EXTERNAL AIDS FOR INTERPRETATION UNDER THE INDIAN LAW
For the purpose of construction or interpretation, the court obviously has to take recourse to various internal and external aids. “Internal aids” mean those materials which are available in the statute itself, though they may not be part of enactment. These internal aids include, long title, preamble, headings, marginal notes, illustrations, punctuation, proviso, schedule, transitory provisions, etc. hen internal aids are not ade!uate, court has to take recourse to external aids. It may be parliamentary material, historical background, reports of a committee or a commission, official statement, dictionary meanings, foreign decisions, etc.
The "upreme #ourt has accepted the necessity of external aids in interpretation of statutory provision. $.#hennappa %eddy &. in B. Prabhakar Rao and others v State o A.P. and others , '
has observed (
“Where “Where internal internal aids are not forthc forthcomi oming, ng, we can always have recourse recourse to extern external al aids aids to discover discover the object of the legislati legislation. on. External aids are not ruled out. This is now a well settled principle of modern statutory construction.” para !"
%ece %ecent ntly ly,, in D!str!"t #!n!n$ O!"er and others v Tata Iron % Stee& 'o. and another ) "upreme #ourt has observed(
“#t is also a cardinal principle principle of construction that external aids are are brought in by widening the concept of context as including not only other enacting provisions provisions of the same statute, statute, but its preamble, the existing state of law, other statutes in pari materia and the mischief which the statute was intended to remedy.” para $%"
"o far as admissibility and utility of these external aids are concerned, law is almost settled in our country now. The "upreme #ourt in (.P. )ar$hese v In"o*e Ta+ O!"er Ernak,&a* * has stated that interpretation of statute being an exercise in the ascertainment of meaning, everything which is logically relevant should be admissible. '
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Following are some known external aids, which are admissible for the interpretation of statutory provisions(
-/ Par&!a*entar0 *ater!a&
0a1 4ebates
#ourts often take recourse to parliamentary material like debates in #onstituent +ssembly, speeches of the movers of the 5ill, %eports of #ommittees or #ommission, "tatement of $b6ects and %easons of the 5ill, etc. +s per traditional 7nglish view, these parliamentary material or 8ansard were inadmissible as external aids, on the basis of &exclusionary rule' . This “exclusionary rule” was slowly given up and finally in Pe11er v Hart9 it was held that parliamentary material or 8ansard may be admissible as an external aid for interpretation of a statute, sub6ect to parliamentary privilege, under following circumstances: where 0a1 legislation is ambiguous or obscure or leads to an absurdity: 0b1 the material relied on consists of one or more statements by a minister or other promoter of the 5ill, together, if necessary, with such other parliamentary material as is necessary to understand such statements and their effect: and 0c1 the statements relied on are clear.
Indian #ourts, in early days followed the &exclusionary rule' which prevailed in 7ngland and refused to admit parliamentary material or #onstituent +ssembly debates for the purpose of interpretation of statutory or constitutional provision 0see State o Travan"ore2 'o"h!n and others v Bo*ba0 'o. Ltd.3: As3!n! (,*ar 4hose and another v Arb!nda Bose and another .1 8owever, in subse!uent cases, the "upreme #ourt relaxed this &exclusionary rule' ,
much before the law laid down in 7ngland in ;
rishna Iyer &. in State o #0sore v R.). B!do12 !uoted a passage from #rawford on "tatutory #onstruction 0page *-*1 in which
exclusionary rule was critici?ed. The relevant passage is ! uoted below(@ 9
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“The rule of Exclusion has been critici(ed by jurists as artificial. The trend of academic opinion and the practice in the European system suggests that interpretation of statute being an exercise in the ascertainment of meaning, everything which is logically relevant should be admissible”
>rishna Iyer &. has observed in this case(@
“There is a strong case for whittling down the )ule of Exclusion followed in the *ritish courts and for less apologetic reference to legislative proceedings and li+e materials to read the meaning of the words of a statute.” para "
In this regard, 5hagwati &. 0as he then was1 in Fa$, Sha3 et". v The State o West Ben$a& - has stated(
“-ince the purpose of interpretation is to ascertain the real meaning of a constitutional provision, it is evident that nothing that is logically relevant to this process should be excluded from consideration. #t was at one time thought that the speeches made by the members of the onstituent /ssembly in the course of the debates of the 0raft onstitution were wholly inadmissible as extraneous aids to the interpretation of a constitutional provision, but of late there has been a shift in this position and following the recent trends in juristic thought in some of the Western countries and the 1nited -tates, the rule of exclusion rigidly followed in /nglo /merican jurisprudence has been considerably diluted2 We may therefore legitimately refer to the onstituent /ssembly debates for the purpose of ascertaining what was the object which the onstitution ma+ers had in view and what was the purpose which they intended to achieve when they enacted cls 3" and !" in their present form.” para 3"
+gain in R.S. Na0ak v A.R. Ant,&a0 the "upreme #ourt observed in this regard(
-
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“2Therefore, it can be confidently said that the exclusionary rule is flic+ering in its dying embers in its native land of birth and has been given a decent burial by this ourt.” para 43"
The "upreme #ourt in a numbers of cases referred to debates in the #onstituent +ssembly for interpretation of #onstitutional provisions. %ecently, the "upreme #ourt in S.R. 'ha,dh,r! v State o P,n5ab and others '/ has stated that it is a settled position that debates in the #onstituent
+ssembly may be relied upon as an aid to interpret a #onstitutional provision because it is the function of the #ourt to find out the intention of the framers of the #onstitution. 0para **1
5ut as far as speeches in
referred to for the purpose of finding out the ob6ect intended to be achieved by the 5ill 0see (.S. Par!1oornan6s "ase .') &. ". Cerma & 0as he then was1 in R.7. Prabhoo -Dr./ v. P.(. (,nte '*
made extensive reference to the speech of the then Aaw Binister "hri +.>. "en for construing the word &his' occurring in sub@section 0*1 of section ')* of the %epresentation of
"imilarly, "upreme #ourt in P.). Nars!*ha Rao v State
'9
agreeing with the view taken in
“#t would thus be seen that as per the decisions of this ourt, the statement of the 5inister who had moved the *ill in 6arliament can be loo+ed at to ascertain mischief sought to be remedied by the legislation and the object and purpose for which the legislation is enacted. The statement of the 5inister who had moved the *ill in 6arliament is not ta+en into account for the purpose of interpreting the provision of the enactment.” 6ara !!". '/
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The "upreme #ourt in S,sh!&a Ran! v 'IT and another '3 referred to the speech of the Binister to find out the ob6ect of &7ar 8ivad -amadhan -cheme $99%' .
0b1 "tatement of $b6ects and %easons
"o far as "tatement of $b6ects and %easons, accompanying a legislative bill is concerned, it is permissible to refer to it for understanding the background, the antecedent state of affairs, the surrounding circumstances in relation to the statute and the evil which the statute sought to remedy. 5ut, it cannot be used to ascertain the true meaning and effect of the substantive provision of the statute. 04evadoss 0dead1 by A. Rs8 v. )eera #aka&! A**an (o!& Atha&,r '.
0c1 %eports of
to the very same report of the "pecial #ommittee 0'*/@*'1 for construing the provisions of section of the
'3
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(hare)/1. "imilarly, the "upreme #ourt in Ros0 and another v State o (era&a and others )'
considered Aaw #ommission of India, 9'st %eport for interpretation of section )// 0)1 of the #ode of #riminal
-:/ Reeren"e to other stat,tes
It is a settled principle that for the purpose of interpretation or construction of a statutory provision, courts can refer to or can take help of other statutes. It is also known as statutory aids. The Deneral #lauses +ct, '-2 is an example of statutory aid. +part from this, #ourt can take recourse to other statutes which are in pari mataria i.e. statute dealing with the same sub6ect matter or forming part of the same system. "upreme #ourt in #ommon #ause, A Re$!stered So"!et0 v Un!on o Ind!a )) took recourse to section '*+ and '* 0951 of the Income Tax +ct
'' for the purpose of interpretation of 7xplanation I to section 22 0'1 of the %epresentation of the
The application of this rule of construction has the merit of avoiding any contradiction between a series of statutes dealing with the same sub6ect: it allows the use of an earlier statute to throw light on the meaning of a phrase used in a later statute in the same context. $n the same logic when words in an earlier statute have received an authoritative exposition by a superior court, use of same words in similar context in a later statute will give rise to a presumption that the legislature intends that the same interpretation should be followed for construction of those words in the later statute. 0see Ben$a& I*,n!t0 'o. Ltd. v State o B!har )*1. 8owever, a later statute is normally not used as an aid to construction of an earlier statute, but when an earlier statue is truly ambiguous: a later statute may in certain circumstances serve as a parliamentary exposition of the former.
-;/ Usa$es and Pra"t!"e )/
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Esages and practice developed under a statute is indicative of the meaning ascribed to its words by contemporary opinion and in case of an ancient statute, such reference to usage and practice is an admissible external aid to its construction. 5ut this principle is not applicable to a modern statute and it is confined to the construction of ambiguous language used in old statute. This principle of ;contemporanea exposito= was applied by the "upreme #ourt in Nat!ona& and 4r!nd&a0s Bank v #,n!"!1a& 'or1orat!on or 4reater Bo*ba0 )9 while construing 5ombay
Bunicipal #orporation +ct, '---. The apex court also referred to the actual practice in the matter of appointment of 6udges of "upreme #ourt and 8igh #ourt in the context of interpreting +rticles 29 and ')9 of the #onstitution and observed that the practice being in conformity with the constitutional scheme should be accorded legal sanction by permissible constitutional interpretation. 0see S,1re*e 'o,rt Advo"ates on Re"ord Asso"!at!on v Un!on o Ind!a .1)3
-
hen a word is not defined in the statute itself, it is permissible to refer to dictionaries to find out the general sense in which that word is understood in common parlance. 0"ee #,n!"!1a& Board Sarahan1,r v I*1er!a& Taba""o o Ind!a Ltd. .) 8owever, in the selection of one out
of the various meanings of a word, regard must always be had to the scheme, context and legislative history.
-=/ Fore!$n De"!s!ons
For the purpose of construction of Indian statutes, courts also refer to decisions of foreign courts which are following same system of 6urisprudence as ours. The assistance of such decisions is sub6ect to the !ualification that prime importance is always to be given to the language of the relevant Indian statute, the circumstances and the setting in which it is enacted and the relevant conditions in India where it is to be applied. These foreign decisions have persuasive value only and are not binding on Indian courts and where guidance is available from binding Indian )9
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decisions, reference to foreign decisions is of no use 0see Foraso& v ON4' )2: 4enera& E&e"tr!" 'o. v. Ren,sa$ar Po3er 'o .)-.
hile interpreting provisions relating to fundamental rights contained in the Indian #onstitution, "upreme #ourt took much assistance from +merican precedents. In case where an International #onvention is involved, it is obviously desirable that decisions in different 6urisdictions across the world should so far as possible be kept in line with each other. Therefore, in such cases foreign decisions are more useful for guiding the courts.
->/ H!stor!"a& a"ts and s,rro,nd!n$ "!r",*stan"es
+part from the various external aids discussed above, courts while interpreting a statutory provision, can take into account relevant historical facts or history of enactment in order to understand the sub6ect matter of statute. #ourt can also have regard to the surrounding circumstances which existed at the time of passing of the statute. 5ut, like any other external aid, the inference from historical facts and surrounding circumstances must give way to the clear language employed in the enactment itself. In this regard, "upreme #ourt in #ohan&a& Tr!1ath! v. D!stt. #a$!strate Ra!& Bare!&&0 and others ) has observed(
“8alue of &historical evolution' of a provision or &reference' to what preceded the enactment is an external aid to understand and appreciate the meaning of a provision, its ambit or expanse has been judicially recogni(ed and textually recommended. *ut this aid to construe any provision which is &extremely ha(ardous' should be resorted to, only, if any doubt arises about the scope of the section or it is found to be &sufficiently difficult and ambiguous to justify the construction of its evaluation in the statute boo+ as a proper and logical course and secondly, the object of the instant en:uiry' should be &to ascertain the true meaning of that part of the section which remains as it was and which there is no ground for thin+ing of the substitution of a new proviso was intended to alter'.” para !"
)2
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This rule of admissibility permits recourse to historical works, pictures, engraving and documents where it is important to ascertain ancient facts of a public nature. %ecently, "upreme #ourt while dealing with the 4ental +ct, '9- in Denta& 'o,n"!& o Ind!a v Har!1rakash */ has observed(
“The /ct is a pre constitutional enactment but it has application in the post constitutional era also. When interpreting such an enactment, we have not only to bear in mind the historical bac+ground leading to the legislation and the amendments effected therein, but also various aspects covered by it”. para 4.$"
It is apparent from this discussion that historical facts and surrounding circumstances are also relevant facts to be taken into account by the #ourt as external aids for interpretation of statutes.
-?/ Later Deve&o1*ent and S"!ent!!" Invent!ons
It is often possible that after the enactment of a statute, political and economic developments in the society may take place. ew scientific inventions may also come out. The legislature might not have been aware of all these developments and inventions, when the law was made. Therefore, courts take into account all these development while construing statutory provisions. In this regard, 5hagwati &. 0as he then was1 in S.P. 4,1ta v Un!on o Ind!a *' has stated(
“The interpretation of every statutory provision must +eep pace with changing concepts and values and it must, to the extent to which its language permits or rather does not prohibit, suffer adjustments through judicial interpretation so as to accord with the re:uirement of the fast changing society which is undergoing rapid social and economic transformation 2 #t is elementary that law does not operate in a vacuum. #t is, therefore, intended to serve a social purpose and it cannot be interpreted without ta+ing into account the social, economic and political setting in which it is intended to operate. #t is here that the ;udge is called upon to perform a creative function.
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harmonise the law with the prevailing concepts and values and ma+e it an effective instrument for delivery of justice.” para =>"
+gain, in S.P. 9a!n v (r!shan #ohan 4,1ta and others *) the "upreme #ourt has held(
“We are of the opinion that law should ta+e pragmatic view of the matter and respond to the purpose for which it was made and also ta+e cogni(ance of the current capabilities of technology and life style of community”. para $%"
ith the change of times, +rticle )' of the #onstitution which was at one time interpreted in a very narrow way has now been interpreted in such a way, that the right to life includes everything which makes a man=s life meaningful, complete and worth living. The "upreme #ourt in 9.(. 'otton S1!nn!n$ % Wv$ #!&&s Ltd. v Un!on o Ind!a
**
observed at para 93 that in a
modern progressive society it would be unreasonable to confine the intention of the legislature to the meaning attributed to the word used at the time the law was made and unless a contrary intention appears, an interpretation should be given to the words used to take in new facts and situations, if the words are capable of comprehending them.
Therefore, court has to take into account social, political and economic developments and scientific inventions which take place after enactment of a statute for proper construction of its provision.
Internat!ona& 'onvent!ons +part from these external aids, court also take recourse to other material. For example, wherever necessary, court can look into International #onventions 0P.N. (r!shan&a& v 4ovt. o (era&a
*9
1.
The "upreme #ourt in )!sakha v. State o Ra5asthan *3 took recourse to International #onvention for the purpose of construction of domestic law. The #ourt observed(@ *)
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“#n the absence of domestic law occupying the field to formulate effective measures to chec+ the evil of sexual harassment of wor+ing women at all wor+ places, the contents of #nternational onventions and norms are significant for the purpose of interpretation of the guarantee of gender e:uality, right to wor+ with human dignity in /rticles $3, $, $9$"g" and >$ of the onstitution and the safeguards against sexual harassment implicit therein. /ny international convention not inconsistent with the fundamental rights and in harmony with its spirit must be read into those provisions to enlarge the meaning and content thereof, to promote the object of the onstitutional guarantee.” para !"
Other *ater!a&s "imilarly, "upreme #ourt used information available on internet for the purpose of interpretation of statutory provision in Ra*&a& v State o Ra5asthan *. #ourts also refer passages and materials from text books and articles and papers published in the 6ournals. e are of the view that these external aids are very useful tools not only for the proper and correct interpretation or construction of statutory provision, but also for understanding the ob6ect of the statute, the mischief sought to be remedied by it, circumstances in which it was enacted and many other relevant matters. In the absence of the admissibility of these external aids, sometime court may not be in a position to do 6ustice in a case.
*
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External Aids to construction in Interpretation of Statutes INTRODUCTION
In a welfare State, rule of law plays a very vital role. As we are familiar with that law is codified into statutes. To give effect to a statute it should be interpreted as it is. Interpretation is the breath of a statute. Whenever the words are ambiguous the statute should be interpreted according to the intention of the legislature. Interpretation should not stop, because of interpretation we come to know the intention of the legislature as to why the statute has been passed. Whenever the words in a statute are ambiguous it is the duty of the court to interpret the statute by referring to internal aids and external aids. Internal aids are inside the statute itself. Where the mind labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seies everything from which aid can be given. In !ostan Sand " #o. v. $nited States , when the meaning of the language was plain, the courts were not to resort to evidence in order to raise doubts, %olmes &. said 'That is rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists. If the #ongress has been
accustomed to use a certain phrase with a more limited meaning than might be attributed to it by common practice, it would be arbitrary to refuse to consider that fact when we come to interpret a statute.' The meaning to be ascribed to an Act can only be derived from a considered weighing of every relevant aid to construction. !ut when it comes to the external aids they stay outside the statute and prove a good aid in interpretation of the statute. (. )xternal aids to construction Apart from the intrinsic aids to construction, such as preamble and the purview of the Act, the #ourt can consider resources outside the Act, called the extrinsic aids, in interpreting and finding out the purpose of the Act. Where the words of an Act are clear and unambiguous, no recourse to extrinsic matter, even if it consists of the sources of the codification, is the intrinsic aids, such as preamble and purview of the Act. Sources outside the Act called extrinsic aids. These resources deal mainly with the history of the Act, both with the prior events leading up to the introduction of the !ill, Select #ommittee reports. In *ohd %anif +uareshi v. State of !ihar , the Supreme #ourt took in to the consideration the eport of the $ttar -radesh osamvardhan #ommittee and the fact that three of the members of the committee were *uslims and had concurred in the unanimous recommendation for a total ban on slaughter of cows. The courts have only to en/uire, what has the legislature thought for to enact0 As long ago as %eydon1s case, 2ord #oke said3 It was resolved that for the sure and true interpretation of all the statutes in general, be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law, four things are to be discerned and considered a4 What was the common law before the Act. b4 What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide. c4 What remedy the -arliament had resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth. d4 The true reason for the remedy. The rule upon the sub5ect was well articulated in the case of Stradling v. *organ , wherein it was said3 'The 5udges of the law in all times past have so far pursued the intent of the makers of statutes, that they have expounded the Acts which were general in words to be but particular where the intent was particular. The sages of the law heretofore have construed statutes /uite contrary to the letter, in some appearance, and those statutes which comprehend all things in the letter, they have expounded to extend but to some things, and those which generally prohibit all people from doing such an act, they have interpreted to permit some people to do it, and those which include every person in the letter, they have ad5udged to reach some persons only6 which expositions have always been founded upon the intent of the legislature, which they have collected sometimes by considering the clause and necessity of making the Act, sometimes by comparing one part of the Act with another, and sometimes by foreign circumstances so that they have ever been guided by the intent of the legislature, which they have always taken according to the necessity of the matter and according to that which is consonant to reason and good discretion'. It is appropriate to consider the state of law which it proposes or claim to alter, the mischief which existed and which it was intended to remedy, and the nature of the remedy provided and to look at the statute in pari materia as a means of explaining the statute. These
external aids are the proper modes of ascertaining the intention of the legislature. 'It is not the words of the law but the internal sense of it' that makes the law and the law consists of two parts, vi., body and soul, the letter of the law is the body of the law and the sense and the reason of the law is the soul of the law. And it often happens that when you know the letter you know not the sense, for sometimes it is more large and extensive. As Supreme #ourt said, the courts should have regard not merely to literal meaning of words used, but also take into consideration the antecedent history of the legislation, its purpose and the mischief it seeks to suppress. To know the evil which it is designed to remedy, the courts may properly look at contemporaneous events, the situation as it existed and it was pressed upon the attention of the legislative body. If the court finds that the meaning of a statutory provision is not clear in itself, it can examine the surrounding circumstances that led to or accompanied its enactment, that is, all those external or historical facts which are necessary for the comprehension of the sub5ect matter, scope and ob5ect of an enactment. ecourse to extrinsic aid in interpreting a statutory provision would be 5ustified only within well recognied limits6 and primarily the effect of the statutory provisions must be 5udged on a fair and reasonable construction of the word used by the statute itself. In coming to a determination as to the meaning of the a particular word in a particular Act, it is permissible to consider two points, namely, 7a4 the external evidence derived from extraneous circumstance such as previous legislation and decided cases etc., and 7b4 the internal evidence derived from the Act itself. PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY
The ingredients of -arliamentary %istory are the bill in its original form or the amendments considered during its progress in the 2egislature, Speech of the minister who introduced the bill in the -arliament which is also referred to as Statements of 8b5ects and easons, eports of -arliamentary debates and resolutions passed by either %ouse of the -arliament and the eports submitted different -arliamentary #ommittees.According to thetraditional )nglish view the -arliamentary %istory of a statute was not considered as an aid to construction. The Supreme #ourt of India in the beginning enunciated the rule of exclusion of -arliamentary %istory in the way it was traditionally enunciated by the )nglish #ourts but on many an occasion, the court used this aid in resolving /uestions of construction. In Indira Sawhney v. $nion of India, while interpreting Article 9:7;4 of the #onstitution the Supreme #ourt referred to s #ase 79?@(4, the then #hief &ustice of India -atan5ali Shastri /uoted that the Statement of 8b5ects and easons should not be used as an aid to interpretation because in his opinion the Statement of 8b5ects and easons is presented in the -arliament when a bill is being introduced. s #ase 79?@;4, &ustice S.. s #ase but he wanted to use the Statement of 8b5ects and easons to protect the sharecroppers against eviction by the new buyers of land since amindari
system was still not abolished and land was still not the property of the farmers. So &ustice S..
%istorical facts are very essential to understand the sub5ect matter of the statute or to have regard to the surrounding circumstances which existed at the time of passing of the statute. The rule of admissibility of this e xternal aid is especially useful in mischief rule. The rule that was laid down in the %eydon>s #ase 79@C;4, has now attained the status of a classic. The mischief rule enables the consideration of four matters in construing an act3 *What was the law before the making of the Act0 *What was the mischief for which the law did not provide0 *What was the remedy provided by the Act0 *What was the reason of the remedy0 This rule was applied in !engal Immunity #o. v. State of !iharin the construction of Article (C: of the #onstitution in which the Supreme #ourt held that a state has the legislative competence to impose sales tax only if all the ingredients of a sale have a territorial nexus. Thus on the same transaction sales tax cannot be imposed by several states. Since the function of the court is to find the meaning of the ambiguous words in a statute, a reference to the historical facts and surrounding circumstances that led to the enactment assist the courts in efficient administration of speedy 5ustice. The rule permits recourse to historical works, engravings, pictures and documents where it is important to ascertain ancient facts of a public nature. %istorical evolution of a provision in the statute is also sometimes a useful guide to its construction. REFERENCE TO OTHER STATUTES
It is a settled principle that for the purpose of interpretation or construction of a statutory provision, courts can refer to or can take help of other statutes. It is also known as statutory aids. The eneral #lauses Act, 9C?D is an example of statutory aid. Apart from this, #ourt can take recourse to other statutes which are in pari mataria i.e. statute dealing with the same sub5ect matter or forming part of the same system. Supreme #ourt in #ommon #ause, A egistered Society v $nion of India took recourse to section 9EA and 9E? 7;!4 of the Income Tax Act 9?:9 for the purpose of interpretation of )xplanation I to section DD 794 of the epresentation of the -eople Act, 9?@9. The application of this rule of construction has the merit of avoiding any contradiction between a series of statutes dealing with the same sub5ect6 it allows the use of an earlier statute to throw light on the meaning of a phrase used in a later statute in the same
context. 8n the same logic when words in an earlier statute have received an authoritative exposition by a superior court, use of same words in similar context in a later statute will give rise to a presumption that the legislature intends that the same interpretation should be followed for construction of those words in the later statute. 7see !engal Imunity #o. 2td. v State of !ihar . %owever, a later statute is normally not used as an aid to construction of an earlier statute, but when an earlier statue is truly ambiguous6 a later statute may in certain circumstances serve as a parliamentary exposition of the former. USAGES AND PRACTICE
$sages and practice developed under a statute is indicative of the meaning ascribed to its words by contemporary opinion and in case of an ancient statute, such reference to usage and practice is an admissible external aid to its construction. !ut this principle is not applicable to a modern statute and it is confined to the construction of ambiguous language used in old statute. This principle of Fcontemporanea exposito> was applied by the Supreme #ourt in Bational and rindlays !ank v *unicipal #orporation for reater !ombay while construing !ombay *unicipal #orporation Act, 9CCC. The apex court also referred to the actual practice in the matter of appointment of 5udges of Supreme #ourt and %igh #ourt in the context of interpreting Articles D; and 9(; of the #onstitution and observed that the practice being in conformity with the constitutional scheme should be accorded legal sanction by permissible constitutional interpretation. 7see Supreme #ourt Advocates on ecord Association v $nion of India.4 DICTIONARIES
It is conventional principle of construction of statutes that in the absence of there being anything contrary to the context, the language of a statute should be interpreted according to the simple dictionary meaning of the terms used in the dictionary. When a word is not defined in the Act itself, it is permissible to refer to dictionaries to find out the general sense in which that word is under'stood in common parlance. It is not always safe way to construe a statute by dividing it by a process of etymological dissection and then to give each word some particular definition given by lexicographers. The duty of the court is to interpret and give full effect to the words used by the legislature and it is really not relevant to find out what a particular branch of the public may or may not understand to be the meaning of those words. It is for the courts to interpret them as the best as they can. The courts in doing so may assist themselves in the discharge of their duty by any literary help which they can obtain, including of course, the consultation of standard authors and also a reference to well known and authoritative dictionaries which state where the interpretations which they give to the words of the )nglish language are to be found. In *idland ail #o., v. obinson, 2ord %erschell used
technical or a legal meaning and in that case they are understood in that sense. A explanation of a particular word given in a lexicon in terms of a court1s decision should not be used unless the decision was given under an Act in pari materia with the Act in /uestion. &udicial decisions expounding the meanings of words in construing statutes in pari materia will have more weight than the meaning furnished by the dictionaries.
Gor the purpose of construction of Indian statutes, courts also refer to decisions of foreign courts which are following same system of 5urisprudence as ours. The assistance of such decisions is sub5ect to the /ualification that prime importance is always to be given to the language of the relevant Indian statute, the circumstances and the setting in which it is enacted and the relevant conditions in India where it is to be applied. These foreign decisions have persuasive value only and are not binding on Indian courts and where guidance is available from binding Indian decisions, reference to foreign decisions is of no use 7see Gorasol v 8B#6 eneral )lectric #o. v. enusagar -ower #o.4 While interpreting provisions relating to fundamental rights contained in the Indian #onstitution, Supreme #ourt took much assistance from American precedents. In case where an International #onvention is involved, it is obviously desirable that decisions in different 5urisdictions across the world should so far as possible be kept in line with each other. Therefore, in such cases foreign decisions are more useful for guiding the courts. CONCLUSION
The chief source of law is legislation, though there are other sources of law such as precedents and customs. )very source of law finds its expression in a language. 8ften the language has a puling effect, i.e., it masks and distorts. 8ften it is found that the language of a statute is not clear. The words used in the statute too at times seem to be ambiguous. Sometimes it is not possible to assign the dictionary meaning to certain words used in legislation. *eaning which is to be assigned to certain words in a legislation. )ven the dictionary does not give the clear'cut meaning of a word. This is so because the dictionary gives many alternative meanings applicable in different contexts and for different purposes so that no clear field for the application of a word is easily identified. So long as expansion of meaning takes place uniformly, the law will develop along healthy lines. !ut if one 5udge takes the narrow view and the other the broad view, the law will mean different things for different persons and soon there will be confusion. %ence, it is necessary that there should be some rules of interpretation to e nsure 5ust and uniform decisions. Such rules are called rules of interpretation. There are various aids to the rule of interpretation and in case the ambiguity is not removed even after applying the internal aids, then the external aids can come in handy. They provide various methods by the help of which a statute can be interpreted and used by the 5udiciary in deciding cases. REFERENCE
1. Bindra N.S., ‘Interpretation of Statutes', 5th edn., aw Book !o"pan#, 1$%&.
. (a)dish Swarup, ‘e)islation *nd Interpretation', nd edn., +andewal ublishin) -ouse, *llahabad, 1$%/. 0awell, ‘2he Interpretation of Statutes', 1th edn.,
*.
papers.ssrn.com, External Aids to Interpretation of Statutes: A Critical Appraisal by Swati
Rao
9.
Vargese! "otty, #Interpretation of statutes principles of legislation ! $egislati%e drafting&, 't Re%ised edn. $aw (oo) Centre
