G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010 ISABELITA C. VINUYA, VICTORIA C. DELA PEÑA, HERMINIHILDA, MANIMBO, LEONOR H. SUMAWANG, CANDELARIA L. SOLIMAN, MARIA L. QUILANTANG, MARIA L. MAGISA, NATALIA M. ALONZO, LOURDES M. NAVARO, FRANCISCA M. ATENCIO, ERLINDA MANALASTAS, TARCILA M. SAMPANG, ESTER M. PALACIO MAXIMA R. DELA CRUZ, BELEN A. SAGUM, FELICIDAD TURLA, FLORENCIA M. DELA PEÑA, FRANCIA A. BUCO, PASTORA C. GUEVARRA, VICTORIA M. DELA CRUZ, PETRONILA O. DELA CRUZ, ZENAIDA P. DELA CRUZ, CORAZON M. SUBA, EMERINCIANA A. VINUYA, LYDIA A. SANCHEZ, ROSALINA M.BUCO, PATRICIA A. ERNARDO, LUCILA H. PAYAWAL, MAGDALENA LIWAG, ESTER C. BALINGIT, JOVITA A. DAVID, EMILIA C. MANGILIT, VERGINIA M. BANGIT, GUILLERMA S. BALINGIT, TERECITA PANGILINAN, MAMERTA C. PUNO, CRISENCIANA C. GULAPA, SEFERINA S. TURLA, MAXIMA B. TURLA, LEONICIA G. GUEVARRA, ROSALINA M. CULALA, CATALINA Y. MANIO, MAMERTA T. SAGUM, CARIDAD L. TURLA, et al. In their capacity and as members of the “Malaya Lolas Organization”, Petitioners, - versus THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGNAFFAIRS DELIA DOMINGO-ALBERT, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, and THE HONORABLE SOLICITOR GENERAL ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondents. FACTS: This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG. Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non -stock, non-profit organization registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by b y Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War. Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort women” stations in the Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s com pliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan. Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals. Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956. On January 15, 1997, the Asian Women’s Women’s Fund Fund and the Philippine government signed a Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former comfort women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
ISSUE: WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners’ claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.
RULING: Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan. Political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Con stitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that "the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative--'the political'--departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision." are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution no t to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question. The President, not Congress, has the better oppo rtunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials. The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be inimical to our country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the to overturn the Executive Department’s determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments b y a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed. From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between th e treaty’s conclusion and our consideration – the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign po licy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary. In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individual’s behalf. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law. Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may ex ercise diplomatic protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the S tate is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequatel y protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally. Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens. The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the commu nity of states as a whole. Essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. B y their very nature, the former are the concern of
all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes. The term “jus cogens” (literally, “compelling law”) refers to norms that command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
