will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in an orderly manner; 3. That he will report, during the period of his parole, to the Executive Secretary of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, during the first year, once a month, and thereafter, once every three months. Should any of the conditions stated be violated, the sentence imposed shall again be in full force and effect. On December 3, 1937, petitioner was charged in the justice of the peace court of San Juan, Rizal, with the crime of adultery alleged to have been committed with one Concordia Dairo, wife of petitioner's brother-in-law, Jose Nagar. To the complaint were attached the affidavits of the complainant Jose Nagar, of Luz Nagar and of Epimaco Nagar. The case was thereafter forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Rizal where the provincial fiscal filed the corresponding information which, however, was dismissed for non-appearance of the complainant. Sometime in the month of February, 1938, the same Jose Nagar lodged a complaint with Board of Indeterminate Sentence, and upon the same facts supporting the criminal action aforementioned, charged the petitioner with violation of the conditions of his parole. On February 3, 1938, petitioner was summoned to appear before the board for a hearing on the aforecited complaint, but petitioner asked for postponement until the day following. On February 4, 1938, petitioner addressed a letter to the board denying the charge of illicit relations with the complainant's wife the included therewith the supposed retraction of Epimaco Nagar of what the latter had stated in his former affidavit. On the same date Simeon Figalang, a parole officer assigned to investigate the case, submitted his report to the board, and, on the strength thereof and papers supporting it, the acting chairman of the board addressed a communication to the President of the Philippines, recommending the arrest and reincarceration of the petitioner. And on February 19, 1938, the President issued the following order: By virtue of this order, the petitioner was arrested and recommitted to the custody of the Director of Prisons. Thereupon, petitioner sued for a writ of habeas corpus against the Director of Prisons, and upon denial thereof by the trial court, took the present appeal.

Section 63 (i) of the Administrative Code, by virtue of which the petitioner was granted parole, gives the Governor-General the following powers and duties: To grant to convicted persons reprieves or pardons, either plenary or partial, conditional or unconditional; to suspend sentences without pardon, remit fines, and order the discharge of any convicted person upon parole, subject to such conditions as he may impose; and to authorize the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions, of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence. Paragraph 6, section 11, Article VII, of the Constitution of the Philippines, provides as follows: The President shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses, except in cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to impose. He shall have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the National Assembly. Issue: Appellant contends that section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code, above quoted, in so far as it confers upon the Chief Executive the power to grant and revoke paroles, has been impliedly repealed by the aforecited constitutional provision, as the latter omitted to specify such power in connection with the powers granted therein to the President of the Philippines. Ruling: Contention is untenable. The power to pardon given the President by the Constitution, "upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to impose," includes the power to grant and revoke paroles. (20 R.C.L., 577; 46 C.J. 1205.) If the omission of the power of parole in the Constitution is to be construed as a denial thereof to the President, the effect would be to discharge unconditionally parolees, who, before the adoption of the Constitution, have been released conditionally by the Chief Executive.

Article 97, 98, 99 (Amended by R.A. 10592)

“ART. 97. A l l o w a n c e f o r g o o d c o n d u c t . – The – The good conduct of any offender qualified for credit for preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of this Code, or of any convicted prisoner in any penal institution, rehabilitation or detention center or any other local jail shall entitle him to the following deductions from the period of his sentence: ―1. During the first two years of imprisonment, he shall be allowed a de duction of twenty days for each month of good behavior during detention; ―2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a reduction of twenty-three days for each month of good behavior during detention; ―3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of twenty-five days for each month of good behavior during detention; ―4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of thirty days for each month of good behavior during detention; and



―5. At any time during the period of imprisonment, he shall be allowed another deduction of fifteen days, in addition to numbers one to four hereof, for each month of study, teaching or mentoring service time rendered.

any time of said defendant, suspend the execution of said sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best.

―An appeal by the accused shall not deprive him of entitlement to the above allowances for good conduct.‖

Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court, with notice to the appellate court if an appeal has been taken from the sentence of conviction. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waver of the right to appeal, or the automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal.

“ART. 98. S p e c i a l t i m e a l l o w a n c e f o r l o y a l t y . – – A deduction of one fifth of the period of his sentence shall be granted to any prisoner who, having evaded his preventive imprisonment or the service of his sentence under the circumstances mentioned in Article 158 of this Code, gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe referred to in said article. A deduction of twofifths of the period of his sentence shall be granted in case said prisoner chose to stay in the place of his confinement notwithstanding the existence of a calamity or catastrophe enumerated in Article 158 of this Code.

An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. Section 5. Post-sentence Investigation . No person shall be placed on probation except upon prior investigation by the probation officer and a determination by the court that the ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well as that of the defendant will be served thereby.

―This Article shall apply to any prisoner whether undergoing preventive imprisonment or serving sentence.‖

Section 6. F o r m o f I n v e s t i g a t i o n R e p o r t . The investigation report to be submitted by the probation officer under Section 5 hereof shall be in the form prescribed by the Probation Administrator and approved by the Secretary of Justice.

“ART. 99. W h o g r a n t s t i m e a l l o w a n c e s . – – Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, the Chief of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology and/or the Warden of a provincial, district, municipal or city jail shall grant allowances for good conduct. Such allowances once granted shall shall not be revoked.‖

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Section 7. P e r i o d f o r S u b m i s s i o n o f I n v e s t i g a t i o n R e p o r t . The probation officer shall submit to the court the investigation report on a defendant not later than sixty days from receipt of the order of said court to conduct the investigation. The court shall resolve the petition for probation not later than five days after receipt of said report.

P.D. 968 Probation Law

Pending submission of the investigation report and the resolution of the petition, the defendant may be allowed on temporary liberty under his bail filed in the criminal case; Provided, That, in case where no bail was filed or that the defendant is incapable of filing one, the court may allow the release of the defendant on recognize the custody of a responsible member of the community who shall guarantee his appearance whenever required by the court.

Section 2. P u r p o s e . This Decree shall be interpreted so as to: (a) promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with individualized treatment; (b) provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence; and (c) prevent the commission of offenses. Section 3. M e a n i n g o f T e r m s . As used in this Decree, the following shall, unless the context otherwise requires, be construed thus: (a) "Probation" "Probation" is a disposition under which a defendant, after conviction and sentence, is released subject to conditions imposed by the court and to the supervision of a probation officer.

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Section 8. Criteria for Placing an Offender on Probation. Probation. In determining whether an offender may be placed on probation, the court shall consider all information relative, to the character, antecedents, environment, mental and physical condition of the offender, and available institutional and community resources. Probation shall be denied if the court finds that: (a) the offender is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or (b) there is undue risk that during the period of probation the offender will commit another crime; or

(b) "Probationer" means "Probationer" means a person placed on probation. (c) probation will depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed. (c) "Probation Officer " means one who investigates for the court a referral for probation or supervises a probationer or both. Section 4. G r a n t o f P r o b a t i o n . Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and upon application at

Section 9. D i s q u a l i f i e d O f f e n d e r s . The benefits of this Decree shall not be extended to those: (a) sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years; years ;



(b) convicted of convicted of any offense against the security of the State; State ; (c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one month a nd one day and/or a fine of not less than Two Hundred Pesos;

Section 11. E f f e c t i vi A probation order shall take effect upon vi t y o f P r o b a t i o n O r d e r . A probation its issuance, at which time the court shall inform the offender of the consequences thereof and explain that upon his failure to comply with any of the conditions prescribed in the said order or his commission of another offense, he shall serve the penalty imposed for the offense under which he was placed on probation.

(e) who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of this Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof. 33 hereof.

Section 12. M o d i f i c a t i o n o f C o n d i t i o n o f P r o b a t i o n . During the period of probation, the court may, upon application of either the probationer or the probation officer, revise or modify the conditions or period of probation. The court shall notify either the probationer or the probation officer of the filing such an application so as to give both parties an opportunity to be heard thereon.

Section 10. 10. C o n d i t i o n s o f P r o b a t i o n . Every probation order issued by the court shall contain conditions requiring that the probationer shall:

The court shall inform in writing the probation officer and the probationer of any change in the period or conditions of probation.

(a) present himself to the probation officer designated to undertake his supervision at such place as may be specified in the order within seventy-two hours from receipt of said order; (b) report to the probation officer at least once a month at such time and place as specified by said officer.

Section 13. C o n t r o l a n d S u p e r v i s i o n o f P r o b a t i o n e r . The probationer and his probation program shall be under the control of the court who placed him on probation subject to actual supervision and visitation by a probation officer.

(d) who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree ; and

The court may also require the probationer to: (a) cooperate with a program of supervision;

Whenever a probationer is permitted to reside in a place under the jurisdiction of another court, control over him shall be transferred to the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of that place, and in such a case, a copy of the probation order, the investigation report and other pertinent records shall be furnished said Executive Judge. Thereafter, the Executive Judge to whom jurisdiction over the probationer is transferred shall have the power with respect to him that was previously possessed by the court which granted the probation.

(b) meet his family responsibilities; Section 14. P e r i o d o f P r o b a t i o n . (c) devote himself to a specific employment and not to change said employment without the prior written approval of the probation officer; (d) undergo medical, psychological or psychiatric examination and treatment and enter and remain in a specified institution, when required for that purpose; (e) pursue a prescribed secular study or vocational training; (f) attend or reside in a facility established for instruction, recreation or residence of persons on probation;

(a) The period of probation of a defendant sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than one year shall not exceed two years, and in all other cases, said period shall not exceed six years. (b) When the sentence imposes a fine only and the offender is made to serve subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, the period of probation shall not be less than nor to be more than twice the total number of days of subsidiary imprisonment as computed at the rate established, in Article thirty-nine of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

(j) reside at premises approved by it and not to change his residence without its prior written approval; or

Section 15. A r r e s t o f P r o b a t i o n e r ; S u b s e q u e n t D i s p o s i t i o n . At any time during probation, the court may issue a warrant for the arrest of a probationer for violation of any of the conditions of probation. The probationer, once arrested and detained, shall immediately be brought before the court for a hearing, which may be informal and summary, of the violation charged. The defendant may be admitted to bail pending such hearing. In such a case, the provisions regarding release on bail of persons charged with a crime shall be applicable to probationers arrested under this provision. If the violation is established, the court may revoke or continue his probation and modify the conditions thereof. If revoked, the court shall order the probationer to serve the sentence originally imposed. An order revoking the grant of probation or modifying the terms and conditions thereof shall not be appealable.

(k) satisfy any other condition related to the rehabilitation of the defendant and not unduly restrictive of his liberty or incompatible with his freedom of conscience.

Section 16. T e r m i n a t i o n o f P r o b a t i o n . After the period of probation and upon consideration of the report and recommendation of the probation officer, the court may

(g) refrain from visiting houses of ill-repute; (h) abstain from drinking intoxicating beverages to excess; (i) permit to probation officer or an authorized social worker to visit his home and place or work;



order the final discharge of the probationer upon finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation and thereupon the case is deemed terminated. The final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspend as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which probation was granted.

Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which clearly mandates that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction," In the case at bar, the petitioner perfected an appeal upon raising it to the RTC. S e c o n d . At the outset, the penalties imposed by the MeTC were already probationable.

The probationer and the probation officer shall each be furnished with a copy of such order. Section 17. C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y o f R e c o r d s . The investigation report and the supervision history of a probationer obtained under this Decree shall be privileged and shall not be disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone other than the Probation Administration or the court concerned, except that the court, in its discretion, may permit the probationer of his attorney to inspect the aforementioned documents or parts thereof whenever the best interest of the probationer make such disclosure desirable or helpful: Provided, Further, That, any government office or agency engaged in the correction or rehabilitation of offenders may, if necessary, obtain copies of said documents for its official use from the proper court or the Administration

Francisco vs CA FACTS: Petitioner Pablo C. Francisco, upon humiliating his employees, was accused of multiple grave oral defamation in five (5) separate Informations instituted by five of his employees, each Information charging him with gravely maligning them on four different days, i.e., from 9 to 12 April 1980. On 2 January 1990, after nearly ten (10) years, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61, found petitioner Pablo C. Francisco, guilty of grave oral defamation, in four (4) of the five (5) cases filed against him, and sentenced him to a prison term of one (1) year and one (l) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional "in each crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the information(s)," ordered him to indemnify each of the offended parties, Victoria Gatchalian, Rowena Ruiz, Linda Marie Ayala Pigar and Marie Solis, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs of suit. However, he was acquitted in for persistent failure of the offended party, Edgar Colindres, to appear and testify. Unsatisfied with the decision of MeTC, the petitioner appealed to the RTC.

Hence, there was no need to appeal if only to reduce the penalties to within the probationable period. The petitioner in the case contended that the appeal made is for the court to lessen the penalty for him to avail of the probation (which limits it to the penalty of imprisonment not exceeding 6 years) and not on asserting his innocence. The court found the petitioners contention untenable. The penalty imposed by the MTC is probationable. The petitioner does not have to appeal for reduction of penalty. The court provided the following guidelines in computing for the maximum period to qualify in a probation: ―Multiple prison terms imposed against an accused found guilty of several offenses in one decision are not, and should not be, added up. And, the sum of the multiple prison terms imposed against an applicant should not be determinative of his eligibility for, nay his disqualification from, probation. The multiple prison terms are distinct from each other, and if none of the terms exceeds the limit set out in the Probation Law,i.e., not more than six (6) years, then he is entitled to probation, unless he is otherwise specifically disqualified.‖ ―P.D. 968, as amended, uses the word maximum not total when it says that "[t]he benefits of this Decree shall not be extended to those . . . . sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years." Evidently, the law does not intend to sum up the penalties imposed but to take each penalty separately and distinctly with the others.‖ . Petitioner appealed to the RTC not to reduce or even correct the penalties imposed Third by the MeTC, but to assert his innocence. Nothing more. The cold fact is that petitioner appealed his conviction to the RTC not for the sole purpose of reducing his penalties to make him eligible for probation — since he was already qualified under the MeTC Decision — but rather to insist on his innocence. In such case, makes the petitioner disqualified in availing probation. F o u r t h . The application for probation was filed way beyond the period allowed by law.

This is vital way beyond the period allowed by law and crucial. From the records it is clear that the application for probation was filed "only after a warrant for the arrest of petitioner had been issued . . . (and) almost two months after (his) receipt of the Decision" of the RTC. This is a ground of disqualification as provided in Sec 4 of PD 968:

After failure to interpose an appeal, the RTC‘s decision became final. Before he was arrested, we filed a certiorari to the CA, and dismissed the petition.

―Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal. . . . place the defendant on probation…‖

ISSUE: Soriano vs CA Whether petitioner is still qualified to avail of probation even after appealing his conviction to the RTC which affirmed the MeTC except with regard to the duration of the penalties imposed. HELD: Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation. F i r s t . Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. Its benefits cannot extend to those not expressly included.

Facts: Petitioner Ronald Soriano was convicted of the crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting to homicide, serious physical injuries and damage to property on December 7, 1993.i[2] 1993.i[2] His application for probation was granted on March 8, 1994, and among the terms and conditions imposed by the trial court were the following:



7. He shall meet his family responsibilities. 8. He shall devote himself to a specific employment and shall not change employment without prior notice to the supervising officer; and/or shall pursue a prescribed secular study or vocational training.

its orders. Nor did it abuse gravely its discretion in issuing said orders. Hence, we are in full agreement with respondent appellate courts decision as well. 2)

11. He is to indemnify the heirs of the victim Isidrino Daluyong in the amount of P98,560.00 as ordered by the Court

On April 26, 1994, Assistant Prosecutor Benjamin A. Fadera filed a motion to cancel petitioners probation due to his failure to satisfy his civil liability to the heirs of the victim, and a supplemental motion alleging petitioners commission of another crime for which at that time he was awaiting arraignment. The Zambales Parole and Probation Office filed a comment recommending that petitioner be allowed to continue with his probation and that he be required instead to submit a program of payment of his civil liability. On June 20, 1994, the trial court denied the prosecutors motion and directed petitioner to submit a program of payment of the civil liability imposed upon him. Thereafter, probation officer Nelda Da Maycong received information that petitioners father, who owned the vehicle involved in the accident which killed Daluyong, received P16,500.00 as insurance payment. This amount was not turned over to the heirs of Daluyong and Da Maycong considered this a violation of the terms and conditions of the probation. She submitted a manifestation to the trial court praying that petitioner be made to explain his non-compliance with the courts order of June 20, 1994, or that he be cited for contempt for such non-compliance. Da Maycong also asked that petitioner be made to submit a program of payment as soon as possible. The trial court granted her prayers in an order dated August 15, 1994. Petitioner was once again ordered to submit his program of payment. Petitioner instead filed a motion for reconsideration explaining that he did not receive any notice of the order dated June 20, 1994. His counsel received a copy of said order on June 23, 1994 but failed to notify petitioner. Thus, the latter failed to comply with said order. On October 4, 1994, the trial court issued an order declaring petitioner in contempt of court for his failure to comply with its orders of June 20, 1994 and August 15, 1994. The court likewise revoked the grant of probation to petitioner and ordered that he be arrested to serve the sentence originally imposed upon him. According to the trial court, among the violations committed by petitioner as regards his probation are his failure to (1) meet his responsibilities to his family, (2) engage in a specific employment, and (3) cooperate with his program of supervision. Ruling: He violated his probation terms 1)

Petitioners counsel has not been shown to be grossly irresponsible as to cause prejudice to petitioners rights.ii[13] rights.ii[13] Moreover, Moreover, we note that petitioner later on discovered that such a court order was received by his counsel. He could have endeavored to comply with the order then. In the June 20, 1994 order, he was given 10 days from receipt of the order within which to comply. The same period was given him in the order of August 15, 1994. Petitioner does not claim that he failed to receive notice of the latter order. In fact, he submitted a motion for reconsideration of said order, but still without the required program of payment. No justifiable reason has been given by petitioner for ignoring those two orders. The trial court could not be faulted for citing him in contempt for his failure to comply with

Petitioners continued refusal to submit a program of payment, along with his prayer for the deletion of the requirement of payment of civil liability from his probation order, creates the impression that he wants to completely avoid paying his civil liability. This he cannot do. He cannot escape payment of his civil liability, with or without a program of payment.

Article 100. Every Person Criminally Liable is also Civilly Liable Jose Garcia vs CA FACTS: Guevarra spouses seeks recovery of one (1) lady‘s diamond ring 18 cts. White gold mounting, with one (1) 2.05 cts. Diamond. Solitaire, and four (4) brills 0.10 cts. Total weight which she brought on October 27, 1947 from R. Rebullida, Inc. Mrs. Guevara lost her ring on February 1952. On October 11, 1953, while talking to Consuelo S. de Garcia, owner of La Bulakena restaurant recognized her ring in the finger of Mrs. Garca and inquired where she bought it, which the defendant answered from her Comare. Spouses Garcia together with Lt. Cementina and their Attorney proceeded to the store of Mr. Rebullida who examined the ring, Rebudilla confirmed that indeed it was her ring. Mrs. Garcia refuted that the said ring was purchased by her from Mrs. Miranda who got it from Miss Angelita Hinahon who in turn got it from the owner , Aling Petring who was boarding in her house; that the ring might be similar but not the same with that she bought from Rebudilla. ISSUE: Whether or not Mrs. Garcia is liable for the lost ring of Mrs. Guevara HELD: Yes, according to Article 559 of the Civil Code, recovery of the lost possession even though the one who got it is in good faith. But in the case at bar, Mrs. Garcia cannot invoke good faith since she ought to know that the said ring is a property in question. The Court found out that Aling Petring is a mysterious and ephemeral figure. The testimony of Mr. Rebullida was reliable. Therefore, Mrs. Garcia will pay Attorney‘s fee and Exemplary damage. Article 103. Subsidiary and Civil Liability of other Persons Pangonorom vs CA

Facts: July 10, 1989 at around 9:00 P.M. Carlos R. Berba was driving an Isuzu Gemini car bearing Plate No. NAR-865 L Pil. 89 belonging to his mother Mary Berba. With him inside the car were his mother Mary Berba who was seated in front beside him and his auntie Amelia Berba who was at the back seat. They were cruising along EDSA coming from the direction of Makati and headed towards the intersection of EDSA and Quezon Boulevard but upon nearing 680 Appliances along EDSA, Quezon City, their car was bumped from behind by MMTC Passenger Bus bearing Plate No. NVJ-999 TB Pil. 89 driven by herein accused Olimpio Pangonorom thereby causing damages to their car which was estimated at P42,600.00 (Exhs. F, F-1). The front and rear portions of their car incurred damages because by reason of the strong impact at the rear portion of their car, it was pushed forward and bumped the car in front of it, then it rested near the island. The bus driven by the accused still travelled a distance of 20 meters from the point of impact. The accused left his bus but they came to know his name is Olimpio Pangonorom. Their car was a total wreck as shown in its photographs (Exhs. B and C).



Carlos Berba noticed this bus following them closely at Nepa Q-Mart up to the point of collision. His car was running along the second lane of EDSA from the island. The MMTC bus driven by the accused was running very fast, kept on switching lane until it finally occupied the second lane and bumped his car. Carlos Berba sustained cuts on his shoulder and back because of broken glasses and was treated at East Avenue Medical Center. He incurred P1,000.00 for medication (Exhs. G to G-3). Mary Berba sustained contusion, hematoma and abrasion (Exh. H). Amelia Berba sustained abrasion on his right elbow (Exh. K). Both were also treated at East Avenue Medical Center. Edward Campos and Enrico Bantique Estupigan, passengers of MMTC Bus driven by the accused explained that their bus was running at 70-80 kph when it swerved to the right to avoid hitting a van stranded at the left side of the island but in the process it hit and bumped an Isuzu Gemini car in front of it. The rear portion of the Isuzu Gemini car was smashed and the front part was also damaged as it hit the Lancer car running ahead. The bus driver, herein accused, fled from the scene. The training officer of MMTC, Milagros Garbo, testified on the procedure of the company in hiring an applicant driver and the requirements to be submitted by the applicant. An applicant for a driver of MMTC as what had been done to the accused before he was admitted as company driver of MMTC must pass an interview, seminars, written examination, actual driving test, psycho-physical test, road test, line familiarization test, defensive driving seminar, drivers familiarization seminar, and traffic rules and environment seminar. Documents they required to be submitted by an applicant driver were NBI Clearance, Residence Certificate, Professional Drivers License, and Official Receipts of payment of required fees for drivers license (Exhs. 1 to 15). Issue: W/N employer is subsidiarily liable for employee’s civil liability Ruling: No. Pursuant to Article 103, an employer may be subsidiarily liable for the employees civil liability in a criminal action when there is adequate evidence establishing (1) that he is indeed the employer of the convicted employee; (2) that he is engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties; and (4) that the execution against the employee has not been satisfied due to insolvency. insolvency. [31] The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability Articles 102 and 103 are deemed written into the judgments in cases to which they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer .[32] The subsidiary liability of the employer arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal action. action.[33] In the present case, there exists an employer-employee relationship between petitioners, the MMTC is engaged in the transportation industry, industry, [34] and Olimpio has been adjudged guilty of a wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. duties.[35] However, there is no proof here of Olimpios insolvency. The judgment of conviction against Olimpio has not attained finality. This being so, no writ of execution can issue against him to satisfy his civil liability. Only after proof of the accused-employees insolvency may the subsidiary liability of his employer be enforced. enforced.[36] In short, there is as yet no occasion to speak of enforcing the employers subsidiary civil liability unless it appears that the accused-employees primary liability cannot in the first instance be satisfied because of insolvency. insolvency. This fact cannot be known until some time after the verdict of conviction shall have become final. And even if it appears prima facie facie that

execution against the employee cannot be satisfied, execution against the employer will not issue as a matter of course. course.[37] The procedure for the enforcement of a judgment will have to be followed. Once the judgment of conviction against Olimpio becomes final and executory, and after the writ of execution issued against him is returned unsatisfied because of his insolvency, only then can a subsidiary writ of execution be issued against the MMTC after a hearing set for that precise purpose. It is still too early to hold the MMTC subsidiarily liable with its accused-employee considering that there is no proof yet of Olimpios insolvency.

Yonaha vs CA Facts: Accused Elmer Ouano, while driving a Toyota Tamaraw sporting Plate No. GCX-237 duly registered in the name of Raul Cabahug and owned by EK SEA Products, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously maneuver and operate it in a negligent and reckless manner, without taking the necessary precaution to avoid injuries to person and damage to property, as a result thereof the motor vehicle he was then driving bumped and hit Hector Caete, which caused the latters instantaneous death, due to the multiple severe traumatic injuries at different parts of his body. When arraigned, the accused pleaded guilty and, on 09 March 1992, the trial court pronounced its judgment. So a writ of execution was issued for the satisfaction of the monetary award. Sheriff stated that he had served the writ on accused Elmer Ouano but that the latter had manifested his inability to pay the money obligation. The sheriff went to petitioners residence to enforce the writ, and it was then, allegedly for the first time, that petitioner was informed of Ouanos conviction. Petitioner filed a motion to stay and to recall the subsidiary writ of execution principally anchored on the lack of prior notice to her and on the fact that the employers liability had yet to be established. Petitioner additionally reminds the Court that Ouanos conviction was not the result of a finding of proof beyond reasonable doubt but from his spontaneous plea of guilt

Ruling: Statutory Ruling: Statutory basis for an employers subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.ii[5] Code.ii[5] This This Court has since sanctioned the enforcement of this subsidiary liability in the same criminal proceedings in which the employee is adjudged guilty,ii[6] guilty,ii[6] on on the thesis that it really is a part of, and merely an incident in, the execution process of the judgment. But, execution against the employer must not issue as just a matter of course, and it behooves the court, as a measure of due process to the employer, to determine and resolve a priori, in a hearing set for the purpose, the legal applicability and propriety of the employers liability. The requirement is mandatory even when it appears prima facie that execution against the convicted employee cannot be satisfied. The court must convince itself that the convicted employee is in truth in the employ of the employer; that the latter is engaged in an industry of some kind; that the employee has committed the crime to which civil liability attaches while in the performance of his duties as such; and that execution against the employee is unsuccessful by reason of insolvency.ii[7] insolvency.ii[7] The assumption that, since petitioner in this case did not aver any exculpatory facts in her motion to stay and recall, as well as in her motion for reconsideration, which could save her from liability, a hearing would be a futile and a sheer rigmarole is unacceptable. The employer must be given his full day in court. Petitioner shall be given the right to a hearing on the motion for the issuance of a writ of subsidiary execution filed by private respondents, and the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings



Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines vs Heirs of Mangawang Facts: Ernesto Ancheta was employed by the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) as driver of one of its passenger buses. Being then the driver and person-in-charge of a Philippine Rabbit Bus while cruising the MacArthur Highway towards the south direction, bumped the left rear side of a Toyota jeep riven by Eduardo Mangawang towards the north direction, and as a result thereof said Eduardo Mangawang ultimately died and the jeep he was then driving sustained damages. He was found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. For the civil liability of the accused, Ernesto Ancheta is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of Eduardo Mangawang the amounts of P28,600.00 as actual or compensatory damages and P1,436,466.30 representing loss of earning capacity. The accused is similarly ordered to pay the amounts of P50,000.00 by way of indemnification for the death of Eduardo Mangawang PRBLI filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order, claiming that it was not s erved with a copy of the decision of the RTC convicting the accused of the crime charged; Ruling: The petitioner (Rabbit Bus), as the employer of the said accused, had no right to appeal from the said decision because, in the first place, it was not a party in the said case. While the subsidiary liability provided for by Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code may render the petitioner a party in substance and, in effect, it is not, for this reason, entitled to be furnished a copy of the decision of the RTC, as well as the resolution and decision of the CA. Indeed, the petitioner was entitled to protect its interest by taking actual participation in the defense of its employee, Ancheta, by providing him with counsel. It cannot leave its employee to his own fate because his failure is its failure . [17] The petitioner, as the employer of the accused, would thereby be apprised of the progress of the case and the outcome thereof from time to time through the said counsel. The failure of such counsel to apprise the petitioner of the progress of the case is thus not equivalent to lack of due process. To allow an employer to dispute its civil liability in the criminal case vi a an an appeal from the decision of the RTC would be to annul, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. The right of the petitioner as the employer of the accused to due process occurs during the hearing of the motion for the issuance of an alias writ alias writ of execution, on the basis of the sheriffs return that the writ of execution issued by the court for the enforcement of its decision on the civil liability of the accused was not satisfied because of the latters insolvency, the sheriff being unable to locate any property in the name of the accused. Such return is prima is prima facie evidence facie evidence of the insolvency of the accused. Petition is denied.

LG Food Corp vs Hon. Agraviador

Facts: On February 26, 1996, Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the spouses Florentino Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by the petitioners and driven at the time by their employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer. Charles died as a result of the accident. In time, an Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was Homicide was filed against the driver before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bacolod City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 67787, entitled People of the Philippines v. Vincent Norman Yeneza. Yeneza. Unfortunately, before the trial could be concluded, the accused driver committed suicide, evidently bothered by conscience and remorse. On account thereof, the MTCC, in its order of September 30, 1998, dismissed the criminal case. 3

On June 23, 1999, in the RTC of Bacolod City, the spouses Vallejera filed a complaint complaint for damages against the petitioners as employers of the deceased driver, basically alleging that as such employers, they failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. Thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 99-10845, the complaint was raffled to Branch 43 of the court. 4

In their Answer their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, Counterclaim, the petitioners as defendants denied liability for the death of the Vallejeras' 7-year old son, claiming that they had exercised the required due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees, including the deceased driver. They thus prayed in their Answer for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action on the part of the Vallejera couple. During pre-trial, the defendant petitioners insisted that their dismissal prayer be resolved. Hence, the trial court required them to file within ten days a memorandum of authorities supportive of their position. Instead, however, of the required memorandum of authorities, the defendant petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, Dismiss, principally arguing that the complaint is basically a "claim for subsidiary 5 liability against an employer" under the provision of Article 103 103 of the Revised Penal Code. Prescinding therefrom, they contend that there must first be a judgment of conviction against their driver as a condition sine qua non to non to hold them liable. Ergo, Ergo, since the driver died during the pendency of the criminal action, the sine qua non condition non condition for their subsidiary liability was not fulfilled, hence the of lack of cause of action on the part of the plaintiffs. They further argue that since the plaintiffs did not make a reservation to institute a separate action for damages when the criminal case was filed, the damage suit in question is thereby deemed instituted with the criminal action which was already dismissed. Issue: whether the spouses Vallejeras' cause of action is founded on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, as maintained by the petitioners, or derived from Article Article 2180 of the Civil Code



Ruling: Action is not founded on Article 103 of the RPC

Article 104-111. Civil Liability People vs Montesclaros

“That defendant LG Foods Corporation is civilly liable for the negligence/imprudence of its employee since it failed to exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer which diligence if exercised, would have prevented said incident. ― Nothing in the foregoing allegations suggests, even remotely, that the herein petitioners are being made to account for their subsidiary liability under Article 10 3 of the Revised Penal Code. As Code. As correctly pointed out by the trial court in its order of September 4, 2001 denying the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss, Dismiss, the complaint did not even aver the basic elements for the subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, such as the prior conviction of the driver in the criminal case filed against him nor his insolvency. Admittedly, the complaint did not explicitly state that plaintiff Vallejeras were suing the defendant petitioners for damages based on quasi-delict . Clear it is, however, from the allegations of the complaint that quasi-delict was was their choice of remedy against the petitioners. To stress, the plaintiff spouses alleged in their complaint gross fault and negligence on the part of the driver and the failure of the petitioners, as employers, to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. The spouses further alleged that the petitioners are civilly liable for the negligence/imprudence of their driver since they failed to exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employees, which diligence, if exercised, could have prevented the vehicular accident that resulted to the death of their 7-year old son. Had the respondent spouses elected to sue the petitioners based on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, they would have alleged that the guilt of the driver had been proven beyond reasonable doubt; that such accused driver is insolvent; that it is the subsidiary liability of the defendant petitioners as employers to pay for the damage done by their employee (driver) based 23 on the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. liable. Since there was no conviction in the criminal case against the driver, precisely because death intervened prior to the termination of the criminal proceedings, the spouses' recourse was, therefore, to sue the petitioners for their direct and primary liability based on quasi -delict. -delict.

Facts: The information states that, on april 1, 1995 about 4:30pm in Lapulapu city with the jurisdiction of the RTC Lapu-Lapu, the accused Tampus was in deep slumber due to drunkenness did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the then 13 yer old victim against her will in conspiracy with Ida Montesclaros who gave permission to Tampus to rape the minor.(2) on April 3, 1995 at about 1am, Tampus was armed with a wooden club and by means of threat and intimidation did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with then 13 year old against her will. The offended party is the daughter of montesclaros. Montesclaros started o rent a room in a house owned by Tampus, a barangay tanod. Minor testified that she was in the house with her mother and Tampus on April 1, 1995, that the two adults were drinking beer and forced her to drink too. After having 3 bottles then she got sleepy and was lying on the floor when she overheard Tampus requesting her mother to be permitted to have sexual intercourse with the minor. Montesclaros agreed and told Tampus to leave as soon as he is finish with her daughter. Montesclaros then left for work and left the minor along with Tampus. The minor fell asleep and have woken up with pain and blood on her genitals. The minor cried to her mother but was ignored by Montesclaros. Minor testified that the abuse was repeated on April 4, 1995. That then made her to seek from her Aunt Nellie who reported the incident to the police. On May 9, 1995 the head of the medicolegal branch of the PNCLS conducted a physical examination of the minor and testified that the result of the examination revealed a deep healed laceration. On September 22, 1995 the minor filed 2 complaints against Tampus on rape and against Montesclaros on conspiracy to the rape. Issue: What are the civil liabilities for each of the accused.

Ruling: The particular liability that each accused is responsible for depends on the nature and degree of his participation in the commission of the crime. The crime. The penalty prescribed by

Instead, the civil case is a negligence suit brought under Article 2176 - Civil Code to recover damages primarily from the petitioners as employers responsible for their negligent driver pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Thus, the employer is liable for damages caused by his employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former is not engaged in any business or industry.

the Revised Penal Code for a particular crime is imposed upon the principal in a consummated felony.ii[68] The accomplice is only given the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by the law for the crime committedii[69] and an accessory is given the penalty lower by two degrees.ii[70] However, a felon is not only criminally liable, he is likewise civilly liable. ii[71] Apart from the penalty of imprisonment imposed on him, he is also ordered to indemnify the victim and to make whole the damage caused by his act or omission through the payment of civil indemnity and damages.

Article 109 of the Revised Penal Code provides that [i]f there are two or more persons civilly liable for a felony, the courts shall determine the amount for which each must respond. Notwithstanding the determination of the respective liability of the principals, accomplices and accessories within their respective class, they shall also be subsidiarily liable



for the amount of civil liability adjudged in the other classes. Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code provides that [t]he principals, accomplices, and accessories, each within their respective class, shall be liable severally (in (in solidum) solidum) among themselves for their quotas, and subsidiarily for those of the other persons liable.

In the case at bar, the trial court ruled that the accomplice is solidarily liable with the principal for the entire amount of the civil indemnity of P50,000.00. This is an erroneous apportionment of the civil indemnity. First, because it does not take into account the difference in the nature and degree of participation between the principal, Tampus, versus the accomplice, Ida. Idas previous acts of cooperation include her acts of forcing ABC to drink beer and permitting Tampus to have sexual intercourse with her daughter. But even without these acts, Tampus could have still raped ABC. It was Tampus, the principal by direct particip ation, who should have the greater l iability, not only in terms of criminal liability, but also with respect to civil liability. Second, Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code states that the apportionment should provide for a quota amount for every class for which members of such class are solidarily liable within their respective class, and they are only subsidiarily liable for the share of the other classes. The Revised Penal Code does not provide for solidary liability among the different classes, as was held by the trial court in the case at bar.

Thus, taking into consideration the difference in participation of the principal and accomplice, the principal, Tampus, should be liable for two-thirds (2/3) of the total amount of the civil indemnity and moral damages and appellant Ida should be ordered to pay one-third (1/3) of the amount. Civil indemnity for simple rape was correctly set at P50,000.00 and moral damages at P50,000.00. The total amount of damages to be divided between Tampus and Ida is P100,000.00, where Tampus is liable for P66,666.67 (which is two-thirds [2/3] of P100,000.00) and Ida is liable for P33,333.33 (which is one-third [1/3] of P100,000.00). This is broken down into civil indemnity of P16,666.67 and moral damages of P16,666.67. However, since the principal, Tampus, died while the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, his liability for civil indemnity ex delicto is delicto is extinguished by reason of his death before the final judgment.ii[108] His share in the civil indemnity and damages cannot be passed over to the accomplice, Ida, because Tampus share of the civil liability has been extinguished. And even if Tampus were alive upon the promulgation of this decision, Ida would only have been subsidiarily liable for his share of the civil indemnity of P66,666.67. However, since Tampus civil liability ex delicto is extinguished, Idas subsidiary liability with respect to this amount is also eliminated, following the principle that the accessory follows the principal. Tampus obligation to pay P66,666.67 his quota of the civil indemnity is the principal obligation, for which Ida is only subsidiarily liable. Upon the extinguishment of the principal obligation, there is no longer any accessory obligation which could attach to it; thus, the subsidiary liability of Ida is also extinguished.

4th Exam Article 80 113 Case Digests and Special Laws

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