1st National Moot Court Competition Appelants (Accused)

TEAM CODE [A05] 1ST NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION SHOOLINI UNIVERSITY, SOLAN. BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

AT NEW DELHI, INDIA. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION APPEAL NO. ****/2017, UNDER SECTION 304B & 498A, IPC AND SECTION 4 OF DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT, 1961. IN THE MATTERS OF AHUL SHARMA AND ANR ............................................. MR . R AHUL ................................................................... .................................A ...........A PPELLANTS V. ESPONDENTS STATE AND ORS........................................ .............................................................. ............................................ .....................................R ...............R ESPONDENTS

-MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS-

1ST NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, SHOOLINI UNIVERSITY .

-TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS........................................... ................................................................. .............................................. ...............................3 .......3 2. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.......................................... ................................................................ ............................................. .....................................4 ..............4 2.1 INDIAN CASES............................................ .................................................................. ............................................ .........................................4 ...................4 2.2 FOREIGN CASES............................................. ................................................................... ............................................ ....................................5 ..............5 2.3 STATUES.......................................... ................................................................ ............................................ ............................................ .............................5 .......5 2.4 CONSTITUTIONS REFERRED......................................... ............................................................... ............................................ .......................6 .6 EFERRED............................................... 2.4 BOOKS R EFERRED ..................................................................... ............................................ ..............................6 ........6 EFERRED............................................ 2.5 DICTIONARIES R EFERRED .................................................................. ...........................................6 .....................6 EFERRED ............................................ 2.6 WEBSITES R EFERRED .................................................................. ............................................ ...........................6 .....6

3. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTIONS.............................................. ...................................................................... ...........................................7 ...................7 4. STATEMENT OF FACTS............................................ ................................................................... ............................................. .....................................8 ...............8 AISED........................................... 5. ISSUES R AISED ................................................................. ............................................. .............................................. ..........................10 ...10

6. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS........................................... ................................................................. ............................................. .............................11 ......11 7. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED......................................... ............................................................... .............................................. ...................................12 ...........12 7.1 THAT THE IN-LAWS OF THE DECEASED HAVE NOT COMMITTED THE OFFENCE OF DOWRY DEATH

........................................... ................................................................. ............................................. ....................................12 .............12

7.2 THAT THE ACTS OF IN-LAWS DO NOT AMOUNT TO CRUELTY UNDER SECTION 498A, IPC..................................... IPC........................................................... ............................................. ............................................. ...........................18 .....18 7.3 THAT THERE WAS NO DEMAND OF DOWRY AS TO ATTRACT CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 4 OF DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT, 1961....................................23 8. PRAYER ............................................. ................................................................... .............................................. .............................................. ..................................26 ............26


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-TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS -

Abbreviation

Explanation

¶

Paragraph

§

Section

&

And

A.C.

Appellate Cases

AD

Apex Decision

A.I.R.

All India Reporter

Anr.

Another

A.P.

Andhra Pradesh

Bom. Cr. L. J. Cr.PC Del D.M.C. D.P.A

Bombay Criminal Law Journal Code of Criminal Procedure Delhi Divorce & matrimonial cases Dowry Prohibition Act

Ed.

Edition

FB

Full Bench

Guj.

Gujarat

H.C.

High Court

H.P.

Himachal Pradesh

i.e.

That is

I.P.C.

Indian Penal Code

I.E.A.

Indian Evidence Act

Jhar


Jharkhand

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Kant. Ker. LR

Karnataka Kerala Law Report

Mad.

Madras

M.P.

Madhya Pradesh

NCT

National Capital Territory

Ori

Orissa

Ors.

Others

P. P&H

Page No. Punjab & Haryana

Pat.

Patna

Raj

Rajasthan

r/w

Read with

S.C. S.C.C. Sd/-

Supreme Court Supreme Court Cases Signed

Supp.

Supplementary

U.O.I.

Union of India

U.P

Uttar Pradesh

u/Art

Under Article

u/s

Under section

v. Vol. W.B.


Verses Volume West Bengal

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-INDEX OF AUTHORITIES -INDIAN CASES-

1. Akula Ravinder v. State of AP AIR 1991 SC 1142. 2. Appasaheb and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra AIR 2007 SC 763 3. Arbind Kumar Ambasta v. State of Jharkhand 2002 Cr. LJ 3973 (Jhar). 4. Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana AIR 2010 SC 2839 5. Bajrang v. State of Rajasthan, 1998 Cr LJ 134 (Raj) 6. Balasaheb Annappa Whagmare v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 1 DMC 249. 7. Balwant singh v. State of Punjab, (2004) 7 SCC 724 8. Bhola Ram v. State Of Punjab AIR 2014 S.C. 241 9. Biswajit Halder v. State of W.B., (2008) 1 SCC 202 10. Durga Parsad v. State of MP 2010 Cr LJ 3419 11. Ghusabhai Risangbhai Chorasiya v. State of Gujrat, AIR 2015 SC 2670 12. Gurnam Singh v. State 1998 Cr. Lj 3694 (P&H) 13. Hakim Singh v. State of Punjab 1989 Ch Cr C (HC) 484 (P&H) 14. Harban Singh v. Gurcharan Kaur, 1990 Cr LJ 1591 15. Hem Chand v. State of Haryana (1994) 3 Crimes (SC) 16. In Smt. Raj Rani v. State (Delhi Administration AIR 2000 SC 3559 17. InderSain v. The State (Del), ( Del), 1981 Cr LJ 1116, 18. IS Bind v. State of Gujarat 2013 (125) AIC 102, 102, P. 103 19. Jalam v. State of MP 2014 Cr LJ 360 (MP) 20. Jatashankarsah v. State of Bihar 2013 Cr LJ 1992(Pat). 21. Jawaharmaghi Sindhi Bhansale v. State 2006 Cr LJ 1717 (Guj.) 22. K. Prema S. Rao and Another v. Yadlasrinivasa Rao and others, 2003 (1) SCC 217 23. KailashVati v. AyodhyaPrakash (1977) 79 P.L.R. 216(F.B.) 24. Kaliaya perumal v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR SCW 438 25. Kamesh panjiyar v. State of Bihar 2005 Cr LJ 1418 (SC) 26. Kanchi Ramachandra v. State of A.P., 1995 (Supp.) 4 SCC119 27. Kans Raj v. State of Punjab2000 CR LJ 2993 28. Krishan Lal v. Union of IndiaCr LJ 3472 (P&H) (FB) 29. Kunhiaabdulla v. State of Kerala AIR 2004 SC 1731. 30. LokeshKaushik & Ors. v. state, SC On 28 th April, 2009.


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31. Malyala Vishwanatha Rao v. State of A.P. 2003 Cr LJ (NOC) 11 (AP) 32. Manju Ram Kalita v. State of Assam On 29 May, 2009 33. Mool Chand v. State of Rajasthan 2012 Cr LJ (NOC) 228 (Raj.)(DB). 34. Mungeshwar Prasad Chaurasia v. State of Bihar 2002 Cr LJ 3505 (S.C.) 35. Murali v. State of Kerala, 2006 DMC 589 36. Naryanamurty 36. Naryanamurty v. State Of Karnataka (2008) 16 SCC 512. 37. Niranjan 37. Niranjan Mohapatra v. State of Orissa 1998 Cr LJ LJ 630 (Ori) 38. Nunna 38. Nunna Venkateswarlu Alias v. The State of Andhra Andhra Pradesh (1996) Cr LJ 108 39. Pyarelal v. State of Haryana, (1997) 2 SCC 552 40. Raj Kumar Khanna v. The State Sta te (NCT of Delhi), 2002 DLT 147. 41. Rajesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2013) 4 SCC 690 42. Ram Vishnu Gupta and 2 Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1999 DMC 489 43. RavanBalu Indalkar v. State Of Maharahtra, 2012 Bom cr (Cri) 106 44. Sankar Prasad Shaw v. State of West Bengal, 1991 Cr LJ 639, 45. Saritha v. R. Ramachandran (2003) DMC 37. 46. SarlaPrabhakar Waghmare v. State of Maharashtra 1990 Cr L.J. 407 47. Satya Narayan And Anr v. State Sta te 2003 Cr LJ 1228 (Bom) (DB) 48. Savitri Devi v. Ramesh Chand and Ors, 2003 Cr. LJ 2759. 49. Sharadbirdhi Chand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1984 SC 1622 50. Shersingh v. State of Haryana AIR 2015 2015 SC 980 51. Shobha Rani v. MadhukarReddi 1988 AIR 121 52. State of Andhra Pradesh v. KalidindiSahadevudu 2012 Cr LJ 2302 (AP). 53. State of Himachal Pradesh v. Yog Raj1997 Cr LJ 2033 (HP) (DB) 54. State of Karnataka v. MV Manjunathegowda 2003 I AD 601 (SC). 55. State of Karnataka v. Neelaawwa 2002 Cr LJ 3981 (Kant) 56. State of Maharashtra v. Ashok Chotelal Shukla(1997) 11 SCC 26 57. SunkaraSuri Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh Cr LJ 1480 (AP). 58. Thangappandian v. State by DSP, Mettur, (1998) Cr LJ 993 (Mad). 59. Vinayakaro v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 114 (6) Bom. LR 3528 60. Vinod Kumar Sethi v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 P&H 372 (FB). 61. Viralu v. State of A.P., 1998 Vol.3 Crimes 549. 62. Yashoda v. State of Madhya Pradesh(2004) 3 SCC 98


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-STATUES-

1. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT, 1973, N 1973, NO. 2, ACTS OF PARLIAMENT, 1973 (I NDIA) 2. I NDIAN CONSTITUTION. 3. I NDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860, N 1860, NO. 45, ACTS OF PARLIAMENT, 1860 4. THE I NDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872, N 1872, NO. 1, ACTS OF PARLIAMENT, 1872 5. THE DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT, 1961, N 1961, NO. 28, ACTS OF PARLIAMENT, 1961

-CONSTITUTION -

1. THE CONSTITUTION OF I NDIA, 1950 EFERRED-BOOKS R EFERRED

1. Aiyar P Ramanatha, The Law Lexicon, (2nd ed. 2006). 2. Dr. D.D. Basu, Commentary on Constitution of India, (8th Ed., Lexis Nexis, 2010). 3. Dunham Beth Walston, Introduction to Law, (6th ed., 2011). 4. Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, (2nd edition 1983). 5. H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, (4th Ed., Universal Law Publication,2015) 6. Halsbury’s Laws of England, (5th e d. 2016). 7. Halsbury’s Laws of India (2012) India (2012) 8. KD Gaur, Criminal Law: Cases & Materials, (6th Ed., Lexis Nexis, 2009) 9. KD Gaur, The Indian Penal Code, (15th ( 15th Ed. , Law Publishers India Pvt. Ltd., 2016) 10. MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, ( 7th Ed. , Lexis Nexis, 2016) 11. Mayne, Hindu Law and Usage, (10 ed. 1938). 12. R. A. Nelson’s, Indian Penal Code (11 th ed. 2016). 13. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code, (33rd Ed., Lexis Nexis, 2016) 14. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, The Code of Criminal Procedure (20th Ed., Lexis Nexis 2016) 15. SC Sarkar, The Indian Penal Code,1860 (3rd Ed., Dwivedi Law Agency, 2014 ) 16. SC Sarkar, The Code of Criminal Procedure: An Encyclopaedic Commentary on the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 (11th Ed., Lexis Nexis, 2015) 17. Sir Dinshah Mulla, Principles of Hindu Law, (7th ed.). 18. V.N. Shukla's, Constitution of India, (12th Ed. Eastern Book Company, India 2013).


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EFERRED-DICTIONARIES R EFERRED

1. Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary, Dicti onary, (9th Ed., Thomas & West, U.S.A 1990) 2. P Ramanatha Aiyar, The Law Lexicon, (2 nd Ed. Lexis Nexis, 2006) EFERRED-WEBSITES R EFERRED

1. www.manupatrafast.in (Last visited on 29th August, 2017) 2. www.scconline.com (Last visited on 5 th September, 2017) 3. www.supremecourtofindia.nic.in (Last visited on 6 th September, 2017) 4. www.westlawindia.com (Last visited on 26 th August, 2017)


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-STATEMENT OF JURISDICTIONAs regard Criminal Appeal No. ______/2017:-

The Appellant has approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India under section 379, The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 1

1

Appeal against conviction by High Court in certain cases. Where the High Court has, on appeal, reversed an order of acquittal of an accused person and convicted him and sentenced him to death or to imprisonment for life or to imprisonment for a ter m of ten years or more, he may appeal to the Supreme Court.


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-STATEMENT OF FACTS-BACKGROUND(¶1.) Mr. Sunil Sharma, aged 29, son of Mr. Rahul Sharma and Mrs. Sunita Sharma live in a

lavish house at New Friends Colony, New Delhi. They have a big textile manufacturing unit at Ohkla Industrial Area, New Delhi. The business is being run by the family since 1970_s and they have established a good and respectable name in t he society. (¶2.) Ms. Amrita Gupta, aged 26, is the daughter of Dr. Ram Gupta and Mrs. Urmila Gupta.

Amrita is an Assistant professor, at Delhi University. She teaches Political Science and was a gold medallist and university topper in Delhi University. Her father is a well-known academician and Department Head of Mathematics at University of Kurukshetra. -THE MARRIAGE(¶3.) Mr. Sunil Sharma and Amrita Gupta met at an online matrimonial website. Soon after

several meetings, they found themselves to be compatible with each other. On the insistence of Sunil, Mr. Rahul Sharma met Amrita’s parents. In the course of the conversation, both the parties mutually agreed for the marr iage iage expenditure to be borne by the bride’s family. Dr. Ram agreed for the proposal and performed the wedding on 12.10.2009. Amrita’s parents spent almost all their savings for the wedding and made sure that the groom’s family didn’t have anything to complain about. At the time of the marriage, the father of the bride gave cash, jewellery and land as a form of Stridhanana for her maintenance. The total worth of all this was approx 30 Lakhs. But there was no demand from Mr. Sharma side, all what Mr. Gupta did with his free will. -THE INCIDENT(¶4.) After 6 months of the marriage, as Sharma’s family business was not going well so just

they ask

for a share share in the land gifted to Amrita to set up new garment showroom in New

Delhi to rebirth their family business. business. However, Amrita refused as the same. Due to the refusal, things started getting heated up in the house. The mother-in law, too, started commenting as she was unable to bear a child. On 18.10.2012, Sunil and Amrita were blessed with a baby girl. There was a grand celebration for the same, but the celebration did not last for long as Amrita’s in-laws in -laws taunted her once or twice for not giving birth to a boy and that she was a bad luck for the family.


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(¶5.) Again, the in-laws continued making unreasonable demands to mentally harass her.

Tired of the claims, Amrita decided to pull all this to an end by putting her daughter and herself ablaze in the kitchen. The in-laws caught her out from the fire at the moment and rushed her to the hospital. However, she and her daughter were found with third degree burns and couldn’t survive the same. Both were found dead on 21.12.2016. (¶6.) Dr. Ram Gupta lodged a complaint at the police station in New Delhi the very next day

and claimed that his daughter had been forced to take such a step due to unreasonable dowry demands by her in- laws. After the investigation, the police filed the charge sheet against Mr. Sunil Sharma, Mr. Rahul Sharma and Mrs. Sunita Sharma u/s. 304B, 498A and 201 of IPC and u/s. 4 of the Dowry prohibition act, 1961. (¶7.) Finding of the Trial Court: The trial court acquitted all the accused on 15.01.2017. (¶8.) Finding of the Delhi High Court: The High Court, on 23.03.2017, convicted mother-

in-law and father-in-law u/s 302 and section 498A IPC and section Dowry Prohibition Act, 1956 and acquitted the husband. (¶9.) Appeal before the Supreme Court: The appellants have preferred an appeal before the

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India against the decision of the Delhi High Cou rt.


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AISED - ISSUES R AISED

I WHETHER THE IN-LAWS OF THE DECEASED HAVE COMMITTED THE OFFENCE OF THE DOWRY DEATH?

II WHETHER ANY WHETHER ANY CRUELTY ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED WAS DONE AS MENTIONED UNDER SECTION UNDER SECTION 498A OF IPC?

III WHETHER THERE WAS ANY DEMAND OF D OWRY AS TO ATTRACT CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 4 OF DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT, 1961?


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- SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS -

I. WHETHER THE IN-LAWS OF THE DECEASED HAVE COMMITTED THE OFFENCE OF DOWRY DEATH?

It is most humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the accused is not guilty for committing the offence of dowry death u/s 304B, IPC, 1860. All the ingredients required to prove the dowry death do not stand established esta blished from the given facts and circumstances. The deceased was not subjected to cruelty or harassment for demand of dowry, soon before her death. In the present case, none of the ingredients are being fulfilled. Thus, § 304B, IPC, is not applicable.

II. WHETHER ANY CRUELTY ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED WAS DONE AS MENTIONED UNDER SECTION 498A OF IPC?

It is most humbly submits before this Hon’ble Court that the acts of the in-laws in -laws do not amount to cruelty as covered u/s 498A, IPC. It is further contended that the evidence on record do not support the plea taken on behalf of the respondent that the deceased was driven to commit suicide on account of cruelty or because of the repeated demands made by the accused. There was simply no evidence of harassment by the appellants; rather it was a case of misunderstanding on the part of Amrita which led to the commission of suicide by her. There was no evidence that any act of the appellants had abetted the commission of suicide by her. her . The fact that no single complain was lodged by the deceased against the accused in the past seven years and two months shows that the deceased was happy in the house of her in-laws. It is further submitted that the trial court below has analyzed the oral as well as documentary evidence on record and has acquitted the accused of all the charges. Secondly, the ingredients of the offence punishable u/s 498A I.P.C. have not been establis hed at all.


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III. WHETHER THERE WAS ANY DEMAND OF DOWRY AS TO ATTRACT CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 4 OF DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT, 1961.

It is most humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that there was no demand of dowry from the in-laws of Amrita. There is no evidence to show that there were constant demands of dowry from Sharma’s family. There is a large difference between dowry and stridhan and stridhan and a demand for land on account of some financial stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic expenses cannot be termed as a demand for dowry.


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- ARGUMENTS ADVANCED -

I. THAT THE IN-LAWS OF THE DECEASED HAVE NOT COMMITTED THE OFFENCE OF THE DOWRY DEATH.

(¶1.) It is humbly submitted by the respondents that in the present case, the offence of Dowry

death is not committed by the accused, against the deceased, Mrs. Amrita. As per the evidences in the trial court, no proof against the mother- in- law was established; she could not be punished only for the fact of being a mother- in- la w. 2 (¶2.) To prove dowry death, the following ingredients of § 304-B3 should be fulfilled 4:

(a) Death of woman was caused any burns or bodily injury or had occurred other than under normal circumstances.5 (b) Such death should have occurred within 7 year of marriage. 6 (c) The deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband. (d) Such cruelty or harassment should be for, or in connection with the demand of dowry 7 (e) To such cruelty or harassment the deceased should have been subjected soon before her death.8 Only 1st ingredient of aforementioned section followed in our present case. 1.1 DEATH NOT OCCURRED WITHIN 7 YEARS OF MARRIAGE (¶3.) The death of a woman in unnatural circumstances must be caused within seven years of

marriage to attract section 304B, IPC, or the presumption u/s 113A and 113B of the Evidence Act, if other condition also satisfied. When the death of the wife by burning took place beyond a period of 8 9 years from the date of marriage, neither § § 304B IPC nor §113A, IEA 2

Balwantsingh v. State of Punjab, Punjab , (2004) 7 SCC 724 Section 304B, Indian penal code, 1860 4 Vinayakaro v. Vinayakaro v. state state of Maharashtra (2012) Maharashtra (2012) 114 (6) Bom LR 3528; Shersingh v. Shersingh v. State of Haryana AIR Haryana AIR 2015 SC 980 5 AkulaRavinder v. v. State of AP, AIR AP, AIR 1991 SC 1142 6 Arbind Kumar Ambasta v Ambasta v.. State of Jharkhand , 2002 Cr. LJ 3973( Jhar) 7 BiswajitHalder v. v. State of W.B., (2008) W.B., (2008) 1SCC 202 8 K. Prema S. Rao and Another v. v. YadlasrinivasaRao and others, others , 2003 (1) SCC 217 9 MalyalaVishwanathaRao v. MalyalaVishwanathaRao v. State of A.P. 2003 A.P. 2003 Cr LJ (NOC) 11 (AP) 3


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1872 is attracted. Where no evidence regarding marriage was tendered, as such it was not proved that death occurred within seven years of marriage; appellant accused was not convicted for offence u/s 304B, IPC. 10 Similarly in this case, according to the factsheet, the wedding of Amrita was held on 12-10-2009, and death had been occurred on 21-12-2016, clearly shows that death of the deceased happened after seven years, two months and ten days, which is beyond the scope of § 304B. 1.2 DECEASED WAS NOT SUBJECTED TO CRUELTY OR HARASSMENT (¶4.) The proximity of time between the alleged ill-treatment and time of death is a highly

relevant factor, and is an essential ess ential and necessary evidence for proof of dowry death. 11 (¶5.) The ordinarily dictionary meaning of ‘cruelty’ would not be applicable to hold that it is

vague being interpreted in so many ways. Obviously, the legislature has defined the term ‘cruelty’ while keeping in view the object which was required to be achieved. 12 (¶6.) In the decided case of Jawaharmaghi Sindhi Bhansale v. State13, The Hon’ble SC

observed that, where the Father-in-law was, in a case was subject to vague accusation of illtreatment but since there was no other evidence which could prove that the father-in-law was inflicting physical and mental cruelty on the deceased wife, hence order of conviction and sentence passed were set aside. (¶7.) In the present case there is no evidence to show that the deceased has been subjected to

cruelty or harassment prior to her death, which compelled the deceased to commit suicide. The parents of the deceased did not lodge any police complaint about the alleged demand and torture for the same but filed the complaint only after the death of their daughter, which clearly shows that there was no cruelty or harassment or ill-treatment, by the in-laws of the deceased. 1.3 NOT FALLING UNDER ‘DEMAND OF DOWRY’ (¶8.) Explanation to section 304B, IPC refers to dowry ‘as having the same meaning as in § 2

of the DPA 1961’.The term “dowry” means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly by one party to the marriage to the other party to the 10

Section 113A, Indian Evidence Act 1872. Niranjan Mohapatra v. Mohapatra v. State of Orissa 1998 Orissa 1998 Cr LJ 630 (Ori) 12 KrishanLal v. Union of India Cr LJ 3472 (P&H) (FB). 13 2006 Cr.LJ 1717 (Guj) 11


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marriage or by the parent of either party to the marriage or to any other person. 14Merely making of dowry demand would not attract the provision of § 304B, IPC. 15 (¶9.) In the present case, the accused never asked for anything from the deceased, they only

asked for a share in the land that was given to the deceased by her father as a part of ‘ stridhan’, stridhan’, which does not come under the ambit of dowry. Similarly, in the case of Rohtash v. state v. state of Haryana, HC convicted the accused, for demanding money from the deceased for establishing business. While allowing the appeal against the judgment of the HC of P&H, the apex court by overruling the judgment of the P&H HC held that the demand of the money for establishing business- is not necessaril y dowry demand. (¶10.) Further, In case of Gurnam Singh v. State16, where the accused were charged for

harassing the victim for bringing inadequate amount of money but demand for dowry was not proved and hearsay evidence of the witnesses could not be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It was held that offence u/s 498A was not made out and accused was entitled to acquittal . (¶11.) When there was no evidence on record to show that the land was demanded as dowry

though it was given by the father of the deceased in the marriage as pasupukumuma, pasupukumuma, the harassment or cruelty meted out to the deceased by the husband after the marriage, to force her to transfer the land in his name was ‘not in connection with any demand for dowry’ 17 1.4 NO CRUELTY OR HARASSMENT ‘SOON BEFORE HER DEATH’ (¶12.) The expression ‘soon before her death’ used in the subtractive § 304B, IPC, and §

113B, IEA, is pregnant with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and expression ‘soon before’ is not defined. When the demand of dowry is made so on after marriage by accused but beyond the range of ‘soon before death’ of the deceased, §304B, IPC, is not attracted. 18 (¶13.) A conjoint reading of § §113B, IEA, 1872 and § 304B, IPC, shows that there must be

material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. Prosecution has to rule out the possibility of any natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of the ‘death occurrence otherwise than in normal circumstances’

14

Section 2, Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Bhola Ram v. Ram v. State Of Punjab A Punjab Air ir 2014 S.C. 241. 16 1998 Cr.Lj 3694 (P&H) 17 Ibid. 18 Mungeshwarprasad Chaurasia v. Chaurasia v. State Of Bihar 2002 2002 Cr LJ 3505 (S.C.) 15


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prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case presumption operates. But prosecution failed to do so. If alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb mental equilibrium for the women concerned, it would be of no consequence. 19 (¶14.) Cruelty soon before death for demand for dowry is necessary constituents without which the offence is not complete.20In case of Kaliayaperumal v. State of Tamil Nadu 21specifically said

“such cruelty or harassment was committed soon before her death” the expression ‘soon before her death’ has to be accorded its appropriate meaning in the facts and circumstances of a given case. In present case there was huge party given by given by Sharma’s. Whole family was happy for baby girl and celebrating the birth of baby girl. Thus given fact and circumstances shows that there was no cruelty “soon before her death”. 1.5 THE CHAIN OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IS INCOMPLETE

v. State of Maharashtra 22, there in, while (¶15.) In case of Sharadbirdhi Chand Sarda v. dealing with circumstantial evidence, it has been held that onus on the prosecution to prove that the chain is complete and the infirmity or lacuna in prosecution cannot be cured by false defense or plea. In the present case, nowhere from the facts of the case, it is derived that such a chain of circumstantial evidence exist. There were huge celebrations by the accused for the birth of the baby girl. Also, they rescued the deceased and took her h er to the hospital as earliest earlies t as possible. 1.6 PRESUMPTION UNDER SECTION 113B, INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT 1872 (¶16.) In order to establish the offence u/s 304B, IPC, the prosecution is obliged to prove that

the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances and such death occurs within 7 years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband. Such harassment and cruelty must be made in connection with any demand for dowry. 23

19

Kameshpanjiyar v. v. State Of Bihar 2005 2005 Cr LJ 1418 (SC); Naryanamurty v. Naryanamurty v. State Of Karnataka (2008) 16 SCC 512. 20 Bajrang v. v. State Of Rajasthan, Rajasthan , 1998 Cr LJ 134 (Raj). 21 AIR SCW 4387. 22 AIR 1984 SC 1622. 23 Hem Chand v. State Of Haryana (1994) Haryana (1994) 3 Crimes (SC); State Of Karnataka v. Karnataka v. MV MV Manjunathegowda 2003 Manjunathegowda 2003 I AD 601 (SC).


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(¶17.) Also, it is pertinent to note that this presumption can only be raised only on proof of

the following essentials which means that the presumption can be raised only if the accused is being tried for the offence u/s 304B IPC. Also in the present case, Trial court acquitted all the accused under the charges of 304B. Therefore, it could be said that the deceased was not being ill- treated or harassed with cruelty on account of dowry. (¶18.) In the case of Durga of Durga Parsad v. State v. State of MP 24, court held that if the requirements of §

304B of IPC and § 113-B 113- B of IEA can’t be satisfied by the prosecution, accused must be acquitted. In the matter present before the Court it is distinguishable from the above cited facts and circumstances that the entire three requisite to form an evident case of dowry death cannot be established. Also from various cases cited and facts provided, the respondents have tried to disprove the various allegations of cruelty and demands of dowry. Since it has been established that the accused are not guilty u/s 304-B, there can be no presumption of dowry death by the Court against the accused u/s 113B. 25 v. state of Madhya Pradesh 26 court held that there must be a (¶19.) In case of Yashoda v. proximate link between the t he act of cruelty along with the demand of dowry and death of the victim. But in present case there was neither cruelty nor demand of dowry. Where there is no evidence that the wife was subjected to cruelty or harassment soon before her death, the husband or his relative would not be convicted on the charge of dowry death u/s 304B, IPC. Conviction of husband was set aside. 27 (¶20.) Evidence was lacking to show that the appellants, mother in law and father in law

inflicted cruelty in connection with the demand of dowry soon before death. The two accused were acquitted of offence u/s 304B, IPC. 28 (¶21.) According to the facts and provision stated it can be easily be construed that there was

lack of the evidence to show that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment for the demand of dowry, soon before her death. Hence, it is humbly submitted bef ore bef ore the Hon’ble court that the conviction of the accused should be set aside.

24

2010 Cr.LJ 3419 Section 113B, Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 26 (2004) 3 SCC 98 27 Jatashankarsah v. Jatashankarsah v. State Of Bihar 2013 2013 Cr LJ 1992(Pat). 28 Mool Chand v. State Of Rajasthan 2012 Rajasthan 2012 Cr LJ (NOC) 228 (Raj.)(DB). 25


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II. THAT THE ACTS

OF IN-LAWS

DO NOT AMOUNT TO CRUELTY UNDER SECTION 498A,

IPC. (¶22.) It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that in the context

of given facts and circumstances it is evident that there was a no substantial cruelty by the appellants. (¶23.) In order to prove the offence u/s 498A the following ingredients must be fulfilled:

1. The women must be married 2. She must be subjected to cruelty or harassment & 3. Such cruelty of harassment must have been shown either by husband of the woman or by the relative of her husband.29 (¶24.) In this present case only the first ingredient of § 498A of IPC has been fulfilled as the

deceased and Mr. Sunil Sharma got married on 12.10.2012. The other two ingredients are not fulfilled, as the deceased had never been subjected to cruelty, neither mental nor physical by the husband or his relatives. There has never been any demand for dowry from the deceased by the in-laws, rather at the time of the marriage, the father of the deceased happily and wilfully gave ‘stridhan’ to his daughter, which does not come under the ambit of dowry. Mere unhappiness in the matrimonial life, pushing the wife to commit suicide, will not attract § 498A, IPC 30.

(¶25.) Ingredients of 'cruelty' as contemplated u/s 498A, IPC are of much higher and sterner

degree than the ordinary concept of cruelty applicable and available for the purposes of dissolution of marriage i.e. Divorce. 31 The High Court of Bombay has also taken the same view in the case of Sarla Prabhakar Waghmare v. State Of Maharashtra

32

observing that

every kind of harassment or cruelty would not attract § 498A. It must be established that the beating and harassment to fulfil the illegal demands of the husband or her in-laws, in-la ws, forced the wife to commit suicide. (¶26.) In the instant case, it is evident from the facts that the comments passed by the mother

in-law were not at all with an intention to force the deceased to commit suicide. The Supreme 29

K.D GAUR, COMMENTARY ON THE INDIAN PENAL CODE 1428 ( 2d Ed. 2013). Thangappandian v. Thangappandian v. State By State By Deputy Superintendent Of Police, Mettur, (1998) Cr LJ 993 (Mad). 31 Savitri Devi v Devi v.. Ramesh Chand And Ors, Ors , 2003 Cr. LJ 2759. 32 1990 Cr.L.J. 407 30


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Court has also taken a similar view in the case of State Of Maharashtra v. Ashok Chotelal Shukla33, observing that the prosecution has to establish that the accused committed acts of harassment or cruelty as contemplated by § 498A, and such harassment or cruelty must be the cause forcing the wife to commit suicide. What can be deduced from this authority is that a solitary incident cannot be interpreted to be the sufficient evidence of cruelty or harassment attracting § 498A, IPC. In the above stated s tated case, cas e, incessant, persistent and sufficiently grave cruelty which is likely to drive the woman to a point of desperation that she is left with no other option but to commit suicide, was absent. Cruelty or harassment must be unabated, continuous or recurring & unbearable, one or two incidents casually taking place, May therefore, attract another penal provision of The Indian Penal Code, but will not attract § 498A, IPC. What is further necessary may be elucidated. 34 (¶27.) There may be innumerable instances where an emotional lady may commit suicide, the t he

moment a word is uttered in anger or in haste. But cruelty contemplates the conduct of the inlaws who intentionally cause harassment to drive the wife to commit suicide or to cause injury to her life, limb, etc. In the absence of any such circumstances, it is difficult to comprehend that such conduct of the in-laws amounts to cruelty as defined u/s 498A, IPC. 35 (¶28.) It may be considered cruelty under the Hindu Marriage Act as held by the Supreme

Court in the case of Shobha of Shobha Rani v. Rani v. Madhukar Madhukar Reddi36. The Apex Court observed that cruelty u/s 498A, IPC is distinct from the cruelty under the Hindu Marriage Act which entitles the wife to get a decree for dissolution of marriage.37 In Smt. Raj Rani v. State (Delhi Administration)38 , the , the Court held that while considering the case of cruelty in the context of the provisions of § 498A, IPC, the court must examine that allegations/accusations must be of a very grave nature and should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. (¶29.) Also, "cruelty" has to be understood having a specific statutory meaning provided

in § 498A, IPC and there should be a case of continuous state of affairs of torture by one to another. In the present case, it is not at all evident from the facts that the woman has been subjected to cruelty continuously/persistently or at least in close proximity of time of lodging the complaint. Petty quarrels cannot be termed as `cruelty' to attract the provisions of §

33

(1997) 11 SCC 26 Indrasing M. Raol v. v. State Of Gujarat , (2000) DMC 239. 35 Smt. Sumangala v Sumangala v.. Laxminarayan Anant Hegde And Anr., 2003 Cr LJ 1418 36 1988 AIR 121 37 Raj Kumar Khanna v. Khanna v. The State (Nct State (Nct Of Delhi), 2002 DLT 147. 38 AIR 2000 SC 3559 34


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498A, IPC. 39 The standards adopted under Clause (a) of Explanation to § 498A, IPC as to what conduct is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide cannot obviously be the standards of a reasonably prudent person. The instinct to survive is so primary and basic in life that no conduct can be reckoned as likely to drive an ordinarily prudent person to commit suicide. For an ordinarily prudent human being, it is possible to reasonably assume that he is not likely to commit suicide, whatever is the adversity. He would battle to get over and surmount the adversity. No conduct can hence be objectively calibrated as conduct likely to drive an ordinarily prudent woman to commit suicide. (¶30.) The Legislature, it appears to me, had alertly and consciously used the expression "the

woman" and not "a woman" or "a reasonably prudent woman". Expression "the woman" used in Clause (a) of the explanation must certainly suggest that the standards of the woman in question have to be adopted while considering whether the conduct impugned was likely to drive the staid woman to commit suicide.40 The conduct of in-laws in the present case cannot be said as the conduct likely to drive an ordinarily ordinarily prudent woman to commit suicide. (¶31.) It is only wilful conduct, with intention to cause physical torture or mental agony to a

woman in married life would amount to cruelty to hold the person responsible guilty of an offence.41 To establish the offence u/s 498A, IPC the prosecution has to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the husband or his relative has subjected the victim to cruelty as defined in clauses (a) and (b) of the explanation to § 498A, IPC. 42 Where no specific particulars regarding time, place and manner of any beating, cruelty or harassment of the deceased for demand for dowry were given, the accused were acquitted of the charge u/s 498A.43 (¶32.) In the present case there is no evidence to show that the deceased has been subjected to

cruelty and harassment prior to her death, which compelled the deceased to commit suicide. The parents of the deceased did not lodge any police complaint about the alleged demand and torture for the same but filed the complaint only after the death of their daughter. Simply because the accused husband and relatives rel atives in past used to quarrel, by itself is not sufficient to 39

Manju Ram Kalita v. State Of Assam On Assam On 29 May, 2009 Murali V. Murali V. State Of Kerala, Kerala , 2006 DMC 589 41 Ram Vishnu Vish nu Gupta And 2 Ors. Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Pradesh , 1999 DMC 489; See Also Pyarelal v. State of Haryana, Haryana, (1997) 2 SCC 552; Kanchi 552; Kanchi Ramachandra v. State of A.P ., ., 1995 (Supp.) 4 SCC119; Viralu v. Viralu v. State of A.P ., ., 1998 Vol.3 Crimes 549. 40

42

IS Bind v. v. State of Gujarat 2013 2013 (125) AIC 102, P. 103. Jalam v. State of MP 2014 Cr LJ 360 (MP); See Also Satya Narayan And Anr v. State State 2003 Cr LJ 1228 (Bom) (DB); Sunkara Suri Babu v. Babu v. State Of Andhra Pradesh Cr Pradesh Cr LJ 1480 (AP). 43


PAGE 22


attract the provisions of section 498A, IPC. 44 In case of State of Himachal Pradesh v. Yog Raj45, even if the accused has demanded Rs 15000 from his wife to be brought from her parents, it will not bring the case within the ambit of § § 498A, IPC, in the absence of evidence that she was being treated with cruelty on account of such demand. (¶33.) Even mere harassment or mere demand for dowry for property etc. is not cruelty. It is

only when the harassment is shown to have been caused for coercing a woman to meet demand that it amounts to cruelty which has been made punishable under the secti on46. (¶34.) It has been consistently held by the Supreme Court that one or two instances of

demand are not sufficient for proving the offence of cruelty. In order to prove said offence it has to be established that there was consistent harassment and ill treatment over a considerable time so that it amounts to cruelty within the meaning of explanation u/s 498A 47. In the present case there is no such evidence and the case was registered only after the death of Amrita. There is neither any specificity in the allegations levelled against the appellants nor are they in equation with the point of time. (¶35.) There is no evidence on record to show that the deceased was subjected subjec ted to cruelty soon

before her death. It is i s submitted that the requirement of proof soon before her death is very essential in proving the offence of dowry death. In the case of Kunhiaabdulla v. v. State of Kerala48 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that there must be existence of approximate and live link between a fact of cruelty based based on the dowry demand and concerned death. If alleged incident of cruelty is remote enough and has become stale enough not to disturb mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence. 49 (¶36.) In the present case it is alleged that as the deceased did not beget children, the accused

harassed the deceased by calling her a barren woman. In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Kalidindi Sahadevudu 50, it was held that mere commenting that the deceased was not begetting children, does not amount to subjecting the deceased deceas ed to cruelty within the meaning of § 498A, IPC. This shows that there was no cruelty from the side of Sharma’s family.

44

Ravan Balu Indalkar v. v. State Of Maharahtra, Maharahtra , 2012 Bomcr (Cri) 106. 1997 Cr LJ 2033 (HP) (DB). 46 Lokesh Kaushik &Ors. &Ors. v. State, SC State, SC On 28 th April, 2009. 47 Section 498A, Indian Penal Code. 48 AIR 2004 SC 1731. 49 Kamlesh Panjiyar v. v. State of Bihar , AIR 2005 SC 785. 50 2012 Cr LJ 2302 (AP). 45


PAGE 23


(¶37.) In the recent judgment of Rajesh Kumar v. v. State of Bihar 51 it has been held that a

general tendency of roping all the relations has developed. Court also held that there is misuse of the provisions of § § 498A, IPC and so there is a need to circumspect and arrest in such cases should not be made in routine matter. In the present case no specific overt acts are attributed to the husband, father-in-law or the mother-in-law and therefore their conviction by the Hon’ble High Court is not sustainable and is required to be set aside. Also, in the case Kans Raj v. State of Punjab 52 , it was observed that the in-laws of the deceased woman could not be roped in, just because they were close relatives. The overt-acts which are attributed to them would require to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. (¶38.) It is humbly submitted that the provisions of § 498A of IPC are not a law for taking

revenge, seeking recovery of dowry or for forcing a divorce, but a penal provision to punish the wrongdoers. There was no allegation of any kind of physical torture. The evidence with regard to cruelty was absolutely sketchy and not convincing. 53 This section was intended for the protection of married women from unscrupulous husbands but is cle arly misused by a few women; again this is strictly condemned in Saritha v. R. v. R. Ramachandran. 54 (¶39.) In case of Kans Kans Raj v. State of Punjab 55, the apex court observed as: “For the fault of

the husband the in-laws or other relatives cannot in all cases be held to be involved. The acts attributed to such persons have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and they cannot be held responsible by mere conjectures and implications. The tendency to rope in relatives of the husband as accused has to be curbed”. curbed” . (¶40.) It is humbly submitted before the Honourable SC of India that the accused are not

guilty of cruelty as mere asking for property does not make it dowry demand and taunting for not begetting child is not covered under cruelty as discussed u/s 498A of IPC. The deceased has never lodged any complaint against the accused in the past seven years and two months which shows that she was very happy in her in-laws house and never faced any cruel treatment.

51

(2013) 4 SCC 690. 2000 CR LJ 2993. 53 Ghusabhai Risangbhai Chorasiya v. Chorasiya v. State of Gujrat , AIR 2015 SC 2670, 2015 Cr LJ 3613. 54 (2003) DMC 37. 55 Kans Raj v. Raj v. State of Punjab, Punjab , 2000 CriLJ 2993. 52


PAGE 24


III. THAT THERE WAS NO DEMAND OF DOWRY AS TO ATTRACT CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 4 OF DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT, 1961. (¶41.) It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that in the context

of the given facts and circumstances it is evident that there was no substantial demand of dowry from the in-laws of deceased. Section 2 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 gives Definition of "dowry". (¶42.) In this Act, "dowry" means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be

given either directly or indirectly(a) By one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or (b) By the parents of either party to a marriage or by a other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person; At or before or after the marriage us consideration for the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies.56 (¶43.) There was no such demand from in-laws in- laws of the deceased as they didn’t demand a

single penny from Mr. Gupta. Mr. Gupta had given her daughter some cash, jewelry and land in form of stridhan stridhan and they had given it without any force. There is a lot of difference between dowry and stridhan stridhan.. § 2, DPA, 1961, specifically says ‘’given or agreed to be given’’. In the present case Mr. Gupta and Mr. Sharma did not give or agreed to give any property or valuable security in consideration for marriage. “Stridhana”” literally means the “woman’s property”. According to the (¶44.) The term “Stridhana Smritika, the Stridhana constituted Stridhana constituted those properties which she received by way of gifts from her relatives, which included mostly movable property such as ornaments, jewellery, dresses. Sometimes even land or property or even houses were given as gifts. The purpose behind deeming deeming properties as “Stridhana “ Stridhana”” was to ensure that "The woman" had full right over its disposal or alienation. On her death, all types of Stridhana of Stridhana,, devolved upon her heirs. But it had been misused by Mr. Gupta and Mr. Gupta falsely said to the police that there was dowry demand by her in laws. In case of Nunna Venkateswarlu Alias v. The State of Andhra

56

Section 2, The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.


PAGE 25


Pradesh57 court ruled that demand of Stridhana made Stridhana made is also not dowry as defined u/s 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. (¶45.) In the case of Kailash Vati v. Ayodhya v. Ayodhya Prakash, 58 Chief Justice Sandhawalia, while

recognizing the distinction between stridhana stridhana and dowry, used both the words interchangeably as if one meant the other .He opined as follows: “The Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 does not bar traditional giving of presents at or about the time of wedding. Thus such presents or dowry given by the parents is therefore not at all within the definition of the statute”. (¶46.) He further went on to state that:

“Law as it stands today visualizes a complete and f ull ull ownership of her individual property by a Hindu wife and in this context the factum of marriage marria ge is of little litt le or no relevance and she can own and possess property in the same manner as a Hindu male Once it is held that a Hindu wife can own property in her own right , then it is purely a question of fact whether the dowry or traditional presents given to her, were to be individually owned by her or had been gifted to the husband alone. Once it is found that as a fact that these articles of dowry were so given to her individually and in her own right, then I am unable to see how the mere factum of marriage would alter any such property right and divest her of ownership either totally or partially”. (¶47.) A demand for money on account of some financial stringency or for meeting some

urgent domestic expenses cannot be termed as a demand for dowry as the said word is normally understood. 59 The evidence adduced by the prosecution does not; therefore, show that any demand for "dowry" as defined in § 2, DPA, 1961 was made by the appellants as what was asked for was some land for expanding their business. In Hakim Singh v. State of Punjab 60 , dowry and stridhan has stridhan has been distinguished and (¶48.) In Hakim held that concept of dowry has defined under Section 2 61 is wider that the concept of stridhan, stridhan, while dowry signifies presents given in connection with marriage to the bridal couple as well as other, stridhan other, stridhan is is confined to the property given to or meant for the bride.

57

1996Cr LJ 108 (1977)79 P.L.R. 216(F.B.) 59 Ashok Kumar v. v. State of Haryana AIR Haryana AIR 2010 SC 2839. 60 Hakim Singh v. State of Punjab, Punjab , 1989 Ch Cr C (HC) 484 (P&H) 61 Section 2, Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 58


PAGE 26


(¶49.) With regard to the allegation of demand of a car and fixed deposit, no evidence has

been presented by the prosecution to substantiate s ubstantiate the same 62. Any demand of any property or valuable security after the performance of marriage which demand had not been made at the time of settlement of marriage would not constitute dowry. 63 (¶50.) In a case it was held that the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 does not, in any way, bar

the giving of presents at or about the time of wedding, which may be willing and affectionate gifts by parents and close relations of the bride to her. 64 (¶51.) Also, Mayne in his book ‘ Hindu Law And Usage’ said that: “The whole body of such a

family, consisting of males and female some of the members of which are coparceners, that is, persons who on partition would be entitled to demand a share while others are only entitled to maintenance.”65 (¶52.) Hindu undivided family’s meaning is given by Sir Dinshah Mulla in his book

Principles of Hindu Law in these words; “A joint Hindu family consists of all persons lineally descended fr om fr om a common ancestor, and includes their wives and unmarried daughters.” 66 (¶53.) This shows wife is the integral part of family. So while being the part of the family the

in-laws in-laws just asked for some help from the deceased and she denied so ‘’just asking’’ cannot amounts to dowry. As the court, in case of Appasaheb of Appasaheb and Anr Anr . v. State of Maharashtra 67 that a demand for money on account of some financial stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic expenses or for purchasing manure cannot be termed as a demand for dowry as the said word is normally understood. This Court held that being a penal provision Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 will have to be construed strictly. (¶54.) In the present case, the appellants never made any unlawful demand from Amrita or

her relatives. They merely asked for help for expanding the family business, which Amrita being the family member was morally bound to do. Moreover, they did not make any demand at the time of the marriage. Had there been any wrongful intentions, the appellants would 62

Factsheet, ¶7 Factsheet, ¶7 Harban Singh v. Gurcharan Kaur, 1990 Cr LJ 1591; See also, Sankar Prasad Shaw v. State of West Bengal, 1991 Cr LJ 639 , Inder Sain v. The State (del), 1981 Cr LJ 1116, Balasaheb Annappa Whagmare v. State of Maharashtra , (1998) 1 DMC 249 . 64 Vinod Kumar Sethi v. State of Punjab , AIR , AIR 1982 P&H 372 (FB) 65 MAYNE, HINDU LAW A ND USAGE 304-305 (10 ed. 1938) 66 SIR DINSHAH MULLA, PRINCIPLES OF HINDU LAW 230 (7 th ed.). 67 AIR 2007 SC 763 63


PAGE 27


have made a demand while the marriage was taking place Even definition of dowry in § 2 of DPA, 1961 makes it clear that dowry has to be in connection with the marriage and where there is no connection between the demand and marriage, the same will not fall within the definition of dowry. Hence, demand for dowry is not established, the conviction of the appellants cannot be sustained.

-PRAYER -

Wherefore, in the light of the facts stated, issues raised, authorities cited and arguments advanced, it is most humbly prayed and implored before the Honourable Court, that it may be graciously pleased to adjudge and declare that: 1. The judgement of High Court is not valid


PAGE 28


2. The accused must be acquitted from all the charges.

And Pass any other Order, Direction, or Relief that it may deem fit in the Best Interests of Justice, Fairness, Equity & Good Conscience. For This Act of Kindness, the Appellant Shall Duty Bound Forever Pray.

(Respectfully (Respectfully Submitted) -COUNSELS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELANTS(______________)

s/d s/d


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1st National Moot Court Competition Appelants (Accused)

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