Time Inc v Reyes 31 May 1971 | Reyes JBL, J . | CP | Torts and Crimes P: Time Inc R: Judge Andres Reyes, Antonio Villegas, JPE S: Antonio J. Villegas and Juan Ponce Enrile seek to recover from Time Inc damages upon an alleged libel arising from a publication of Time (Asia Edition) magazine. D: [ Caveat: The only tort doctrine in the case was mentioned in passing and was not relevant to the disposition of the case but the case is placed under the heading torts and crimes so the author of the digest will put the doctrine pertinent to the topic aforementioned.] The common law rule/multiple publication rule as to causes of action for tort arising out of a single publication was to the effect that each communication of written or printed matter was a distinct and separate publication of a libel contained therein, giving rise to a separate cause of action. This rule ('multiple publication' rule) is still followed in several American jurisdictions, and seems to be favored by the American Law Institute. Other jurisdictions have adopted the 'single publication' rule which originated in New York, under which any single integrated publication, such as one edition of a newspaper, book, book, or magazine, or one broadcast, is treated as a unit, giving rise to only one cause of action, regardless of the number of times it is exposed to different people.
Facts: 1.
In Time’s Asian Edition Magazine, Manila Mayor Antonio Villegas was accused of having coffers containing “far more pesos than seemed reasonable in the light of his income.” Juan Ponce Enrile was dragged onto the article because he allegedly lent Villegas 30,000 pesos as he was his compadre and at that time, Enrile wa s the Secretary of Finance. 2. Villegas and Enrile sought to recver damages from Time Magazine, an American Corporation, so they filed a complaint in the CFI of Rizal. 3. Petitioner received the summons and a copy of the complaint at its offices in New York on 13 December 1967 and, on 27 December 1967, it filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and improper venue, relying upon the provisions of Republic Ac t 4363. 4. The judge deferred the proceedings for the reason that "the rule laid down under Republic Act. No. 4363, amending Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, is not applicable to actions against non-resident defendants, and because questions involving harassment and inconvenience, as well as disruption of public service do not appear indubitable. Issue/s 1. WON under the provisions of Republic Act No. 4363 the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the civil suit for damages arising from an allegedly libelous publication, considering that the action was instituted by public officers whose offices were in the City of Manila at the time of the publication; if it has no jurisdiction, whether or not its erroneous assumption of jurisdiction may be challenged by a foreign corporation by writ of certiorari or prohibition. – NO and YES
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WON epublic Act 4363 is applicable to action against a foreign corporation or non-resident defendant – NO Ruling: GRANTED. Ratio: 1.
Art 360, RA 4363 reads in part: The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; Provided , however , That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or c ity where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published; Provided further , further , That the civil action shall be filed in the same court where the criminal action is filed and vice versa; Provided , furthermore , That the court where the criminal action or civil action for damages is first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts; And provided finally, That this amendment shall not apply to cases of written defamations, the civil and/or criminal actions which have been filed in court at the time of the effectivity of the law… 2. The complaint lodged in the court of Rizal by respondents does not allege that the libelous article was printed and first published in the province of Rizal and, since the respondents-plaintiffs are public officers with offices in Manila at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, it is clear that the only place left for them wherein to file their action, is the Court of First Instance of Manila. 3. The intent, of the law is clear: a libeled public official might sue in the court of the locality where he holds office, in order that the prosecution of the action should interfere as little as possible with the discharge of his official duties and labors. The only alternative allowed him by law is to prosecute those responsible for the libel in the place where the offending article was printed and first published. Here, the law tolerates the interference with the libeled officer's duties only for the sake of avoiding unnecessary harassment of the accused. Since the offending publication was not printed in the Philippines, the alternative venue was not open to respondent Mayor Villegas of Manila and Undersecretary of Finance Enrile, who were the offended parties.
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That respondents-plaintiffs could not file a criminal case for libel against a non-resident defendant does not make Republic Act No. 4363 incongruous of absurd, for such inability to file a criminal case against a non-resident natural person equally exists in crimes other than libel. It is a fundamental rule of international jurisdiction that no state can by its laws, and no court which is only a creature of the state, can by its judgments or decrees, directly bind or affect property or persons beyond the limits of the state. Not only this, but if the accused is a corporation, no criminal a ction can lie against it, whether such corporation or resident or non-resident. At any rate, the case filed by respondents-plaintiffs is case for damages. 50 Am. Jur. 2d 659 differentiates the "multiple publication" and "single publication" rules (invoked by private respondents) to be as follows: The common law rule as to causes of action for tort arising out of a single publication was to the effect that each communication of written or printed matter was a distinct and separate publication of a libel contained therein, giving rise to a separate cause of action. This rule ('multiple publication' rule) is still followed in several American jurisdictions, and seems to be favored by the American Law Institute. Other jurisdictions have adopted the 'single publication' rule which originated in New York, under which any single integrated publication, such as one edition of a newspaper, book, or magazine, or one broadcast, is treated as a unit, giving rise to only one cause of action, regardless of the number of times it is exposed to different people. These rules are not pertinent in the present scheme because the number of causes of action that may be available to the respondents-plaintiffs is not here in issue. The court is confronted by a specific venue statute, conferring jurisdiction in cases of libel against Public officials to specified courts, and no other. The rule is that where a statute creates a right and provides a remedy for its enforcement, the remedy is exclusive; and where it confers jurisdiction upon a particular court, that jurisdiction is likewise exclusive, unless otherwise provided. Hence, the venue provisions of Republic Act No. 4363 should be deemed mandatory for the party bringing the action, unless the question of venue should be waived by the defendant, which was not the case here. Only thus can the policy of the Act be upheld and maintained. Nor is there any reason why the inapplicability of one alternative venue should result in rendering the other alternative, also inapplicable. Petitioner's failure to aver its legal ca pacity to institute the present petition is not fatal, for A foreign corporation may, by writ of prohibition, seek relief against the wrongful assumption of jurisdiction. And a foreign corporation seeking a writ of prohibition against further maintenance of a suit, on the ground of want of jurisdiction in which jurisdiction is not bound by the ruling of the court in which the suit was brought, on a motion to quash service of summons, that it has jurisdiction. It is also advanced that the present petition is premature, since respondent court has not definitely ruled on the motion to dismiss, nor held that it has jurisdiction, but only argument is untenable. The motion to dismiss was
predicated on the respondent court's lack of jurisdiction to entertain the action; and the rulings of this Court are that writs of certiorari or prohibition, or both, may issue in case of a denial or deferment of action on such a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
