1_Political_and_International_Law.pdf

DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW Lasallian Commission on Bar Operations 2018

POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW Justice Del Castillo Castillo Digests

Chel Sy

Tet Valeza

Nolan Domingo

LCBO Chairperson

Academic Affairs Chairperson

Constitutional Law I Subject Head

LCBO Vice Chair for Internals

Janine Tutanes Rod Zantua

Martin Villadolid

Steph Griar

Academic Affairs Deputy Chairpersons

LCBO Vice Chair for Externals

Borgy Gavina

Pat Costales

Political and International Law Chairperson

Law on Administrative Agencies and Election Law Subject Head

Iris Yap

Sam Loyola

Political and International Law Deputy Chairperson

Law on Local Governments Subject Head

Nico Garcia

Jesse Solis

LCBO Executive Secretary

Ces Naga LCBO Executive Treasurer

Constitutional Law II Subject Head

Cha De Vera Public International Law Subject Head

Dane Chua Anna Rae De Guia Tetel Guillermo Bianca Tolentino Ivan Valcos Political and International Law Digest Team Members

Political and International Law

Justice Del Castillo Dig ests

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS CONSIDERATIONS LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ENRIQUE LIVIOCO G.R. No. 170685| 22 September 2010 Eminent Domain DOCTRINE: For purposes of just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking. There are three important concepts in this definition the character of the property, its price, and the time of actual taking.

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Respondent Enrique Livioco (Livioco) was the owner of sugarland located in Mabalacat, Pampanga. He offered his sugarland to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for acquisition under the CARP at P30.00 per square meter, for a total of P9,189,870.00. The DAR referred Livioco’s offer to the Land Bank of the Philippines for valuation. Livioco was then informed of the valuation valuat ion and that the cash portion of the claim proceeds have been “kept in trust pending his submission submission of ownership documents.” It appears, however, that Livioco did not act upon the notices given by both agencies. LBP issued a certification to the Register of o f Deeds of Pampanga as compensation for Livioco’s sugarland. It was only after two years that Livioco requested for a revaluation of the compensation on the ground that it has already appreciated from the time it was wa s offered for sale. The request was denied by the DAR Director on the ground that there was already a perfected sale. The DAR proceeded to take possession of Livioco’s property. The DAR awarded Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) covering c overing Livioco’s property prope rty to 26 farmer-beneficiaries. farmer-beneficiaries. Livioco filed separate complaints to cancel the CLOAs and to recover his property but the same proved to be futile. Unable to recover his property but unwilling to accept what he believes is an outrageously low valuation of his property, Livioco filed for a determination of just compensation against the DAR, LBP, and CLOA holders before the RTC of Angeles City. He maintained that the area where his property is located has become predominantly predominantly residential, hence, he should be paid fo r his property’s value as s uch.

ISSUE: Whether or not the determination of just compensation was proper HELD: No, it is reminded to adhere strictly to the doctrine that just compensation must be valued at the time of taking. The time of taking is the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic. The lower courts erred in ruling that the character or use of the property has changed from agricultural to residential because there is no allegation or proof that the property was approved for conversion to other uses by the DAR. It is the DAR that is mandated by law to evaluate and to approve land use conversion to prevent fraudulent evasion from the agrarian reform cover age. As to the price of the property, we find that LBP did not sufficiently substantiate its valuation. While LBP insists that it strictly followed the statutory provision and its relevant implementing guidelines in arriving at its valuation, v aluation, the Court notes the lack of evidence to prove the veracity of LBPs claims. LBP merely submitted its computation to the court without any evidence on record, whether documentary or testimonial, that would support the correctness of the values or data used in such computation. •

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DOH v. PHIL. PHARMAWEALTH, INC. G.R. No. 182358 | 20 February 2013 State Immunity DOCTRINE: As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if it consents, either expressly or impliedly, then it be the subject of a suit. There is implied consent when the state “enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation.” However, However, it must be clarified that when a state enters into a contract, it does not automatically mean that it has waived its non-suability. “Public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith.”

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In line with a Memorandum providing for a list of categories of sanctions to be imposed on accredited government suppliers of pharmaceutical products in case of adverse findings regarding their products (e.g. substandard, e.g. substandard, fake, or misbranded) or violations committed by them during their accreditation, the Department of Health (DOH_ invited accredited drug companies, including Phil Pharma, to a meeting. The meeting appraised the drug companies that some of t heir products are Violative Products unfit for human consumption. The companies were then directed to submit, within 10 days, their respective explanation on the adverse findings on the Report. Phil Pharma, instead of submitting an explanation, sent a letter informing DOH Under-Secretary (USec) that their lawyers are preparing the corresponding reply. USec replied telling them that their letter is “untenable” and informed them that its accreditation has been suspended for two years. Phil Pharma questioned the suspension by filing a Complaint mainly seeking to nullify various DOH Memorandums, with a prayer for damages against DOH USecs, alleging, among others, that there was an undue suspension of its accreditation, which warrants damages. DOH moved to dismiss claiming that the case was one against the State. RTC: Dismissed. The principle of state immunity from suit is applicable. The case is one instituted against the State CA: Reversed: by filing a motion to dismiss, DOH is deemed to have hypothetically admitted the allegations in the complaint, which state that they were being sued in their individual capacities, negating their claim that the case is an unauthorized suit against the State.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case be dismissed for being a suit against the State? T his immunity may be waived by way of an express HELD: Yes, as a general rule, a state may not be sued. This or implied consent to be sued. There is express consent when a law, either special or general, so provides; there is implied consent when the state “enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation.” However, it must be clarified that when a state enters into a contract, it does not automatically mean that it has waived its non-suability. non-suability. The State “will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non -suability [only] if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. [However,] when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity[,] xx x no such waiver may be implied. ”Statutory provisions waiving [s]tate immunity are construed in strictissimi juris. juris . For, waiver of immunity is in derogation of sovereignty .” The DOH can validly invoke state immunity because it is an unincorporated agency, which performs sovereign/governmental functions. It has neither sued nor consented to be sued. If a Complaint seeks to “impose a charge or financial liability against the state,” the defense of non-suability may be properly

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invoked. The doctrine of state immunity extends its protective mantle to complaints filed against state officials for acts done in the discharge and performance of their duties. “Public “Public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith.”

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 190582| 8 April 2010 Party-List System DOCTRINE: The crucial element in party-list registration is whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941 that the party-list is indeed marginalized and underrepresented.

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Ang Ang Ladla Ladladd is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). They applied for accreditation before the COMELEC but was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial s ubstantial membership base. Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and underrepresented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation COMELEC dismissed the petition on moral grounds. Ang Ang Ladl Ladlad ad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant An grant Angg Ladl Ladlad ad’’s application for accreditation. Ang Ang Ladlad Ladlad argued argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation. The COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for for the the firs firstt time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC’ COMELEC’s field personnel.

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC should s hould grant petitioner’s application for registration Bayani does not stand for the proposition that only those sectors HELD: Yes, the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani does specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. The enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive. A cursory perusal of An of Angg Ladla Ladladd’s initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group. We find that An that Angg Ladl Ladlad ad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELECs moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, •

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nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that An that Angg Ladl Ladlad ad is is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Ang Bag Bagon ongg Bayan Bayanii.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT NAZARENO ET AL v. CITY OF DUMAGUETE G.R. No. 181559 | 2 October 2009 Midnight Appointments DOCTRINE: Appointments (midnight appointment) are banned prior to the elections to ensure that partisan loyalties will not be a factor in the appointment process, and to prevent incumbents from gaining any undue advantage during the elections. The exception is when it will be shown that the appointments have undergone the regular screening process, that the appointee is qualified, that there is a need to fill up the vacancy immediately, and that the appointments are not in bulk.

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Dumaguete City Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo sought re-election in May 2001 elections but lost to respondent Mayor Agustin R. Perdices. A few weeks before the end of his term, outgoing Mayor Remollo promoted 15 city hall employees, and regularized another 74 city hall employees, including the herein 52 petitioners. When he assumed office, Mayor Perdices publicly announced that he would not honor the appointments made by former Mayor Remollo. On the same day, he instructed the City Administrator, respondent Dominador Dumalag, Jr., to refrain from making any cash disbursements for payments of petitioners' salary differentials based on their new positions. Petitioners filed a Petition for Mandamus with Injunction and Damages with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order against the City of Dumaguete. They sought to enjoin respondents from taking any action or issuing any orders nullifying their appointments. The CSC Field Office in Dumaguete City revoked and invalidated the appointments of the petitioners. Pertinent portions of the findings are the following: 1. There was only only one meeting meeting of the Personnel Selection Board Board (PSB) held to consider the number of appointments and no PSB statements certifying that there was actual screening and evaluation done on all candidates for each position. 2. The 89 appointments appointments were were all issued after the elections and when the new city mayor was about to assume office. 3. The rationale against against the prohibition prohibition on the issuance issuance of "midnight "midnight appointments" appointments" by the President is applicable to appointments extended by outgoing local chief executives immediately before and/or after the elections.

ISSUE: Whether or not the mass appointments are valid HELD: No, this case is a typical example of the practice of outgoing local chief executives to issue "midnight" appointments, especially after their successors have been proclaimed. It does not only cause animosities between the outgoing and the incoming officials, but also affects efficiency in local governance. Those appointed tend to devote their time and energy in defending their appointments instead of attending to their functions. Not all appointments issued after the elections by defeated officials are invalid. However, it must be shown that the appointments have undergone the regular screening process, that the appointee is qualified, that there is a need to fill up the vacancy immediately, and that the appointments are not in bulk.

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Here, there was only one en banc banc meeting of the city PSB to consider the appointments, without any evidence that there were any deliberations on the qualifications of the petitioners, or any indication that there was an urgent need for the immediate issuance of such appointments. The absence of evidence showing careful consideration of the merits of each appointment, and the timing and the number of appointments, militate against petitioners’ cause. On the contrary, the prevailing circumstances in this case indicate that the appointments were hurriedly issued by the outgoing administration.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT MAMBA ET AL v. LARA ET AL G.R. No. 165109 | 14 December 2009 Concepts of the Judicial Department DOCTRINE: A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that the public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid i nvalid or unconstitutional law.

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The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan passed a resolution authorizing Governor Edgar R. Lara to engage the services of and appoint Preferred Ventures Corporation as financial advisor or consultant for the issuance and flotation of bonds to fund the priority projects of the governor without cost and commitment. They also ratified the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) entered into b y Gov. Lara and Preferred Ventures Corporation which provides that the provincial government of Cagayan shall pay Preferred Ventures Ventures Corporation a one-time fee of 3% of the amount of bonds floated. Subsequently, Subsequently, the majority ma jority of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan approved to use the bond flotation to fund the construction and development of the new Cagayan Town Center. Gov. Lara issued the Notice of Award to Asset Builders Corporation, giving to the latter the planning, design, construction and site development of the town center project for a fee of ₱213,795,732.39 Petitioners Manuel N. Mamba, Raymund P. Guzman and Leonides N. Fausto filed a Petition for Annulment of Contracts and Injunction with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the respondents (Gov. Lara et al.). However, the RTC dismissed their petition on the grounds that the 1) petitioners are not the th e proper parties or they lack locus standi in court; 2) the action is barred by the rule on state immunity from suit; and 3) the issues raised are not justiciable questions but purely political.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have locus standi to standi to file the petition. HELD: Yes, the petitioners have legal standing to sue as taxpayers. For a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two requisites must be met: (1) Public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated, or some irregularity is committed, and (2) The petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act. In this case, although the construction of the town center would be primarily sourced from the proceeds of the bonds, which respondents insist are not taxpayer’s money, a government support in the amount of ₱187 million would still be spent for paying the interest of the bonds. Records also show that the governor requested the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to appropriate an amount of ₱25 million for the interest of the bond. Clearly, the first requisite has been met.

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As to the second requisite, the court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent "direct injury test" bearing in mind that locus standi is a procedural technicality. By invoking "transcendental importance", "paramount "paramount public interest", or "far-reaching implications", ordinary citizens citizens and taxpayers were allowed to sue even if they failed to show direct injury. In cases where serious legal issues were raised or where public expenditures of millions of pesos were involved, the court did not hesitate to give standing to taxpayers.

HADJI HASHIM ABDUL v. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 184496 | December 2, 2013 Concepts of Judicial Department DOCTRINE: Where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, and adjudication thereof would would be of no practical use or value as courts do not sit to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging.

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Abdul was first elected as municipal mayor of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur and re-elected for a second term. It was while serving his second term as municipal mayor when the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao filed an information charging him and Domado, with falsification of public documents, defined and penalized under Article 171(2) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). That they made it appear that Engr. Murad as Municipal Engineer prepared prepared and signed the Local Budget Preparation Form Nos. 152, 153 and 154 known as the Program Appropriation and Obligation by Object, Personnel Schedule and Functional Statement and General Objective, respectively, when in truth and in fact, as the accused well knew that said Zubair F. Murad was never employed as Municipal Engineer of the said Municipality, to the damage and prejudice of public interest which led to their suspension pendente lite. lite. Hence, he filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer Prayer for TRO alleging that the suspension order was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The suspension order, however, was no longer implemented because it was superseded by the expiration of Abdul’s second term as municipal mayor and his unsuccessful bid for re-election during the May 2004 election. During the May 2007 election, Abdul emerged as the winner in the mayoralty race and again sat as Mayor of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur. Abdul called attention to Sandiganbayan’s pronouncement in its Resolution that his defeat in the election has effectively rendered his suspension moot and academic. Nonetheless, Sandiganbayan ordered anew the suspension of Abdul from his present position for a period of 90 days. Abdul moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in suspending him pendente lite from lite from his position as mayor of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur?

HELD: No, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for being moot and academic. In the present case, the acquittal of Abdul operates as a supervening event that mooted the present Petition. Any resolution on the validity or invalidity of the issuance of the order of suspension could no longer affect his rights as a ranking public officer, for legally speaking he did not commit the offense charged. Notwithstanding the mootness of the present Petition, he nevertheless implores us to make a clear and categorical resolution on whether the offense of falsification of public documents documents under Article 171 of the RPC is included in the term "fraud" as contemplated under Section 13 of RA 3019.

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As earlier quoted, to warrant the suspension of a public officer under the said Section 13, he must be charged with an offense (1) under RA 3019, or (2) under Title Seven, Book II of the RPC, or (3) involving fraud upon government or public funds or property. Admittedly, Abdul in this case was not charged under RA 3019. Neither was he charged under under Title Seven, Book II of the RPC as the crime of of falsification of public documents under Article 171 of the RPC is covered by Title Four, 26 Book II thereof. Since vouchers are official documents signifying a cash outflow from government coffers, falsification thereof invariably involves fraud upon public funds. In fine, we reiterate that the t he issue on the validity or invalidity of petitioner’s suspension had mooted considering his acquittal by the Sandiganbayan. As such, there is no justiciable controversy for this Court to adjudicate.

MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC. v. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE G.R. No. 175356 |December 3, 2013 Concepts of Judicial Department DOCTRINE: When a party challenges the constitutionality of a law, the burden of proof rests r ests upon him. FACTS: •

In 1992, RA 7432 was passed into law, granting senior citizens c itizens the following privileges: SECTION 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. – The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following: a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to utilization of transportation services, hotels and similar lodging establishment[s], establishment[s], restaurants and recreation centers and purchase of medicine anywhere in the country: Provided, That private establishments may claim the cost as tax credit;b) a minimum of twenty percent (20%) discount on admission fees charged by theaters, cinema houses and concert halls, circuses, carnivals and other similar places of culture, leisure, and amusement;c) exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: Provided, That their annual taxable income does not exceed the property level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year;d) exemption from training fees for socioeconomic programs undertaken by the OSCA as part of its work;e) free medical and dental services in government establishment[s] anywhere in the country, subject to guidelines to be issued by the Department of Health, the the Government Service Insurance System and the Social Security System;f) to the extent practicable and feasible, the continuance of the same benefits and privileges given by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Social Security System (SSS) and PAG-IBIG, PAG-IBIG, as the case may be, as are enjoyed by those in actual service.

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To implement the tax provisions of RA 9257, the Secretary of Finance and the DSWD issued its own Rules and Regulations. Hence, this petition. Manila Memorial Park and La Funeraria Paz are not questioning the 20% discount granted to senior s enior citizens but are only assailing the constitutionality of the tax deduction scheme prescribed under RA 9257 and the implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF. Manila Memorial Park and La Funeraria Paz posit that the tax deduction scheme contravenes Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution, which provides that: "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." DSWD and DOF maintain that the tax deduction scheme is a legitimate exercise of the State’s po lice power.

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ISSUE: Whether the legally mandated 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power or eminent domain?

HELD: Yes, it is a valid exercise of police power. In conclusion, we maintain that the correct rule in determining whether the subject regulatory measure has amounted to a "taking" under the power of eminent domain is the one laid down in Alalayan v. National Power Corporation and followed in Carlos Superdurg Corporation consistent with long standing principles in police power and eminent domain analysis. Thus, the deprivation or reduction of profits or income. Gross sales must be clearly shown to be unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory. Under the specific circumstances of this case, such determination can only be made upon the presentation of competent proof which Manila Memorial and La Funeraria Paz failed to do. A law, which has been in operation for many years and promotes the welfare of a group accorded special concern by the Constitution, cannot and should not be summarily invalidated on a mere allegation that it reduces the profits or income/gross sales of business establishments.

EDCEL LAGMAN VS. MEDIALDEA G.R. No. 231658 | July 4, 2017 Judicial Power DOCTRINE: The judicial power to review the sufficiency of factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not extend to the calibration of the President’s decision of which among his graduated pow ers he will avail of in a given situation.

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President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in corpus in the whole of Mindanao on May 23, 2017 for a period not exceeding 60 days. The full text of Proclamation No. 216 includes the following: following: Proclamation No. 55 was issued on 04 September 2016 declaring a state of national emergency emergency o on account of lawless violence in Mindanao; o Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution provides that, “In “Incase case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he (the President) may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial martial law.” o Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6968, provides that , “the “the crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising and taking ar ms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives;” prerogatives ;” o Part of the reasons for the issuance of Proclamation No. 55 was the series of violent acts committed by the Maute terrorist group, such as the attack on the military outpost in Lanao del Sur in 2016, killing and wounding several soldiers, and the mass jailbreak in Marawi City in 2016, freeing their arrested comrades and other detainees; That on May 2017, the same Maute terrorist group has taken over a hospital in Marawi City, o established several checkpoints within the City, burned down certain government and private facilities and inflicted casualties on the part of Government forces, and started flying the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several areas, thereby openly attempting to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government this part of Mindanao and deprive

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the Chief Executive of his powers powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws laws of the land and to maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, constituting the c rime of rebellion; and o This recent attack shows the capability of the Maute group and other rebel groups to sow terror, and cause death and damage to property not only in Lanao del Sur but also in other parts of Mindanao. Three (3) Petitions were filed questioning the legality of the said declaration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitions are the “appropriate proceeding” covered by paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of review required by the Court.

HELD: YES. Unique features features of the t he third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII make it sui generis. - All 3 petitions may be taken cognizance by the Court, by virtue vir tue of par 3, Sec. 18, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the SC may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. - The jurisdiction of this Court under par 3 of Section 18, Article VII is sui generis. It is a special and specific jurisdiction of the Supreme Court different from those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. - The phrase “in an appropriate proceeding” proceeding” appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive’s emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court. Jurisdiction must be specifically conferred conferred by the Constitution Constitution or by law. - It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or by the law. Unless jurisdiction has been specifically conferred by the Constitution or by some legislative act, no body or tribunal has the power to act or pass upon a matter brought before it for resolution. It is likewise settled that in the absence of a clear legislative intent, jurisdiction jurisdiction cannot be implied from the language of the Constitution or a statute. It must appear clearly from the law or it will not be held to exist. - A plain reading of the afore-quoted Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants authority to the Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. “In an appropriate proceeding” does not refer to a petition for certiorari filed under Section 1 or 5 of Article VIII. - It could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the phrase “in an appropriate proceeding” would refer to a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII. The standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the performance of his or her functions. Thus, it is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension. It must be emphasized that under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President’s exercise of emergency powers. Put differently, if this Court applies the standard of review used in a petition for certiorari, the same would emasculate its constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII.

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Purpose/ significance of Section 18, Article VII is to constitutionalize the pre-Marcos martial law ruling in In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang. - Par 3, Section 18, Article VII was inserted by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to constitutionalize the pre-Marcos martial law ruling of this Court in In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang, to wit: that the factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political question but precisely within the ambit of judicial review. - “In determining the meaning, intent, and purpose of a law or constitutional provision, the his tory of the times out of which it grew and to which it may be rationally supposed to bear some direct relationship, the evils intended to be remedied, and the good to be accomplished are proper subjects of inquiry.” - Montenegro v. Castaneda: The authority to decide whether there is a state of rebellion requiring the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is lodged with the President and a nd his decision thereon is final and conclusive upon the courts. This ruling was initially reversed, but later reinstated in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, which ruled: According to the SC, the constitutional power of the President to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not subject to judicial inquiry. - Thus, by inserting Section 18 in Article VII which allows judicial review of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the framers of the 1987 Constitution in effect constitutionalized and reverted to the Lansang doctrine. Purpose of Section 18, Article VII is to provide additional safeguard against possible abuse by the President on the exercise of the extraordinary powers. - Section 18, Article VII is meant to provide additional safeguard against possible abuse by the President in the exercise of his power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Reeling from the aftermath of the Marcos martial law, the framers of t he Constitution deemed it wise to insert the now third paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII. This is clear from the records of the Constitutional Commission when its members were deliberating on whether the President could proclaim martial law even without the concurrence of Congress. Purpose of Section 18, Article VII is to t o curtail the extent of the powers of the President. - The most important objective, however, of Section 18, Article VII is the curtailment of the extent of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief. This is the primary reason why the provision was not placed in Article VIII or the Judicial Department but remained under Article VII or the Executive Department. - The executive power is vested in the President of the Philippines elected by the people for a six-year term with no reelection for the duration of his/her life. While W hile traditional powers inherent in the office of the President are granted, nonetheless for the first time, there are specific provisions which curtail the extent of such powers. Most significant s ignificant is the power of the Chief Executive to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or proclaim martial law. - The 1987 Constitution now provides that suspension of the privilege of the writ can be exercised only in 2 cases, invasion or rebellion when public safety demands it, only for a period not exceeding 60 days, and reserving to Congress the power to revoke such suspension or proclamation of martial law which congressional action may not be revoked by the President. More importantly, the action of the President is made subject to judicial review, thereby again discarding jurisprudence which renders the executive action a political question and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts to adjudicate.

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS CAPABLANCA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION G.R. No. 179370 | 18 July 2009 Powers and Functions of Each Constitutional Commission

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DOCTRINE: The Civil Civil Service Commission (“CSC”), (“CSC”) , as the t he central personnel agency of the Government, is mandated to establish a career service, to strengthen the merit and rewards system, and to adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency and integrity in the civil service.

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Eugenio Capablanca was appointed into the PNP with a rank of Police Officer 1 (PO1) with a temporary status. He took and passed both the PNP Entrance Exam conducted by NAPOLCOM and the Career Service Professional Exam – Computer Assisted Test (CSP) given by the t he CSC. Capablanca, thereafter, thereafter, was conferred with permanent status. About a year after being permanently appointed, appointed, Capablanca was informed about certain alleged irregularities relative to his CSP exam: both the picture and the signature in the Personal Data Sheet was different from the one appearing on the seat plan – these irregularities would constitute the offense of dishonesty if prima if prima facie evidence facie evidence is established. During the Preliminary Investigation, Capablanca moved to dismiss the proceedings on the ground that it is the NAPOLCOM which has sole authority to conduct entrance e ntrance and promotional examinations for police officers, to the exclusion of the CSC, in effect voiding the CSP. He H e further alleged that the administrative discipline over police officers falls under the jurisdiction of the PNP and/or NAPOLCOM. CSC promulgated an order stating that there was no dispute that it is indeed the NAPOLCOM, which has the sole authority to conduct the entrance and promotional examinations of police officers. However, since Capablanca submitted a CSC Career Service Professional eligibility and not a NAPOLCOM eligibility to support his appointment on a permanent status, then the CSC had jurisdiction to conduct conduct the preliminary investigation. After being issued a temporary restraining order, CSC moved to dismiss the summary hearing set to resolve the application for preliminary investigation arguing, among others, that the CSC was not stripped of its original disciplinary jurisdiction over all cases involving civil service exam anomalies.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC have jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of a possible administrative case of dishonesty against a PNP officer for the alleged CSP exam irregularity. irr egularity.

HELD: Yes. Section 28, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations specifically confers upon the CSC the authority to take cognizance over any irregularities or anomalies connected with the examinations. •

Capablanca asserted that CSC does not have the authority aut hority to conduct an initiatory investigation of the case and that it only has appellate jurisdiction to review the decision of any of the disciplining authorities above mentioned. The Court disagreed. It has already been settled in Cruz v. Civil Service Commission that Commission that the appellate power of the CSC will only apply when the subject of the administrative cases filed against erring employees is in connection with the duties and functions of their office, and not in cases where the acts of complainant arose from cheating in the civil service examinations.

LUMAYNA v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R. No. 185001 | 25 September 2009 Powers and Functions of Each Constitutional Commission

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DOCTRINE: The Commission on Audit (“COA”) may disallow public fund disbursements through resolutions by both the Sangguniang Bayan and Panlalawigan when the same are contrary to law (i.e. when it exceeds the limitations set forth in the law)

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The Department of Budget and Management ("DBM”) issued a budget circular authorizing the grant of a maximum of 5% salary adjustment to personnel in the LGUs. By virtue of the circular, the Sangguiniang Bayan (“SB”) of Mayoyao, Ifugao enacted various resolutions and Appropriation Ordinances approving the budget containing an appropriation for the salaries and benefits of newly created positions in the municipality. Upon review by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (“SP”), and after originally disallowing the same, upon finding good faith on the part of the officials of the municipality, the SP allowed the salary increase. Lumayna, et. al., were granted the salary increase. Meanwhile, the Regional Legal and Adjudication Office of COA issued a Notice of Disallowance for an amount representing payments for the salary increases of municipal personnel o The disallowance was said not to be in accordance with law o That the limitation on personal services s ervices had been exceeded, and o That the SB resolution was not the appropriate manner of granting the increase. It ordered Lumayna, et. al., to refund the amounts

ISSUE: Whether the disallowances of the funds representing the salar y increase valid? HELD: Yes, the limitation set under the LGC was exceeded. However, Lumayna, et. al., were not ordered to refund the disallowed amounts because they acted in good faith. Lumayna contend that the Resolutions passed by the SB are valid exercise of legislative prerogative in accordance with the DBM circular, which gave them the authority to grant a maximum of 5% salary adjustment to personnel in the LGU. They also cited as basis the SP Resolution declaring as operative the 2002 Annual Budget of the Municipality of Mayoyao, Ifugao, which included the salary increase. They further claimed that the amount disbursed did not exceed the limit. The annual budget of Mayoyao exceeded the limit for personal services as prescribed in the LGC. Further, the grant of the increase through the adoption of higher salary class schedule is not among the list of items and activities whereby the limitation for personal services may be waived pursuant to SB Resolution. As regards Lumayna’s reliance on the SP Resolution, the COA in its Decision made it clear that the review of the 2002 municipal budget by the SP was only limited to the provisions stated in the said budget which contained, among others, provisions for the funding of the 17 newly created positions, and not its re-alignment to the 5% salary increase. Consequently, the declaration by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in Panlalawigan in the said Resolution that the 2002 municipal budget was operative did not include the grant of the 5% salary increase, as the same was not contained in the said budget but in Resolution No. 66, s. 2002. •

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CATIPON, JR. v. JAPSON G.R. No. 191787 | 22 July 2015 Powers and Functions of Each Constitutional Commission DOCTRINE: The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, has jurisdiction over disputes involving the removal and separation of all employees of government branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including government-owned or -controlled corporations with original charters. Simply put, it is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service.

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Macario Catipon, Jr. is a holder of a Bachelor’s Degree in Commerce despite having a d eficiency of 1.5 units. He later found employment with SSS. Sometime in 1993, the personnel head of the SSS informed Catipon that the CSC was conducting a Career Service Professional Examination (CSPE), (CSPE), to which Catipon applied to, believing believing that the CSC still s till allowed applicants to substitute the length of their government service for any academic deficiency they may have. As it turns out, pursuant to a CSC Memorandum Circular and Office Memo, the policy has been discontinued. Catipon, nevertheless, nevertheless, took the test, and obtained a rating of 80.52%. He was eventually promoted. In 1995, he finally eliminated his deficiency. In 2003, Jerome Japson, filed a letter-complaint with the CSC-CAR alleging that Catipon made deliberate false entries in his CSPE application, specifically, specifically, that he obtained his college degree in 1993 when actually he graduated in 1995 only, after removing his deficiency. Catipon was therefore not qualified to take the CSPE since he was not a college graduate contrary to the entry in his application form. Catipon was then charged with Dishonesty, Falsification of Official documents, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of t he Service. CSC-CAR’s CSC-CAR’s RULING: Revoked Catipon’s eligibility after passing the CSPE in 19 93 for being the fruit of a poisonous tree, so to speak. He was found guilty of Conduct Prejudicial and was meted out with suspension. CA RULING: Appeal denied. Held that by filing directly with the CA, Catipon violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, and the case does not fall within any of the exceptions to the same.

ISSUE: Whether the appeal should have first been filed with the CSC and not the CA? HELD: Yes, the CSC has jurisdiction over decisions by CSC Regional offices brought before it on petition for review In line with the Constitution and its mandate as the central personnel agency of government and sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service, the CSC can adopt memorandum circulars providing for rules governing public officers/employees. As pointed out by the CA, pursuant to the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the Civil Service Commission Proper, or Commission Proper, shall have jurisdiction over decisions of Civil Service Regional Offices brought before it on petition for review. It is only the decision of the Commission Proper that may be brought to the CA on petition for review. •

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BILL OF RIGHTS ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 190582| 8 April 2010 Party – List System th e essential foundations of a democratic society, DOCTRINE: Freedom of expression constitutes one of the and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.

FACTS:

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Ang Ang Ladla Ladladd is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). They applied for accreditation before the COMELEC but was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial s ubstantial membership base. Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and underrepresented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation COMELEC dismissed the petition on moral grounds. Ang Ang Ladl Ladlad ad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant An grant Angg Ladl Ladlad ad’’s application for accreditation. Ang Ang Ladlad Ladlad argued argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation. The COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for for the the firs firstt time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC’ COMELEC’s field personnel.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ang not Ang Ladlad is Ladlad is covered under the equal protection clause HELD: Yes, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in participating in the party list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and underrepresented sectors.

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC violated the freedom of expression and association clause HELD: Yes, under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means. It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.

ANTOLIN v. DOMONDON G.R. No. 165036 | 5 July 2010 Right to Information DOCTRINE: The people’s right to information is not absolute and as such is limited to “matters of public concern,” and is further “subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.”

FACTS:

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Hazel Antolin (petitioner) took the 1997 CPA Board exams but failed (4/7 of the subjects). Antolin was convinced she deserved to pass, thus, she wrote to Abelardo Domondon (respondent), (respondent), Acting Chairman of the Board of Accountancy, and requested that her answer sheets be recorrected. Antolin was shown her answer sheets which consisted merely of shaded marks, so s he was unable to determine why she failed the exam. Antolin wrote again but Domondon denied the request. Petitoner Antolin filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages. Respondent Domondon opposed arguing that petitioner was not entitled to relief sought.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition has become moot and academic. HELD: No, the petition has not become moot and academic when Antolin passed the 1998 CPA Board exam. Art. III, Sec 7 of the Constitution recognizes the right of people to matters of public information on matters of public concern, together with the guarantee to right to information is Art. II, Sec. 28 which promotes full disclosure and transparency in government. Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolu te. The people’s right to information is limited to “matters of public concern,” and is further “subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.” Similarly, the State’s policy of full disclosure is limited to “transactions involving public interest,” and is “subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law.” In the case at bar, the Court has held that t hat national board examinations such as the CPA Board Exams are matters of public concern. The populace in general, and the examinees in particular, would understandably be interested in the fair and competent administration of these exams in order to ensure that only those qualified are admitted into the accounting profession. •

HO WAI PANG v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 176229 | 19 October 2011 Rights of the Accused DOCTRINE: Allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession is extracted from the accused and becomes the basis of their conviction

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leader of the HK tourists 13 HK nationals arrived as tourists at NAIA. At the arrival area, the group leader presented a Baggage Declaration Form to Customs Examiner, Cinco. When Cinco examined each of the baggage, she saw similar chocolate boxes from the first baggage and the second baggage. As Cinco became suspicious, she took out four of the chocolate boxes and opened one of them. Instead of chocolates, white crystalline substance (aka shabu) shabu) contained in a white transparent plastic was revealed. The 13 HK tourists were brought to NBI for further questioning. Out of the 13 tourists, the NBI found evidence for violation of R.A. No. 6425 only as against petitioner and his five coaccused.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights under c ustodial investigation when evidence taken during custodial investigation was not excluded. 1. Whether petitioner was denied of his right to confrontation.

HELD: No, petitioner was not deprived of his rights. While petitioner was subjected to all the rituals of a custodial questioning by the customs authorities and the NBI in violation of his constitutional right under Sec. 12, Article III of the Constitution such constitutional provision prohibits, as evidence, only confessions and admissions of the accused as against himself.

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In the case at bar, petitioner did not make any confession or admission during his custodial investigation. The prosecution did not present any extrajudicial confession extracted from petitioner as evidence of his guilt and no statement was taken from petitioner during his detention and subsequently used in evidence against him. As the Court held in People v. Buluran, “any allegation of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their conviction.” Hence, petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred in not excluding evidence taken during the c ustodial investigation deserves scant consideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied of his right to confrontation HELD: No, petitioner was not denied of his right. The right to confrontation, under Sec. 14(2), Art. III of the Constitution is essentially a guarantee that a defendant may crossexamine the witnesses of the prosecution. The right to confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the person facing criminal prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a chance to cr ossexamine them on their charges. The chief purpose of the right of confrontation is to secure the opportunity for crossexamination, so that if the opportunity for crossexamination has been secured, the function and test of confrontation has also been accomplished, the confrontation being merely the dramatic preliminary to cross- examination.” •

POLSOTIN v. DE GUIA G.R. No. 172624| 5 December 2011 Rights of the Accused DOCTRINE: The right to counsel, being intertwined with the right to due process, is guaranteed by the Constitution to any person whether the proceeding is ad ministrative, civil or criminal.

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Petitioners Polsotin et. al were bus drivers and conductors of Respondent De Guia, Enterprises Inc. alleged that they were illegally dismissed without cause and due process and thus filed a complaint before the NLRC. During the hearings set before the LA, De Guia Inc. failed to appear and failed to timely submit its position paper. However, However, De Guia Inc. I nc. filed its position paper afterwards but without furnishing copies to the petitioner. ( NOTE: Petitioners NOTE: Petitioners had no counsel on record and had been filing and signing all pleadings only through their representative, petitioner Rayala.)

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to due consideration of their petition. HELD: Yes, the right to counsel, being intertwined with the right to due process, is guaranteed by the Constitution to any person whether the proceeding is admi nistrative, civil or criminal. The CA should have extended some degree of liberality so as to give the party a chance to prove their cause with a lawyer to represent or to assist them. The T he dismissal of an employee’s appeal on purely technical ground is inconsistent with the constitutional mandate manda te on protection to labor.” The labor.” The Court has often set aside the strict application of procedural technicalities to serve the broader interest of substantial justice. Labor tribunals are mandated to use all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily, objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure. However, in every proceeding before it, the fundamental and essential requirements of due process should not be ignored but must at all times be respected. Besides, petitioners’ petitioners’ case concerns their job, considered as a property right, of which they could not be deprived of without due process. •

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NAPOCOR v. SPS. ZABALA G.R. No. 173520| 30 January 2013 Just Compensation DOCTRINE: Just compensation is a judicial function function that cannot be usurped usurped by any other branch or or official official of the government and statutes and executive issuances fixing or providing for the method of computing just compensation is not binding on courts and, at best, best, are treated as mere guidelines.

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Respondents Sps. Zabala et. al. were owners of different parcels of land in Balanga City, Bataan. Petitioner National Power Corporation Corporation (NAPOCOR) needed an easement of right of way over the affected areas for its 230 KV LimayHermosa Transmission Lines. NAPOCOR repeatedly negotiated with the respondents for the acquisition of right of way easement over the said parcels of land but failed to reach an agreement. Thus, it filed a complaint for expropriation of such lands alleging that it has the right to take or enter upon the possession of the subject properties pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 42.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 3, RA 6395 can restrict/limit NAPOCOR’s liability. constitutional power of the courts to determine determine HELD: No, Section 3A of RA No. 6395 cannot restrict the constitutional just compensation. compensation. Just compensation has been been defined as “the full and fair equivalent equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. ‘Just’ is used to qualify the meaning of the word ‘compensation’ ‘compensation’ and to convey thereby the idea that the amount to be tendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.” The payment of just compensation for private property taken for public use is guaranteed no less by our Constitution and is included in the Bill of Rights. As such, no legislative enactments or executive issuances can prevent the courts from determining whether the right of the property owners to just compensation has been violated. It is a judicial function that cannot “be usurped by any other branch or official of the government. Courts have consistently ruled that statutes and executive issuances fixing or providing for the method of computing just compensation are not binding on courts and, at best, are tr eated as mere guidelines in ascertaining the amount thereof. Since the hightension electric current passing through the transmission lines will perpetually deprive the property owners of the normal use of their land, it is only just and proper to require NAPOCOR NAPOCOR to recompense recompense them for the full market value of their property. •

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TANENGGE v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 179448| 26 June 2013 Rights of the Accused DOCTRINE: Custodial interrogation is any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner.

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Petitioner Carlos Tanenggee was the manager of Commercio Branch of Metrobank in Divisoria. Five separate Informations for estafa through falsification of commercial documents were documents were filed against

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him for filling up cashier checks and promissory notes under the name of Romeo Tan, a valued client of Metrobank. Prosecution presented different different witnesses, the most relevant which are: o Valentino Elevado: a member of the Internal Affairs in Metrobank, testified that he conducted and interviewed Tanenggee in January 1998 and that in said interview, Tanenggee admitted having committed the allegations in the Informations , specifically forging the promissory notes. o Maria Dolores Miranda: Loans Clerk at Metrobank Commercio Branch, testified that several cashier’s checks were we re issued in favor of Romeo Tan and that Tanenggee instructed her to encash the same; and that it was he who w ho received the proceeds of the loan Tanenggee claimed that all the signatures of Tan appearing on the promissory notes and the cashier’s checks were the genuine signatures of Tan although he never saw the latter affix them thereon. RTC: found Tanenggee guilty of the charges. CA: affirmed. Tanenggee’s argument: that while he admits signing a written statement, he refutes the truth of the contents thereof and alleged that he was only forced to sign the same without reading its contents. He asserts that said written statement was taken in violation of his rights under Sec. 12, Art. III of the Constitution, Constitution , particularly of his right to remain silent, right to counsel, and right to be informed of the first two rights. Hence, the same should not have been admitted in evidence against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tanenggee’s written statement is admissible in evidence. HELD: Yes, the constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt obtained in violation of Sec. 12, Art. III of the Constitution is applicable only in custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation is any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. A person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights which attach upon the commencement thereof, which are: (1) to remain silent, (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other rights above. In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled written statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he managed, the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any significant manner during the questioning. Clearly, Tanenggee cannot be said to be under custodial investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the taking of his written statement. •

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AGUILAR v. O’PALLICK G.R. No. 182280 | 29 July 2013 Due Process DOCTRINE: A person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party to.

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PPGI entered into a Contract-To-Sell with Poblete and Villanueva over Unit 3301 in Makati Prime Citadel Condominium Condominium in Makati City. Thereafter, PPGI issued a Deed of Sale in favor of O’Pallick after he paid the purchase price in full. Although O’Pallick took possession of the unit, the Deed of Sale in his favor w as never registered nor annotated.

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Meanwhile, a case between PPGI and petitioner Aguilar Aguilar (HLURB case), Aguilar was able to obtain a final and executory decision in her favor, which resulted to the levy of several properties including Unit 3301. Notice of Sale was posted and published. O’Pallick filed an Affidavit of Third -Party Claim. Still, public auction was conducted where Aguilar was declared as the highest bidder. Thus, O’Pallick filed a Complaint for quieting quieting of title and to set aside the l evy on execution of the unit, to annul the certificate of sale issued in favor of Aguilar, as well as to recover the unit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision in the HLURB case is binding upon O’Pallick. HELD: NO. It is not binding upon O’Pallick. •

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DEMAALA v. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 173523 | 19 February 2014 Due Process DOCTRINE: Where a party was afforded the opportunity to participate in the proceedings, yet he failed to do so, he cannot be allowed later on to claim that he was deprived of his day in court.

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Demaala was the Municipal Mayor of Narra, Narra , Palawan, and is the accused for violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Thereafter, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a Motion to Suspend Demaala stating that suspension was mandatory. Demaala opposed. Sandiganbayan (9 Feb 2006): granted the preventive suspension. On 3 March 2006, 2006, Demaala filed an MR. Demaala scheduled the hearing of her MR on 26 April 2006. Ombudsman (prosecution) sought to reset the scheduled April 26 and 27, 2006 hearing for the continuation of the presentation of the prosecu tion’s evidence to a later date and was later granted by Sandiganbayan. The continuation continuati on for presentation of the prosecution’s evidence was scheduled on August 2 and 3, 2006 Sandiganbayan (23 May 2006): denied Demaala’s MR. Demaala claims that she was denied due process when process when the Sandiganbayan issued its May 23, 2006 Resolution denying her MR even before the same could be heard on the scheduled August 2 and 3, 2006 hearings.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan its Resolution denying the MR without conducting a hearing thereon. petitioner ’s failure failure to attend the scheduled April 26, 2006 hearing of her MR is fatal to her cause. HELD: No, petitioner’s Her excuse was that she no longer bothered to go to court on April 26, 2006 since “she had no busin ess to be there” there” is unavailing. By being absent at the April 21, 2006 hearing, petitioner did not consider the prosecution’s manifestation and motion to reset trial as related to her pendi ng MR.

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Where a party was afforded the opportunity to participate in the proceedings, yet he failed to do so, he cannot be allowed later on to claim that he was deprived of his day in court. Petitioner was accorded ample opportunity to be heard through her pleadings. As stated in Batul v. Bayron: Notice and hearing is the bulwark bu lwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rights that must be respected even in administrative proceedings. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. So long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due process.

SR METALS v. REYES G.R. No. 179669 | 4 June 2014 Equal Protection DOCTRINE: Issue on violation of EPC is moot since all smallscale miners are equally treated as the production limit applies to all of them.

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SR Metals Inc. was awarded a 2yr SmallScale Mining Permit (SSMP) and were allowed to extract Nickel and Cobalt (Ni-Co) in Agusan del Norte. The mining corporations’ ECCs contain a restriction that the amount of NiCo ore they are allowed to extract annually should not exceed 50,000 MTs of ore pursuant to Section 1 of PD 1899. Gov. Amante of Agusan del Norte questioned the quantity of ore that had been mined and shipped by the mining corporations. The mining corporations denied having exceeded the extraction limit of 50,000 MTs and explained that an extracted mass contains only a limited amount/percentage of NiCo because it is lumped with gangue (the unwanted rocks and minerals.) Gov. Amante sought the opinion of DOJ. By comparing PD 1899 to RA No. 7076, a subsequent law that likewise defines smallscale mining, the DOJ opined that Section 1 of PD 1899 is deemed to have been impliedly repealed by RA 7076 as 7076 as nothing from the provisions of the latter law mentions anything pertaining to an annual production quota for smallscale mining.DOJ categorically concluded that the term ‘ore’ shou ld be confined only to NiCo, that is, excluding soil and other materials that are of no economic value to the mining corporations.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 1, PD 1899 violates the equal protection clause. HELD: No, while under RA 7076, small-scale mining refers to 'mining activities which rely heavily on manual labor using simple implements and methods and do not use explosives or heavy mining equipment. equipment. Significantly, this definition does not provide for annual extraction limit unlike in PD 1899. DOJ Opinion concluded that since nothing from RA 7076 speaks of an annual production limit, Sec. 1 of PD 1899 should be considered impliedly repealed by RA 7076, the later law. However, while these two laws tackle the definition of what small-scale mining is, both have different objects upon which the laws shall be applied to. PD 1899 applies to individuals, partnerships and corporations while RA 7076 applies to cooperatives. With the 50,000MT limit likewise imposed on small scale miners under RA 7076, the issue raised r aised on the violation of the equal protection clause is moot. The fact is, the DENR treats all smallscale miners equally as the production limit applies to all of them. There is therefore no more reason for the mining corporations to not recognize and comply with the said limitation. It must be stressed that the DENR is the government agency tasked with the duty of managing and conserving the •

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country’s resources; it is also the agency vested with the authority to promulgate rules and regulations for the implementation of mining laws.

PEOPLE v. CONSTANCIO G.R. No. 206226 | 4 April 2016 Rights of the Accused DOCTRINE: Confession is admissible when it is voluntarily executed with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel.

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On the night of 10 March 2001, “AAA” after parting ways with her friends, was abducted, raped and slain by accused Berry, Constancio, Pagkalinawan, Pagkalinawan, Darden and Burog. Eventually, Berry and Constancio were arrested after an informant surfaced and identified them as “AAA’s” assailants. The informant came out after Mayor Marquez offered a reward for information leading to the identity of persons responsible for “AAA’s” rape-slay. During the custodial investigation, where Atty. Suarez advised him of his constitutional rights and the consequences of his statements, Berry executed an extrajudicial confession which was embodied in a Sinumpaang Salaysay. Berry also confessed to Amparo (an ABS CBN reporter) during an interview that he did take part in the execution of the crime. At the trial, however, Berry denounced the Sinumpaang Salaysay as false, and claimed that he was coerced into signing the same. Berry also contends that Atty. Suarez does not qualify as a competent and independent counsel since the circumstances circumstanc es surrounding this lawyer’s presence at the precinct during the custodial investigation was suspect.

ISSUE: Whether or not Berry’s extra-judicial confession is admissible. HELD: Yes, Atty. Suarez is a competent and independent counsel and that he was in fact chosen by Berry himself during the custodial investigation. Atty. Suarez testified that he thoroughly explained to Berry his constitutional rights and the consequences of any statements he would give. Thus, Berry’s confession is admissible because it was voluntarily executed with the as sistance of a competent and independent counsel in the person of Atty. Suarez. In addition, Berry’s confession is admissible in evidence because it was v oluntarily made to a n ews reporter and not to the police authority or to an investigating officer. Statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. In this case, there was no ample proof t o show that appellant Berry’s narration of events to ABSCBN reporter Amparo was the product of intimidation or coercion, thus making the same admissible in evidence. •

PEOPLE v ABENES G.R. No. 210878| 7 July 2016 Rights of the Accused DOCTRINE: The guilt of the accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt since the Constitution presumes that the accused is innocent.

FACTS:

23


•

•

•

•

• •

•


Upon receiving a tip from an informant that appellant was involved in the sale of shabu, shabu, a team of police officers arranged a buy bust operation. As arranged by the informant, they were to meet with appellant to buy P1,000 worth of shabu. shabu. After proceeding to the target area, informant introduced the SPO1 assigned to appellant. The exchange then took place, wherein the SPO1 handed to appellant the buy-bust money, and the appellant handed in turn a plastic sachet containing shabu. shabu. Upon seeing this exchange, appellant was approached by the other officers and was placed under arrest. The sachets were marked on the site. While being fr isked, another plastic sachet was found in her possession. She was brought to the police station where the arresting officers prepared their affidavit and other documents. The confiscated specimen tested positive for the presence of shabu. shabu. Appellant was charged with illegal possession and illegal sale of dangerous drugs. RTC: Guilty for both crimes. Prosecution has sufficiently proven that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto. The court gave credence to the prosecution witnesses who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner. CA: Affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the guilt of accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt in the charges of illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs.

HELD: Yes, but only as to the charge of illegal sale, but not as to the charge of illegal possession. •

•

•

We must bow to the superior and immutable rule that the guilt of the accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt since the fundamental law presumes that the accused is innocent. This presumption must prevail unless overcome by strong, clear and compelling evidence; and the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence. As to the charge of illegal sale of drugs, the guilt of the appellant was established beyond reasonable doubt. The elements were satisfied by prosecution’s evidence. evidence. As to the allegation of broken chain of o custody, the appellant failed to contest the admissibility in evidence of the seized item during trial but raised for the first time on appeal. In fact, at no instance did she manifest or even hint that there were lapses on the part of the police officers in handling the seized item which affected its integrity and evidentiary value. Moreover, the prosecution was able to establish the necessary links in the chain of custody of the specimen subject of the sale from the moment it was seized, delivery to the crime laboratory, until it was presented during trial as proof of the corpus delicti. delicti. Hence, the guilt of the accused was duly proven. However, as to the charge of illegal possession, her guilt was not adequately established beyond reasonable doubt. In prosecutions involving narcotics, the substance itself constitutes the corpus delicti delicti of the o offense, and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain conviction beyond reasonable doubt. It is therefore of prime importance that in these cases, the identity of the dangerous drug be likewise established beyond reasonable doubt. With the mat erial omission to indubitably show the identity of the drug, subject matter in the charge of illegal possession, evidence for prosecution casts serious doubt as to the guilt of the appellant for it has not proven the indispensable element of corpus delicti. delicti. o In the case herein, prosecution failed to provide a clear identification identification of the illegal drug seized from appellant’s possession. The lone SPO1 involved in the exchange, who could identify the

24



plastic sachet and acknowledge the marking thereon as her own, was not even presented in court to identify it. As such, the charge of illegal possession must be dismissed.

CITY OF ILOILO v. HON. CONTRERAS-BESANA G.R. No. 168957 | 12 February 2010 Just Compensation DOCTRINE: When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.

FACTS: •

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Petitioner filed a Complaint for eminent domain against private respondent Javellana and Southern Negros Development Bank, the latter as mortgagee. City of Iloilo sought to expropriate two parcels of land owned by Javellana to be used as a school site for Lapaz High School. Javellana admitted ownership of the Subject Property but denied the petitioner’s avowed public purpose of the sought-for expropriation, since the City of Iloilo already had an existing school si te for Lapaz High School. City of Iloilo filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession, alleging that it had deposited the amount of ₱40,000.00 with the PNB-Iloilo Branch. Petitioner claimed that it was entitled to the immediate possession of the Subject Property. Javellana filed filed an Opposition Opposition on on the grounds that the city already already had a vast tract of land where its existing school site was located, and the deposit of a mere 10% of the Subject Property’s tax valuation was grossly inadequate. inadequate. The court ruled in favor of City of Iloilo and authorized it to take immediate possession of the Subject Property. Petitioner Petitioner was able to take physical possession of the properties in 1985 and the Subject Property was actually used as the site of Lapaz National High School. The expropriation proceedings remained dormant until 2000 when Javellana filed an Ex Parte Motion/Manifestation, where he alleged that when he finally sought to withdraw the ₱40,000.00 allegedly deposited by the petitioner, he discovered that no s uch deposit was ever made. Javellana thus demanded his just compensation as well as interest. He alleged that since he had not been compensated for the Subject Property, petitioner’s possession was illegal, and he was entitled to recovery of possession of his lots. However, City of Iloilo argued that Javellana could no longer bring an action for recovery since the Subject Property was already taken for public use. Rather, Javellana could only demand for the payment of just compensation. Petitioner also maintained that the legality or illegality of petitioner’s possession of the property should be determined determined in the eminent domain case and not in a separate action for recovery of possession.

ISSUE: Whether or not just compensation should be reckoned from the filing of the complaint HELD: Yes, just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint. An order of condemnation or dismissal is final, resolving the question of whether or not the plaintiff has properly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain. Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use can no longer be questioned. •

25


•


Javellana did not bother to file an appeal from the May 17, 1983 Order which granted City of Iloilo’s Motion Iloilo’s Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession, authorizing it to take immediate possession of the Subject Property. Thus, it has become final, and the petitioner’s right to expropriate the property for a public use is no longer subject to review.

CITIZENSHIP REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. KERRY LAO ONG G.R. No. 175430| 18 June 2012 Naturalization DOCTRINE: The qualification of some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation means not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid ones becoming the object of charity or a public charge. His income should permit him and the members of his family to live with reasonable comfort.

FACTS: •

• •

Respondent Ong, then 38 years old, filed a Petition for Naturalization. He alleged the following: 1. He was born in Cebu City to Chinese citizens Siao Hwa Uy Ong and Flora Ong on March 4, 1958. He is registered as a resident alien and possesses an alien certificate of registration and a native-born certificate of residence from the Bureau of o f Immigration. 2. He has been continuously and permanently residing in the Philippines from birth up to the present and can speak and write in Tagalog, English, Cebuano, and Amoy. Amoy . 3. He took his elementary and high school studies in Cebu and finished college in Ateneo. 4. He married Griselda S. Yap, also a Chinese citizen and they have four children. 5. He has been a businessman/business manager since 1989, earning an average annual a nnual income of P150,000.00. When he testified, however, he said that he has been a businessman since he graduated from college. Moreover, Ong did not specify or describe the nature of his business. The trial court granted Ong’s petition. Republic appealed the court’s decision alleging that respondent Ong did not prove his allegation that he is a businessman/business manager earning an average income of P150,000.00 since 1989. His income tax returns belie the value of his income. Moreover, he failed to present evidence on the nature of his profession or trade, which is the source of his income.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Ong has proved that he has some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation evidence,, like business permits, registration, official HELD: No, the applicant provided no documentary evidence receipts, or other business records to demonstrate his proprietorship or participation in a business. Instead, Ong relied on his general assertions to prove his possession of some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation. Bare, general assertions cannot discharge the burden of proof that is required of an applicant for naturalization. The Court finds the appellate appel late court’s decision erroneous. 1. It should not have included the spouse ’s income in its assessment ass essment of Ong’s Ong’s lucrative income. 2. It failed to consider the following circumstances which have a bearing on Ong ’s expenses vis-avis -avis his income: (a) that Ong does not own real property; (b) that his proven average gross a nnual income around the time of his application, which was only P106,000.00, had to provide for the •

26


3.


education of his four minor children; and (c) that Ong ’s children were all studying in exclusive private schools in Cebu City. The CA did not explain how it arrived at the conclusion that Ong ’s income had an appreciable margin over his known expenses

REPUBLIC v. BATUIGAS G.R. No. 183110 | 7 October 2013 Naturalization DOCTRINE: Under existing Philippine law, foreign women who are married to Philippines citizens may be deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens

FACTS: •

• • •

•

•

Ascuzena Batuigas was born in Zamboanga del Sur on September 28, 1941 to Chinese parents. Her primary secondary and tertiary education were taken in Philippine schools. She then practiced her teaching profession in various schools situated in the Philippines. In 1968, Azucena married Santiago Batuigas, a natural born Filipino citizen . Azucena then filed a Petition for Naturalization. In her petition she stated that she s he intends in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce, absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to China; and that she will reside continuously in the Philippines from the time of the filing of her Petition up to the time of her naturalization. After all the jurisdictional requirements requirements had been complied with, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged in a lawful occupation or in some known lucrative trade. The OSG maintained that Azucena is not allowed under the Retail Trade to engage directly or indirectly in the r etail trade. The OSG likewise disputed Azucena’s Azucena’s claim that she owns real property because aliens are precluded from owning lands in the country. RTC: Dismissed the motion to dismiss

t he citizenship requirement to become a Filipino citizen? ISSUE: Has Azucena Batuigas complied with the

HELD: Yes, under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial naturalization under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the “Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000”). A third option, called derivative naturalization, naturalization, which is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that: “Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.” Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso facto Philippine facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that they possess other qualifications for naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do they have to submit themselves to judicial naturalization.

REPUBLIC v. HUANG TE FU G.R. No. 200983 | 18 March 2015 Naturalization

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DOCTRINE: An applicant for naturalization must show full and complete compliance with the requirements of the naturalization law; otherwise, his petition for naturalization will be denied.

FACTS: • •

• •

Huang Te Fu, a.k.a. Robert Uy was a citizen of the Republic of China (Taiwan). In 2005, Huang Te Fu filed with RTC QC a Petition for Naturalization showing that he complied with the requirements and stating importantly that he was a businessman engaged in the manufacture of zippers, that he is of good moral character . RTC: granted his petition. Republic opposed stating that Huang Te Fu: does not have some known lucrative trade, profession p rofession or lawful occupation, thus, he is not o gainfully employed, as he merely worked in the business owned by his family and was merely given allowances by his parents for the daily expenses of his family; o lacks good moral character as shown in a Deed of Sale covering a parcel of land in Antipolo City where he and his wife supposedly purchased, and falsely misrepresented himself as a Filipino citizen. is either evading taxes or concealing the truth regarding his income as his income tax o returns for the years 2002-2004 reveal that his actual monthly income differs from his monthly income as declared in his petition for naturalization.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Huang Te Fu complies with requisites under CA 473 (Revised Naturalization Law.

HELD: No, an applicant for naturalization must show full and complete compliance with the requirements requirements of the naturalization law; otherwise, his petition for naturalization will be denied. Sec. 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law or CA 473 requires, among others, that an applicant for naturalization must be of good moral character and must have some known lucrative trade, tr ade, profession, or lawful occupation. Based on jurisprudence the qualification for l ucrative trade means trade means not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid one’s becoming the object of charity or a public charge. His income should permit “him and the members of his family to live with re asonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the demands of human dignity. Income of the applicant is the only one considered and does not include his spouse’s income. Moreover, his admitted false declaration under oath contained in the deed of sale that he is a Filipino citizen is further proof of respondent’s lack of good moral character and a violation of the constitutional prohibition on ownership of lands by foreign individuals •

•

LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS BALASBAS v MONAYAO G.R. No. 190524 | 17 February 2014 Liabilities of Public Officers DOCTRINE: Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is an administrative offense which need not be related to respondent’s official functions.

FACTS:

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•

•

•

•

•


Petitioner Atty. Balasbas filed a letter-complaint with the DSWD accusing respondent Monayao — then employed by DSWD— DSWD —of misrepresentation, fraud, dishonesty, and refusal to implement an Order issued by DENR in a land dispute case filed by her brother against respondent’s father. Petitioner further claimed that the judgment rendered therein awarded ½ of the property to her brother and ½ to respondent’s father; that respondent executed a notarized waiver of her rights to her portion, but illegally sold the same to her children via a Deed of Sale purportedly executed by respondent’s respondent’s father, who was already dead at the t he time of the alleged execution. Respondent Respondent was subsequently transferred from DSWD to the LGU of the Municipality of Alfonso Lista in Ifugao. Hence, petitioner filed a complaint therein. Lista refused to take an action, as the acts complained of were not in relation to the latter’s duties and responsibilities as Municipal Population Office. CSC-OLA: Refused to take the appeal. It held that CSC had no j urisdiction over petitioner’s complaint as it stemmed from a private transaction between the parties. Petitioner alleged that respondent’s misrepresentation, fraud, dishonesty, and refusal to implement DENR’s Order constitutes acts unbecoming a public off icial and fall within the jurisdiction of the the CSC.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s dishonest acts and misrepresentations casted serious doubt as to her fitness to continue in the public service.

HELD: Yes, Respondent’s supposed dishonest acts and mi srepresentations committed in relation to a land dispute arising from her private dealings case doubt on her fitness to discharge her responsibilities as a public official. If it is true that respondent caused the execution of a forged or falsified deed of sale as alleged herein, then she committed a dishonest act even as she is enjoined to adhere at all times to law, morality, and decency in her private and professional life. Dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the performance of duty by the pubic officer, for it inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to continue in office and the discipline and morale of the service. While the law and justice abhor all forms of abuse committed by public officers and employees whose sworn duty is to discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity, competence, accountability, and loyalty, the Court must protect the, against unsubstantiated charges that te nd to adversely affect, rather than encourage, the effective performance of their duties and functions. •

•

HALLASGO v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R. No. 171340 | 11 September 2009 General Principles DOCTRINE: A public office is a public trust. A public servant is expected to exhibit, at all times, the highest degree of honesty and integrity, and is accountable to all those he or she serves. Gross misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty out of all measure beyond allowance, flagrant, shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused.

FACTS: • •

Hallasgo was the Municipal Treasurer of a municipality in Bukidnon. She was accused before the Deputy Ombudsman (“OMB”) with “unauthorized withdrawal of monies of the public… amounting to malversation of public funds.”

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It was claimed that Hallasgo, along with two others, made unrecorded withdrawals from d ocuments (vouchers) the municipality’s bank account without the required supporting documents and failed to liquidate cash advances despite the lapse of over a year. The Deputy OMB temporarily referred the matter to the Commission on Audit for an extensive audit. The Special Audit Team first directed Hallasgo to account for the unauthorized withdrawals and to record all the cash advances received, and second, found that Hallasgo failed to remit the amounts she received thus exposing government funds to probable misuse and application . The Deputy OMB issued found Hallasgo guilty of grave misconduct, dismissing the latter from service o

•

•

•

ISSUE: Whether or not Hallasgo guilty of gross, grave misconduct? HELD: Yes, the anomalies complained of were not the result of mere inadvertence, but rather, her actions demonstrate her wanton and deliberate disregard for the demands of public service. Hallasg o’s failure to ensure that disbursements are properly documented or that cash advances granted to her are properly and timely liquidated certainly deserves administrative sanction. Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. It is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty. Qualified by the term “gross,” it means conduct that is “out of all measure beyond allowanc e; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused.” Various laws and regulation r egulation prescribes the procedure to follow regarding handling of public funds. As treasurer of the municipality, it is Hallasgo’s duty to perform her responsibilities diligen tly, faithfully, and efficiently. It behooves her to exercise the highest degree of care over the custody, management, and disbursement of municipal funds. Even if she may have justified some of the transactions, these explanations were belatedly done, effected only after being directed to do so by the audit team. All of Hallasgo’s acts, collectively, constitute gross misconduct. Pursuant to Section 52, Rule IV of the Civil Service Rules, gross misconduct is a grave offense punishable with dismissal for the first offense, without prejudice to the Ombudsman’s right to file an appropriate criminal case. •

•

•

DELA CRUZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 161929 | 8 December 2009 Liabilities of Public Officers: Preventive Suspension DOCTRINE: Preventive suspension of the accused is mandatory upon finding that the Information is valid. Court possesses no discretion to determine whether whether one is necessary.

FACTS: •

•

•

•

The City of Tarlac approved budget allowing for construction and/or renovation project involving several multi-purpose halls in various barangays therein. But, as it turns out, instead for renovating/constructing multipurpose halls, the funds were used to renovate barangay chapels. For doing so Lynn Paz T. Dela Cruz – Assistant Accountant, and other City of Tarlac T arlac high-ranking officials, including the mayor, were charged with the violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Ombudsman. An Information was eventually filed against all of them. The Information stated that they conspired with one another, committing the crime in relation to their office, taking advantage of their official position, acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence,

30


•

•


causing undue injury to the government and give unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to a specific group of constituents by approving and releasing the amount knowing fully well, that what were being constructed are in truth chapels. After being arraigned, the prosecution filed a motion to suspend all the accused pendente lite. In various suits, the accused filed for motions to quash, which were all denied by the t he Sandiganbayan. De la Cruz et al were ordered 90-day preventive suspension pursuant to the man datory imposition upon a finding that the information is valid. Hence, this appeal filed by De la Cruz et al.

ISSUE: Whether or not the preventive suspension is valid pending appeal. HELD: Yes, preventive suspension of the accused under Section 13 of RA 3019 is mandatory upon a finding that the information is valid. The court possesses no discretion to determine whether a preventive suspension is necessary to forestall the possibility that the accused may use his office to intimidate witnesses, or frustrate his prosecution, or continue committing malfeasance. The presumption is that unless the accused is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both. All that is needed is proof that a valid information exists. •

•

BAUSTISTA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION G.R. No. 185215 | 22 July 2010 Rights of Public Officers DOCTRINE: 1.

2.

A reorganization is valid provided that it is done in good faith. A demotion in office is tantamount to removal, if no cause is shown for it. Thus, before a demotion may be affected pursuant to a reorganization, the observance of the rules on bona fide abolition of public office is essential There is demotion when an employee is appointed to a position resulting to a diminution in duties, responsibilities, status or rank which may or may not involve invo lve a reduction in salary. Where an employee is appointed to a position with the same duties du ties and responsibilities but a rank and salary higher than those enjoyed in his previous position, there is no demotion and the appointment is valid.

FACTS: •

• •

•

•

•

Virginia Bautista worked in the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) as a Technical Assistant. President Aquino issued EO 81, which authorized the reorganization of DBP. Bautista was then appointed as Account Officer with an annual salary, which is equivalent to the 14th step of Salary Grade (SG)-20, subject to the result of the ongoing reorganization of DBP and the approval of the CSC. Sometime later, the Compensation and Classification Act of 1989 took effect. T o implement the this, the DBM promulgated the Government Financial Institutions Index of Occupational Services which mandated GFIs, like the DBP, to adopt a uniform set of position titles in their plantilla. As a consequence, Bautista was appointed on a permanent status as Bank Executive Officer II (BEO II) with an annual salary equivalent to the 8 th step of SG-24 (as compared to her prior to her appointment with SG-20 (24 th step)) Bautista protested her appointment because it allegedly amounted to a demotion due to the attendant diminution of benefits and emoluments arising from said appointment

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ISSUE: Whether or not Bautista was demoted. HELD: No, the Court found that the reorganization of the DBP was made in good faith. There was no demotion in this case because Bautista was appointed to a position comparable to the one she previously occupied. There was even an increase in her rank and salary.

GSIS v. MANALO G.R. No. 208979| 16 September 2016 Liabilities of Public Officers DOCTRINE: 1. 2. 3.

Gross Neglect of Duty is characterized by want of even the slightest care , or by conscious indifference to the consequences, or by flagrant and palpable breach o f duty. Misconduct, on the other hand, is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. Dishonesty is defined as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; unworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and s traightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive, or betray

FACTS: •

•

•

•

•

•

In 2004, Rogelio Manalo, Computer Operator IV of the t he GSIS was assigned as membership processor at the Membership Department I (Manila) where his main duty was to process membership applications. He was tasked to check the completeness of the documents submitted to support membership application and verify the authenticity of the signatures of the authorized officials before creating applicant’s membership record and policy. To enable Manalo to access system’s membership database, he was assigned computer access/operator code. Sometime in 2005, the Internal Audit Service Group (IASG), GSIS, conducted an audit examination and found that on several occasions in July 2004, Manalo’s operator code and terminal ID was used in creating the membership records and policies of fictitious and terminated employees of the City Government of Manila (CGM) These fictitious and terminated employees were granted loans because of their membership records and policies. Additionally, it was discovered that the specimen signatures of the individuals who purportedly endorsed the membership applications were not found in the list of authorized endorsing officials of the City Government of Manila. IASG concluded that the processor and the official tasked to review his output failed to detect the apparent defects in the supporting documents used to create membership records and policy contracts. Hence, membership records were created in the database and policy contracts were issued in favor of the fictitious and separated CGM employees, which became the basis for granting of unauthorized loans. Manalo was eventually charged and found with Serious Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Gross Neglect of Duty. He was dismissed as a consequence.

ISSUE: Whether or not Manalo guilty of Grave Misconduct. HELD: No, Manalo is guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty. As membership processor, Manalo was required — upon being given Application Forms for Emergency Assistance Loan, Summer One-Month Loan, or Enhanced Salary Loan together with the accompanying required source documents (Membership Information Sheet, Service Record, Appointment Appointment Paper, and Plantilla) — to “examine and evaluate if the submitted source documents are complete, authentic and in order; if the signatories are the authorized

32



officials and if the endorsing officials are complete and their signatures authentic based on their specimen signatures on file.” It was his task to determine the completeness and authenticity of the source documents submitted to him, before he can create a policy record which the GSIS member-applicant shall use to secure the documents above mentioned. It turned out that Manalo created policy records of fictitious and previously terminated employeeapplicants from the City Government of Manila, and as a result, P621,165.00 worth of loans were released and lost through these irregular policies. He was grossly negligent in evaluating and authenticating the source documents accompanying application forms filed by fictitious individuals or separated employees of the Manila City government. For failing to perform his duty which thus caused the creation cr eation of anomalous policy records which were in turn used to defraud GSIS of P621,165.00, Manalo is guilty not of grave misconduct or dishonesty, but gross neglect of duty •

•

•

ANTONIO KING VS. FRANCISCO ROBLES G.R. No. | 197096-97 | December 2, 2013 Ombudsman DOCTRINE: The Ombudsman is a constitutional officer duty-bound to investigate on its own or on complaint by "any person, any act or omission of a public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient."

FACTS: •

•

•

•

•

•

•

The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Azkcon Group of Companies and/or Jay Ar Lazo were adjudged guilty of having illegally dismissed Rogelio from service and were ordered to reinstate Rogelio to his former position, to pay him full backwages from the time his salary was withheld up to his actual reinstatement. This Decision became final and executory. Labor Arbiter Robles issued a writ of execution commanding the execution arm of the NLRC "to proceed to the premises of Azkcon Group of Companies and/or Jay Ar Lazo located at J.P. Ramos St., Bo. Talipapa, Caloocan City or wherever it may be found and collect the sum of x x x P471,200.99 representing [Rogelio's] [Rogelio's] backwages and 13th month pay. In case you fail to collect said amount in cash, you are to cause the satisfaction of the same from the movable or immovable properties of the respondent respond ent not exempt from execution.” In compliance with the directive in the writ of execution, respondent Deputy Sheriffs served a Notice of Levy/Sale on Execution on Personal Properties upon the representative of therein respondents. Personal properties found inside the compound were levied upon. Meanwhile, Philippine Metal and Alloy Fabrication Corporation (PMAFC, (PMAFC, one of the companies represented by King) filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim before Arbiter Robles, asserting ownership over the levied properties. Subsequently, PMAFC filed a Motion to Quash Notice of Levy/Sale on Execution of Personal Property and to Inhibit Sheriffs. PMAFC contended that the Deputy Sheriffs levied on properties belonging to PMAFC worth P12M and that the Deputy Sheriffs Sh eriffs intended to sell the said properties for a measly sum of P471,200.99. PMAFC thus prayed that the Notice of Levy/Sale on Execution be set aside for being void ab initio and the Deputy Sheriffs be disqualified. In an Order Arbiter Robles directed Rogelio to post a Sheriffs Indemnity Bond in an amount double the judgment award. After the consolidation of the cases and hearing the parties' respective position, the Ombudsman dismissed all the charges against the respondents for lack of probable cause. According to the Ombudsman, petitioner's evidence failed to establish the four elements of the crime of robbery. The Ombudsman held that the intent to gain is totally absent since Rogelio is the

33



owner of the subject properties on account of his being the highest bidder and a Certificate of Sale issued to him. Thus, Rogelio cannot be charged for taking the personal property of another. respondents ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman erred in its finding of lack of probable cause to hold respondents for trial?

HELD: No, the Ombudsman has prerogative to prosecute or dismiss a complaint. •

•

By constitutional fiat and under RA 6770, the Ombudsman is given wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers on offenses committed by public officers free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention. Because of the endowment of broad investigative authority, the Ombudsman is empowered to determine, based on the sufficiency of the complaint, whether there exist reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. In contrast, if the Ombudsman finds the complaint insufficient in form or substance, it may also dismiss the complaint. Such prerogative is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the Ombudsman's exercise of discretion in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it except when the exercise thereof is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

ARNADO v COMELEC G.R. No. 210164 | 18 August 2015 Eligibility and Qualifications Requirements DOCTRINE: Only natural-born Filipinos who owe total and undivided allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines could run for and hold elective public office. | For those who avail themselves of RA 9225 and intend to run for public office, Sec 5(2) thereof provides the additional requirement of making a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships prior to or at the time of filing of their Certificate of Candidacy.

FACTS: •

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•

•

• •

Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship after he was naturalized as a US citizen. Subsequently, and in preparation for his plans to run for public office in the Philippines, Arnado applied for repatriation under RA 9225 before the Consul in San Francisco. He took the Oath of Allegiance and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. He then filed his 2009 COC for the mayoralty post of Lanao del Norte for the 2010 elections. However, his co-candidate filed a petition to disqualify on the ground that he continued to use his US passport for entry to and exit from the Philippines after executing his Affidavit of Renunciation. Renunciation. While the petition for disqualification disqualification was pending, the 2010 elections proceeded, wherein wherein Arnado garnered the highest votes and was proclaimed winner. COMELEC 1st Division: Nullified proclamation and applied rule on succession. Maquiling, another co-candidate who garnered 2 nd highest votes, contested to the application of the rule on succession.

ISSUE: Whether or not Arnado was correctly disqualified from running for public office by virtue of his subsequent use of US passport, which effectively disavowed or recalled his 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. in Maquiling, his 2009 Affidavit HELD: Yes, Arnado failed to comply with the 2 nd requisite because as held in Maquiling, of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when he used his US passport after executing said affidavit. Since then up to the time he filed his COC in 2012, Arnado had not cured the defect in his qualification.

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Arnado has not yet satisfied the twin requirements of Section 5(2) of RA 9225 at the time he filed his COC for the May 13, 2013 elections. o Under 4(d) of the LGC, a person with “dual citizenship” is disqualified from running for any elective local position. This refers to dual allegiance. Consequently, congress enacted RA 9225 allowing natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of naturalization abroad to reacquire r eacquire their Philippine citizenship and enjoy full civil and political rights. o Hence, they may now run for public office provided they: a.) Meet the qualifications for holding such public office, and b.) Make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath, prior to or at the time of filing their COC.

•

ADMINISTRATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW VILLANUEVA v. PALAWAN COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVT. G.R. No. 178347| 25 February 2013 Powers of Administrative Agencies DOCTRINE: A government agency performs adjudicatory functions when it renders decisions or awards that determine the rights of adversarial parties, which decisions or awards have the same effect as a judgment of the court. There must be an enabling statute or legislative act conferring quasi-judicial power quasi-judicial power upon the administrative body.

FACTS: •

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•

•

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Controversy arose when the Palawan Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD) issued a Strategic Environment Plan (SEP) Clearance to Patricia Louise Mining and Development Corp (PLMDC). Villanueva et al, farmers, sought the recall of the clearance, which was denied by the PCSD. They then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus for nullification of the Clearance against PLMDC and PCSD before the RTC. PLMDC and PCSD sought the dismissal on various grounds including the impropriety of the remedy of certiorari, arguing that it did not perform a quasi -judicial function. RTC: Denied the motion, but ruled that Certiorari is proper to assail PCSD’s action. This procedure is an exercise of quasi-judicial power. power. PLMDC and PCSD again filed a MTD, but on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. They argued that only the CA can take cognizance of a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus filed against a quasi judicial body.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction to review actions of quasi-judicial bodies? HELD: The issue was not answered by the Court. However, it did rule that PCSD does not have quasi judicial functions. functions. The Court disagrees with the parties’ reasoning and held that PCSD did not perform a quasi judicial function that is reviewable by petition for certiorari. There must be an enabling statute or legislative act conferring quasi-judicial power quasi-judicial power upon the administrative body. In the case at bar, the law creating PCSD did not confer on it quasi-judicial powers that its enabling statute clearly withheld. A government agency performs adjudicatory functions when it renders decisions or awards that determine the rights of adversarial parties, which decisions or awards have the same effect as a •

•

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judgment of the th e court. In other words, the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasiquasi judicial function function must be clothed clothed with power and authority authority to pass judgment or or render a decision on the controversy construing and applying the laws to that end. An agency admin order cannot confer a quasi-judicial power on a statutory body that its enabling statute clearly withheld. An agency’s power to formulate rules for the proper discharge of its functions is always circumscribed by the enabling statute. Otherwise, any agency conferred with rule-making power, may circumvent legislative intent by creating new powers for itself through an administrative order. •

ORAIS v. ALMIRANTE G.R. No. 181195 | 10 June 2013 Judicial Recourse and Review DOCTRINE: Save for some instances, proof of grave abuse of discretion – as a general rule , where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of o f conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one-month salary, the Ombudsman’s decision shall be final, executory, and unappealable.

FACTS: •

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•

Fredrick Orais filed with the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) a Complaint for corruption and grave misconduct against his superior, Dr. Amelia Almirante. Both are under the Veterinary Quarantine-Seaport Quarantine-Seaport of the Department of Agriculture. It was alleged that Almirante, among others, induced officers to receive money and not issue receipts for them. Naturally, Almirante denied the allegations and said that t hat all payments were received through its duly authorized Collection Officers, the proper official receipts therefor. The Office of the OMB dismissed the complaint for lack of substantial basis, holding that the acts were in accordance with law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA gravely erred when it simply concurred with the OMB in dismissing the complaint.

HELD: No, the Court agrees with the CA that consistent with law and the rules of procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman — that where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one-month one- month salary, the Ombudsman’s decision shall be final, executory, and unappealable. In one case, the Court went so far as to declare that in such cases, “it follows that the CA has no appellate jurisdiction to review, review, rectify or reverse” reverse” the order order or decision of the Ombudsman. Ombudsman. But of course, the above principles are subject to the rule that decisions of administrative agencies which are declared final and unappealable by law are still “subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law, or when such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual findings.” •

ELECTION LAW SAÑO v. COMELEC G.R. No. 182221 | 3 February 2010 Remedies Jurisdiction in Election Law

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DOCTRINE: The mere invocation of the grounds of a pre-proclamation controversy, without more, will not justify the exclusion of election returns which appear regular and authentic on their face.

FACTS: •

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Petitioner Saño of LAKAS-CMD LAKAS-CMD and private respondent Manuel Que of the Liberal Party both ran for Municipal Mayor of Leyte during the May 2007 elections. During the canvassing of votes, Saño sought to have the contested ERs excluded on the grounds of massive fraud, illegal proceedings, and tampered/falsified and obviously manufactured returns. He alleged that after the casting and counting of votes, a man was seen carrying a ballot box that was not locked, inserted certain documents, took the aluminum seal, sealed the box, and turned it over to the Reception Group. 5 election returns (ERs) were allegedly affected by this anomalous activity. Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) proclaimed Que as Municipal Mayor. Saño filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation and/or Proceedings of the MBOC before COMELEC. He prayed for the exclusion of the contested ERs and that he be proclaimed the winning candidate. However, COMELEC upheld the proclamation of Que. Hence, Saño filed this petition for certiorari. He insisted that all 5 of the contested ERs were prepared by one person person and surreptitiously presented before before the MBOC. Thus, the issues raised before the MBOC of massive fraud, illegal proceedings, and tampered/falsified and obviously manufactured returns were pre-proclamation controversies as defined in Sec 241 of the Omnibus Election Code and fall within the contemplation of Sec 243(b) of the said Code. As such, the contested ERs should have been excluded from the canvass and MBOC’s proclamation of Que violated Sec 39 of CA 7859 and Sec 20 of RA 7166. Que argues that the allegations raised by Saño on the contested ERs are not proper in a preproclamation controversy. Moreover, he failed to substantiate his claims and failed to follow the mandatory procedure under under Sec 20 of RA 7166.

ISSUE: Whether or not the allegations raised are proper in a pre-proclamation controversy. HELD: No, the Court ruled that not only did petitioners fail to follow the proper procedure, the unsubstantiated issues were not proper for a proclamation controversy. 1.

Concept - A pre-proclamation controversy, as defined in the Omnibus Election Code, is any question pertaining to or affecting the proceeding of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sec. 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody, and appearance of the election returns.

2.

Compliance with the procedure on contested ERs - A pre-proclamation controversy is summary in character and limited in scope. It is to be promptly decided so as not to delay canvass and proclamation. Hence, the BOC will not look into allegations of irregularity that are not apparent on the face of ERs that appear otherwise authentic and duly accomplished. Consistent with its summary character, compliance with the procedure on contested ERs before the BOC under Sec. 20 of RA 7166 is mandatory. Such provides that any candidate may contest the inclusion of an ER by making an oral objection at the time the questioned return is submitted for canvass. - In the case herein, Saño failed to timely object as there was a lapse of over 12 hours after the ERs have been presented for canvass before objections were made. Moreover, it is irregular that only one written petition for exclusion was filed for the 5 contested ERs.

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3.


While the court was willing to overlook the procedural lapses, there is still no evidence that the ERs were falsified or tampered with - MBOC did not err is proclaiming the private respondent, since the unsubstantiated issues raised by the petitioner were not proper for a pre-proclamation controversy. Claims that contested ERs are obviously manufactured or falsified must be evident from the face of the said documents themselves. Contrary to petitioner’s remonstrations, there is absolutely no indication that the contested ERs were falsified or tampered with. As such, there was no valid ground to delay the proclamation. - Unlike a pre-proclamation controversy, the annulment proceedings before COMELEC were not summary in character. Petitioner had every opportunity to ventilate and substantiate his allegations before COMELEC but failed to present any evidence to overcome the presumption that the contested ERs were valid.

DOROMAL v BIRON G.R. No. 181809 | 17 February 2010 Election Protest DOCTRINE: It is the over-all policy of the law to place a premium on an election return, which appears regular on its face, by imposing stringent requirements before the certificate of votes may be used to controvert the election return’s authenticity and operate as an exception to the general rule that in a pre proclamation controversy, the inquiry is limited to the four corners of the election return.

FACTS: •

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Petitioner Rose Doromal and private respondent Hernan Biron were both candidates for vicemayoralty in the Municipality of Iloilo. During the canvassing of votes, Biron orally objected to the inclusion of 25 election returns (ERs) due to alleged missing taras (lines taras (lines representing one vote in the counting of votes) and discrepancy between the number of votes stated in the ERs and those stated in the certificate of votes issued by the Board of Election Inspectors (BEIs). Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) denied the petitions for exclusion. It found no tampering on the number of taras and taras and that the ERs were complete with no material defect and duly signed and thumbmarked by the BEIs. COMELEC 2nd Division: Partially granted. Ordered the exclusion of 11 contested ERs as the same were allegedly tampered or falsified. o Lent credence to Biron’s allegations of discrepancy and dissimilarity between the votes in the ERs and those in the certificate of votes and found numerous irregularities in the tallying of votes at the precinct level. Hence, necessitating the exclusion of the subject ERs. Gave credit to the affidavits of Biron’s poll watchers, who stated that numerous irregularities o allegedly occurred during the tallying of the votes at the precinct level. MBC reconvened and canvassed the remaining 14 returns. Biron was proclaimed the winner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the certificate of votes is admissible to controvert the authenticity of the election returns.

HELD: No, the certificates of votes are inadmissible to prove tampering, alteration, or falsification for failure to comply with Sec 16 and 17 of RA 6646. COMELEC En Banc Resolution is nullified and is ordered to raffle to one of its division to resolve the matter. While Sec 16 of RA 6646 authorizes COMELEC to use the certificate of votes to prove tampering, alteration, falsification, or any anomaly committed in the ERs, this presupposes the certificate of •

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•

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votes was accomplished in accordance with Sec 16. In the case herein, the subject certificates of votes are defective for they did not contain the names, signatures and thumbmarks of members of BEI, total number of voters, time of issuance of certificates required under Sec 16, raising grave doubts as to its accuracy. The affidavits of Biron’s poll watchers are self -serving and grossly inadequate to establish tampering of the subject returns. The manner in which the COMELEC excluded the ERs are fatally flawed. In the absence of o clearly convincing evidence, the validity of the ERs must be upheld. A conclusion that an ER is manufactured or false and consequently should be disregarded in the canvass must be approved with extreme caution and only upon the most c onvincing proof. In case of discrepancy in the other authentic copies of an ER, the procedure in Sec 236 of the Omnibus Election Code should be followed. In light of the minor discrepancies found in other authentic copies of the subject ERs, the proper o procedure is not to exclude the said returns, but to follow Sec 236. 2 36. o Had there been sufficient evidence of tampering in this case, it would still be highly improper for COMELEC to outrightly exclude the ERs. It should proceed according to Sec 235 of the OEC, which is similar to Sec 236 in that the COMELEC is authorized to open the ballot box as a measure of last resort.

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS DU v JAYOMA G.R. No. 175042 | 23 April 2012 Powers of Local Government Units DOCTRINE: Sangguiniang Bayan is empowered to authorize and license the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks; A license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is a mere privilege that may be revoked when public interest so requires.

FACTS: •

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The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Mabini enacted an Ordinance requiring the conduct of a public bidding for the operation of a cockpit in the municipality every 4 years. Due to failure of the winning bidder for the period of 1989-1992 to comply with the legal requirements, the SB authorized petitioner Du to continue his cockpit operation until the winning bidder complies with the requirements. r equirements. However, in 1997, the SB discovered that Du has been operating his cockpit in violation of the Ordinance. Hence, the Mayor of Mabini ordered Du to desist from holding any cockfighting activity effective immediately. Du filed a petition for prohibition with the RTC, claiming that he has a business permit to operate and that the order to desist deprived him of due process and was ultra vires as the Mayor enforced it without the review or approval of the SB.

ISSUE: Whether or not Du had a legal right to t o operate a cockpit in the municipality. HELD: No, the Sangguniang Bayan allowed Du to continue to operate his cockpit only because the winning bidder for the subject period failed to comply with the legal requirements for operation. Du’s authority to operate would end in 1992 or upon compliance of the win ning bidder, whichever comes first. The only reason he was able to continue until 1997 was due to the SB’s S B’s failure to monitor the status of the cockpit. •

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Even if he was able to get a business permit from the t he Mayor for 1997, he was still not duly authorized considering that no public bidding was conducted. Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the LGC provides that it is the SB which is empowered to authorize and license the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks. Hence, the SB had every reason to suspend the operation of Du’s cockpit. Moreover, a license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not property of which the holder may not be deprived without due process of law, but a mere privilege that may be revoked when public interest so requires.

REPUBLIC v RAMBUYONG G.R. No. 167810 | 4 October 2010 Concept of Public Corporations

DOCTRINE: The term “instrumentality” includes GOCCs—the GOCCs— the NPC is clearly an instrumentality of the government. A Sangguinian member cannot appear as counsel of a party adverse to the NPC, which is an instrumentality to the government.

FACTS: •

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Alfredo Chu filed a case for collection of sum of money against the National Power Corporation (NPC). Appearing Appearing as his counsel is Atty. Rambuyong, who was then the incumbent Vice-Mayor of Ipil, Zamboanga. NPC filed a Motion for Inhibition of Rambuyong, alleging that Section 90(b)(1) of the LGC prohibits Sanggunian members to appear as counsel wherein any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government so the adverse party. NPC, being a GOCC, is embraced within the term “instrumentality.”

ISSUE: Whether or not NPC is an instrumentality of government such that Atty. Rambuyong, as a Sanggunian member, should not appear as counsel against it.

HELD: Yes, Atty. Rambuyong cannot appear as counsel of a party adverse to the NPC, which is a government instrumentality. •

•

Section 446 of the LGC provides that the “Sangguiniang Bayan, the legislative body of the municipality, shall be composed of the municipal vice mayor as the presiding officer…” Whereas, Section 90(b)(1) of the LGC provides that, “All govern ors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation, other than the exercise of their functions as local executives… Sangunnian members who are also members of the Bar are also prohibited to appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a LGU or any office, agency or instrumentality of the government is an adverse party.” Thus, pursuant to Section 90(b)(1) of the LGC, Rambuyong, as Sanggunian member, cannot appear as counsel of a party adverse to the NPC, which is a government instrumentality. On the other hand, Section 2 of the Administrative Code of 1987 clearly defines an instrumentality to “include regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and GOCCs.” Hence, there is no room for construction. The law has to be applied as called for by the circumstances of the case. Following Section 2, NPC is clearly an instrumentality of the government. Moreover, the Court already categorically stated that NPC is a government instrumentality in Maceda in Maceda v Macaraig.

DIGITAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS v CANTOS G.R. No. 180200 | 25 November 2013

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Taxing Power of the Local Government Units DOCTRINE: Tax exemption must be clear and unequivocal, A taxpayer claiming a tax exemption must point to a specific provision of law conferring on the taxpayer, in clear and plain terms, exemption from a common burden. Any doubt whether a tax exemption exists is resolved against the taxpayer.

FACTS: •

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By virtue of RA 7678, petitioner was granted a legislative franchise to install, operate, and maintain telecommunications systems throughout the Philippines. Upon seeking renewal of its Mayor’s Permit to operate in Batangas, it was informed that its business operation would be restrained should it fail to pay the assessed real property taxes. As petitioner failed to pay, a Cease and Desist Order was issued enjoining petitioner from further operating its business. Petitioner thus filed a case for Annulment of the Order before the RTC. RT C. RTC granted the petition. It held that a Cease and Desist Order was without legal basis as enjoinment of petitioner’s business operation is not one of the remedies available to enforce collection of real property taxes under existing laws. Moreover, petitioner is only liable to pay real property taxes on properties not used in connection with the operation of its franchise. CA: Affirmed. Subsequently, the Provincial Treasurer of Batangas issued 7 Warrants of Levy. Petitioner wrote letters for the lifting of the Warrants, to no avail. Hence, it filed a Petition for Indirect Contempt with prayer of TRO. RTC granted the TRO. Respondent, however, manifested that when said TRO was served upon him, he had already affected public auction. Subsequently, Subsequently, RTC issued an Order denying the issuance of the WPI, a s such issuance has become moot and academic since the public auction sought to be enjoined was already consummated. Moreover, petitioner should have availed of the remedy under Sec 260 of the LGC in order to stop the scheduled auction sale— sale —that is, to pay delinquent tax and interest due thereon under protest.

ISSUE: Whether or not the real properties of petitioner, whether used in the furtherance of franchise or not, are subject to real property tax.

HELD: Yes, there is no grant of exemption in RA 7678. •

Petitioner failed to avail of any of the remedies provided under Sec 206 and 252 of RA 7160; namely, to avail of tax exemption or submit the requirements to establish that it is exempted from paying real property taxes, or to pay the assessed real property tax under protest. The availment of these remedies could have prevented respondent’s issuance of the Warrants of Levy and the conduct of the subsequent public auction sale of petitioner’s properties. Due to petitioner’s non -availment of these remedies, respondent therefore remained duty bound to perform such acts. Otherwise, he may be subjected to penalties prescribed for non-performance of his ministerial duties as provincial treasurer, to which he is bound to perform under Sec 176 and 177 of RA 7160.

REPUBLIC v DACLAN G.R. No. 197115 | 23 March 2015 Corporate Powers of the Local Government DOCTRINE: Devolution refers to the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the various LGUs to perform specific functions and responsibilities.

FACTS:

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The Agoo Breeding Station was established by the Department of Agriculture (DA), through the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI), for the purpose of breeding cattle that would be distributed to the intended beneficiaries, pursuant to the livelihood program of the national government. In support of said project, the Daclans executed deeds of donation donating 4 parcels of land. The deeds uniformly stipulated that the donated lands shall be used for the establishment of a breeding station and shall not be used for any other purpose, and that in case of nonuse, abandonment, or cessation of the activities of BAI, possession or ownership shall automatically revert to the Daclans. Subsequently, Subsequently, the powers and functions f unctions of certain government agencies, including those of the DA, were devolved to the LGUs. Thus, the Province of La Union (Province) assumed the powers and functions of the DA in the operation of the th e breeding station. Sometime after the donations were made, the La Union Medical Center (LUMC) was constructed within a portion of the donated properties. The Daclans demanded the return of their donated lands on the ground that BAI has ceased the operations of the breeding station and that the land has been abandoned. The Province refused, alleging that the breeding station still existed, although this time it is being operated by the Province, pursuant to the devolution program. The Daclans countered that the donated land cannot be assigned by the Republic to the Province as the deeds did not include Republic’s successors or assigns as intended beneficiaries.

ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer of the breeding station by the Republic to the Province violated the stipulations of the deeds of donation.

HELD: NO, the conditions of the donation were not violated as the breeding station remained operational. It is not violated by way of a valid devolution. While the breeding station may have been transferred to the Province as a consequence of the policy of devolution adopted by the government under the LGC, it remained operational and continued to function as a breeding station. The activities of BAI did not cease even after it was dissolved. Thus, the purpose for which the donations were made remained and was carried carr ied out. Devolution cannot have any effect on the donations made by the Daclans to the Republic. o As defined, “devolution refers to the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the various LGUs to perform specific functions and responsibilities.” o It includes the transfer to the LGUs of the records, equipment, and other assets and personnel of national agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers, functions, and responsibilities. Besides, the deed of donation did not specifically prohibit subsequent transfer of the o donated lands by the donee to the Republic. The argument of Daclan with regard to the supposed failure of the Province to provide “agricultural extension and onsite research services and facilities” as required under the IRR of the LGC c annot be made a ground for the reversion of the donated lands. On the contrary, to allow such would condone undue interference by private individuals in the operations of government. o The deeds of donation never stipulated that the Daclans may interfere in the management and operation of the breeding station. They could not even directly participate in the operations of the breeding station. o Even if BAI ceased to exist or was abolished as an office, the deeds of donation may not be nullified just by the fact that the BAI became defunct. Its activities continued when its functions were devolved to the LGUs, such as the th e Province of LU herein. With regard to LUMC: The portion in which it occupied was not donated by the Daclans, but by donors who are not parties in this case. Whatever the Daclans donated still remained part of the breeding station. Hence, no right of reversion accrues to them. •

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NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY REGIONAL AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD v. CA G.R. No. 165155 | 13 April 2010 Acquisition, Acquisition, Ownership and Transfer of Public and Private Lands DOCTRINE: Rules of Procedure in agrarian cases should be liberally construed for as long as the purpose is sufficiently met, and no violation of due process takes place.

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Respondents, co-owners of several parcels of land primarily devoted to rice production, filed a complaint for ejectment against petitioners for non-payment of rentals before the DARAB. They averred that petitioners were agricultural lessees while the petitioners themselves contend that they are farmer-beneficiaries under PD 27. When the complaint for ejectment was filed, the actual tillers on the land were the successors-ininterest of two of the named defendants (Pedro and Avelino) as they had died at the time of filing, and the same participated in the proceedings despite no formal substitution of party litigants. The Regional Adjudicator directed the petitioners to surrender possession of the land to the respondents as they could only retain their status as agricultural lessees if they complied with their statutory obligation to pay the required leasehold rentals. Upon appeal, the Regional Regional Adjudicator issued, in its May 6, 2003 Order, a writ of execution against the non-appealing defendants and deceased defendants. Dissatisfied, both respondents and petitioners moved for reconsideration of the order. The respondents argued that the appeal should not have been given due course because it did not adhere to Section 2, Rule XIII of the DARAB Rules of Procedure. On the other hand, the petitioners included in the writ of execution contended that said Order was hastily executed. In its August 5, 2003 Order, the Regional Adjudicator allowed the appeal of the heirs of the two decedents and nullified the writ of execution as regards to them. Respondents moved for reconsideration, but was denied in the November 13, 2003 Order which also ordered the sheriff to restore the farmholdings of the heirs of the deceased in view of the quashal of the writ of execution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the notices of appeal are mere scra ps of paper for failure to state the grounds relied upon for appeal and are null and void v oid for containing two falsified signatures.

HELD: No, the notices of appeal are valid. The defects found in the two notices of appeal are inconsequential inconsequential and are not of such nature that would cause a denial of the right to appeal. •

•

Under Section 2 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, it is provided that the rules should be liberally construed to carry out the objectives of the agrarian reform program and to promote just, expeditious and inexpensive settlement settlement of agrarian cases. There is nothing sacred about the forms of pleadings, for their sole purpose is to facilitate the application of justice to the claims of contending parties. Hence, pleadings as well as procedural rules should be construed liberally. Courts must proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of statutory appeal; they must ensure that all litigants are granted the amplest opportunity for the proper and just ventilation of their causes, free from technical constraints.

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Notices of appeal in DARAB cases only serve to inform the officer that rendered the appealed decision of the timeliness of the appeal, the general reason for such appeal, and to prepare the records for transmission to DARAB. D ARAB. o Both notices of appeal stated that the petitioners herein were appealing the decision on the grounds of questions of fact and law, which substantially s ubstantially complied with the ground for appeal under the DARAB rules. While the notices omitted to state that the decision would cause grave and irreparable injury, requiring a literal application of the rules when its purpose has already been served is a superfluity.

•

The Regional Adjudicator has no power to determine if the appeal was intended for delay as such matters are for the appellate body to determine after it has studied the appeal memorandum. This principle is applicable to agrarian disputes by virtue of Section 8, Rule XIII of the DARAB rules. Since the Board is the one which has the power to punish, it is also the one which has the power to decide if there has been a violation. When an appeal is timely filed, it becomes a ministerial duty to approve the same.

FERRER v. CARGANILLO G.R. No. 170956 | 12 May 2010 Acquisition, Acquisition, Ownership and Transfer of Public and Private Lands DOCTRINE: The use, enjoyment, occupation or disposition of private property is not absolute, , such as the prohibition against subleasing an agricultural lease, for it is predicated on the social functions of property

FACTS: •

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This case involved 4 separate complaints filed by Ferrer to several different respondents, one of the complaints alleging that Domingo Carganillo subleased the subject landholding to his brother Sergio without her knowledge and consent and that she only knew of this act when she found Sergio in possession and cultivation of the land (Carganillo case). Domingo denied that he had mortgaged his possessory rights to Sergio, asserting that he is still in actual, continuous, and peaceful possession of the property. In an investigation report, an officer of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office stated that the cultivation and possession of the landholding was subleased by Domingo to Sergio as the former was applying for work abroad. In support thereof, t hereof, a Katulagan was submitted in evidence showing that Sergio has been cultivating the land for more than 2 years prior to filing of the complaint. complaint. PARAD ruled that Ferrer failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there is subleasing or mortgage of the property by Domingo Carganillo. DARAB: Affirmed. Affirmed. It also held that the t he Katulagan is inadmissible in evidence as it was not formally offered before the PARAD. CA: Affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents in the 4 cases herein are guilty of subleasing an agricultural lease. HELD: Only the respondents in the Carganillo case were found guilty of subleasing and share-tenancy, which are prohibited by law. However, as to the respondents in the other 3 cases, the fact of subleasing was not sufficiently proven. Hence, the dismissal of the said cases was affirmed. •

In the Carganillo case herein, Ferrer has sufficiently proved the fact of subleasing by Domingo to Sergio. Such is prohibited, except in the case of illness or temporary incapacity of the agricultural

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lessee where he may employ laborers. As consequence of such, Domingo and Sergio should be dispossessed of the subject agricultural landholding. •

•

Dispossession is provided under Sec. 36 of the Agricultural Reform Code, that an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding, except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that the lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding. Similarly, Sec. 24 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act provides that it is unlawful for a share-tenant to employ a subtenant to furnish labor or any phase of the work required of him. Further, Section 4 of the Agricultural Reform Code declared all share tenancy to be contrary to public policy. With regard to the Katulagan, the Court ruled that DARAB also erred in disregarding it into evidence. The DARAB rules of procedure provide that the Agrarian Reform Adjudicators are not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence in the Rules of Court nor shall it apply suppletorily.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF MAXIMO PUYAT and GLORIA PUYAT G.R. No. 175055 | 27 June 2012 Acquisition, Acquisition, Ownership and Transfer of Public and Private Lands DOCTRINE: Where the agrarian reform process is still incomplete at the time of effectivity of RA 6657, the just compensation compensation should be determined and completed completed under under RA no. 6657, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect.

FACTS: •

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Gloria and Maximo Puyat were the registered owners of a parcel of riceland consi sting of 46.8731 hectares located in Cabanatuan City of which 44.3090 hectares DAR placed under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to PD 27. In 1989, DAR issued emancipation patents in favor of farmer beneficiaries which were annotated on the Puyat’s TCT, causing c ausing the partial cancellation of their title. They did not receive any compensation for the cancellation of title. 2 years after the DAR awarded the property to the farmer- beneficiaries, Land Bank received DAR’s instruction to pay just compensation and made an initial valuation, but the Puyats rejected the valuation for being low. Thus, the heirs of Puyat filed a complaint for determination and payment of just compensation with the RTC, praying that their property be valued instead at P100, 000 per hectare instead of the recommended P2, 012.50 per hectare. On the other hand, Land Bank and DAR argued that the valuation was made in compliance with the formula provided for lands acquired under PD 27 and EO 228, and that valuation should be made using the prevailing rates when PD 27 took effect. RTC ruled that the valuation of the property should be made in accordance with Section 17 of RA 6657. Based on the fact that the property could yield an average of 65 cavans per hectare, easily accessible and serviced by telecommunication telecommunication utilities, the reasonable compensation should be set at P100, 000 per hectare. A 6% legal interest was also imposed. imposed. CA held that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function which cannot be unduly restricted by requiring the courts to strictly adhere to a formula thus the courts can choose to rely on the factors enumerated in Section 17, RA 6657 even if these factors do not appear in PD 27 or EO 228. The 6% legal interest was also properly imposed as Puyats were deprived of property without receiving just compensation.

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Land Bank filed a petition for review, arguing that the just compensation must be valued at the time of taking of the property under the effectivity of PD 27, and not RA 6657. Furthermore, if PD 27 and EO 228 are to be applied, DAR AO no. 13 already provides for the 6% compounded interest, so the imposition of the legal interest is tantamount to double interest.

ISSUE: Whether or not lands acquired pursuant to PD 27 may be valued using the factors in Section 17 of RA 6657?

HELD: Yes, when the government takes property pursuant to PD 27 but does not pay the landowner his just compensation compensation until after RA 6657, it becomes more equitable equitable to determine the just compensation using using the latter. When the government takes property pursuant to PD 27 but does not pay the landowner his just compensation until after RA 6657 has taken effect, it becomes more equitable to determine the just compensation using RA 6657. Both the taking of Puyats’ property and the valuation for the just compensation made by Land Bank occurred during the effectivity of RA 6657. PD 27 only applies insofar as their gaps in RA 6657 but where the latter law is sufficient, PD 27 is superseded. Thus, Land Bank cannot insist on the application of PD 27 as it would render Section 17 of RA 6657 on determination of just compensation inutile. The lower courts also did not disregard the basic valuation formula in DAR AO no. 5 which implements Section 17 as it took into account the factors provided therein. While the courts should be mindful of the formula created by DAR, it is not strictly bound to adhere to the same. s ame. •

ISSUE: Whether or not it is proper to impose the 6% legal interest per annum on the unpaid just compensation?

HELD: Yes, but only because the respondents did not contest the interest award. •

As to the interest rate awarded for Land Bank’s delay, the trial courts did not ap ply DAR AO no. 13 so the lower courts’ imposition of the 6% interest cannot constitute a double imposition of a legal interest. Current jurisprudence furthermore sets the interest rate for delay in payments in agrarian cases at 12% per annum but even if this is so, the heirs of Puyat did not contest the interest awarded by the lower courts. Hence, the interest rate imposed by the lower courts should not be disturbed.

LADANO v. NERI G.R. No. 178622 | 12 November 2012 Acquisition, Acquisition, Ownership and Transfer of Public and Private Lands DOCTRINE: For a tenancy relationship, express or implied, to exist, the following requisites must be present: (1) the parties must be landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is consent by the landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (6) there is sharing of harvests between the landowner and the tenant.

FACTS: •

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Ladano filed a complaint against Neri, Soto, Espanola and Blanco before the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator, alleging that respondents forcibly entered the 2-hectare land which he an d his family have been peaceably occupying and cultivating since 1970. He maintained that he has been a possessor in good faith for more than 30 years and cannot be removed without being compensated for the improvements he introduced. Neri countered that Ladano does not have nor did he allege a leasehold arrangement with him.

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The Provincial Adjudicator dismissed the case, ruling that the 2-hectare property, while agricultural, is not covered by RA 6657 which only covers agricultural properties beyond 5 hectares nor covered by PD 27 as the property was not planted with rice or corn. It was also not covered by tenancy laws. DARAB held that Ladano’s 30-year 30 -year occupation and cultivation of the land could not have possibly escaped the landowner’s notice and acquiesced Ladano’s actions, thus c reating an implied tenancy. Respondents, Respondents, as landowners, has the burden to prove that Ladano was a mere intruder which they failed to discharge. CA held that there is no evidence to support the conclusion that a tenancy relationship exists between Ladano and Neri as the burden, which lies with the person who is asserting the existence of a tenancy relationship, was not sufficiently discharged by Ladano.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ladano is an agricultural tenant of the landholding th e same could not be presumed HELD: No, there was no claim of tenancy made in the allegations and so the by the court. There is no tenancy relationship between Ladano and Neri. A tenancy relationship arises between a landholder and a tenant once they agree, expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to the landholder, as a result of which relationship the tenant acquires the right to continue working on and cultivating the land. For a tenancy relationship, express or implied, to exist, the following requisites must be present: (1) the parties must be landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is consent by the landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (6) there is sharing of harvests between the landowner and the tenant. te nant. The DARAB erroneously failed to consider that occupancy and cultivation of agricultural land will not render one a de jure tenant. jure tenant. Ladano did not even allege that he is a tenant of the landowner nor did he allege that he shared his harvests with the landowner. Anent such factual bases, Ladano is not a tenant on the land is not entitled to security of tenure. •

HEIRS OF LAZARO GALLARDO v. SOLIMAN G.R. No. 178952 | 10 April 2013 Acquisition, Acquisition, Ownership and Transfer of Public and Private Lands DOCTRINE: While the tenant is emancipated from bondage to the soil, the landowner is entitled to his just compensation for the deprivation of his land.

FACTS: •

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Lazaro Jr. and Proseperidad Gallardo, two of the heirs of Gallardo, Gallar do, are the registered owners of a parcel of land in Tarlac placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer pursuant to PD 27. Respondent Respondent Porferio Soliman was instituted as a qualified farmer tenant-transferee. The heirs of Gallardo filed a complaint for collection of land amortizations, dispossession, ejectment and cancellation of the Deed of Transfer Tr ansfer and Emancipation Patent against Porferio before the PARAD, alleging that under a Kasunduan, Porferio obliged himself to pay to them 99 cavans of palay of which 66 cavans were deducted as advance payment, but that he fell short. Despite Porferio’s refusal to pay amortizations, the Tarlac PARO still issued him Emancipation Patents. PARAD ruled that the failure of the respondents to pay rentals cannot be considered deliberate because they labored under the honest belief that they are now vested with absolute ownership. DARAB affirmed. CA held that Porferio’s failure and refusal to pay the ann ual amortizations were deliberate and necessitated the cancellation of his title.

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ISSUE: Whether or not CA properly dismissed the th e petition for review? HELD: No, there is a need for the CA to resolve the issue regarding the Emancipation Patents and their validity. •

The case should be remanded for proper disposition whether the Emancipation Patents issued in respondents’ names are valid. As the farmer-tenant farmer -tenant transferee of the land under PD 27, Porferio is required to make amortizations on the land until he completes payment of the fixed price. Under the Kasunduan and Kasunduan and Deed of Transfer, he has to make good on his payments but if he fails to pay, cancellation of any certificate of land transfer or emancipation patent issued in his name is proper based on Sec. 2, PD 816. Moreover, when one party enters into a covenant with another, one must perform his obligations with fealty and good faith. This becomes more imperative where such party has been given a grant, such as land, under the land reform laws. While the tenant is emancipated from bondage to the soil, the landowner is entitled to his just compensation for the deprivation of his land.

GARCIA v. ROBLES VDA. DE CAPARAS G.R. No. 180843 | 17 April 2013 Acquisition, Acquisition, Ownership and Transfer of Public and Private Lands DOCTRINE: Any modification to the lease agreement must be made with the consent of both parties, even those who have been instituted as substitutes, and an d must not violate their right to security of tenure. t enure.

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Makapugay is the owner of a 2.5-hectare farm in Bulacan which is being tilled by Eugenio Caparas as agricultural lessee under a leasehold agreement. Before she passed away, she appointed Amanda dela Paz-Perlas as her attorney-in-fact. After Eugenio died, Amanda and Pedro, Eugenio’s son, entered into an agricultural leasehold contract whereby Pedro was installed as the lone agricultural lessee. In 1979, Amanda instituted Vda. De Caparas as the replacement of Pedro. The landowners (Amanda et al) and Pedro’s sisters entered into a Kasunduan whereby Pedro’s sisters were acknowledged as his co-lessees. Pedro’s sisters filed a complaint for nullification of leasehold and restoration of rights as agricultural lessees against Pedro’s heirs and surviving spouse, a lleging that notwithstanding the terms of the 1979 agreement, Pedro and his sisters were really co-lessees. They base this contention on the agreement entered with Pedro that they would alternately farm the land. PARAD, DARAB denied the petition, declaring Vda. De Caparas as the lawful successor-tenant. CA ruled that the cancellation of the survey plans reverts the property to its original classification as agricultural land which vindicates the leasehold agreements of the parties. However, the petitioners argue that the land has been re-classified as residential land.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners had a right as co-lessees based on the verbal admission of Pedro? HELD: No, the execution of a leasehold contract supersedes an extrajudicial verbal admission. •

Part of the duties as a landowner’s representative is to know the personal circumstances of the lessee so Amanda was duty-bound under Section 9 of RA 3844 to decide who would succeed as agricultural lessee. When she executed the 1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract with Pedro, she is deemed to have chosen the latter as Eugenio’s successor, and is presumed to have diligently performed her duties, as Makapugay’s representative, in conducting an inquiry prior to making the choice. As to the petitioners, if it was true that they entered into an arrangement with Pedro to alternately till the land, they were obliged to inform Makapugay or Amanda, but they did not do so. They even allowed 17 years to pass before revealing revealing the claimed alternate farming agreement.

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Thus, the 1996 Kasunduan between Amanda and petitioners, grounded on Pedro’s inadmissible verbal admission and entered into without Dominga’s consent, constitutes undue infringement of Dominga’s rights as Pedro’s successor in interest and operates operat es to deprive her of such rights and dispossesses her of leasehold against her will. Furthermore, Dominga is entitled to security of tenure and any modification of the lease agreement must be done with the consent of both parties without prejudicing her security of tenure.

CODERIAS v. ESTATE OF JUAN CHIOCO G.R. No. 180476 | 26 June 2013 Acquisition, Acquisition, Ownership and Transfer of Public and Private Lands DOCTRINE: Although a cause of action is deemed prescribed if filed beyond the 3-year period, the same cannot be legally invoked and the security of tenure of a tenant is deemed uninterrupted if the eviction was due to force.

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Coderias was a tiller of a farm owned by Chioco. Several individuals connected with Chioco threatened to kill Coderias if he did not leave the farm, so he eventually left. Upon learning of Chioco’s death, Coderias and his family re -established themselves on the farm. He filed with the DARAB a petition against Chioco’s estate praying that his possession and cultivation of the farm be respected, and the agricultural leasehold contract be executed. The Estate of Juan Chioco moved to dismiss the same, contend ing that Coderias’ cause of action had gone beyond the 3-year period for filing claims since the alleged dispossession took place in 1980 but the petition was filed only in 1995. On the other hand, Coderias argued that his tenure was uninterrupted since his departure was due to threats. PARAD dismissed on the ground of prescription. DARAB ruled to maintain Coderias in his possession of the land. CA held that the action had prescribed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Estate of Chioco had a right to claim prescription of Coderias’ cause of action. action . HELD: No. A CLT, which serves as a provisional title of ownership, had already been issued in favor of Coderias. The farm is considered expropriated and placed under the coverage of the land reform law. As such, the Estate had neither the right to evict Coderias nor to claim prescription. •

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It is undisputed that a Certificate of Land Tenancy (CLT) was issued in favor of Coderias. Thus, he already had an expectant right to the farm. It serves as a provisional title of ownership over the land while the lot owner is awaiting full payment of just compensation for as long as the tenantfarmer is an amortizing owner. At any rate, rate , the failure to immediately file was due d ue to Chioco’s own threats and intimidation. If the Court allows prescription to set in, it would lead to an absurd situation wherein a tenant who was unlawfully deprived of his landholding would be barred from pursuing his rightful claim against the transgressor. Section 8 of RA 3844 provides that the agricultural leasehold relation shall be extinguished only under any of the following three circumstances: (1) abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural lessor; (2) voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, written notice of which shall be served three months in advance; or (3) absence of the persons under Section 9 to succeed the lessee. None of the circumstances applied herein. Furthermore, Section 38 provides that an action to enforce any cause of action shall be barred if not commenced within 3 years after such cause of action accrued. In this case, the cause of action only

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accrued upon Coderias’ knowledge of Chioco’s death. Fo r as long as the intimidation and threats to Coderias’ life and limb existed, he had a cause of action against Chioco to enforce the recognition of this juridical tie.

BUMAGAT v. ARRIBAY G.R. No. 194818 | 9 June 2014 Acquisition, Acquisition, Ownership and Transfer of Public and Private Lands qualify as an agrarian dispute and DOCTRINE: A case involving agricultural land does not immediately qualify does not immediately make the possessor an agricultural tenant which would bring it into the jurisdiction of DARAB.

FACTS: •

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The petitioners Bumagat, registered owners of an agricultural land, filed a complaint for forcible entry against Arribay with the MCTC, alleging that the latter ousted them of their lawful possession of the property through the use of intimidation. Arribay claimed that the subject properties are agricultural lands which should be under the jurisdiction of the DARAB. MCTC denied Arribay’s MTD as the pleadings failed to show the existence of a tenancy relationship that would bring the dispute within the jurisdiction of DARAB; based on evidence, Bumagats were in actual possession of the land. RTC affirmed. CA held that the dispute fell under the jurisdiction of the DARAB since the Bumagat’s titles were obtained pursuant to PD 27 and an d that correction and cancellation cance llation of Certificates of Land Ownership Awards registered with the LRA fall under said s aid jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the dispute falls under the jurisdiction of the DARAB? HELD: No, absence of a tenancy relationship between the contesting parties divests the DARAB of jurisdiction. There is no tenancy or agrarian arrangement existing between the Bumagats and Arribay. A case involving agricultural land does not immediately qualify as an agrarian dispute and does not immediately make the possessor an agricultural tenant. For the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over the case, there must exist a tenancy relation between the parties which is established when the following requisites are present: 1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring bri ng about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. •

OFILADA v. ANDAL G.R. No. 192270 | 26 January 2015 Acquisition, Acquisition, Ownership and Transfer of Public and Private Lands DOCTRINE: The fact of working on another’s land does not raise the presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy as the same must be proven through the establishment that the parties are the landowner and the tenant; the subject is agricultural land; there is consent by the landowner; the purpose is agricultural production; there is personal cultivation; cultivation; and that there is sharing of the harvests.

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FACTS: •

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Ofilada, together with her husband, brought from the heirs of Teresita Liwag a parcel of land principally planted with rambutan and coconut trees, evidenced by an extra -judicial settlement of estate with absolute sale wherein Miraflor Andal signed as “tenant”. Ten days prior to the said sale, Andal appeared before the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council Chairman and executed a Pagpapatunay stating Pagpapatunay stating that the land would be transferred to Ofilada. Two weeks after the said sale, Miraflor executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein Salaysay wherein she acknowledged acknowledged the Ofiladas as the new owner of the property and waived any tenancy rights she might have. Eight years later, Ofilada filed a complaint for ejectment and damages before the MTC against spouses Andal, averring that the spouses were mere caretakers of her lands and as such, there is no agrarian dispute. On the other hand, spouses Andal claimed that they were tenants of Irene’s predecessor in interest and continued to be such despite the transfer of ownership of the properties and that DARAB should have jurisdiction, not the MTC. MTC ruled that spouses Andal failed to adduce ad duce proof that they are tenants. RTC affirmed. CA held that the existence of tenancy relations between previous owners and spouses Andal was undisputed, the question of whether they can be dispossessed constitutes an agrarian dispute despite the severance of such relations, so jurisdiction remains with DARAB.

ISSUE: Whether or not a tenancy relationship between Ofilada and spouses Andal exists as to strip the MTC of its jurisdiction over the suit for unlawful detainer?

HELD: No, the relationship was severed prior to the purchase by way of an express declaration. •

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The tenancy relationship between the former owners of the properties and the spouses Andal was clearly severed prior to Irene’s purchase of the same. Both the Pagpapatunay Pagpapatunay and Sinumpaang Salaysay contain Salaysay contain express declarations which evidence that at the time the property was bought by Ofilada, the tenancy relationship between spouses Andal and Liwag had already ceased and that no such relations would would continue between between spouses Andal and Ofilada. Ofilada. Furthermore, Miraflor executed her Pagpapatunay stating that she and an d her parents have h ave received sufficient consideration for her to release her landlord and new purchaser from liability. As such, no relationship was subsequently subsequently created between Irene and spouses Andal. As to whether a new tenancy relationship exists between Ofilada and spouses Andal, there was dearth of evidence to prove that a tenurial relationship exists. The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. The fact alone of working on another’s landholding does not raise a presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy. For tenancy to be proven, all indispensable elements must be established, namely: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; 2) the subject is agricultural land; 3) there is consent by the landowner; 4) the purpose is agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation; and 6) there is sharing of the harvests. The first and sixth element were not sufficiently proven, thus no tenancy relationship so the action to dispossess spouses Andal is cognizable by MT C.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPOUSES CHU G.R. No. 192345 | 29 March 2017

Acquisition, Acquisition, Ownership and Transfer of Public and Private Lands DOCTRINE: Consideration of the valuation factors under Section 17 of RA 6657 and the formula under DAR A.O. No. 05-98 s mandatory in ascertaining just compensation for purposes of agrarian reform r eform cases.

FACTS:

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Spouses Chu were the registered owners of two parcels of land which were acquired by the government pursuant to PD no. 27 and RA 6657 which LBP valued. Said spouses rejected LBP’s valuation so summary administrative proceedings were conducted before the PARAD to determine the just compensation. PARAD recomputed the valuations of the RA 6657-acquired property and PD 27-acquired property at P1,542,360 and P983,663.94, respectively, but LBP was dissatisfied so it filed a petition for determination of just compensation before the RTC. RTC set the just compensation at P2,313,478 for the RA-acquired property and P1,155,173 for the PD 27-acquired land, taking cognizance of the factors considered cons idered by LBP. CA held that LBP failed to consider the rising risi ng values of the lands in Pilar, Sorsogon which resulted from the economic developments in coming up with value for the RA 6657-acquired land. LBP contends that CA improperly relied on extraneous factors and should have mandatorily applied the formula provided in DAR AO no. 05-98.

ISSUE: Whether or not the valuation factors under Section 17 of RA 6657 and DAR AOs were followed. HELD: No, the mandatory valuation factors were not complied with. Thus, the case was remanded to the RTC for proper determination of just compensation. •

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Consideration of the valuation factors under Section 17 of RA 6657 and the formula under DAR A.O. No. 05-98 s mandatory in ascertaining just compensation for purposes of agrarian reform cases, the judge ought to take into full into full consideration the consideration the factors specifically identified identified therein and its implementing rules. Otherwise, Otherwise, the judge runs the risk of violating the agrarian reform law should he choose not to use the formula laid down by the DAR for the determination d etermination of just compensation. However, the valuation of P263,928.57 as just compensation for the RA 6657-acquired property should not be sustained for failure to substantiate the same. The formula used sufficiently established the capitalized net income, but not the market value component. The LBP also did not present any testimonial evidence before the RTC which could explain or corroborate how it came up with the figures and what credence ought to be accorded to them. Further, the valuations fixed by PARAD and RTC were in disregard of the formula in DAR AO 05-98, as only the comparable sales factor was considered. In sum, the respective evidence of both parties is insufficient to come up with a correct computation on the just compensation to which respondents are entitled. e ntitled. The Court noted that it is equally glaring that none of the tribunals below took into full consideration the consideration the factors laid down in Section 17 of RA 6657. As such, the case was remanded to the RTC for determination of just compensation strictly in accordance with the guidelines.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. SUSIE IRENE GALLE G.R. No. 171836 | 11 August 2014 Acquisition, Acquisition, Ownership and Transfer of Public and Private Lands DOCTRINE: It has been the consistent pronouncement of this Court that the determination of just compensation is basically a judicial function. Also, it is settled that in the computation of just compensation for land taken for agrarian reform, both Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988/CARL) and the formula prescribed in the applicable Administrative Order of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) should be considered.

FACTS:

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Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) filed a Motion for Reconsideration ar guing that it was improper for this Court to declare null and void the Decision in DARAB Case No. JC-RIX-ZAMBO-0011-CO, which fixed just compensation on the basis of outdated 1991 data instead of valuation criteria as of 1993, the time of taking of the subject property; that said October 15, 1996 DARAB Decision is already final and executory and thus beyond judicial review, even by this Court; and that even if it were to be assumed that said DARAB Decision is null and void, it nonetheless cannot be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration insisting that the October 15, 1996 DARAB Decision is correct; that the 1991 valuation is accurate since the actual taking of Galle's property for purposes of fixing just compensation may be said to have occurred at that time when the Notice of Coverage was served upon Galle; that a property valuation discrepancy of three years is not significant in the determination of just compensation due to the owner of expropriated property; and that the DARAB Decision, being correct and havi ng attained finality, shall prevail as regards the amount of just compensation to be paid for Galle's expropriated property.

ISSUE: Whether or not DARAB’S decision on the determination of just compensation is already final and executory, thus beyond judicial review?

HELD: No, the determination of just compensation is primarily a judicial function. •

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The Court finds nothing wrong with using the appreciation and depreciation rate factor of 5% employed by bank appraisers, in the absence of official DAR data/evidence or any other reliable method and given the DAR's incompetence in handling Galle's case and the unjust consequences that resulted from such inefficiency and neglect. After all, Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL) provides that - Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. Compensation. - In determining determining just compensation, compensation, the cost of acquisition acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land la nd shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation. Out of regard for the DAR's expertise as the concerned implementing agency, courts should henceforth consider consider the factors stated in Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, as translated into the applicable DAR formulas in their determination of just compensation for the properties covered by the said law. If, in the exercise of their judicial ju dicial discretion, courts find that a strict application of said formulas is not warranted under the specific circumstances of the case before them, they may deviate or depart therefrom, provided that this departure or deviation is supported by a reasoned explanation grounded on the evidence on record. In other oth er words, courts of law possess the power to make a final determination of just compensation.

SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS LUCIA RODRIGUEZ AND PRUDENCIA RODRIGUEZ v. TERESITA V. SALVADOR G.R. No. 171972|8 June 2011 Concept of Social Justice POLITICAL LAW – SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS – CONCEPT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE

DOCTRINE: Agricultural tenancy exists when all the following requisites are present:

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1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6)


The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; lessee; The subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; There is consent between the parties to the relationship; The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and The harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee.

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Teresita V. Salvador filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against petitioners Lucia (Lucia) and Prudencia Rodriguez, mother mother and daughter before MTC, alleging that: a. She is the absolute owner of a parcel of land covered by an OCT issued by virtue of Free Patent in the name of the Heirs of Cristino Salvador represented represented by Teresita Salvador; b. Petitioners acquired possession of the subject land by mere tolerance of her predecessorsin-interest; and c. Despite several verbal and written demands made by her, petitioners refused to vacate the subject land. In their Answer, Petitioners interposed the defense of agricultural tenancy – that she and her deceased husband, Serapio, entered the subject land with the consent and permission of respondent’s predecessors-in-interest, predecessors -in-interest, and under the agreement that Lucia and Serapio would devote the property to agricultural production and share the produce with the Salvador siblings.

ISSUE: Whether or not agricultural tenancy relationship exist in this case . HELD: No, petitioners failed to prove consent and sharing of harvest between the parties. •

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The statements in the affidavits presented by the petitioners are not sufficient to prove the existence of an agricultural tenancy. o The element of consent is lacking. Except for the self-serving affidavit of Lucia, no other evidence was submitted to show that respondent’ respondent ’s predecessors-in-interest consented to a tenancy relationship with petitioners. o Petitioners also failed to prove sharing of harvest. They should have presented receipts or any other evidence to show that there was sharing s haring of harvest and that there was an agreed system of sharing between them and the landowners. o Mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land will not ipso facto make the tiller an agricultural tenant. It is incumbent upon a person who claims to be an agricultural tenant to prove by substantial evidence all the requisites of agricultural tenancy However, the only damage that can be recovered by respondent is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property the only issue raised in ejectment cases is that of rightful possession; hence, the damages which could be recovered are those which the respondent could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property.

VICENTE ADRIANO v. ALICE TANCO, et. al. G.R. No. 168164| July 5, 2010 Concept of Social Justice DOCTRINE: Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises between a landowner and a tenant once they agree, expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to the landowner, as a result of which relationship the tenant acquires the right to continue working on and cultivating the land.

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FACTS: •

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Respondent Alice Tanco (Alice) purchased a parcel of land located in Norzagaray, Bulacan. The land was devoted to mango plantation. Later on, it was partitioned among the respondents (Alice and her three children, namely, Geraldine, Ronald, and Patrick). Alice Ali ce sent sent to Vicente a letter informing him that subject landholding is not covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). She asked him to vacate the property. Vicente filed before the regional office of DARAB a Complaint for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. He averred that in 1970, Arsenio, the husband of Alice, instituted him as tenant-caretaker of the entire mango plantation. Since then, he has been performing all phases of farm works, such as clearing, pruning, smudging, and spraying of the mango trees. The fruits were then divided equally between them. Respondents denied having instituted any tenant on their property. They stressed that Vicente never worked and has no employer-employee relationship with Geraldine, Ronald, and Patrick. Insofar as Alice is concerned, respondents asserted that Vicente is not a tenant but a mere regular farm worker.

ISSUE: Whether or not Vicente is a tenant HELD: No, the essential element of consent is sorely missing because there is no proof that the landowners recognized Vicente, or that they hired him, as their legitimate tenant. • The existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed and allegations that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. For tenancy relationship to exist, the following essential requisites must be present: (1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) The subject matter is agricultural land; (3) There is consent between the parties; (4) The purpose is agricultural production; (5) There is personal cultivation by the tenant; and, (6) There is sharing of the harvests between the parties. All the requisites must concur in order to establish the existence of tenancy relationship, and the absence of one or more requisites is fatal. Likewise, the essential requisite of sharing of harvests is lacking. Independent evidence, such as receipts, must be presented to show that there was s haring of the harvest between the landowner and the tenant. Self-serving statements are not sufficient. In the case at bench, aside from being self-serving, some of the allegations of Vicente are contradicted by the evidence on record. While he claims that Arsenio instituted him as tenant in 1970 and has since then occupied and cultivated respondent’ respondent’s landholdings, the Deed of Absolute Sale presented by the latter indubitably shows that Alice (or the Tanco family) acquired the same only in 1975. •

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1_Political_and_International_Law.pdf

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