SECTION 3 Privacy Of Communication and CorrespondencePhilippines Constitution CASE DOCTRINES (1)The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this and the preceding section shall be inadmissible for anypurpose in any proceeding. What type of communication & correspondence does the provision cover? 1935 Consti Convention – Convention – “letters & messages” carried by agencies of gov’t Coorected: “used in general sense” Olmstead doctrine – when there is no actual trespass, there is no search, & where the object is not tangible, it cannot be seized. Tangibles – Tangibles – house, papers, persons & effects.. Katz v US overruled Olmstead – Olmstead – includes wire-tapping, with or without trespass under the ban of search & seizure clause What are the conditions for allowable intrusion into the privacy of communication & correspondence? **The guarantee given by the privacy provision is not absolute Intent of Laurel is to condition allowable intrusion upon an order of a court “person entitled to his secrets but if it involves public questions w/c State ought know may infringe that privacy (process or appeal to Court) 1) Lawful order 2) Public safety & order so demands
Okabe v. Gutierrez – estafa case – An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefore.. An application for bail SHALL NOT BE considered as a waiver of rights. A valid waiver, requisites. 1) rights must exist; 2) there must be clear and convincing proof that there was an actual intention to relinquish the right C. Anti-Wire Tapping Act Navarro v. CA – police complaint gone bad – where the exchange between two persons is not private, the tape recording is not prohibited Salcedo-Ordonez v. CA – annulment with damages – husband is cheating on me case – Unauthorized tape recordings of telephone conversations not admissible D. Privacy of Bank Accounts Marquez v. Desierto – secrecy of bank deposits – exceptions: 1) depositor consents in writing; 2) subject of an impeachment case; 3) by court order in cases of bribery and dereliction by public officials, 4) deposit is subject of litigation; 5) unexplained wealth E. Privacy of Communication
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**text not give any ground to allow intrusion but there must be probable cause & that privacy right is but an aspect of the right to be secure in one’s person.. ** identity of person & offense & the period of authorization given can be specified When in intrusion is made without judicial order? Public order & public safety through non- judicial judicial gov’t official Ex: Exec. Officer can order intrusion when in his judgment, even w/o prior court approval he believes that PS & PO so requires. PO & PS – PS – security of human lives, liberty & property against the activities of invaders, insurrectionists & rebels. A. Exclusionary Rule (Second paragraph of Section 3) People v. Marti – package bound for Switzerland – The Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against act of private individuals. It is directed against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. The constitutional against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by a private individual. B. Waiver of Rights Veroy v. Layague – search of rebels in a house – Permission was granted by Veroy to enter the house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers. Where permission to enter a residence was given,it is illegal to search the rooms therein and seize firearms without as search warrant.
Roxas v. Zuzuaregui – contempt of the Supreme Court – the letter ceased to be private when Roxas furnished the letter to the all the justices and not just to the one whom it is addressed The right of privacy of communication and correspondence is a right embodied in the Constitution. During illegal search, documents taken from you cannot be used against you and it is inadmissible in any courts in any proceedings. With regards to written documents recovered by the relatives after the death of the patient (just a list of heartaches against the company he was previously connected, might be the caused of his sudden death), is not included or one of the exceptions. The right of privacy of communication and correspondence correspond ence cannot be invoked by the company if such documents are vehemently manufactured. The company has no cause of action. Much more if the deceased wrote it a minute ago before he suffered cardiac arrest.
Gaanan v. IAC, 145 SCRA 112 (1986) F: Complainant Atty. Pintor and Montebon offered to withdraw the complaint for direct assault they filed against Laconico after demanding P8,000 from him. That same morning, Laconico, another lawyer, telephoned the appellant to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business t rip. This demand was heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone extension as requested by Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for the settlement. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money, he told Laconico to give the money to his wife but the latter insisted t hat complainant himself should receive the money. In an entrapment operation Atty. Pintor was subsequently .arrested in upon receipt of the money, arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary. Appellant Laconico executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Complainant then charged Laconico with violation of RA 4200 for listening to the t elephone conversation without complainant's consent. Since Atty. Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200). ISSUE: W/N an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Sec. 1 of RA 4200 such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute an unlawful interception of communication between 2 parties using a telephone line. RULING: NO. An extension tel. cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph, or other devices enumerated in Sec. 1 of the law as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. This section refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by t he party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting, or recording a tel. Our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. We are of the view that an extension telephone is not among such devices or arrangements What the law refers to is a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA 4200 . There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record t he spoken words. In statutory construction, in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA 4200, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a tel ephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.
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In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court , a case which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise 19 was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, following the 20 principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused." The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable. RAMIREZ V CA A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public 1 policy." As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes. " An information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to the 4 communication. From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989. On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that: [T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse 5 of discretion correctible by certiorari . Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent 6 Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated June 19, 1990. Hence, t he instant petition. 7 Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" that the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a 8 private conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication. In relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information, 9 otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal 10 under the said act. We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either 11 12 impossible or absurb or would lead to an injustice. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides: Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described. The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private 13 conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" under this provision of R.A. 4200. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the r espondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons. The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish. Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of 14 the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed." Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in 15 a conversation, or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between 16 individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)" These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts
about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the bill. SALCEDO-ORTANEZ V CA GR NO 110662 FACTS: Respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed City a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner. Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons. CA dismissed the petition stating tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they are presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and fairness and the even handed administration of justice. ISSUE: W/N Tape recordings are admissible as evidence. HELD: No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200. C. Anti-Wire Tapping Act Salcedo-Ortanez v. CA – annulment with damages – husband is cheating on me case – Unauthorized tape recordings of telephone conversations not admissible In re: Alejano v. Cabuay 468 SCRA 188 August 25, 2005 En Banc: Carpio, J. a mere allegation of a violation of one’s constitutional right is not sufficient. The violation of constitutional right must be sufficient to void the entire proceedings. Facts: Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers, entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments (“Oakwood”), an upscale apartment complex, located in the business district of Makati City. The soldiers disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced their support for the administration and called for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members.
Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive devices they had earlier planted. The soldiers then returned to their barracks. On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major Service Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup d’etat with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers involved in the 27 July 2003 Oakwood incident. The trial court later issued the Commitment Orders giving custody of junior officers Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV and Capt. Gerardo Gambala to the Commanding Officers of ISAFP. On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major Service Commanders to take into custody the military personnel under their command who took part in the Oakwood incident except the detained junior officers who were to remain under the custody of ISAFP. On August 11, 2003, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with SC. The Supreme Court issued a resolution, which required respondents to make a return of the writ and to appear and produce the persons of the detainees before the CA. On the same date, the detainees and their other co-accused filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the trial court granted. The Court of appeals dismissed the petition. Nonetheless, the CA ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was in charge of implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center, to uphold faithfully the rights of the detainees in accordance with Standing Operations Procedure No. 0263-04. The appellate court pointed out that the detainees are already charged of coup d’etat before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees’ confinement is under a valid indictment, the legality of which the detainees and petitioners do not even question. The Court of Appeals recognized that habeas corpus may also be the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of detention if there is a deprivation of a constitutional right. However, the appellate court held that the constitutional rights alleged to have been violated in this case do not directly affect the detainees’ liberty. The appellate court ruled that the regulation of the detainees’ right to confer with their counsels is reasonable under the circumstances. The appellate court declared that while the opening and reading of Trillanes’ letter is an abhorrent violation of his right to privacy of communication, this does not justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The violation does not amount to illegal restraint, which is the proper subject of habeas corpus proceedings. Issue: Whether or not the detainees have the regulations imposed in the ISAFP Detention Center is a violation of the right to privacy of the detainees Held: American jurisprudence initially made a distinction between the privacy rights enjoyed by convicted inmates and pre-trial detainees. The case of Palmigiano v. Travisono recognized that pre-trial detainees, unlike convicted prisoners, enjoy a limited right of privacy in communication. Censorship of pre-trial detainees’ mail addressed to public officials, courts and counsel was held impermissible. While incoming mail may be inspected for contraband and read in certain instances, outgoing mail of pre-trial detainees could not be inspected or read at all. In the subsequent case of Wolff v. McDonnell, involving convicted prisoners, the U.S. Supreme Court held that prison officials could open in the presence of the inmates incoming mail from attorneys to inmates. However, prison officials could not read such mail from attorneys. In Hudson v. Palmer, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an inmate has no reasonable
expectation of privacy inside his cell. The U.S. Supreme Court explained that prisoners necessarily lose many protections of the Constitution. The curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as a practical matter, to accommodate a myriad of “institutional needs and objectives” of prison facilities, chief among which is internal security. The later case of State v. Dunn, citing Hudson v. Palmer, abandoned Palmigiano v. Travisono and made no distinction as to the detainees’ limited right to privacy. State v. Dunn noted the considera ble jurisprudence in the United States holding that inmate mail may be censored for the furtherance of a substantial government interest such as security or discipline. State v. Dunn declared that if complete censorship is permissible, then the lesser act of opening the mail and reading it is also permissible. The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees’ personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in t he presence of the detainees. That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizen’s privacy rights] is a guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to persons who are detained or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy rights. In RE: Laureta Facts: In almost identical letters dated 20 October 1986, personally sent to Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, and Isagani A. Cruz, and a fourth letter, dated 22 October 1986 addressed to Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, all members of the First Division of the Supreme Court, in a stance of dangling threats to effect a change of the Court’s adverse resolution (in GR 68635: Eva Maravilla Ilustre vs. IAC being dismissed), Eva Maravilla Ilustre/Atty. Wenceslao Laureta wrote in part that “we are pursuing further remedies in our quest for justice under the law. We intend to hold responsible members of the First Division who participated in the promulgation of these three minute-resolutions in question. For the members thereof cannot claim immunity when their action runs afoul with penal sanctions, even in the performance of official functions; like others, none of the division members are above the law.” True to her threats, after having lost her case before the Su preme Court, MaravillaIlustre filed on 16 December 1986 an Affidavit-Complaint before the Tanodbayan, charging some Members of the Supreme Court with having knowingly and deliberately rendered, with bad faith, an unjust, extended Minute Resolution “making” her opponents the “illegal owners” of vast estates; charging some Justices of the Court of Appeals with knowingly rendering their “unjust resolution” of 20 January 1984 “through manifest and evident bad faith”; and charging Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordoñez and Justice Pedro Yap of the Supreme Court with having used their power and influence in persuading and inducing the members of the First Division of the Court into promulgating their “unjust extended Minute Resolution of 14 May 1986.” Atty. Laureta reportedly circulated copies of the Complaint to the press, which was widely publicized in almost all dailies on 23 December 1986, without any copy furnished the Supreme Court nor the members who were charged. The issue of the Daily Express of 23 December 1986 published a banner headline reading: “ORDONEZ, 8 JUSTICES FACE
GRAFT CHARGES” thereby making it unjustly appear that the Justices of the Supreme Court and the other respondents were charged with “graft and corruption” when the Complaint was actually filed by a disgruntled litigant and her counsel after having lost her case thrice in the Supreme Court. On 26 December 1986, the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) dismissed Maravilla- Ilustre’s Complaint. In the Resolution of the Supreme Court en banc, dated 20 January 1986, it required (1) Eva Maravilla Ilustre to show cause, within 10 days from notice, why she should not be held in contempt for her statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and/or official actions of the Justices concerned, which statements, unless satisfactorily explained, transcend the permissible bounds of propriety and undermine and degrade the administration of justice; and (2) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta, as an officer of the Court, to show cause, within 10 days from notice, why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for the statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and the official actions of the Justices concerned, and for hiding therefrom in anonymity behind his client’s name, in an alleged quest for justice but with the manifest intent to bring the Justices into disrepute and to subvert public confidence in the Courts and the orderly administration of justice. Issue: Whether the letters addressed to the Supreme Court justices are matters shielded bythe constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy.
Held: Letters addressed to individual Justices, in connection with the performance of their judicial functions become part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire Court and thus, not covered by the constitutional guarantee. The contumacious character of those letters constrained the First Division to refer the same to the Court en banc, en consulta and so that the Court en banc could pass upon the judicial acts of the Division. It was only in the exercise of forbearance by the Court that it refrained from issuing immediately a show cause order in the expectancy that after having read the Resolution of the Court en banc of 28 October 1986, MaravillaIlustre and Laureta would realize the unjustness and unfairness of their accusations. Ilustre has transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice in her letters addressed to the individual Justices; in the language of the charges she filed before the Tanodbayan; in her statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and/or the official actions of the Justices concerned and her ascription of improper motives to them; and in her unjustified outburst that she can no longer expect justice from the Supreme Court. The fact that said letters are not technically considered pleadings, nor the fact that they were submitted after the main petition had been finally resolved does not detract from the gravity of the contempt committed. The constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy cannot be used as a shield for contemptuous acts against the Court. Also, Atty. Laureta has committed acts unbecoming an officer of the Court for his stance of dangling threats of bringing the matter to the “proper forum” to effect a change of the Court’s adverse Resolution; for his lack of respect for and exposing to public ridicule, the two highest Courts of the land by challenging in bad faith their integrity and claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgments; for authoring, or at the very least, assisting and/or abetting and/or not preventing the contemptuous statements, conduct, acts and malicious charges of his client, Ilustre, notwithstanding his disclaimer that he had absolutely nothing to do with them, which we find disputed by the facts and circumstances of record as above stated; for totally disregarding the facts and circumstances and legal considerations set forth in the Supreme Court’s Resolutions of the First Division and en banc, as the Tribunal of last resort; for making it appear that the Justices of the Supreme Court and other respondents before the Tanodbayan are charged with “graft and corruption” when the complaint before the Tanodbayan, in essence, is a tirade from a disgruntled litigant and a defeated counsel in a case that has been brought
thrice before the Supreme Court, and who would readily accept anything but the soundness of the judgments of the Courts concerned, all with the manifest intent to bring the Justices of this Court and of the Court of Appeals into disrepute and to subvert public confidence in the Courts. People vs. Albofera [GR L-69377, 20 July 1987] En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (J): 13 concur Facts: Sometime in June or July 1980, at about 4:30 p.m., Rodrigo Esma was tending his onion farm located in Upper Bagong Silang, Managa, Bansalan, Davao del Sur, near the place of Romeo Lawi-an, when Alexander Albofera called him and informed him they would run after somebody. Esma acceded. Together, Albofera and Esma proceeded at once to the house of Lawi-an. There Lawi-an told Albofera that the forester was around making a list of people engaged in “caingin.” Whereupon, Albofera asked Esma to join him in going after the forester. The two were able to overtake the forester, a certain Teodoro Carancio, at the lower portion of the road. Carancio was taken to the house of Lawi-an where several persons were already gathered, among whom were Lawi-an, a certain alias Jun, Boy Lawi-an, and Joel Maldan. Once inside and seated, Albofera began questioning Carancio about his purpose in the place. Carancio replied that he was there to inspect the “caingin” as a forester. Albofera, Romeo Lawi-an, alias Jun, Boy Lawi-an, and Joel Maldan decided to bring Carancio to the forest some 200 meters away from Lawi-an’s house. Esma did not join the group but remained in the house of Lawi-an. Not long after the group returned to Lawi- an’s house, but without Carancio. Albofera’s hands, as well as alias Jun’s hands were bloodied. After washing their hands, Albofera warned everyone, particularly Esma, against revealing or saying anything to any person or the military. The following day, at about 9:00 a.m., Efren Sisneros was at his farm when Lawi-an and Jun Menez passed by and called him. When Sisneros got near the two, Lawi-an told him that the forester was already killed and warned him not to reveal this matter to anybody otherwise he would be killed. The threat to his life caused Sisneros to be cautious in not reporting at once the matter to the authorities. However, in June 1981, Sisneros finally reported the killing of that forester to his brother Margarito, a CHDF member in Bansalan. Sisneros asked that his identity be kept secret in the meantime pending the arrest of Albofera and Lawi-an. The police authorities arrested Albofera on 2 July 1981. Romeo Lawi-an was subsequently arrested on 4 July 1981. Also in July, 1981, the two, shortly after their arrest, led the police authorities to the place in Bagong Silang where they buried the slain forester, specifically in a hilly portion near the forest where the trees were not quite big besides a coffee plantation, where the authorities dug and recovered the cadaver. On 2 July 1981, Albofera executed an extra-judicial confession before the Municipal Circuit Judge, stating therein that he was forced to join the NPA movement for fear of his life; that said group had ordered the “arrest” of Carancio which sentenced the latter to die by stabbing. In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented a letter written in the Visayan dialect by Alexander Albofera, while under detention, to witness Rodrigo Esma several days before the latter testified on 20 October 1982. After trial, the the Regional Trial Court, Branch XVIII, Digos, Davao del Sur, in Criminal Case 184, found the circumstantial evidence sufficient to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt of both Albofera and Lawi-an for murder, sentenced them to death, and ordered them to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P35,000.00 “by way of moral as well as actual damages” in its Decision of 5 October 1984. Hence, the mandatory review. Issue: Whether the Albofera’s letter to Esma should be excluded as evidence in light of alleged unwarranted intrusion or invasion of the accused’s privacy. Held: Section 4, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (substantially reproduced in Section 3, Article III of the 1987 Constitution) implements another Constitutional provision on the security of a citizen against unreasonable search and seizure. The production of that letter by the prosecution was not the
result of an unlawful search and seizure nor was it through unwarranted intrusion or invasion into Albofera’s privacy. Albofera admitted having sent the letter and it was its recipient, Rodrigo Esma himself, who produced and identified the same in the course of his testimony in Court. Besides, there is nothing really self-incriminatory in the letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma change his declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his (Albofera’s) favor. Furthermore, nothing Albofera stated in his letter is being taken against him in arriving at a determination of his culpability. *** A letter written by the accused to a witness which was produced by the witness during the trial is admissible in evidence; it was not the result of an unlawful search, nor through an unwarranted intrusion or invasion into the privacy of the accused. It was produced by the recipient of the letter who identified the same. Besides, there is nothing self-incriminatory in the letter. (NACHURA) ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996 Petitioner: Cecilia Zulueta Respondents: Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin Ponente: J. Mendoza Facts: This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband. Issue: (1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence; Held: (1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other. *** The right may be invoked against the wife who went ti the clinic of her husband and there took documents consisting of private communications between her husband & his alleged paramour. (NACHURA)
Waterhouse Drug v NLRC Facts: Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation on 15 August 1988. On 31 July 1989, Catolico received a memorandum from WATEROUS Vice President-General Manager Emma R. Co warning her not to dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the latter's accounts because the same was a prohibited practice. On the same date, Co issued another memorandum to Catolico warning her not to negotiate with suppliersof medicine without consulting the Purchasing Department, as this would impair the company's control of purchases and, besides she was not authorized t o deal directly with the suppliers. As regards the first memorandum, Catolico did not deny her responsibility but explained that her act was "due to negligence," since fellow employee Irene Soliven "obtained the medicines in bad faith and through misrepresentation when she claimed that she was given a charge slip by the Admitting Dept." Catolico then asked the company to look into the fraudulent activities of Soliven. In a memorandum dated 21 November 1989, WATEROUS SupervisorLuzviminda E. Bautro warned Catolico against the "rush delivery ofmedicines without the proper documents." On 29 January 1990, WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he noticed an irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Forthwith, in her memorandum dated 37 January 1990, Co asked Catolico to explain, within twentyfour hours, her side of the reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional time to give her explanation, and she was granted a 48-hour extension from 1 to 3 February 1990. However, on 2 February 1990, she was informed that effective 6 February 1990 to 7 March 1990, she would be placed on preventive suspension to protect the interests of the company. In a letter dated 2 February 1990, Catolico requested access to the filecontaining Sales Invoice No. 266 for her to be able to make a satisfactory explanation. In said letter she protested Saldaña's invasion of her privacy when Saldaña opened an envelope addressed to Catolico. In a letter to Co dated 10 February 1990, Catolico, through her counsel, explained that the check she received from YSP was aChristmas gift and not a "refund of overprice." She also averred that the preventive suspension was ill-motivated, as it sprang from an earlier incident between her and Co's secretary, Irene Soliven. On 5 March 1990, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a memorandum notifying
Catolico of her termination. On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, and illegal suspension. In his decision of 10 May 1993, Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez found no proof of unfair labor practice against petitioners. Nevertheless, he decided in favor of Catolico because petitioners failed to "prove what alleged as complainant's dishonesty," and to show that any investigation was conducted. Hence, the dismissal was without just cause and due process. He thus declared the dismissal and suspension illegal but disallowed reinstatement.
the charge against him, given reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself, and assisted by a representative if the employee so desires. Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense, including legal representation. In the case at bar, although Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side, she was dismissed from the service in the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her Supervisor after receipt of her letter and that of her counsel. No hearing was ever conducted after the issues were joined through said letters.
Petitioners seasonably appealed from the decision and urged the NLRC to set it aside because the Labor Arbiter erred in finding that Catolico was denied due process and that there was no just cause to terminate her services.
Catolico was also unjustly dismissed. It is settled that the burden is on the employer to prove just and valid cause for dismissing an employee, and its failure to discharge that burden would result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified. It clearly appears then that Catolico's dismissal was based on hearsay information. Catolico's dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere suspicion, which in no case can justify an employee's dismissal. Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of employment; and even the dismissal of an employee for loss of trustand confidence must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or suspicion. Besides, Catolico was not shown to be a managerial employee, to which class of employees the term "trust and confidence" is restricted.
In its decision of 30 September 1993, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico's dismissal from her employment. It found that petitioner's evidence consisted only of the check of P640.00 drawn by YSP in favor of complainant, which her co-employee saw when the latter opened the envelope. But, it declared that the check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article III of the Constitution. It concluded: With the smoking gun evidence of respondents being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants, respondents' case falls apart as it is bereft of evidence which cannot be used as a legal basis for complainant's dismissal. The NLRC then dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, but modified the dispositive portion of the appealed decision by deleting the award for illegal suspension as the same was already included in the computation of the aggregate of the awards in the amount of P35,401.86.
Issue: Whether or Not the dismissal of the private respondent is in violation of the Constitution, under the Bill of Rights.
Held: As to the first and second grounds, petitioners insist that Catolico had been receiving "commissions" from YSP, or probably from other suppliers, and that the check issued to her on 9 November 1989 was not the first or the last. They also maintained that Catolico occupied a confidential position and that Catolico's receipt of YSP's check, aggravated by her "propensity to violate company rules," constituted breach of confidence. And contrary to the findings of NLRC, Catolico was given ample opportunity to explain her side of the controversy. In her Comment, Catolico asserts that petitioners' evidence is too "flimsy" to justify her dismissal. The check in issue was given to her, and she had no duty to turn it over to her employer. Company rules do not prohibit an employee from accepting gifts from clients, and there is no indication in the contentious check that it was meant as a refund for overpriced medicines. Besides, the check was discovered in violation of the constitutional provision on the right to privacy and communication; hence, as correctly held by the NLRC, it was inadmissible in evidence. Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due process requires that an employee be apprised of
As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its decision, that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that Catolico's reinstatement would not be to the best interest of the parties, he correctly awarded separation pay to Catolico. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is computed at one month's salary for every year of service. In this case, however, Labor Arbiter Lopez computed the separation pay at one-half month's salary for every year of service. Catolico did not oppose or raise an objection. As such, we will uphold the award of separation pay as fixed by the Labor Arbiter. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the challenged decision and resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 30 September 1993 and 2 December 1993, respectively, in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-93 are AFFIRMED, except as to its reason for upholding the Labor Arbiter's decision, viz., that the evidence against private respondent was inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of her constitutional rights of privacy of communication and against unreasonable searches and seizures which i s hereby set aside. *** However, the SC in this case said that the bill of rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches & seizures made by private individuals. In this case, an officer of the petitioner corporation opened an envelope addressed to the private respondent & found therein a check evidencing an overprice in the purchase of medicine. Despite the lack of consent on the part of the private respondent, the check was deemed admissible in evidence. (NACHURA)
